APOLLO IN THE *ORESTEIA* OF AESCHYLUS

by

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the dramatic functions of Apollo in the *Oresteia*. I attempt to define the contribution that Apollo makes to each play by devoting one chapter to each of the three plays. Thus Chapters II, III, and IV form the main body of the thesis. In Chapter I I assess the use which Aeschylus makes of the traditional views of Apollo as he appears in cult and literature. I demonstrate that Aeschylus is following the tradition in his presentation of Apollo as the god of purification and of prophecy. Moreover Aeschylus, like Pindar and Herodotus, accepts Apollo's authority as a prophet and portrays him as the true spokesman of Zeus. Apollo was also traditionally conceived as a god of healing, and Aeschylus employs this tradition to provide a foil to "Apollo the Destroyer", so emphatically indicated for us by Cassandra and her fate in the *Agamemnon*. Finally, I discuss the origins of the story of Apollo and Cassandra which is related in the *Agamemnon*, and conclude that this too must be to some extent traditional. Aeschylus' handling of the story is contrasted with Pindar's treatment of Apollo's relationship with mortal women. Aeschylus and Pindar, I suggest, are alike in their fundamentally anthropomorphic conception of the god.

Chapter II, which is concerned with Apollo's role in the *Agamemnon*, naturally focusses upon the Cassandra-scene. I conclude that the story of Apollo and Cassandra illustrates how mankind, by offending the gods, may encounter the god's violence in place of divine favour. Although Cassandra's suffering is disproportionate to her crime, no criticism is

made of the god who inflicted her punishment. Apollo is predominantly portrayed in the Agamemnon as Cassandra's destroyer, but his equal ability to be saviour and healer of mortals is implied, mainly in the first half of the play.

In Chapter III, I begin by illustrating how Apollo affects the action of the Choephoroe through the instructions which he gave to Orestes in an oracle. I show how the details of the oracle are gradually revealed in the course of the drama. In the second part of the chapter I attempt to refute Professors Wilamowitz-Moellendorf and Winnington-Ingram, who contend that Aeschylus wishes us to condemn Apollo in this play. I argue, against these critics, that Apollo is portrayed in a favourable light.

In Chapter IV I consider the Eumenides, in which Apollo himself becomes one of the actors. I analyse the part which Apollo plays first in the opening scene at Delphi, and, secondly, in the Trial Scene at Athens. Again, I argue that it is not Aeschylus' intention to criticise Apollo. Apollo is harsh to the Erinyes, one-sided in outlook, and not entirely correct in all his arguments. However these features are not intended to make us suspect the god; rather they are required by the dramatic themes of this final play in the trilogy.

In my Conclusion I discuss whether Apollo is portrayed consistently throughout the trilogy. Professors Kitto and Winnington-Ingram have suggested that Apollo alters in the course of the trilogy in character or in attitude. I contend that Apollo does not alter, but that his different dramatic functions require that, first, his capacity for malevolence and, later, his capacity for benevolence predominate. In this thesis I have tried to indicate both the complexity of Apollo's

role, and the essential consistency of his character throughout the *Oresteia*.



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For my mother:

οὐκ ἔστι μητρὸς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τέκνοις·

(Erechtheus 360N^2 = *fr.* 358 TGF^2)

The text used throughout is that of D. Page:

Aeschyli Tragoediae (Oxford, 1972).

I

Apollo in Cult and Literature

My purpose in this chapter is to indicate in general terms the part played by Apollo in the events of the *Oresteia*. I shall also examine some references to Apollo by authors who wrote before or at the same time as Aeschylus, in order to define those functions and powers of Apollo which, as we shall see, are significant in Aeschylus' presentation of the god. In considering Apollo's part in the actions of the trilogy, I shall limit myself in this chapter to general, factual description. Matters of interpretation and of detail will be discussed in my three later chapters, one devoted to each play of the trilogy.

(1) Apollo, the God of Prophecy

In all three plays of the *Oresteia* Apollo is either referred to or presented as the god of prophecy. In the *Agamemnon*, he inspires Cassandra with her prophetic visions. In the *Choephoroe*, he directs Orestes through the oracle to avenge Agamemnon. Finally, Apollo appears as a prophet in the *Eumenides*; indeed, he claims to give testimony at Orestes' trial as the prophet of Zeus himself.

It is clear that Apollo, as the god of prophecy, makes his most significant contribution to the action of the *Choephoroe*. His oracular command to Orestes has a direct effect on the action, in two ways: the oracle not only stirs Orestes to take vengeance, but also prescribes the use of guile, which Orestes does employ in killing Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. It is unlikely that Aeschylus invented Apollo's oracular command to Orestes. Creative adaptation, rather than significant and

radical innovation, seems to have been the essential characteristic of the Athenian dramatists' handling of their mythical material. Unfortunately, however, we cannot be certain of Aeschylus' literary precedent. The story of Orestes' vengeance, of course, appears very early, in Homer's Odyssey; but until the time of Stesichorus no mention is made of Apollo in connection with Orestes. Stesichorus composed his Oresteia a century or more before Aeschylus' time, and his work certainly influenced Aeschylus.[1] In the fragments which remain of Stesichorus' Oresteia, Apollo gives his bow to Orestes after the vengeance, for protection against the Furies' onslaught.[2] But it is impossible to know whether or not Stesichorus also made Apollo command the vengeance. Many critics have proposed a different literary precedent for Aeschylus' version - an epic version of the Orestes story influenced by promotors of the Delphic oracle.[3] They suggest that Apollo played a prominent part in this version; that he commanded Orestes to take vengeance and subsequently purified him, as Apollo does in Aeschylus' Oresteia. The major difficulty with this hypothesis is that there is no evidence for the existence of the Delphic epic. It is, as Professor Nilsson comments, a "general assumption"[4] on the part of critics. But the assumption is a very feasible one, and would certainly help to explain Aeschylus' version. On the other hand, it is dangerous to speak of "the Delphic version" as though it were certain and to argue from that basis - as Professor Winnington-Ingram does.[5]

Beside the probable factor of literary precedent, Apollo's oracle to Orestes can also be accounted for, to some extent, by one of his prerogatives, or τιμαί. The prerogative to which I refer is his special concern with moral codes and law-giving, a prerogative which indeed was

part of his function as Apollo the prophet, for Apollo was the god most accessible to men who wished to discover the will of the gods. Thus, on an individual level, many consulted him on matters of moral concern - for instance Glaucus, whose story is given by Herodotus.[6] On a public level Apollo was consulted by rulers of Greek states; the Spartans, for instance, believed that Lycurgus had founded Spartan law with the guidance, or at least the blessing, of Apollo.[7] Generally speaking, then, Apollo was associated with the founding of laws and moral codes. But of special relevance to his part in the Orestes story is his particular connection with laws governing homicide and, above all, murder of kin.

It is clear that Apollo was associated with the moral advance in the Athenian laws governing homicide (Draco's reforms) and that he alone could offer purification for "justifiable" homicide. But it is very probable that Apollo was also associated with the moral code regarding homicide and murder of kin at an earlier stage, before the code was refined. At the time when the moral code placed a duty on the next of kin to take vengeance upon the murderer, the same moral code under which Orestes acts, Apollo was probably associated with that code simply because, since he is the oracular god, his name was most likely to be invoked by those who claimed that the moral code was sanctioned by the gods. To that extent, then, it is likely that Apollo's name was associated with the "lex talionis", the law of revenge. Once more, however, it is necessary to distinguish between probability and certain fact. Professor Winnington-Ingram is guilty of another unwarranted assumption when he refers constantly to "the Delphic code of vengeance".[8] It is not certain that Apollo or Delphi was in any way associated with a code of vengeance. To sum up, then, Apollo's command to Orestes to

avenge Agamemnon, and his prescription of the manner of doing so are natural results of Apollo's function as the god of prophecy and his general connection with moral codes. On two other questions, Aeschylus' possible literary source in which Apollo specifically ordered the vengeance, and Apollo's possible connection with the law of vengeance, we cannot be dogmatic.

I have outlined Apollo's role as a god of prophecy within the Oresteia, and I intend now to examine some details in Aeschylus' representation of the prophetic Apollo.

(i) Apollo Loxias

"Loxias" is the name by which fifth century authors generally refer to Apollo in his prophetic capacity.[9] This particular name for the god occurs more times than any other in the Oresteia; a fact commensurate with the importance of the prophetic aspect of Apollo in the trilogy. Examples of "Loxias" as it is typically used are Cho. 269ff and 1030ff; both times Orestes is thinking specifically of the god's oracle.[10] The derivation of the name is unknown, but by Sophocles' time at the latest it was popularly connected with the Greek adjective λοξός, "slanting", with reference to the obscurity of Apollo's oracles.[11] If Aeschylus appreciated the word-association, there is no hint of that appreciation in the Oresteia or his other plays. Though the Cassandra-scene of the Agamemnon contains numerous allusions to the obscurity of oracles, Aeschylus does not play on the name "Loxias" as he does on the word-associations of the name "Apollo". In the case of the oracle to Orestes, it is not implied that the oracular language was at all obscure or ambiguous. It suits Aeschylus' purpose to emphasize the obscurity of prophecy in the Agamemnon, where he is dealing with a

prophetess fated never to be believed, and yet in the Choephoroe he can represent the oracle to Orestes as clear, because he wants the divine command to be recognised. Nor is there any theological discrepancy here. There is evidence in Aeschylus' younger contemporary, Herodotus, that the oracles were sometimes clear, sometimes obscure.[12]

(ii) Apollo, Prophet of Truth

A distinction is made in the Oresteia between true and false prophecy. It is applied first of all, not to Apollo himself, but to his prophetess Cassandra. Cassandra insists that she is no ψευδόμαντις, "false prophet" (Ag. 1195), but an ἀληθόμαντις, "true prophet" (1241), whose prophecy is right (ὀρθομαντείας, 1215). The chorus respond by finding her prophecies πιστά, "faithful" (1213). Indeed, she is proved a true prophetess by the events which follow: Agamemnon's death, and, in the next play, the coming of one to avenge him.

In the Choephoroe and the Eumenides, the same distinction is made, this time with reference to Apollo himself. At Cho. 269f, Orestes announces:

> οὔτοι προδώσει Λοξίου μεγασθενὴς
> χρησμὸς,
>
> "The mighty oracle of Loxias shall not betray me..."

and at 559 he refers to Apollo as μάντις ἀψευδὴς τὸ πρίν, "a prophet never before found false." When, in the Eumenides, Apollo finally comes face to face with Orestes, he confirms Orestes' trust with the reassurance οὔτοι προδώσω........"I shall not betray you" (Eum. 64). The phrase is a striking verbal reminiscence of Cho. 269, almost as though Apollo had heard Orestes' pronouncement. Later in the same play, Apollo affirms that his testimony for Orestes will be true, for ...μάντις ὢν δ' οὐ ψεύσομαι. "...being a prophet I shall not be false." (Eum. 615).

Two noteworthy points are the frequency of words with the root ψευδ –, and the personal note which enters with the use of προδίδωμι, as though an agreement had been made between the god and the mortal.

A parallel for Aeschylus' treatment can be found in the work of his contemporary, Pindar. In Pythian 9.29ff. Apollo, asking the Centaur for information about the girl Cyrene, is met with gentle remonstrance. The Centaur points out that Apollo already knows the answer to his own question; he knows the end of all things. He adds that it is against θέμις, against what is ordained, for Apollo to touch a lie. The word ψεῦδος is used here (43), a word which recurred constantly in Aeschylus. Again, at Pythian 3.29f., Pindar affirms that Apollo does not come into contact with lies, for the god's knowledge is supreme. The noun used is ψεῦδος.

The attitude apparent in the work of Aeschylus and Pindar is borne out by Herodotus, who recounts how Croesus tested various oracles, and the Delphic oracle was the only one to give him the true answer (1.46, 48). His own opinion as to the validity of oracles is that he will not deny their truth, nor contest them, provided that they are phrased in clear language (8.77). Thus Aeschylus, Pindar and Herodotus stand together at the end of the age of faith.[13]

(iii) Apollo, Prophet of Zeus

The strongest guarantee that Apollo is a prophet of truth is his claim to be the spokesman of Zeus. The claim is not made explicitly until the Eumenides, but the first two plays prepare the audience to accept the claim. In both plays, Apollo is often called μάντις, "prophet", a term which clearly implies that he speaks not for himself but for another (see e.g. Ag. 1202, 1275; Cho. 559, 1030). More important,

perhaps, is the fact that Apollo and Zeus are closely associated in the first two plays. They are mentioned together at Ag. 55 and 509, and in the Choephoroe Zeus and Apollo are invoked together in support of Orestes' cause (e.g. in the choral ode at 783ff). In explicit form, the claim is first made by Apollo's priestess in the prologue to the Eumenides:

Διὸς προφήτης δ'ἐστὶ Λοξίας πατρός

"Loxias is the prophet of his father, Zeus." (17).

Thereafter, Apollo himself twice repeats the claim (Eum. 616ff., 713), which is recognised implicitly by his enemies, the Erinyes (229), and by his fellow-Olympian, Athena (797f.).

Apollo's claim to be Zeus' prophet is first found in the Homeric Hymn to Delian Apollo. There, Apollo says:

Εἴη μοι κίθαρις τε φίλη καὶ καμπύλα τόξα,
χρήσω δ'ἀνθρώποισι Διὸς νημερτέα βουλήν.

"The lyre shall be dear to me, and the curved bow;
and I shall prophesy to men the sure counsel of Zeus" (131f.).

Similarly, in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes, Hermes recognises that Apollo has his gift of prophecy from Zeus (469ff.). Apollo tells Hermes that he must not seek to learn prophecy, which is forbidden him and the other gods. Only he, Apollo, knows the counsel of Zeus (533ff.).

Professor Parke suggests that the claim may have arisen to support the Delphic oracle against the rivalry of the oracle at Dodona, the oracle of Zeus.[14] But however it originated, it is clear that the claim does not establish Apollo on equal terms with Zeus. The 'counsel' belongs to Zeus, and Apollo's part is to deliver it to men. Professor Farnell comments: "Zeus is always supreme... Apollo then is his confidant and mouthpiece, but in no wise the dispenser of fate."[15]

It is primarily as Apollo Loxias, the true prophet, the prophet of Zeus, that the god appears in the Oresteia. But the oracle in which Apollo commands Orestes to take vengeance includes the god's promise of purification, so that Apollo also plays a part in the trilogy as the god of purification.

(2) Apollo the Purifier

Apollo as the god of purification is a significant figure at the end of the Choephoroe and the beginning of the Eumenides. During the Choephoroe, the various parts of the oracle to Orestes are gradually revealed as they become relevant to the action: first, the command to take vengeance; second, the prescription of guile in taking vengeance; finally, Apollo's promise to purify Orestes. Orestes does not tell us of the promise of purification until he has fulfilled Apollo's command to take vengeance. He then realises that he is polluted by the deed, and the need for purification becomes urgent with the sudden onset of the Erinyes.

The Chorus introduces the ideas of pollution and purification at 965ff., just before Orestes returns from killing Clytemnestra. Cheerfully they sing:

> τάχα δὲ παντελὴς χρόνος ἀμεΐψεται
> πρόθυρα δωμάτων, ὅταν ἀφ' ἑστίας
> μύσος ἅπαν ἐλαθῆι
> καθαρμοισῖν ἀτᾶν ἐλατηρίοις. (965-68).

967: ἐλάσει M ἐλαση M^s ἐλαθῆι Kayser
μύσος πᾶν κλύση Sidgwick.

"Soon all-fulfilling time shall pass out through the doors of the house, when from the hearth the entire pollution shall fade, by means of purifications that drive away troubles."

Clearly, the Chorus believes that Orestes' victory will be final, and will purge the house of its troubles. But it soon becomes evident to Orestes, if not to the Chorus, that his victory has brought pollution upon him also. He speaks of ἄζηλα νίκης τῆσδ' ... μιάσματα, "the unenviable pollutions of this victory" (1017). He declares that he will go as a suppliant to Apollo's shrine at Delphi, to escape the stain of matricide (1035ff.). As his mother's Erinyes become visible to him, the Chorus refers him to the Delphic shrine;

> εἷς σοι καθαρμός. Λοξίας δὲ προσθιγὼν
> ἐλεύθερόν σε τῶνδε πημάτων κτίσει.
>
> "There is one means of purification for you.
> Loxias, by his touch, shall make you free of
> these troubles." (1059f.).

Thus ends the Choephoroe. In the prologue to the Eumenides, Apollo's priestess gives the cues for Apollo's entry in these words:

> ἰατρόμαντις δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τερασκόπος
> καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοις δωμάτων καθάρσιος.
>
> "Apollo is healer-prophet and seer, and for
> other men he is the purifier of their house." (62-63).

The last word here, καθάρσιος, picks up the καθαρμός of Cho. 1059 above. It is the epithet used in cult to denote Apollo "The Purifier". Once more, the reference is wider than a direct reference to Orestes' need of purification. It is to Apollo as the purifier of a whole household, a reference which hints that, with Orestes' purification, the whole house of Atreus will be cleansed. Later, the method of purification is revealed: sacrifice of a pig.[16] This was the regular sacrifice prescribed by Apollo to propitiate the chthonian powers.[17] Finally, the efficacy of the purification becomes evident. Apollo's purification is not sufficient, in this case, to reprieve Orestes without his guilt

being further contested. But the purification does enable Orestes to plead his case before Athena, where otherwise he would have been obliged to keep ritual silence as one polluted.[18]

In making Apollo Orestes' purifier, it is highly probable that Aeschylus was following literary precedent. As I mentioned above, in discussing Apollo the Prophet, Aeschylus' predecessor Stesichorus had written an Oresteia in which Apollo gave Orestes his bow to protect him from the Erinyes.[19] Even though purification is not mentioned in the fragments, it is possible that it took place in that lost poem; and, at the least, the idea of protection is there. Again, purification of Orestes was doubtless included in the Delphic version, if such a version did exist. Indeed, it is likely to have been the Delphic version's climax, the happy ending to the story.[20]

Apart from the story of Orestes, Apollo's purification of individuals and of states is well-attested in cult and literature. Myths related Apollo's purification of Achilles, Theseus and Alcmaeon, who all had, like Orestes, committed homicide.[21] After the battle at Plataea, the Greeks considered their altar fires to have been polluted by the barbarian invasion. It was to Apollo's Delphic shrine that they turned, whence pure fire was sent to rekindle the altars in Athens and elsewhere.[22]

(3) Apollo the Healer

We have seen how Apollo performs specific dramatic functions in the Oresteia as the god of prophecy and as the god of purification. Aeschylus also refers in the Oresteia to Apollo as the god of healing, another aspect of Apollo that is well-attested in cult and literature.

But Apollo does not perform a dramatic function as the god of healing; instead, Aeschylus refers to his healing powers in order to provide contrast with his power to destroy, demonstrated in his destruction of Cassandra. For that reason, references to Apollo as the god of healing occur only in the Agamemnon, mainly in the scenes prior to that in which Cassandra calls Apollo her "destroyer".

Firstly, the Chorus tells how Calchas invoked the aid of Apollo under his title of Paian, the Healer-god: ἰήιον δὲ καλέω Παιᾶνα, "I call upon the blessed Paian" (Ag. 146.) Another reference to Apollo as the god of healing occurs in the Herald's speech:

> νῦν δ' αὖτε σωτὴρ ἴσθι καὶ παιώνιος,
> ἄναξ Ἄπολλον.
>
> "But now in turn be our saviour and healer,
> Lord Apollo!" (512f.)

In this speech, the Herald alludes to the sufferings brought on the Greek army by Apollo's archery:[23] Apollo, he suggests, was hostile (ἀνάρσιος) enough by the river Scamander, and now he should demonstrate his power to save and heal (509-13). Apollo is not mentioned again until the "Cassandra-scene". We should note, however, that just before the Cassandra-scene begins the idea of healing is re-introduced by an allusion to Apollo's son Asclepius, who was renowned for his healing powers.[24] When Cassandra begins to speak, the whole emphasis of her words during her first exchange with the Chorus is upon Apollo the Destroyer. "Apollo the Destroyer" is not, of course, a cult-title; nor does it have any foundation in cult. Cassandra is playing upon the name "Apollo", which in Greek closely resembles the verb ἀπολλύναι, "to destroy". Throughout the Cassandra-scene, it is Apollo's power to destroy Cassandra which is emphasized; but there are enough references

to the idea of healing to remind the audience of Apollo's ability to heal (cf. 1199, 1248).

Healing imagery with specific reference to Apollo occurs only in the Agamemnon, where it provides an antithesis to Cassandra's presentation of Apollo as her destroyer. There is one further, brief reference to Apollo's healing power in the Eumenides: the priestess of Apollo calls him ἰατρόμαντις, "healer prophet" (Eum. 62).

