

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE CANADIAN MILITIA, 1945-1975

by

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ABSTRACT

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In the thirty years following the Second World War there have been a number of reports, studies and statements of government policy which were concerned with assigning suitable roles for the Canadian militia. Despite this attention paid to the militia, it has been influenced by factors over the years which have decreased its vitality as part of Canada's defence force. The difficulties of the militia have not always been apparent to the public and there has been no account of the militia which covers the period as a whole. A lack of secondary source material necessitated personal research of files in Ottawa, primarily in the Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters.

This thesis surveys the roles of the militia and the policies affecting them in the period from 1945 to 1975. In addition, considerable attention has been paid to the effects of the roles upon the militia at the national, formation, and unit levels. It will be seen by examining the militia at the lower levels that, despite generally accepted impressions to the contrary, it was often incapable of fulfilling its assigned roles.

Above all the militia has been prevented from fulfilling its proper roles because the government, and others, have regarded it as a convenience. In the 1945 to 1950 period the government was content to rely upon planned militia strength as proof of its concern for defence while taking few steps to improve the reserves. One result of failing

to improve the militia was that its shortcomings were recognized when recruiting for Korea took place in 1950 and it was not relied upon as a primary source of men. In 1951, when the Canadian army recruited for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force, it relied entirely upon the militia to produce a brigade for European service despite its inability to do so without major difficulties. In the immediate post-war years a heavy reliance had been placed upon the Second World War veteran both to enlist in the militia and to provide for such expansion as the formation of forces for Korea and Europe. In raising both forces, the wartime service of the veteran was considered more valuable than any militia training he may have received. In short, during the 1945 to 1950 period, little had been done to ensure that the militia could provide a new source of trained men.

In 1954, a board of officers under Major-General H. Kennedy was formed to study the problems of the militia. The beneficial effects of this board were largely negated in the late 1950's when plans for the survival of Canada in an atomic attack came to rest, in large part, upon the militia which was not prepared for the task. The steps taken to prepare the militia for national survival were largely ineffective and the militia entered a period of decline which coincided with changing attitudes towards reserves in general.

In the early 1960's the militia was influenced by two commissions and three parliamentary committees concerned with defence. The militia was also influenced to a lesser degree by the 1964 White Paper on Defence and by plans to unify Canada's armed forces. These studies all led to a greater reliance upon forces-in-being, and as a

result of this, the decline in the militia continued.

In the 1970's there have been attempts to revitalize the militia to the extent that the regular army looks to the reserve to provide individual troop augmentation. The necessity of bolstering the regular force has come about because of the declining strength of the regular army following changes in defence policy in 1969.

This thesis has examined some subjects which have not appeared before in secondary sources. Two examples are the brief accounts of the Young Soldiers Training Plan and the Special Militia Training Plan. It is hoped that in addition certain subjects have been suggested which might be examined in the future. To cite but two, the extremely important relationship between the regular army and the militia should be studied and it can be imagined that a comparison of the Canadian militia with foreign reserves would be fruitful. It is hoped that this thesis might help provide a background for such studies.

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Chapter 1

Foundations of the Militia During the 1945-1950 Period

From 1945 to 1975 the roles of the Canadian militia,¹ while not lacking, had been obscurely defined, or at times ill-advised. While a definition of roles is not considered crucial in many national forces² the necessity of providing a rationale was thought necessary in the Canadian armed forces.³ Between 1945 and 1959 the militia's role was based upon the traditional concept of a "mobilization base and mobilization period"⁴ with refinements to reflect tasks such as the defence of Canada, aid to the civil power, and United Nations peacekeeping.⁵ After 1959, for some four years, the militia's role was to provide a civil defence force⁶ while in the 1960's the principle grew of the militia supporting the regular army.⁷ Plans for the immediate post-war years had seen the main hope for defence lying with the regular army support of the militia. Before examining the militia role from 1945 to 1950 in detail it is necessary to consider the political and military events which produced militia planning for the period.

On the political level the lack of an apparent military threat in the 1945 to 1948 period confined Canadian parliamentary "...interest in foreign affairs - when it could be aroused - ...to broad gauge thinking and grand strategy."⁸ This, combined with Canada's lack of influence in peace settlements,⁹ a loss, outside of the United Nations at least, of the war time "functional" theory which had equated military effort with national prestige,¹⁰ and a lack of potential United Nations obligations,¹¹ combined to produce in Canada a diplomatic hiatus if not a

retreat from international affairs.¹² When the diplomatic withdrawal was translated into military policy, it meant a swift reduction of forces abroad¹³ and cut-backs in the regular army to a very low strength. This in turn led to a reliance, theoretically at least, upon the militia to provide for Canada's defence.

W. L. Mackenzie King, as Prime Minister, was the instigator of the reduction of the defence establishment. His policies were carried out by two successive defence ministers, Douglas Abbott and Brooke Claxton, who were in accord with his views. The prime minister, who was "...sceptical of collective security...." and "...hostile to the notion that force would be needed to restrain the ambitions of future aggressors",¹⁴ stressed post-war domestic rather than defence spending.¹⁵ The task of demobilization was given to Abbott who became Minister of National Defence on 21 August 1945. Since he saw "...his mandate (as) demobilization rather than re-establishment"¹⁶ he was hesitant to form long range defence plans. Abbott was succeeded by Claxton on 6 November 1946. Claxton was first briefed by King as to the low priority afforded defence¹⁷ and then given the job of cutting the defence budget.¹⁸ Both ministers carried out their tasks so well that the Canadian army had left Europe by 30 November 1946.¹⁹ By January 1947 establishment paring, to King's delight, had effected "...a saving of something like \$100,000,000."²⁰

One result of reduced military spending was the reliance placed upon the militia. On 5 July 1945 the Joint Planning Sub-Committee of the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee reported that in addition to a regular force to meet normal peacetime requirements there would also be a need for "an organization capable of rapid and full mobilization of Canada's

war potential...."²¹ Within a week of the Sub-Committee report a General Staff summary on 11 July recommended a small regular force, basically a brigade group, and a large militia. It was recommended that the militia force have a strength of 177,396 all ranks with a further 48,500 men in the 18 and 19 year age groups taking a year's universal military training with an additional three year militia obligation. The militia units were to be organized into six divisions and four armoured brigades with supporting troops.²²

The first public announcement of plans for the post-war militia was in October 1945 when Abbott said in the House of Commons:

The post-war army will consequently consist of two main elements.

The first is the part-time reserve army whose organization will reflect the military potential of the country and whose staffs and units will form the basis of mobilization of a field force and of our coastal and anti-aircraft defences.²³

Abbott embraced the 11 July General Staff summary, at least in part,²⁴ when he said further that the reserves would be organized at the division and corps levels and that there would be a "generous scale" of "adequate equipment of the latest type" for the militia together with regular army assistance.

In 1946 the concept of a traditional "field force" became a reality when the Department of National Defence Report for that year authorized the militia "...to train and to organize for training purposes on field unit establishments." It was felt that such a structure would provide a "...basis...upon which further reorganization could more easily proceed."²⁵

In 1947 the government issued a white paper which stated that

subject to Canada's geography, enemy capacity, allied intentions, and the "international climate" Canada's defence forces might be required:

- (1) to defend Canada against aggression;
- (2) to assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country;
- (3) to carry out any undertakings which by our own voluntary act we may assume in co-operation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations.²⁶

Within their potential requirements the forces would adopt the following order for their priorities: (1) Organization, (2) Training of officers, (3) Reserve training, (4) Research, (5) Industrial organization. In addition to setting priorities the government also presented a fourteen-point list of the "long-term objects (sic) of the department and services."

The more pertinent of these to the militia were:

- (2) Joint intelligence and planning groups to review defence appreciations and plans.
- (4) Means to provide the active and reserve forces of the three services with adequate numbers of highly qualified officers.
- (5) Development of reserve forces of an age and with educational and physical standards and training approximating those of the active forces and who will in time be capable of entering speedily on active service at sea, on land and in the air.
- (6) Provision for reserve forces of the most modern methods, administration and training officers (sic), and adequate equipment.²⁷

The year 1947 also saw publication of the annual Department of National Defence Report which stated that the reserves had been "...re-organized to conform to modern tactical requirements in the light of wartime experience"²⁸ and that the militia "...provided the basis for

the organization of a field force in the event of an emergency with the establishment provision of approximately 180,000 all ranks...."²⁹

In 1948 Canada's defence aims were presented by the Minister of National Defence as being,

- (1) To provide the force estimated to be necessary to defend Canada against any sudden direct attack that could be or is likely to be directed against it in the near future.
- (2) To provide operational and administrative staffs, equipment, training personnel and reserve organization which would be capable of expansion as rapidly as necessary to meet any need; and
- (3) To work out with other free nations plans for joint defence based on self help and mutual aid as part of a combined effort to preserve peace and to restrain aggression.³⁰

In 1949, immediately prior to the Korean War, despite indications that the militia was not a true basis of mobilization,³¹ there were no changes in policy. Training, for instance, remained confined to the individual and sub-unit levels.³²

In summary, Canada's defence forces were based primarily upon the militia which was expected to reflect the military potential of the country and which would be capable of speedy mobilization of a large field force. In reality the militia was not capable of meeting these roles. The 1947 claim that the militia did provide a mobilization base for a field force was simply not true.

If the militia was given a role which was beyond its capabilities, the reasons for these unjustified expectations should be examined. First was a sincere belief that the militia could recruit a large enough force to provide a mobilization base. In speaking at the annual meeting of the Infantry and Machine-Gun Association in December 1945 Lieutenant-General C. Foulkes, the Chief of Staff, had said:

I think it is sound to lay the foundation now to the maximum force for war and raise that force in the Reserve Army, which is really the Army in time of war. I have not included in that force any units which I don't believe we will take to war when we go to war.³³

Foulkes' concepts were founded on Plan "H", which had been initiated in October 1943 by the then Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General J. C. Murchie, and which had been considered together with seven alternative plans over the years.³⁴ In January 1946 the Minister of National Defence, in speaking to the Conference of Defence Associations, said that the "...Reserve Force will form the source from which a Field Force would be found in the event of war...." He went on to say that the "duty" of the Active Force would be to assist the militia.³⁵

A second reason for assigning the militia a mass mobilization role was a lack of political cum military sophistication in defence planning or, at best, a lack of flexibility in planning. On 11 November 1949, some eight months before the Korean War started, the Minister of National Defence stated that Canadian defence policy was based upon the supposition that:

- 1 The only possible aggressor is the Soviet Union.
- 2 Any war would be a world war involving all western peoples who would be fighting for their survival as nations and their freedom as men.
- 3 ...our forces should also serve as the nucleus for the development of our maximum potential.³⁶

Seven months later the minister, in reporting on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization meeting in Paris, said that defence might see:

...the abandonment of the old concept of defence by great masses of conscripted infantry, the bulk of which would be reservists called up on the outbreak of war.³⁷

Seemingly the conflicting principle of whether to abandon the idea of calling up reservists for war or whether to develop a "maximum potential" was never resolved or, if it was even discussed, the theories of the late 1940's held, since well into the Korean War one of the national defence objectives was to have an "...organization to build up strength in a total war."³⁸ While the Canadian government can hardly be blamed for not forecasting North Korean aggression in 1950, the need for partial mobilization became evident in that year when the 25th Brigade was recruited for Korea and in the following year when the 27th Brigade was raised for service with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The failure to plan for partial mobilization resulted in the militia appearing in rather a poor light during this mobilization period.

There were various other reasons why the militia was assigned a mass mobilization role. One, which was parallel to the lack of intelligence mentioned above, was a belief that the nature of war had not, as late as 1948, changed to an appreciable degree,³⁹ that even if an enemy had atomic weapons Canada lacked profitable targets,⁴⁰ and that "...any attack on North America would be diversionary...."⁴¹ Taken together these views would have allowed at least a partial training period,⁴² following the declaration of an emergency, similar to the 1939-1943 period when the Canadian Army had mobilized. Another reason militia planning was based upon the mobilization role was that until 1951 the army had Second World War equipment stored for four divisions.⁴³ The result seems to have been a rather comforting theory that stored equipment,⁴⁴ taken with a large militia, would lead to a strong defence. In September 1950, the Minister of National Defence, said in the House that:

When we entered the first great war and the second great war it was largely on the basis of the reserve army that the forces were

built up. That is still the plan, but it can be done now very much faster because the forces are to a greater extent more effective.... It can also be done very much faster because we have the equipment with which to supply them for training purposes, and also, as I indicated before, equipment that would to a considerable degree be sufficient for the Canadian army during the first year in a total war.⁴⁵

Two of the stronger reasons for assigning the militia a mobilization role grew from both the regular army and the militia being in favour of such a role. The regular army's acceptance of the role was founded upon more legitimate reasons than those of the militia. A summary of regular army establishment for the 1946 to 1948 period is shown in Table I. The numbers who were on strength are shown in the second part of the table.⁴⁶

Year	Officers				Other Ranks
	Generals & Brigadiers	Field	Junior	Total	
1946-1947	40	959	1817	2816	Not available
1947-1948	Not available			2400	19,512
	Numbers on Strength				
1946-1947	30	797	1806	2625	12,938
1947-1948	32	793	1558	2383	13,502

Table I. Establishment and Numbers Serving in the Regular Army, 1946-1948.⁴⁷

Table II shows the distribution of headquarters and units throughout the Commands in 1948 down to the company level or the equivalent.⁴⁸

	Headquarters	Field Units		CA & AA	Static Units	Schools
		Major	Minor			
Army	1					
Eastern Command	2			1	7	
Quebec Command	2	1			7	1
Central Command	3	2	2	1	12	9
Prairie Command	2	1	2		7	2
Western Command	2	2	1	1	7	2

Table II. Distribution of Headquarters and Units of the Regular Army, 1948.⁴⁹

When, in 1946, the establishment of roughly 25,000 all ranks was announced in Parliament it was subject to quick, if not major, opposition. Mr. A. Cockeram (P.C., York South) questioned the "bureaucracy of senior officers"⁵⁰ while D. S. Harkness (P.C., Calgary East) questioned the efficiency of producing only one brigade in a force of 25,000 men.⁵¹ While J. Lapointe (Lib., Megantic-Frontenac), the parliamentary assistant to the Minister of National Defence, did a competent job in pointing out the necessity for headquarters, static units and schools, in the long run these could probably be best justified politically if they had a task such as supporting the militia. To take one example the General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, a major-general, had, under his command, two regular force headquarters and various regular army static units and detachments with a total strength of 131 officers and 949 other ranks.⁵² A potential political difficulty lay in there only being one minor arms unit⁵³ in the Command.

This was a coastal artillery unit at Halifax. His command structure was justified however since in the Maritimes there were six militia headquarters, 24 major and 17 minor militia field unit.⁵⁴ To return to the national level, and to consider Cockeram's complaint, in military terms these units gave every justification for the Command to be headed by a major-general.⁵⁵

It has been suggested that the militia's acceptance of the mobilization role, and of the large establishment upon which it was founded, was less legitimate than the regular army's concurrence of the role for the militia. The basis of this contention lies with the hasty and complaisant acceptance of the role, and the interests of militia officers once the role was put into practice. At the 1945 annual meeting of the Infantry and Machine Gun Association referred to above one officer, Colonel S. A. Rolland, expressed concern about long range plans, the necessity for prudence in laying plans for divisions, and for a "decision of the final role of the Reserve Army...."⁵⁶ Aside from Colonel Rolland the plans seem to have been readily accepted by the Association but an even more telling indication of their acceptance by the militia in general became apparent when the Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.) met seven weeks later. On 25 January 1946 representatives of the C.D.A. met with the Army Council headed by General Foulkes. While the C.D.A. expressed doubts as to whether the plan (Plan "H") "...could be satisfactorily implemented without compulsory training"⁵⁷ the important thing was that, "The Conference considered the plan to be sound...."⁵⁸ The plan was accepted and, it was agreed that General Officers of Commands could, "...work out detailed changes in (unit) locations." It was felt, moreover,

that "no insurmountable problems were anticipated" in converting some infantry units to anti-aircraft artillery.⁵⁸

In addition to their ready acceptance of Plan "H" the manner in which the Conference of Defence Associations agreed with regular army control in 1946 might have been a reflection of the amount of leadership it was felt many militia structures were prepared to provide. On the evening of 25 January 1946 the C.D.A. representatives met the Army Council members,

...to receive any recommendations which representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations had to make as a result of their studies of the Postwar Army plan as presented by the CGS at the Morning Conference.⁶⁰

It may be remembered that details of Plan "H" had been available for seven weeks following General Foulkes' meeting with the Infantry and Machine Gun Association. Despite time for deliberation, and the invitation to make their views known, the C.D.A. representatives agreed that General Officers Commanding (a regular force appointment) should be "charged primarily with directing training" of the militia. It was agreed that the establishment of senior militia headquarters should receive "careful consideration" and the main tasks for many of them were to be supervisory.⁶¹ If the views of Brigadier L. M. Chesley, a Deputy Chief of the General Staff, were indicative of policy, it would seem that greater command might have gone to the militia. In his aide memoire of 4 January he had recommended that "...units be so grouped as to facilitate the exercise of command [by the militia] over approximately organized fighting formations."⁶²

While there was no connection between the C.D.A. stand in the 1946 conference and that of a conference of the General Officer Com-

manding in 1951 in Newfoundland, some principles involved were parallel. At the latter conference the Commander had to try to convince militia units that they should run their own messes and institutes and when the question arose of having two guns for training at Grand Falls the unit commander officer said they were not needed. In dealing with command problems the Commander,

...said that he considered that the units at Corner Brook and Grand Falls should deal directly with their Battalion Headquarters rather than with Area Headquarters. He felt that Reserve Force Commanding Officers should welcome this responsibility because the out-lying units belonged to them.⁶³

A close look at the recruiting pattern for officers in 1948 might also be considered pertinent in looking at the militia's acceptance of the mobilization role since their support of certain corps was indicative of where their interests seemingly lay. Ninety-six per cent of the headquarters and 97 per cent of the major units planned by 1948 were raised while this held true of only 44 per cent of the minor units. (See Appendix "B".) The failure to raise minor units was primarily a failure to recruit in The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, The Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, and The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. Since most of the major units were in the arms it might be thought that the average officer was mainly influenced by a predilection for combat unless another aspect of recruitment is considered. Presumably in many cases, hopes for personal advancement, or a wider scope of interest in the larger units, must have been factors with many officers in choosing units. Of the 65 vacancies for unit signal officers in the 65 infantry battalions in 1948 only nine were filled. It might be suggested that the smaller

scope of interest of battalion signal officer would have discouraged the position being filled when it is noted further that 18 out of 22 minor signal units failed to attract officers. It was different with the major signal units since out of 240 national officer vacancies in these units, 166 were filled. A similar situation existed in The Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps since, while 93 per cent of the major medical units were raised, only 58 per cent of the minor units became active. In both major signal and medical units it was possible to reach the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In the infantry units, however, the situation with the doctors was not identical with that of the signal officers since seemingly the RCAMC was governed by different promotional policies. There were 65 vacancies for battalion medical officers in the rank of captain but since some units had as many as three medical officers a total of 78 were serving with the infantry (nine battalions did not have a medical officer). Of these 78 five were lieutenant-colonels and 19 were majors.⁶⁴

In summarizing the assignment of a mobilization role to the militia it is seen that the chief weakness lay in looking to the immediate past. During the Second World War the military potential of Canada had been well used and it was this potential which the government saw as the strength of the future. Unfortunately the reasons for assigning the militia a mobilization role in the post-war period were often less than legitimate. Despite this the role was accepted by the C.D.A., supported by militia officers, and seemingly approved by the regular army. As a result the militia never did reach the standards which would have allowed it to have been viewed as a mobilization base in the late 1940's.

Chapter 1 Footnotes

- 1 See Appendix "A".
- 2 Force Structure Commission of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Force Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany: Analysis and Options, Bonn, 1972/1973.
- 3 At the 69th meeting of the Defence Management Committee, on 7 August 1973, direction was given to the Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff to prepare a paper on the roles, missions and tasks of the Primary Reserve. It was felt that not only would this lead to greater clarity within the Department of National Defence on these matters but also, perhaps more importantly, such a study would allow "...a convincing argument to the Treasury Board" for pay increases which were part of a Reserve study.
Defence Management Committee, Minutes of the 77th Meeting, 1 October 1973, file held by writer.
- 4 Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper On Defence, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964, p. 7.
- 5 Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization, Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 1947, p. 7.
- 6 Order-In-Council PC 656 of 28 May 1959, Directorate of History files.
- 7 White Paper On Defence, 1964, op. cit., p. 25.
- 8 Peter C. Kasurak, "Pawn in the Game of National Politics: Origins and Fortunes of the Canadian Occupation Force, 1943-46," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 5 (Autumn 1975), p. 45.
- 9 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacekeeping and Deterrence, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972, vol. 3, pp. 194-196.
- 10 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 4 August 1944, p. 5909.
- 11 Canada, Commons Debates, 19 August 1946, p. 505.
- 12 Brooke Claxton, "The Place of Canada In Post-War Organization," The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. X (4 November 1944), pp. 409-421.
- 13 On 3 August 1945 a Cabinet Defence Committee was formed and on the same day it was given as one of its first tasks the drafting of a message for the United Kingdom government expressing Canada's desire to reduce her European occupation commitments "as rapidly as possible."

"Armed Forces; continuing requirements in Stage II; occupation forces; postwar establishments; Cabinet Defence Committee," 3 August 1945, Public Archives of Canada files.

14 James Eayrs, "Canadian Defence Policies Since 1867," Supplement 1964-1965 to Special Studies Prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, Ottawa, 1965, p. 13.

15 Canada, Parliament, Senate Debates, 27 January 1944, p. 2.

16 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, p. 19.

17 J. W. Pickersgill and D. F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, 1945-1946, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1970, vol. 3, pp. 393-394.

18 Colonel C. P. Stacey, "The Life and Hard Times of an Official Historian," Canadian Historical Review, vol. LI (March 1970), p. 29.

19 C. P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1960, p. 619.

20 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, pp. 23-24.

21 "Strategic Factors Affecting Canada's Post-War Military Requirements," 5 July 1945, Department of External Affairs files, p. 4.

22 "Summary of Army Postwar Plan," 11 July 1945, Department of External Affairs files.

23 Canada, Commons Debates, 16 October 1945, p. 1135.

24 One of the bases of the summary was a requirement for universal military training, or conscription. It was unrealistic of the plan to suggest such a measure and doubtless Abbott realized this.

25 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1946, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1946, p. 26.

26 Claxton, Canada's Defence, op. cit., p. 7.

27 Ibid., p. 26.

28 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1947, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1947, p. 25.

29 Ibid., p. 26.

30 Canada, Commons Debates, 24 June 1948, p. 5784.

31 One of the first public indications that there was a failure on the part of the militia to be ready for mobilization was found in the following article:

Colonel Wallace Goforth, "We Do Not Stand On Guard," Macleans, vol. 61A, (15 June 1948), pp. 51-52.

32 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1949, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1949, pp. 46-47.

33 "General Foulkes' Remarks from Record of Discussion at Annual General Meeting of the Infantry and Machine Gun Association of Canada," Ottawa, 7-8 December 1945, Directorate of History files, pp. 50-51.

34 "Opening Address of the Minister of National Defence to the Council of Defence Associations Meeting at Ottawa--25 January 1946 to Discuss Postwar Army Plans," Directorate of History files, p. 1.

35 Ibid., p. 2.

Foulkes had been even more definite by saying that the "main purpose" of the Active Force was to support the militia.

"General Foulkes' Remarks from Record of Discussion at Annual General Meeting of the Infantry and Machine Gun Association of Canada," op. cit., p. 50.

36 Canada, Commons Debates, 11 November 1949, p. 1663.

37 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 June 1950, p. 3189.

38 Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence Programme, 1952-53, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1952, p. 3.

39 Claxton: "...these new developments (in submarines, missiles, and atomic bombs) have not in fact yet been carried to the point where it is possible for them to change the character of war or make out of date either existing concepts or existing equipment. The view of every responsible scientist and soldier I know is that the day of push-button warfare has not yet come."

Canada, Commons Debates, 24 June 1948, p. 5783.

40 Ibid., p. 5784.

41 Loc. cit.

42 The Chiefs of Staff Joint Planning Sub-Committee had written in July 1945 that, "As extended time will not again be available to Canada for military preparation after the outbreak of war, a policy of military preparedness in peacetime is essential. While it may be assumed that some warning of war will be discernible, the period of warning is almost certain to be inadequate...." It is not likely, however, that these views would have been weighed heavily since there was a tendency to disregard military advice at the policy level in the immediate post-war years.

"Strategic Factors Affecting Canada's Post-War Military Requirements," op. cit., p. 3; Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, pp. 53-74.

43 Eventually most of this equipment was allocated to ten N.A.T.O. nations as part of a three-year, five billion dollar aid programme with the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy benefiting in particular by each being supplied with arms and ammunition for one division.

Department of National Defence, Report for the Fiscal Year 1953-1954, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955, p. 10; Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence Programme, 1953-54, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1953, p. 42; House of Commons, Appendix "E" to Special Committee on Defence Expenditures, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 3, 10 December 1951, p. 104.

44 In 1947 9.7 per cent of the regular army establishment called for Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps soldiers. This large RCOC establishment might be seen as being indicative of strong regular army support for the militia. While, for a number of reasons, the comparison is less than valid it may be noted that in the Canadian Army Overseas in the Second World War the RCOC formed 3.8 per cent of the force.

"Composition of the Canadian Army--Active Force", HQS 8948-2, 9 September 1947, Directorate of History files, passim; Major-General E. L. M. Burns, Manpower In the Canadian Army 1939-1945, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1956, p. 52.

45 Canada, Commons Debates, 6 September 1950, p. 336.

46 Certain discrepancies might seem to exist in strength and establishment figures for the regular army during the changing period immediately following the Second World War. For instance it was reported in Parliament by J. Lapointe that as of 31 July 1946 the strength of the Interim Force was 2,613 officers and 10,905 other ranks. In 1955 the 1946-47 strength was reported to have totalled 15,563. The discrepancy was legitimate because of the daily strength changes taking place. Establishments and establishment figures were also subject to variation and in addition to a normal establishment it became necessary for the regular force to have a smaller "Restricted Table of Organization Strength."

Canada, Commons Debates, 19 August 1946, p. 5013; Appendix 6 to Department of National Defence: Report for Fiscal Year 1953-1954, op. cit., p. 73. "Table of Organization--Active Force," Appendix "A" to Circular Letter Organization 1851," 1 April 1947, Directorate of History files.

47 In October 1947 there were two lieutenant-generals, seven major-generals, and 21 brigadiers on strength. In October 1948 there were two lieutenant-generals, three major-generals, and 27 brigadiers.

Canada, Commons Debates, 23 August 1946, p. 5271; "Composition of the Canadian Army--Active Force," loc. cit.; Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part I--Active Force, Ottawa, 1 October 1947, 19 October 1948, passim.

48 In keeping with the terminology adopted in later years a

major unit is defined as one commanded by a lieutenant-colonel while a minor unit is commanded by a major or below. The minor unit is usually of company strength or its equivalent such as a battery or squadron.

49 Loc. cit.; "Composition of the Canadian Army--Active Force," loc. cit., "Table of Organization--Active Force," Appendix "A" to Circular Letter Organization 1851," loc. cit.

50 Canada, Commons Debates, 23 August 1946, p. 5270.

51 Canada, Commons Debates, 19 August 1946, pp. 5053-5055.

52 "Composition of the Canadian Army--Active Force," loc. cit.; "Table of Organization--Active Force, Appendix "A" to Circular Letter Organization 1851," loc. cit.

53 Until 1968 the Canadian army was, for "functional reasons", divided into corps which were classified as "arms" or "services." The arms were armour, artillery, engineers, signals, and infantry. All others, such as the medical and ordnance corps, were classified as services. This distinction is used throughout this thesis. Following 1968 the armour, artillery, and infantry become known as "combat arms" while the signals, engineers and army aviation units became known as "combat support arms." All other branches became known as "combat services support."

Canadian Army, Organization and Administration in Canada 1960, CAMT 1-34, pp. 2-3.

54 Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II--Reserve Force, Ottawa, 1 July 1948, pp. 5-87.

55 Military Districts 6 and 7, which later became Eastern Command, were expected to provide two infantry brigades of the 5 Infantry Division plus the 21 Armoured Brigade out of the 41 units assigned to them. Since fictions were being maintained it may be noted that a major-general commands a division. See also:

"Distribution of Reserve Units by Districts," HQS 24-4-6, 1 February 1946, Directorate of History files.

56 "General Foulkes' Remarks from Record of Discussion at Annual General Meeting of the Infantry and Machine Gun Association of Canada," op. cit., pp. 63-64.

57 "Record of a Meeting of Representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations with Military Members of the Army Council," Ottawa, 25 January 1946, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

58 Loc. cit.

59 Loc. cit.

60 "Record of a Meeting of Representatives of the Conference of Defence Associations with Military Members of the Army Council," loc. cit.

61 Ibid., p. 2.

62 Aide Memoire, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, "Reorganization Postwar Reserve Army," 4 January 1946, Directorate of History files, p. 2.

63 "Minutes of Reserve Force Commanding Officers Conference," St. John's, 18 November 1951, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

64 This paragraph judges harshly the attempts made to raise minor units but the fact remains that the units were not raised. Chapter 2 will show that the major units sometimes failed to produce companies. If, in defence of the minor units, infantry and armour had been required to recruit a number of companies or squadrons rather than, in effect, using battalion headquarters as proof of the units's existence, they would probably have been hard pressed to do so.

Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II--Reserve Force, op. cit., passim.

Chapter 2

Potential for Failure in the 1945-1950 Period

The reasons for assigning the militia a mobilization role in the late 1940's have been seen and it is necessary to examine the effectiveness of units to substantiate the contention that there was a failure to meet the role. The reasons for this failure, aside from the initial role assignment considered in Chapter 1, will then be considered.

The system used to determine unit war and authorized establishments, and ceilings and paid ceilings, revealed as little in the late 1940's as it does now regarding the size of the militia the government really expected or wanted.¹ However, the system did have certain advantages for the government (see Appendix "C") if not for the militia to whom an establishment remained a rather chimerical figure.² Table III shows the December 1948 strength of certain major units in Western Ontario Area, most of which compare with the national average in recruited strength.³ It might seem that units with 300 or 169 all ranks would provide a fair basis for mobilization but an examination at the unit level shows that this was not necessarily so.

One major unit, The Canadian Scottish Regiment, of Victoria, will be used to see whether or not the strength of a unit was a true indication of its mobilization potential. The regiment was typical enough of the period to serve as an example. By Canadian standards it had historic roots within the community, it had an excellent record in

Unit	Strength			Establishment	
	Officers	OR's	Total	Officers	OR's
Divisional units					
The Canadian Fusiliers (MG)	33	190	223	37	701
22 Reconnaissance Regt (Essex Regt)	33	281	314	43	777
1st Inf Bde					
HQ 1st Inf Bde	5	0	5	18	52
The Elgin Regt	26	136	162	38	812
The Essex Scottish	31	269	300	38	812
The Kent Regt	33	83	116	38	812
2nd Inf Bde					
HQ 2nd Inf Bde	3	0	3	18	52
The Oxford Rifles	20	109	129	38	812
The Perth Regt	26	139	165	38	812
The Highland Light Infantry of Canada	25	144	169	38	812
Totals	<u>235</u>	<u>1351</u>	<u>1586</u>	<u>344</u>	<u>6454</u>

Table III. Strength of Selected Units in Western Ontario Area, 17 December 1948.⁴

both wars,⁵ and although it shared an armoury with one major and seven minor units,⁶ geographic isolation precluded infantry corps competition for recruits. In the calendar year 1946 the unit showed an average monthly strength of 254 all ranks and in 1947 an average monthly strength of 260 all ranks.⁷ Since these figures represented roughly one-third of the establishment, and since the period was admittedly one of reorganization, the figures would appear encouraging. They were not, though, because of the large number of "non-effectives." The Canadian Scottish Monthly Organizational Report for 30 November 1946, to choose a date at random, showed a strength of 288 all ranks. However, of these,

129 had not paraded between September and 25 November 1946 and might therefore be said to have been non-effective. Table IV shows the effective strength of the unit on the above date.

Type	WE	Reported Strength	Number on rolls	Non-effectives	Effective Strength
Offrs	38	35	34	6	28
WOs	8	13	16	3	13
NCOs	45	40	49	30	19
R & F	759	200	172	90	82
Totals	<u>850</u>	<u>288</u>	<u>271</u>	<u>129</u>	<u>142</u>

Table IV. Strength Figures for The Canadian Scottish Regiment, 30 November 1946.⁸

It might be thought that having 142 effective all ranks in a unit would have provided the necessary organization for a potential field force. Such was not the case. In May 1946 units of Military District Number 11 were ordered to report their sub-units as "organized and operational" or simply as "organized." Table V shows the Canadian Scottish's assessment of the status of its sub-units on 30 November 1946. The effective strength of the sub-units is shown down to the company level while, for purposes of comparison, the establishment figures are also shown. Where a sub-unit is not shown, such as a particular rifle platoon, this is because it was not in existence at the time.

Sub-unit	Status	Org	Effective str		Establishment	
			Offrs	ORs	Offrs	ORs
Bn HQ	X		7	9	6	65
HQ Coy			5	34	5	140
Coy HQ	X					
Sig pl	X					
Admin pl		X				
Sp Coy			3	33	6	171
Coy HQ	X					
Mor pl	X					
"A" Coy						
Coy HQ	X		2	5	2	15
"B" Coy			4	4	5	132
Coy HQ	X					
No. 4 pl	X					
"C" Coy						
Coy HQ	X		1	6	Same as above	
"D" Coy						
Coy HQ		X	6	7	Same as above	
Totals			28	98		
NB: There were also 16 "Guard" personnel who were effective.						

Table V. Sub-unit Reporting and Effective Strength for The Canadian Scottish Regiment, 30 November 1946.⁹

The purpose of examining Ontario units in general and the Canadian Scottish in particular has been to demonstrate that the militia of the early post-war years did not possess the "basis for the organization of a field force"¹⁰ as the 1947 Department of National Defence report claimed. In the event that it is thought that the Canadian Scottish was a "weak" unit, even by the standards of the times, it may be noted that in the summer following the submission of the reports considered the regiment took a third as many all ranks to summer camp as the entire Vancouver district. Establishments in Vancouver at the time called for 408 officers and 7,798 other ranks.¹¹ Table VI is a partial summary of 1947 camp attendance for British Columbia.

Unit(s)	Officers	Other ranks
The Canadian Scottish Regiment	13	31
Vancouver district total	15	99
The Rocky Mountain Rangers	3	13
The British Columbia Dragoons	3	9
NB: Vancouver's establishment was for four formation headquarters, eight major units, and eighteen minor units.		

Table VI. Partial Summary of 1947 Summer Camp Attendance in British Columbia.¹²

Summer camp attendance, as well as effective strengths, might also be taken as an index of the militia's potential in the late 1940's period. While attendance at camp has never ensured that successful training and organization has been behind the figures, the reverse might hold since it is unlikely that year-round efficiency would exist and then not see

a respectable turn-out at summer camp.¹³ In addition to this general principle, the significance of a particular year's attendance might be judged with care, and perhaps in isolation, since mitigating factors often existed. The following extract, from later years, attests to this.

The date and location of the 1956 summer camp were discussed....

Location - Opinion was unanimous that Sarcee would be preferable to Wainright, a number of personnel have rather harsh memories of a previous Wainright camp, and we consider that less personnel will attend a camp held at Wainright than would attend a camp held at Sarcee. The date of Jun 30 - Jul 7th has some disadvantages:

(a) Some clerical personnel are required for month end work in their civilian occupations.

(b) Some personnel will be loath to miss the Jul 1st holiday and celebrations, and the dates of the 1955 camp (8 - 15 Jul) would appear to be much more satisfactory.¹⁴

Table VII shows national camp attendance for certain typical years as well as for the years 1946 to 1950.

Year	Reported unit str	Numbers to camp			%age of str at camp	Remarks
		Offrs	ORs	Total		
1938	86,308	Not available			17	"Annual camps were limited"
1946	56,523	Not available			-	
1947	37,657	973	3,565	4,538	12	"These were at summer or winter camps"
1948	33,591	1,464	5,628	7,032	20.9	
1949	36,311	Not available		7,092	19.5	
1950	43,047	2,646	8,893	11,539	26.8	
1955	45,085	Not available		20,500	45.5	
1974	14,217	Not available		4,068	28.6	

Table VII. Summer Camp Attendance.¹⁵

It will be seen below that in 1955, for various reasons, the militia was enjoying comparatively prosperous times. It has been seen that in 1947, to be charitable, the militia was disorganized. Camp attendance would appear then to be an index of efficiency but, for reasons which will be seen in considering training (see inter alia Chapter Five), not a guarantee of it.¹⁶ One of the chief reasons for considering summer camp attendance is that continued political reference to the subject might leave the impression that it was of paramount importance in indicating the militia's degree of success in its assigned role.

A third way in which the effectiveness of the militia in the late 1940's might be judged, aside from strength reporting and possibly summer camp attendance, is in considering the effectiveness of its training. The two-year hiatus in foreign policy referred to in Chapter One was reflected in militia training policy, probably coincidentally, so that the 1945-1947 period was one of reorganization.¹⁷ The 1947 White Paper stated that:

The challenge to reserve units is that they should be in a position by then (the summer of 1947) to give useful training to the men it is hoped and expected will be willing to serve.¹⁸

The Department of National Defence report of the same year considered it essential that,

...unit cadres of officers, non-commissioned officers, tradesmen and specialists be trained, prior to encouraging any large scale intake of new recruits.¹⁹

As late as 1949 training was confined to the platoon level.²⁰ It would seem that too close an adherence to building a mobilization base tended to throttle the militia or, at best, a lack of vigour failed to tap the talent of the many serving veterans²¹ or capture the imagination of the

recruit. In one three-week period in September and October 1950, a recruit in The Canadian Scottish Regiment trained indoors for thirteen hours. Six of these were spent on the rifle, four on arms drill, and three on foot drill²² despite the training syllabus only requiring seventeen periods on the rifle out of 117 periods of recruit training.²³ In short the interpretations given to the mobilization role seem to have resulted in a rather plodding approach to training which, in turn, helped lead to a rather low level of efficiency.²⁴

If it is granted that there was a low level of efficiency, then the question follows as to why this was the case. It has been suggested in Chapter 1 that there was a lack of sophistication in defence planning at the higher levels of government. At the militia formation and unit level this shortcoming became evident when it was stated that, "The Reserve Force was re-organized to conform to modern tactical requirements in the light of wartime experience"²⁵ and plans were then produced for a militia force somewhat similar to that of 1939.²⁶ This was done despite Opposition protests in Parliament calling for new concepts and pointing out, among other things, that tradition alone could no longer be enough for a modern militia.²⁷

An example of partial failure in trying to institute a mass mobilization role in a metropolitan area is found in the case of post-war Toronto. It should be noted that regular army staff studies concerning national recruiting expectations, and those of Toronto, were, on the basis of the figures available, perhaps not unrealistic. Where the lack of sophistication seems to have lain was in a policy level failure to adopt new and more challenging roles. In 1946 the Deputy Chief of the General Staff noted that the national establishment strength of 180,000

all ranks constituted 1.6 per cent of Canada's population.²⁸ The 1948 establishment for units in metropolitan Toronto totalled 14,227, or 1.3 per cent of the population of 1,117,470 as shown in the 1951 census.²⁹ Since there was an establishment ceiling of 90,000 on the militia after 1947 the true expectations were that Toronto would have recruited some 7,000 men, or .65 per cent of the population. (This did not prohibit a given unit from recruiting to full strength if it was found possible for it to do so.) It is instructive to note that during the Second World War 80,320 men, or 8.9 per cent of Toronto's 1941 population, were in the army³⁰ (the navy and air force took additional manpower). It was not unreasonable to expect that 18 per cent of the wartime army numbers would join the militia and the hope was underlined when Military District Number 2, containing Toronto, had its quota increased from 14.9 to 16.3 per cent of the national quota.³¹

While the recruiting expectations in regards to numbers were founded upon reason, it was impossible to foresee the lack of civilian response to them. To continue with Toronto as an example Appendix "D" shows the decline of recruiting expectations for that city between 1948 and 1973. A good example of the reasons for the reduced expectations is found at the officer level in considering the medical and engineering professions in Toronto. In 1951 there were 5,362 engineers living in Toronto and it was reasonable to have thought that the 31 officers required for the RCEME could have been found. However in 1948 only eight officers were in RCEME units. By way of some contrast, in 1948 21 doctors³² were serving in four Toronto medical units with 18 others with units of other corps. By 1951 there were 571 doctors in Toronto so that some seven per cent of Toronto's doctors were serving in the militia in

the late 1940's while the percentage of engineers was so small as to be meaningless. The reasons why one profession and not the other would choose to serve are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in summary, it would seem that the studies leading to the mass mobilization role rested upon good mathematics but poor policy since there was a failure to find an attractive role based upon new concepts.³³ (See Appendix "E".)

A second reason the mobilization role was not successful was allied with the failure to meet recruiting expectations but was distinct from it. This was the supposition that community support would appear in population centres of all sizes, that this support would somehow aid in recruiting, and that therefore militia units should be formed in all sizeable communities. The difficulties of having all communities support the militia were appreciated in a March 1946 memorandum to the Chief of the General Staff which said that there was not,

...much sense....in spreading our butter thinner amongst the activated units. However, we would be justified in forming new units to the extent that we can find suitable areas of population without adequate representation.³⁴

Despite any such caution it was recognized that there was a "...necessity of ensuring adequate representation for all arms in accordance with the incidence of population...." so that all eligible citizens would have an opportunity of volunteering. It was also hoped to "...absorb personnel in proportion to the population...." to provide for later conscription or mobilization if either proved necessary.³⁵

The dilemma between over and under representation was solved by taking a bold course. Two examples of such a course are found in the case of Saint-Jérôme, Quebec and Ponoka, Alberta. It was expected that the former, a town of 11,286 in 1948 which lay 40 miles north of Montreal,

would supply Support and "D" Companies for Le Régiment De Joliette. Ponoka had a population of 1,265 in 1948 and it lay some half way between Edmonton and Red Deer with few supporting communities. It was expected Ponoka would raise a Field Dressing Station of seven officers, five of whom were to be doctors, with an additional 89 other ranks.³⁶

To have supported the militia on the basis of the above expectations Canadian society would need to have been cast in an entirely different mould than was the case.³⁷ Experiences showed that even recruiting campaigns with national support³⁸ failed in their objectives and an intensive "Army Week" in Victoria in 1949 resulted in five enquiries about the regular army, the enrolment of several cadets, and no recruits for the militia.³⁹ Those who attended military displays in Victoria's armoury were "...mostly elderly people past military age or young children (and) the young men of suitable military age were most conspicuous by their absence on each evening."⁴⁰

At this distance of time it is difficult to assess why individuals decided not to enlist in centres such as Victoria, Toronto and Ponoka. This is particularly true at the rank and file level where little serious consideration of the problems of recruiting took place until the 1970's.⁴¹ Despite this certain verities seem to exist. The first is that seldom was a potential militia soldier ever induced to enlist because of international events such as approaching war, the possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons by a given country and so forth. For instance in the 1930's, throughout the occupation of the Rhineland, the Spanish Civil War, and the fall of Austria, the strength of the Canadian militia did not vary by more than 2,375 from an average strength of 49,043.⁴² Throughout the late 1940's potential recruits, in

a similar way, ignored the Berlin crisis and Russian acquisition of the atom bomb. Secondly, it would seem that the prosperity of the late 1940's, at least in contrast to conditions of the 1930's, played little part in men deciding not to enlist. It will be seen below that during the even greater prosperity of the mid-1950's the militia reached its highest post-war strength. It would seem that instead of international and national conditions, which were second in the potential recruit's mind, if he thought of them at all, he was influenced by what he found at his local armoury. What he found was a result, in large measure, of policies which are considered elsewhere in this chapter.

The third reason for the lack of complete success of the militia in the 1945 to 1950 period lay in its terms of reference with the regular army. One of the difficulties was that the expectation that the regular force could carry out a dual role of "defending Canada against aggression"⁴³ while at the same time being prepared to train an expanded militia,⁴⁴ probably worked to the detriment of both components of the army because of the small size of the regular force. In 1950 Claxton, as Minister of National Defence, insisted that the regular army had to be able to do both although he admitted that, "...the one operation may interfere a little with the other."⁴⁵ While seemingly the militia was given as much support as was available by the regular army⁴⁶ the system, and the amount of regular force support available, was not conducive to intensive training for the large militia envisaged.

The second difficulty in relations with the regular army was that the militia was not allowed enough latitude in exercising powers of command at the higher levels. It has been seen that General Officers Commanding were, with the support of the Conference of Defence Associations

(C.D.A.), given the responsibility for directing militia training, It was also seen that this was a fairly judicious decision in view of the later attitude of at least some militia commanding officers. In looking further at the background leading to the command structure it is seen that on 4 January 1946, before the C.D.A. met with the Army Council, it was recognized by the General Staff that the "assumption" would have to be made that militia generals might command divisions upon mobilization but until then command of the "fighting formations" would be confined to the brigade level.⁴⁷ Because of the advisability of making only assumptions rather than clear decisions and because Department of National Defence policies encouraged training at the platoon level rather than at a higher level,⁴⁸ no-one seemed to know what a brigadier's responsibilities were. It is suggested here that if militia brigadiers were confined in their powers this need not have been the case since they possessed a good deal of experience. Of the twenty-one brigadiers commanding militia brigades in 1948 twelve had commanded brigades in action during the Second World War while five had commanded battalions.⁴⁹ Despite their record it cannot be thought that they played too important a role in post-war militia command. In 1954 the Kennedy Commission termed formation headquarters, commanded by brigadiers, "redundant."⁵⁰

In summary it is seen that vagueness surrounded most militia matters in the late 1940's. Unit strengths were low and even these figures are seen to be of doubtful validity when summer camp attendance is considered. A good deal of speculation was involved in setting recruiting goals for the militia. As a result of these goals not being met it cannot be thought that the militia served as a firm base for mobilization in the 1945-1950 period.

Chapter 2 Footnotes

1 "The Canadian Army Reserve Force was authorized to train at war establishment for thirty days during 1946-47."

Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1947, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1947, p. 33.

2 Claxton: "...it never was planned by anyone that there should be 180,000 officers and men in the reserve army of Canada in peace time.... The figure generally set has been of the magnitude of 50,000 or something of that kind; and for this year the ceiling was set at 30,000."

Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 9 July 1947, p. 5291.

3 The officer strength recruited was 68 per cent of the establishment while other rank strength was 21 per cent. See Appendix "B" for similar officer strengths nationally and this chapter for a consideration of other ranks strength in The Canadian Scottish Regiment.

4 Area Pay Office, HQ Western Ontario Area, "Reserve Force Strength Returns," 17 December 1948, London, Ontario, Directorate of History files; "Composition of the Canadian Army--Part II, Reserve Force," HQS 8948-2, 20 March 1946, Directorate of History files, passim.

5 R. H. Roy, Ready For The Fray, Vancouver, Evergreen, 1958; Colonel H. M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish), Toronto, Macmillan, 1932.

6 These were 5 (BC) Heavy Anti-aircraft Regiment, 8 Anti-aircraft Gun Operations Room, 5 Area Signal Squadron, No. 13 Field Ambulance, No. 46 Field Sanitation Section, No.'s 58 and 59 LAA Workshops, and a section of 8 Provost Company.

RCCS Signal Centre, Wire from Area Headquarters to all Victoria units, Vancouver, 29 September 1948, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

7 The Canadian Scottish Regiment, "Western Command Monthly Organization Reports," 3 June 1946 to 31 December 1947, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

8 Loc. cit.; "1st Bn., The Canadian Scottish Regiment, Attendance Record, 1 April 1946-31 March 1947," Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

9 Loc. cit.

Establishment figures taken from:

Canadian Army, "Study Papers for Professional Advancement Training 1947-48, The Infantry Battalion," Precis No. 1, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

10 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1947, op. cit., p. 26.

11 "Composition of the Canadian Army--Part II, Reserve Force," loc. cit.; Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II--Reserve Force, Ottawa, 1 July 1948, pp. 449-527; SD 1 Chart No. 947 entitled "Reserve Force Order of Battle by Corps Within Districts," 1946, Directorate of History files.

12 Canada, Commons Debates, 24 June 1948, p. 5789.

13 G.R. Pearkes (P.C., Esquimalt-Saanich): "Here and there, scattered across this country, are certain reserve units which were able to go into camp at reasonably high strength. There were many other units that failed to take 25 per cent of their establishment into camp. There were other units that failed to take in 10 per cent, or even 5 per cent.A unit which has not trained 10 per cent of its establishment can hardly be considered in any standard of preparedness."

Canada, Commons Debates, 1 September 1950, pp. 132-133.

14 Major J.L. Gallagher, letter from "A" Company to Battalion Headquarters, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 3 January 1956, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

15 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1948, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1949, p. 26; Canada, Commons Debates, 26 June 1950, p. 4141; Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1951, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1951, p. 56; Appendix 6 to Department of National Defence, Report for the Fiscal Year 1953-54, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955, p. 73.

16 The purposes of an annual camp were, and are today, a subject of discussion within the militia. Some officers are of the opinion that camps test a unit's efficiency and because of this it is not uncommon to find various trophies awarded for camp attendance and so forth. One of the better reasons for holding camps is to train under circumstances not found at home locations. In 1974 The Fort Garry Horse had the use of twenty-one reconnaissance vehicles at Camp Shilo to carry out the following training which must have been of great value to the unit. "The scope of reconnaissance training was to practice crew, patrol and troop level skills with a thirty hour squadron exercise to put individual skills to use."

Annex "B", Recce Report to "Final Report MILCON (Shilo) 1974," 4935-9 (comd), 15 October 1974, Winnipeg Militia District Headquarters files.

17 "Reserve Force units were...authorized to train and to organize for training purposes on field unit establishments. A basis

was thus provided upon which further reorganization could more easily proceed."

Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1946, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1946, p. 26.

18 Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization, Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 1947, p. 32.

19 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1947, op. cit., p. 34.

20 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1949, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1949, p. 47.

21		Offrs	WOs	NCOs	R & F	Total
	Total strength	35	13	40	200	288
	Overseas veterans	28	10	40	95	173

The Canadian Scottish Regiment, "Western Command Monthly Organization Report," 30 November 1946, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

22 "C" Company, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), "Weekly Training Programme for Weeks Ending 23, 29 September, 6, 13 October 1950," Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

23 "Reserve Army Basic Training Modified Block Syllabus, 1945-1946," Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

24 The following directive assigned one rifle company as an "enlistment" company and one company as being responsible for non-effective personnel with the officer commanding the latter company ordered to make a "...concerted effort to reduce the number of non-effective personnel on his company strength." These measures probably led to efficiency in time but the pity was that it was necessary to even use skeletal companies in such tasks.

The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), "Unit Training Policy, October 1949-July 1950," Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

25 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1947, op. cit., p. 25.

26 "Military Forces," The Canada Year Book, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939, p. 1081.

27 Canada, Commons Debates, 16 October 1945, p. 1181; Canada, Commons Debates, 22 October 1945, p. 1373; Canada, Commons Debates, 6 February 1947, p. 173.

28 Aide Memoir, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, "Reorganization Postwar Reserve Army," 4 January 1946, Directorate of History files, p. 2.

29 Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ninth Census of Canada, Population, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1953, vol. I, Table 30-3.

Toronto's establishment figures were compiled from the following sources:

Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II--Reserve Force, op. cit., pp. 213-361; "Composition of the Canadian Army--Part II, Reserve Force," loc. cit.; SD 1 Chart No. 947 entitled "Reserve Force Order of Battle by Corps Within Districts," loc. cit.; Appendices "C" and "D" to SD 1 Letter No. 3681, "Mobilization Planning," 25 May 1948, Directorate of History files.

30 Directorate of Records, National Defence Headquarters, "Canadian Army Appointments, Enlistments, Enrolments and Fatal Casualties by Address at Time of Appointment, Enlistment or Enrolment," 24 October 1946, Directorate of History files.

31 Aide Memoir, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, "Reorganization Postwar Reserve Army," loc. cit.

32 For simplicity it is assumed here that officers in either RCAMC or RCEME units would be doctors and engineers.

See also: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Ninth Census of Canada, Labour Force, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1953, vol. IV, Table 23-61.

33 In planning units in the late 1940's there was a tendency to try for every eventuality in Second World War terms. This was evident when the order of battle was being drawn up for the Supplementary Reserve and units considered reached the army level. Since the Supplementary Reserve order of battle was enmeshed with that of the militia, thinking was seemingly steered away from some of the more immediate problems of re-establishing the militia.

Memorandum, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, untitled, 25 March 1946, Directorate of History files.

34 Loc. cit.

35 Aide Memoir, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, "Reorganization Postwar Reserve Army," op. cit., p. 1.

36 Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II--Reserve Force, op. cit., pp. 502, 155.

37 At one time civilian association with the militia was seen to confer social status, however there has been a steady decline in

this view since the Second World War. The 1945-1950 period probably fell about half way in the importance attached to the militia.

While community hostility to the militia would be anathema it would seem that, over the years, the support of community leaders seldom did much. In the middle-1920's the Honorary Membership of the Officers' Mess of the Canadian Scottish Regiment at Victoria included ten provincial cabinet ministers, eight members of the bench, four service club presidents, and the city's mayor as well as 138 other prominent citizens including the Sheriff and the Chairman of the Liquor Control Board. In the same era the strength of the regiment stood "only at about 150 other ranks."

The Canadian Scottish Officers' Mess, "Honorary Members List," not dated, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria; Roy, op. cit., p. 9.

38 Naval Service, Department of National Defence, "Inter-Service and Naval Recruiting Publicity," Ottawa, 24 September 1947, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria; Canadian Infantry Association, "Recruiting Campaign," Hull, 4 February 1949, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

39 Captain A. V. Robbins, Appendix "A" to letter from The Canadian Scottish Regiment to HQ B.C. Area under "Report on Army Week Activities," 26 May 1949, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

40 Ibid., p. 3.

41 Major T. H. Goodfellow, "A Profile of the Militiaman (sic) of 1970," Defence Research Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, April 1974; Major T. H. Goodfellow, "Study of the Civilian Background of Members of the Canadian Forces Primary Reserves; Preliminary Results of the Survey of the Militia," Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, September 1975.

42 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1939, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939, p. 60.

43 Claxton, op. cit., p. 7.

44 In parliament Abbott said that the regular army should be "...a small but highly trained and skilled professional force which can be expanded in time of war, primarily to train the citizen soldiers who would have to fight the war."

Canada, Commons Debates, 19 August 1946, p. 5059.

45 Canada, Commons Debates, 6 September 1950, (2nd Session), p. 337.

46 Between 1946 and 1949 regular army schools trained 5,521 regular recruits and 11,437 active and reserve soldiers on courses. While

the latter figure does not differentiate between the two components, in view of the low strength of the militia at the time, it might be reasonable to assume that all who were qualified or available were taken on course.

"Recruits Trained and Active Force and Reserve Force Personnel Who Have Taken Officer, NCO or Tradesmen Training at Corps Schools," Part II, Chapter 3 to HQTS 1950-2, Canadian Army 1945-1949, 13 January 1950, Directorate of History files.

47 Aide Memoir, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, "Reorganization Postwar Reserve Army," op. cit., p. 2.

Provision for two lieutenant-generals and six major-generals in the militia was made by order-in-council with the stricture that the "appointment (was) to be filled only in the event of mobilization."

P.C. Order 4/3144, The Canada Gazette, Ottawa, 13 September 1947, pp. 2766-1767, Part I, vol. 81E.

48 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31 1949, loc. cit.

49 See Appendix "F".

50 Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, Part IV, "Re-organization of the Reserve Force," p. 2.

Chapter 3

Partial Success in the Early 1950's

The challenge to the militia to act as a mobilization base in the late 1940's may have been somewhat theoretical but the challenges in the early 1950's became more concrete when four brigades were recruited.¹ In 1950 militia soldiers were expected, to a degree, to enlist when the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was being raised for Korea. In 1951 the expectation was that the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade would be recruited entirely from the militia when it was formed for North Atlantic Treaty Organization service in Germany. Despite criticism of some of the results of the recruiting,² militia support in raising both brigades was perhaps as great as that envisaged by the government. This was particularly true during the Korean war when preference was given to veterans and regular army personnel in forming the brigade.

The recruiting of the 25th Brigade might be examined in order to provide an indication of the success of militia policies from 1945 to 1950. There were three reasons why militia response to recruiting for the 25th Brigade was somewhat meagre. Two of these were a result of government policy while the third lay with the nature of the militia soldier. These will be examined in turn.

The first policy which mitigated against militia soldiers joining the 25th Brigade grew from a wish to avoid "...the territorial difficulties of using reserve force units..."³ and a parallel desire not to disrupt the militia.⁴ Furthermore there was a wish for speed in recruiting the brigade. It was intended that the 25th Brigade would be raised

as a temporary force to be "...demobilized after the crisis"⁵ and, rather than making an appeal to militia units the recruiting of second battalions for the three regular army infantry regiments relied largely upon "...the prestige of Active Force regimental titles."⁶

The second policy which discouraged militia soldiers from joining the 25th Brigade was that preference for enrolment was given to "battle experienced veterans" and "experienced tradesmen" of the Second World War rather than to the militia soldier.⁷ The preference for veterans was founded upon the need for speed⁸ in meeting the Korean emergency and the recognition that experienced soldiers could provide a field force in the shortest possible time.⁹ (See Appendix "G".)

In the selection of personnel for the Canadian Army Special Force¹⁰ (CASF) officer appointments were made from army headquarters and the authority existed to voluntarily transfer a large number of senior non-commissioned officers from the regular army into the CASF. Despite earlier plans which would have allowed a total of 37 artillery and infantry subalterns to be selected by General Officers Commanding (GOCs), it was found desirable to centralize officer selection at army headquarters when the "age and experience" of officer volunteers showed the majority of them unsuitable for service.¹¹ The shortage of suitable officers led to a reliance upon regular army officers in the headquarters and the technical corps where 77 out of 111 officers were from the regular force. In the infantry 86 officers out of 113 were either from the militia or from the Supplementary Reserve.¹² At the senior non-commissioned officer (NCO) level a similar reliance was placed upon the regular army. On 11 August, four days after recruiting had opened for the CASF, GOCs were authorized to transfer 105 warrant officers, staff-

geants, and sergeants to the Special Force.¹³ On the same date the twelve personnel depots across Canada were instructed to recruit, between them, 51 sergeants for the CASF.¹⁴ Since the 51 sergeant positions would be competed for by veterans from the street it would seem that the expectations were low of recruiting militia sergeants; particularly those without wartime service. In referring to recruiting at the rank and file level, Central Command Headquarters, six days after recruiting had been announced, noted that, "Some doubt exists as to whether Reserve Force personnel can be enlisted into Special Force." The Headquarters went on to direct that, "...Reserve Force soldiers must be accepted if they apply for Special Force and conform to standards."¹⁵

With a heavy reliance placed upon the regular army for finding officers and senior NCOs for the CASF, and with enlistment priorities not clear to all recruiters, it is not surprising that the flow from the militia into the Korean force was not overwhelming. Precise figures on the number who volunteered from the militia are not readily available. However indications are that the response, at least initially, was light. On the 8th and 9th August 1950, the two days after recruiting had been announced, it was reported from Vancouver that out of 144 applicants for CASF service, "Only six ... were from the Reserve Force." In Regina it was noted that there was "...little response from (the) Reserve Force" and 23 of 54 applicants were veterans.¹⁶ In a final reckoning it would seem that something in excess of 2,000 militia soldiers volunteered for Korea. (See Appendix "H".)

Aside from policies which were not designed to encourage militia soldiers from joining the CASF, the nature of the militia soldier, most particularly at the rank and file level, and the nature of the men who

did join the Special Force, combined to exclude the former. For one thing the age group of the average militia soldier was probably much younger than that of the veteran seeking to join the force. Of the twelve personnel depots reporting the age groups of applicants for the Special Force on 8 August 1950, ten said that the average age was from 25 to 30 while only two, in St. John's and Halifax, reported the ages to be in the 20 to 25 bracket.¹⁷ The significance of the age differences lies in social factors which must have left the younger militia soldier feeling excluded from the older group of veterans.¹⁸ Not only did age and experience set apart the veteran and the potential recruit from the militia, but it would seem that the general attitude of the two groups was different. Officers who had served with both the 25th Brigade and the 27th Brigade, after the latter had been recruited from the militia, found "...a pretty general feeling...that the type of man coming in now is far better than in the Special Force."¹⁹ While it would be inaccurate to condemn the veteran and praise the militia soldier, it is beyond dispute that the CASF had an extraordinary number of disciplinary problems.²⁰ Perhaps the majority of these were a result of the veterans who had enlisted.²¹

It is a matter of judgment, based primarily upon the more than 2,000 soldiers who enlisted from the militia, as to whether the militia was successful in being able to provide an appropriate response to recruiting for the Korean war. If, as Douglas Abbott said in October 1945, the militia was expected to "...reflect the military potential of the country..."²² then, despite the vagueness of Abbott's words, it probably did so. In August 1950 15,469 men applied for regular and Special Force service in the Canadian Army.²³ It might be thought that

if 2,000 of these were from the militia that their representation as partially trained soldiers was indicative of the militia having carried out Abbott's policy. If, on the other hand, it was hoped, as it had been in 1947,²⁴ that the militia would provide a force which could enter "speedily on active service" it was seen that it could not, at least in keeping with the policies of 1950.

Once the shock of the Korean emergency had been stabilized, L. B. Pearson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, expressed Canadian foreign policy concerns under five headings.²⁵ The first was that the most vital area of Canadian defence interests lay in Europe where there was both a military threat and a need for European unity. Pearson's second point recognized the threat of a Russian dominated Europe arising from artificial political divisions. Thirdly, and fourthly, Pearson expressed concern over the "aggressive forces of Communism" dominating China and he pointed out the necessity of improving "...the economic conditions and human welfare in free Asia." At the same time he expressed the conviction that nationalism in China would eventually replace Communism and that it would become a vibrant force in all Asian countries. Finally Pearson pointed out that despite "certain differences" with the United States, there was general agreement with Canada that peace was in jeopardy, that "Soviet imperialism" had to be opposed, that there must be "collective resistance to aggression," and that the main front to be defended was western Europe. On 5 February 1951, three days after Pearson's foreign policy speech, the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, stated Canadian defence policies. These were to provide for:

- (1) The immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack;

- (2) the implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the United Nations, or under the North Atlantic treaty or other agreement for collective security;
- (3) the organization to build up our strength in a total war.²⁶

Taken together the foreign and defence policies meant that the principal threat to world peace lay in Europe and that Canadian military isolation of the late 1940's was over.²⁷ Korea had been dismissed as a "police action" by the Prime Minister, Louis St. Laurent,²⁸ and on 5 February 1951 Claxton informed the House that a Canadian brigade group would be sent to Europe under the International Force of N.A.T.O.²⁹ The brigade would have been the 25th Brigade, the bulk of which was still in North America, but as a result of United Nations enquiries³⁰ it was decided in March 1951 to send the balance of the 25th to Korea.³¹ In April it was decided to raise the 27th Brigade for N.A.T.O. service and recruiting was announced on 4 May.³²

Raising forces for overseas peacetime service was a radical change in Canadian defence policy which grew from a fear of "...the possibility that what has occurred in Korea might be repeated on a larger scale in Germany."³³ This concern dictated plans for the brigade since not only was the immediate provision of troops considered but a future, and larger, mobilization was also taken into account. In a staff letter on 26 April 1951 the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds, wrote that:

An important consideration in the plan is that infantry and artillery sub-units of the formation will retain their unit identity and continue to wear the uniform and insignia of their parent Reserve Force units. In the event of general mobilization this will result in a trained nucleus on which the Reserve Force units will build.³⁴

Simonds went on to say that the newly formed units of the 27th Brigade would maintain "...the closest possible association...." with their parent militia units and that the latter would "...retain the places they now hold in the plans for general mobilization."³⁵ (The idea that the 27th Brigade would serve as the basis for future mobilization was in contradistinction to the principle seen above of disbanding the 25th Brigade at the conclusion of the Korean war.) Since the plans for raising the 27th Brigade catered to a partial mobilization, with the realization that general mobilization was a possibility, the significance of the plans to the militia lay in giving the reserves more flexibility in their role. In the late 1940's thinking had been directed towards total mobilization and total war.³⁶

A more valid assessment of the success of the militia in meeting the roles assigned in the late 1940's can be made in considering the response to recruiting for the 27th Brigade than could be done for the 25th Brigade. While the militia soldier was discouraged, to a degree, from enlisting in the 25th Brigade the 27th was "formed on the framework of the Reserve Force" with consideration given to regional representation, the strengths of units, regional recruiting potential, and unit representation.³⁷ The "framework" mentioned took the following form. It was planned to recruit 351 officers and 5,483 other ranks for the brigade with 185 officers and 3,861 other ranks to be recruited in replacement units.³⁸ Within a month 6,671 all ranks had enlisted.³⁹ Ten armoured regiments each raised a troop, six artillery regiments each raised a battery, and 15 militia infantry regiments raised two companies apiece. Engineer, medical, and intelligence troops were also sponsored by militia units while signal, service corps, and RCME

troops were raised by national contributions from all militia units of these corps.⁴⁰ Three of the artillery batteries became the 79th Field Regiment and three became a replacement regiment, the 81st.⁴¹ Similarly the 1st Highland, Rifle, and Infantry Battalions were formed from one company of the nominated militia regiments while 2nd Battalions were formed from the second companies. The provision of armoured corps personnel was complicated by the length of time required for technical training so that initial armoured support was provided by The Royal Canadian Dragoons, a regular army unit, while militia soldiers continued with armoured training.⁴² Some of the supporting arms raised reinforcing units while some of them relied upon individual replacements.⁴³

While the above plans were attractive enough to gain the necessary troops for the brigade, certain weaknesses in the militia became apparent during the recruiting period. For one thing it would seem that the "...well qualified nucleus of officers, non-commissioned officers, specialists and tradesmen"⁴⁴ which were to have been produced in the late 1940's did not exist. Instead it was necessary to raise the age limits for lieutenants and captains by three years and to accept tradesmen up to forty-five years of age.⁴⁵ At the rank and file level "...two thirds of the men enlisted were without military experience."⁴⁶ It is not known if this includes militia experience. However it is more than likely that a large portion of the other ranks were recruited from the streets.⁴⁷ (See Appendix "I".)

If adjustments in some standards and a possible lack of trained soldiers at the rank and file level are not held to have been too important, then it can be said that recruiting the brigade through the

militia was a success. It was planned to have the brigade in Europe and "...operationally ready for any contingency by the end of March 1952."⁴⁸ As part of the schedule, sub-unit training was carried out at Valcartier by the end of October 1951.⁴⁹ Training was carried out with a minimum of regular army instructional support.⁵⁰ With the brigade in Germany by December 1951⁵¹ it was possible to take part in Northern Army Group exercises in September 1952.⁵² It is a matter of conjecture as to whether or not the 27th Brigade could have carried out such advanced training within a year and a half of its formation without the framework⁵³ of officers and non-commissioned officers it had from the militia. The chances are that it could not.

A second advantageous result of raising the 27th Brigade through the militia was that there was no apparent political dissent at increasing the size of the army from 13 to 21 battalions. (See Appendix "J".) While the political popularity of a strong defence programme was recognized by all parties in the early 1950's the "regional representation" and fame of the units selected⁵⁴ for mobilization may have contributed to the lack of criticism. There was criticism of the brigade once it was in Germany but the idea that the brigade should exist was never challenged.⁵⁵

A third advantage of having used the militia as a partial mobilization base was that their availability reinforced political opinion that the reserves should retain a role in Canadian defence. In April 1951 the Minister of National Defence said that:

The parent units (those which had contributed to the 27th Brigade) in the Reserve Force will continue to form part of our defence organization. Should these Reserve Force units be required for service in an emergency, they will re-absorb the Active Force elements formed

under their sponsorship and serving in Canada at the time. This will give them the advantage of a well-trained nucleus to assist in their expansion.⁵⁶

Such a statement forecast continued support of the militia and allowed the reserves to maintain a prominent position within the defence structure. This, in turn, augured the need for a fresh look at militia policy. Within a year and a half of the Minister's statement, groundwork was laid to establish the Kennedy Commission to effect improvement in the efficiency of the Reserve Force.