The first literary evidence for Apollo as god of healing comes in the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo. Apollo, having assembled a band of Cretans to be his ministers, instructs them:

> ἔρχεσθαί θ' ἅμ' ἐμοὶ καὶ ἰη παιῆον' ἀείδειν
>
> "Come with me, and sing 'Hail, Healer!'" (500).

The cry, "Hail, Healer" is again referred to at 517. By the time of Hesiod, Paian was a god in his own right, distinct from Apollo.[25] But Apollo continued to be saluted, in his healing aspect, with the "iepaion" cry.[26] It is to this cry that Aeschylus alludes in the parodos of the Agamemnon (146). Pindar is also aware of Apollo's healing aspect. He refers to Apollo as, among other things,

> ὃ καὶ βαρειᾶν νόσων
> ἀκέσματ' ἄνδρεσσι καὶ γυναιξὶ νέμει.
>
> "the one who apportions cures to men and women
> for harsh diseases" (Olympian 5. 59f.).

In cult, Apollo's healing aspect was recognised by various titles according to the locality of his worship. Paian, Oulios, Korudos, and Maleatas were all titles of Apollo which either had, or came to have, a healing connotation.[27] As the god who prevents, rather than heals, sickness, Apollo was familiar under the titles Alexikakos and Epikourios.[28] The term ἰατρόμαντις, employed by Aeschylus in the Eumenides prologue,

unites Apollo's aspects of healing and prophecy. Professor Farnell has offered a likely explanation of the term, in that "sickness was the commonest motive for [prophetic] consultation."[29] Apollo, with his special vision, could see where the sickness lay, its cause and its remedy. Moreover, he himself could cause sickness, sending upon men his arrows of plague, when angered with them; when appeased, he could remove the sickness once more. The story of how he thus afflicted the Greek army at Troy was familiar from Homer (Iliad 1. ff.). It is to this plague that the Herald refers, when he speaks of Apollo's banefulness by the Scamander (Ag. 511).

(4) The Conduct of Apollo

So far, I have been discussing those aspects of Apollo in the Oresteia which have their basis in the god's τιμαί or prerogatives. I turn now to an aspect of Apollo within the trilogy which has its basis, not in his cult prerogatives, but in the world of myth: his relationship with Cassandra.

The story of Apollo and Cassandra is revealed gradually in the Cassandra-scene of the Agamemnon. Since I shall be discussing it in detail later, within its context in the Agamemnon, I shall at this stage simply give an outline of the story, fitting together the pieces of information which Aeschylus gives us. Apollo, it seems, desired Cassandra, and wrestled with her. In return for her favours, he gave her the gift of prophecy. She, however, cheated Apollo. Having first consented, she then reneged, so that there was no sexual consummation. Apollo in his wrath turned the gift into a punishment by arranging that no-one should believe her prophecies. Therefore she became an outcast

and a laughing-stock at Troy. Finally, he punished her by death, in sending her to the House of Atreus where she would be killed by Clytemnestra.

Unfortunately, for the purpose of comparison, there are no extant records of this myth before the Agamemnon. For that reason, some critics have felt that the story may be an Aeschylean invention.[30] This is, however, unlikely, since Aeschylus gives only the bare bones of the story, in a passage of stichomythia that would be hard for the audience to grasp fully if they did not know already at least something of the story.

Even though comparison with a complete version of the myth before Aeschylus is impossible, nevertheless there are two lines of enquiry which may prove helpful to our understanding of Aeschylus' treatment. Firstly, it is possible to determine how the character Cassandra appeared in earlier literature. Secondly, Aeschylus' contemporary, Pindar, provides a very useful comparison in his treatment of Apollo's relationships with mortal women.

Recently, an interesting article has been published by Mr. P.G. Mason, in which he compares different literary treatments of Cassandra.[31] The fullest treatment of Cassandra in myth, however, is still the work of Professor Davreux.[32] Professor Davreux distinguishes three separate stories: Cassandra as Apollo's prophetess; Cassandra as Agamemnon's captive; and Cassandra the victim of Ajax.[33] She points out that the three are rarely combined, and that during the Cassandra-scene, where Cassandra's relationship with Apollo is most important, her relationship with Agamemnon is forgotten. The following comments about Cassandra owe much to the work of Davreux and Mason. I shall naturally

focus upon Apollo's relationship with Cassandra.

Cassandra first appears in extant literature in Homer. In the Iliad (e.g. XIII. 365) she is a Trojan princess; in the Odyssey (e.g. XI. 421-23), Agamemnon's captive. In neither case is there any reference to her gift of prophecy. Perhaps, as the Scholiast remarks, Homer did not know her as a prophetess.[34] According to Proclus' summary of the lost epic Kypria, Cassandra did appear there as a prophetess, together with her brother Helenus, also a prophet.[35] The association of Cassandra and Helenus is significant. It seems to have been traditional, appearing again for instance in a fragment of an unknown poet.[36] The scholiast on Iliad VII. 44 relates that Cassandra and Helenus both received the gift of prophecy as infants. As the siblings lay in the temple of Apollo, their ears were licked by snakes, and subsequently they were divinely inspired. Although the scholiast is himself writing later than Aeschylus, it is very probable that the story he gives was current before Aeschylus' time; for we have already seen that Cassandra and Helenus were traditionally associated. Aeschylus, then, was perhaps aware of this version, but gives the alternative one because it suits his purpose better.

If Cassandra and Helenus were traditionally associated, how then did the alternative version arise, of Cassandra's particular relationship with Apollo? Perhaps, from the belief that it was through a sexual relationship with the god that Apollo's priestesses became divinely inspired.[37] Moreover, Apollo's desire for Cassandra fits well with the traditional representation of her as a beautiful virgin. The part of the story where Apollo is cheated by a woman is paralleled in Pindar, and so too the subsequent punishment inflicted upon her. Whether Pindar

himself knew the story of Cassandra and Apollo remains a matter of conjecture, since the only reference to Cassandra in his work is a brief mention of the μάντιν...κόραν, "prophetess maiden" (Pythian 11.33.) It is possible that the story had appeared in Stesichorus' Oresteia, Aeschylus' source for some of his material, but once again there is a disappointing lack of evidence. None of Stesichorus' fragments even mentions Cassandra.

I now turn to Pindar and his treatment of Apollo's relationships with mortal women. I shall comment briefly on three odes: Pythian 3, which deals with Apollo and Coronis; Pythian 9, which deals with Apollo and Cyrene; and Olympian 6, which treats the relationship of Apollo and Evadne. The first affords the closest comparison with the story of Cassandra in the Agamemnon. Coronis, although with child by Apollo, cheated him by preferring another, a mortal man. Apollo, in anger, sent Artemis to punish her. Coronis and many of her neighbours were killed. But when Coronis was placed on the funeral pyre, Apollo rescued the child from her body, to become a healer for men. This last part is interesting because it provides the same antithesis which we saw in the Cassandra episode, that of healing/destroying; but the antithesis is less important for Pindar than for Aeschylus. There are several points in Pythian 3 that can be paralleled in the story in Aeschylus. Pindar speaks of the wrath (χόλος, 11) of the children of Zeus, just as Aeschylus mentions Apollo's wrath (κότος, Ag. 1211). The wrath in each case leads to the infliction of a terrible punishment: Coronis and her neighbours are destroyed, Cassandra is destroyed 'twice over'. Moreover, Pindar represents the woman as having brought the punishment upon herself, by making Apollo angry. Coronis is to blame.

She acts under the influence of ἄτη, madness (24). In the same way, Cassandra admits to 'cheating' the god (Ag. 1208) and "acting in error" (1212). The Chorus expect a harsh punishment for her; they are surprised that she is still alive (1211).

In the odes dealing with Cyrene and Evadne, the liaisons are, by contrast, represented as happy. Pindar speaks of Evadne as experiencing for the first time the "sweetness of Aphrodite" in the arms of Apollo (Olympian 6.35). So too, Cassandra describes the χάρις, "grace" or "charm", which Apollo breathed upon her (Ag. 1206). Nevertheless, there is a difference between Pindar and Aeschylus here. For Pindar, the women's experience of Apollo is wholly sweet; for Aeschylus, Cassandra's experience was characterised by βία, "force", as well as by χάρις. Cassandra describes Apollo as a wrestler (1206). Far from using force in Pindar, Apollo even pauses to enquire of the Centaur whether it is ὁσία, "holy", to lay a hand on Cyrene (Pythian 9.36).

In all three odes, Pindar relates how the child of the union of god and woman becomes a great hero: Iamus, Asclepius, and Aristaeus. Moreover, in Pythian 9 he refers to the relationship of Apollo with Cyrene as a marriage (γάμος, 111, 113) and to Apollo as Cyrene's husband (πόσις, 51). Influenced by Pindar's treatment, some critics have believed that Aeschylus represents the union of Apollo and Cassandra as a marriage. The line which has caused considerable discussion on this topic is Ag. 1207:

> ἦ καὶ τέκνων εἰς ἔργον ἠλθέτην ὁμοῦ;
>
> "And did you two together come to the work of children?"

I have given the reading which is preferred in the recent Oxford

text by Professor Page. He has adopted Butler's emendation ὁμοῦ, instead of the manuscript reading, which is νόμῳ. Reading νόμῳ, Professor Fraenkel takes the whole line to be a reminiscence of the Athenian marriage-formula: γνησίων παίδων ἐπ'ἀρότῳ (or ἐπὶ σπορᾷ).[38] In fact, the only word in the formula which corresponds in meaning to a word in *Ag.* 1207 is παίδων corresponding to τέκνων. (Both mean "children".) The argument therefore, although supported by a weighty authority, is in itself insubstantial. For the Greeks, the production of children and sexual consummation were almost synonymous, and it seems more plausible that the Chorus are simply asking Cassandra whether sexual consummation took place, rather than referring to marriage. Actual marriage is, as Leahy says "improbable in the extreme";[39] and personally I doubt whether even the concept of marriage is introduced, in order to suggest an "honourable" relationship."[40] It is possible to retain the MS. reading νόμῳ with the interpretation I have suggested above, excluding reference to marriage, and understanding νόμῳ in the sense of "as is usual". With this interpretation, it becomes apparent also that the reference to "children" is not to be taken too literally. Leahy suggests that there is a general pattern in Aeschylus: there are women whom the gods desire, and such women suffer personally and yet conceive children who are demi-gods or heroes. Therefore, Cassandra is all the more guilty in so far as she prevented such offspring being conceived in her.[41] But, in my opinion, the general pattern in Aeschylus cannot be sufficient evidence for interpreting the text in this light, since the reference to children is so brief, and no such implications are drawn out either by Cassandra or by the Chorus.

Apart from the detailed points of similarity and dissimilarity be-

tween Pindar's treatment and Aeschylus', perhaps the most illuminating and striking comparison between them is their unashamed anthropomorphism. Here the words of Professor Woodbury concerning Pindar are equally valid for Aeschylus: "The full humanity of the god, I conceive, was as important to Pindar, and to traditional belief, as his august knowledge and power."[42] He adds that, soon afterwards

> "Greek poetry lost the capacity that it had for so long possessed of encompassing all things, both human and divine, in a single, freshly visual imagination"

In conclusion, I suggest that Aeschylus, in his presentation of Apollo in the _Oresteia_, makes use of the major aspects of the tradition concerning Apollo as they appear in cult and literature. Together with Herodotus and Pindar, he stands at the end of an age of faith, in which the authority of the Delphic oracle was firmly established for the majority, and in which the poets and dramatists conceived of the Olympians in candidly anthropomorphic terms. Apollo's well-known prerogatives in the areas of prophecy and purification guaranteed that he would play a vital part in the story of Orestes, as it appears in the _Choephoroe_ and the _Eumenides_. Apollo's part in the _Agamemnon_ is less easily accounted for in terms of cult prerogatives. Clearly, one function of Apollo in the _Agamemnon_ is traditional: as the god of prophecy, he inspires Cassandra with her visions concerning the House of Atreus and the death of Agamemnon. But why Aeschylus also depicted Apollo in less conventional terms as Cassandra's Destroyer remains to be seen.

II

Agamemnon[1]

Most of the references to Apollo in the Agamemnon occur in one scene: the so-called "Cassandra-scene". There, we see Apollo through Cassandra's eyes, as the god who has in some sense "destroyed" her in the past, and who will now finally destroy her. Most of this chapter will therefore be devoted to the presentation of Apollo in the Cassandra-scene. Firstly, however, I will consider the three brief references to Apollo earlier in the play.

In the parodos, the Chorus first mentions Apollo in a 'tricolon' with Pan and Zeus. In this passage Menelaus and Agamemnon are likened to vultures which grieve over the loss of their young (48-54), and whose cries reach the ears of the gods:

> ὕπατος δ'ἀΐων ἤ τις 'Απόλλων
> ἢ Πὰν ἢ Ζεὺς οἰωνόθροον
> γόον ὀξυβόαν τῶνδε μετοίκων
> ὑστερόποινον
> πέμπει παραβᾶσιν 'Ερινύν. (55-59)
>
> "One on high, maybe Apollo, or Pan, or Zeus, hearing the shrill wailing cry of the birds, these visitors in his realm, sends upon the transgressors the late-punishing Erinys."

Professor Fraenkel comments that "It is probably better to admit that we do not know the poet's special motive in naming Apollo", since Apollo had no particular association with vultures or with high places.[2] If, then, the reason is not "theological", it may be dramatic: that is, even at this stage, Aeschylus may have wanted to establish the closeness of Apollo to Zeus. He also makes the point that Apollo and Zeus use the Erinys; it is only later in the trilogy that the Olympians

begin to repudiate the Erinyes. But, whatever the reason for Apollo's inclusion here, I think it is safe to say that neither he nor Pan is important. They are only mentioned in passing, before the Chorus narrows the focus on to Zeus Xenios himself. Such is the significance of the Chorus' use of the tricolon, a useful literary device which highlights the third, and main, subject.[3]

Apollo is mentioned again in the parodos, where the seer Calchas prophesies that Artemis will be angry. He prays to Apollo to intercede and appease the goddess:

ἰήιον δὲ καλέω Παιᾶνα (146)

"I call upon the blessed Healer-god"

The special motive for an appeal to Apollo here is easier to find: like other prophets, Calchas traditionally owed his prophetic gift to Apollo,[4] and besides, Artemis is Apollo's sister. Dramatically, however, the main point seems to be to emphasize Apollo's role as the god of healing. It was in this capacity that he was hailed with the cry "ἰὴ Παιάν", echoed here.[5]

The Herald makes the third reference to Apollo, in his home-coming prayer:

νῦν χαῖρε μὲν χθών, χαῖρε δ'ἡλίου φάος,
ὕπατός τε χώρας Ζεύς, ὁ Πύθιός τ'ἄναξ,
τόξοις ἰάπτων μηκέτ' εἰς ἡμᾶς βέλη·
ἅλις παρὰ Σκάμανδρον ἦσθ' ἀνάρσιος·
νῦν δ'αὖτε σωτὴρ ἴσθι καὶ παιώνιος,
ἄναξ Ἄπολλον· (508-13.)

"Now hail, earth! and hail, light of the sun! Hail, Zeus, highest god of our land, and hail, Pythian lord! you who shoot, no longer, I pray, against us, arrows with your bow. You were hostile enough and more than enough by the Scamander. But be saviour and healer, lord Apollo."

The point of this reference to Apollo is clear: the Herald salutes him, along with the other gods, on his return to his native land. It is interesting that Apollo and Zeus again appear side-by-side, as in the parodos. The Herald refers to the fact (again, familiar to the audience from Iliad I) that Apollo had opposed the Greeks at Troy, and had sent his arrows of plague upon them. But now in the Herald's view it is time for the god to be benevolent, where once he was malignant.

It is significant that the Herald uses a word which echoes Calchas' invocation in the parodos of the "Healer-god". The word is παιώνιος, "healer" (512), which recalls Calchas' word Παιᾶνα, "Healer-god". I believe that Aeschylus deliberately makes both Calchas and the Herald invoke Apollo under his title of Healer-god, in order to provide a direct contrast for the Cassandra-scene later in the play, where Cassandra names him "Destroyer".

Although these references to Apollo are admittedly brief, they do help to prepare the audience for the way in which Apollo will be presented in the trilogy. They hint at his closeness to Zeus, and to his potential for malevolent and benevolent treatment of mortals. Within the context of the Agamemnon, they have the specific function of preparing us for the Cassandra-scene. The second and third references point to Apollo as Healer, while the first and second point to Apollo's ability to take vengeance for wrong done. The latter is precisely what he does in Cassandra's case.

Apollo in the "Cassandra-scene"

In my discussion of this scene I shall, in accordance with the

subject of this thesis, confine my comments to a consideration of Apollo's part in it. I shall refer to wider issues only in so far as they are relevant to my specific subject. I think it is important to make clear at the outset how I see Apollo's place in the scene as a whole. Firstly, it is obvious that Aeschylus presents the prophetess Cassandra on stage partly in order that she, with her special prophetic gifts, can describe Agamemnon's imminent death at the hands of Clytemnestra. Moreover, Cassandra, with her visionary insight, is able to unlock the house's secrets: the feast of Thyestes and the curse on Atreus' house. The death of Agamemnon and the story of the curse are in the foreground in this scene; Cassandra's own story, interwoven as it is with her prophecies and visions, is in the background. As far as the foreground of the scene is concerned, Apollo's function is merely pragmatic: he is the god who inspires Cassandra with the prophecies she utters.

Yet Aeschylus chose to make of Cassandra more than a functional prophetess. She is a dramatic figure in her own right. Her account of her past and present experiences at the hands of Apollo has implications for the whole trilogy. Apollo's treatment of Cassandra is an example of the Chorus' earlier reference (182-3) to the χάρις βίαιος, "violent grace" of the gods to men. In my discussion of the Cassandra-scene I shall attempt to support this interpretation and to indicate the nature of the "violent grace".

There are three passages in this scene which specifically treat the relationship between Apollo and Cassandra. I shall deal with them in their dramatic sequence, rather than attempting to put the whole story together at the outset. This method is more appropriate, because

Aeschylus' own dramatic method, here as elsewhere, is one of gradual revelation.[6]

(i) Ag. 1072-1099.

Cassandra has been on stage for almost three hundred lines before the actual "Cassandra-scene" begins, at 1072. She entered with Agamemnon in his chariot; she silently witnessed the scene in which Clytemnestra persuades him to enter the house, treading on red carpet; and she ignored Clytemnestra's attempts to draw her into the house after him. When she finally breaks her long silence,[7] with a resounding cry, the audience's attention is gripped immediately. Cassandra's first words are an untranslatable cry of horror, and then comes the god's name.

> ὦπολλον, ὦπολλον (1073)
>
> "Oh Apollo, Apollo!"

The Chorus appeals to her: why does she call on Apollo with cries of woe? Surely she knows that Apollo has nothing to do with lamentations (1074-75). Cassandra repeats her cry (1077); the Chorus repeat their protest (1078-79). The point is thus made that Cassandra for some reason associates Apollo with a source of lamentation as yet unknown to us.

Cassandra's next words reveal much more:

> ὦπολλον, ὦπολλον,
> ἀγυιᾶτ', ἀπόλλων ἐμός·
> ἀπώλεσας γὰρ οὐ μόλις τὸ δεύτερον. (1080-82).
>
> "Oh Apollo, Apollo!
> Apollo of the streets, my Destroyer!
> For you have destroyed me easily for
> the second time!"

Cassandra has already stressed Apollo's name by repetition. Now she makes a startling pun on his name, connecting "Apollo" with the verb απόλλυμι "destroy". The origin and derivation of the name Apollo are unknown.[8] Originally, there is no etymological connection between the name Ἀπόλλων and the verb ἀπόλλυμι. There is no evidence for the pun being made earlier than in this passage of the Agamemnon; so that there is no knowing whether Aeschylus was the first to make it.[9] If so, it would have been all the more startling. But even if the pun had been made before, it would be rendered effective and startling here; effective because of the repetition and startling because of the contrast with the association established earlier in the play between Apollo and healing.

There is a separate point about Cassandra's pun; namely, that she calls the god ἀπόλλων ἐμός "my destroyer". Cassandra's view of the god is based on her own personal, bitter experience of him. This is worth bearing in mind for my discussion, later in this chapter, of the question whether the scene contains criticism of Apollo.

Cassandra also gives the god his title of "Agyiates" - Apollo "of the streets". Apollo Agyieus was represented by a stone statue outside the house, and in fact such a statue is on stage, in front of the palace gates.[10]

Finally, there are the four pregnant words οὐ μόλις τὸ δεύτερον· οὐ μόλις has been translated variously as equivalent to the Latin "non parum" -- "not too little", "enough"; "utterly" -- or as "with no difficulty".[11] Either meaning is possible, or even both; and both would be typical of the way in which a Greek god might be expected to destroy. τὸ δεύτερον, "for the second time", serves here to emphasize

Cassandra's point: Apollo is her destroyer <u>twice over</u>. The explanation of how he destroyed her the first time comes later, as more of the story is revealed.

The Chorus once more provides a comment on her words. They have understood at least part of Cassandra's reference to 'destruction'; for they remark that she seems about to prophesy her own misfortunes (1083-84). They evidently know her to be a prophetess, a fact familiar to the audience also.[12] They do not cry "blasphemy!" at Cassandra's pun. Evidently they do not find it sacrilegious to call Apollo "Destroyer".

Cassandra repeats the cry she had just made, and continues with the question:

> ἆ ποῖ ποτ' ἤγαγές με; πρὸς ποίαν στέγην; (1087)
>
> "Ah, where have you brought me? to what house?"

Although on a human level Agamemnon was responsible for bringing her here as his captive, Cassandra feels the god's hand in her fate. It is "double motivation" - responsibility on both human and divine levels at once.[13] Similarly, later, she dies at the hands of Clytemnestra, and yet Apollo is her destroyer. Cassandra begins to hint at the mysterious horror of the house, and instead of prophesying her own woes she begins to prophesy about the House of Atreus (1090ff., 1095ff., 1100ff., etc.). When she has proved her skill as a prophetess (1178ff.), the Chorus is moved to wonder at her ability to tell of the past "as though she had been present" (1198ff.). Cassandra explains that Apollo gave her the gift of prophecy (1203), and thus begins the second passage in which she relates her own story.

(ii) Ag. 1202-1213.

Here we have the story of Cassandra and Apollo told in a nutshell. The story is not communicated in a speech by Cassandra, but in a passage of stichomythia between Cassandra and the Chorus. Because the passage is central to this enquiry, and because every word in the passage counts, I shall quote it in full, with translation:

Κα. μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῷδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει.
Χο. μῶν καὶ θεός περ ἱμερῷ πεπληγμένος;
Κα. πρὸ του μὲν αἰδὼς ἦν ἐμοὶ λέγειν τάδε.
Χο. ἁβρύνεται γὰρ πᾶς τις εὖ πράσσων πλεόν.
Κα. ἀλλ' ἦν παλαιστὴς κάρτ' ἐμοὶ πνέων χάριν.
Χο. ἦ καὶ τέκνων εἰς ἔργον ἠλθέτην ὁμοῦ;
Κα. ξυναινέσασα Λοξίαν ἐψευσάμην.
Χο. ἤδη τέχναισιν ἐνθέοις ᾑρημένη;
Κα. ἤδη πολίταις πάντ' ἐθέσπιζον πάθη.
Χο. πῶς δῆτ' ἄνατος ἦσθα Λοξίου κότῳ;
Κα. ἔπειθον οὐδέν' οὐδέν, ὡς τάδ' ἤμπλακον.
Χο. ἡμῖν γε μὲν δὴ πιστὰ θεσπίζειν δοκεῖς.

1207 νόμῳ codd: ὁμοῦ Butler

Ca. "The prophet Apollo appointed me to this task."
Cho. "Being smitten with desire, even though a god?"
Ca. "Before now I was ashamed to speak of this."
Cho. "Yes; for everyone is too fastidious when prosperous."
Ca. "But he was a wrestler, breathing grace strongly upon me."
Cho. "And did you come together to the work of begetting children?"
Ca. "No: I gave my consent, but cheated Loxias."
Cho. "When you had already been taken captive by the divine art?"
Ca. "Yes: already I prophesied to the citizens all the disasters."
Cho. "How then were you not hurt by the wrath of Loxias?"
Ca. "I was -- I could convince no one of anything, once I had erred thus."
Cho. "Yet to us you seem to prophesy things worthy of belief."

Since I have already dealt in the previous chapter with the problems concerning the story's origin, and compared similar stories of Apollo's liaisons with mortal women as treated by Pindar,[14] I shall now concentrate solely upon the implications of the story in its context.

Throughout this passage, the Chorus plays an important role: they

ask the right 'leading' questions to elicit Cassandra's story, and at the same time their attitudes and reactions provide us with criteria by which to assess the conduct of Apollo and Cassandra. When Cassandra explains that Apollo made her a prophetess, the Chorus immediately asks whether the god desired her. Their question implies that Apollo usually conferred the gift of prophecy on girls whom he desired. Nevertheless, their question also indicates surprise; it is introduced by the particle μῶν, meaning "Surely not...?" Professor Winnington-Ingram, whose criticisms of Apollo in the Choephoroe and the Eumenides will be discussed in later chapters, calls the Chorus' question "horrified".[15] This is surely a subjective interpretation. The Chorus' surprise is occasioned by the fact that Apollo, a god, could desire a mortal woman. The emphasis is clear from καὶ θεός περ, "even though a god". It is important to realise that ἱμέρος here means "desire", not "love". Some critics, in their discussions, have constantly employed the term "love" of Apollo's desire,[16] but the translation is misleading and better avoided.

Cassandra's reply to the Chorus' question implies that the god did indeed desire her. Before now, she says, she was ashamed to speak of it. Once again, the Chorus' response is a guide-line to us, indicating how the ancient Greeks, in general, would have reacted. They say that Cassandra's αἰδώς is scarcely surprising: all people in times of prosperity are too particular and fastidious about the proprieties. An implication of this response is that Cassandra's present position leaves her no room for such reticence as she displayed in the past. Significantly, the Chorus also indicates by its reply that Cassandra, in becoming the object of Apollo's desire, had in their eyes gained

good fortune.

When Cassandra speaks of Apollo's wrestling with her, and in the same line mentions the grace he breathed upon her, we are reminded of the δαιμόνων ... χάρις βίαιος, the "violent grace of the gods", mentioned in the parodos (182). παλαιστής, "wrestler", should certainly be taken literally, as Professor Fraenkel suggests,[17] to indicate real physical force. Thus Apollo was violent in his encounter with Cassandra. Yet Cassandra herself admits to the χάρις he breathed upon her. Charis is a complex word, not easily translated into English. The fact that it is governed by πνέων here suggests that it is not exactly similar to the χάρις δαιμόνων mentioned in the parodos. That charis, which is in essence the charis of Zeus, is something that he gives to men over and above what they might expect.[18] But Apollo's charis is not primarily a favour that he gives to Cassandra, but something that he breathes upon her. Fraenkel suggests that it is "an emanation of Apollo's nature".[19] This grace, or charm, works upon Cassandra despite her resistance, and reminds us that Apollo was conceived by the Greeks to be a young and especially handsome god.

Responding to the implications of παλαιστής, the Chorus proceeds to ask whether Cassandra and Apollo "came to the work of children" (1207). I have argued in the previous chapter that this rather curious phrase does not necessarily imply either that the Chorus views the union of Apollo and Cassandra as a dignified relationship, equivalent to marriage, or that they expect Cassandra to have produced a hero-child.[20] The Chorus are simply asking Cassandra whether the encounter was sexually consummated. The question is asked entirely for the sake of information it elicits from Cassandra. She admits that no sexual

intercourse took place; for after giving her consent she cheated Apollo.

How or why Cassandra cheated Apollo is not revealed,[21] presumably because Aeschylus thought only the <u>fact</u> of denial relevant. But the word ἐψευσάμην, "I cheated", leaves no doubt of Cassandra's guilt in the matter. Once again, the Chorus brings out the important point. They ask whether, before Cassandra went back on her side of the bargain, she had already received Apollo's gift of prophecy; the reply is affirmative. Why then, they ask, was she not punished? (1211). The word they employ, ἄνατος, means "untouched, unhurt" and implies that they expected some physical punishment, perhaps complete destruction. Cassandra says that she was indeed punished, since no-one subsequently believed her prophecies. Fraenkel comments that the form of punishment was "peculiarly cruel".[22] Certainly, the punishment made Cassandra a very isolated figure, as she will later explain in some detail. But the Chorus' remark suggests that what is strange here is that Cassandra is still <u>alive</u> after cheating Apollo. That the universal loss of belief in her prophecies was not to be the final punishment is perhaps hinted at again in the Chorus' last remark: "Well, anyway, <u>we</u> believe you." Thus, ironically, Cassandra's prophecies at last gain credence. The Chorus' assurance rounds off the passage of stichomythia, and subsequently Cassandra is caught up again in prophetic feenzy.

I have now dealt at some length with interpretation of the passage. Now I shall consider two inter-related questions that arise from the story as revealed to us so far. They are: (1) was Cassandra guilty of an offence against Apollo? (2) was Apollo culpable in his courtship of her? These questions must be answered before one can consider fully

whether or not Apollo is criticised in the Cassandra scene. Another question could be asked at this stage: Was Apollo's punishment of Cassandra excessive? However, I prefer to leave this question until I consider the third passage, where the audience hears more about the first part of her punishment. Rather surprisingly, critics have tended to bypass these issues, possibly because they have been more concerned with the 'foreground' of the Cassandra-scene. Professor Fraenkel makes no explicit comment. Professor Winnington-Ingram, in his article on Apollo's role in the Oresteia, has only a footnote on the Agamemnon.[23] Professor Kitto finds Apollo to be a crude god in the Agamemnon, specifically in his treatment of Cassandra, but he is vague as to the two questions I have posed and has more to say on the third, that is, the nature of the punishment.[24] The best and fullest treatment of these and other questions raised by the Cassandra-scene, is that offered by Mr. D.M. Leahy.[25]

(1) Was Cassandra guilty of an offence against Apollo?

Certainly Cassandra was guilty. Even though I have stated my disagreement with Professor Kuhns' idea that she violates the relationship of marriage, and with Mr. Leahy's idea that she disappoints the world of possible heroes,[26] nevertheless she is guilty on more simple grounds: she cheated Apollo by going back on her promise. She admits it herself, using the words ἐψευσάμην "I cheated" (1208), and ἤμπλακον "I erred" (1212). She does not offer any excuse, or indeed any reason for her action: what matters is that she did it. Personally, I would avoid using the word "sin", with its Christian connotations,[27] but fundamentally I agree with Mr. Leahy that Cassandra is guilty on this count.

(2) Was Apollo culpable in his courtship of her?

Professor Kitto says that he was: "The Apollo of the Agamemnon is one whose behaviour, in contemporary Athens, would rightly have put him in reach of the law."[28]

As Mr. Leahy observes,[29] this comment must refer not to Apollo's punishment of Cassandra but his courtship. It is a rather vague and sweeping statement. It is probable that Professor Kitto is here thinking of rape, since this would be an action on Apollo's part that could be thought of as illegal. From the text, however, it seems that Apollo did not rape Cassandra. It is true, that she describes him as a "wrestler", but evidently she reneged before the relationship was consummated. Nor did Apollo attempt to overcome her at this stage by force -- or at least, the text nowhere says so. The sequence of events appears to have been as follows: Apollo desires Cassandra; Cassandra is reluctant, therefore he wrestles with her; she consents; Apollo confers on her the gift of prophecy; Cassandra withdraws her consent, refusing him intercourse with her. In other words, the element of force comes into play early in the story, and is not carried through to the point of rape. Therefore, the strongest charge that we can make against Apollo is one of attempted rape, but we must recognise that Cassandra does give her consent at an early stage in the proceedings.

Another critic who has misinterpreted the part force plays in the story is Professor Lesky. He refers to "Apollo, the god who has forced her into his dreadful, thankless service as a prophetess."[30] But again, there is no evidence in the text to support this assertion. Indeed, it seems much more feasible, from the text, to suppose that Cassandra desired the gift of prophecy. This is not stated explicitly, but perhaps

implied when the Chorus ask Cassandra whether she had already become inspired before she reneged. If the "service" was "dreadful" and "thankless", it was so because no one believed her, the punishment exacted by Apollo because she had cheated him.

I now turn to some other suggestions made by Professor Kitto, who says that Apollo "carnally desired" Cassandra and "bribed" her.[31] As I have just said, it is feasible to suppose that Cassandra desired the gift of prophecy. This desire may have been a factor in her eventual acceptance of Apollo's sexual advances, although, equally, Apollo's use of force may have influenced her. But such statements are all conjectural, and the text does not state explicitly that Apollo bribed Cassandra.[32]

On the question of carnal desire, that is certainly a closer translation of the Greek word that appears in the text, ἵμερος (1204), than the English word 'love'. Certainly, Aeschylus leaves us in no doubt that Apollo desired Cassandra. But I suspect that Professor Kitto has inserted the adverb "carnally" to make the desire sound rather villainous, whereas in fact Apollo's desire is not criticised, either by Cassandra or the Chorus.

In conclusion, I would suggest that the various criticisms directed at Apollo's courtship if Cassandra are of questionable validity. However, though some critics have exaggerated the degree to which Apollo uses force, it cannot be denied that there is an element of βία in Apollo's approach to Cassandra. It is present in the one word, παλαιστῆς, "wrestler". This word must have been carefully chosen; it is "anything but a faded metaphor".[33] But because there are no comparable usages of the word (Denniston-Page quote one instance where

"Love" is described as a wrestler,[34] but that is not quite so personal) it is impossible to know whether or not it carries any criticism with it. Did Aeschylus mean that Apollo was brutal? All that is certain is that Apollo initially tried to overpower Cassandra.

(iii) 1256-1279

Before Cassandra resumes her consideration of her own fate, she prophesies Agamemnon's death at the hands of Clytemnestra (1215ff.). In connection with this prophecy, she makes a comment that must remind the audience of the healer/destroyer antithesis. She says:

> ἀλλ' οὔτι παιὼν τῶιδ' ἐπιστατεῖ λογῶι
>
> "But I tell you, it is no healer who rules over this that I have said."

The connection of thought here is obscure, but its main point is clear. Cassandra is using the word παιὼν, "healer", of Apollo -- a word that, as we saw, was twice used of him in the earlier part of the play -- and she is using it with a grim irony. Apollo, in inspiring her with the prophecy of death, is no "healer", but a destroyer, as she so emphatically pronounced at the beginning of the scene. Her ironic assertion here prepares us for our third passage -- where once more Apollo figures as Cassandra's destroyer.

I will not, this time, quote the passage in full but summarise its three main ideas.

(i) at 1256-1263, Cassandra prophesies that she too, alongside Agamemnon, will die at the hands of Clytemnestra. (She has already spoken of her own death, at 1138ff.). The human perpetrator, Clytemnestra, is named.

(ii) 1263-1268. From the thought of death, Cassandra proceeds to the

question: Why then do I retain my prophetic insignia, which mock me? The word καταγέλωτα (1264) is very emphatic: her thought seems to be that they bring her small comfort: her gift of prophecy enables her to foretell her own death but not to escape it. It is an ironic situation -- and, ironically, she wishes that her insignia may enrich some other girl (1268). In an act of defiant rejection, she strips herself of her prophetic insignia: thus by trampling on them, she requites them (1267).

(iii) 1269-1278. At first, Cassandra's act appears to be one of human defiance and indignation. But then she realises that Apollo himself is stripping her of her insignia -- he who formerly watched her, clothed in those prophetic robes, become a laughing-stock amongst her people. Again, we should note the idea of γέλως (1271: καταγελωμένην). When she imagines Apollo watching her sufferings at Troy, she uses the verb ἐποπτεύω "look down upon". Fraenkel notes that the verb usually denotes the benevolent look of a deity,[35] and so there is probably a certain bitterness in this expression. The bitterness and irony of Cassandra's humiliation are further brought out by the wording in 1272:

φίλων ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν

"by friends, become enemies."

Cassandra describes the depths to which she descended -- how she bore the name of "beggar" and "starveling" (1273-4).

Finally, having described how Apollo made her suffer in Troy, Cassandra returns to the thought of her coming death (1275-1279). Where before she named Clytemnestra as her destroyer, now she emphasizes the fact that it is Apollo who has brought her here to die. Her words here too contain a note that, to me at least, is clearly bitter:

καὶ νῦν ὁ μάντις μάντιν ἐκπράξας ἐμὲ
ἀπήγαγ' ἐς τοιάσδε θανασίμους τύχας. (1275-76).

"And now the seer has put an end to me, his seer,
and brought me to this chance of death."

Firstly, καὶ νῦν, "And now" sets her present punishment alongside the past one, implying, perhaps, that the first punishment alone was enough. Then the juxtaposition of μάντις μάντιν, "seer - seer", also seems to contain the ironic suggestion that the seer could have taken better care of his own seer. Cassandra also uses two strong verbs here: ἐκπράσσω and ἀπάγω. The former has been variously understood as "ruining me" (Denniston-Page) or "exacting me as his due" (Fraenkel).[36] Both commentators agree on the meaning of the latter, ἀπάγω, "lead off under arrest", "arrest and carry off". Both verbs would thus seem to impute a kind of vindictiveness on the part of the god. Cassandra's final words (1277-1279) dwell on the poignancy of her death.

This, then, is the third of the three passages in the Cassandra-scene where she reveals the story of her relationship with Apollo. She has now explained both the first and the second punishments for her offence. Thus it is now possible to answer the question: Is Apollo excessive in his punishment?

In my interpretation of the third passage, I have already indicated part of my answer to this question. It is clear, I think, from the tone of the passage that Cassandra at least implies criticism of the god; and I have attempted to support this interpretation in my discussion of the language she uses. But we must now reconsider a question which I raised earlier; would the audience necessarily adopt Cassandra's view of the god? In considering the first passage, I mentioned that Aeschylus establishes straightaway that Cassandra has a

uniquely <u>personal</u> view of the god, whereas the Chorus by contrast represent the norm, the conventional view. Yet the Chorus do not at any time in the scene remonstrate with Cassandra about her view of Apollo. They do not accuse her of blasphemy when she calls Apollo her destroyer, nor do they interpose when she strips herself of the insignia of the god's service. On the other hand, when they hear of her offence they seem to expect a violent punishment, even death. Here they are displaying, in my opinion, a normal Greek expectation: if anyone strongly offends a god, he will almost certainly be destroyed for it. It is not that they think of Apollo as more cruel than any other god. Rather they assume that a human offence against a god will inevitably be punished in a violent fashion. They expect and accept it; Cassandra feels it more intensely, of course, because she is the one who has suffered.

Thus we are given two sides of the coin. Cassandra suffers, perhaps more than any other character in the trilogy. But, as the Chorus indicate, such suffering is to be expected when one offends a god. The suffering is self-evidently disproportionate to the original offence. In that sense, then, one might say that Apollo's punishment of Cassandra was "excessive". But such a disproportion between crime and punishment is not peculiar to the case of Cassandra and Apollo. Rather, as Mr. Leahy comments, the disproportion is typical of tragedy:

> "She suffers for her wrong choice more disproportionately than any other character in the trilogy, and with that sort of disproportion between initial fault and resulting disaster <u>which especially characterizes tragedy</u>."[37] (my italics)

For Professor Kitto, however, the Cassandra-scene, and the punishment of Cassandra demonstrate that:

> "Apollo's conception of 'justice' is as violent as Clytemnestra's."[38]

He argues that

> "Apollo avenges himself in the same spirit as Agamemnon, Clytemnestra and Aegisthus..."[39]

This spirit is a spirit of "wrath", and "bloody retribution", personified by the Erinyes.[40] Apollo uses the Erinyes to avenge himself on Cassandra, and the human elements of which he avails himself are

> "Agamemnon's concupiscence and folly",
> and
> "Clytemnestra's blind hatred."[41]

These ideas form part of a general argument which merits close examination. At first sight, the argument is very convincing, because of Professor Kitto's unusual ability to make sense of a drama as a whole, by finding the dramatist's purpose in the structure of the drama and its recurrent patterns. Thus here he fits Apollo into the pattern of vengeance, which undoubtedly constitutes a major theme of the trilogy. He believes that both Zeus and Apollo, in the early part of the trilogy, use the Erinyes for retributive purposes; but that by the end of the trilogy, both Zeus and Apollo have "progressed" to a more advanced ethos.[42]

For Kitto, Apollo is to be perceived as "the embodiment of a universal principle"; and that principle is "'justice' pursued through blind retaliation".[43]

What evidence is there in the text for or against Kitto's theory? Firstly, I think there is some support for Kitto's assertion that Apollo acts in a spirit of wrath or anger. The Chorus speak of Apollo's wrath (κότος) at 1211, when they ask Cassandra how it happens that she was "unharmed" (ἄνατος) by the god's wrath. This is the only point in the

text where the actual word "wrath" is used; but it may also be implied in the speech of Cassandra at 1256ff. She certainly implies that the god actively desired her punishment. Secondly, as to the Erinyes, is Apollo really employing the Erinyes here? It is true that both he and Zeus are named in the parodos as sending the Erinys against the transgressors who took the vultures' fledglings (55-59). Thus Apollo is capable of employing the Erinyes. Nevertheless, the Erinyes are not mentioned in the text with specific reference to Apollo's treatment of Cassandra. Kitto infers that Apollo is employing them to destroy Cassandra from the fact that Apollo sends her to the house of Atreus, where the Erinyes have their lodging. He says:

> "in order to satisfy his rage against Cassandra, Apollo availed himself of the blood-drinking Erinyes who were haunting Atreus' house."[44]

That the house of Atreus is haunted by the Erinyes is undeniable (cf. 1119, 1190). It is also true that, on the divine level, Apollo has sent her to that house to die (1087, 1138f.). But the actual connection between Apollo and the Erinyes is nowhere stated in the text. Nor are the Erinyes ever mentioned in connection with Cassandra's death, but only in connection with Agamemnon's (1433). Therefore, although Kitto's inference that Apollo employs the Erinyes is a very feasible one from the clues offered in the text, I suggest that it is a dangerous one. If Aeschylus had wanted, he could have made this idea quite explicit: Apollo sent Cassandra to a house haunted by Erinyes in order to employ them in her death. But the fact is that the Erinyes are only mentioned in connection with the past crimes of the House of Atreus and with the death of Agamemnon - and Cassandra is only involved incidentally in that sequence. Personally, I believe that Aeschylus avoided the overt

statement that Apollo employed the Erinyes, in order to forestall the charge against Apollo of inconsistency which, as we shall see, Winnington-Ingram does in fact make against Apollo.[45] For later in the trilogy, of course, Apollo repudiates the Erinyes.