Chapter 3 Footnotes

1 At the beginning of the Korean war the regular component of the Canadian Army had three infantry battalions in three regiments. Initial recruiting for the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade caused second battalions of these three regiments to be formed while subsequent recruiting for reinforcements saw third battalions raised. When recruiting was carried out for the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in 1950 six battalions were recruited for the infantry. (See Appendix "J" for details.)

2 See footnote 20 and 55.

3 Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, Wire AG 1619 to all GOCs, Ottawa, 7 August 1950, Directorate of History files, p. 2.

4 "For other good reasons we do not wish to draw more heavily than we have to on the existing active and reserve forces [in recruiting for the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade]."

Ibid., p. 1.

5 Ibid., p. 2.

6 Loc. cit.

7 Mobilization instructions provided the following orders of priority in recruiting. For officers: 1 Veteran officers 2 COTC (veterans of Second World War) University Contingents 3 Supplementary Reserve 4 Reserve Force. For other ranks: 1 Civilian veterans of Second World War 2 Supplementary Reserve 3 Reserve Force 4 General public.

Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, "Mobilization Instruction, Canadian Army Special Force (Canadian Army Active Force), HQTS 2264-1 (Org 1A), Ottawa, Army Headquarters, 8 August 1950, Directorate of History files.

8 "The object of Lotus [the code name for recruiting the 25th Infantry Brigade] is to mobilize as quickly as possible a brigade group for purposes announced by (the) Prime Minister tonight."

Macklin, Wire AG 1619 to all GOCs, op. cit., p. 1.

9 "...the more trained veterans we can get back from civilian life the better provided of course the veterans applying are suitable."

Loc. cit.

10 Originally the term Canadian Army Special Force (CASF) was used synonymously with the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade but as the force for Korea grew to include units supporting the brigade a distinction grew between the brigade and the rest. The distinction is retained here so that, for example, when total numbers recruited for Korea are referred to the term Canadian Army Special Force, or Special Force, is used.

11 Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1966, pp. 33-34.

12 Ibid., p. 34.

13 Army Headquarters, Org. 196, 10 August 1950, cited in Wire from Army Oakville to Army London and Toronto, 11 August 1950, Directorate of History files; wire from National Defence Headquarters to Command and Area Headquarters and Personnel Depots 1 to 12, 11 August 1950, Directorate of History files.

14 Wire from National Defence Headquarters to Command and Area Headquarters and Personnel Depots 1 to 12, loc. cit.

15 Wire from Headquarters Oakville to Officers Commanding 5, 6 and 7 Personnel Depots, 13 August 1950, Directorate of History files.

16 "Canadian Army, Special Force Recruiting from 0800 hrs 8 August to 1200 hrs 9 August 1950", Directorate of History files.

17 Loc. cit.

18 Once the CASF had been formed this exclusion was reinforced by the veterans taking a blasé attitude towards the army as the following might illustrate. "The highest figures [for absence without leave] were in the infantry where it appears that the Second World War veterans took least kindly to the many strange manifestations of regular Army discipline." It is unlikely that the militia soldier would have bridled to as great a degree to "regular Army discipline" since he would have had little ground for comparison. If differences were apparent once the CASF had been formed they were probably sensed, albeit to a lesser degree, during the recruiting period.

Telegrams from Commands to D Adm. HQS 2509-151/25, 26-28 October 1950, cited in "Absence Without Leave in the C.A.S.F." not dated, Directorate of History files, p. 3.

19 William A. Westley and others, Canada, Department of National Defence, Recruits Meet the Training Camp: A Sociological Study of Canadian Infantry Recruits, Ottawa, January 1953, (Defence Research Board Operational Research Memorandum No. 28), pp. 31-32.

20 "It is recognized that some chaff must be taken in with the grain. However in this particular instance this draft seems to be mostly chaff...."

Brigadier G. Walsh, Letter to GOC Central Command, 17 January 1951, cited in "Absence Without Leave in the C.A.S.F.", op. cit., p. 1.

"The terrific incidence of absence and desertion is a symptom of the overall lowering of standards of discipline in Canada, and also of the marked lowering in the class of men being enlisted into the Active Force since the start of the Korean incident."

Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, Letter to Chief of the General Staff, 2 April 1952, cited in "Absence Without Leave in the C.A.S.F.," op. cit., p. 4.

In later years Macklin clearly pointed out that the chief difficulty did not lie with the men who eventually proceeded to Korea but rather with those who enlisted during a period of confusion.

Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, "Statement by Maj-Gen W.H.S. Macklin," The Canadian Military Journal, vol. 23 (October 1956), p. 6.

21 See footnote 18.

22 Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Official Report of Debates, 16 October 1945, p. 1135.

23 From January to July inclusive, in 1950, 8,709 men had applied to join the ranks in the regular component of the Canadian Army and 7,817 of these were rejected because of establishment restrictions high standards. On 28 July Brooke Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, took measures to increase the recruiting intake because of a falling effective strength but the plans were overtaken by the Korean emergency in August. In August 7,114 of the 15,469 applicants were accepted. It might be thought that a portion of those accepted in August had previously been rejected.

"Growth of the Army 1950-53, OR - CA(R)," Directorate of History files; "Standards of Enlistment," Adjutant-General Instruction no. 380, Army Headquarters, 2 August 1950, Directorate of History files. Wood, op. cit., p. 21.

24 Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence: Information on Canada's Defence Achievements and Organization, Ottawa, Department of National Defence, 1947, p. 12.

While it would not be expected that defence policies would remain static in all details over the years the consistency which might be expected seems to have been lacking when the 1947 wish for entering "speedily on active service" was refuted in 1951. In that year Claxton said: "It is not part of the role of the reserve forces to have forces in being trained, equipped and ready to fight an equally trained and equipped enemy in instant battle. That is not their job and never has been; and it is a total misconception to consider it as their job."

Canada, Commons Debates, 8 May 1951, p. 2802.

25 Canada, Commons Debates, 2 February 1951, pp. 53-54.

26 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 February 1951. p. 91.

27 "...the assumption of this new responsibility [of sending troops for N.A.T.O. service] was a natural consequence of the larger share which Canada had lately been taking in international affairs, and of her acceptance of the policy of collective defence as insurance for peace."

Historical Section, Army Headquarters, "The 27th Canadian In-

fantry Brigade Group 1951-1953," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 8 (April 1954), p. 2.

28 "The Korean Crisis," External Affairs, vol. 2 (September 1950), p. 323.

29 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 February 1951, p. 94.

30 Canada, Commons Debates, 21 February 1951, p. 563.

31 Wood, op. cit., p. 89.

32 "Reserve Army Given Job of Raising New Brigade", Daily Colonist, Victoria, 5 May 1951, p. 1.

33 Canada, Commons Debates, 31 August 1950, p. 95.

34 Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, "Canadian Contribution to the Integrated Force (Europe)," HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 26 April 1951, Directorate of History files, p. 2.

35 Loc. cit.

36 Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1946, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1946, p. 26.

37 Simonds, op. cit., p. 1.

38 "A Canadian Infantry Brigade Group," Appendix "A" to HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 28 April 1951, Directorate of History files; "Replacement Units," Appendix "B" to HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 28 April 1951, Directorate of History files; "Summary of Minimum Number of Officers Required by Corps and Commands for Operation Panda," Appendix "A" to AG Administrative Order No. 7, 30 April 1951, Directorate of History files; Amendment No. 1, 2 May 1951 to "Summary of Minimum Number of Officers Required by Corps and Commands for Operation Panda," Appendix "A" to AG Administrative Order No. 7, 30 April 1951, loc. cit.

39 Historical Section, Army Headquarters, "The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 1951-1953," loc. cit.

40 "Reserve Force Contribution to 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade by Units," Appendix "B" to "Canadian Contribution to the Integrated Force (Europe)," HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 26 April 1951, Directorate of History files, pp. 1-3.

41 None of the battalions raised as replacement units for the 27th Brigade went to Germany. The 81st Field Regiment went to Korea in early 1953 where it became the 4th Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery in October and hence a unit of the regular army. The three infantry battalions all re-mustered as regular army units on 16 October 1953 and went to Korea in late 1953 or early 1954. On 3 December 1951 the "Y" Troops raised by militia armoured units for 27th Brigade were

reduced to nil strength and the personnel joined regular army units.

SD 1 Letter No. 4381, 6 December 1951, Directorate of History files; Woods, op. cit., p. 273; Army Historical Section, The Regiments and Corps of the Canadian Army, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964, pp. 111, 121, 124.

42 Simonds, op. cit., p. 1.

43 "Plan for Forming the Canadian Contribution to the Integrated Force (Europe)," Appendix "C" to Simonds, "Canadian Contribution to the Integrated Force (Europe)," HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 26 April 1951, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

44 "Reserve Force Contribution to 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade by Units," Appendix "B" to Simonds, "Canadian Contribution to the Integrated Force (Europe)," HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 26 April 1951, loc. cit.

Report of the Department of National Defence for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1947, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1947, pp. 46-47.

45 "Terms Set For Service," Daily Colonist, Victoria, 5 May 1951, p. 1.

It has been seen that when the 25th Brigade was being raised there were not enough officers volunteering who were "suitable for service." While it is possible that different officers volunteered for the two brigades it is more likely that raising the age limits was indicative of a continued search for suitable officers.

Wood, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

46 Historical Section, Army Headquarters, "The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 1951-1953," op. cit., p. 5.

47 In raising the first company, or "E" Company, of The Canadian Scottish Regiment for the 27th Brigade recruiting quite literally took men from the streets. In part the regiment relied upon recruiting teams on Vancouver Island with an office opened later in downtown Victoria. It was reported that: "The Nanaimo men (a two man recruiting team) don't bother with an office. They wander around town, talk to their friends about "E" Company and wind up with their names on the dotted line." While there were other factors involved (See Appendix "I") such informal methods were not fruitful and the first recruit did not join the company until 16 May.

Trevor Collins, "Scots May Entrain for Quebec July 15." Daily Colonist, Victoria, 8 July 1951, p. 31. "Notes for War Diary, 'E' Company, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 4 May 1951 to 1 January 1953, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

48 Historical Section, Army Headquarters, "The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 1951-1953," op. cit., p. 8.

49 "Training Programme, Integrated Force for Europe," Appendix "G" to HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 28 April 1951, Directorate of History files.

50 The regular army initially provided 26 officers and 104 other ranks for instructional assistance to the brigade.

"Provision of Training Cadre From Active Force Units," Appendix "F" to HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 28 April 1951, Directorate of History files.

51 Historical Section, General Staff, "Germany, 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group," 22 April 1952, Directorate of History files.

52 While the article below reported the September exercise, Exercise "Holdfast," as the "principal training event of 1952" the Highland Battalion, at least, was required to do little in the exercise. Much more ambitious training had been carried out between 21 and 27 August when the brigade had practised advances to contact and assault river crossings. In "Holdfast" the brigade was bussed from Hanover to the Soest area where it took up defensive positions which it occupied for the duration of the manoeuvres. It was reported that: "The exercise was mostly one of endurance as the men did little other than stand guard in their slits." A lack of sophisticated training during the N.A.T.O. force "Holdfast" exercise might be taken as an index of the brigade's ability which, in turn, might be seen as an indication of the time necessary to train militia troops.

Historical Section, Army Headquarters, "The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 1951-1953," op. cit., p. 11; "Notes for War Diary, 'E' Company, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 4 May 1951 to 1 January 1953, loc. cit.

53 An example of the "framework" of officers and senior non-commissioned officers was found in the case of "E" Company of The Canadian Scottish Regiment when the parent unit provided four officers and eleven senior non-commissioned officers.

"Ready To Shoulder Arms Again," Victoria Times, 17 May 1951, p. 10. Trevor Collins, "Four Victoria Officers Appointed To Company of Scottish for Europe," Daily Colonist, Victoria, 28 June 1951, p. 31.

54 One of the considerations in assigning units to the 27th Brigade was that "...all units selected should be well known to the Canadian people."

Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, "Canadian Contribution to the Integrated Force (Europe)," op. cit., p. 2.

55 Ross Munro, "Compulsory Service Key To Military Obligations," Vancouver Province, 30 July 1953, p. 3; Jim Senter, "Equipment Shortages Plague Canadian Troops In Germany," Calgary Herald, 4 June 1954, p. 1; Lionel Shapiro, "Lionel Shapiro Examines the Failure of the 27th," Maclean's, vol. 66 (15 August 1953), pp. 7-9, 46-47.

Articles such as those by Munro and Senter used the brigade as a vehicle for presenting points of view on particular subjects such as conscription. The Shapiro article was critical of most aspects of the brigade. The article was refuted by the Chief of Staff of the Canadian Army and by Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery who was Deputy Commander of N.A.T.O. at the time. The conditions which may have led to certain

difficulties in the brigade were examined, without reference to Shapiro's article, in subsequent books and articles such as those by Moir and Rand.

"Article About Brigade Angers Chief of Staff," Calgary Herald, 2 September 1953, p. 5; "Monty Denies 27th Brigade Morale Bad," Calgary Herald, 29 August 1953, p. 1; John S. Moir, ed., History of The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals 1903-1961, Ottawa, Corps Committee, 1962, p. 305; Major J.L. Rand, "The Chaplain In the 27th Brigade," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 8 (January 1954), pp. 52-56.

56 "Draft News Release By the Minister of National Defence," Appendix "D" to HQTS 2000-1 (SD 1), 26 April 1951, Directorate of History files, p. 3.

Chapter 4

The Kennedy Report

On 27 May 1953 a board was convened by the order of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) for the purpose of

Examining, reporting and recommending on the organization, training and administration of the Canadian Army Reserve Force with a view to effecting improvement in the efficiency of the Reserve Force in relation to its purpose and to the expenditure of funds required to maintain it.¹

The scope of the board's tasks were to include an examination of the divisional system and unit establishments, the type of training most suitable for mobilization requirements and, under the heading of administration, questions such as equipment holdings and recruiting.² Permanent members of the board were Major-General H. Kennedy as president with Majors-General H.F.G. Letson and E.J. Renaud as members. Lieutenant-Colonel W.G.A. Lambe served as secretary.

There were a number of reasons why a review of militia policy was desirable in the early 1950's. Defence policies of the late 1940's had been mainly concerned with defending Canada against "direct attack" and with building up an "...all out effort in a total war."³ These policies had not catered to the partial mobilization found necessary in raising the 25th and 27th Brigades⁴ nor had they anticipated the tasks of United Nations (U.N.) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) which were to follow. On 31 August 1950 L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, noted that the invasion of Korea had changed "..."

the whole character of the United Nations...." He also pointed out that by signing the N.A.T.O. charter Canada had assumed "specific" obligations in the defence of the North Atlantic area.⁵ Within six months U.N. and N.A.T.O. commitments had become of major importance in Canada's defence programme.⁶ This emphasis on a new internationalism in defence tended to exclude the militia and its potential for mass mobilization.⁷

While it was still recognized in the early 1950's that mobilization for total war might become necessary⁸ the immediate emphasis was for "forces in being", that is to say forces which could react immediately without a mobilization period. The phrase "forces in being" was used by Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds in December 1952 in reference to the need for a reserve study.⁹ The emphasis on instant response grew throughout the 1950's and in 1956 Ralph Campney, the Minister of National Defence, said in the House that,

...we must provide forces in being, completely trained, equipped and immediately ready.

He based his reasoning on the belief that,

...[war] is far too complex and too technical a matter to be left to the amateurs - only professionally trained and experienced servicemen can cope quickly with the weapons and tactics of modern war.¹⁰

Such a view was politically convenient, particularly when a prosperous Canadian public¹¹ was willing to spend large amounts of defence¹² and when the profession of arms, if it could not guarantee complete safety, could at least provide a comforting fatalism about complex defence questions.¹³ Lieutenant-General Simonds was to remark that:

The R.C.A.F. ...had been preaching hard the doctrine that only 'forces in being' mattered in a war in the nuclear age - it would be over in 48 hours, and anything not operational on 'D-day' was of no use anyway. This of course had great

appeal for politicians - they had committed themselves to providing certain 'forces in being' for the NATO shield, and anything which could be saved elsewhere was a heaven-sent blessing.¹⁴

The concept of forces in being gave rise to the belief that all contingencies could be met by the regular force. This was noted later in the Kennedy Report which said that:

The role of the Reserve Force is not clearly understood by most Canadians.This obscurity may be based in some measure on the assumption that the expanded Active Force is now capable of discharging all foreseeable defence requirements and that the need for a 'part-time' Army component no longer exists.¹⁵

In late 1952 Lieutenant-General Simonds, as Chief of the General Staff, held a conference which was the first in a series of steps leading to the Kennedy Report.¹⁶ The necessity of an examination of the militia had its basis in the needs of N.A.T.O.¹⁷ and, seemingly, an even greater need to modernize militia policies in general to reflect the changes of the early 1950's.¹⁸ Simond's conference was attended by the General Officers Commanding (GOCs) of the several commands and, most importantly, by the Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.).¹⁹ The conference considered it desirable to obtain the views of the C.D.A. and of selected militia commanding officers on the organization, administration and training of the militia. To this end Simonds circulated a letter on 12 December 1952 to all GOCs and to the Chairman of the C.D.A. which summarized the findings of the conference. In the letter Simonds asked that the "...various arms consider this problem [of the speedy mobilization of the militia] and advise the president of their own corps associations of their views...."²⁰ Simonds asked for the corps associations to be ready to present these views at the C.D.A. meeting scheduled for 23 and 24 January 1953. In addition to

soliciting the views of his subordinates for the meeting Simonds, himself, "...submitted a memo (to the C.D.A. meeting) regarding certain proposals for the improvement of the Reserve Force."²¹ When the C.D.A. met in January it recommended the formation of a committee to make an extensive study of the militia with a view to informing the Minister of National Defence how the militia could "...adequately fulfill its role in the Defence of Canada and Canada's international commitments."²²

Once the board was convened under General Kennedy in May 1953 it carried out an extensive appraisal of the militia. The board visited all commands and areas of the Canadian Army and received confidential briefs from senior officers, both active and retired, of all army components. They visited a "wide range of summer training camps"²³ and in May 1953 they met the presidents of the several corps associations in Ottawa "upon the authority of the CGS."²⁴ The board's findings were completed on 14 January 1954 and submitted to the Chief of the General Staff. They were then examined by the C.D.A. and the GOCs of the five army commands.²⁵ The C.D.A. endorsed the proposed re-organization in principle but since they were denied access to the appendices affecting unit changes or mobilization commitments, their endorsement was made with reservations.²⁶ On the 18-19 March 1954 the Kennedy Report was discussed in some detail at the 12th CGS Conference as a means of implementing certain of the recommendations.²⁷ On 21 June 1954 the Minister of National Defence read into Hansard steps which were to be taken as a result of the report and early implementation of many of the recommendations was carried out. As early as 1 August 1954 action had been taken on some 57 subjects.²⁸

The findings in the Kennedy Report were extensive, as might be

expected in view of the purposes and broad scope of the terms of reference. Twenty-four major recommendations were made²⁹ and one section of the five comprising the report was concerned with the re-organization of militia units.³⁰ The 24 general recommendations covered a myriad of topics ranging from the role of the reserves, which will be considered later, to items of dress. Changes in unit organization were to take place in two areas. The concept of organizing the militia on a divisional structure was to be discarded as were brigade and other field headquarters. In their place Group Headquarters would be formed and given specific tasks in support of the units under their command.³¹ Secondly, extensive unit changes were recommended.

At the unit level proposed changes reflected the need for speedy mobilization as well as the need to adjust the roles of armour and artillery. The Kennedy Report suggested that quick mobilization could be achieved in "successive waves" by the establishment of "training regiments" which could "...draw personnel to man field force units on mobilization as required."³² It was felt that such regiments would function best in supporting corps such as ordnance and engineers. The unit changes proposed in armour and artillery reflected current doctrinal changes by increasing the number of armoured regiments by four, by converting eight anti-tank regiments to other arms, and by converting or absorbing 26 anti-aircraft regiments to other corps or types of artillery.³³ In the infantry it was proposed that a system be adopted of linking militia infantry battalions with both regular army units and with each other.³⁴ The organization of linked battalions meant that two militia battalions would train in peacetime with their unit identity but that upon mobilization one of the battalions would supply men for the other without

itself mobilizing. Which battalions would mobilize was not to be decided until an emergency took place. These plans were meant to produce 38 battalions initially (including the 15 active force battalions already in existence) with the potential of further mobilization of 31 battalions.³⁵ By April 1954 a draft of a new order of battle had been prepared by National Defence Headquarters³⁶ and by July plans existed to amalgamate, convert or disband 13 militia infantry battalions with three of them becoming armoured.³⁷ While eight militia units became linked with regular army battalions the idea of linking militia battalions with each other was eventually discarded; presumably because the necessity of mobilizing never arose.

The "major tasks", or roles,³⁸ of the militia were seen by the Kennedy Report as being, first, to:

...provide the nucleus of a partially trained and equipped force which may be quickly mobilized and brought up to strength in the case of emergency.

Secondly, in the event of an invasion of Canada,

...the units of the Reserve Force (would) provide assistance to the Active Force in containing and eliminating....

the enemy.³⁹ Perhaps the greatest weakness of the Kennedy Report was in the proposed roles since civil defence training was not mentioned and yet within two years it would be carried out by the militia and within five years it would be the militia's chief concern. The failure to mention civil defence training, or national survival training as it was later called, was seemingly not the board's fault but rather a result of neglect on the part of the Department of National Defence to advise the board that it should consider the question. Civil defence training

must have been topical while the Kennedy Report was being prepared since two months after its submission a confidential report on the subject was received by the Chiefs of Staff. The latter report considered the degree to which the armed forces might support civilian civil defence agencies.⁴⁰ In addition, in reviewing the roles suggested for the militia in the Kennedy Report, National Defence Headquarters wrote that they agreed,

...with the description of the roles and tasks of the Militia contained in this recommendation.

The review went on to say that:

In addition, it should be recognized that in many major centres throughout the country the local Militia units represent the only formed and cohesive organization capable of backing civil defence in the early stages of an emergency before the Civil Defence Organization becomes geared to war conditions.⁴¹

Thus it would seem that civil defence training was a current question within the Department of National Defence. It is suggested here that the Kennedy Report would have had greater long-term significance if its authors had been advised of the necessity of considering national survival training.

Three reasons might be assumed why the commission was not alerted to the possibility that national survival training might later be assigned to the militia. At the 12th Chief of the General Staff Conference held on 18-19 March 1954 it was agreed that the roles envisaged for the militia in the Kennedy Report were acceptable and it was also agreed that it would be dangerous to "highlight" any statements committing the militia to a civil defence role.⁴² Writing in later years Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson suggests that such reticence may have been the result of "... the bureaucratic attitude of senior officials in the Department of Nat-

ional Defence."⁴³ If such an attitude existed within weeks of the Kennedy Report being published it would not be unreasonable to think that it probably existed prior to publication and a reluctance to inform the board of civil defence matters hindered the board. A more legitimate reason for not having informed the board of the needs of civil defence might have resulted from a wish to allow them greater independence in their investigations. A third reason for the board not considering civil defence tasking might have grown from the army's reluctance to become involved with it. This reluctance was shown in 1952 and 1953 when an army policy statement saw the armed forces role as one of providing assistance to the civil powers in a civil defence emergency⁴⁴ and when a request by the Winnipeg Metropolitan Civil Defence Board for staff assistance in planning was refused.⁴⁵

The result of not mentioning civil defence in the Kennedy Report was that beneficial recommendations were largely vitiated when the national survival role was later assigned to the militia.⁴⁶ It will be seen below that the 1956 to 1959 period was an unsettling one for the militia in part because of obscure roles.⁴⁷ Following the publication of the Kennedy Report, however, the mid-1950's had seen the militia prosper.⁴⁸ For instance summer camp attendance in Western Command showed a marked improvement from 1953 to 1955 as the following table indicates. Other indices of militia prosperity following the Kennedy Report were an increase in efficiency⁴⁹ and increased regular army interest and support.⁵⁰ Despite the good effects of the Kennedy Report, difficulties arose later with the introduction of national survival as a militia role. These will be considered in subsequent chapters.

Unit	Strength			
	Officers		Other Ranks	
	1952	1955	1952	1955
The King's Own Calgary Regiment	0	20	5	79
The Rocky Mountain Rangers	8	14	28	77
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment	6	19	15	85
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada	9	29	38	107

Table VIII. Summer Camp Attendance for Selected Western Command Units in 1952 and 1955.⁵¹

Chapter 4 Footnotes

1 Preface, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, p. 1.

2 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

3 Canada, Commons Debates, 31 August 1950, p. 99.

4 L.B. Pearson: "The furnishing to the United Nations on short notice of expeditionary forces capable of quick deployment in distant areas wherever acts of aggression might take place had not, I admit, entered into our planning as it had not entered into the planning of any other country."

Canada, Commons Debates, 31 August 1950, p. 94.

5 Loc. cit.

6 In 1951 B. Claxton stated that the three objectives of Canadian national defence were to defend Canada from direct attack, to have an organization to build up strength in a total war and to be able to implement "...any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the United Nations or under the North Atlantic treaty or other agreement for collective security...."

Canada, Commons Debates, 5 February 1951, p. 91.

7 Even prior to the Korean war, and the attendant mobilization difficulties, a reliance upon reservists had been questioned in parliament. In reporting on a Paris N.A.T.O. meeting Claxton, on 5 June 1950, had mentioned the idea of "balanced collective forces" which would have seen N.A.T.O. member nations contribute the forces they were best able to provide. In enlarging on the theory Claxton went on to say that: "This principle may come to mean the further application to defence of new techniques and tactics of scientific warfare; and eventually, possibly, the abandonment of the old concept of defence by great masses of conscripted infantry, the bulk of which would be reservists called up on the outbreak of war."

Canada, Commons Debates, 5 June 1950, p. 3189.

8 See footnote 6.

9 "Organization, Administration and Training of the Canadian Army Reserve Force," under covering letter Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, "Reserve Force Organization," HQC 2001-3/1 (CGS) vol. 4, 12 December 1952, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

10 Canada, Commons Debates, 20 June 1956, p. 5215.

11 P. Regenstreit referred to the period before 1957 as one of "...relative calm, economic certainty, and even prosperity, with international affairs stabilized...."

P. Regenstreit, "The Canadian General Election of 1958," Western Political Quarterly, vol. 13 (June 1960), p. 352.

12 In 1953 \$1,882 million was spent on defence out of a budget of \$4,337 million. Defence spending thus amounted to 43 per cent of the national budget.

"Details of Expenditure, Years Ended March 31, 1950-53," Canada Year Book, 1954, pp. 1068, 1069.

13 The effects of the complexity of the nuclear question upon the militia will be considered in chapter 5.

14 Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds' letter to Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, 17 February 1952 quoted in Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil-defence Training," Policy By Other Means, ed. M. Cross and R. Bothwell, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1972, p. 223.

15 Part III, General Recommendations, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, p. 1.

16 See Appendix "K".

17 "...the strategic problem of the NATO alliance in the defence of Western Europe is to check a hostile invasion in the first critical weeks and months. In the light of this concept, a mobilization of the Reserve Force...would require the speedy mobilization of an immediate back-up for the initial forces in being...."

"Organization, Administration and Training of the Canadian Army Reserve Force," Simonds, loc. cit.

18 Simonds' paper, once it had noted the importance of N.A.T.O., went on to discuss most other militia matters while noting that "the essence of the problem" lay in improving "...the organization, administration and training of the Canadian Army Reserve Force within the framework of existing manpower and financial provisions."

Ibid., pp. 1-5.

19 The Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.) was, and is, the co-ordinating body for a number of defence associations such as the Royal Canadian Artillery Association and the Canadian Infantry Associations. The defence associations meet separately and annually and may forward resolutions on defence matters to the C.D.A. which also meets annually. These resolutions may be amended, combined or otherwise dealt with but, most importantly, they may be forwarded as a question to the Minister of National Defence or one of his staff officers. In such cases there is usually a ministerial reply from the Department of National Defence.

20 Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, "Reserve Force Organization,"

HQC 2001-3/1 (CGS) vol. 4, 12 December 1952, Directorate of History files.

21 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1952, Ottawa, 23-25 October 1952, p. 17.

22 Resolution Number 1/53, "CGS Memorandum," Minutes CDA 16th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 22-24 January 1953,

23 Preface, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, p. 3.

24 Brigadier A.W. Beament, "Opening Address and Report by Chairman," Minutes CDA 17th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 20-23 January 1954.

25 Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Montreal, 12-14 November 1953, p. 50.

26 Recommendation Number 13, Minutes CDA 17th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 20-23 January 1953.

27 "Minutes, 12th CGS Conference with GOCs, 18-19 March 1954", HQS 1300-75/1A TD 22, Ottawa, Directorate of History files, passim.

28 Progress Report Number 9, "Report of Board of Officers On Reorganization of the Reserve Force," 1 August 1954, Directorate of History files, passim.

29 Part I, Summary of Recommendations, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 17 January 1953, pp. 1-6.

30 Part IV, Reorganization of the Reserve Force, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 17 January 1953, pp. 1-6.

Part IV of the Kennedy Report contained twelve appendices. It was these appendices to which the C.D.A. was denied access and which resulted in the C.D.A. withholding complete endorsement of the report.

Appendices A-L to Part IV, Reorganization of the Reserve Force, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 17 January 1953.

31 Part IV, Reorganization of the Reserve Force, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 17 January 1953, pp. 2-3.

32 Ibid., pp. 1-2.

33 Ibid., pp. 3-5.

The Kennedy Report did well in anticipating the doctrinal changes for armour and artillery which took nuclear warfare into consideration. The principal needs in such warfare would be for armour with its

mobility and personal protection and for heavier artillery to cover gaps between units which dispersion would bring about. The board also accepted a suggested deferral in forming anti-aircraft regiments "...pending approval of a new plan for the country's anti-aircraft defence." This decreased emphasis on conventional anti-aircraft artillery together with the conversion of eight anti-aircraft regiments was a recognition that rockets and guided missiles should become part of Canada's arsenal. The following references consider changes in the period.

Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1972, vol. 2, p. 597; Director of Artillery, "Guns and Guided Missiles," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 9 (April 1955), pp. 49-64; Major-General F.W. von Mellenthin, "Armour In the Atomic Age," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 14 (Summer 1960), pp. 53-59; Colonel A.J.B. Bailey, "The Age of Nuclear Gunners," Canadian Army Journals, vol 11 (July 1957), pp. 5-19; Director of Public Relations (Army), "Fourth Armoured Regiment Formed," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 13 (January 1959), pp. 15-16.

34 Part IV, Reorganization of the Reserve Force, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1953. pp. 3-4.

35 Loc. cit.

36 "12th CGS Conference with GOCs," op. cit., p. 3.

37 Appendix "B" to Headquarters Prairie Command, "Reorganization - Canadian Army (Militia)," PCS 2001-3/1 TD 2 (GOC), Winnipeg, 9 July 1954, Directorate of History files, p. 5.

38 The Kennedy Report did not differentiate greatly between the terms "role" and "task." The board wrote that it, "...recommends that the role of the Reserve Force be made clear to the people of Canada and that the following be recognized and accepted as its major tasks...." No further clarification of roles was made.

Part III, General Recommendations, Report of the Board of Officers On Organization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1953, p. 1.

39 Loc. cit.

40 "Assistance of the Armed Forces in Civil Defence," 11 March 1954, cited in Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil-defence Training," loc. cit.

41 National Defence Headquarters, "Summary of Action to Implement the Report of the Board of Officers," not dated, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

42 "It was agreed that there would be no 'highlighting' of such a statement (on civil defence) in any information released to the general public."

"12th CGS Conference with GOCs," op. cit., p. 1.

43 Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil-defence Training," p. 225.

44 Canadian Army Policy Statement No. 90, 17 January 1952, cited in Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil-defence Training," p. 222.

45 Major-General H.A. Sparling, Vice Chief of the General Staff to General Officer Commanding Prairie Command, 14 April 1953, cited in Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil-defence Training," p. 222.

46 For three reasons it would be tedious to attempt to trace the eventual course of many of the recommendations of the Kennedy Report. In the first place many of them were of a minor nature. Such items included the replacement of band instruments and the provision of cadet uniforms and the only wonder is that such matters could not have been handled through normal administrative channels. Secondly, some of the recommendations were simply allowed to lapse. An example of this exists in the appointment of an Advisor to the Chief of the General Staff on militia matters. This office was not filled after 1958. (Twelve years later a similar office was created with the appointment of a Major-General Reserves.) Finally, the national survival role had eclipsed the roles of the various corps of the militia by the late 1950's and as a result some of the more important Kennedy Report recommendations were lost.

Resolution Number 14, Appointment of Advisor On Militia (R.C.A.-C.A.), Proceedings, 25 Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 12-13 January 1962; Leo Cadieux, "Statement by the Honourable Leo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence, 19 December 1969," Ottawa Information Services, Department of National Defence, 19 December 1969, p. 4.

47 "During the period 1946 to 1959 the roles of the Militia appeared to be obscurely defined."

Terms of Reference, Appendix "A" to Part I of The Commission On the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964, p. 42.

48 While the good effects of the Kennedy Report are not disputed there were indications, albeit of a minor nature, that the militia was enjoying minor prosperity even prior to the report's submission. National strength had risen from 34,986 in 1950-1951 to 49,278 in 1951-1952 and remained fairly constant while the Kennedy Report was being written. While it was the opinion of one Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Murrell that the "Strength of Reserve Force units is based on paper strength..." the Saskatoon Light Infantry "at least doubled" its effective strength in the 1953-1954 period before the Kennedy Report recommendations took effect. The Canadian Scottish Regiment might have been an example of increased effectiveness; by 20 July 1953 the regiment's strength was only 124 but only nine of these were non-effective. This was in contrast to three years earlier when an inspection showed a large number of inaccuracies in non-effective returns and the "Unit [was]

advised to take measures to reduce numbers [of non-effectives]."