Let us now examine the suggestions that Apollo's conception of justice is as violent as Clytemnestra's, and that Apollo, in his treatment of Cassandra, is the embodiment of "'justice' pursued through blind retaliation". These ideas cannot be either proved or disproved from the text, since they are part of a general interpretation of the whole story and not argued from any specific lines in the text. We might begin by observing that the text gives no positive support to Kitto's ideas. In this trilogy, Aeschylus does not draw comparisons between the moral standards of humans and gods, as Euripides does. The text nowhwere suggests that Apollo is acting just like Clytemnestra, or that he is to be judged by human standards. On the contrary, as we have seen, the Chorus expect violent punishment for Cassandra because she has offended a god. Gods, by reason of their supernatural power, can be expected to retaliate violently. But a stronger objection can be made to the second part of Kitto's interpretation. Kitto views Apollo as a symbol:

> "We must think of this Apollo as we thought of Apollo in the Electra, as the embodiment of a universal principle...."[46]

Generally speaking, I do not believe that Aeschylus' presentation of the gods in the Oresteia allows us to interpret them as symbols. In particular, to interpret Apollo in the Agamemnon as a symbol of violent justice raises difficulties for the interpretation of the Choephoroe and the Eumenides, where Apollo has many different roles to play.

I have discussed Kitto's view of Apollo's role in the Agamemnon here in this section because it followed naturally upon the question of excessive punishment. Now, by way of conclusion to this chapter, I would like to discuss other critics' views of Apollo's general role in this play and to offer my own.

Apollo's role in the Agamemnon

The only critic who has actually set out to assess Apollo's role in the Agamemnon is Professor Kitto, whose views I discussed above. He concentrates totally on Apollo in the Cassandra story and neglects the first three references to Apollo in the earlier part of the play.[47] In doing so, he misses the healer/destroyer antithesis, which suggests that the god is not to be viewed as symbolizing a single force or principle, but as a god of ambivalent potential. Nevertheless, his assessment of Apollo has been very helpful to me in forming my own views. Other critics have not considered the question of Apollo's role as such, but have discussed Apollo as part of their attempts to define the significance of the Cassandra-scene. These critics put the emphasis on Cassandra rather than Apollo. When they attempt to define the significance of the Apollo-Cassandra story in the context of the trilogy as a whole, they start from Cassandra. This may seem a little odd, when one considers that Cassandra appears in only one play, and Apollo has an important part in all three. Yet, paradoxically (since I started out from Apollo) I have come to the same conclusion as they: that the emphasis of the story is on the human sufferer.

Professor Thomson has said of the Cassandra-scene that "the keynote of the scene is pity."[48]

I believe that the text provides ample support for this view. The Chorus begins to pity Cassandra even before the scene 'proper' opens, and their sympathetic response continues to the end.[49] Cassandra, too, pities her own fate.[50] This is particularly apparent in the passage where the Chorus compares her to the nightingale (for the Greeks, a standard image of woe) and Cassandra responds that her fate is more horrible than that (1142-49). But pity is evoked not only for Cassandra's fate, but also for Troy, for the children of Thyestes' feast, and finally for the whole of mankind.[51] The verb οἰκτίρω "pity" and its cognates recur frequently (1069, 1221, 1241, 1286, 1321, 1330) whilst Cassandra is often referred to as τάλαινα, "unhappy" (1138, 1143, 1158, 1260, 1295).

Why, then, did Aeschylus choose to evoke pity so strongly in this scene? Professor Thomson says: "The effect of the scene as a whole is to concentrate on Cassandra the compassion we might otherwise have felt for Agamemnon."[52] He does not develop this idea, but I believe that his hint can be profitably expanded. Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes and Electra are all caught up in the fateful sequence of retributive acts which overwhelm the House of Atreus. The concentration of pity on any of those characters would distract our attention from that sequence, from the pattern of crime and retribution. But Cassandra is only incidentally involved in the fate of the House of Atreus: really her fate is determined by Apollo. Thus, if Aeschylus wanted a paradigm of human suffering, Cassandra was an obvious choice; and, in my opinion, Aeschylus does arouse pity and fear for the whole state of mankind through the person of Cassandra. These are her final words:

ἰὼ βρότεια πράγματ' · εὐτυχοῦντα μὲν
σκιᾶι τις ἂν πρέψειεν · εἰ δε δυστυχῆ
βολαῖς ὑγρώσσων σπόγγος ὤλεσεν γραφήν·
καὶ ταῦτ' ἐκείνων μᾶλλον οἰκτίρω πολύ. (1327-30)

"Alas, for the state of man! When successful, one might compare man to a shadow. But when unsuccessful, a sponge wipes out the mark, moistening it with its assaults. And this I pity far more than the other."

A similar interpretation is offered by Professor Greene. He interprets Cassandra as a "symbol of tlemosyne, of noble suffering", and he notes that τλάω and its cognates are used repeatedly in reference to her.[53] I agree that Cassandra displays tlemosyne at the end of the scene, when she resolves to go in to die. There is a nobility and human dignity about her conduct. But against the view of Cassandra as a symbol of noble suffering, two things may be said. First, this view is not easily reconciled with the factor of Cassandra's guilt, which I hope I established earlier. Greene, who sees her as a "victim of hybris"[54] probably does not think her guilty. It is true that Cassandra could be guilty and also a symbol of tlemosyne, but if Aeschylus wished to portray simply tlemosyne and nothing else he could have chosen someone innocent. Secondly, the emphasis on pity is much stronger. Words related to pity occur much more frequently than words related to noble suffering, which occur only in the last part of the scene.

According to one general interpretation, then, Cassandra is to be viewed as a paradigm of human suffering, evoking pity. The other and complementary side of the presentation of Cassandra is provided by two critics, Miss Lebeck and Mr. Leahy, who emphasize the importance of Cassandra's choice and of voluntary action. Both feel that the impor-

tant factor contributed to the overall theme of the Agamemnon by the story of Cassandra and Apollo is Cassandra's guilt. However, they give quite different interpretations of the nature of Cassandra's guilt and of the way in which it is integral to the play or trilogy as a whole. I will give Leahy's view first. He says:

> "...how is the fate of Cassandra to be related to the economy of the trilogy as a whole? The answer is, I suggest, to be found in that nexus of communal guilt and individual free-will which is so important a feature of the Oresteia."[55]

Leahy first argues that there is a pattern which holds good not only for the Oresteia but for the other extant plays of Aeschylus:

> "Final disaster...does not come upon his characters just because of communal or ancestral guilt, but presupposes also their own personal guilt."[56]

He argues, then, that Cassandra, when she makes her wrong choice, is both personally guilty and also pre-conditioned by "communal guilt". With the first part of this interpretation, I am in complete agreement, as I have indicated in my discussion of Cassandra's guilt. The second part, however, Leahy states without supporting it with evidence from the text. Leahy says that Cassandra was "conditioned by her Trojan blood, for Troy was guilty of hybris".[57]

As with some of Kitto's arguments, this argument appears to be based on the assumption of a general pattern rather than a particular reference in the text. I disagree with it on two counts. Firstly, "communal guilt", in the sense that Cassandra is "conditioned by her Trojan blood" is entirely different from the "ancestral guilt" which conditions Agamemnon. One type of guilt is contemporaneous and involves a whole society; the other is from the past and involves a particular house. Secondly, I disagree because I can find no evidence

in the text, either within or outside the actual Cassandra-scene, of Cassandra being "conditioned by her Trojan blood". When she speaks of Troy and Paris (1157, 1167-71, 1186-88), it is in the tone of general lament, and nothing is said about communal guilt.

Professor Lebeck agrees that Cassandra's guilt is integral, not, however to the whole trilogy, but to the Agamemnon, but she takes a different approach from Leahy. Cassandra, in her prophecies concerning the House of Atreus, emphasizes for us the element of the curse, showing Agamemnon's guilt to have been conditioned by heredity. But, in her own right, Cassandra's own situation indicates the importance of human voluntary action. Professor Lebeck explains:

> "Thus in this scene hereditary guilt comes into the foreground as a causal factor determining the destiny of Agamemnon. Yet its counterpart, the guilt he has incurred as an individual, is evoked through the person of Cassandra. In such a way Aeschylus maintains a balance between the forces of necessity and choice; neither cause is totally eclipsed by the other."[58]

I have given these critics' views on Cassandra's guilt: my own view is as follows. I agree with both that Cassandra is guilty; and I agree with Lebeck, against Leahy, that Cassandra's guilt is individual, rather than communal or inherited. But I agree with neither as to why Cassandra's guilt matters; or, to put it another way, how her guilt is integrated into the play or into the trilogy. To me, there is no emphasis in the text on Cassandra's moment of choice; so that the question whether the choice was "conditioned" or individual and free hardly concerns us. Although Miss Lebeck's idea that Cassandra's free choice nicely balances Agamemnon's conditioned choice is well argued from the structure of the scene --the interweaving of Cassandra's fate

with prophecies concerning the House of Atreus--nevertheless, if Aeschylus was in reality emphasizing Cassandra's free choice it is very odd that he passed over the moment so quickly, giving no indication at all as to Cassandra's personal motivation. I think, then, that the nature of Cassandra's guilt is only important in one respect, and that respect is the one emphasized in the story. It is, that Cassandra offended against a god. She offended a god directly, whereas the other mortals in this trilogy offend against other mortals, and thereby indirectly against the gods. And because she offends him, the god who had previously shown her the charismatic side of his nature now shows her in turn the violent side. The two sides were there from the beginning, but it takes a human to determine which side of the god's nature will predominate.

To understand the part that the Cassandra-Apollo story plays in this scene, and in the trilogy, it is necessary to synthesize the two aspects which different critics have discussed: the pity which is evoked for Cassandra and mankind as a whole, and the guilt of Cassandra. The significance of the story is that man can transgress against the gods and thereby encounter the gods' violence, instead of their favour. But the violence is disproportionate to the original wrongdoing, and mankind is therefore immensely to be pitied.

Shortly before Cassandra goes in to die, she prophesies that her death and Agamemnon's death shall not go unavenged by the gods. A son shall come to avenge his father and kill his mother (1279-91). She does not tell us that the god who will be most closely connected with this avenger will be Apollo himself; she refers to "the gods" generally. The reason is clear - if she had named Apollo as Orestes' patron,

it might have seemed that Apollo was concerned to avenge Cassandra's own death. In fact, later in the trilogy Cassandra is almost forgotten, and certainly her connection with Apollo is "dropped". But the *Agamemnon* has prepared us for an Apollo who may be healer or destroyer by turns. When the god appears next in the *Choephoroe* as Orestes' patron, we shall see which aspect is uppermost there.

III

Choephoroe

In the *Agamemnon*, the picture of Apollo and his relationship with Cassandra is characterised by candid anthropomorphism. In the *Choephoroe*, on the other hand, Aeschylus has made Apollo a more remote and impersonal god. We hear of him only as the god who gives an oracle to Orestes and champions Orestes' cause. But though the god's anthropomorphic nature is not so apparent in this play, Apollo has a considerable effect on the action. The god's command to Orestes is one of the factors which compel him to take vengeance; the conspirators use guile to achieve their ends because such was Apollo's prescription; finally, it is to Apollo's shrine that the polluted Orestes flees to obtain purification at the play's close. All of these actions have their origin in one oracle given to Orestes, but the oracle is not related in full at the beginning of the play. Rather the specific details of the oracle are revealed only when those details are immediately relevant to the play's action at a given point. I shall, therefore, first consider each of the references to the oracle in its dramatic sequence in order to support my contention that in this play, as in the Cassandra-scene which we examined in the last chapter, Aeschylus' method is one of gradual revelation. Later, I shall discuss more general matters of interpretation, in particular the view that Aeschylus condemns, and wants us to condemn, Apollo and his oracle.

I Apollo's oracle

The first reference in the play as it has come down to us[1] is at

269ff. Orestes, in a long speech, relates how Apollo's oracle commanded him to avenge Agamemnon, warning him of fearful consequences should he fail to do so (269-77). The description of these consequences which follows forms the longest section of the speech (278-96). Orestes concludes by listing his own personal motives for avenging his father (297-305).

> οὔτοι προδώσει Λοξίου μεγασθενὴς
> χρησμὸς κελεύων τόνδε κίνδυνον περᾶν, (269-70).
>
> "The mighty oracle of Loxias shall not betray
> me, ordering me to pass through this peril."

As I noted in my first chapter,[2] the verb προδιδόναι, when used of the oracle, is given additional significance by the various references to true and false prophecy in the Agamemnon. Thus, Orestes' remark implies that the oracle will not prove invalid or untrue. The dominant sense of προδιδόναι, however, is that of "betrayal"; therefore, what Orestes is primarily affirming here is that Apollo will stand by him and protect him. His perilous undertaking is sanctioned by the god's mighty oracle.

But in contrast to this calm, strong beginning, a note of terror enters with the next line:

> κἀξορθιάζων πολλὰ καὶ δυσχειμέρους
> ἄτας ὑφ' ἧπαρ θερμὸν ἐξαυδώμενος, (271-72)
>
> "crying aloud many things and telling a tale
> of freezing woes that steal upon the warm heart."

The emotional intensity is immediately heightened. This is evident in the choice of the rare verb ἐξορθιάζειν, which conveys the Pythia's excitement and also the effect on her audience, and in the effective antithesis of hot and cold. Orestes then explains that, according to the oracle, such woes will be his fate if he fails to kill those respon-

sible for his father's murder, in the same manner as they killed. For the moment, "in the same manner" primarily suggests that the oracle sanctioned vengeance commensurate with the crime that is to be avenged. Later, we shall learn that the new avengers have been instructed to use guile "in the same manner" as Agamemnon's killers employed guile against him.

Orestes' next comments (278ff.) are full of emotional intensity and graphic details as he describes the full horror of the fate that comes upon a son who fails to avenge his father. Because the language in this passage suggests an oracle issued to mankind generally (βροτοῖς, 279, the use of present infinitives and the negative οὐ rather than μή) some scholars have thought that two distinct oracles are involved: first, the oracle given personally to Orestes, which he recounts in the early part of his speech (269-277) and, second, a general oracle to mankind which Orestes quotes because it is relevant to his case.[3] Professor Lesky convincingly refutes this theory, on the grounds that the first part of Orestes' speech is clearly linked with the second. He accounts for the general reference of the oracle by adopting Wilamowitz' suggestion: Apollo's speech to Orestes has acquired, in the tradition before Aeschylus, the paradigmatic force of religious legislation about the duty of vengeance.[4] This is a very probable explanation. In terms of dramatic function, however, the universal reference of the oracle has an important effect. It shows us that Apollo's warning is not based on a personal concern that Orestes in particular should avenge Agamemnon, but rather on a general principle involving all sons of murdered fathers.

The terrible consequences which the oracle described are these:

firstly, plague; then, even more dreadful, the onset of the Erinyes, roused by the father's blood; finally, expulsion from the city so that the man dies a gruesome death, friendless and without honour (275-296).

At the end of this persuasive description, Orestes suddenly asks:

τοιοῖσδε χρησμοῖς ἆρα χρὴ πεποιθέναι; (297)

"Should I then trust such oracles as these?"

Scholars do not agree on the exact interpretation of χρησμοῖς here. Does it refer only to the description of the woes which befall sons who neglect to avenge their fathers? If this interpretation is correct, then it follows that Orestes does not question Apollo's command, but only the oracle's description of the nightmarish consequences should he fail to act. Or, on the other hand, does χρησμοῖς refer to the whole oracle, including both the god's command and his warning?[5] It is difficult to be dogmatic on this question. However, I am inclined to believe that χρησμοῖς refers to the entire oracle, although the warning is probably uppermost in Orestes' mind. But I think that there is a more important issue here: why does Aeschylus make Orestes ask this question? In my view, he does so because the question effectively introduces the final part of the speech, in which Orestes tells us his personal motives. The question is raised mainly for the sake of the reply he makes to it: even if he did not believe the oracle the deed would still be necessary (298). For, besides the god's command, there are many other compelling factors. We are thus made to observe that there are two levels of motivation operating here, the divine and the human, and to recognize that both are equally important. Orestes' question, then, is posed mainly in order that he might define his own personal, human motives. It should not be understood as a sign of

doubt in Orestes' mind as to the truth of the Delphic oracle. He has already shown us how completely he trusts in the oracle, at 269-70. Nor does he develop his question by, for example, suggesting reasons why he should doubt the oracle's veracity. Nevertheless, there is an element of <u>moral</u> doubt or hesitation here which should not be overlooked. Though Orestes does not question the oracle's truth, he does hesitate about whether he ought to act upon the oracle. If Aeschylus had not intended to convey moral doubt, he would not have used χρή with its moral connotations.[6] Orestes displays here the same awareness of right and wrong that Electra manifested earlier in the play (cf. e.g. 122, 140-41).

It is significant also that all the motives which Orestes now lists are irreproachable: the god's commands, grief for his father, loss of property, and the tyranny of a pair of women over noble citizens (299-305). It may be objected that loss of property is a less dignified motive than the others. But Professor Kitto has pointed to the true significance of Orestes' poverty in this play. Like Electra's unmarried state, Orestes' poverty is a sign of prevailing injustice. Far from constituting "gratuitous character-drawing", these material details are evidence that "in Shakespearean terms ... 'Degree has been shak'd'."[7] In fact, all the motives which Orestes mentions here explain why he <u>should</u> act upon the oracle, why vengeance is right.

I have dealt with Orestes' speech at some length, because it establishes very early in the play the extent of Apollo's influence on the action. Although, as we have seen, the final lines of the speech are concerned with Orestes' human motives, the speech as a whole is dominated by Apollo's oracle. It is in the might of Apollo's oracle

that Orestes puts his trust, and it is the oracle's prophecy of the Erinyes' onset which helps to create the atmosphere of compulsion in which Orestes resolves upon vengeance. Once Aeschylus has fixed Apollo's oracle firmly in the audience's mind, he proceeds to the kommos where Apollo is not mentioned at all. Rather, in this great lyrical passage the poet draws our attention to the other powers which are operating in this situation. The spirit of the dead king is invoked to aid the avengers, who appeal also to the gods of the underworld. In addition, the kommos complements Orestes' speech, as Professor Lesky[8] has clearly shown. Whereas Orestes' speech had presented him, until the final lines, as very much the passive instrument of the divine command, acting under its compulsion, the kommos shows us an Orestes who is beginning to desire the vengeance actively, for himself. The final lines of Orestes' speech in fact anticipate the kommos, with their reference to Orestes' ἵμεροι, his own desires.

By the end of the kommos, Aeschylus has pointed to all the powers at work on the side of the avengers, and Orestes is now resolved upon the deed. There follows an exchange in which Orestes learns of Clytemnestra's dream, and interprets it as a good omen (523-50). He then begins to outline practical plans for the vengeance. It is at this point that we receive more information about Apollo's oracle. These are Orestes' words:

> αἰνῶ δὲ κρύπτειν τάσδε συνθήκας ἐμάς,
> ὡς ἂν δόλωι κτείναντες ἄνδρα τίμιον
> δόλωι γε καὶ ληφθῶσιν ἐν ταὐτῶι βρόχωι
> θανόντες, ἧι καὶ Λοξίας ἐφήμισεν
> ἄναξ Ἀπόλλων, μάντις ἀψευδὴς τὸ πρίν. (555-59)
>
> "I think it best that we should keep these plans of mine secret, so that they who killed the honoured king by guile should be taken also by

> guile, dying in the same trap, even as Loxias pronounced, the lord Apollo, a prophet formerly without falsehood."

Once again, Apollo's oracle has a direct effect on the action, for Orestes does use guile to kill Clytemnestra and Aegisthus. He gains entry to the house by posing as a stranger from Phokis, and lulls the enemy into a sense of security by giving them a false story of his own death. Guile is, in fact, necessary to the success of the plot. But Aeschylus does not stress the guile in itself, as Sophocles was later to do.[9] Rather, he makes the use of guile a feature of the general demand for retribution. Apollo prescribes guile in order that the king's murderers, themselves employers of guile, may be punished most fittingly. Apollo himself has no special connection with guile. Guile is the province of his brother Hermes; and when the Chorus is thinking specifically of the guile which the avengers will use, it is to Hermes, not to Apollo, that they make their appeal (e.g. 812ff; also 556, 726ff.).[10]

Apollo is not mentioned again until 807ff. Meanwhile, the conspirators' plot has been put into action. Orestes has convinced Clytemnestra that her son is dead. Aegisthus is sent for, and the Chorus persuades Orestes' old nurse to tell Aegisthus to come alone instead of with an armed guard. In this atmosphere of tension before Aegisthus appears on-stage, the Chorus sings an ode (783ff.). They sing appeals to Zeus, Apollo, and Hermes in turn, and urge Orestes to stand firm. Their tone is optimistic, and particularly so in the mesode addressed to Apollo:

> τὸ δὲ καλῶς κτίμενον ὦ μέγα ναίων
> στόμιον, εὖ δὸς ἀνιδεῖν δόμον ἀνδρός,
> καί νιν ἐλευθερίας φῶς
> λαμπρὸν ἰδεῖν φιλίοις
> ὄμμασιν ἐκ δνοφερᾶς καλύπτρας. (807-11)

"O Thou who dwellest in the great cave, finely-wrought, grant that the man's house may lift its head again, and that with friendly eyes it may behold the bright light of freedom, from out of the veil of darkness!"

It is clear from the first line that they are addressing Delphic Apollo, for the 'great cave' refers to Apollo's oracular cave at Delphi.[11] As always in the Choephoroe, Apollo is invoked as the Delphic god of oracles; here, because the Chorus are thinking of his oracle to Orestes. The long, formal vocative phrase, reminiscent of solemn hymn invocations, evokes Apollo's majesty. The rest of the mesode is dominated by light imagery. Of all the Olympians, Apollo was the god most frequently associated with light; second only to the sun-god, Helios, with whom he was later identified.[12] Here, Apollo is linked with the trilogy's recurring light imagery, an image which represents hope throughout the trilogy, a hope which is finally realized at the end of the Eumenides, in the torch-lit procession (Eum. 1003ff.).

At the end of this choral ode, Aegisthus appears and is quickly dealt with. He dies off-stage at the hands of Orestes. Now comes the climax of the play, for Clytemnestra arrives (885) and soon realises that Aegisthus is dead and that her own son Orestes confronts her, not dead but alive. Orestes threatens her with death (886). Clytemnestra responds with an appeal to him to respect the fact that she is his mother, who gave him life. Now that he is confronted with the reality of killing his own mother, Orestes hesitates and turns to Pylades, asking

Πυλάδη, τί δράσω; μητέρ' αἰδεσθῶ κτανεῖν; (899)

"Pylades, what am I to do? Should I shrink from killing my mother?"

Pylades replies thus:

> ποῦ δαὶ τὸ λοιπὸν Λοξίου μαντεύματα
> τὰ πυθόχρηστα, πιστά τ'εὐορκώματα;
> ἅπαντας ἐχθροὺς τῶν θεῶν ἡγοῦ πλέον. (900-902).

> "Then, henceforth where are Loxias' holy oracles, spoken at Pytho? Where the faithful pledges sworn? Count all men your enemies rather than the gods!"

Pylades, a mute third-actor, has been silent to this point, and this established silence is now dramatically broken. The theatrical effect of his response cannot be overstated. For the audience the effect would be, as Professor Kitto comments, "almost as if the god himself had spoken."[13] Thus the authority of Apollo's oracle is invoked at the most critical moment of the play. Apollo's general responsibility for the vengeance has already been established in Orestes' speech at 269ff. Now, in this comment of Pylades, Apollo is specifically associated with the matricide itself. The association created here prepares the way for Apollo's role in the Eumenides, where he will accept responsibility for the matricide. Aegisthus' death is, in that play, no longer an issue.

There is a minor problem here in the reference to "faithful pledges sworn", for no pledges have been mentioned earlier in the play. It has been debated whether the pledges were made by Pylades and/or Orestes, or by Apollo. I suggest that it makes best sense to take them as pledges made by Orestes to Apollo.[14]

The authority of Apollo cannot be questioned. Orestes' moment of hesitation is resolved immediately by Pylades' words. Orestes declares:

> κρίνω σὲ νικᾶν, καὶ παραινεῖς μοι καλῶς (903)
>
> "I judge you the victor. You advise me well."

Although Orestes continues to debate with Clytemnestra until they both

leave the stage at 930, there is no question of further hesitation on Orestes' part. Their argument serves rather to convey more fully the meaning of the matricide. During this exchange we learn for the first time that Orestes will be pursued by Clytemnestra's Erinyes after her death (924). The two then make their exit, and now Clytemnestra will be killed off-stage.

At this juncture the Chorus' optimism runs high, and their ode (935-972) indicates their confident belief that Orestes will be victorious and Atreus' house will finally be delivered. Apollo is central in this ode. The Chorus sings of how Δίκη (Justice), the daughter of Zeus, assisted Orestes in the killing of Aegisthus (946-52). They then refer to Apollo Loxias, the god who initiated the action by his oracle (953-60). The text of this strophe is unfortunately very obscure and probably corrupt. If we accept Heath's emendation τάνπερ at 953, Apollo is then conceived as "calling out" Justice. Again, the Delphic god of prophecy is indicated by the formal title, which is similar to that at 807ff.:

> ὁ Λοξίας ὁ Παρνασσίας
> μέγαν ἔχων μυχὸν χθονὸς
>
> "Loxias, who holds the great cave in
> the land of Parnassus."

The reference to Apollo has further similarities with 807ff., for the Chorus finds in Apollo's command some hope that there will again be moral order in the world (957-59). Their hope is once more linked with the imagery of light (961).

In the final antistrophe (965-72), the Chorus expresses its belief that now the House of Atreus will be thoroughly cleansed from its pollution. This is the cue for Orestes to appear once more, displaying

the corpses of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra (973-74). At first, all is well, and Orestes, in a speech of accusation against those who killed his father, justifies his own act (975-1006). But soon it becomes evident that the House of Atreus is not yet finally purified, for Orestes is polluted by the blood he has shed. At 1017, he refers to himself as

> ἄζηλα νίκης τῆσδ' ἔχων μιάσματα·
>
> "Possessing the unenviable pollutions
> of this victory."

He realises that madness will soon overcome him. Therefore, while he is still sane, he must assert that he killed his mother οὐκ ἄνευ δίκης "not without justice" (1027). He bases his claim on the authority of the Delphic oracle, referring the responsibility to Apollo and turning to him for purification. Thus, at 1029ff., Apollo comes into the fore-ground

> καὶ φίλτρα τόλμης τῆσδε πλειστηρίζομαι
> τὸν πυθόμαντιν Λοξίαν, χρήσαντ' ἐμοὶ
> πράξαντα μὲν ταῦτ' ἐκτὸς αἰτίας κακῆς
> εἶναι, παρέντι δ' οὐκ ἐρῶ τὴν ζημίαν.
> τόξῳ γὰρ οὔτις πημάτων ἐφίξεται.
> καὶ νῦν ὁρᾶτε μ', ὡς παρεσκευασμένος
> ξὺν τῷδε θαλλῷ καὶ στέφει προσίξομαι
> μεσόμφαλόν θ' ἵδρυμα, Λοξίου πέδον,
> πυρός τε φέγγος ἄφθιτον κεκλημένον,
> φεύγων τόδ' αἷμα κοινόν · οὐδ' ἐφ' ἑστίαν
> ἄλλην τραπέσθαι Λοξίας ἐφίετο (1029-39).
>
> "And, as for the spells that prompted me to this
> bold task, I name as chief the Pythian prophet;
> Loxias, who declared to me that if I did these
> deeds I would be free of evil guilt, but if I
> neglected it - I will not tell the punishment!
> For no man's bow could reach the height of
> sufferings.
>
> And now, behold me, how I shall go as suppliant,
> armed with branch and garland, to the shrine at
> earth's centre, the hallowed ground of Loxias,
> and the gleaming fire that is called undying,

> fleeing this deed of kindred bloodshed. Nor did Loxias bid me turn to any other hearth but his."

The first part of this speech is reminiscent of his speech at 269ff., where he told how Apollo had commanded the vengeance and named the consequences of disobedience. In that speech, the consequences had been graphically described; so that now when Orestes breaks off, in aposiopesis, without putting the penalty into words (1032), we remember the full horror of that former description. But in this speech Orestes, far more explicitly than in the earlier speech, places the responsibility on Apollo's shoulders. We learn now, for the first time, that Apollo not only named the penalty of disobedience but alos promised that if Orestes fulfilled the command, he would be "free of evil guilt": that is to say, while Orestes as the agent would be responsible for the matricide, he would not be guilty of evil action, because Apollo's command removes the element of "evil". The emphasis placed here on Apollo's command prepares us for the situation of the Eumenides, where Apollo himself takes responsibility for Orestes' deed; for in that play the gods replace the mortals as the true protagonists.

The second part of the speech prepares us for Orestes' exit, at the end of the play, to seek purification at Delphi. Here, for the first time, Orestes reveals Apollo's promise of purification after the vengeance. Again, however, there is a link with Orestes' first speech. Orestes had hinted there at Apollo's promise of protection, in his assertion that Apollo's oracle would not "betray" him (269). Aeschylus here establishes the majesty and power of Apollo's shrine at Delphi, by the dignified language used to describe that shrine. He refers to the tradition according to which Delphi was regarded as the centre of the

earth, and he uses an elaborate periphrasis to describe the shrine's flame. Moreover, it is suggested that only this shrine can help Orestes: Apollo forbade him to approach any other. In addition to underlining the authority of the Delphic shrine, this final revelation again confirms Apollo's personal involvement in Orestes' fate. He commands that Orestes must not approach the shrine of any other god.

After this last sane speech, Orestes is confronted with the vision of the Erinyes. They are, he realises, the Erinyes of his mother, the Erinyes with whom she threatened him before he killed her (1054; cf. 924). Only Orestes sees the Erinyes; they are not visible to the Chorus or to the audience. The Chorus at first fails to realise that the Erinyes are now pursuing him because of the blood still on his hands. Orestes, in terror, calls out Apollo's name (1057). The Chorus answer with a brevity that fits the urgency of Orestes' situation and appeal:

> εἷς σοι καθαρμός · Λοξίας δὲ προσθιγὼν
> ἐλεύθερον σε τῶνδε πημάτων κτίσει (1059-60)
>
> "There is one means of purification for you. Loxias, by his touch, shall make you free of these afflictions."

Orestes runs off, driven by the Erinyes, and the Chorus is left to ponder the fate of the House of Atreus: where will its sorrows end (1075-76)? The Choephoroe ends on a question which the final play must answer.

II. Is Apollo criticised in the Choephoroe?

Two critics have asserted that in the Choephoroe Aeschylus presents the god of Delphi in an unfavourable light. They propose the same basic thesis: that the matricide is depicted as an evil act and that since

Apollo is ultimately responsible for this act, he is thereby condemned. The arguments which they assemble to support this interpretation are, however, very different, and therefore I shall discuss them separately.

Wilamowitz was the first to condemn Apollo. His argument runs thus: Orestes is only the instrument of Apollo, who initiates the vengeance and constantly urges Orestes to its completion. Orestes is himself a pure young man, and his conscience rebels against the horrible crime which he is urged to perform as a moral duty. So profound is Orestes' moral revulsion that Apollo is thereby implicitly condemned. There is no need, Wilamowitz suggests, for blasphemous speeches against the god, of the sort that Euripides might have written. We see plainly enough, in the spiritual torments of Orestes before and after the matricide, that the god who orders such a deed cannot be good. Humanity in its religious development has transcended the Apolline level.[15]

What evidence is there in the play for the alleged "Seelenqualen" of Orestes, and is that evidence sufficient to support Wilamowitz's contention that Apollo is condemned?

The first piece of evidence that could be adduced to show Orestes rebelling against Apollo's command is his question at 297:

> τοιοῖσδε χρησμοῖς ἆρα χρὴ πεποιθέναι;
>
> "Should such oracles be trusted?"

As I observed in my earlier analysis of the text, there is a hint of moral doubt here, indicated by the use of <u>χρὴ</u>, which among other things implies "ought". But though Orestes does momentarily question whether he ought to act upon the oracle, it is only in order that he may tell us the human longings (ἵμεροι, 299) which must lead him to perpetrate the vengeance even without the god's command. Thus, far from being

torn between the divine command and his own "conscience", it is made quite clear that Orestes simply sees urgent reasons for positive action. The "desires" which he mentions are certainly honourable motives, and not *evil* desires against which Orestes is conceived as fighting an inner battle.

With regard to the *kommos*, Wilamowitz felt that the most significant feature here is the supposed movement in Orestes' soul from indecision to resolve. For that reason, he adopted, wrongly, in my view, the transposition of lines 434-438 to follow 455 - proposed by Schütz and Weil - to make the *kommos* end with Orestes' declaration that he will avenge his father.[16] I have already stated my support for the "dynamic", as opposed to the "static", interpretation of the *kommos*, in other words, for the view that the *kommos* shows a growth in Orestes' resolve. Nevertheless, to make Orestes' decision the climax of this passage is, I believe, to overstate its "dynamic" aspect at the expense of another equally important aspect, the summoning of Agamemnon's aid. But there is a more important argument against Wilamowitz here: Orestes does not move from *indecision* to resolve, but rather from a passive acceptance of the god's command to an active desiring of the vengeance. At no point in the *kommos* does Orestes indicate that he hesitates in his course of action. He does not, like Hamlet, debate "To be, or not to be". Neither Orestes, nor Electra, nor even the Chorus puts forward an argument against taking vengeance. There is no evidence here of a divided self, or of "spiritual torments".

After the *kommos*, Orestes makes his plans for the vengeance, which are swiftly put into action. He shows no hesitation at all until, after killing Aegisthus, he is finally confronted by his mother, Clytemnestra.

But when his mother appeals to him, he does hesitate, and he turns to Pylades, asking what he should do. I do not deny that Orestes hesitates at this crucial moment, But I doubt whether his hesitation is evidence of "spiritual torments". Rather than showing us Orestes' inner struggle, his question serves to emphasize the dreadful act which he is about to perform. John Jones comments neatly: "'What shall I do?' flows not from inner uncertainty but from the need to achieve full exposure of the Oresteian dilemma."[17]

Furthermore, the question is immediately overshadowed by Pylades' answer, which as I have already indicated, must have made a powerful impact on the audience. Jones notes that questions may often be asked in Aeschylean plays entirely for the sake of their answers: "This kind of exchange is first cousin to epic narrative in that the information that emerges serves the unfolding tale and not the questioner's ignorance. Which is not, of course, to argue that the questioner knows the answer, that Orestes turns to Pylades with his mind irrevocably made up: rather, that the modern critical sensibility grasping at a Hamletish indecision finds itself empty-handed... When Orestes asks "What shall I do, Pylades?", we can only follow the question into the contemplated and imminent deed, a further facet of which Pylades is about to illuminate..."[18] Once Orestes has received Pylades' advice, he accepts it immediately, and there is no further hesitation before he actually kills his mother.

So far, then, those points in the play at which Orestes hesitates have not proved, on close examination, to be evidence of torments. But Wilamowitz' contention that Orestes is conscience-stricken <u>after</u> the matricide perhaps is more persuasive, at least at first glance. For

Orestes admits that he is polluted; that he feels madness coming upon him; and, above all, that he sees the Erinyes approaching. Are these details not evidence that he is overcome by feelings of guilt? Wilamowitz lays particular emphasis on Orestes' vision of the Erinyes: he argues that they symbolize the tormented nature of Orestes' conscience.[19] They are, after all, the Erinyes of his mother, who appear to him after her death, and Orestes is the only one who sees them. Thus, in Wiliamowitz's view they are a subjective and psychological phenomenon. But this interpretation raises serious problems. If we allow that these Erinyes symbolize Orestes' repentance over killing his mother, we must bear in mind that earlier he had described how his father's Erinyes would assail him if he did not take vengeance (925). Are the father's Erinyes then to be understood as representing another aspect of Orestes' conscience? But, in that case, why was Orestes warned of them by Apollo, whom Wilamowitz finds deficient in moral sensibility? Not only is Wilamowitz's view of the Erinyes inconsistent with the presentation of the Erinyes elsewhere in the _Choephoroe_, but also it is incompatible with the presentation of the Erinyes in the _Agamemnon_ and especially in the _Eumenides_.[20]

Wilamowitz's interpretation presents an additional difficulty. He assumes that the Greeks had similar ideas to our own about the questions of guilt and conscience. In fact, the Greeks had no word for 'conscience' until much later than Aeschylus. They had, of course, a word for guilt, αἰτία, but this word denoted the fact of responsibility rather than the perpetrator's inner sense of guilt. They conceived of guilt in the external world of fact and action: if a man killed his mother, he was materially polluted by her blood.[21] Thus the Chorus

explains Orestes' vision of the Erinyes in terms of the blood he still has on his hands (1055). The appearance of the Erinyes to Orestes is just as much a manifestation of his pollution as is the blood on his hands, and neither has a merely subjective existence in Orestes' mind. Jones puts it thus:

> "the solitude of his vision is not the solitude of an unshared hallucination, but the solitude of this one pair of bloody hands."[22]

Thus neither before nor after the matricide is there any real evidence of spiritual torment within Orestes' soul. Since Wilamowitz's view that Apollo is criticised in this play was contingent upon some such torment, we must conclude that the play offers no support for it.

More recently, the notion that Apollo is condemned by Aeschylus has been taken up by Professor Winnington-Ingram.[23] In his article on Apollo in the Oresteia he is concerned with "Aeschylus' attitude to the Apolline code", most especially in the Eumenides. For that reason he is not at all concerned with Apollo's role in the Agamemnon, but begins by trying to show how the Apolline code is questioned in the Choephoroe. He proposes that Apollo is closely linked with the lex talionis, the law of vengeance, and that the play raises doubts about the moral validity of that code in such a way as to reflect unfavourably upon Apollo himself. The first part of his statement is self-evident, since we have already seen that Apollo initiates the vengeance and is closely associated with it throughout. It will become apparent in the following discussion of Winnington-Ingram's reading of the text that I also agree with him to some extent that doubts are raised about the validity of the code of vengeance. What I shall attempt to refute is Winnington-Ingram's final point: that the questioning of the vengeance also en-

tails criticism of Apollo.

He first compares Aeschylus' treatment of Orestes' vengeance with the Delphic version of the story. As I noted in Chapter 1,[24] it is generally assumed that a traditional Delphic version existed before the time of Aeschylus. Winnington-Ingram suggests that "in the Delphic version there were no premonitions of evil, no hints of counter-claims. The Choephoroe is full of them from the start."[25]

He cites, as examples of these hints of counter-claims, several passages in the early scenes before Apollo is mentioned. Thus, Electra wonders whether it is right to pray that an avenger may come (122); she wishes to be more chaste and purer of hand than her mother (140f.); she asks that those who slew her father may be slain in turn, justly (144). Admittedly, moral terms such as εὐσεβής and δίκη are used here to indicate some doubt as to the rightness of vengeance. But Kitto has suggested, correctly in my view, that the use of such terms indicates the new spirit of purity which distinguishes the avengers of this play from the avengers of the Agamemnon.[26] Next, Winnington-Ingram notes in the Recognition Scene "one explicit and two unmistakable symbolic references to the sacrifice of Iphigenia" (242, 250-51, 255-56). The effect of these references, he argues, is to "make the children remind us of their evil heredity by a reference to their father's sin."[27] Actually, one of his "unmistakable symbolic references" is open to doubt:[28] nevertheless I agree that the other two references do hint at a "counter-claim". I believe that the "counter-claim" here is the suggestion that there was also some justice on Clytemnestra's side in killing Agamemnon. Any allusion to the children's evil heredity is, at best, secondary.

So far in the play, then, we have had some questioning of the

vengeance, but in my view no hints of evil in the natures of the children, Orestes and Electra. But how does all this concern Apollo? Winnington-Ingram states that, after all these sinister references to Iphigeneia, "there follows immediately the description of Apollo's oracle: οὔτοι προδώσει Λοξίου μεγασθενὴς / χρησμὸς κελεύων τόνδε κίνδυνον περᾶν."[29] (269-70). In fact, however, the reference to Apollo's oracle does not follow immediately. The coryphaeus urges caution on the siblings and prays for the deaths of Clytemnestra and Aegisthus (264-269). Moreover, Apollo can hardly be said to be associated with the references to Agamemnon and Iphigeneia: for it is Zeus to whom Orestes addresses his first speech (cf.246), and it is Zeus with whom Agamemnon is associated, by the imagery of the eagle (255-59).