"Strengths, Defence Appropriations and Expenditures during Past Twenty-Five Years," Appendix 6 to Department of National Defence: Report for the Fiscal Year 1953-1954, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1955, p. 73; Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Murrell, letter from Garrison Commander, Lakehead Area to Brigadier D.M. Clark, President, Canadian Infantry Association, Port Arthur, 19 January 1953, Directorate of History files: Headquarters Saskatchewan Area to Headquarters Prairie Command, "Reorganization Canadian Army Militia," Regina, 18 August 1954, Directorate of History files, p. 3; "Strength Recapitulation," Appendix to Part 2 Order Number 23, 20 July 1953, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria; Headquarters, British Columbia Area letter to Headquarters, Western Command, "Report On Annual Inspection, C Scot R, 3 April 1950," BC 5-2-14-6 (GS), Vancouver, 13 April 1950, Directorate of History files.

49 "Commenting on the success of the camp programme last year, Major-General H.F.G. Letson, CB, CBE, MC, ED, CD, Advisor on Militia to the Chief of the General Staff, said, 'It is clear that the morale and enthusiasm of the Militia has increased.' He added, 'There has been a marked revival of interest in militia matters with a resulting increase in efficiency.'"

Directorate of Public Relations (National Defence), "A Review of Militia Camp Training," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 10 (January 1956), p. 45.

50 In 1950 in Western Command the annual training directive had been written primarily for the regular army with only four pages devoted to militia training. By the mid-1950's greater attention was paid to the militia in training matters when Western Command published a 79 page volume devoted to militia training.

Western Command Headquarters, Western Command Policy of Training 1950-51, Edmonton, 9 May 1950; Headquarters Western Command, Western Command Training Directive 1957/58, Edmonton, 14 November 1957.

51 Headquarters, Western Command, Appendix "B" to Final Report Exercise Buffalo IV, Edmonton, 18 September 1953, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria; Camp Commandant, Sarcee Militia Camp, Part 2 Orders Number 18, 19, 22, 26, 27, 17 July 22-July 1955, the Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's) files.

Chapter 5

Civil Defence and National Survival

In 1951 an order-in-council had given all "...powers, duties and functions relating to civil defence" from the Minister of National Defence to the Department of Health and Welfare.¹ In the next year a series of measures were begun which were to culminate with the role of the militia becoming one of national survival² by 1959. Until 1957 the Liberal government placed an increasing, yet limited, responsibility for civil defence training upon the militia. Following 1957 a Conservative government stressed civil defence training and continued to do so throughout the remainder of the 1950's. In the early 1960's, while national survival was retained as the militia's primary role, there were indications that corps training might gain in importance,³ and by 1963 the militia's role had begun to be reoriented towards corps training.⁴

Throughout all of the 1950's the enormity of the nuclear question looked for answers which were "as much theological as technological"⁵ and, under the circumstances, the most any government could hope to do, as James Eayrs pointed out, was "...to steer a middle and, it hoped, a reasonable course."⁶ In trying for such a course the Liberal government, if not complacent, seems to have been as much concerned about the possibility of spreading alarm as anything else. In 1949 Russia exploded a nuclear device and in the same year "U.S. planners" advised the Canadian Chief of the General Staff (CGS) that it was estimated that by 1954 Russia would be able to deliver 150 atomic bombs on North America by missile, submarine, and airplane.⁷ In 1950 Brooke

Claxton, the Minister of National Defence, said that:

At the present time no potential enemy is believed to have the aircraft or a stockpile of atomic bombs sufficient to permit a series of saturation raids on North America. Moreover, compared to several other countries, Canada does not have many targets that would appear to justify the employment of an A-bomb out of present stocks.⁸

The complacency found in Claxton's 1950 statement was continued into the mid-1950's. Six months after Russia had exploded her first hydrogen bomb, and after it was known that she had the capability of launching them upon North America,⁹ Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, as CGS, addressed the 17th Annual Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.) in January 1954. General Simonds covered some half dozen topics, one of which was civil defence, but in referring to the militia he placed emphasis upon the ability of the reserves to mobilize and train for conventional warfare.¹⁰ Brooke Claxton spoke at the same meeting and he foresaw, "...no new commitments for the armed forces as current commitments maintained are all the allotment of funds will permit."¹¹

By the middle of the decade not only was the nuclear threat minimized but, quite erroneously,¹² the government seemed to believe that a period of military stabilization was at hand. In speaking to the C.D.A. in January 1956 Ralph Campney, the Minister of National Defence,¹³ noted an "improved world situation" and echoed the remarks of Claxton in foreseeing no new commitments.¹⁴ While Campney noted that the danger of war was always present, he seems to have thought in terms of conventional war and his ideas were enlarged upon by Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham. Graham, who had succeeded Simonds as CGS, alluded at the same meeting to the Korean Mobilization and said that, "The world situation might cause another call on the Militia."¹⁵ While ministers

were doubtless influenced by a growing nuclear missile threat¹⁶ the belief that a period of international stability had arrived seems to have given rise to a disinclination to take major steps in civil defence preparations.

The lack of major policy in planning for civil defence prior to 1957 is illustrated by the steps which were taken. In 1952 the army issued a policy statement which noted that the responsibility for civil defence rested with the civil authorities providing assistance in certain matters.¹⁷ Two years later at the 12th Chief of the General Staff Conference plans were laid for the first mobile army civil defence columns. This was done because of the assumption that Russia possessed the hydrogen bomb and reality dictated the need for some support of the "Civil Defence organization."¹⁸ At the same conference the "danger" of allowing the militia to be committed to civil defence was realized¹⁹ and, as seen in Chapter 4, it was agreed there would be no "highlighting" of the militia in any mentioning of national survival.²⁰ In the summer of 1954 civil defence was not mentioned in a comprehensive General Staff Instruction (GSI)²¹ dealing with military training. However an amendment was published in the fall of 1956 which made civil defence training a part of the Instruction.²² In April 1956 a GSI²³ was issued which viewed national survival as a task similar to any other assistance the armed forces might provide to civilian authorities. This was the first time in which plans included the militia in the civil defence role and, incidentally, the principal planning authorities, the General Officers Commanding (GOCs), were to keep the "role on mobilization in mind."²⁴ In October 1956 the General Staff training directive was issued to cover the April 1957 to March 1958 period. This directive called for a nucleus

of militia units capable of assisting the civil defence organizations.²⁵

The results of Liberal policy in civil defence preparations were meagre. In 1956 the Minister of National Defence wrote that:

The training programme is a further development of existing policy whereby the Armed Forces have been ready to assist Civil Defence authorities in the same manner in which they now give assistance to the civilian authorities in any type of emergency or disaster.²⁶

At the unit level training to give civil defence assistance required little if the Canadian Scottish can serve as an example. That regiment appointed one officer as Atomic, Biological, Chemical Defence (ABCD) Officer and required that sub-units carry out "...at least one lecture or demonstration (on ABCD warfare) per month commencing 1 January 1957."²⁷ While other units might have done more in ABCD training, later attitudes towards the subject would indicate a reluctance to have become deeply involved with it.

While, under the Liberal administration, civil defence had been treated as a part of normal militia training, when a Conservative government took office after 10 June 1957 steps were taken to increase the militia's responsibilities towards civil defence. On 1 October 1957 Army Headquarters issued an "Annual Training Directive 1957-58" which said that, "Emphasis will be given to civil defence."²⁸ This was the first clear indication that civil defence was to be of major importance to the militia. Furthermore the manner in which the directive was promulgated to militia units was of some significance in showing a determination that civil defence training would be carried out. In June 1957 Army Headquarters had issued its annual training directive for 1957-1958.²⁹ It may be assumed this directive had been in preparation prior to the

election on 10 June. At the Command level, following the issue of the new "Annual Training Directive 1957-58" on 1 October it was necessary to revise the June directive mid-way in the training year.³⁰ Obviously the normal cycle of army training had been interrupted and in view of the magnitude of the resulting changes³¹ it can only be thought that the interruption was a result of political direction.

Whether the initiative in assigning a larger civil defence role to the militia, as opposed to the implementation of plans for doing so on 1 October 1957, came from the government or from the army is a matter of conjecture. It is the current belief of Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson that Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham, who was Chief of the General Staff in 1957, would not have "...initiated or enthusiastically supported a modification of the role of the Militia [towards increased civil defence training] had he not been under political pressure to do so."³² General Graham, writing in 1977, said that he believed "...the initiative in this matter came from the Chiefs [of Staff Committee]."³³ This might be seen as support for Nicholson's contention that General Graham's personal attitude was, at its strongest, neutral towards increased civil defence training for the militia.³⁴ Graham went on to say that, "certainly the Minister of Defence and, I assume, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet concurred in the Chiefs' appreciation.... [that the militia should be trained in a civil defence role.]" It was of little immediate importance to the militia whether the initiative for the October plans, or their promulgation, was the result of government or of army policy. What was of greater significance was that the plans had ministerial approval. This was indicative of a natural concern about the threat of nuclear war and the government's resolve to train the militia in preparing for it.

Some of the reasons for assigning a civil defence role to the militia existed during the Liberal term of office while others became apparent during the Conservative administration after June 1957. It is convenient to examine together the common reasons for both governments giving the militia the role. The steps taken by the Conservatives to strengthen the civil defence role and the results of their policy will be considered later.

One of the reasons both governments assigned the militia a civil defence role was that the growth of the "forces-in-being" concept referred to in Chapter 4 meant that the necessity for reserves for purely military tasks lessened. The reliance upon such forces continued throughout the 1950's³⁵ and was given emphasis by the growth of alliances,³⁶ the accepted rise of United States leadership,³⁷ and the growing demands for peace-keeping forces.³⁸ These factors led to an expectation on the part of Canada's allies that immediate support would be available and not the promise of a mobilization of reserves.

A second reason for assigning the militia a civil defence role was that no one else wanted it. The Department of Health and Welfare had become the central federal authority for civil defence matters in 1951 and seven years later the Minister, Waldo Monteith, for "various reasons"³⁹ was trying to divest Health and Welfare of the responsibility. In 1955 Lieutenant-General Simonds, as CGS, stated that in his view the Canadian Army should assist in civil defence but that it was not "...a means of relieving the civil authorities of their proper responsibilities."⁴⁰ Simonds' successor, Lieutenant-General Graham, said later in the same year that, "The service...should assist but

not be part of the civil defence organization."⁴¹ In November 1956 General Graham "...elaborated on co-operation with civil defence, but stated that the primary role of the Militia was as a Military Force."⁴²

When G.R. Pearkes became Minister of National Defence he wanted to "...ensure that an efficient civil defence system was created" but he "did not want to assume full responsibility..." for civil defence.⁴³

The disinclination of departments to assume the major responsibility for civil defence did not mean that the sole hope for national survival came to rest with the militia since the regular army and the "civil defence organization" were to continue to train for civil defence.⁴⁴ Within the Department of National Defence however, the amount of emphasis given to the militia's training requirements was a matter of some discretion⁴⁵ and eventually the tasks which no one else seemed to want became the chief concern of the militia.⁴⁶

The third reason for assigning the militia a civil defence role was that it was a logical role for the reserves and not to have done so might have raised questions regarding the purpose of the militia. It seemed logical to give the militia a civil defence role in a decade of nuclear concern because of the geographic dispersion of units, because of the organizational structure of the militia, and because of the training it received in subjects such as engineering and communications.⁴⁷

In later years Lieutenant-General S.F. Clark was to remark that:

What was involved primarily was to teach not only the Militia but the regular force how to rescue and look after people if our country was hit. To me this was sensible.⁴⁸

Clark's ideas were shared by others. G.R. Pearkes, as Minister of National Defence, felt that:

If they [the reserves] were given a civil defence role as well as their traditional training...there would be less criticism of their place in national survival.⁴⁹

W.M. Johnson, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Member of Parliament from Kindersley, agreed and said that:

The militia might very well be geared to playing a most useful role connected with civil defence. If this were done they would be fulfilling a useful role and I am certain that those who are members of the militia would be happier to know that they in fact had a more vital part to play in the defence of Canada than is the case at the present time.⁵⁰

For these reasons the Conservative government took an early and strong stand in adopting national survival. The government's concern became increasingly apparent when it was announced on 22 July 1958 that Lieutenant-General Graham, the retired Chief of General Staff, had been appointed to "...make a complete study of the civil defence organization in Canada."⁵¹ The Graham report led to John Diefenbaker, the Prime Minister, outlining to parliament, on 23 March 1959, the steps which would be taken to re-structure civil defence.⁵² It was noted that the reserve force was necessary for the regular army to carry out its civil defence functions. Two months after Diefenbaker's statement Civil Defence Order, 1959⁵³ was passed which outlined the "powers, duties and functions" in national survival for the Departments of National Defence, Health and Welfare, Justice and for the Office of the Prime Minister. The latter would carry out its functions through the Emergency Measures Organization. In August 1959 Major-General A.E. Wrinch was appointed Major-General Survival with responsibilities for forming national survival training policies and directing the army in its new tasks.⁵⁴

The results of giving the militia a primary role of national

survival training were disappointing. There was probably a decline in the number of experienced militia soldiers as their place was taken by younger men. It will also be seen that training results were suspect. Figures for random years show that in 1952 militia strength was 48,306; in 1955, 43,398; in January 1960, 40,090; in December 1960, 42,661; in 1961, 40,892; in June 1962, 65,558; in 1963-1964 there was an average strength of 51,184; and by June 1964 the strength was 46,673.⁵⁵ With the exception of the June 1962 figure, whose significance will be considered below, the strength level shows consistency, and there was even a slight increase during the years when national survival training was stressed. Despite this the manpower needs of national survival caused the Royal Canadian Artillery Association (R.C.A.A.) to forward a resolution to the Conference of Defence Associations in 1956 which expressed concern over the low numbers available "in the event of a national disaster."⁵⁶ The Conference of Defence Associations acted upon the resolution and when submitting it to the Minister of National Defence a strong memorandum was sent in support of the resolution.⁵⁷ In later years the militia showed more concern about roles and less about manpower and recruiting.⁵⁸ This reduced emphasis on recruiting concern came about when the introduction of a Young Soldier Training Plan (YSTP) gave the illusion that recruiting needs were being met.

The adoption of YSTP was necessitated by what might be termed the fragmentation of the militia at the unit level in the 1950's. For instance in 1956 the nearly 2,000 militia soldiers at Wainright summer camp came from "118 Militia units and detachments."⁵⁹ In the summer of 1958 artillery units of Prairie and Western Commands were attached to 2 Royal Canadian Horse Artillery at Camp Shilo for annual training. From

the two Commands, eight regiments and three independent batteries sent a total of 260 men to camp.⁶⁰ Because of such conditions⁶¹ it was felt that manpower needs could be partially met by enlisting high school students in the sixteen to nineteen year age group. What made the YSTP plan unique was that it catered to the needs and aspirations of the young militia soldier. The results were gratifying.⁶² The plan seems to have originated in 1957 with The Loyal Edmonton Regiment (3 Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) and it was soon emulated in other areas.⁶³ By 1959 YSTP was being considered in eastern Canada⁶⁴ and in British Columbia, for instance, success was such that vacancies existed for 1,120 high school students for the 1959/1960 training year.⁶⁵ Most importantly, it was found that, based upon attendance, the effectiveness of the young soldier was higher than that of his older counterpart.⁶⁶

It is not known how much the strength figures of the 1950's and 1960's depend upon YSTP soldiers however if the percentage was high, and it probably was,⁶⁷ then from the viewpoint of manpower the militia was ill-prepared to carry out its national survival role. At the heart of the national survival concept was the expectation that militia units would serve as cadres to "...provide the leadership and command organization needed in an emergency."⁶⁸ For example it was expected that a Mobile Survival Column would consist of 120 soldiers who would direct 380 civilian volunteers. There were to be an additional 200 supporting troops and civilians.⁶⁹ It was hoped that the 380 civilians would, in part, come from occupational groups such as doctors, cooks, truck drivers, construction workers, and welders.⁷⁰ Because of their youth it is unlikely that YSTP soldiers would have been able to have exerted much

leadership towards older members of the civilian volunteers in an atomic attack.⁷¹

A second recruiting plan also complicates an assessment of the militia's efficiency, based on strength, at the time when national survival was a major concern. It has been seen that in 1962 there was a sharp increase in militia strength to 65,558 men. This was a result of the Special Militia Training Programme (SMTP) which was run from November 1961 to May 1962. The programme had its beginning in August 1960 when the Army Policy Co-Ordination Committee felt that an expansion of army trades training schools might benefit both army recruiting and the civilian economy.⁷² A month later the Director General of Military Training produced a plan for training 10,000 militia soldiers for three to seven months in a variety of trades which would have had civilian application.⁷³ By November 1961, when the programme was instituted, both its purpose and the numbers involved had changed. The purpose become to train men "...in fundamental military skills and in rescue operations."⁷⁴ On 23 November 1961 PC 4/3144 of 1947 was revoked which had placed a 90,000 man ceiling on the militia.⁷⁵ Provision was made for training a total of 100,000 men in four six-week courses over the winter.⁷⁶ The programme was one of mixed success. The course⁷⁷ was completed by 61,802 men and 22,564 said they would be staying in the militia.⁷⁸ Whether or not they did cannot be determined. However, as seen above, by 1963 the militia's strength was back down to 51,184. In the long run the SMTP was of little significance to the militia; certainly not as much as the YSTP which provided an impetus of vigorous idealism when the militia perhaps needed it most.⁷⁹ In the short run the maturity⁸⁰ and presence of the SMTP men would have been of some worth if they had been needed

for national survival duties.⁸¹

A second disappointment in tasking the militia with a primary role of national survival was that it is unlikely that successful training was carried out. There were a number of reasons for this. The shortage of manpower considered above, combined with a shortage of equipment⁸² and training time,⁸³ precluded much large scale training even if essential civilian bodies had been inclined to participate in supporting national survival training.⁸⁴ As it was .2 per cent of Montreal's population, or 3,227 men, were in the militia in 1961 and, as a further example, .45 per cent of Toronto's.⁸⁵ In Vancouver the effect of low strength in the Irish Fusiliers of Canada (The Vancouver Regiment) meant that the 941 Mobile Survival Column (MSC) formed by the unit had only 44 men instead of the 120 it needed.⁸⁶ With such low numbers attempts at realistic training, in an already theoretical subject, were limited and as late as 1962 the 941 MSC was further limited since units meant to support the Irish Fusiliers had not even been designated. These were to have been the transport and medical companies and the decontamination and police platoons.⁸⁷ The slow implementation of government policy after 1959 may also have affected training since by 1960 the regular army seems to have been uncertain of some training requirements. The Director of Militia and Cadets wrote in late 1960 that:

It is assumed that by end 1960 (sic) the detailed requirements of the Militia in national survival will be known and that a clear picture of the total training and administrative Requirements will emerge.⁸⁸

In the summer of 1961 the Director of Survival Operations and Plans was, with the Cabinet Committee on Emergency Plans, considering what the requirements would be to man an as yet unspecified number of MSCs.⁸⁹ A

third reason for less than full effectiveness in national survival training was simply that the subjects taught had little appeal for the soldiers under training. Writing in the Canadian Army Journal Lieutenant-Colonel F.S. Wotton said that:

Collective training has always been more interesting than individual training. Those in the Militia and Regular forces have almost reached the saturation point in knot-tying, lashings, bandages and somewhat dry general lectures.⁹⁰

Even at the collective level of training national survival subjects had little appeal. Following a summer camp in 1960 it was suggested that:

The officers must accept the fact that National Survival is one of the roles the Canadian Army has been given and it is their duty as officers to inform themselves of how to perform this task.

....

It is felt that the whole of 19 Militia Group must accept the National Survival Role and must start thinking as a Task Force Headquarters not after they arrive in Camp, but right at the commencement of the training year.⁹¹

Inadequate training eventually resulted in the Canadian Infantry Association asking that, "A programme of training calculated to maintain the interest of militia soldiers be evolved, said programme to include the required skills in National Survival...."⁹²

The end of an emphasis on national survival training for the militia began in 1961, and by 1963 such training had begun to assume a low priority. The termination of the role seems to have been the result of three factors. First, the failures of the militia to meet the role, which have been examined, probably influenced the decision to abandon it. Second, continued opposition to the role on the part of the several defence associations seem to have convinced the Conservative government that an unpopular role was not ideal for a volunteer force. Initially

the defence associations had seen virtue in national survival training and had wanted the subject examined. In January 1958, with an emphasis growing on civil defence, the C.D.A. asked that a body similar to the Kennedy board be called to consider the relationship between civil defence and the militia. The Department of National Defence reply, while not discouraging, was non-committal.⁹³ In 1958 the president of the Canadian Infantry Association, Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Horsey, noted that "...our primary role is that of being militia and soldiers" but he also urged that preparations for a nuclear war necessitated "a different approach in the matter of national defence."⁹⁴ In November 1959 the reaction of the C.I.A. to Civil Defence Order, 1959 was that "...the Militia is a military organization and not one devoted entirely to the role of civil defence."⁹⁵ By the 1960's the defence associations were taking an even firmer stand against national survival training. In 1960 the C.D.A. expressed apprehension that the usefulness of the militia would be "dissipated by reason of misdirection"⁹⁶ in view of the role it had been given. In 1961 seeming exasperation with the "acute" problems raised by the armour, artillery, and infantry not having military roles⁹⁷ led to a C.D.A. suggestion that if neither the government or the Canadian people foresaw the need of the militia in a "purely military role" then,

...the proper action to be taken at the present time is to abolish the Militia and transfer its resources of men and material to an organization charged with national survival only.⁹⁸

Not all resolutions were filled with the same despair and the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association in particular⁹⁹ attempted to introduce armoured training within the framework of national survival.¹⁰⁰ In 1961 the Minister of National Defence, D.S. Harkness, admitted the possibility

of "limited" conventional war and the necessity of training for it.¹⁰¹ In the following year the Department of National Defence answered a C.D.A. resolution calling for an increase in corps training for armour, artillery and infantry. The department agreed that 25 per cent of training would be in corps subjects and to this end 22 trades were introduced which would have application to field operations as well as national survival.¹⁰²

The third reason for terminating an emphasis of the national survival role arose from a conviction of the Western powers, which was shared by Canada, that a new reliance should be placed upon conventional forces. In speaking before the Conference of Defence Associations in January 1961, Harkness called for balanced and versatile forces.¹⁰³ On 25 May 1961 President Kennedy of the United States told the House of Representatives that, "To meet the changing conditions of power we have endorsed an increased emphasis on N.A.T.O. conventional strength."¹⁰⁴ Kennedy went on to note that a re-structuring of the army would increase non-nuclear firepower, it would allow for the deployment of ten reserve divisions in less than eight weeks, and it would give "...further increases in our flexibility, our adaptability and our readiness."¹⁰⁵ A year later, in Great Britain, the Minister of Defence, Harold Watkinson, in reporting to the Commons on a N.A.T.O. Council ministerial meeting in May 1962, rejected a dependence upon nuclear weapons. He also announced the reinforcing of the British Army of the Rhine and, when asked, placed the acquisition of medium range ballistic missiles low in priority.¹⁰⁶ A week after Watkinson's statements retired Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery spoke on the deterrent use of a non-nuclear army. He said

that:

It must not only be a good army, it must be seen to be a good army. It will then be a deterrent for cold war, limited war, and nuclear war....¹⁰⁷

In short there was general agreement that while the "...nuclear deterrent must...be kept strong"¹⁰⁸ the nuclear fear which had haunted the 1950's had abated somewhat.¹⁰⁹ With such beliefs current, and following the partial failures of national survival training, the militia was more than ready to leave national survival training. The final catalyst enabling them to do so came in October 1963 when Lieutenant-General G. Walsh, the Chief of the General Staff, said that:

National survival has received a great deal of emphasis in the last three years. I believe now it is time for the militia to go back to their corps training.¹¹⁰

Chapter 5 Footnotes

1 P.C. 985 of 23 February 1951 cited in Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil-defence Training," Policy By Other Means, ed. Michael Cross and Robert Bothwell, Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1972, p. 222.

2 The term "civil defence" was replaced in 1959 training directives with "national survival." It had been felt that "civil defence" was a term which harmed the militia's image. Both terms are used here with "national survival" used in reference to later times.

"Resolutions Adopted by the 21st Annual Meeting of the C.D.A., 23-25 January 1958, Resolution No. 1/58," cited in Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Calgary, 11-13 September 1957, p. 39; "Report of the President," Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 25-27 November 1959.

3 "Recent statements by the Minister (Hansard, 2 March 1961) have indicated the continuing need of forces to meet the threat of limited conventional wars, and recently the Minister directed that some corps training of the arms units be reintroduced."

"Organization, Canadian Army Militia," Directorate of Staff Duties study, HQS 2001-3/1 (SD 1), 26 July 1961, p. 2, presented to Army Policy Co-ordinating Committee Sub-Committee, Study of Military Organization, HQS 2001-3/1 (DMC 1), 2 August 1961, Directorate of History files.

4 See page 86.

5 James Eayrs, "Canadian Defence Policies Since 1867," Supplement 1964-1965 to Special Studies Prepared for the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, Ottawa, 1965, p. 19.

Some of the most cogent questions concerning the nuclear dilemma were posed in a series of British Broadcasting Corporation lectures by G.F. Kennan in 1957. He posited, among other things, that if mankind had to "flee like haunted creatures" then we would be better off to "divest ourselves of this weapon altogether...stake our safety on God's grace and...at least walk like men...as long as we are permitted."

George F. Kennan, Russia, The Atom, and the West: The BBC Reith Lectures 1957, London, Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 55.

6 Eayrs, Loc. cit.

7 James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence, University of Toronto Press, 1972, p. 359.

8 Brooke Claxton, Organization for Civil Defence: Manual No. 1, Ottawa, October 1959, p. 4.

9 Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, pp. 363-364.

10 "Address by Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds," Minutes Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 20-23 January 1954.

11 "Address by Minister of National Defence," Minutes Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 20-23 January 1954.

12 In June 1956 revolts took place in Poland, in July the Suez crisis took place, and in November insurrection was put down in Hungary. In May 1958 American intervention took place in Lebanon.

13 Campney had succeeded Claxton as Minister of National Defence on 1 July 1954.

14 Report Conference of Defence Associations 19th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 19-21 January 1956.

15 Loc. cit.

16 Writing in 1977 Lieutenant-General Graham said: "I believe the Soviets had fired a long-range ballistic missile earlier than 1957 which foreshadowed the I.C.B.M. - hence influencing any decisions."

Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham, letter to the writer, 22 February 1977.

17 Nicholson, op. cit., p. 222.

18 "Minutes, 12th CGS Conference with GOCs, 18-19 March 1954," HQS 1300-75/1A TD 22, Ottawa, Directorate of History files, p. 12.

19 The Minutes of the 12 CGS Conference did not elaborate on what the "danger" was however a retired adjutant-general of the Canadian Army, Major-General W.H.S. Macklin probably reflected some current thinking. He said it would be "Good-bye Militia!" if its role became one of civil defence.

Nicholson, op. cit., p. 232.

20 "Minutes, 12th CGS Conference with GOCs, 18-19 March 1954," loc. cit.

21 "Canadian Army (Militia) Training," General Staff Instruction No. 54/17, HQC 3271-1 vol. 4 (Trg), Ottawa, 30 July 1954, Directorate of History files.

22 In the amendment training was to take place in rescue, first aid, traffic control, and radiation monitoring. The training cycle was divided into two sixty hour blocks and it was estimated that each block would take one training year to complete. Civil defence training blocks were to be run alternately between blocks of "military training" such as recruit or trades training. Thus, depending upon local conditions, it would take some two or three years to produce a soldier trained for basic rescue standards. In 1957 the C.D.A. noted that the turnover of

all ranks in the militia meant that few personnel served long enough to master the skills necessary for civil defence. In 1956 the strength of the militia had been 42,212 at the year's end. 19,233 of these had joined in 1956 while 22,106 had left during the year.

"Canadian Army (Militia) Training Standards," Appendix "T" to GSI 54/17, not dated, Directorate of History files; "Memorandum in Support of CDA Resolution No. 1/57," Report 20th Annual Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 17-19 January 1957.

23 "Assistance of the Armed Forces In Civil Defence," General Staff Instruction No. 56/3, HQTS 2090-1 TD 5298 (DMO & P) 2A, Army Headquarters, 24 April 1956, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

24 Ibid., p. 2.

25 Directive of 26 October 1956, Part II, Canadian Army (Militia), cited in Nicholson, op. cit., p. 228.

26 Ralph Campney, "Mobile Support Group For Civil Defence," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 10 (July 1956), p. 39.

27 "Unit Training Instruction No. 1, ABCD Training," The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), CSR 3655-1, not dated, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

28 HQC 3200-1 (DGRT), 1 October 1957 cited in Nicholson, op. cit., p. 231.

29 Headquarters Western Command, "Western Command Militia Training Directive 1957/58, Amended," WC 3200-1 (G Trg), 14 November 1957, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

30 Loc. cit.

Since the first Russian world satellite was launched in late 1957 it might be thought that this influenced the 1 October decision to place an emphasis upon civil defence training for the militia. Such was not the case since the satellite was not launched until 4 October.

31 Nicholson gives a good account of the impact on the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association when they were told, on 10 October, of the new 1957-1958 training directive.

Nicholson, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

32 Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, letter to the writer, 18 January 1977.

33 Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham, letter to the writer, 17 January 1977.

Writing in 1977 Colonel Nicholson observed that, in view of the defence associations' opposition to large scale national survival train-

ing, to suggest that it was a military decision to adopt the role "particularly in the higher echelons" would tend to imply "...a considerably wider divergence [of opinion between the regular army and the militia] than one has normally come to accept." The point would seem to be extremely well taken even if it does tend to go against General Graham's belief that the Chiefs of Staff Committee had initiated the idea of large scale national survival training. The circumstances surrounding the presentation of the idea to the minister can only be imagined.

Nicholson, letter to the writer, loc. cit.

34 This is not to imply that General Graham, or other senior officers, were unaware of the need for national survival training. It is this writer's opinion, based upon the following quotation from General Graham's letter of 17 January 1977 and Major-General W.H.S. Macklin's reaction to increased national survival training for the militia that senior officers faced a dilemma. To increase national survival training might see a loss in militia strength but not to increase the training would be to ignore the problem. General Macklin's reaction is found at footnote 19 above. General Graham's letter read in part:

"As I recall the situation in 1957, the Chiefs' of Staff appreciation was that if war occurred between the great powers, it would be probable that nuclear weapons would be used and might be of long range or intercontinental character. In such an event this country, or parts of it, would be open to direct attack or suffer the effects of 'fallout'. It was therefore reasonable and important that the army in particular, both regular and militia, should be trained to support and augment the efforts of civilian organizations, police, fire, etc."

Graham, letter to the writer, loc. cit.

35 In 1957 the Minister of National Defence rejected any thought of selective training since it would have been "...difficult to justify at this time." He went on to say, "I would point out that we must rely mainly upon the forces in being to meet our commitments."

"Reply by the Minister of National Defence to Resolution No.1 which was adopted by the Conference in January 1957," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations, 21st Meeting, Ottawa, 23-25 January 1958.

36 In 1955 the spirit of Canadian internationalism was demonstrated when parliament voted 213 to 12 to admit the Federal Republic of Germany to N.A.T.O.

Canada, Commons Debates, 20 January 1955, pp. 393-394; Canada, Commons Debates, 25 January 1955, pp. 533-37.

37 The acceptance of United States leadership was not universal and The Canadian Military Journal wrote some rather bombastic articles on the topic. A more balanced view was taken by John S. Conway who noted that political co-operation, rather than economic, was more easily come by between the two countries.

"Are the United States Our Friends?" The Canadian Military Journal, vol. 23 (Christmas 1956), p. 5; "How Our Allies Tricked Us," The Canadian Military Journal, vol. 23 (May 1957), p. 3; John S. Conway, "Canadian-American Relations: Co-operation Or Conflict?" International Journal, vol 13 (Summer 1958), pp. 204-212.

38 From 1949 to 1963 when national survival assumed a lower priority Canada contributed to nine peace-keeping operations. With the exception of Korea the numbers involved in the field at any one time were small and ranged from 13 all ranks in West New Guinea to some 400 in the Congo. It would seem that the effect these operations had on defence thinking was magnified out of proportion to the numbers involved.

Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, "Canadian Participation In Peace-Keeping Operations," Appendix 4 to Eighth Report of the Standing Committee On External Affairs and National Defence Respecting United Nations and Peace-keeping, 5 June 1970, pp. 38-39.

39 R.H. Roy, draft copy of biography of Major-General G.R. Pearkes, p. 596.

40 Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, letter to Federal Civil Defence Co-ordinator, 26 January 1955 quoted in Nicholson, op. cit., p. 225.

41 "It's a Duty To Prepare For Defence," The Canadian Military Journal, vol. 22 (Christmas 1955), p. 55.

42 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1956, Ottawa, 21-23 November 1956, p. 14.

43 Roy, loc. cit.

44 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 December 1957, p. 1903.

45 The amount of discretion allowed seems to have lessened between 1956 and 1961. In 1956 a General Staff Instruction had said that:

Planning for survival operations and in the event, the conduct of such operations is the responsibility of the General Officer Commanding. Each GOC therefore is free to plan the employment of forces available to him to meet the varying needs of the Command concerned. As a guide the following is a desirable allocation of roles of the various corps of the Militia....

By 1961 less discretion was envisaged when the Army Policy Co-ordinating Committee decided that:

The practical limitations in Militia training will not allow individuals and units to reach operational standards of efficiency in both field and survival operations. Because the Militia's primary role is

survival operations the greater part of all training must continue to be directed to that end. This will result in units and individuals having only an elementary preparation for their responsibilities in field operations and must be acceptable.

Perhaps as a result of uncertainty engendered by the above two policies the C.D.A. formed a resolution in 1961 which said:

...the problems of corps military training are handled in different manners in different commands. The Conference feels that there should be an overall policy providing for a due proportion of corps military training, and that this policy should be administered in the same manner in each command.

"Role of the Militia in National Survival," General Staff Instruction No. 59/3, HQS 2426-1 vol. 2 (DGSO), Army Headquarters, 2 July 1956, Directorate of History files, p. 2; Draft copy of Army Policy Co-ordinating Committee meeting at Army Headquarters, 18 July 1961, Directorate of History files; "Resolution No. 1/61, Corps Training," Report Conference of Defence Associations, 24th Annual Meeting, 12-13 January 1961.

46 The regular army was not in a position to become overly involved with national survival because of its commitments in other areas. The C.D.A. noted in 1961 that, "...the Canadian Army (RF) is fully committed in support of NATO field forces, and has become committed in a number of police actions...."

"Resolution No. 13/60, Role of the Militia (CIA)," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations, 24 Annual Meeting, 12-14 January 1961.

47 Directorate of Public Relations (Army), "Plans for National Survival," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 13 (July 1959), pp. 38-41.

48 Lieutenant-General S.F. Clark, interview with Dr. R.H. Roy, June 1967, Roy, op. cit., p. 597.

49 Roy, op. cit., p. 596.

50 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 December 1957, p. 1921.

51 Canada, Commons Debates, 22 July 1958, p. 2522.

52 Canada, Commons Debates, 23 March 1959, pp. 2129-2130.

53 PC 656, 28 May 1959, Directorate of History files.

54 Major-General A.E. Wrinch, "New Civil Defence Role," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 13 (October 1959), p. 5.

55 Strength figures are from the following sources: Directorate

of Public Relations (National Defence), "A Revue of Militia Camp Training," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 10 (January 1956), p. 46; "Notes On the Reserve Force for a Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Minister of National Defence," 26 March 1974, file held by the writer, p. 1; Director of Staff Duties, "Notes on Canadian Army Organization, Components," 12 January 1960, Directorate of History files; National Defence: Explanatory Material Relating to 1961-1962 Estimates, Ottawa, May 1961, p. 14; "Number of Type of Units By Corps In Commands With Total Establishment and Strengths," Annex "D" to HQS 2001-3/1 (SD 1), 26 July 1961, Directorate of History files; Director of Personnel Statistics, "Canadian Army (Militia), Unit Strength by Location," BDF-DPS 3065-3, 30 June 1962, Directorate of History files; Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 16, 18 August 1964, p. 481.

56 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, "Resolution 1/56," Report 1956, op. cit., p. 9.

57 The R.C.A.A. and C.D.A. resolutions, in showing concern over manpower problems, both advocated "selective training" as did the supporting C.D.A. memorandum. It has been seen in footnote 33 that the Minister of National Defence, in replying to the C.D.A. resolution, felt that conscription would have been "difficult to justify." It may be noted that a 1956 poll of 500 people in Vancouver showed that 60 per cent of the electorate favoured compulsory military training while 29 per cent were against it.

Market Research Associates, "Military Training Good for our Youth?" The Canadian Military Journal, vol 23, (October 1956), p. 4; "Resolution No. 1/57, Manpower," Report 20th Annual Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 17-19 January 1957; "Memorandum in Support of Conference of Defence Associations Resolution No. 1/57," Report 20th Annual Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 17-19 January 1957; "Reply by the Minister of National Defence to Resolution No. 1 which was adopted by the Conference in January 1957," loc. cit.

58 In 1958 the Canadian Infantry Association passes a resolution calling for "National Military Service" based upon the manpower needs of National survival. In 1959 three resolutions were considered by the C.I.A. on roles.

Canadian Infantry Association, "Resolution No. 27, National Military Service," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Beauport, Quebec, 11-13 September 1958, pp. 38-39; Canadian Infantry Association, "Resolution No. 1, Role of the Militia," "Resolution No. 2, Training Militia Personnel," "Resolution No. 3, Training for Civil Defence Role," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 25-27 November 1959, pp. 15-18.

59 "Summer Training, 1956," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 10 (October 1956), p. 67.

60 Lieutenant-Colonel J.E. Pincock, "RCA Militia Training at Shilo," Canadian Army Journal, vol 12 (October 1958), pp. 124-127.

61 There were exceptions to small unit numbers at camps in the mid-1950's and most of them were a result of unit changes resulting from the Kennedy report. For instance the 1st Battalion, The Royal New Brunswick Regiment (Carleton and York) "attended camp over 300 strong." The regiment was a result of the merging of two units in October 1954. Another strong unit was the 6th Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment, which took 214 all ranks to camp. The unit had had a concentrated recruiting drive prior to camp.

"Summer Training, 1956," op. cit., pp. 25, 34; Army Historical Section, The Regiments and Corps of The Canadian Army, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1965, pp. 178-181.

62 The needs and aspirations of the Y.S.T.P. soldier were uncomplicated. The men were trained to militia standards, the intention was that they be paid monthly, training times were established for Saturdays rather than week-nights, and Local Headquarters Training was usually augmented by six weeks of summer training. Presumably they also got the best of instruction and in elaborating on this Western Command noted that:

It has been definitely established from our experience in the last three years that Militia instructors cannot meet the requirements because these young soldiers, when they're "on the ball", very quickly reach the level of their instructors and are then left with nothing. The I Staff (regular army instructional staff) on the other hand are the only answer because it is their job to keep ahead of these lads and in all instances they can do so readily.

GSO 2 Training (Militia), Headquarters Western Command, letter to GSO 2, Headquarters New Brunswick Area, Edmonton, 25 September 1959, Directorate of History files, p. 2.

63 Recruiting for similar schemes had taken place in 1951 and 1955. The 1951 scheme had been sponsored by Army Headquarters while an Ontario militia field regiment had sponsored courses in 1955. Neither scheme seems to have reached fruition.

Lieutenant-Colonel G.R. Stevens, A City Goes To War, Brampton, Charters, 1964, p. 374.

64 GSO 2, Headquarters New Brunswick Area, letter to GSO 2 Training (Militia), Headquarters Western Command, Fredericton, 4 September 1959, Directorate of History files.

65 Headquarters British Columbia Area, Annex "A" to "Militia Training Directive 59-60, No. 2. Young Soldiers Training Plan," BC 4001-3/1 vol. 9 (GS), 30 November 1959, Directorate of History files.

66 In 1957 150 Y.S.T.P. soldiers trained for the summer with the Loyal Edmonton Regiment. Of these 130 remained in the service with 87 joining the Loyal Edmonton Regiment and 43 some other militia unit or

the regular army. Two years later 53 of the 87 were still with the Loyal Edmonton Regiment and all had advanced to the level of having taken junior NCO training. During the two years they had paraded, on the average, 80 per cent of the time and each man had averaged 160 hours of training for each winter. By contrast the older militia soldiers had trained 90 hours a year.

"Statistics - Young Soldiers," under covering letter Headquarters, British Columbia Area, "Young Soldier Training Course, 1959, 24 and 25 Militia Groups," BC 3201-2 vol. 2 (GS), Vancouver, 21 September 1959, Directorate of History files.

67 Prior to the YSTP programme being instituted in the Loyal Edmonton Regiment a 1954 parade in that unit had seen "33 officers, 31 non-commissioned officers, 32 bandsmen and three privates" turn out. By 1962 the Loyal Edmonton Regiment had a strength of 23 officers and 334 other ranks in the Edmonton area. It is difficult to see what would have accounted for the strength increase of the other ranks other than the YSTP and the Special Militia Training Programme. The latter is considered below.

Stevens, op. cit., p. 375; Director of Personnel Statistics, "Canadian Army (Militia), Unit Strength by Location, BDF-DPS 3065-3, Directorate of History files, p. 13.

68 Director of Survival Operations and Plans, "Survival Operations Concept, Employment of Militia," HQ 2426-3/1 (DSO & P 1), 26 July 1961, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

69 Ibid., Annex "A".

70 Irish Fusiliers of Canada (The Vancouver Regiment), Annex "E" to Chapter 3 to Standing Operating Procedure No. 8, 1 November 1962, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

71 In 1956 a General Staff Instruction read as follows:

An ex-Canadian Army Cadet who has qualified on the Senior Leaders Course, joins the Militia within 3 years of leaving the Royal Canadian Army Cadets and who in the opinion of his Commanding Officer meets the standards for junior non-commissioned officer may be granted the qualification of corporal.

This meant, theoretically, that a boy with cadet training could join the YSTP as a militia soldier and be promoted to corporal in the Canadian Army on his sixteenth birthday. Such an emphasis on extreme youth could hardly have come at a more inopportune time. It is doubtful if many civilians would have looked to boys for leadership in a period of extreme emergency and when the Irish Fusilier's Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) are considered in detail it may be wondered if civilians would have bothered with the militia at all. The procedure for enrolling civilians was as follows:

Civilian volunteers will be registered by the Pay-

master. A Nominal Roll will be forwarded to the Staff Captain A & Q. The personnel will be allocated to duties by the GS03. Unit Paymaster will give each volunteer a checksheet (See Annex "D") to complete to assist in the most useful employment.

It would be difficult to imagine a truckdriver, for example, holding still while 380 people were processed through three staff officers during a nuclear attack. The idea might grow as well that the same truckdriver might be inclined to take his truck elsewhere when it is noted that the above reference to "Annex 'D'" should have read "Annex 'E'". Annex "D" of the Irish SOP was a sample Card For Dependents while Annex "E" was the checksheet.

Irish Fusiliers of Canada (The Vancouver Regiment), p. 3, chapter 3 and Annexes "D" and "E" to chapter 3 to Standing Operating Procedure No. 8., 1 November 1962, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria; "Ex-Canadian Army Cadets," Amendment No. 25 to General Staff Instruction No. 54/17, HQC 3271-1 (Trg), Army Headquarters, 20 December 1956, Directorate of History files.

72 "Special Militia Training Programme," HQ 3200-1 TD 0242 (DDMT), 3 October 1960, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

73 Ibid., pp. 1-5.

73 Lieutenant-General G. Walsh, "Special Militia Training Programme, Final Report," 7 June 1962, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

75 See Appendix "C".

76 This was done by passing PC 1961-9/1666 of 23 November 1961. Under covering letter "Special Militia Training Programme, Militia Strength Ceiling," HQC 2001-3/1 TD 1258 (SD1), 30 November 1961, Directorate of History files.

77 Of the 110,849 who applied for the course 21,186 were rejected and 89,653 were accepted. 19,545 left before the course was completed; presumably some of these because of job offers elsewhere.

Walsh, op. cit., p. 4 and Appendix "1" to Annex "A".

78 James Stewart, "Army Plan Falls Short by 30,000", Montreal Star, cited in Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Appendix "1" to Annex "A" to "Report for the Minister, Special Militia Training Programme, Winter 1961/1962," 13 April 1962, Directorate of History files.

79 "The intake of young soldiers continued unabated; they became the principal preoccupation of the Regiment. In 1959 four of them - K. R. Sivertson, R.R.F. Burns, R.D. Gillespie and R.C.G. Laird - were accepted as Officer Cadets at Royal Roads."

Stevens, op. cit., p. 377.

80 While the training demands placed upon the S M T P men differed vastly from those placed upon men who had joined the 25th Brigade a decade before it may be noted that only 11 per cent of the S M T P men were discharged for medical or disciplinary reasons. The 25th Brigade had a 20 per cent wastage for similar causes.

Walsh, op. cit., Appendix "1" to Annex "A".

81 An improved employment situation, cost, and a decline in the perceived need for a national survival force all combined to terminate the programme. In 1960 there had been 446,000 unemployed in Canada. This figure had fallen to 390,000 by early 1962 and SMTP enrolments reflected this. The last intake, that from 16 April to 27 May, was the smallest of the four courses which ran over the winter. The programme had cost \$25,663,000.

Walsh, op. cit., p. 5; Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Annex "A" to Report for the Minister, Special Militia Training Programme, Winter 1961/1962," loc. cit.; "Estimates of the Civilian Labour Force and its Main Components, Annual Averages, 1960-1970," Canada Year Book, 1972, p. 833.

82 In 1960 a Canadian Infantry Association resolution asked that:

...greater quantities of national survival equipment be made available to Militia units and that a minimum allotment be made sufficient to equip one platoon or equivalent with its national survival stores and that a minimum of one national survival kit be made immediately available to all units.

"Resolution No. 12/60, National Survival Training (CIA)," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations 24th Annual Meeting, 12-14 January 1961.

83 It is a debatable point as to whether a militia soldier could have been efficient in national survival without first being trained as a soldier in most other respects. Despite arguments either way any conflicts in time allotments were resolved by 1961 by placing an emphasis upon national survival training. See footnote 45.

84 A Canadian Infantry Association resolution which was forwarded by the C.D.A. in 1960 noted that "...the apparent lack of public and government support has produced a situation wherein the general public tends to look upon the Militia with apathy and detachment...." Under such conditions municipal and provincial governments or private companies which would have been involved if there had been a nuclear attack, were hardly inclined to subordinate normal business to accommodate militia national survival training.

"Resolution No. 13/60, Role of the Militia (CIA)," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations 24th Annual Meeting, 12-14 January 1961.

85 "Comparative Study, Militia Potential," Annex to Director of Survival Operations and Plans, "Survival Organizations Concept, Employment of Militia" HQ 2426-3/1 (DSO & P 1), 26 July 1961, Directorate of History files.

86 Irish Fusiliers of Canada (The Vancouver Regiment), Annex "C" to Chapter 2 to Standing Operating Procedure No. 8, 1 November 1962, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

87 Ibid., chapter 2, p. 3.

88 Director of Militia and Cadets, "Instructional Staff and Cadet Training Staff," HQ 2001-85/0 (DMC 1), 6 October 1960, Directorate of History files, p. 3.

89 Director of Survival Operations and Plans, "Survival Operations Concept, Employment of Militia," HQ 2426-3/1 (DSO & P 1), 26 July 1961, Directorate of History files, pp. 1 and 2 and Annex "A".

90 Lieutenant-Colonel F.S. Wotton, "Green Line Battle Drill," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 14 (Fall 1960), p. 21.

91 Co-ordinator "I" Staff, "19 Militia Group Summer Camp, Report on Training," Winnipeg, 19 July 1960, Directorate of History files.

92 "Resolution No. 13/60, Role of the Militia (CIA)," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations, 24th Annual Meeting, 12-14 January 1961.

93 The Department of National Defence reply, in part, was that,
...in the future any important changes in organization or policy should be referred to a small representative group from the Conference of Defence Associations before final acceptance and promulgation.

The following passage, in the same reply, is open to interpretation but it might have been an attempt on the part of the government to impose its will in regards to civil defence.

...we need the Militia and...it should continue to receive military training but, at the same time, should receive training in what we call "civil defence." It...(is) further recognized that we have many units, or sub-units, of low strength and that over a period of time some of these might well be closed out.

Departmental Reply to Conference of Defence Association's Resolution No. 1/58, "Board of Officers to Consider Any Changes in Organization, Administration and Equipment Required by the Militia to Carry Out Its Present Role," "Resolutions Adopted by the 21st Annual Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations Held 23-25 January 1958," cited

in Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Calgary, 11-13 September 1957, p. 41.

94 "Report of the President," Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Beauport, 11-13 September 1958, pp. 8-9.

95 "Report of the President," Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 25-27 November 1959, pp. 8-9.

96 "Resolution No. 13/60, Role of the Militia (CIA)," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations, 24th Annual Meeting, 12-14 January 1961.

97 The Western Command training directive for 1959 said that, "Commanding Officers should confine their training plan to the primary role of their unit in National Survival operations." The directive went on to say: "On completion of recruit training, all soldiers will progress to National Survival training. Units of all corps will train in subjects which support National Survival training."

Headquarters Western Command, Western Command Militia Training Directive 1959/60, Edmonton, 4 August 1959, pp. 11-12.

98 "Resolution No. 1/61, Corps Training," Report Conference of Defence Associations, 24th Annual Meeting, 12-13 January 1961.

99 The armoured corps had better arguments for military training than either the infantry or the artillery, or any other corps, since reconnaissance was a necessary task in both national survival and field operations. Conversely, perhaps, it would seem that in time the national survival role was used as a cachet to further a number of projects. In New Brunswick in 1963 a seemingly understrength field battery and a rifle company were to be disbanded and replaced by a provost company on the grounds that it would improve the "...capability of 5 Militia Group to perform its allotted national survival tasks." This was a tenuous reason for the unit changes since, while there were some corps differences in training, theoretically all corps were taking similar national survival training. (Among seven artillery and infantry national survival roles were traffic control, direction of police and fire services, first aid. The provost were to carry out traffic control, refugee and crowd control and anti-looting measures.)

It would seem that national survival training was also used to ease the burdens of command in 1961 when six anti-aircraft artillery regiments were converted to field artillery. In May 1960 General Officers Commanding had deferred the conversion pending the outcome of "certain national survival planning" and in July 1961 the CGS directed that a study take place on anti-aircraft needs. Eventually the six regiments were converted because there was no need for their obsolete equipment in army anti-aircraft plans. It went without saying that they would not receive more modern equipment if only because the regular army possessed nothing better. If the "certain national survival planning" included a return to artillery training then the conversion of the regiments was

well founded. If it did not then the reason for the conversion is not clear since they would not be firing in any event.

General Officer Commanding, Eastern Command, letter to Army Headquarters, "Reorganization of Militia, Moncton Garrison, New Brunswick Area," EEC 2001-3/1 vol. 14 (G), 17 April 1963; Vice Chief of the General Staff to Chief of the General Staff, "Conversion of Militia Anti-Aircraft Units," HQC 2001-3/1 TD 1297 (DSD), 5 December 1961; Director of Staff Duties, wire to Eastern Quebec, Central, Western Commands concerning conversion and redesignation of militia AA units, 17 December 1962; "Role of the Militia in National Survival," General Staff Instruction No. 59/3, HQS 2426-1 vol. 2 (GDSO), Army Headquarters, 2 July 1956, pp. 2, 4; Directorate of History files.

100 "Resolution No. 1, Corps Training Standards (RCACA)," "Resolution No. 7, Role of the Militia (RCACA)," Proceedings Conference of Defence Associations, 25 Annual Meeting, 12-13 January 1962.

101 Canada, Commons Debates, 2 March 1961, p. 2574.

102 The militia had retained limited military roles while national survival was emphasized. These roles required that:

In the event of any war the Militia...(would) be responsible for assistance in the protection of vital points, in internment operations and in guarding prisoners of war. It...(would) also provide the back-up forces for phase 2 of the Field Force.

The back-up for the regular field force would have taken the form of "...skilled individuals and possibly of replacement units...."

Director of Staff Duties, "Briefing, Swedish Army Attache," HQC 1725-35/0 TD 2235 (DSD), 23 August 1962, Directorate of History files, p. 5; Address by The Honourable Douglas S. Harkness, Minister of National Defence, to the Conference of Defence Associations, 13 January 1961, Directorate of History files, p. 9.

103 Departmental Reply to Conference of Defence Associations's Resolution No. 1/62, Report Conference of Defence Associations 25th Annual Meeting, 11-13 January 1962.

104 United States, House of Representatives, Congressional Records, 25 May 1961, p. 8879.

105 Ibid., p. 8880.

106 Great Britain, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 16 May 1962, pp. 1310-11.

107 "Viscount Montgomery Lists His Rules of War," Montreal Star, Montreal, 31 May 1962, p. 40.

108 United States, House of Representatives, Congressional Records,

25 May 1961, p. 8879.

109 Michael Maclean, "The Futility of H-test Protests; Japanese Demonstrations Ineffectual," Montreal Star, Montreal, 16 May 1962, p. 11.

110 Defence Engineers Association of Canada, Minutes of Annual Meeting, October 1963, p. 85, cited in Nicholson, op. cit., p. 242.

Chapter 6

Background to the Suttie Commission and the Hahn Committee

In June 1964 the report of the Suttie Commission on the reorganization of the Canadian militia was made public. This document, which considered with other events of the times such as the unification of the armed forces, was one of the most influential studies on the militia during the thirty year period being considered. If there was a watershed in militia affairs in the 1960's it lay with the report of the Glassco Commission on government organization and most particularly with that body's consideration of the Department of National Defence which was published on 21 January 1963. The Glassco Commission was followed by a Special Committee On Defence under the chairmanship of Maurice Sauvé in the summer and fall of 1963 and in March 1964 a White Paper On Defence was published. All of these studies, which led to the Suttie Commission, will be considered in this chapter while the Suttie Commission and a Special Committee On Defence under David G. Hahn, which considered the Suttie Report, will be examined in a subsequent chapter.

Prior to the above studies there had been a Special Committee On Defence Expenditures under the chairmanship of G.E. Halfpenny in the spring and summer of 1960.¹ While the Halfpenny Committee only considered the role of the militia incidentally a statement to the committee by the Minister of National Defence, Major-General G.R. Pearkes, confirmed the militia's part in national survival and, at the same time, reported on the equipment which was to be forthcoming to carry out survival tasks.² In questioning before the committee Pearkes reinforced

the principles of the 1950's when he said that:

I believe that if a war comes that war would be fought with the forces which are in being at the time. I see little likelihood of forces being built up by process of mobilization and a calling in of a large number of reserves.³

General Pearkes also confirmed the virtues of international collective defence, he discounted Russian attempts to "create an atmosphere of detente,"⁴ and he strongly reinforced the military role of the Canadian brigade in Europe.⁵ In speaking on the topic of "General Policy" in defence Pearkes said:

...we must not consider our defence effort in isolation but, rather, one should look at the general effectiveness of the defensive alliances to which we make a contribution commensurate to our ability and without placing an undue strain upon our manpower and financial resources.⁶

This statement was significant in reflecting the "balanced collective forces" doctrine of the 1950's which was to remain current in the 1960's. It also anticipated, to a degree, the appointment of the Glassco Commission by the Conservative government.

The Glassco Commission was called to enquire into, and report on, all 116 departments and agencies comprising the Federal government with a view to promoting efficiency, economy and improved service. The commission sat from 1960 to 1962 and, with its enormous task, it chose to devote a relatively small part of its efforts to considering national defence. Except for one passage, which will be considered later, the importance of the Glassco Commission in relation to the militia did not lie with any recommendations about the reserves but rather with the commission's views about the entire defence structure. When steps were taken in subsequent years to put these views into practice the emphasis Glassco had placed upon larger issues often resulted in the subordina-

tion of smaller affairs which were of vital concern to the militia. For instance the Glassco Commission, after positing that armed forces "...utilization in peacetime is a problem,"⁷ went on to point out that 27 per cent of all expenditures for government buildings and works were incurred by the Department of National Defence.⁸ It was probably not coincidental that a year and a half later the Suttie Commission's recommendations to disband certain units resulted in the closure of 114 armouries, or their equivalents, at an annual saving, "conservatively stated," of \$1,078,549.⁹

At a higher and more theoretical policy level the Glassco Commission expressed views which ruled out a strong role for the militia. While the commission stopped short of recommending unification, it did say that, "...there are strong reasons for seeking a greater integration of those functions common to the three Services."¹⁰ The commission saw as the object of integration the achievement of "...a balanced collective effort, rather than a balanced and integrated Canadian defence establishment" and it commented that, "considered by themselves...Canadian forces necessarily present a fragmentary appearance."¹¹ By this Glassco meant that organizations, perhaps skeletal headquarters or units held in being for unforeseen contingencies, were not as desirable as all three services co-operating in performing functions which were common to them with the object of producing formed units. In recruiting the 25th and 27th Brigades, not to mention various summer camps, the militia had shown that, of necessity, fragmentation was one of its hallmarks. For instance in recruiting for the 27th Brigade it had taken contributions from fifteen regiments to produce three infantry battalions. The necessity of fragmentation in the militia arose from the static nature of

its units and personnel, the perceived necessity of providing unit representation of the several corps in different localities and, perhaps above all, because militia units were commonly viewed as a basis of mobilization.

The strongest harbinger of a decreasingly important role for the militia to grow from the Glassco Commission was the passage referred to earlier in which it was stated that:

The forces to be used in meeting any major emergency must be organized, equipped and trained before the emergency arises.

This was amplified by saying that:

The experience of the past - in which regular peacetime forces were maintained as a nucleus around which a wartime force would be built through a fairly protracted process of mobilization training and equipping - is no longer considered to be valid.

One consequence of this new concept is to simplify, in a sense, the organizational problem of defence. There is no need to plan directing establishments for hypothetical forces and to maintain nominal elements of those establishments at a level which makes any realistic peacetime deployment impossible. Under the new concept, each component of the Armed Forces can be designed for a task of known dimensions and given the resources needed to do its job.¹²

Leaving aside the extraordinary tendency of Glassco to plan the forces for peace rather than war this quotation could have meant that there was little rationale for the reserves continuing to exist at all. The militia, because of its fragmentation, was incapable of "deployment," and, because of continued plans for at least a partial mobilization base,¹³ its role could not be seen as a "task of known dimensions." If the militia was to prosper within the framework of Glassco's theories it could

only do so by finding a role which was compatible with the commission's pragmatism. The search for such a role was to take place for the next 15 years.

On 30 May 1963, two months after the 8 April election, Prime Minister L.B. Pearson announced to parliament the formation of a Special Committee On Defence under the chairmanship of Maurice Sauvé. Pearson had urged the formation of such a committee during the six years the Liberal party had been in opposition¹⁴ and if he hoped to solve defence problems similar to those which had bedevilled the Diefenbaker government it was to Pearson's advantage to see that the commission was formed. For example during the 1963 campaign, on 12 January, Pearson had called for Canada to acquire nuclear weapons and all three opposing parties in parliament wanted the nuclear issue, and others, clarified.¹⁵ The terms of reference for the committee encouraged it to examine not only finances, as in the case of the Halfpenny Committee, but also to consider policy. In keeping with the broad scope of its terms the Sauvé Committee considered that it should "...examine...future defence policy rather than...review in detail the past" and it felt that it should do so "...in the light of new strategic concepts."¹⁶

Two results emerged from the deliberations of the Sauvé Committee which influenced the militia and its role. The first was that the committee advocated some of the same principles of economy as those of the Glassco Commission. For instance the Sauvé Committee recommended, "that more effective reviews be made of organization, manpower management and utilization to achieve greater efficiency."¹⁷ In examples of more specific recommendations Sauvé said that, "...Financial Reports of the Defence Department should reflect the cost of defence according to

functions and operations" and that the division of the defence budget should be "...determined according to the changing overall military role rather than frozen to any traditional percentages."¹⁸ Glassco had laid down these principles when his commission had recommended that, "...departmental Estimates be prepared on the basis of programmes of activity rather than by standard objects of expenditure" and when criticism was raised of "rigidities in the defence establishment" which had "important budgetary effects."¹⁹ In summary, and by way of example, both Sauvé and Glassco felt that if a particular military unit or role was to exist it should not do so for traditional reasons but because of immediate necessity. The financing of the militia rested upon the "rigidity" both Sauvé and Glassco spoke about, if only because it was difficult to spend much less on the reserves,²⁰ and, as seen above, the nature of the militia restricted its activities.

The second effect of the Sauvé Committee on the militia was that it recommended further study of the "role of the Militia and the reserves." While Sauvé largely ignored the militia in postponing a consideration of it, this was not a matter of particular concern since the commission also identified 18 other areas of defence which required further study. The committee recommended further that six of these be examined by a reconstituted special committee, or by a standing committee, in succeeding parliamentary sessions.²¹ The reasons for postponing a study of the militia showed the desirability of doing so. For one thing while the Sauvé Committee was sitting, a review was being conducted within the Department of National Defence on "...all aspects of defence policy and all existing commitments."²² This in itself need not have prevented Sauvé from considering the militia. It will be seen that the

Hahn Commission sat while the Suttie Commission deliberated. However the 19 areas of concern mentioned above probably meant that Sauvé felt priorities had to be established which would give emphasis to matters other than the militia. Secondly, it was probably apparent to the committee that major changes would be taking place within the militia in any event and there was little use in making premature recommendations. Evidence of change, and potential change, was found when Paul Hellyer, the new Minister of National Defence, announced on 5 December 1963 that there would be a cut in the militia from 51,000 to 30,000.²³ The Sauvé Committee was also advised that the "organization of the army" was to be examined by Major-General J.V. Allard.²⁴

The 1964 White Paper, which followed the Sauvé Committee, is perhaps remembered best for having introduced unification of the armed forces. Integration, or close co-operation between the three services, had been recommended by the Glassco Commission as a means of cutting administrative costs, streamlining the decision-making process, and assuring a strong civilian control of the military establishment. The commission's report was published in 1962 and when a new Liberal government took office in 1963 they concluded that Glassco had been too conservative in his recommendations on the Department of National Defence.²⁵ The government planned instead on unification, the adoption of a single service,²⁶ and Paul Hellyer was appointed Minister of National Defence. Hellyer, who Pearson meant to "...inject a reforming force into the Canadian defence organization,"²⁷ was influenced, perhaps principally,²⁸ by three studies on defence and, if not by the Glassco report in its entirety, at least by its general intent. In speaking before the Sauvé Committee Hellyer said, "The recommendations of the Glassco commission

are being studied and will be considered in the context of future policy."²⁹ The first of the studies on defence which must have influenced Hellyer was the Minister's Manpower Study Group which had been created in 1961 by the previous government. The study group had been strongly in favour of amalgamation being, "...the only way to economize on a function...."³⁰ A second study influencing Hellyer was a "special advisory group" from the Defence Research Board which was formed to consider government procurement policy. This group, headed by Dr. R.J. Sutherland, was given direct access to the minister and its task was to ensure that no procurement programme would limit policy options. Following the procurement review a "general review of future policy"³¹ was carried out within the Department of National Defence. In December 1963 Hellyer produced the first draft of the 1964 White Paper which introduced unification.³²

The effects of the white paper on the militia will be considered in a subsequent chapter but it may be noted at this point that they were minimal since applicable changes brought about by unification were confined to minor matters such as uniforms and base support. There were three reasons why the militia was not affected by the white paper. The first was that the paper did not pretend to consider the militia much beyond a few rather vague tasks. The white paper said that the primary role of the militia would be "...to support the Regular Army" by forming "...the framework for logistics and special units which are not provided in peace time." Secondary roles were to include the provision of a "training force" to support the field force, the guarding of key points in an emergency, and support of the regular army in its national survival responsibilities.³³

A second reason the white paper did not affect the militia greatly was that, as the paper itself noted, the Suttie Commission was at that time engaged in studying "...the best means of fulfilling the militia requirements of Canadian defence policy...."³⁴ It will be seen in the next chapter that the primary role of supporting the regular army outlined in the 1964 White Paper was given to the Suttie Commission as the role of the militia.

Lastly, the militia was not directly affected by the white paper because the importance of the paper did not lie at the unit level and the militia, particularly in the early 1960's, was what might be termed a collection of units. It was not involved in command or staff work above the Militia Group level. By way of illustration it was of little consequence to the militia whether the Minister of National Defence was approached by three service chiefs or by a single Chief of the Defence Staff. The low political cum military level at which the militia operated, combined with the four years necessary to accomplish unification, meant that the chief effect of the white paper on the militia was to serve as an umbrella under which the theories of Glassco, Sauvé and Al-lard could be gathered and translated into roles. These roles were primarily for the regular force and the militia's difficulty lay in trying to adjust to them.

In conclusion, it has been seen that the Halfpenny Committee confirmed the trend of the late 1950's against relying on reserve force potential while a trend towards efficiency in the forces was encouraged by the Glassco Commission. The Sauvé Committee linked roles with fiscal accountability while recommending that the role of the militia be studied further. The 1964 White Paper, while assigning roles to the militia,

tended to exclude the reserves from the more important aspects of defence planning. Since none of the above studies had considered the militia in particular, this remained to be done by the Suttie Commission which followed them.

Chapter 6 Footnotes

1 The following studies affected the militia in the first half of the 1960's: The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964, (hereafter called the Suttie Commission); The Royal Commission On Government Organization, Report 20: Department of National Defence, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 21 January 1963, vol. 4, (hereafter called the Glassco Commission); Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee On Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Numbers 1 to 22, 18 June 1963 to 18 December 1965, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, (hereafter called the Sauvé Committee); Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper On Defence, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, March 1964, (hereafter called the 1964 White Paper); Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee On Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Numbers 1 to 27, 19 May 1964 to 1 April 1965, (hereafter called the Hahn Committee); Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee On Defence Expenditures, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Numbers 1 to 27, 3 May 1960 to 27 July 1960, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, (hereafter called the Halfpenny Committee).

2 G.R. Pearkes, Statements On Defence Policy and Its Implementations, Special Committee On Defence Expenditures, June 1960.

3 Halfpenny Committee, op. cit., p. 447.

4 Pearkes, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

5 "The Basic role of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade is to assist in the protection of Western Europe by delaying any advance that might be made by enemy ground forces. The NATO shield is not merely a trip wire to sound an alarm...."

Halfpenny Committee, Minutes Number 9, 3 June 1960, p. 228.

6 Pearkes, op. cit., p. 6.

7 Glassco Commission, op. cit., p. 61.

8 Ibid., p. 64.

9 \$1,078,549 was the amount the Suttie Commission estimated could be saved in accommodation costs by reorganizing the militia. The Department of National Defence estimated that \$913,210 could be saved. The savings in closing out many small accommodations were low. Thus, while closing out the College Street Armoury in Toronto saved \$172,440 a year relocating an infantry company from rented accommodation in Leamington, Ontario saved only \$300 a year.

Appendix 2 to Annex "A" to Suttie Commission, pp. 41-42; Appendix 1 to Annex "C" to Suttie Commission, p. 82; Department of National Defence Position on the Recommendations of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), cited in Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 18, 3 November 1964, p. 741.

- 10 Glassco Commission, op. cit., p. 69.
- 11 Ibid., p. 66.
- 12 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
- 13 See page 84 above.
- 14 Canada, Commons Debates, 30 May 1963, p. 456.
- 15 Canada, Commons Debates, 4 June 1963, p. 637; J.M. Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elections, Scarborough, Prentice-Hall, 1968, p. 363.
- 16 Canada, House of Commons, Interim Report of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, 20 December 1963, p. 8. (Hereafter called Sauvé Interim Report.)
- 17 Ibid., p. 11.
- 18 Ibid., p. 15.
- 19 Glassco Commission, op. cit., pp. 62, 66-67.
- 20 See Appendix "L".
- 21 Sauvé Interim Report, op. cit., pp. 5-24.
- 22 Jon B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power In Alliance, Toronto, Copp Clark, 1967, p. 193.
- 23 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 December 1963, p. 5457.
- 24 Sauvé Interim Report, op. cit., p. 11.
- 25 Vernon J. Kronenberg, All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972, Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973, (Wellesley Paper 3/1973), p. 21.
- 26 In the 1964 White Paper the term "integration" was used in describing the process of bringing the three services together. In later years, for reasons outlined by Kronenberg, the term "unification" came into use.
- 27 Michael Howard, The Central Organisation of Defence, London, Royal United Services Institute, 1970, p. 60.
- 28 It might well be imagined that Hellyer took his information for restructuring the forces from a number of other sources as well. Armed Forces Management wrote that: "At the same time...Hellyer launched a series of broad studies: Review of foreign policy, NATO relationship,

guesstimate of technical developments, world political analysis, strategic military roles, and similar policy."