Winnington-Ingram now proceeds to "the snake-metaphor and Clytemnestra, the other side of the heredity."[30] Clytemnestra was a snake who killed Agamemnon (249, cf. Agam. 1233); she dreams of a snake, her own offspring, that draws blood from her breasts (527-33); Orestes, when he hears of the dream, identifies himself as the snake (540-50). Here again, I agree that there is a "premonition of evil", and in this case I also agree that we are meant to think of Orestes' evil heredity. But once more, the question is whether or not Apollo is implicated. Winnington-Ingram thinks so, and he notes that reference is made almost immediately to Apollo (558). There, Orestes says that those who killed by guile must die by guile; such was Apollo's command. But there is no reference to snakes here; so that Apollo is not overtly, at any rate, associated with the sinister implications of the snake-metaphor and dream. Nor, I think, does his command to use guile suggest a particularly snake-like quality in the god or his oracle to Orestes. I

have argued earlier that the command to use guile is in accordance with the idea of reciprocal justice, and that is the only reason for Apollo's choice of method. Winnington-Ingram notes that the mention of the god is reassuring to the actors. I see no reason why it should trouble the audience.

From here, Winnington-Ingram proceeds through the play and selects references to Justice. He points out that the Chorus "are imbued with the primitive doctrine of retaliation: ἀντὶ δὲ πληγῆς φονίας φονίαν πληγὴν τίνετω. This is 'justice' for them, and they assume it is the will of Zeus."[31] The Chorus retain this simple idea of justice until the very end. Once Orestes has killed Clytemnestra, the Chorus refer to him as ὁ πυθόχρηστος φυγὰς θεόθεν εὖ φραδαῖσιν ὡρμημένος (940). "And this justice of Apollo is regarded by them as very Justice herself, the daughter of Zeus."[32] Winnington-Ingram, of course, implies that they are wrong. He points out that Orestes himself recognizes that there are conflicting claims upon his energies: ξυμβαλεῖ Δίκᾳ Δίκα (461). "Thus the right may not be all on one side", and, in fact, by the play's close "justice is no longer such a simple notion for us." This is a valid point. However, he continues:

> "Apollo has in the immediately preceding scene been identified not with some high principle of morality but with the desire of a dead man's ghost for vengeance."

Winnington-Ingram is here misrepresenting the picture which Aeschylus gives us. It is not true to say that Apollo is "identified...with the desire of a dead man's ghost for vengeance." To support this statement he refers to v.925, and continues: "It is one claim of rights against another, and the sanction behind each is the same, a pack of hell-

hounds." To understand this comment, we must examine his interpretation of Orestes' first reference to Apollo and his oracle. He states that "If Orestes fails he will be pursued by Furies under Apollo's sanction" (my emphasis).[33] This statement rests on his assumption that "The Delphic oracle had driven Orestes to murder his mother with very definite threats." I have observed earlier in this chapter that Apollo did not "threaten" Orestes with the Furies. It is not true that Apollo himself would set the Furies upon Orestes if he failed to exact vengeance: rather the Furies would, by virtue of their own nature, inevitably pursue him. The Furies are not Apollo's "sanction" or "under his sanction". On the contrary, it is implied in the Choephoroe, and explicitly stated in the Eumenides, that Apollo's sanction is Zeus. It is implied in the Choephoroe by the fact that the avengers and the Chorus appeal both to Zeus and to Apollo, sometimes side by side in the same ode. If, as Winnington-Ingram would suggest, the Chorus mistakenly assume that Zeus is on their side, how do we know that they are right in assuming that Apollo is on their side? Aeschylus could have made this distinction, but Winnington-Ingram provides no evidence that he does so, nor can I find any in the text.

Professor Winnington-Ingram ends his survey of the Choephoroe by noting that it ends with a "blend of hope and fear."[34] Orestes sets off for Delphi to be purified, but the Chorus' final comment "is not one of confidence." Again, this is true; but against Winnington-Ingram's criticisms of Apollo it should be pointed out that Apollo is not the source of the Chorus' misgivings. Their fear is based on the past history of the woes of the House of Atreus. But Apollo is the source of what hope there is at the end of the play. He has promised

to purify Orestes, and with that hope Orestes sets off for Delphi.

To sum up, then, the hints of "counter-claims" and the premonitions of evil, which Winnington-Ingram rightly sees to be a distinct feature of the Choephoroe, nevertheless do not entail criticism of Apollo. Aeschylus neither criticises nor condemns Apollo or his oracle, though he clearly questions the morality of the matricide and of the law of vengeance. This questioning, I believe, has a definite purpose: it presents to the audience the conflicting claims which the dead Agamemnon and Clytemnestra have, in terms of 'justice' (δίκη) upon Orestes. In the Choephoroe, Agamemnon's claims, those of the father whose death must be avenged, are irresistible. In the Eumenides, the Erinyes will champion the claims of the mother. A further point about the questioning is that much of it comes from the avengers themselves, so that we perceive a new moral awareness in Electra and Orestes. Professor Kitto emphasizes that this new purity of motive, particularly in the early scenes, distinguishes the new avengers from Clytemnestra and Aegisthus, who took their vengeance upon Agamemnon so savagely and impiously. Kitto remarks:

> "The new avengers ... are very different ones, seeking their vengeance not out of guilty passions but in purity of heart."[35]

Orestes' purity of heart, in fact, reflects well upon the god who serves as his patron.

Far from Aeschylus directing criticism at Apollo in this play, I believe that Apollo is portrayed in a favourable light. It is true that he is stern in his command to Orestes and that he bids him take vengeance on his father's murderers, by the use of guile. But the vengeance, though questioned, has considerable emotional support in this

play. Agamemnon is presented in Kitto's words, as "a great King, foully slain."[36] The traitors who killed the king deserve to die. They have exiled Orestes and have kept Electra unmarried to protect themselves. They have kept the property which is rightfully Orestes', for he is heir to the dead king. Finally, they have established a tyrannical and hated rule over the citizens. The vengeance is taken by a young man who acts out of the best motives. For all these reasons, Apollo's command of vengeance emerges as essentially just, though stern. Apollo is positively associated with might and power, light and freedom. Secondly, the fact that Apollo has promised Orestes his special protection is, as Professor Kitto says of the play's first half:

> "The one reassurance we can find among so much that is black and menacing."[37]

Kitto's statement applies equally to the end of Choephoroe, where madness and the dark Furies threaten to overcome Orestes, but at least he has the hope of purification at Apollo's shrine.

The Choephoroe is designed to raise and explore issues which will not be solved until the Eumenides. At the end of the Choephoroe, we are left with certain questions concerning Apollo. Will he stand by Orestes and protect him from the Furies? Will the matricide be justified, and will Apollo's purification be sufficient to absolve Orestes? Will this be the final cure for the House of Atreus? The Chorus do not know the answers. Nor will the audience learn them until the final play. But one thing is assured: Apollo's central role in the outcome.

IV

Eumenides

I. Apollo at Delphi

The Choephoroe ended on a note of suspense, as Orestes set off for Apollo's shrine at Delphi. He was being tormented by the Erinyes, but hoped to win purification from the god who had undertaken to protect him. The Eumenides, on the other hand, opens on a serene and harmonious note. The priestess of Apollo[1] enters and speaks the prologue, and we learn that the scene is now Apollo's Delphic shrine. Her speech is full of solemnity and of reverence for the god she serves.

Aeschylus, by means of the priestess' opening prayer, is able to enhance Apollo's dignity, before the god himself enters, and to show that Apollo's authority is a gift from Zeus himself and is recognised by the other Olympians. In order to establish these details, he has rejected the more familiar tradition that Apollo took the prophetic seat at Delphi by his violent killing of the monstrous Python.[2] Instead, the poet has the priestess relate how Apollo took possession of the Delphic shrine through the gift of Phoebe, the last Titan occupant (1-8). Furthermore, he was escorted to Delphi by the Athenians, and the people of Delphi welcomed him on his arrival. We should note that it is Athena's land that first receives Apollo from his Delian birthplace, and the Athenians are described as the sons of another Olympian, Hephaestus. In this manner Aeschylus clearly hints at Apollo's close ties with the gods of Olympus. But the most important feature is kept to the last: it was Zeus, the priestess declares, who inspired Apollo with prophecy. Apollo is the spokesman of his father, Zeus. This line

has an emphasis and finality in the Greek which cannot be rendered into English:

> Διὸς προφήτης δ'ἐστὶ Λοξίας πατρός. (19)

It is a claim which will be very important later in the play.

The priestess begins the second part of her prayer with praise of Athena, the local nymphs, Dionysus, Poseidon, and finally Zeus Teleios (21-28). Once again, the effect is to suggest the unity of the Olympians. It is significant that Athena comes first, and Zeus last, in the priestess' invocation; for Athena and Zeus, together with Apollo himself, are to be the most important Olympian gods in this play. After these prayers, the priestess enters the temple in order to prophesy (30-34).

The atmosphere of peace, harmony and order is suddenly broken by the unexpected return of the priestess, completely terrified, crawling on hands and knees (34ff.). She then describes the sights which have caused her such terror (40-59). Firstly, she has seen a suppliant, a polluted man whose sword drips blood: clearly, Orestes.[3] Before him sit some monstrous beings, whom the audience will suppose to be the Erinyes. The priestess tries to compare these beings to the Gorgons or the Harpies; yet, she says, they are beyond comparison. Their whole appearance is so foul that it is not right for them to approach the altars of the gods or even the dwellings of men. But, she implies, Apollo will surely clear his temple of these creatures who pollute it. Despite her dread, the priestess assumes that her master will prevail. Her final words are the cue for Apollo's entry:

> τἀντεῦθεν ἤδη τῶνδε δεσπότηι δόμων
> αὐτῶι μελέσθω Λοξίαι μεγασθενεῖ·
> ἰατρόμαντις δ'ἐστὶ καὶ τερασκόπος
> καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοις δωμάτων κάθαρσιος. (60-64)

> "Let the outcome now be the concern of the master of this house himself, the strong and mighty Loxias. He is the healer-prophet and seer, and for others he is the purifier of houses."

Apollo now appears on-stage, together with Orestes. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to tell us what his mask would have been like. We may conjecture, however, both from the play and from representations of Apollo in art, that the mask would have portrayed a young, stern face.[4] Probably, the part of Apollo would have been taken by a tall actor. Seen here beside the mortal Orestes, and standing over the sleeping Erinyes, he would indeed appear "mighty and strong", as the priestess described him.

Apollo speaks directly to Orestes, in words of reassurance:

> οὔτοι προδώσω, διὰ τέλους δέ σοι φύλαξ
> ἐγγὺς παρεστὼς και πρόσωθ' ἀποστατῶν
> ἐχθροῖσι τοῖς σοῖς οὐ γενήσομαι πέπων. (64-66)

> "I shall not betray you, but to the end I shall be your guardian, standing by you or standing afar off; and I shall not prove soft to your enemies."

Apollo's first words recall the assertion made by Orestes in the Choephoroe:

> οὔτοι προδώσει Λοξίου μεγασθενὴς / χρησμός (269-70)

> "The mighty oracle of Loxias shall not betray me."

Thus we now see that Orestes was right to trust in the Delphic god's promise of protection. Having stated that he will not prove soft to Orestes' enemies, Apollo turns to the sleeping Furies, and his abusive description of them shows how hostile he already feels towards these creatures. It is not simply an hostility which he assumes for the sake of the mortal who is under his protection. It is made clear that

Apollo's hostility is personal and has its roots in the very nature of the Erinyes. He repudiates them strongly, calling them γραῖαι παλαιαὶ παῖδες "grey-haired old girls", with whom no god or man or even beast has intercourse (69f.). They came into being for the sake of evil, for they inhabit the evil darkness below the earth (71f.). They are objects of hatred both for men and for the Olympian gods (73). Each of these statements implies that their nature is directly opposed to that of Apollo himself; where they are old, he is a young god; they inhabit the realms of darkness, he the realms of light; they are chthonic, and he is Olympian. Here, as in the prologue, Aeschylus hints at one of the play's major ideas: the great disparity and conflict between the old chthonic powers and the new Olympian deities.

Turning back to Orestes, Apollo bids him continue his flight over land and sea until he comes to Athens. There he must embrace the statue of Athena, and there they shall find men to judge their case (74-84). They shall find, too, words that charm and devices ὥστ' ἐς τὸ πᾶν σε τῶνδ' ἀπαλλάξαι πόνων, "to release you wholly from these troubles" (83). Apollo indicates here that there will be a final solution to the woes of the House of Atreus, in words which recall the watchman's prayer to the gods at the beginning of the Agamemnon:

> θεοὺς μὲν αἰτῶ τῶνδ' ἀπαλλαγὴν πόνων (1; cf. 20)
>
> "I pray the gods for release from these troubles."

Finally, Apollo explains his own involvement in Orestes' trial:

> καὶ γὰρ κτανεῖν σ' ἔπεισα μητρῷον δέμας. (84)
>
> "For I persuaded you to kill your mother."

We saw how, at the end of the Choephoroe, Aeschylus referred responsibility for the matricide to Apollo: and now he makes Apollo in person

accept that responsibility.

Orestes replies briefly to Apollo:

> ἄναξ Ἄπολλον, οἶσθα μὲν τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν·
> ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπίσται, καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμελεῖν μάθε.
> σθένος δε ποιεῖν εὖ φερέγγυον τὸ σόν. (85-87)
>
> "Lord Apollo, you know how not to act unjustly.
> Since you know, learn also not to neglect! Your
> strength is the guarantee of your acting well."

Professor Lebeck comments that "Orestes admonishes Apollo to perform his duty with words which resemble the god's own moral maxims", and she regards this as one example amongst many others of peripeteia, or reversal, in the Eumenides.[5] This interpretation, however, tends to imply that the god is gently mocked: "Orestes gives Apollo a taste of his own moralizing".[6] Interpretation of the tone here is related to the larger question of the tone of the Trial Scene, where many critics find a strong element of humour and parody. Here, at any rate, I believe that it is unnecessary to find an element of parody. Orestes is simply making sure that the god will indeed stand by him, and he also suggests that since Apollo has the might to do good, he must help his suppliant. The reference to Apollo's strength is one of several (cf. Choeph. 269; Eum. 61.).

Apollo gives Orestes a final reminder not to be overcome by fear (88). He then entrusts him to the keeping of his brother, Hermes, who will escort him on his way. He adds that Zeus honours the respect due to outlaws (88-93). Apollo thus indicates that Orestes has the united support of the Olympians: not only of himself, but also of Athena, Hermes and Zeus.

After the exit of Apollo and Orestes, Clytemnestra's ghost appears and rouses the sleeping Furies with the complaint that Orestes has es-

caped them. The Furies sing their first choral ode, which is full of accusations against Apollo. We have already seen how the Furies appear in the eyes of the priestess and Apollo; now we hear how Apollo appears in the eyes of the Furies:

> ἰὼ παῖ Διός, ἐπίκλοπος πέλῃ, (149)
> τὸν μητραλοίαν δ' ἐξέκλεψας ὢν θεός. (153)
>
> "O son of Zeus, you are a thief!....
> You have stolen away the man who killed
> his mother, god that you are!"

Apollo is a thief, because he has taken away their rightful prey. Moreover, he has stained his own sanctuary with polluted blood:

> ἐφεστίῳ δὲ μάντις ὢν μιάσματι
> μυχὸν ἔχρανας αὐτόσσυτος, αὐτόκλητος, (169-70)
>
> "Though a prophet, you have stained your
> sanctuary with pollution at its hearth,
> acting upon your own desires and your own
> summons."

By his actions, Apollo transgresses against the Fates' ancient dispensations. Thus they accuse him of:

> παρὰ νόμον θεῶν βρότεα μὲν τίων,
> παλαιγενεῖς δὲ μοίρας φθίσας. (171-72)
>
> "honouring mortals contrary to the law of the
> gods and destroying the ancient allotments."

These criticisms of Apollo are not to be dismissed because they are made by creatures who, up to this point, have been portrayed in a wholly unsympathetic light. Clearly the Erinyes believe that Apollo's actions have infringed upon their ancient privilege. Soon we shall see the full meaning of Orestes' prophecy in the Choephoroe: Δίκαι Δίκα ξυμβαλεῖ, "Justice shall clash with Justice" (461). Once again, the hostility between Apollo and the Erinyes is set within the framework of a larger conflict, that between the ancient gods and the new Olympians. The

Erinyes see Apollo's behaviour as typical of the Olympians: τοιαῦτα δρῶσιν οἱ νεώτεροι θεοί, "such are the actions of the younger gods" (162).

At the end of their ode, Apollo enters and orders them from his temple (179ff.). He threatens them with an arrow from his bow, which, he says, would make them spew out the blood they have sucked. He points out that they have no place here in his sanctuary. Their place is rather "where sentence is given to lop off heads and gouge out eyes, where murders are, and by destruction of the seed the manhood of the young is ruined, and there are mutilations and stoning, and men moan in long lament, impaled beneath the spine."[7] Professor Solmsen comments: "It is fair to note that even Apollo does not suggest that the Erinyes themselves perpetrate such acts but rather that they pursue the perpetrators."[8] This is true; but nevertheless Apollo manages to convey the worst impression of the Erinyes, by associating them with such horrors and failing to add that they persecute the agents of such deeds rather than assist them.

Apollo continues by making an ironic remark on the feasts which they love, but which earn them the loathing of the gods (190-192). Their ugly form is suggestive of their ugly activity (192-193). At the end of his speech, Apollo returns to his initial accusation: the Erinyes do not "belong" in his sanctuary, but rather in the den of a blood-lapping lion. He closes with an animal image: he calls them a "flock without a shepherd", whom none of the gods love (195-196).

Apollo's speech is characterised by rhetoric, exaggeration, and passion. In his defence, however, it may be remarked that he is right in his essential charge. The Erinyes are transgressing upon his shrine,

where they have no place. Also, all that he says of the Erinyes is true, even though he sees only their ugly aspects. But we have already heard something of the Erinyes' claims in the first choral ode, and we are therefore aware that Apollo's attitude to them is one-sided. As Professor Thomson puts it: "His attitude is too passionate to be final."[9]

The Erinyes, despite Apollo's threat of physical violence, do not leave immediately. Instead, they counter his denunciation with an accusation of their own:

> αὐτὸς σὺ τούτων οὐ μεταίτιος πέλῃ,
> ἀλλ' εἷς τὸ πᾶν ἔπραξας ὡς παναίτιος. (199-200)
>
> "You yourself are not partly responsible for
> these things, but you alone wrought the entire
> deed, as one fully responsible."

Professor Lloyd-Jones' translation of τούτων as "this deed" is misleading.[10] τούτων refers to the matricide and its consequences. The fact that they are now trespassing on his shrine is, the Erinyes point out, the natural consequence of Apollo's own actions: he commanded Orestes to kill his mother and to come to Delphi for expiation (202, 204). Apollo is drawn into argument by the Erinyes' accusation, but he remains grudging throughout. The Erinyes, on the other hand, show themselves reasonable here. They attempt to justify their position to Apollo on the grounds of their τιμή: their special prerogative is to chase from their homes those who murder their own kin (208-210).

We now learn that they pursue only those who shed kindred blood. When Apollo says that Clytemnestra killed her husband, the Erinyes reply that it is not the same as killing one of the same blood (211-12). Apollo then interrupts the stichomythia and makes a speech in which he

defends the sanctity of the marriage-bond (213ff.). Apollo in this way attempts to refute the Erinyes' argument that Clytemnestra's murder of her husband was less heinous than Orestes' murder of his mother. In saying this, the Erinyes place the claims of the blood-tie before those of the marriage-bond. Apollo contends that they are wrong; but he does not offer abstract arguments in defence of the sanctity of marriage. Rather, he argues that a failure to pay proper respect to the relationship between husband and wife in effect dishonours Hera, Zeus and Aphrodite. He plays on the word the Erinyes have just been using to denote their special prerogative: τιμή. Twice he employes the adjective ἄτιμος (213, 215). Once again, the issue is shown to reflect a deep-seated conflict between the τιμαί of the older and the younger gods. Apollo ends with the prediction that Athena shall judge the case (224).

Naturally, Apollo's argument fails to persuade the Erinyes, who reiterate their resolve to pursue Orestes. Apollo contemptuously refers to their pursuit as "making more trouble for themselves" (226). They tell him not to curtail their τιμαί, to which he replies that even if they offered their τιμαί to him, he would not accept them (228). This attitude does not surprise them, since he speaks from a position of strength, seated by the throne of Zeus (229). Their comment reminds us of the statement made in the prologue, that Apollo had special authority as the spokesman of Zeus (19). The Erinyes make their exit, to hound Orestes. Apollo also leaves, after expressing determination to help and save his suppliant (232-34). Here, as in his first speech, he recognizes Orestes' claim upon him: προδῶ (234) is clearly a verbal echo of οὔτοι προδώσω in his opening line (164). Upon this note, the

scene at Delphi ends.