"The Man Behind Canada's Bold Look at Tomorrow," Armed Forces Management, vol. 10 (June 1964), p. 48.

29 Sauvé Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 1, 27 June 1963, p. 20.

30 Kronenberg, op. cit., p. 19.

31 Sauvé Committee, loc. cit.

32 "Hellyer's White Paper In Brief," Armed Forces Management, vol. 10 (June 1964), p. 60.

33 1964 White Paper, op. cit., p. 25.

34 Loc. cit.

Chapter 7

Suttie Commission and the Hahn Committee

The Suttie Commission on the reorganization of the militia¹ sat between February 1964 and June 1964 while the Hahn Special Committee on Defence² met between May 1964 and April 1965. The Hahn Committee had its origins in a Sauvé Committee recommendation that a special committee on defence be continued in the next session of parliament. Since the Sauvé Committee had identified a number of areas of concern in defence it was desirable from both a military and political point of view to continue with committee study. The resulting Hahn Committee, which considered a number of defence questions besides the militia, was able to take advantage of the Suttie Commission's currency in formulating recommendations on the militia.

It became apparent throughout the proceedings of the Hahn Committee that some discontent existed within the committee about certain aspects of the Suttie Commission. Some committee members felt that the Suttie Commission had been "restrained by its terms of reference,"³ potential militia strength reductions were challenged, and sympathy was shown to the contention that Suttie had erred in not consulting certain outside bodies, particularly the Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.). The formation of the Suttie Commission and the assignment of its terms of reference, strength reductions, and the question of consultation will each be examined in turn.

In its terms of reference the Suttie Commission was,

...given the task of recommending to the Minister of National Defence the best means of fulfilling the

Militia requirements of the Canadian Defence Policy and the changes which should be made in the organization of the Militia to carry out its revised roles more efficiently and realistically.⁴

The "revised roles" were to provide 9,000 men "in support of the Regular Army" if its static personnel joined the field force in an emergency. Secondary roles were for the militia to provide 18,000 men in three brigades as a source of trained reinforcements, 2,500 men for guarding key points, and 1,500 to assist in national survival operations.⁵

The first announcement that roles would be changed from national survival training and the "traditional concept of a substantial mobilization base" came on 5 December 1963 when Paul Hellyer, the Minister of National Defence, spoke in the Commons. While he did not elaborate on new roles he referred to "combat readiness," reorganization, and a strength reduction from 51 to 30,000 in the militia.⁶ At the annual C.D.A. meeting in 1964,⁷ held between 16 and 18 January, the minister elaborated on his statements in the Commons and he also told the conference that a commission would be set up to consider the resulting reorganization of the militia. In agreeing to a reduction of the militia and a re-appraisal of its roles, Hellyer had been acting on the advice of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS).⁸ Presumably the CGS had been influenced by a "detailed study" which had taken place within the Department of National Defence (DND) "...prior to the establishment of the (Suttie) Commission...(on) the requirements for a militia force."⁹ Between 20 and 30 January 1964 Suttie Commission members were appointed¹⁰ and on 4 February the commission held its first meeting at which the role was "set out."¹¹

The basis of the strength reduction of 20,000 men proposed by the Department of National Defence remains obscure. It would seem that money was a primary consideration and in his December 1963 announcement Hellyer offered few reasons other than financial to justify militia cuts.¹² In speaking before the Hahn Committee a year later Hellyer said:

Our aim has been to discover ways and means of reducing overhead in order to redirect the money thus saved into more productive channels. During the course of our investigations in this area, the structure of the reserve forces came under close examination and it was apparent almost at once that the reserves could be reduced from the present levels. It was also apparent that a redefinition of the militia's role was needed in order to make it compatible with the forces-in-being defence concept, and this change would in turn require major organizational changes in the militia.¹³

Hellyer's statement, taken at its face value, might have meant that the structure of the reserves was dependent upon money and that the militia's role and organizational changes were decided upon later. Whatever interpretation is given to Hellyer's remarks the Hahn Committee seems to have felt that defence needs were not the primary consideration for strength reductions and the committee observed that, "...after the militia is cut to 30,000 all ranks, it will be unable to fulfill its proposed roles."¹⁴ Both Lucien Cardin, the Associate Minister of National Defence, and Lieutenant-Colonel B.J. Legge,¹⁵ a member of the Suttie Commission, agreed before the Hahn Committee that the strength ceiling should be some 30 per cent higher to have an effective militia of 30,000.¹⁶ Despite such disagreement with the government's requirements, and despite the vagueness of the reasons for setting a low strength ceiling, the subject was not considered in the recommendations of the Suttie Commission.¹⁷ Instead it seems to have been left as a matter

of chance that smaller revised militia establishments, combined with the disbandment or conversion of units, would produce the strength desired by the government.

The lack of extensive consultation by the Suttie Commission with the Conference of Defence Associations was one of the more baffling aspects of the work of the commission. The commission's terms of reference had said that, "During the course of its deliberations, it is acknowledged that the Commission will consult with the Conference of Defence Associations, through its Executive."¹⁸ This did not happen, to any great degree, and the C.D.A.'s activities before, and while, the Suttie Commission sat are as follows. On 3 January 1964 the C.D.A. executive met with the Minister of National Defence, his Associate and his Deputy ministers together with the Chief of the Defence Staff regarding government proposals on defence studies. It has been seen that at the C.D.A. conference between 16 and 18 January the minister informed the delegates that a commission would be set up to consider the re-organization of the militia. At the same conference the C.D.A. requested that studies be made on the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve and the Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary. This was done and ministerial committees were set up under Commodore R.I. Hendy and Group Captain J.W.P. Draper.¹⁹ On 3 March the C.D.A. held a luncheon in Toronto for the Suttie Commission which, it will be seen, was of some significance. In June 1964, Part I of the Suttie report was issued without any major discussion having taken place with the C.D.A.²⁰

Relations between the Suttie Commission and the Conference of Defence Associations remained distant following publication of Part I of the report. On 16 July the Chairman of the C.D.A., Lieutenant-

Colonel W.R. Learmonth, appeared before the Hahn Committee to present the C.D.A.'s views on Part I of the Suttie report. At about the same time Part II of the Suttie Commission report was received in confidence by the C.D.A. On 7 August the C.D.A. sent a letter to the Associate Minister of National Defence outlining the executives' views²¹ on Part II. The letter was acknowledged on 11 August. On 3 November Part II of the Suttie report was made public and the Department of National Defence position on the report was released on the same day. As a result of the findings of the DND and Suttie the CDA executive requested, and on 18 November, received, a hearing with the Minister of National Defence. The Associate Minister and senior officers were in attendance. At the hearing the C.D.A. submitted an 11 point brief covering such topics as "the unanswered briefs of the C.D.A. Executive", "the non-appointment of the Adviser on Militia," aspects of administration, and related matters.²²

Throughout the Suttie Commission deliberations it has been seen that the C.D.A. was informed but not consulted to any appreciable degree. When Learmonth appeared before the Hahn Committee he stated that "...the commission did not approach the CDA to request its views."²³ It was suggested to Legge by M. Asselin, a Hahn Committee member, that the Suttie Commission had ignored the C.D.A. Legge agreed and replied that there had been no "obscure reason" for having done so. He pointed out that the commission, because of time limitations, had concentrated upon serving members of the forces.²⁴ Brigadier Suttie, however, felt that there had been sufficient consultation because of the Toronto luncheon meeting²⁵ and because he had met with one of his own commissioners, Legge, while the latter was in his capacity as vice-chairman of

the C.D.A.²⁶ The action of the C.D.A. executive in submitting a brief and meeting with the Minister of National Defence on 18 November would indicate that they felt there had been insufficient consultation. If the C.D.A. was ignored, and it would seem it was, the reasons can only be imagined and it might be thought that the commission's recommendations may have suffered from not taking advantage of C.D.A. expertise.

The recommendations of the Suttie Commission were what might have been expected by its critics. Since the commission was "not set up to establish reserve policy"²⁷ and since it was denied some rather basic information, such as the rationale of the militia role,²⁸ it was restricted in what it could recommend. Some of its recommendations, such as the formation of major and minor units,²⁹ were in keeping with, for example, the realism called for in the terms of reference, while some recommendations were not of extreme importance.³⁰ The commission's greatest effects were in command, organizational, and unit changes. This was in keeping with the terms of reference of the Suttie Commission which called upon it "to recommend the selection of units" necessary to reorganize the militia. However the terms were criticized by G. Laniel, of the Hahn Committee, for not adding to "an orientation of the militia."³¹

The command and unit changes recommended by Suttie and implemented by the Department of National Defence were extensive. At the command level Suttie recommended that the 25 Militia Group Headquarters formed in 1954 be reduced to 15. The department did away with the Militia Headquarters completely on the grounds that a "closer relationship between the Regular Army and the Militia"³² would eliminate the need for them. Command and administration of the militia, in the new organization,

would be carried out through 12 regular District Headquarters and there were to be 19 senior militia officers acting as advisers to the regular force. Suttie's recommendations on certain unit changes and the DND position on them are shown in Table X. For purposes of simplicity, but to illustrate the trends, only armour, artillery, and infantry units are considered.

	Existing prior to 1964	Suttie Recommendations	DND Position
Armour	26	21	20
Artillery	43 (7 minor)	22	26 (3 minor)
Infantry	60	52	54 (2 minor)

Table X. Suttie Recommendations On Number of Arms Units and Final Number of Arms Units Resulting from the DND Position.³³

The results of the Suttie Commission, aside from reorganization, worked profound changes upon the militia. Its strength dropped from 46,763 in June 1964³⁴ to 30,000 in the following year.³⁵ This decline was not entirely due to the reduction in the number of units. A second factor was that the commission coincided with the passage of two decades following the Second World War and what would have been, in any case, the retirement of many veterans from the militia.³⁶ Their retirement was encouraged by the Suttie Commission's recommending an emphasis on youth³⁷ and reduced establishments³⁸ which left little room for mature soldiers who might have carried out miscellaneous, yet essential, tasks. The decline in militia strength continued in the late 1960's as the emphasis on youth grew. By 1970 the militia's strength was 19,855,³⁹ 76

per cent of the militia's privates were under 19 years of age and 40 per cent of the sergeants were between 19 and 21.⁴⁰ Since young men failed, to a certain degree, to maintain the militia's strength when it was expected they would, it might be argued that youthful social unrest and anti-military attitudes were in part responsible. The argument is seemingly without foundation.⁴¹ While there were a number of reasons for the decline of militia strength in the late 1960's, and these will be examined in a subsequent chapter, it would seem that the Suttie recommendations acted as a catalyst leading to the decline.

A second result of the adoption of many of the Suttie Commission recommendations was that it paved the way for the regular army to effect a variety of improvements designed to increase the effectiveness of the militia in meeting its four new roles. In speaking to the C.D.A. on 16 January 1965 Colonel C.P. McPherson, the Director of Reserves (Army), reviewed the new roles and presented a schedule of 38 subjects which had either been implemented or were due for implementation by July 1965.⁴² The items in the schedule were largely administrative and were almost entirely a result of Suttie recommendations.⁴³

Perhaps the most important result of the Suttie Commission was a realization, which grew over the next decade, that a government could do what it liked with the militia without being overly concerned with political repercussions. While previous government concern, other than what might normally be expected in public issues, would be difficult to demonstrate, it is certain that after 1964 important changes were made in the militia without public consultation. This was perhaps possible because of the Suttie Commission's success despite having avoided the C.D.A. to a degree, or it may have come about because of a pragmatic

atmosphere within the Department of National Defence which grew with the energetic policies of the minister, Paul Hellyer.⁴⁴ At the time of the Suttie Commission few interested members of the public seemed aware of Hellyer's resolve to restructure the militia. In Parliament G. Churchill (P.C., Winnipeg) noted a lack of reaction to Suttie's findings by the press and the public.⁴⁵ Briefs submitted to Suttie while the commission sat showed, judging from their subject matter, little appreciation of what was to be expected from the militia.⁴⁶

Whatever the reasons for ignoring previously accepted areas of consultation there followed, after the Suttie report, a Defence Council study on the reserves in 1965 and a departmental review in 1969. Neither of these involved public discussion and, as will be seen, both made major changes in the militia.

Chapter 7 Footnotes

1 The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964. (Hereafter called the Suttie Commission.)

2 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee On Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Numbers 1 to 27, 19 May 1964 to 1 April 1965. (Hereafter called the Hahn Committee.)

3 G. Laniel, Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 14, 23 July 1964, p. 428.

4 Terms of Reference, Appendix "A" to The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), Part I, June 1964, p. 43.

5 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

6 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 December 1963, p. 5457.

7 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1964-65, Camp Petawawa, 1-3 October 1965, p. 49.

8 Loc. cit.

9 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 11, 14 July 1964, p. 338.

10 The C.D.A. had submitted a list of possible appointees for the Suttie Commission but all were rejected. The members were "...appointed on a geographical basis...with one representative from the Services."

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, loc. cit.

11 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., p. 53.

12 The Hahn Committee attributed the manpower cuts solely to "budgetary reasons."

Canada, House of Commons, Reports of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, Fourth Report, Ottawa, 1965, p. 20.

13 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 18, 3 November 1964, p. 627.

14 Canada, House of Commons, Reports of the Special Committee of the House of Commons on Matters Relating to Defence, loc. cit.

15 While sitting on the Suttie Commission Lieutenant-Colonel Legge was the Vice-Chairman of the Conference of Defence Associations.

16 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 12, 16 July 1964, p. 370; Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 16, 18 August 1964, p. 483.

17 In appearing before the Hahn Committee on 16 July Lieutenant-Colonel W.R. Learmonth, the Chairman of the C.D.A., pointed out that there had been "...no acceptance by the Suttie Commission of...(the) reduction." Brigadier Suttie felt that in excess of 40,000 men would be needed to maintain 30,000 effective men.

Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 12, 16 July 1964, p. 370; Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 14, 23 July 1964, p. 425.

18 Terms of Reference, Suttie Commission, op. cit., p. 45.

19 See Appendix M.

20 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., pp. 49-53.

21 Since Part II of the report was confidential until 3 November 1964 the position of the CDA was "one of difficulty." The CDA executive could not make Part II known to the Conference's constituent corps because of the secrecy but "...notwithstanding it prepared a letter on its position...." The views in this letter were presumably the basis of the interview with the Minister on November 18 since time would have precluded canvassing the views of the several corps.

Ibid., p. 50.

22 Ibid., pp. 49-53.

23 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 12, 16 July 1964, p. 360.

24 "We did not go to the Conference of Defence Associations, or to the defence study group, or to any other people concerned with defence."

Ibid., p. 375.

25 The Chairman of the C.D.A. saw the luncheon as an "...attempt (ed) to establish some relationship with the Commission."

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., p. 49.

26 Suttie went to some lengths to show that he had been available for consultation with the C.D.A. Before the Hahn Committee he said there was, "...a great difference between consulting and consulting with" and he felt that he had "consulted." He went on to say that when he had been in Toronto on 13 May he "gave them [the C.D.A.] an opportunity" to meet with him but the only member of the C.D.A. executive in Toronto was the past president. It is difficult to think that the serving executive would not have made themselves available to Suttie; presumably they did not know he would be in Toronto.

Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 14, 23 July 1964, p. 429.

27 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 16, 18 August 1964, p. 483.

28 Legge: "...I do not know what is (sic) the Minister's reason for reversing the militia role."

Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 12, 16 July 1964, p. 369.

29 A major unit was defined by Suttie as having a total strength of 300 under the command of a lieutenant-colonel. A minor unit would have 100 men and be commanded by a major.

Suttie Commission, Part II, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

30 Such a recommendation was one urging, "That great care be given to the preparation of new training manuals." Throughout all of the militia's committees and commissions the wonder remains that such matters could not have been handled, without the benefit of investigation, through normal army administration.

Suttie Commission, Part I, op. cit., p. 13.

31 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 14, 23 July 1964, p. 428.

32 Department of National Defence Position on the Recommendations of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), cited as Appendix "B" to Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 18, 3 November 1964, p. 748.

33 There were minor disagreements in the number of units involved in the changes. See:

Canadian Infantry Association, "Report of the President," Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Edmonton, 3 September, 1-2 October 1965, p. 12; Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., p. 12; Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 18, 3 November 1964, p. 639.

Figures quoted in Table X were compiled from:

Reorganization of Canadian Army (Militia), cited as Appendix "C" to Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 18, 3 November 1964, pp. 755-799.

34 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 16, 18 August 1964, p. 481.

35 "Notes On the Reserve Force for a Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Minister of National Defence," 26 March 1974, file held by the writer, p. 26.

36 "In the years immediately following World War II (sic) and the Korean War the militia attracted many officers and men who had seen

active service in operational theatres. These mature men gave a leadership and character to the militia that has been difficult to replace as time has seen more and more of them leaving for retirement."

Major T.H. Goodfellow, "A Profile of the Militiaman (sic) of 1970," Defence Research Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, April 1974, p. 1.

37 "The chief role of the Militia should be to provide medically fit and youthful personnel trained to basic standards."

Suttie Commission, Part I, op. cit., p. ix.

38 The percentage of senior non-commissioned officers in an armoured unit, for instance, was reduced by 59 per cent while the privates were only reduced by 41 per cent.

Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 18, 3 November 1964, p. 638.

39 "Notes On the Reserve Force for a Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Minister of National Defence," loc. cit.

40 Goodfellow, op. cit., p. 3.

41 "It is often assumed that Canadian youth shares the views of its American counterpart. This has not been proved and it is not by any means certain that Canadian students in the 17 and 18 year old age group have an anti-military bias. It is more likely that the vast majority have no formed opinion at all concerning the Canadian military."

Ibid., p. 9.

42 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., pp. 54-57.

43 In referring to Suttie's findings Lieutenant-Colonel Learmonth had remarked before the Hahn Committee that, "These recommendations are not necessarily inspired by the terms of reference, and indeed, one is hard put to find them in the terms of reference." By the same token it might be questioned if some important items on McPherson's schedule were inspired by Suttie's recommendations. Two of these were that, "...staff action to effect the redistribution of Command Pool equipment" be taken and that there be a "...Working Group...to make a comprehensive review of Reserve Forces accommodations needs."

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., p. 56; Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 12, 16 July 1964, p. 363.

44 Armed Forces Management devoted its June 1964 issue to considering Canadian defence policies and Hellyer's part in them. Articles were:

"Why Hellyer Needn't Fear a Military Undercut," Armed Forces

Management, vol. 10 (June 1964), p. 57; "Why Canada Is Welding Its Three Services Into One," Armed Forces Management, vol. 10 (June 1964), pp. 53-59; "The Man Behind Canada's Bold Look at Tomorrow," Armed Forces Management, vol. 10 (June 1964), pp. 45-48; "Hellyer's White Paper In Brief," Armed Forces Management, vol. 10 (June 1964), p. 60.

45 In the Commons Churchill said: "Even those people who do such a good job from day to day disseminating news and editorial comment have published nothing in their papers but obituary notices concerning regiments being disbanded. In the newspapers and magazines I have not seen any series of articles dealing with the importance of the militia to Canada...."

Canada, Commons Debates, 27 November 1964, p. 10659.

46 Blame, naturally, does not lie with brief writers for presenting their views, but from the viewpoint of hindsight the futility of their doing so is apparent. One writer commented on the roles of the militia "...and the order of priority which should be followed." It has been seen that such matters were decided before the Suttie Commission was even struck.

Terms of Reference, Suttie Commission, op. cit., p. 46.

Chapter 8

The Reorganization of the Militia in the Late 1960's

After the Suttie Commission in 1965 the role of the militia was increasingly directed towards the support of the regular army. This was to be particularly so after 1969. Three major reviews took place between 1965 and 1975 which were designed to bring about greater accord between the regular army and the militia by improving the efficiency of the militia. This chapter will consider the Deputy Chief Reserves study in 1965 and the 1969 Department of National Defence (DND) review. A reserve development study which was begun in January 1973 will be considered in a subsequent chapter.

Before considering the steps which finally brought the militia closer to the regular force it should be noted that the unification of the armed forces and the 1964 White Paper On Defence were of little direct influence upon the militia. The white paper made little reference to the reserves other than to mention that the Suttie Commission and the Hendy and Draper committees¹ would be making recommendations to the Minister of National Defence.² For his part Suttie did not feel constrained by the white paper and before the Hahn Committee he said that, "...we did not find our objectives altered or affected materially by the white paper for the specific job we were asked to do."³ Unification had little influence upon the militia and the Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.) showed an early disinclination to even consider the topic other than in the broadest terms. They rejected "integration at the bottom" while accepting unification at the higher headquarters level.⁴

There was an equal reluctance on the part of the Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, to consider the militia in unification planning. Speaking to the C.D.A. in January 1967 Hellyer said: "We do not propose to make any changes [in the reserves] at the outset but to continue the present organization as far as possible within the framework of the single service."⁵

It would seem that there were two reasons why the militia was not greatly affected by unification. Perhaps the most important was that there was no need, or desirability, to involve the reserves in the four year administrative and legal task of bringing about a unified force.⁶ Secondly, there was a measure of uncertainty as to how the militia might be fitted into the unified force. Once Mobile Command (FMC) had been formed the militia was expected to provide it with reinforcements, but since the necessity of doing so never arose, the militia remained an appendage outside of the functional commands. Such a status did little towards ensuring the militia a place within the unified force and four years after the white paper some elementary questions remained unanswered. In September 1968 the Director of Land Reserves told the Royal Canadian Artillery Association that emergency plans could not be produced because war and peace establishments did not exist for the militia. Furthermore while "provisional tasks" existed for 16,700 men out of 24,000 in the militia it was still necessary to "...ascertain the overall bill for the augmentation of the regular force by the militia."⁷ By September 1969 Major-General M.R. Dare, who was by then engaged in the D.N.D. review which included the militia, noted that 1965 plans for the militia which he had drawn up, "did not get fully off the ground."⁸ In short unification passed the militia by and it may be

noted parenthetically that, once the militia became part of Mobile Command on 1 April 1970, the effect was still small since the militia had to deal mainly with that command.

Of far greater significance to the militia than either the white paper or unification was the Deputy Chief Reserves (DC Reserves) study carried out by Major-General Dare upon the initiative of the Chief of the General Staff. The aim of the study was to establish "...clear and realistic tasks for the Reserve Force in terms of the requirements for 1966 and within the context of the forces-in-being."⁹ The terms of reference went on to say that the roles of the reserves would be to "...support the Regular Forces in a variety of escalating emergencies should these contingencies arise."¹⁰ The result of the study, as noted briefly above, was that the militia was brought in line with the unified command structure but was not made part of it. Instead its 96 major and 138 minor units were to be commanded and administered outside of the Commands such as Mobile and Training. From 1965 to 1970, as a result of the DC Reserves study, the militia was administered by the Deputy Chief Reserves through five region and seven district headquarters which were commanded, respectively, by regular force and militia officers. The tasks assigned to the militia reflected the wish to give the militia goals which would support the regular force. The active reserve was divided into the Ready Reserve, the Canadian Regional Reserve, and the Mobile Command Reserve. Personnel of a given militia unit might be assigned a role in any one of these Reserve sub-components. The Ready Reserve was composed of miscellaneous specialists in such things as stores, dental or engineering work while the Canadian Regional Reserve was expected to train for internal security and civil emergency operations.

By January 1968 557 all ranks had been tasked to the Ready Reserve and 3,951 to the Regional Reserve.¹¹ While commitments had not been settled by early 1968 presumably the rest of the militia, some 20,000 men, were tasked to Mobile Command Reserve. Militia units assigned to the FMC Reserve were to provide either individual or sub-unit reinforcements to the regular force.¹²

The recommendations of the DC Reserves study can be seen, in retrospect, to have contained points which were both of benefit to the militia and some which were not. The latter were largely corrected after the 1969 D.N.D. study. The better recommendations had their basis in reality. For instance major units were only required to produce a company, and minor units a platoon, at concentrations such as summer camps. It would seem that most units were able to meet such realistic commitments.¹³ Perhaps the poorest of the recommendations was splitting the militia into Ready, Regional, and FMC Reserves. One result of doing so was that if a unit had to contribute to all three groups it was over-taxed. In 1968 the president of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Lieutenant-Colonel J.D. Cambridge said that,

Questions of economy, re-organization and uncertainty as to future roles have all plagued our commanding officers, as well as the perennial problems of maintaining unit strength and training efficiency.¹⁴

The split of the militia into three types of active reserves had the further result of seeing units, particularly those in the artillery which could not justify firing,¹⁵ having to train in roles which were reminiscent of national survival with the added disadvantage of Regional Reserve units not having clearly defined tasks.¹⁶ As a result of this anomalies arose. For instance 50 Field Regiment of Peterborough was

unable to enter the annual "Artillery Competition" because of its Regional commitments but its "Infantry Strike Company" placed high in an "Infantry Patrol Competition."¹⁷ Another example of misdirected training took place on the West Coast where for two summer training concentrations a "Strike Battalion"¹⁸ carried out simplistic amphibious exercises which were more directed towards normal infantry training than a new role of internal security.¹⁹

In 1969 there were major policy changes at the ministerial level which resulted in redefined military roles and defence budget restrictions for the Canadian Armed Forces. The redefinition of roles had begun on 3 April when Prime Minister P.E. Trudeau outlined new Canadian defence priorities which placed Canadian national sovereignty and North American defence ahead of NATO commitments and peacekeeping.²⁰ This reversed the order of priorities which had existed in the 1964 White Paper. On 23 April Trudeau moved, in the House, for a "...planned and phased reduction of the size of Canadian forces in Europe." At the same time the Prime Minister listed five "conditions" which he felt had to prevail for "lasting security." These conditions placed emphasis upon international co-operation, arms limitations, and the removal of unrest by increasing economic security.²¹ In late May L. Cadieux, the Minister of National Defence, initiated plans for a "phased reduction" of Canadian forces in Europe²² and on 23 June the reserve force was considered when the minister announced plans for their reduction.²³ In June 1969 the defence budget was frozen at \$1.8 billion. In summary there was to be a lessening of NATO commitments and more attention was to be paid to the less expensive defence of national sovereignty.

It is difficult to determine why policy changes were made in

1969 which called for smaller forces. Despite a two year delay in publishing the 1971 White Paper On Defence it may be taken as an expression of the 1969 review.²⁴ If this is done the avowed reasons for the review, such as improved international developments and national concerns such as the security of the Canadian north, are less than plausible.²⁵ The Canadian government, at the turn of the decade, was willing to ignore certain defence questions and referred to the "greater stability (of) the last few years...."²⁶ In 1968 Czechoslovakia had been invaded, in 1969 Russian defence spending increased by six per cent, and there was increased Soviet naval activity in a number of areas such as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Britain felt that the fall of Czechoslovakia in particular was a "serious setback" to N.A.T.O. countries which would hinder "...fruitful dialogue with the Warsaw Pact about the reciprocal reduction of Forces in Europe."²⁷ Despite evidence of continued world instability, the "quiet diplomacy"²⁸ of Trudeau in defence matters lessened Canada's part in N.A.T.O. and saw the Prime Minister ignore matters such as the United States' anti-ballistic missile programme.²⁹ Perhaps stronger reasons for initiating the 1969 review, than those advanced by the white paper, lay in the economic, cultural and social beliefs of the Trudeau administration.³⁰ Whatever the reasons for the review it would seem that if the trend of international events was ignored in its application to the regular force then the chance of such trends influencing the militia were even more remote.

At the national level, once the need to demonstrate Canada's defence capabilities in N.A.T.O was seen, erroneously, to be of decreasing importance, there was a greater role for the militia. V.J. Kronenberg observed that the emphasis given to sovereignty in the 1969 review,

"...fitted in conveniently with the kind of thinking that had been going on within DND..."³¹ In other words the functional and regional organization could be better exercised in Canada's coastal waters, or in the far north, than, for example, on the European plain. Since it was unlikely that the militia would find major tasks in Europe the logical step was to bring it within the Command system.

The effects of the 1969 decision to restructure the militia were felt in four areas. The first was that in bringing the militia into the Command system the majority of units were assigned to Mobile Command. The exception to this were the three regiments and 11 squadrons of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals which became part of the Canadian Forces Communication Command. One result, and the second in this account, of functional tasking to FMC, was that the militia fell heir to the roles of the regular force without a great deal of examination. In making a major militia policy statement on 19 December 1969, Cadieux said the reserves would fit "...within the framework of our current military roles."³² This was confirmed in the 1971 White Paper which said that, "Generally speaking, the role of the Reserves is to support the Regular Force."³³ The white paper also mentioned augmentation and reinforcement of the regular army, internal security, civil emergency operations and providing a base for expansion as being tasks of the militia.³⁴

The third major result of the 1969 reorganization was a substantial cut in the number of militia units³⁵ and in establishment strengths. The number of major units was reduced from 96 to 87 and minor units from 138 to 78. The basic establishment for major units was reduced from 300 to 157.

The fourth change after 1969 was in the command and control of

the militia. Instead of the five region headquarters commanded by regular force brigadiers and colonels there were, after 1970, five militia areas commanded by militia brigadiers who were responsible to Mobile Command. Under the five new areas were 20 (later 21) district headquarters, commanded by militia colonels, to carry out primarily administrative functions. Staffs of area and district headquarters were composed of both regular and militia officers. Most importantly a major-general of the reserves was appointed who was a militia officer and who advised the Chief of the Defence Staff on reserve force matters. The advisor was assisted by two (later increased to three) brigadier-generals, or officers of equivalent rank, to ensure representation from all three elements of the reserves.³⁶

The effects of the 1969 reorganization were of mixed benefit to the militia. To consider the negative effects first, it would seem that the reduction of militia units, and most particularly the reduction of their establishment, was in part responsible for a decline in strength which almost destroyed the militia.³⁷ For a 12 month period beginning in September 1970 some 60 per cent of the strength, or 650 officers and 10,000 men, left the militia. While in 1971 7,109 men joined, a continued fall in net strength meant that by June 1972 the militia's effective strength was 12,865 all ranks.³⁸ The Minister of National Defence, J. Edgar Benson, saw the exodus as a result of a lack of training and operational challenges, poor pay, and a shortage of regular force support.³⁹ There was little or no public outcry over a declining militia. In the press Benson "...conceded that over the past few years there have been problems in the militia on the personnel and equipment level, but these will be overcome by the new attention given to the militia."⁴⁰

(In the year after Benson spoke 7,973 men left the militia.) If the press is taken as a barometer of public opinion then reaction to a press conference held by Benson on the militia was illustrative of public indifference in 1972. Reports of the conference were published in some papers⁴¹ but no major editorial stands were taken. Two papers, often interested in defence, also showed a lack of concern. The Daily Colonist, of Victoria, ignored the Benson conference while the Calgary Herald published an account of it as a small article.⁴²

The 1969 reorganization benefitted the militia by giving it a single role, supporting the regular army, and by assigning all militia units to either Mobile or Communication Command. Being in the Commands gave the militia soldier a new sense of purpose⁴³ while having a single role put the purpose in comprehensible terms. All of this was particularly true in the Communication Command where units prospered to an unparalleled degree.⁴⁴

Finally, in considering the mixed benefits of the 1969 studies, it must be said that any benefits from the militia taking command at the Area, or brigadier-general level, are difficult to assess. The reasons advanced for the militia assuming senior commands were less than legitimate. In appearing before a parliamentary committee in 1972 Major-General D.R. Adamson, Deputy Chief of Operations and Reserves said that the command changes had been made because militia officers "wished to have more authority" and, secondly, because of budget restraints "positional savings" in regular force officers had been made.⁴⁵ When General Adamson spoke, there were 97 officers of the rank of brigadier-general or higher and 1,100 colonels and lieutenant-colonels in the Canadian Armed Forces.⁴⁶ In view of this it is difficult to credit a

shortage of senior officers as a reason for the regular force not continuing to command the militia at the Area level if it had been considered advisable. To have done so would have required five brigadier-generals or colonels. Whatever the reasons for giving the militia its own headquarters structure below the Command level, there is no evidence either for or against the advisability of having done so. Of unquestionable benefit in the new militia structure was the appointment of a Major General Reserves who had direct access to the Chief of the Defence Staff and to "...the total military story, regular and reserve."⁴⁷

Chapter 8 Footnotes

1 The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964; Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Role and Organization of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, 15 February 1964; Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary, 15 February 1964.

2 Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper On Defence, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, March 1964, p. 25.

3 Canada, House of Commons, Special Committee On Defence, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 14, 23 July 1964, p. 423. (Hereafter called the Hahn Committee.)

4 Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 12, 16 July 1964, pp. 372-373.

5 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1966-67, Ottawa, 18-21 October 1967, pp. 82-83.

6 The steps taken in bringing about the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces were as follows: in March 1964 the white paper was issued which forecast unification. In July Bill C-90 established a Chief of the Defence Staff to replace the former individual service chiefs and in August the CDS and branch heads were appointed at Canadian Forces Headquarters. In July 1965 the new functional command structure was announced and in January 1966 these were brought into being. In December 1966 Bill C-243 (the Reorganization Act) was placed before parliament and in April 1966 the Act was passed. On 1 February 1968 the Reorganization Act was brought into force with all three former services becoming the Canadian Armed Forces.

"1 February Makes History," Canadian Forces Bulletin, vol. 3 (January 1968), p. 3.

7 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1967-68, Camp Shilo, 26-28 September 1968, p. 44.

8 John R. Walker, "General Defends Halving Our Militia," The Edmonton Journal, 12 September 1969, p. 5.

9 Major-General M.R. Dare, Deputy Chief Reserves, Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1965-66, Camp Shilo, 29-30 September, 1 October 1966, p. 42.

10 Loc. cit.

11 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1967-68, op. cit., p. 85.

12 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1966-67, op. cit., p. 84.

13 A random sampling of units shows that in the summer of 1968 the following units provided the numbers shown at their annual concentrations. 49 (Sault Ste. Marie) Field Regiment, 99 all ranks; 5 (BC) Field Battery, 49 all ranks; The Royal Westminster Regiment, 98 all ranks; The Canadian Scottish Regiment, 131 all ranks.

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1967-68, op. cit., pp. 64, 74; The Royal Westminster Regiment, Annual Historical Report for Year Ending 31 December 1968, 16 December 1969, Pacific Area files; The Canadian Scottish Regiment, Historical Report 1 January-31 December 1968, 8 March 1969, Pacific Area files.

14 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1967-68, op. cit., p. 15.

15 In trying to justify the rationale for artillery units having a non-firing role in the Regional Reserve Colonel M.H. Bateman, the Director of Land Reserves said, "I know that regional reserve units are anxious to retain their ability to shoot but does it make sense to spend time and money developing skills which may not be required?" Such thinking, if carried to the extreme, would have had rather far-reaching results for the entire defence structure.

Ibid., p. 44.

16 In 1972 Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Bussi res, a representative from Mobile Command, outlined to the artillery association eight tasks which were basic for internal security training. These included such things as crowd control, support of bomb searches and so forth. There is no evidence that such tasks were assigned to the militia in 1967. Instead, as the text shows, it was a case of local interpretation as to what internal security involved.

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1971-72, Ottawa, 22-24 September 1972, p. 42.

17 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1967-68, op. cit., p. 75.

18 There were two "strike battalions" and one strike company formed for "internal security requirements" in the Regional Reserve. The battalions were on either coast while the company was at Whitehorse.

19 Lieutenant-Commander R. Wormald, "Pacific Region Strike Battalion," Sentinel, vol. 4 (July-August 1968), pp. 10-13; "Army Games Scheduled To Start Today," Daily Colonist, Victoria, 30 March 1969.

20 Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches 69/7, 3 April 1969 cited in Vernon J. Kronenberg, All Together Now: the Organization of the Department of National Defence in Canada 1964-1972, Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973, p. 91.

21 Canada, Commons Debates, 23 April 1969, pp. 7866, 7868.

22 Canada, Commons Debates, 2 June 1969, p. 9305.

23 Canada, Commons Debates, 23 June 1969, p. 10, 517.

Plans for the reduction of the militia were decided by a "Force Structure Working Group" of 15 officers under Major-General Dare. The Group began reviewing the entire defence structure in April. On 11 July 1969 the Working Group presented the proposed reorganization of the reserves to the Conference of Defence Associations for endorsement. Apparently the C.D.A. refused to endorse the proposals and "vast changes" followed in the plans before militia cuts were finalized by 19 December 1969.

"Force Structure Working Group Had Long, Hot Summer," Canadian Forces Bulletin, vol. 4 (September-October 1969), pp. 1-2; Air Vice-Marshal Bob Cameron, "Unexploited Natural Resource", Winnipeg Free Press, 17 February 1970; Brigadier-General W.A. Howard, Chairman's Report, Report 33rd Annual Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, 15-17 January 1970.

24 Minister of National Defence, White Paper On Defence: Defence in the 70's, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971, p. 1.

25 Colin S. Gray, "Defence in the Seventies: A White Paper For All Seasons," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 1 (Spring 1972), p. 31.

26 Minister of National Defence, White Paper On Defence: Defence in the 70's, op. cit., p. 4.

27 Secretary of State for Defence, Statement On the Defence Estimates 1969, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1969, p. 2.

28 John W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada, Toronto, New Press, 1970, p. 224.

29 Canada, Commons Debates, 17 March 1969, p. 6684.

30 Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study In Decision-Making, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1972, pp. 105-120.

Paul Hellyer wrote of a shift to the left in Canadian foreign policy in the early 1970's and in a letter to the writer said that the shift was recognized, "...amongst those members of the Cabinet who hold a more traditional approach to foreign affairs." If such a shift meant less emphasis upon defence then it is probably one result of an accurate assessment of the Canadian people by Trudeau. The pragmatistic aspect of the man's character were ably considered in a Saturday Night article by Christina Newman.

Paul Hellyer, "Rumors Useful to Prime Minister," Daily Colonist, Victoria, 21 November 1974, p. 4; Paul Hellyer, letter to the writer, 2 January 1965; Christina McCall Newman, "The Exotic Mindscape of Pierre Trudeau," Saturday Night, vol. 92 (February 1977), pp. 17-23.

31 Kronenberg, op. cit., p. 91.

32 L. Cadieux, "Statement by the Honourable Leo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence, 19 December 1969," Ottawa, Information Services, Department of National Defence, 19 December 1969.

33 White Paper On Defence: Defence in the 70's, op. cit., p. 46.

34 The white paper used augmentation, internal security and so forth to amplify the primary role of supporting the regular force. In time terms were refined and by 1972 when the militia's role became simply "To support the Regular Force" then augmentation, internal security and the others became "missions."

"Notes On the Reserve Force for a Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Minister of National Defence," 26 March 1974, file held by writer. (Hereafter called "Notes On the Reserve Force.")

35 During the era militia unit cuts were not necessarily connected with studies or policy changes. In September 1968 the president of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association reported that in the previous year three major and one minor artillery unit had been eliminated.

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1967-68, op. cit., p. 15.

36 "Reduction of the Reserve Forces," Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1968-69, Ottawa, 1-4 October 1969, pp. 38-40.

37 See Appendix N.

38 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1972-72, op. cit., p. 46.

39 "Notes On the Reserve Force," op. cit., p. 29.

40 "Militia Will Get Stress - Benson," Trenton Trentonian, 21 April 1972.

41 "Militia Declining...Girls More Fun," Ottawa Journal, 27 April 1972; "Drop In Reserve Forces Steeper Than Forecast," Ottawa Citizen, 27 April 1972.

42 "Reserve Strength Drops 22 Per Cent," Calgary Herald, 27 April 1972, p. 37.

43 In commenting on the popularity of Mobile Command with the militia in 1969, General Dare was quoted as having said that one of the troubles was that "everyone wanted to be in the mobile command reserve" because of "the glamour." Since, shortly after, Dare became Vice Chief of the Defence Staff it might have been hoped that he would have promoted "glamour" as a means of overcoming recruiting and retention problems.

John R. Walker, "General Defends Halving of Our Militia," loc. cit.

44 See Appendix O.

45 Canada, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Number 18, 30 May 1972, p. 6. (Hereafter called Standing Committee on National Defence.)

46 Standing Committee on National Defence, Minutes Number 19, 29 June 1972, p. 28.

47 Standing Committee on National Defence, Minutes Number 18, loc. cit.

Chapter 9

Growing Affinity With the Regular Force in the Early 1970's

In the early 1970's the forces-in-being concept of the armed forces, which had excluded the militia in the previous decade, began to lose in importance. Its place was taken by a greater emphasis upon the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) and upon "...conventional capabilities and the national mobilization base."¹ The new emphasis resulted from a decline in the fear of possible nuclear war and from international talks such as those on strategic arms limitations and force reductions.² In addition the 1971 White Paper On Defence³ saw the need for military forces for tasks in maintaining national sovereignty, in carrying out national development, and in maintaining internal security. Because of the international climate and because of internal tasks there was an increased need for troops. The difficulty was that by 1972 Mobile Command, which is central to all land operations, was reduced to 20,000 regular troops of which only 10,000 were in combat formations.⁴ The result was that in the early 1970's defence headquarters turned to the militia for the support of the regular army. In speaking to the Defence Management Committee (DMC) on 22 January 1973 Lieutenant-General S.C. Waters said:

As the Regular Force declines in strength, then the Reserve Force must grow if we are to create the kind of trained manpower needed to meet our undiminished operational and administrative commitments.⁵

With the necessity of creating a stronger reserve force "well understood and supported" within the Department of National Defence General Waters, as Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, Operations, announced his

proposals for a two-phased National Defence Headquarters Reserve Development Study at the January 1973 DMC meeting.⁶ Phase One of the study consisted of General Waters' presentation to the DMC. This presentation called for "a series of measures" which would be "of immediate and lasting benefit"⁷ to the reserves. In brief, the measures concerned inadequate clothing, old and scarce equipment and low pay rates.⁸ Phase Two of the Development Study was to take a broader view of reserve "concepts, structures and detailed policies" for the coming five to eight years. The recommendations were to be based in part upon studies which had taken place at the Command level in 1972⁹ and Waters' expectation was that Phase Two would be completed by the spring of 1973.

The Defence Management Committee showed natural concern about the possible adverse reaction of the Treasury Board to both phases of the Development Study.¹⁰ As a result while the majority¹¹ of Part One was accepted by November 1973 the DMC did not accept the proposals for Part Two which were presented to them on 7 August 1973 at the 69th DMC meeting. The proposals were refused by the DMC on the grounds that "...the rationale for the existence of the Reserve Force, together with the role, missions, and tasks were not adequately developed."¹² The unacceptable proposals had simply said that, "The White Paper, Defence in the 70's, will be the policy basis for this (the Phase Two) study."¹³ In seeking to enunciate a rationale for the reserves, the revised proposals relied much more heavily upon the 1971 White Paper and proposed that the militia provide troops for the maintenance of national sovereignty, the joint defence of North America, for NATO, and for five other tasks.¹⁴ All of the tasks had their basis in the white paper where they had been assigned to either the regular or the reserve force. The rev-

ised rationale, role, missions and tasks were accepted by the Defence Management Committee at their 77th meeting on 1 October 1973.

The acceptance by the Defence Management Committee of Part Two of the Reserve Development Study was significant in illustrating a changed attitude towards supporting and financing the militia which was found in many quarters. In 1972 the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, in its Third Report to the House, noted that:

The Committee was struck...by the severe budgetary limitations within which the Reserves now have to operate.¹⁵

In presenting Phase One to the DMC General Waters, in recognizing the same problem, said:

We must begin to exercise more care in the split of resources between the Regular and Reserve Forces.¹⁶

Such an attitude did not mean drastic changes in the amount spent on the reserves¹⁷ but it did mean that, in addition to some new clothing and equipment,¹⁸ the militia would be looked upon as having more in common with the regular force. This was expressed at the 77th meeting of the Defence Management Committee when a Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff noted that the philosophy accepted by the committee showed a "considerable difference in attitude" which showed that the militia "are an integral part of the Regular Force."¹⁹

A greater need for the militia and a greater reliance upon it came to mean that, with one or two limitations, its capabilities were considered to be equal to those of the regular army. In February 1974 Brigadier-General G.H. Sellar, the Director General of Reserves and Cadets, said:

...the need for forces-in-being is no longer tied to the theory of a brief general war. A new force structure is evolving and it will consist of both regular and reserve forces. That part of the force structure which is required to be in existence on a continuous basis, by reason of reaction time, continuity of support, degree of specialization and similar reasons will be the regular force. The remainder of the force structure will be the primary reserve.²⁰

The first limitation on the militia's capabilities was that 30 days were needed before its troops could "...be engaged in a war operation."²¹

Secondly, the use of militia troops was not anticipated in combatting civil insurrection.²²

In almost all other respects the militia and the regular force operated with greater affinity and the the militia's roles, or missions, became more flexible. With this flexibility the roles coincided, roughly in time, with the needs of the regular force. For instance from 1969 to 1972 the militia's role had been to support the regular force. During this period the militia's missions had been to provide individual reinforcements for the regular army, to provide sub-units for the defence of Canada and the maintenance of internal security, to provide individual augmentation for civil emergency operations, and to provide a base for expansion.²³ By the mid-1970's it was recognized that a shortage of troops in 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in NATO had rendered the force ineffective.²⁴ As a result of this the militia was looked to for reinforcement and its role was broadened to include the augmentation of NATO forces.²⁵ By the same token when "national development" became recognized as a contribution to Canada of the regular force it was assigned, two years later, as a militia "mission".²⁶

The table below might be taken as a partial reflection of the results of a closer relationship between the militia and the regular force.

Year	Militia Strength	Summer Camp	On "long" courses ¹	Service		Artic or jungle training
				NATO	Middle East	
1971	18,000	4,000	2,309	149	None	19
1973	14,428	3,926	1,824	319	None	Not known
1974	14,217	4,068	2,186	422	85	Not known
1975	15,200	6,488	4,166	421	123	170
¹ "Long" courses here is meant to designate courses away from the soldiers home unit such as national or area rank and trade schools.						

Table XII. Militia Strengths and Activities in the Early 1970's.²⁷

The stabilization of militia strength²⁸ and good strength at summer camps might be attributable to poor economic conditions within the country.²⁹ It is equally possible that increased training and perceivable tasks such as those exemplified by overseas postings, have given the militia a new sense of purpose.

It would seem that if a new sense of purpose has grown within the militia in the early 1970's then it will have gained an ingredient which it has sometimes been denied. The expectations that the militia would provide a mobilization base in the late 1940's was too grandiose and theoretical to have produced results. When the 25th and 27th Brigades were being mobilized the militia responded to a degree which was in keeping with the amount of challenge it was offered. The militia had a brief period of prosperity following the Kennedy Report until an emphasis was placed upon national survival training. Rightly or wrongly,

the average militia soldier felt that this role did little in providing him with a sense of purpose. From 1964 to 1970 numerous reorganizations and economies together with a belief in the paramount importance of regular army forces-in-being kept the militia from assuming a prominent role in defence. In referring to the late 1960's J.A. MacLean, a member of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, astutely observed in 1972 that,

We went through a long period when the philosophy was that the only thing that mattered at all...were forces in being.... Now the pendulum seems to be swinging back to the fact that you have to be able to react to all sorts of situations.... I have a feeling that maybe the concept of the armed forces organization, has been pushed hither and yon a little too much.³⁰

MacLean's words coincided with the need to react to a number of situations, most of which are dictated by the militia's task of supporting the regular army. This is a reversal of the roles given to the regular army and the militia in the 1940's and it would seem to offer sufficient purpose to the militia soldiers involved.

Chapter 9 Footnotes

1 "Presentation by the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Operations to the Defence Management Committee on 22 January 1973," (Lieutenant-General S.C. Waters), Annex "B" to Minutes, 42nd Meeting, Defence Management Committee, Ottawa, 22 January 1973, p. 1. (Hereafter called Waters Presentation).

2 Loc. cit.

3 Minister of National Defence, White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70's, Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971.

4 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1971-72, Ottawa, 22-24 September 1972, p. 42.

At the unit level regular army establishments were referred to by the Director of Artillery as "completely inadequate" in 1974. Field artillery regiments had been reduced to 357 all ranks on a two battery organization.

"Address by the Director of Artillery," Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1973-74, Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, 17-19 October 1974, p. 37.

5 Waters Presentation, loc. cit.

6 In addition to the National Defence Headquarters study a series of studies were carried out by Mobile Command, beginning in 1970, which were designed to use a series of objectives, goals, and programmes in planning the operation of the Command up until 1980. The studies were to take place on a continuing basis. Initially the militia was considered under the acronym NURES (New Reserves) with reserve matters isolated from other objectives. By 1971 six of the 14 goals for the militia had been achieved and, perhaps significantly in view of the growing affinity between the regular force and the militia, the remaining eight were transferred to objectives which were of equal concern to the regular force.

Mobile Command Headquarters, Mobile Command Objectives and Goals Handbook - Third Edition, FMC 3135-0057-1 (P & P), 24 March 1972, Headquarters Militia Area Pacific files, covering letter and Part 2.

7 Waters Presentation, op. cit., p. 3.

8 General Waters' presentation was an extremely adequate, detailed and sympathetic consideration of these topics. For instance in regards to pay he noted that the lowest paid private in the militia received \$6.20 a day. Waters noted that based on an eight hour day the resulting 77¢ an hour was below the federal minimum wage of \$1.90 an hour.

Ibid., p. 6.

9 Reports had been received from Maritime and Mobile Commands, from the Communication Command and from the Surgeon General.

Ibid., p. 2.

10 Minutes, 42nd Meeting, Defence Management Committee, Ottawa, 22 January 1973, p. 4.

11 Chief of the Defence Staff, "NDHQ Reserve Development Study Second Report On Implementation of Recommendations," National Defence Headquarters, 20 March 1975.

12 National Defence Headquarters, "Plan to Implement Recommendations NDHQ Reserve Development Study - Phase 2, NDHQ Instruction DCDS 18/73," 20 November 1973.

13 Appendix 1 to Annex "A" to loc. cit.

14 "Memorandum to Defence Management Committee," September 1973, p. 7, under covering letter "The Primary Reserve Rationale and Tasks," 5323-2 TD 3040 (DCDS), 19 September 1973.

15 Canada, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence Number 19, (Third Report to the House), 29 June 1972, p. 28. (Hereafter called Standing Committee on National Defence.)

16 Waters Presentation, op. cit., p. 2.

17 In 1973-74 \$22 million had been spent on the reserves. Following the Reserve Development Study this was increased by \$7 million in 1974-75. It may be remembered that in 1963-64 \$51,539,000 had been spent on the reserves. (See Appendices L and M.)

Report Conference of Defence Associations 38th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 17-18 January 1975, p. 14.

18 20,000 new uniforms and some 450 light trucks were the main items purchased.

Loc. cit.

19 Minutes, 77th Meeting, Defence Management Committee, Ottawa, 1 October 1973, p. 2.

20 Brigadier-General G.H. Sellar, "The Primary Reserve - Rationale, Role, Missions and Detailed Tasks," Presentation by the Director General Reserves and Cadets to the Canadian Forces Training and Education Study Group, 7 February 1974.

21 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1971-72, op. cit., p. 47.

22 In 1972 the Minister of National Defence, E.J. Benson, said that if the regular force was over-extended in its internal security tasks

that consideration would be given to calling on the militia "for assistance". A much clearer stand had been given in 1970 by Major-General M.R. Dare who said: "I simply will not accept the point of view that a young 16 or 17 year old partially trained militiaman and 50 rounds of ammunition should be placed in this position of direct confrontation with rioters ." There is little question but that General Dare's stand was correct. He went on to say that in periods of unrest the militia might guard facilities and so forth. This was exactly what did happen nine months later when 601 Quebec militia soldiers were called out in a supporting role in the October 1970 crisis.

Lieutenant-General M.R. Dare, Vice-chief of the General Staff, Report Part One, Conference of Defence Associations 33rd Annual Meeting, 15-17 January 1970, p. 17; E.J. Benson, Standing Committee On National Defence, Minutes No. 1, 25 February 1972, p. 12; Major L.F. McInnis, "Reserves On Essay," Sentinel, vol. 7 (July-August 1971), p. 46.

23 "Statement on the Reserve Forces Tabled with the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Honourable E.J. Benson, Minister of National Defence," Standing Committee On National Defence, Minutes No. 2, 29 February 1972, p. 25.

24 Annex "F" to "Minutes of the FMC Conference of Honorary Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels," FMC 1180-120/C6 (CSec), 16 December 1975, p. 3.

25 Militia augmentation of 4 CMBG had begun in 1967 when 330 militia soldiers joined the brigade. Two differences existed between the augmentation of the 1960's and those of the 1970's. The first was that it was not until 1973 that the policy of having the militia serve with the brigade was announced. Secondly, the attitude seems to have been that when a militia soldier was posted to the brigade it was some form of reward or recreation rather than a response of the militia to a need of the regular army. In speaking to the Conference of Defence Associations in 1969 General Dare had said:

This opportunity to train with Regular troops in the field in an operations setting, for even limited numbers, is the obvious highlight of the Militia training year. I am looking forward to similar flyover training being available in 1969, but I must reiterate that we respond to the stated needs of the Brigade Command and we cannot over-burden his command.

"Presentation by Major-General M.R. Dare," Report - Part One of the 32nd Annual Meeting of the Conference of Defence Associations, Ottawa, 16-18 January 1969, p. 17; Don Gain, "European Trip," The Brazier, Victoria, vol. 1 (January 1968), p. 3.

26 Department of National Defence, "Reserves and Cadets," Defence 1973, Information Canada, 1974, p. 60.

27 Ibid., pp. 62-6 ; Department of National Defence, "Reserves," Defence 1971, Information Canada, 1972, p. 68; Department of National Defence, "Reserves and Cadets," Defence 1974, Information Canada, 1975, pp. 52-53; Department of National Defence, "Command Control of the Canadian Forces," Defence 1975, Information Canada, 1976, p. 36.

28 In Table XII it is assumed that 15,200 is an accurate figure for 1975 and if it is then it reflects a minor renaissance in the militia. Strength figures vary for various years depending upon the time of year a count is taken, the inclusion of non-effectives and so forth. For instance in 1972 strength figures of 12,865 and 15,696 were given with the former figure reflecting non-effectives. In the same year the government reported the strength as 16,583.

Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Bussi res, Mobile Command, Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1971-72, op. cit., p. 46; Major-General D.R. Adamson, Deputy Chief, Operations and Reserves, Standing Committee On National Defence, Minutes No. 18, 30 May 1972, p. 32; Department of National Defence, "Reserves and Cadets," Defence 1972, Information Canada, 1973, p. 91.

29 In 1976 a national recruiting scheme was based upon poor economic conditions and the possibility of militia soldiers serving at the Montreal Olympics. The scheme guaranteed summer employment and training with a clear wage of \$1,518 over the spring and summer. The directness of the appeal worked and nationally the militia was able to contribute 3,000 troops to various tasks connected with the Olympics. In the majority of cases these 3,000 were probably not the same men who had been attracted by the recruiting scheme. An example of recruiting success at the unit level was found in Victoria where 102 men and women were recruited between 10 and 26 February.

Wire from Militia Area Pacific to Victoria Militia District, 30 January 1976, Militia Area Pacific files; Defence Information Services, "Reserves Aim for Quality Over Quantity," National Defence Headquarters, 19 June 1976, p. 1; "Gamescan Recruiting Statistics," 26 February 1976, Victoria Militia District files.

30 J.A. MacLean: Standing Committee On National Defence, Minutes No. 18, 30 May 1972, p. 25.

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APPENDIX A

Definition of the Militia

The names used over the years to denote components of the Canadian army have been numerous. Prior to the Second World War the army was known as The Militia of Canada and it was composed of The Permanent Active Militia and the Non-Permanent Active Militia. During the war these two terms were changed to the Canadian Active Service Force and the Reserve Army respectively. Following an interim period after the war, by 31 March 1947, the two principal components of the army became the Canadian Army (Active) and the Canadian Army (Reserve Force). In 1950 the 25th Brigade was recruited for Korea as part of the Active Force but since there were special terms of enlistment the term Canadian Army Special Force was used to describe this temporary force. In 1954 the active and reserve components became the Canadian Army (Regular) and the Canadian Army (Militia). The Canadian Army (Regular) continued as such until 1 February 1968 when it ceased to exist and became part of the Regular Force of the Canadian Armed Forces. On the same date the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve Component was formed and it was made up of the Primary Reserve, the Supplementary List, the Cadet Instructors List, and Canadian Rangers. The Primary Reserve was, in turn, made up of the Naval Reserve, the Militia, the Air Reserve, and later the Communication Reserve. For simplicity, and in keeping with the most common usage over the years, the terms Regular Army and Militia will be used throughout.

APPENDIX B

Officers Serving by Corps and Militia Headquarters and Units Raised, 1948¹

Corps or Headquarters	Officers Estb Vacancies	Number Serving	% of Estb Filled	Headquarters			Major Units			Minor Units		
				Number Planned	Number Raised	% Raised	Number Planned	Number Raised	% Raised	Number Planned	Number Raised	% Raised
Brigade Headquarters	416	156	37	22	22	100						
RCA Headquarters	86	27	31	8	8	100						
RCASC Headquarters	80	67	84	8	8	100						
RCOC Headquarters	36	21	58	8	7	88						
RCEME Headquarters	47	23	49	8	7	88						
Royal Canadian Armoured Corps	1,003	652	65				23	23	100			
Royal Canadian Artillery	2,513	1,428	57				77	72	95	9	5	55
Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers	422	145	34				10	10	100	24	14	58
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals	317	193	61				10	10	100	25	7	28
Royal Canadian Infantry Corps	2,461	1,814	74				65	65	100			
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps	463	185	40							46	35	76
Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps	483	216	45				29	27	93	19	11	58
Royal Canadian Dental Corps	192	43	22				8	8	100			
Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps	56	32	57							14	11	78
Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	364	110	30							173	54	31
Canadian Postal Corps	8	2	25							8	2	25
Canadian Provost Corps	32	14	44							8	6	75
Canadian Intelligence Corps	37	1	3							2	1	50
Totals or Average Percentages	9,001	5,226	58	58	54	96	222	216	97	328	146	44

1 Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part I - Reserve Force, Ottawa, 1 July 1948.

2 See Appendix P for abbreviations used in Appendices B, D, and J.

APPENDIX C

The System Used In Determining the Strength of The Militia

The system used in determining what the strength of the militia should be in a given year in the late 1940's was both flexible and convenient. The system, working from the largest to the smallest numbers, was as follows. At the top there was an order of battle for units on the Supplementary Reserve list. These were "paper" units and it was never planned that they would be active in the militia. Below this was the figure of 187,865 all ranks which was the number of men who would be in the militia if all units were completely filled. This was known as the establishment strength. The same order-in-council¹ which set the establishment strength also provided a ceiling of 90,000 which was the maximum number who could serve in the militia at any one time. If a particular unit recruited to full strength under this ceiling the strengths of other units, in theory, would have to be reduced. The 90,000 ceiling could be adjusted to anything less by the Department of National Defence while any adjustments between 90,000 and the establishment strength could be made by an order-in-council. In addition, over the years, a paid ceiling figure was used to reflect the amount of money available to pay the militia. This ceiling would be smaller than the normal ceiling set in a given year.

There were a number of advantages in using inflated figures in a militia whose true strength, the number of effective soldiers, never exceeded 50,000. Maintaining a Supplementary Reserve list of units which would absorb some 500,000 men had the advantage of planning for the

event of total mobilization.² The establishment figure of 187,865 allowed a six division, six brigade "net" to be spread across Canada with the object of reflecting organizational changes, exercising chains of command, ensuring inter-arms training, and ensuring arms representation in "...accordance with the incidence of population."³ A second advantage to the system was the flexibility referred to above in adjusting the strength. This was taken advantage of in 1961 when an order-in-council was signed authorizing an additional 100,000 militia soldiers under the Special Militia Training Programme⁴ (see Chapter Five). Finally the system was advantageous to the government since, with a large number of unit names in existence, it could be seen to be supporting the militia. If this resulted in the enrolment of a relatively large number of officers, the more politically sensitive segment of the militia,⁵ this was acceptable not only in its own right but also because it reinforced the government's policy of viewing the militia as a mobilization base.

There were two harmful effects in using large establishment figures. The first was that it must have confused the electorate. In 1946 Abbott told the Canadian Club at Ottawa that,

The Canadian army will consist of an active force of approximately 25,000 and a reserve force of six divisions, with a total authorized strength of approximately 180,000.⁶

The interpretations put on Abbott's speech can only be imagined but many listeners must have thought Canada would have a mixed force of 205,000 men. The second harmful effect was that presenting the militia with unattainable national and unit establishment figures could only cause frustration and disappointment within the militia. This was a most important point.

Appendix C Footnotes

1 P.C. Order 4/3144, The Canada Gazette, Ottawa, 13 September 1947, pp. 2766-2767, Part I, vol. 81E.

2 Aide Memoir, Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) to Chief of the General Staff, "Reorganization Postwar Reserve Army," 4 January 1946, Directorate of History files, p. 1.

3 Loc. cit.

4 PC 1961-9/1666 cited in "Memorandum - Special Militia Training Programme, Militia Strength Ceiling," HQC 2001/1 TD 1258 (SD 1A), 30 November 1961, Directorate of History files.

5 Major E.W. George served as a major in the 8th Princess Louise's (New Brunswick) Hussars in 1948. In 1949 he was the Liberal Member of Parliament for the riding of Westmorland, N.B. While this combination of public service was out of the ordinary George's career illustrated how a contented Militia officer could support the government. He did so at some length in Parliament in November 1949.

Canada, Commons Debates, 24 November 1949, p. 2168.

6 Canada, Commons Debates, 13 February 1947, p. 394.

APPENDIX D

Decline in Toronto Recruiting Expectations from 1948 to 1973

1949	Estb	1964	Estb	1973	Estb
Headquarters					
HQ, 19 Armd Bde	23 - 199	14 Mil GP HQ	12 - 16	HQ, Mil Area Cent	7-14
HQ, 1 AGRA	14 - 35	15 Mil GP HQ	12 - 16	HQ, Tor Mil Dist	11-9
HQ, RCA 2 Armd Div	13 - 31*	16 Mil Gp HQ	12 - 16		
HQ, 2 Fd Regt, RCE	5 - 26				
HQ, 4 Inf Bde	18 - 52				
HQ, 5 Inf Bde	18 - 52				
HQ, RCASC, 2 Armd Div	10 - 35*				
HQ, 1 Corps Tps, RCOC	1 - 4				
HQ, 1 Corps, RCEME	5 - 17				
HQ, 2 Armd Div, RCEME	5 - 17				
Armour					
GGHG	38 - 647	GGHG	40 - 642	GGHG (2)**	20-137
QY Rang	38 - 647	QY Rang	40 - 642	QY Rang (2)	20-137
Artillery					
29 Fd Regt (SP)	39 - 610	29 Fd Regt (SP)	40 - 609	7 Fd (3)	28-203
32 Fd Regt (SP)	39 - 610	42 Med Regt	28 - 513		
42 Med Regt	28 - 514	1 Loc Regt	35 - 600*		
69 Obsn Regt	48 - 864				
1 AAGOR	5 - 33				
Engineers					
2 Fd Sqn	7 - 249	2 Fd Eng Regt (-)	19 - 285	2 Eng Regt (2)	20-137*
27 Fd Pk Sqn	4 - 112				
Signal					
2 Armd Div Sig Regt (-)	25 - 601	2 Sig Regt	29 - 520	709 Comm Regt	20-137*
1 Corps HQ Sig Regt	20 - 321	8 Sig Regt	29 - 520	(Part of Comm Comd)	
38 Army Gp RCA Sig Tp	2 - 63				
9 Fd Regt (SP) Sig Tp	1 - 38				
40 Fd Regt Sig Tp	1 - 38*				
3 Med Regt Sig Tp	1 - 38				
5 Inf Bde Sig Tp	3 - 145				
Infantry					
QOR of C	38 - 812	QOR of C	37 - 875	QOR of C (2)	20-137
R Regt C	38 - 812	R Regt C	37 - 875	R Regt C (2)	20-137
48 Highrs	38 - 812	48 Highrs	37 - 875	48 Highrs (3)	28-203
Tor Scot R	38 - 812	Tor Scot R	37 - 875	Tor Scot R (2)	20-137
Ir RC	38 - 812	Ir RC	37 - 875		
Service Corps					
1 Tpt Coy	9 - 308	5 Colm	31 - 370*	HQ, Toronto Mil (3)	28-44
4 Tpt Coy	9 - 308			Svc Bn	
6 Tpt Coy	9 - 308			134 Tpt Coy***	6-68
25 Tpt Coy	9 - 308				
40 Med Regt P1	2 - 102				
Medical					
2 Fd Amb	12 - 230	26 Med Coy	43 - 238		
7 Fd Amb	12 - 230				
27 CCS	21 - 96				
47 CCS	21 - 96				
16 FDS	6 - 89				
40 Fd Hyg Sec	2 - 27				
Ordnance					
4 Armd Div OFP	2 - 78	4 Ord Bn	23 - 162	13 Ord Coy***	7-26
1 Corps Tps OFP	4 - 18				
RCEME					
34 Corps Tps Wksp	6 - 255	4 Tech Regt	41 - 930	45 Tech Coy***	7-33
4 Armd Wksp	8 - 277				
5 Inf Wksp	6 - 184				
Two LADs (Type A) Total	2 - 30				
Seven LADs (Type B) Total	7 - 91				
Four LADs (Type C) Total	4 - 96				
Other Corps					
2 Dent Coy	24 - 80	56 Dent Unit	23 - 84		
2 Armd Div Post Unit	1 - 21				
2 Pro Coy	3 - 112	2 Pro Coy	4 - 167		
2 Int Coy	37 - 66*	2 Int Trg Coy	28 - 66		

* indicates establishment figures are estimated.

** indicates the number of sub-units, e.g., the GGHG had two sabre squadrons.

*** indicates the unit was part of Toronto Service Battalion.

Notes: 1 1964 statistics are from a period prior to the Suttie Commission recommendations.

2 1973 figures do not include bands.

Appendix D Sources

Mapping and Charting Establishment, Department of National Defence, "Canadian Forces Primary Reserves Location Map," 1973, First Edition; Deputy Chief Operations and Reserves, Primary Reserve-Militia Command and Location List, November 1970, passim; "Effects on Units of Re-Organization," Annex "A" to BC 1000-260/0 TD 3 (Comd) 28 April 1970, Headquarters, Militia Area Pacific files; "Vancouver Militia District Headquarters Establishment," 1 September 1970, Headquarters, Militia Area Pacific files; "The Reorganization of the Militia 1969-70," FMC establishment charts for RCA, RCIC, and RCASC units, Headquarters, Militia Area Pacific files; Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II - Reserve Force, Ottawa, 1 July 1948, pp. 213-361; "Number of Type of Units by Corps in Commands With Total Establishment and Strengths," Annex "D" to HQS 2001-3/1 (SD1), 26 July 1961, Directorate of History files, pp. 2-3; Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College, Militia Officer Staff Course, Staff Officers' Handbook, Kingston, 1975, passim.

APPENDIX E

The Decline of Minor Units in Certain Corps in the Toronto
Area from 1948 to 1973

It was seen in Chapter 1 that difficulties were experienced in raising minor units (also see Appendix B) while Chapter 2 has shown that men in certain professions in Toronto did not join the militia. Difficulties in recruiting, and eventually retaining, minor units in all corps were experienced and as Appendix D shows all of the "miscellaneous" corps units in Toronto ceased to exist by the 1970's. Three corps might be examined in detail since their failure to recruit indicates that not all representative portions of Canadian society were, or are, ready to serve in the militia. This appendix will continue with the Toronto area and the three corps which will be examined are The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RC Sigs), The Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, and The Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RCEME).

Appendix D shows a complete decline in the expectations of recruiting for medical units. While no medical units continued to exist by 1973 there was still a medical section of eleven officers and six other ranks¹ in the Headquarters of the Toronto Militia Service Battalion whose primary duties lay in examining recruits. This is of some significance since by the 1970's militia units ceased to exist unless they performed an immediate function. A Field Dressing Station, for example, had been rather theoretical in its training.