So far, the audience has observed Apollo on his home-ground at Delphi, and in the preliminary hostilities with the Erinyes he has had a decided advantage. The scene of the play now shifts to Athens; and before Apollo appears again for the actual trial, the poet gives us more insight into the nature and the claims of the Erinyes and introduces Athena. Since this new information and the various developments here affect later our response to Apollo, I must examine them before I discuss the Trial Scene.

II. Apollo at Athens: the Trial Scene

Although the scene shifts to Athens at 235, with Orestes' re-entry, the Trial Scene does not begin until 566. The major function of the pre-trial scene at Athens is to convey the seriousness of the Erinyes' claim to justice. Thus, by the time the trial actually begins, the audience are aware that the fate of Orestes is not the only issue in the trial: there is also the much more significant question of the future role and authority of the Erinyes.

We witness the arrival of Orestes and of the Erinyes at Athens, and also Athena's reception of them. Before Athena arrives, Orestes embraces the statue of the goddess, in obedience to Apollo's instructions. Several times in his appeals to Athena, he stresses the fact that he has Apollo's patronage, and that Apollo has granted him purification (235, 241, 282f.). Some critics have contended that Apollo's purification of Orestes is manifestly ineffective, and that in this way Apollo is criticised. Thus Professor Herington, who finds the purification to be, most probably, the only traditional element in a play

which is entirely "free invention", comments: "even this element is not so much re-used by Aeschylus as perverted. Instead of a proof of Apollo's ultimate healing and reconciling power (as which it was surely intended by the inventors) it has become, in the context of this play, a proof of Apollo's inefficacy."[11] Similarly, Professor Winnington-Ingram suggests that "Aeschylus disbelieved in the power of Apollo to command and to absolve."[12] It is certainly true that Apollo's purification does not provide the final solution to Orestes' problem, as it probably would have done in the Delphic epic version.[13]

Apollo's purification has some degree of efficacy in that it enables Orestes to speak and to plead his own case before Athena (276ff., 443ff.). Otherwise, as a polluted person, he would have been forbidden communication with others. But Apollo's purification does not satisfy the Erinyes, who continue to view Orestes as polluted (247, 261ff.). Nevertheless, we can see that Apollo's purification is not totally ineffective, nor, in my view, is any criticism of the god intended. Aeschylus' reasons for limiting the efficacy of the purification are very probably dramatic rather than theological. He wants to dramatize Athena's institution of the trial of homicide by a human jury. If Apollo's purification of Orestes had been presented as totally effective, there would have been no need for such a trial, nor would the claims of the Erinyes have been given due recognition.

Athena arrives in response to Orestes' prayer, at the end of the Erinyes' "Binding Song" (397). Although struck by the Erinyes' appearance, since they seem like neither gods nor mortals, she reserves judgment until she has heard who they are, and who the suppliant may be (410ff.). Once she has learnt the identity of the Erinyes and the

nature of their case against Orestes, she cautions them not to seek an unjust victory by making Orestes swear an oath of his innocence (432). He could not do so, of course, since the fact of the matricide cannot be denied. She asks whether the Erinyes will submit to her arbitration, and they willingly agree (434f.). They respect Athena, whom they call "worthy" (ἀξίαν, 435).[14]

Athena's treatment of the Erinyes and their respect for her are thought by Professor Kitto to be in deliberate contrast to Apollo's relationship with them. On Athena's reception of the Erinyes, he remarks: "Athena brings something new, and in doing it she throws into relief the one-sidedness of Apollo. She, like him, is astonished at the appearance of the Erinyes, but, unlike him, she treats them with studied courtesy."[15] On the Erinyes' submission to Athena's arbitration, he comments "Apollo was indeed vindicating something that had to be vindicated, but in far too autocratic a spirit. The reasonableness of Athena at once sensibly changes the situation."[16] These comments are in accordance with Kitto's theory, which I will discuss in my Conclusion, that Apollo is superseded in the Eumenides by Athena. My objection at this stage is that Aeschylus does not draw an overt contrast between Apollo and Athena. It is Kitto who introduces the contrast, to Apollo's disadvantage. But since Kitto forces us to compare them, we should notice that the situations which show Apollo as autocratic and Athena as gracious, in dealing with the Erinyes, are completely different. Apollo deals autocratically with the Erinyes because they are trespassing upon his shrine and because they are pursuing his suppliant, Orestes. Athena is able to reserve judgment about the Erinyes because she is detached from the situation, since she has just returned to

Athens to find the two parties already established in opposition. The fact that Apollo is "one-sided" and that Athena is, to begin with, impartial, is not evidence of Athena's superiority. Rather, it is a dramatic requirement in a play which represents Apollo as Orestes' patron and the Erinyes as Orestes' assailants.

When Athena has heard the Erinyes, she asks also to hear Orestes explain himself. Orestes again emphasizes that he has been purified, but candidly admits that he killed his mother. The act, he says, cannot be denied: the issue is the justice or injustice of the act (463-468). Apollo is jointly responsible with him (465-467).

Finally, Athena decides that the case is beyond individual mortal judgment, and beyond her own. She therefore institutes the Court of the Areopagus to judge the case (470-489). She and Orestes both make their exit, leaving the Erinyes to sing a choral ode (490-565) before the Trial Scene begins. This ode, which stresses the need for fear of punishment as a constraint upon mankind, and as a necessary safeguard of law and order, depicts the Erinyes' function for the first time in a wholly favourable light. This is an important turning point in the representation of the Furies, and it prepares us for their eventual assimilation into Zeus' world order.

When the Chorus has finished the ode, Athena enters with Orestes, with those who are to form the jury, and possibly with Apollo. Professor Croiset, however, suggests that Apollo makes his entry after the others, when Athena has made her proclamation and the Herald has blown his trumpet. In this way, Aeschylus has made Apollo's re-entry all the more dramatic: "un admirable coup de théatre".[17] Croiset's suggestion accounts for the Furies' cry at 574, which could be motivated by the

sudden appearance of their adversary:

> ἄναξ Ἄπολλον, ὧν ἔχεις αὐτὸς κράτει.
> τί τοῦδε σοὶ μέτεστι πράγματος λέγε. (574-75)
>
> "Lord Apollo, rule over your own affairs!
> Say what part you have in this business!"

Clearly, their cry shows fear as well as indignation.[18] They had hoped to be dealing only with a mortal. Now they find that Apollo is here, not just as a witness for the defence (576-78), but as a defendant himself together with Orestes. Apollo explains:

> καὶ μαρτυρήσων ἦλθον,............
> καὶ ξυνδικήσων αὐτός. αἰτίαν δ' ἔχω
> τῆς τοῦδε μητρὸς τοῦ φόνου. (576, 579-80).
>
> "I have come to be a witness for the defence,
> and to stand trial together with Orestes. I
> bear responsibility for this matricide."

With his announcement, it is established that the agon, the Contest, is essentially between gods.

To begin with, however, Orestes himself answers the prosecution (585-609). He does not attempt to deny the fact that he killed his mother. Apollo instructed him to do so, and to this hour he finds no fault with his fortune (596). Orestes asks whether he was truly of his mother's blood (606), a question which was already implicitly raised in the Choephoroe by the speech of Orestes' old nurse (Cho. 734ff.). But when the Erinyes insist that, on the literal level, Orestes was Clytemnestra's child and closest kin (607-8), Orestes turns to Apollo for help:

> ἤδη σὺ μαρτύρησον, ἐξηγοῦ δέ μοι,
> Ἄπολλον, εἴ σφε σὺν δίκηι κατέκτανον. (609-10)
>
> "Now you bear witness, and instruct me, Apollo,
> as to whether it was with justice that I killed
> her."[19]

From this point on, Orestes remains silent until he is acquitted, and

the contest is wholly between Apollo and the Erinyes.

Apollo begins thus:

> λέξω πρὸς ὑμᾶς, τόνδ' Ἀθηναίας μέγαν
> θέσμον, δικαίως, μάντις ὢν δ' οὐ ψεύσομαι.
> οὐπώποτ' εἶπον μαντικοῖσιν ἐν θρόνοις,
> οὐκ ἀνδρός, οὐ γυναικός, οὐ πόλεως πέρι,
> ὃ μὴ κελεύσαι Ζεὺς Ὀλυμπίων πατήρ.
> τὸ μὲν δίκαιον τοῦθ' ὅσον σθένει μάθε,
> βουλῇ πιφαύσκω δ' ὔμμ' ἐπισπέσθαι πατρός.
> ὅρκος γὰρ οὔτι Ζηνὸς ἰσχύει πλέον. (614-21)
>
> 619 μάθε Blaydes μαθεῖν M
>
> "I shall say to you, to this great court of Athena, that it was justly done; and as a prophet I shall not lie. Never have I spoken on my mantic throne, regarding man, woman, or city, a word which has not been decreed by Zeus, father of the Olympians. Recognise the strength of this plea of justice! I bid you attend to the will of my father. For no oath has greater power than Zeus'."

Scholars have disagreed about the validity of this claim of Apollo. Professor Winnington-Ingram questions Apollo's authority: in his view the Delphic god cannot truly claim to be the mouthpiece of Zeus. He suggests that Apollo's claim is "subtly prejudiced for an Athenian audience" by the inclusion of οὐ πόλεως πέρι. Apollo claims infallibility, and yet he could be "wrong about politics": Apollo was the god who medised.[20] For Professor Croiset, on the other hand, Apollo's speech has the tone of a divine revelation:

> "sa parole, grave et majestueuse, loin d'être celle d'un plaideur, bien moins encore celle d'un accusé, prend l'accent d'une révélation divine."[21]

Apollo's claim amounts to a final justification for the matricide: "Elle équivalait, en somme, à dire que l'acte d'Oreste ne relevait pas des jugements humains, mais qu'il devait être justifié du moment que Zeus, dans sa divine sagesse, l'avait estimé nécessaire."[22]

These two views are both extreme, and I believe that the text itself does not permit us to be so dogmatic either for or against the god. Apollo's claim to be Zeus' prophet cannot be totally undercut by οὐ πόλεως πέρι. In addition, we have been given no reason to question the assertion made in the prologue by the priestess to the effect that Apollo is the spokesman of his father Zeus (19). Moreover, Zeus' association with Apollo in aiding the avengers was assumed in the Choephoroe. Later in the play Athena notes the importance of the testimony from Zeus and of that given by Apollo (797-98). The claim, then, is not so obviously false as Winnington-Ingram implies. Nevertheless, he is right to suggest that Apollo's claim is open to question at this stage in the play. As Professor Thomson comments: "The doctrine of Delphic infallibility was familiar at Athens in the fifth century, but it was resisted by the more advanced democrats, who saw that it was used to support an attitude to contemporary society which they regarded as reactionary. Therefore, as spectators at the City Dionysia, Athenian citizens would be prepared to see the doctrine vindicated and they would be equally prepared to see it challenged."[23] Croiset, who believes that the claim amounts to a final justification for the matricide, explains all of Apollo's subsequent arguments as "simplement des ripostes aux attaques injurieuses de ses ennemis, ripostes qui n'ont qu'un rapport indirect avec la cause."[24] Apollo's first argument is not prefatory but conclusive: "Bien loin d'annoncer d'autres arguments, elle les exclut d'avance."[25] Yet the speech is clearly intended as a preface, as Apollo's opening speech for the defence. This is indicated by the way he turns to address the jury, and by his use of the future tense when he declares "I shall say", and "I shall not lie". He is

laying the foundation for his case, on the strong base of Zeus' authority.

The Erinyes ask whether Zeus really gave Apollo this oracle, to tell Orestes to avenge his father and to set aside the rights of the mother (622ff.). Apollo begins his second argument by declaring "Yes, for it is not the same thing" for a noble man to die at the hands of a woman (625-26). Here he is clearly comparing Agamemnon's death with Clytemnestra's and saying that Agamemnon's murder was a far more heinous crime than the killing of Clytemnestra. He answers the Furies by saying that Zeus did indeed sanction the oracle's command to Orestes, and in doing so was quite just. Forgetting the Furies, however, Apollo develops his argument into a vivid description of Agamemnon's ignominious death, and appeals to Athena and the jurors for their sympathy (629-30). He declares that Agamemnon was a nobleman, a king, honoured by all, and the leader of the fleet. Yet he, a man, was slain ignominiously by a woman, not in battle, but by guile (631-39).

How far could Apollo's argument be expected to gain the sympathy of the audience? Professor Lloyd-Jones comments:

> "The argument based on the doctrine of the superiority of the male over the female, on which Apollo is thrown back, is one that few among the play's original audience are likely to have questioned."[26]

Whether or not Lloyd-Jones is right about the contemporary feelings on "male superiority", the fact is that "male superiority" is only part of the issue here. It is true that ἀνήρ (625, 635, 636) is contrasted with γυνή (627), that Agamemnon's death is conceived as more ignominious because he was a man slain by a woman. But Apollo is not arguing that Clytemnestra's death was less important because she was a woman. Basi-

cally, he is arousing sympathy for Agamemnon and indignation against Clytemnestra. The antithesis between man and woman plays a part, but at least of equal importance is the fact that Agamemnon was a great king (626). How, then, would the Athenians react to kingship? It is useless here to try to assess the audience's response by adducing evidence for contemporary Athenian views on kingship. What is important here is how Apollo's argument would affect the audience in the light of what has gone before in the trilogy.

Professor Winnington-Ingram thinks that Apollo's argument is undercut by the audience's memory of the Agamemnon. Apollo's reference to Agamemnon as returning "from warfare, where he had, for the most part, won success" is meant to remind the audience of the sacrifice of Iphigeneia. The garment with which Clytemnestra fettered her husband is meant to recall the "spiritual entanglement" of the carpet scene, in which "she had subjected his will to hers and forced him to accept the feminine role". The word παντόσεμνος reminds us of how Agamemnon was actually humiliated. The reference to him as στρατηλάτης νέων reminds the audience of the "ill-omened history of the Argive fleet".[27] However, I find it hard to believe that such subtle and ironic verbal and thematic echoes would be perceived by the audience, who would thus be missing the main argument. But there is a more serious objection to Winnington-Ingram's criticisms. He cites the Agamemnon, but he fails to notice that the Choephoroe had offered a very different picture. Professor Kitto, remarking on the "fundamental changes" which occur between the Agamemnon and the Choephoroe, comments:

> "Agamemnon too is presented in a different aspect; his sins forgotten, he is now the great king, foully slain, and outraged even in his death."[28]

The reinstatement of Agamemnon as the Zeus-appointed king who set out against Troy begins as soon as he is dead (see e.g. Ag. 1489ff.), and is especially developed in the kommos of the Choephoroe. Apollo simply continues that reinstatement, referring to Agamemnon as διοσδότοις σκήπτροισι τιμαλφούμενον "honoured with the Zeus-given sceptre". The connection of Zeus and kingship helps to explain why Zeus favoured the rights of Agamemnon above those of Clytemnestra. Professor Solmsen, in his discussion of Apollo's arguments, stresses that the audience has been prepared for their acceptance:

> "Apollo's arguments are merely an attempt to appraise in rational, or even doctrinal, terms those factors which long before the trial scene have influenced our responses to the plot."[29]

The Erinyes counter by asking how Zeus can favour the father above the mother, when he himself bound his father, Kronos (640ff.)? Their question causes Apollo to lose his temper, for he prefaces his reply with ὦ παντομισῆ κνώδαλα, στύγη θεῶν, "O beasts most hateful, objects of the gods' loathing" (644). Professor Winnington-Ingram contends that he loses his temper because "the charge of inconsistency which they make ... is true".[30] But the terms in which Apollo denounces the Erinyes suggest rather that his temper is roused by the insult to Zeus. That is why he calls them "στύγη θεῶν." He rushes to Zeus' defence by explaining that fetters can be loosed (645-46).[31] But there is no remedy for death, for blood once it is split (647-651). This last point has been firmly established already in the trilogy; but in the mouth of Apollo it furnishes a perfect opening for the Furies. They immediately retort, how then does he plead for Orestes, who shed his mother's blood (652ff.)? As Professor Winnington-Ingram comments, it

is almost as if, by their question concerning Zeus and Kronos, the Erinyes had "unconsciously set a trap for Apollo, into which he falls headlong."[32]

Why does Aeschylus introduce the legend about Zeus, and why does he give Apollo only a weak answer? The question has been raised by Kitto, who also supplies an answer "Unless Aeschylus had wanted to put Apollo in a hole, he would not have made the Erinyes ask this particular question. But he does wish, in this scene, to show Apollo to no great advantage. The strong side of Apollo's case we have seen already, in the Choephori and in the first scene of the Eumenides: now it is the turn of the Erinyes."[33]

I agree with Kitto's basic point here, that Apollo's answer is intended to show some weakness on Apollo's part, and some strength on the Erinyes' side. On the other hand, I believe that Kitto overstates the case when he says that since the strong part of his case has been presented already, Apollo is shown to no great advantage in the Trial Scene. Although Apollo is temporarily "put in a hole", the momentary downfall does not affect the main argument. Nor are all of Apollo's arguments in the Trial Scene weak, by any means. But Aeschylus takes the opportunity here to show that Apollo is not infallible. Thus Kitto rightly concludes: "...the majestic god does not represent the whole truth. If Apollo were given a conclusive answer to all the questions, the inconclusive verdict of the court would be unintelligible."[34]

The Erinyes ask how Orestes, after shedding his mother's blood, can possibly have a share in social and religious life thereafter (652-656). Croiset, who is totally pro-Apolline and critical of the Erinyes, interprets the Erinyes' question as a sign that they have lost

sight of the real issue, and are merely quibbling about a question of custom.[35] But in fact the Erinyes' question is quite pertinent. In the eyes of the Erinyes, Apollo's purification of Orestes is not sufficient, and thus they provoke Apollo into a final attempt to justify Orestes' matricide. Apollo now produces his famous "biological" argument, which of all the arguments in the Trial Scene has produced the most controversy amongst modern critics.

This is Apollo's argument:

> οὐκ ἔστι μήτηρ ἡ κεκλημένη τέκνου
> τοκεύς, τροφὸς δὲ κύματος νεοσπόρου·
> τίκτει δ'ὁ θρώισκων, ἡ δ'ἅπερ ξένωι ξένη
> ἔσωσεν ἔρνος, οἷσι μὴ βλάψηι θεός. (657-61)
>
> "She who is called the mother of the child is not a parent, but the nurse of the newly-sown seed. The one who sows the seed is truly the parent, whilst the woman merely preserves the offspring as a stranger for a stranger, provided some god does not destroy it."

Apollo here brings a general argument to bear upon Orestes' special case. He wants to show that Agamemnon has the greater claim on Orestes, and that Clytemnestra, though called Orestes' "mother", has no real blood-relationship with him. If Apollo can prove this argument, he removes the Erinyes' motive for pursuing Orestes, that he has shed kindred blood.

Once again, critics have attempted to assess the audience's response to Apollo's argument by considering how far the theory he adduces was accepted in contemporary Athens. Evidence for such acceptance is thin. Aristotle attributes the theory to Anaxagoras and other philosophers, so that the theory may have been common in Aeschylus' time.[36] But we do not know whether it would still have been so esoteric and novel that it would have shocked the audience, or whether it was fairly

widely argued and even accepted. This question must remain a matter for conjecture, and thus the only possible means of assessing the audience's response to Apollo's argument is again to consider how it fits in to the *Oresteia* as a whole.

First of all, Apollo's theory must recall for us the way in which the relationship between Clytemnestra and Orestes is presented in the *Choephoroe*. There, Orestes' old nurse seems to supplant Clytemnestra as Orestes' mother. The nurse tells us that she was the one who tended him as a baby, and that Clytemnestra is glad to hear that her son is dead (*Cho.* 734-765). Thus Clytemnestra's maternal claim is weakened, in all but literal fact. Moreover, when Orestes comes to the house in disguise, she fails to recognise him, but receives him as a stranger. During the scene in which she welcomes Orestes as a guest, the word ξένος, "stranger", occurs again and again; with an emphasis that suggests that Aeschylus is not simply exploiting the irony of the situation, but is again weakening the natural tie between Orestes and his mother.[37] Now, when Apollo speaks of the mother as harbouring the seed ἅπερ ξένωι ξένη, "as a stranger for a stranger", we are inevitably reminded of that scene in the *Choephoroe*. So too, earlier in the Trial Scene, Orestes had exclaimed:

> ἐγὼ δὲ μητρὸς τῆς ἐμῆς ἐν αἵματι; (606)
>
> "But am I truly of my mother's blood?"