In the signals the trend was similar to that of the medical corps however the final results were more propitious. In 1946 and 1947

RC Sigs requirements for Toronto were set at two major and five minor units² while vacancies existed in eight major non-signal units for a signal officer. Only one of these eight was filled.³ On 2 March 1950 the seven signal units were disbanded and they were replaced the next day by the 2nd and 8th Signal Regiments.⁴ In 1964, as a result of Suttie Commission recommendations the 2nd and 8th Regiments were amalgamated into the Toronto Signal Regiment.⁵ In 1969 one geographically outlying troop at Newmarket was disbanded.⁶ The decline in signal strength from roughly 2½ regiments to something less than one regiment in a little over 20 years was arrested when the 709th Communication Regiment was established on 1 April 1970.⁷ On this date, in common with two other signal regiments and nine squadrons across Canada, the 709th left the militia and became part of the Canadian Forces Communication Command.⁸ It would seem that units in this Command have prospered primarily because of the perceived immediate importance of their role. The importance of such a perception will be examined in following chapters.

The results of the decline of RCEME units was even more serious than in the case of signal units. The RCEME units envisaged for the Toronto area in 1948 called for an establishment strength of 33 officers and 933 other ranks in three workshops and a number of LADs. On 6 May 1950 all of the RCEME units were disbanded and were replaced by the 4th Technical Regiment.⁹ This amalgamation of units resulted in a slight increase in establishment to some 41 officers and 930 other ranks¹⁰ and by 1964 the 4th Regiment had 32 officers and 155 other ranks on strength,¹¹ as good a strength as many an arms unit. Despite this the Suttie Commission recommended that the 4th Technical Regiment be disbanded with two of the squadrons retained.¹² These squadrons become part of the 1st

and 2nd Toronto Service Battalions and they were called 45th and 46th Technical Squadrons. The new squadrons each had an establishment strength of nine officers and 71 other ranks.¹³ The 46th Squadron was put on the Supplementary Order of Battle in early 1970 when the 1st and 2nd Toronto Service Battalions merged.¹⁴ Thus only the 45th Squadron remained active and seemingly its strength was reduced to 40 all ranks upon the reorganization of the militia in April 1970.¹⁵

Appendix E Footnotes

1 "Effect on Units of Re-Organization," Annex "A" to BC 1000-260/0 TD3 (Comd), 28 April 1970, Headquarters Militia Area Pacific files.

2 In the late 1940's a number of units were changed or disbanded and their passing was of little significance since the Militia was in a period of change. For instance on 29 July 1949 Troops No. 20 through 37 of the signals were disbanded nationally. Among these had been four despatch rider troops, line maintenance troops, and others not necessary for peacetime training.

Army Headquarters, "Supplement to Canadian Army Orders," issue no. 139, para. 78-3, 15 August 1949.

3 This was a Lt. J.W. Moody, RC Sigs, who served with The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada.

4 Army Headquarters, "Supplement to Canadian Army Orders," issue no. 170, paras. 78-3 and 110-3, 20 March 1950.

5 Appendix 3 to Annex "A" to The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964.

6 L. Cadieux, "Statement by the Hon. Leo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence, 19 December 1969," Ottawa, Information Services, Department of National Defence, 19 December 1969, p. 14.

7 "Effect on Units of Re-Organization," loc. cit.

8 Major A. Gibbon, "A Proposal to Amalgamate the Regular Force and the Primary Reserve Components of Communication Command," Canadian Forces Staff College, 1 May 1973, p. 1.

9 Army Headquarters, "Supplement to Canadian Army Orders," issue no. 180, paras. 78-3 and 110-3, 29 May 1950.

10 "Number of Type of Units By Corps In Commands With Total Establishment and Strengths," Annex "D" to HQS 2001-3/1 (SD 1), 26 July 1961, Directorate of History files, p. 3.

11 "Summary of Militia Effective Strengths by Areas/Militia Groups as of May 31, 1964," The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964 cited Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Special Committee on Defence, Appendix "D" to Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence No. 16, 18 August 1964.

12 Appendix "C" to The Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), June 1964.

13 "Reorganization of the Militia - What It Means to RCME," RCME Technical Bulletin, vol. 10, (April 1965), pp. 17-19.

14 Cadieux, op. cit., p. 16.

15 It is assumed that technical squadrons in Vancouver and Toronto had the same establishment.

"Effect on Units of Re-Organization," loc. cit.

APPENDIX F

Wartime Service of Brigadiers Commanding Militia Brigades in 1948.¹

Brigade	Location	Officer	Highest overseas Appointment
1	Windsor	G.W. Robinson	Commander, 2 Armoured Brigade
2	Stratford	J.S.H. Lind	Commander, 12 Infantry Brigade
3	Hamilton	W.D. Whitaker	CO, Royal Hamilton Light Infantry
4	Toronto	I.S. Johnston	Commander, 11 Infantry Brigade
5	Toronto	J.E. Ganong	Commander, 4 Infantry Brigade
6	Kingston	D.G. Cunningham	Commander, 9 Infantry Brigade
7	Ottawa	Not formed	
8	Montreal	J.G. Gauvreau	Commander, 6 Infantry Brigade
9	Montreal	J.B. Weir	CO, The Cape Breton Highlanders
10	Quebec	J.M.P. Sauve	CO, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
11	Quebec	J.H. Price	Not known
12	Quebec	J.N.E. Grenier	Not known
13	Halifax	H.V.D. Laing	DA & QMG, 2 Corps
14	Fredericton	J.E. Anderson	CO, The North Shore (NB) Regiment
15	Vancouver	J.M. Rockingham	Commander, 9 Infantry Brigade
16	Winnipeg	R.S. Malone	Editor, <u>The Maple Leaf</u>
17	Saskatoon	P.C. Klaehn	Commander, 8 Infantry Brigade (acting)
18	Edmonton	J.C. Jefferson	Commander, 10 Infantry Brigade
19	Toronto	I.H. Cumberland	Commander, 5 Armoured Brigade (acting)
20	Montreal	E.M. Smith	Commander, 4 Armoured Brigade (acting)
21	Moncton	R.J. Colwell	CO, 1 Hussars

Brigade	Location	Officer	Highest overseas Appointment
22	Vancouver	W.C. Murphy	Commander, 1 Armoured Brigade

1 Army Headquarters, The Canadian Army List: Part II - Reserve Force, Ottawa, 1 July 1948, passim.; Colonel C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The Operations In North-West Europe 1944-1945, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1960, pp. 663-668 and passim.

APPENDIX G

Policies to Expedite Recruiting For the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade

In a visit to Toronto on 10 August 1950 the Minister of National Defence became convinced that mobilization procedures were too complicated. For instance he felt that selection interviews should take only five or ten minutes for each man.¹ Prior to the Minister's visit it was held that recruit testing for general military suitability took two hours.² With only some 41 Personnel Selection Officers in Canada quite obviously the over 15,000 applicants in August could not receive the same attention normally given a recruit.

The immediate result of Claxton's visit was some rather emphatic correspondence from National Defence Headquarters stating, among other things, that, "No delay in processing will be tolerated"³ and that, "Applicants should be attested and other problems sorted out later."⁴ Some of the far-reaching results were the disciplinary problems referred to by, among other, General Macklin and Brigadier Walsh. These are considered in Footnote 20 of Chapter 3.

1 Wood, op. cit., p. 28.

2 "Personnel Selection," Part VIII, Chapter VII to Canadian Army 1945-1949, HQTS 1750-2, 13 January 1950, Directorate of History files.

3 "Enlistment Policy for 'Canadian Army Special Force'," HQ 2731-1 vol. 2 (Org 1), 11 August 1950, Directorate of History files.

4 Wire from National Defence Headquarters to Numbers 1 to 12 Personnel Depots, Command and Area Headquarters, 11 August 1950, Directorate of History files.

APPENDIX H

Estimate of the Number of Men Joining the Canadian Army Special Force
From the Militia

Statistics are not readily available on how many men went directly from the militia into the CASF when it was being raised, however an estimate can be made. By the time recruiting for the CASF had closed 10,587 men had enrolled from all sources.¹ With a wastage of 500 men from desertion and 1,500 through discharge² there was an effective force of 8,000 "on the eve of departure." "More than a thousand"³ of the force of 8,000 were from the regular army while 3,200, or 40 per cent, were Second World War veterans.⁴ The remaining 3,800 were men who had never seen continuous service. Probably 1,200 of these were off the streets while the remaining 2,600 came from the Militia. This is thought to be so since from June 1950 to June 1952 7,600 militia soldiers "went active" while in 1951 alone 5,000 did so.⁵ Since 1951 saw an emphasis on recruiting for the 27th Brigade it is perhaps fair to say that some 2,600 had joined the 25th Brigade.

1 Canada, Commons Debates, 8 May 1951, p. 2801.

2 Historical Section, General Staff, Army Headquarters, Canada's Army in Korea: The United Nations Operations, 1950-53 and Their Aftermath, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1956, p. 22.

3 Canada, Commons Debates, 31 August 1950, p. 100.

4 Loc. cit.

5 Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence Programme 1952-53.
Canada, Commons Debates, 24 June 1952, p. 3642.

APPENDIX I

Regional Conditions Affecting Recruiting for the 27th Canadian Infantry
Brigade Group

In recruiting for the 27th Brigade it was found that "the largest number" of men "came from Central and Eastern Canada."¹ In the west some units were not able to meet their quota of raising one company for the 1st Battalions of the Brigade. The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada, from Vancouver, raised 90 men towards their company while the Canadian Scottish Regiment raised 61.² Roughly 150 men were needed for each of the companies so that in the case of the Canadian Scottish they received a draft of 68 men from the 48th Highlanders and a second draft of 19 men from Eastern Canada before proceeding overseas.³ The main reason for a failure to recruit in the west was probably economic. Unemployment was not a major factor since rates were low across the country. In Halifax, Montreal and Victoria there was a 2 per cent unemployment rate as of 2 June 1951 while in Toronto the rate was 1 per cent and 3 per cent in Vancouver. It would seem though that wages might have been a factor influencing enlistment. In British Columbia 56 per cent of the male work force made between \$2,000 and \$4,000 a year, in Ontario 47 per cent, in Quebec 42 per cent, and in Nova Scotia 37 per cent. By way of further example 68 per cent of British Columbia's pulp and paper workers made between \$2,000 and \$4,000 a year while in Nova Scotia only 40 per cent did so. The size of the population of the recruiting areas, combined with local high employment rates and wages, were also inhibiting factors for western recruiting. For in-

stance Port Alberni and Nanaimo, two of the major recruiting areas for the Canadian Scottish had, respectively, 18 and 51 men unemployed out of a total male work force for the two cities of 4,830. While the unemployed were not necessarily the chief hope for recruits quite obviously the 6,391 unemployed in Montreal at the time formed a more likely recruiting pool than Vancouver Island.⁴ As recruiters on Vancouver Island quite accurately noted: "Wages are high and labour is scarce."⁵

1 Draft copy of "The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group," 22 April 1952 (sic), Directorate of History files.

2 "Recruiting Here For Europe Force Canada's Lowest," Daily Colonist, Victoria,

3 "Notes for War Diary, 'E' Company, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 4 May 1951 to 1 January 1953, Special Collections, McPherson Library, University of Victoria.

4 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, "Ninth Census of Canada, 1951," Labour Force, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1953, vol. V, tables 21 and 24.

5 "Notes for War Diary, 'E' Company, The Canadian Scottish Regiment (Princess Mary's), 4 May 1951 to 1 January 1953, loc. cit.

APPENDIX J

Regular Army Growth and Decline in Selected Years From 1949 to 1974 in Headquarters, Armour, Artillery and Infantry I				
1949	1950	1951	1953	1974
			HQ 1 CID HQ 1 CIBG HQ 2 CIBG HQ 3 CIBG HQ 25 CIB	HQ FMC HQ 1 Cbt Gp HQ 2 Cbt Gp HQ TF North HQ 4 CMBG HQ 5e Gp de Cbt
	HQ 25 CIB	HQ 25 CIB HQ 27 CIB		
RCD Ld SH (RC)	RCD Ld SH (RC)	RCD Ld SH (RC)	RCD Ld SH (RC)	RCD Ld SH (RC) 8 CH 12e RBC
1 RCHA	1 RCHA 2 RCHA*	1 RCHA 2 RCHA 79 Fd RCA** 81 Fd RCA**	1 RCHA 2 RCHA 3 RCHA 4 RCHA 1 LAA	1 RCHA 2 RCHA 3 RCHA 5 RALC
RCR PPCLI R 22e R	1 RCR 2 RCR* 3 RCR* 1 PPCLI 2 PPCLI* 3 PPCLI* 1 R 22e R 2 R 22e R* 3 R 22e R*	1 RCR 2 RCR 3 RCR 1 PPCLI 2 PPCLI 3 PPCLI 1 R 22e R 2 R 22e R 3 R 22e R 1 CDN Inf Bn ** 2 CDN Inf Bn ** 1 CDN High Bn ** 2 CDN High Bn ** 1 CDN Rifle Bn** 2 CDN Rifle Bn**	1 RCR 2 RCR 1 CDN GDS 1 PPCLI 2 PPCLI 2 CDN GDS 1 R 22e R 2 R 22e R 3 R 22e R 3 CDN Gds 4 CDN Gds 1 RHC 2 RHC 1 QOR of C 2 QOR of C	1 RCR 2 RCR 3 RCR 1 PPCLI 2 PPCLI 1 R 22e R 2 R 22e R 3 R 22e R 3 PPCLI CDN AB Regt
1 Unit changes on a given line indicate a redesignation of title. * indicates recruiting from the general public and the militia. ** indicates recruiting primarily from the militia.				

Appendix J Sources

Army Historical Section, The Regiments and Corps of the Canadian Army, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1964, passim.; Canada, Commons Debates, 5 December 1957, p. 1901; Brooke Claxton, Canada's Defence Programme 1954-55, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955; Department of National Defence, Report for the Year Ending 31 March 1952, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1952, p. 47; Department of National Defence, Report for the Fiscal Year 1953-1954, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1955, pp. 10, 41-42; "Force Structure Changes in 1970-71," Canadian Forces Bulletin, vol. 5 (May 1970), p. 2; "Force Structure Working Group Had Long, Hot Summer," Canadian Forces Bulletin, vol. 4 (Sep-Oct 1969), p. 2; "Formation of 1 and 2 Bn, The Cdn Guards," SD Letter No. 53/114, HQS 2001-2/1, 22 October 1953, Directorate of History files; Colonel Strome Galloway, "The Canadian Guards," Sentinel, (September 1970), pp. 22-23; Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1972, vol. 2, passim.; "Second Rifles Farewell," The Powder Horn: Chronicle of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, 1968, p. 73; "The Ladies From Hell Are Gone," Sentinel, (September 1970), pp. 10-11; Historical Section, Army Headquarters, "The 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade Group 1951-1953," Canadian Army Journal, vol. 8 (April 1954), pp. 2-14; Lieutenant-Colonel H.F. Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects On the Defence Policy of Canada, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1966, passim.

APPENDIX K

Origins of the Kennedy Report and Chronology of Events
Surrounding the Report

The background leading to the convening of the Board of Officers under Major-General Kennedy was somewhat obscure at the time and it seems to have been generally thought that the Conference of Defence Associations (C.D.A.) was responsible for calling the board. In 1953 the President of the Canadian Infantry Association (C.I.A.) said that,

A rather important development has taken place since the last annual meeting in the appointment of a committee to study the reserve army. This was brought about at the Defence conference last January, when as a result of the many resolutions coming before the Conference, it was decided a committee should be formed to study the reserve army.¹

The 1952 Report of the Royal Canadian Artillery Association stated that,

The Conference (of Defence Associations) came to the conclusion that the whole question of Training, Organization and Administration of the R.F. (Reserve Force) requires an extensive study and has recommended the setting up of a committee to make this study.²

A more accurate interpretation of the C.I.A.'s part in the origins of the board is found in the 1953-1954 Department of National Defence report which said that the board was convened, "...as a consequence of discussions with the Conference of Defence Associations...."³

The part played by Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, the Chief of the General Staff, in laying the ground work for the board some months before the C.D.A. met in January 1953, should not be overlooked. The significance of Simonds' role was that, as Chief of the General

Staff, he recognized the importance of the militia and took steps for its welfare. For greater clarity the major events before and after the submission of the Kennedy Report are recorded below:

1 "Late 1952." A Chief of the General Staffs Conference with General Officers Commanding considered militia problems. The Chairman of the C.D.A. was in attendance.⁴

2 12 December 1952. General Simonds sent a letter to the General Officers Commanding requesting that views of selected militia Commanding Officers be forwarded to their Defence Associations for possible submission to the C.D.A.⁵

3 22-24 January 1953. The 16th Annual Meeting of the C.D.A. took place. At this meeting General Simonds submitted a memo on improvements for the militia⁶ and a resolution was passed calling for a board to be convened which would make recommendations aimed at allowing the reserve force to fulfill its role in Canada's defence.⁷

4 22-23 May 1953. A meeting was held "upon the authority of the CGS" at which the presidents of the corps associations presented their views to the Board of Officers. At the meeting the terms of reference for the Board of Officers were approved.⁸

5 21-23 January 1954. The Board of Officers met the C.D.A. for detailed discussion of the intent of the various resolutions. The C.D.A. concurred in principle with the recommendations of the Kennedy Report.⁹

6 18-19 March 1954. The 12th Chief of the General Staff's Conference with General Officers Commanding took place at which there was general agreement on the Kennedy Report with points not agreed to receiving further discussion.¹⁰

7 21 June 1954. The Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton,

read into Hansard some of the steps which were to be taken as a result of the Kennedy Report.¹¹

1 Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Montreal, 12-14 November 1953, p. 6.

2 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1952, Ottawa, 23-25 October 1952, p. 17.

3 "Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), Department of National Defence: Report for the Fiscal Year 1953-1954, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1955, p. 43.

4 Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, "Reserve Force Organization," HQC 2001-3/1 (CGS) vol. 4, 12 December 1953, Directorate of History files.

5 Loc. cit.

6 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1952, loc. cit.

7 Resolution Number 1/53, "CGS Memorandum," Minutes CDA 16th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 22-24 January 1953.

8 Brigadier A.W. Beament, "Opening Address and Report by Chairman," Minutes CDA 17th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 20-23 January 1954.

9 Minutes CDA 17th Annual Meeting, Ottawa, 20-23 January 1954.

10 "Minutes, 12th CGS Conference with GOCs, 18-19 March 1954," HQS 1300-75/1A TD 22, Ottawa, Directorate of History files.

11 Canada, Commons Debates, 21 June 1954, pp. 6423-6425.

APPENDIX L

Department of National Defence Position On Estimated Savings Resulting
from the Suttie Commission

A rigidity of militia financing resulted from an inability to spend much less on the reserves. The \$34,839,733 spent on the militia in 1963-1964 represented three per cent of the defence budget of \$1,758,698,000 for that fiscal year.¹ Furthermore, as the table below indicates no money had been spent on equipment for the militia over the year. In order to attempt some savings the Department of National Defence, following the submission of the Suttie Commission report, took the "position" shown below on militia financing with the "proposed" column being what the D.N.D. thought might be spent.²

	<u>1963-64</u>	<u>Proposed</u>	<u>Est.Savings</u>
Militia pay.....	\$14,863,113	\$9,161,184	\$5,701,929
Other Personnel Costs..... (grants, allowances, clothing, food, medical, transportation)	3,169,000	2,554,500	614,500
Rentals.....	492,000	139,813	352,187
Other Accommodation Costs.... (including owned property)	4,727,620	4,166,597	561,023
Other Maintenance Costs..... (stationery, barracks & mis- cellaneous stores, spare parts, repairs, gas, oil, am- munition, etc.)	2,919,000	2,122,000	797,000
Canadian Army Regular Support Costs.....	8,669,000	7,919,000	750,000
Total.....	<u>\$34,839,733</u>	<u>\$26,073,094</u>	<u>\$8,776,639</u>

Table IX. Department of National Defence Position On Estimated Savings Resulting from the Suttie Commission.

The above table might illustrate a parsimonious attitude towards the militia, however continued spending for regular army elements supporting the militia could only have been encouraging. While militia pay was to be cut by 38 per cent the support costs of the regular army were to be cut by only 8.7 per cent. Such costs were made up of \$6,888,000 for military pay, \$1,245,000 for civil pay, and \$536,000 for transportation of the regular army.³

1 "The Man Behind Canada's Bold Look at Tomorrow," Armed Forces Management, vol. 20 (June 1964), p. 46.

2 Department of National Defence Position on the Recommendations of the Commission on the Reorganization of the Canadian Army (Militia), cited in Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence no. 18, 3 November 1964, p. 741.

3 Appendix "A" to Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence no. 13, 21 July 1964.

APPENDIX M

The Hendy and Draper Ministerial Committees

At the 1964 CDA meeting, when plans for a militia commission were announced, a resolution requested that appropriate committees be formed to enquire into "...the structure, operational capability and establishment of the Royal Canadian Navy Reserve (RCNR) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (Auxiliary) RCAF (Aux)."¹ On 17 January 1964 a committee was set up under Commodore R.I. Hendy to study naval reserve matters and a second was formed under Group Captain J.W.P. Draper to study the air force auxiliary. Both committees were given one month to complete their findings and on 16 February 1964 their reports were submitted to the Associate Minister of National Defence.

The request for the committees was doubtless a result of the Minister of National Defence announcing naval and air force cuts in the Commons on 5 December 1963. At that time Hellyer announced a strength cut in the RCNR of 1,300 from the 4,000 men on strength while the RCAF auxiliary would be reduced from 2,200 to 860. This entailed a loss of seven out of 21 naval divisions, as well as two naval air reserve squadrons, while the air force was to lose four out of ten squadrons.²

The Hendy report was searching, particularly in view of the short time allowed for preparation. Since 1960 the role of the RCNR had been to support the Royal Canadian Navy and the committee was asked to present their views on future roles. Following receipt of 71 briefs and visits to ten naval centres Hendy's recommendations centred largely on cost.³ His arguments for the retention of units were partially suc-

cessful and strength reductions were halved with two divisions originally slated for closure to continue to exist.⁴

The tasks facing the Draper committee⁵ were difficult if only because of the greater comparative costs of the air force auxiliary. \$10,700,000 was needed to maintain the auxiliary while only \$6,000,000 was needed for the RCNR.⁶ Furthermore, the Minister of National Defence felt that an air force auxiliary was the most difficult of the reserves to justify.⁷ In its findings the Draper committee recommended that the RCAF (Aux) be given a primary role of "Army Air Support" with four secondary roles. These were short range transport, search and rescue, and aid to the civil authorities. Despite the affinity of Draper's recommendations with the principles of unification it was decided that the reductions announced in December 1963 would remain.

There were no direct results to the militia from the Hendy and Draper reports. Indirectly, particularly since naval and air force representation to the CDA was new, it might be thought that the committees, and the methods of their formation, demonstrated a united resolve in reserve force policy by interested bodies.

Appendix M Footnotes

1 Letter of Transmittal, Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Role and Organization of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve, Ottawa, 15 February 1964, (Hereafter called the Hendy Committee), cited in Hahn Committee, Appendix "B" to Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 16, 18 August 1964, pp. 532-533.

2 Canada, Commons Debates, 5 December 1963, p. 5457.

3 Hendy Committee, op. cit., pp. 585-586.

4 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1964-65, Camp Pet-tawawa, 1-3 October 1965, p. 57.

5 Report of the Ministerial Committee on the Royal Canadian Air Force Auxiliary, (Draper Committee), cited in Hahn Committee, Appendix "C" to Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 16, 18 August 1964.

6 \$6,681,000 of the RCAF (Aux) costs were for regular RCAF support in manpower and station costs. Hendy, in speaking on naval matters estimated that only 50 per cent of regular support of the RCNR went to support that component. Because of a similar dependence upon base support in the RCNR and the RCAF (Aux) the same estimate might have been made for the RCAF (Aux). If it had been the reserve costs of the RCAF (Aux) could have been estimated at about \$7,000,000.

Hendy Committee, op. cit., p. 566; Appendix "A" to Hahn Committee, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence Number 13, 21 July 1964, pp. 408-409.

7 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, loc. cit.

APPENDIX N

Strength of the Militia Combat Arms Following the
1969 Reorganization

The following table illustrates the low strength of the militia following the 1969 reorganization.

	Number of units			Strengths	
	Major	Minor	Sub-units	Establishments	Trained Troops
Armour	17	1	37 squadrons	2891	1214
Artillery	14	4	38 batteries	2938	1234
Infantry	49	1	119 companies ¹	9247	3884

Table XI. Number of Trained Combat Arms Troops Theoretically Available in the Militia following the 1969 Reorganization.

Following the reorganization each regiment had a battalion headquarters strength of nine all ranks and either two or three companies of seventy-four.² The trained troop strength in the table is based upon the supposition that units recruited 75 per cent of their establishment³ and that 56 per cent of those serving were trained to reasonable standards.⁴

Since the effectiveness of a militia soldier remains theoretical until he reports to the armoury any further computations go rather far towards hypothesis. Despite this it should be noted that the "Trained Troops" column above does not reflect the low age of the militia rank and file which precluded them from a number of military tasks. Nor

does it include the number of serving females, which lowered the bayonet strength, and, most importantly, it does not include the number of non-effectives. Since, in 1970, 45.2 per cent of the rank and file were 16-18 years of age⁵ a reasonable guess might be that 25 per cent of the total militia was too young for tasks such as crowd confrontation. If five per cent are thought to have been women,⁶ and ten per cent as having been non-effective,⁷ then the combat strength of the militia in 1970 was about 3,800.⁸

The low numbers are significant when they are considered in relation to the illusions which seemingly were fostered. For instance, on 19 December 1969, the Minister of National Defence announced that the militia would have a strength of 19,500,⁹ and the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff felt that a 15,500 man militia would provide part of a "viable military force" for Canada.¹⁰ Both figures were somewhat misleading if it was thought that a base of 19,500 would result in anything other than a few thousand soldiers.

Appendix N Footnotes

1 Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1968-69, Ottawa, 1-4 October 1969, pp. 40-42; Canadian Infantry Association, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, Quebec, 9-11 October 1969, pp. 54-55; Annex to L. Cadieux, "Statement by the Honourable Leo Cadieux, Minister of National Defence, 19 December 1969," Ottawa, Information Services, Department of National Defence, 19 December 1969.

2 An Infantry Battalion, RCIC (Militia), ME/RCIC/1005/3, April 1970, Headquarters Militia Area Pacific files.

3 In 1970-71 the militia was about 75 per cent of its establishment figure in strength. To take a further, isolated, example, in October 1970 the nine major units in Pacific Area were effective to 83 per cent of their establishment figure.

Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1971-72, Ottawa, 22-24 September 1972, p. 46; Headquarters, Militia Area Pacific, Primary Reserve Strength Return Pacific Area October 1970, 10 November 1970, Pacific Area files.

4 Notes On the Reserve Force for a Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Minister of National Defence, 26 March 1974, p. 28.

5 Major T.H. Goodfellow, "A Profile of the Militiaman (sic) of 1970," Defence Research Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, April 1974, p. 3.

6 This is an estimate. By 1975, following a rather large influx of females, 17.2 per cent of the privates and corporals in the militia were females.

Major T.H. Goodfellow, "Study of the Civilian Background of Members of the Canadian Forces Primary Reserves: Preliminary Results of the Survey of the Militia," Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Directorate of Social and Economic Analysis, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, September 1975, p. 5.

7 This was the prevailing non-effective rate in the early 1970's. Royal Canadian Artillery Association, Report 1970-71, loc. cit.

8 Lieutenant-Colonel F.A. Bussi res, Mobile Command, Royal Canadian Artillery Association, op. cit., p. 47.

In 1972 an "optimistic estimate" was that the militia could have provided "7,000 operationally ready troops." This included the total militia while the estimate of 3,884 in Table XI considered only the armour, artillery, and infantry.

9 Cadieux, loc. cit.

10 John R. Walker, "Cutback Defended by Dare," Montreal Gazette,
22 September 1969.

APPENDIX O

The Canadian Forces Communication Command Reserve

The Canadian Forces Communication Command Reserve, or the Communication Reserve as it is becoming known, is a good example of what the militia often needs to prosper. When, in the early 1970's the Communication Command of the regular force found that it was short 703 teletype operators it requested that the shortage be filled by reserve personnel. As a result on 1 April 1970 the militia's signal units transferred to the Communication Command on an establishment of 928 all ranks. Once in the Command militia personnel were required to complete trades training standards and serve a period of on job training with a regular force unit. This was done in a designated position. The soldier then became an augmentee on an "individual basis" to the regular force to allow 24 hour a day communication in an emergency. A monthly report on the augmentee's availability was sent to Communication Command headquarters on the soldier. Three factors emerge from this scheme. First, the militia soldier had, and has, "viable and visible"¹ tasks. Secondly, they are well trained and, thirdly, control at the unit level and higher headquarters is good enough to ensure that tasks can be performed.

In addition it has been found that units have been at full strength, or close to it, and some 90 per cent are considered trained.²

1 "Concept of the Canadian Forces Communication Command Reserve Force, Part 1, General," file held by writer.

2 "Notes On the Reserve Force for a Presentation to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence by the Minister of National Defence," 26 March 1974, p. 28, file held by writer.

APPENDIX P

Corps, Headquarters and Unit Abbreviations Used in Appendices
B, D, and J.

Appendices B and D

RCA	Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery
RCASC	Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
RCOC	Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
RCEME	Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

Appendix D

HQ, 19 Armd Bde	Headquarters, 19 Armoured Brigade
HQ, 1 AGRA	_____, 1 Army Group, Royal Artillery
HQ, RCA 2 Armd Div	_____, Royal Canadian Artillery, 2 Armoured Division
HQ, 2 Fd Regt	_____, 2 Field Regiment, The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers
HQ, 4 (etc) Inf Bde	_____, 4 (etc) Infantry Brigade
14 (etc) Mil Gp HQ	14 (etc) Militia Group Headquarters
HQ, Mil Area Cent	Headquarters, Militia Area Central
HQ, Tor Mil Dist	_____, Toronto Militia District
GGHG	The Governor General's Horse Guard
QY Rang	The Queen's York Rangers (1st American Regiment)
29 (etc) Fd Regt (SP)	29 (etc) Field Regiment (Self-propelled), RCA
42 Med Regt	42 Medium Regiment, RCA
69 Obsn Regt	69 Observation Regiment, RCA
1 AAGOR	1 Anti-Aircraft Gun Operations Room
1 Loc Regt	1 Locating Regiment
2 Fd Sqn	2 Field Squadron, RCE
27 Fd Pk Sqn	27 Field Park Squadron, RCE
2 Fd Eng Regt	2 Field Engineer Regiment, RCE
2 Armd Div Sig Regt	2 Armoured Division Signal Regiment
709 Comm Regt	709 Communication Regiment
QOR of C	The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
R Regt C	The Royal Regiment of Canada
48 Highrs	48th Highlanders of Canada
Tor Scot R	The Toronto Scottish Regiment
Ir RC	The Irish Regiment of Canada
1 (etc) Tpt Coy	1 (etc) Transport Company, RCASC
2 (etc) Fd Amb	2 (etc) Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
27 (etc) CCS	27 (etc) Casualty Clearing Station, RCAMC
16 (etc) FDS	16 (etc) Field Dressing Station, RCAMC

4 Armd Div OFP
 1 Corps Tps OFP
 34 Corps Tps Wksp
 LAD
 4 Tech Regt
 26 Med Coy
 5 Colm
 13 Ord Coy
 45 Tech Coy
 2 Dent Coy
 2 Pro Coy
 2 Int Coy
 Toronto Mil Svc Bn

4 Armoured Division Ordnance Field Park
 1 Corps Troops Ordnance Field Park
 34 Corps Troops Workshop, RCEME
 Light Aid Detachment, RCEME
 4 Technical Regiment, RCEME
 26 Medical Company, RCAMC
 5 Column, RCASC
 13 Ordnance Company, RCOO
 45 Technical Company, RCEME
 2 Dental Company, Royal Canadian Dental Corps
 2 Provost Company, Canadian Provost Corps
 2 Intelligence Company, Canadian Intelligence Corps
 Toronto Militia Service Battalion

Appendix J

HQ FMC
 HQ 1 CID
 HQ 1 (etc) CIBG
 HQ 25 CIBRG
 HQ 1 (etc) Cbt Gp
 HQ 25 (etc) CIB
 HQ TF North
 HQ 4 CMBG
 HQ 5e Gp de Cbt
 RCD
 Ld SH (RC)
 8 CH
 12e RBC
 1 (etc) RCHA
 79 (etc) Fd, RCA
 5 RALC
 1 (etc) RCR
 1 (etc) PPCLI
 1 (etc) R 22e R
 1 (etc) CDN GDS
 1 (etc) QOR of C
 1 (etc) RHC
 1 (etc) CDN Inf Bn
 1 (etc) CDN High Bn
 1 (etc) CDN Rifle Bn
 CDN AB Regt

Headquarters, Mobile Command
 _____, Headquarters 1 Canadian Infantry
 Division
 _____, 1 (etc) Canadian Infantry Brig-
 ade Group
 _____, 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade
 Replacement Group
 _____, 1 (etc) Combat Group
 _____, 25 (etc) Canadian Infantry Brig-
 ade
 _____, Task Force North
 _____, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade
 Group
 _____, 5e Groupement de combat

The Royal Canadian Dragoons
 Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians)
 8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's)
 12e Régiment blindé du Canada
 1 Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
 79 (etc) Field Regiment, The Royal Canadian
 Artillery
 5e Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada
 1 (etc) The Royal Canadian Regiment
 1 (etc) Princess Patricia's Canadian Light
 Infantry
 1 (etc) Royal 22e Régiment
 1 (etc) The Canadian Guards
 1 (etc) The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
 1 (etc) The Black Watch of Canada (Royal
 Highland Regiment)
 1 (etc) Canadian Infantry Battalion
 1 (etc) Canadian Highland Battalion
 1 (etc) Canadian Rifle Battalion
 The Canadian Airborne Regiment

VITA

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
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21st April, 1978

Date