Nevertheless, though it harmonises with this questioning of Clytemnestra's maternal status, Apollo's theory, as Professor Lebeck has shown, is presented in such a way as to highlight its one-sidedness.[38] In Greek, the verb τίκτω can refer to either the father or the mother of the child; but the Erinyes themselves employ it only of the mother,

whereas Apollo here uses it only of the father. Thus both Apollo and the Erinyes suggest that only one of the parents is the true parent. The limitation they impose on τίκτω demonstrates their one-sidedness. Furthermore, Lebeck has point out that, though Apollo's argument is more than "mere sophistry", yet "The sophistic element does enter, however, because of the way in which the argument is here presented. It turns on establishing by purely verbal means, a special kinship between τοκεύς, a word not used of the mother in the singular, τίκτω, here limited to the meaning "beget", and τέκνον."[39] Thus we may conclude that the sophistry of Apollo's argument and its evident one-sidedness would prevent the audience from accepting it as representing the whole truth.

Perhaps of all Apollo's arguments, this final one is the least convincing in itself. Why, then, did Aeschylus include it? Partly, I think, because it is a convenient theory, and indeed the only theory available, to rationalise the separation of the blood-tie between mother and child.[40] In addition, the theory has a modern ring to it, and thus it fits nicely with the contrast between Apollo, representing the new divine régime, and the Erinyes, representing the old.[41] But there is one final reason which is more important. Till now, Apollo's arguments have been cogent because they focussed on the strong part of his case. The oracle had the authority of Zeus; Agamemnon had to be avenged; Clytemnestra deserved to die, because she killed her husband, a revered king, by guile. On the other hand, as Kitto comments, "The impossible part of his case is that it was right to allow Orestes to kill his mother."[42] It is this point that Apollo is now arguing, and Aeschylus wants us to realise that Apollo is wrong. For this reason he

here supplies Apollo with an argument which promoted a theory that was probably "at the best, an unproved speculation"[43], and the terms in which Apollo argues show that the argument is sophistic and one-sided.

Apollo's argument has a subsidiary dramatic function, of furnishing a compliment to Athena which proves to be the basis on which she decides her vote.[44] For, as the "proof" of his argument, he offers Athena herself:

> τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦδέ σοι δείξω λόγου·
> πατὴρ μὲν ἂν γείναιτ' ἄνευ μητρός· πέλας
> μάρτυς πάρεστι παῖς 'Ολυμπίου Διός (662-64)
>
> "I shall point out to you a proof of this argument: there can be a father without a mother; near at hand is the witness, the child of Olympian Zeus"

Thus Athena, when she votes, declares:

> ψῆφον δ' 'Ορέστηι τήνδ' ἐγὼ προσθήσομαι·
> μήτηρ γὰρ οὔτις ἔστιν ἥ μ' ἐγείνατο,
> τὸ δ' ἄρσεν αἰνῶ πάντα, πλὴν γάμου τυχεῖν,
> ἅπαντι θυμῶι, κάρτα δ' εἰμὶ τοῦ πατρός· (735-38)
>
> "I shall place this vote in favour of Orestes; for there is no mother who gave me birth, and I approve above all the male side, short of entering marriage, with all my heart. I am wholly my father's child."

Athena's vote, then, seems almost to be an endorsement of Apollo's argument; and some critics have thought therefore that the point of view represented in Apollo's arguments and in Athena's vote must have been Aeschylus' own view, that he was seriously advocating male superiority. Thus Solmsen comments: "I see no reason why he [Aeschylus] should not have welcomed a physiological theory that strengthened his belief in the superiority of the male by recognizing him as the real τοκεύς of the child."[45] Thomson also contends that the arguments of Apollo, together with Athena's vote, represent Aeschylus' own view:

"And if we ask why the dramatist has made the outcome of the trial turn on the social relations of the sexes, the answer is that he regarded the subordination of women, quite correctly, as an indispensable condition of democracy."[46]

These critics believe that the Trial Scene offers Aeschylus' own solution to a definite social problem. But, as I mentioned above, there are clear indications that Apollo's argument is not meant to be wholly acceptable, and not even Athena's endorsement can make it otherwise. Besides, Athena also endorses an earlier assertion of the Erinyes (cf. 517ff.): in her "Foundation" speech at 681ff. she emphasizes the need for Fear to act as a restraint upon men's actions (690ff.). I prefer the interpretation of John Jones, who points out that Athena's vote is made on purely arbitrary grounds, and that this fact demonstrates the impossibility of deciding the issue of the Trial on logical grounds alone.[47]

Finally, after his compliment to Athena, Apollo adds a promise to the city of Athens (667f.). He explains that he sent Orestes to Athens in order that he and his descendants should be their faithful ally in the future (669ff.). He is, of course, assuming that Orestes will be acquitted. He promises further such favours. Some critics have interpreted this as an attempt on Apollo's part to sway the jury. Lebeck, for instance, finds Apollo's appeal here to be an attempt at bribery, and she finds a counterpart to it in the Erinyes' threats to the jury at 711-712. She cites evidence compiled by Professor Groeneboom that bribery and brow-beating were forbidden by law in the Athenian law-court. But it is possible that both were commonly practised. She suggests that there is a strong element of parody here: Aeschylus' Trial

Scene is a parody of Athenian practice.[48] Her interpretation is in line with the view of other critics, notably Herington and Reinhardt, that the Eumenides is different in tone from the first two plays and that it contains an element of humour and light-heartedness.[49]

While I acknowledge that Apollo is making an all too human attempt to sway the jury, by appealing to their patriotic emotions, it is dangerous, I believe, to interpret this appeal, and other aspects of the play, as humorous. Too little is known about the Greek sense of humour, or whether it was thought appropriate to introduce humorous elements into Tragedy at this period. Moreover, there are two good reasons for believing that Apollo's appeal has a serious point. Firstly, the hint at future Argive-Athenian alliance is one of several allusions in the play to an alliance which was actually made between Athens and Argos in 461 B.C. (cf. 289ff., 762ff.).[50] But, more importantly, Apollo's so-called "bribery" and the Erinyes' "brow-beating" call attention to the gravity of the present trial, and the seriousness of its consequences. As in Athena's speeches at 566ff. and 681ff., so here we are made aware that this is a critical moment in history. Athena says that her laws will endure for all time (572; cf. 683-4), and Apollo suggests that Orestes will be loyal to Athens forever (670). Orestes also predicts that the Argive alliance will be for all time (291, 763). This is the last speech of any length that Apollo makes before the jury vote, and it is fitting that he thus predicts in advance the consequences of Orestes' acquittal for the city of Athens.

At the end of Apollo's speech, Athena moves that the jury now cast their votes, and both sides consent. Athena then makes her "foundation speech", in which she stresses the need for fear in a

community (681ff.). This assertion helps to prepare the way for the later transformation of the Erinyes into the Eumenides. There follows the last exchange between Apollo and the Erinyes (715-733). No new argument is introduced at this stage, but the Erinyes accuse Apollo of acting now as he did in the past, when he made the Moirai drunk in order to prevent the death of Admetus (723-24). Apollo refers (717-18) to Zeus' treatment of Ixion: Ixion, after murdering his father-in-law, supplicated Zeus, and Zeus purified him. The first allusion to this myth had been made at 441, where Athena declares that Orestes should be accorded the same respect as the suppliant Ixion. Here, the allusions to Ixion and to Admetus make it clear that such action is typical of the Olympians, whom the Erinyes accuse of favouring mortals at the expense of the Fates.

Apollo's final comment in this play is his appeal at 748ff.:

> πεμπάζετ' ὀρθῶς ἐκβολὰς ψήφων, ξένοι,
> τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν σέβοντες ἐν διαιρέσει.
> γνώμης δ'ἀπούσης πῆμα γίγνεται μέγα,
> βαλοῦσα δ'οἶκον ψῆφος ὤρθωσεν μία.
>
> "Strangers, count the votes cast forth rightly,
> revering justice in the sorting! When right
> judgment is absent, great harm occurs; but one
> vote cast can raise a fallen house."

When the announcement is made that Orestes is acquitted, Orestes makes a speech of thanks to Athena, Apollo and Zeus and leaves the stage. Apollo presumably leaves the stage with him. Apollo has no exit line, and, as Kitto remarks, makes no farewell speech.[51] His role in the drama is concluded, appropriately, at the moment when Orestes' fate is decided. Apollo could have no part in the scenes after the Trial, during which the Erinyes are persuaded to become the Eumenides, and are reconciled with Zeus and the Olympian order. Thus, in the words of Kitto, Apollo

"simply evaporates".[52] Apollo has been closely involved in matters central to the trilogy, but now that he has served his purpose, Aeschylus declines to extend his role.

Conclusion

I will now attempt to draw together the various statements I made in previous chapters about Apollo's functions in each of the plays, in order to assess the part Apollo plays in the whole trilogy. In particular, I shall consider the question whether Apollo is represented consistently throughout the trilogy, or whether he undergoes a change of character or of attitude. Professor Kitto has suggested that Apollo undergoes a change of character, that the god "improves" within the trilogy. Professor Winnington-Ingram contended that Apollo shows an "arrogant inconsistency" of attitude in the final two plays. My own view is at variance with both critics, since I do not believe that Aeschylus makes Apollo change in character or attitude. The only difference we may perceive in Apollo is one of dramatic function.

Let us first of all consider Professor Winnington-Ingram's thesis. He suggests that, whereas Apollo in the _Eumenides_ vilifies the Furies, he had already employed them in the _Choephoroe_ as the instruments of his threat against Orestes. Thus: "we cannot but impute to the god an arrogant inconsistency."[1] This inconsistency is not carelessness on Aeschylus' part, but conforms with the dramatist's intention: "I believe that Aeschylus has made it so glaring precisely in order that we may not fail to see that the Delphic morality of vengeance is itself inconsistent, an unworkable compromise, destined to supersession in the evolution of Zeus' will no less than that of the Furies."[2]

I have refuted the charge of inconsistency by demonstrating that, in the _Choephoroe_, Apollo does not "threaten" Orestes with the attack of the Furies. Rather, he warns Orestes through the oracle that the Furies will inevitably, of their own nature, pursue him should he fail

to avenge his father's murder.[3] But the charge of inconsistency could be taken a stage further back than Winnington-Ingram takes it. He might have remarked, as Kitto does in fact remark, that Apollo employs the Erinyes in the Agamemnon. Kitto says: "We might say to Apollo, if he would allow us to be so familiar: 'It is all very well for you to denounce the Erinyes as evil denizens of Hell, but did you not, in the Agamemnon, for private reasons of your own, send Cassandra to meet her death at the hands of these same Erinyes, quartered in the palace of Atreus?'"[4] To which in fact Apollo would be entitled to answer "No, not in terms of the play", for I have shown earlier that Aeschylus avoids making an explicit connection between Apollo as Cassandra's destroyer and the Erinyes of the House of Atreus. The Erinyes of the House of Atreus are not associated in the play with Cassandra's death, but only with the death of Agamemnon.[5] Aeschylus, it seems, has taken pains in the Agamemnon and Choephoroe to avoid presenting Apollo as the employer of the Erinyes, precisely in order that Apollo may, in the Eumenides, dramatically oppose the Erinyes without appearing thereby to be a hypocrite.

Though I have refuted the charge of inconsistency, the second part of Winnington-Ingram's thesis could still be valid. Aeschylus could, even without depicting a glaring inconsistency in Apollo himself, have represented the Delphic code as an unworkable compromise. Winnington-Ingram describes the Delphic morality as "a half-way house": "And because over almost the whole of Greece and for many generations the morality of Delphi had seemed the final voice of God, he [Aeschylus] is at pains to show that it is only a half-way house and being founded upon the sands of inconsistency cannot stand for ever" (my emphasis).[6]

Winnington-Ingram's statement raises a valid question about Apollo's position in the _Eumenides_: how does Apollo stand in relation to Zeus? Is he truly superseded, as Kitto suggests, by another spokesman of Zeus, Athena? Kitto implies that Apollo appears less splendid in comparison with Athena, who corrects him by virtue of her superior wisdom. He refers to the scenes at Delphi as the "Apolline half" of the Eumenides, "But in the second part of the play the dominant figure is Athena. She supersedes Apollo, and by implication she corrects him."[7]

I will not deny that Apollo makes a quiet exit from the _Eumenides_; that he is shown, during the Trial Scene, to possess part of the truth but not the whole truth in arguing Orestes' case; and that ultimately the law of vengeance, in accordance with which Apollo commanded Orestes to avenge his father's murder, is replaced by the institution of the Areopagus. It is clear that Winnington-Ingram is partly right: that the law of vengeance _is_ superseded, by the will of Zeus. But the supersession of that law is not, in my view, represented in such a way that Apollo himself appears superseded, or criticised in any way. On the contrary, Apollo himself promotes the supersession of that law, in so far as he purifies Orestes of the matricide, and in doing so puts an end to the chain of crime and retribution within the House of Atreus. Above all, the suggestion that Apollo is superseded must be dismissed in the light of the strong emphasis Aeschylus places on the unity of the Olympians. Apollo claims that his authority is from Zeus, and we have seen how that claim is vindicated in the play.[8] Apollo and Zeus were frequently associated in the first two plays; for instance in the parodos of the _Agamemnon_ (56) and similarly in the Herald's speech (509); and in two choral odes of the _Choephoroe_ (783ff.; 935ff.).

Moreover, Apollo's authority is recognised by Athena. Athena's soil first received Apollo on his arrival from Delos (Eum. 10), and she acknowledges Apollo's authority after he has made his final exit from the play, at 797ff.:

> ἀλλ' ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια παρῆν,
> αὐτός θ' ὁ χρήσας αὐτὸς ἦν ὁ μαρτυρῶν
> ὡς ταυτ' 'Ορέστην δρῶντα μὴ βλάβας ἔχειν.
>
> "But clear testimony from Zeus was present, and he who gave the oracle was himself the one who gave testimony; so that Orestes should not suffer harm in doing these deeds."

I conclude, therefore, that Winnington-Ingram's view of Apollo is not supported by the text: Apollo is not manifestly inconsistent in attitude; he is not, implicitly or explicitly, criticised; he is not superseded.

I turn now to Kitto's view that Apollo changes in character during the course of the trilogy. Kitto begins by suggesting that the Apollo represented in the Choephoroe and Eumenides is completely different from the Apollo represented in the Agamemnon: "What relation are we to imagine between the Apollo of the last two plays and the Apollo of the Cassandra-episode? The Apollo of Delphi, though he does not possess all wisdom, is at least a god of purity and light. The Apollo of the Agamemnon is one whose behaviour, in contemporary Athens, would rightly have put him within reach of the law. How can we reconcile the two?"[9] Kitto thus presents us with "The difficulty of the two Apollos".[10]

Having raised the difficulty, Kitto defines two other problems in the trilogy which he believes to be related to the problem of Apollo: the problem of Zeus, and the problem of the Erinyes.[11] Zeus also appears to change within the trilogy, Kitto suggests, and so do the Erinyes, "who, having in the Agamemnon been the willing agents of Zeus,

rise up against him in the Eumenides."[12] Kitto believes that all these difficulties are capable of one explanation, as follows: "It is that the Oresteia, like the Prometheia, is based on the idea of a progressive Zeus, and of a progressive Apollo."[13]

Let us first consider the "difficulty of the two Apollos." Most of the difficulty evidently originates in Kitto's interpretation of the Cassandra-scene, which he believes to be "dedicated to the statement that Apollo's conception of 'justice' is as violent as Clytemnestra's."[14] I have explained in an earlier chapter[15] my reasons for dissenting from this interpretation. To begin with, Cassandra was guilty of offending the god, and his punishment of her, harsh though it is, is not represented as other than typical of a Greek deity. It is wrong to compare Apollo's revenge with that of Clytemnestra, for Aeschylus does not give us any indication that the god is to be judged in this matter by human standards. Cassandra rejected Apollo's initial χάρις, and hence encountered the malevolent side of his nature. Furthermore, it is important to realise that Aeschylus depicts Apollo in the Agamemnon as one who is capable of healing as well as destroying. There are two sides to Apollo's nature; although Kitto is partially right, for the malevolent aspect certainly predominates in the Cassandra-scene.

But both sides of Apollo's nature are also manifested in the Choephoroe and Eumenides. Apollo's command to Orestes to kill Agamemnon's murderers has the support of justice, but it is stern and harsh. The god shows mercy to his mortal suppliant, but fierce hostility to the Erinyes. Again, it is true that Kitto is partially right, for on the whole the benevolent side of Apollo is uppermost in the Choephoroe and Eumenides, but it is important to recognise that the other and

complementary aspect is also apparent.

Thus Kitto's "difficulty of the two Apollos" is not so problematic as he avows, since the Apollo of the Agamemnon is not by any means irreconcilable with the Apollo of the Choephoroe and the Eumenides. But in so far as he is partially right about the problem, let us examine his proposed solution: the "progressive" Apollo.

I do not intend to discuss here whether there are parallels for a "progressive" Apollo, whether in the Oresteia Zeus and the Erinyes also progress, or whether Zeus improved in the missing plays of Aeschylus' Prometheia.[15] Nor am I concerned with the question whether the concept of a Greek deity "improving" was characteristic of Aeschylus' day; for I agree with Kitto that the Greek mind was not "a Parmenidean ἕν,"[16] and that Aeschylus was capable of forming this concept even if it was not current at the time when he lived. I shall simply argue that the Oresteia provides no evidence that Apollo improves or progresses within the trilogy.

Apart from his observation that the Apollo of the final two plays is "different" from the Apollo of the Agamemnon, Kitto gives no specific evidence from the text that Apollo has actually improved. He implies, however, that Apollo learns something during the course of the trilogy. In commenting that Aeschylus does not write a farewell speech for Apollo, Kitto outlines the type of exit line which presumably he, Kitto, thought appropriate: "Now I return to Delphi, a wiser god" (my emphasis).[17] What, then, has Apollo learnt? Kitto does not say. Has Apollo learnt that, whereas he himself took vengeance on Cassandra in the Agamemnon, yet vengeance is after all bloody and godless? The text nowhere says so; and in fact Apollo still, in the Eumenides, claims that his command to

Orestes to take vengeance was just.

There is a better explanation for the fact that Apollo is not represented in quite the same way in all the plays. It is simply this: that the presentation of Apollo depends on how Aeschylus is employing Apollo in each separate play. In the Agamemnon, Aeschylus employs Apollo in the story of Cassandra; so that together Apollo and Cassandra illustrate the relationship between gods and mortals. The gods may show the charismatic side of their nature to mortals, but if the mortal rejects the charisma, the god may in turn prove wholly destructive. In this play, as I have mentioned earlier, the emphasis is less on Apollo and more on the human Cassandra, who in her person becomes for Aeschylus and his audience a paradigm of human suffering.[18] Apollo's part in the story of Orestes is different. He first of all commands and directs the action of the mortal, and subsequently takes responsibility for the mortal's action in such a way that the god himself becomes a defendant on trial. An impersonal, though effective god in the Choephoroe, Apollo himself takes the stage in the Eumenides. The manner of presentation then, varies; but the nature of the god does not. As for the fact that Apollo has two sides to his nature, and that the malevolent aspect predominates early in the trilogy, and the benevolent aspect predominates in the final two plays, we are not to interpret this as a sign that Apollo improves in the course of time. Rather, these are two permanent aspects of the god, which happen to be portrayed in turn because this suits Aeschylus' dramatic purpose.[19] I should make it clear that Aeschylus does not, in my view, set out to portray Apollo expressly as an ambivalent god. Even in the Cassandra-scene, where Apollo's actual destruction of Cassandra is contrasted with his ability

to heal, Aeschylus does not make the antithesis between healing and destroying so overt as to draw attention to Apollo's ambivalence.[20] The two sides to Apollo's nature happen, incidentally, to be demonstrated within the trilogy. This, I believe, was not intentional on Aeschylus' part, but was natural enough, since the Greeks typically conceived their deities as possessing equal power for benevolent or malevolent action.

Finally, I hope that I have shown the significance of Apollo's part in the Oresteia. He has, indeed, many roles and many functions which exist side by side. He makes a very vital contribution to the plot of the Oresteia, and a proper understanding of that contribution cannot be reached without encountering problems of criticism central to the trilogy: the problems which we face in trying to comprehend Aeschylus' concept of divinity and of the relationship between god and man.

Notes

Chapter I. Apollo in Cult and Literature

1. For Stesichorus' influence, see C.M. Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry (Oxford, 1961) 112ff. and A. Podlecki, "Stesichoreia", Athenaeum 49 (1971) 313ff.

2. D.L. Page, Poetae Melici Graeci (Oxford, 1962) fr. 217.

3. See, e.g. H.W. Parke, Greek Oracles (London, 1967) 62 and A. Lesky, "Die Orestie des Aischylos" Hermes 66 (1931) 194-95, where he follows Bethe and Wilamowitz.

4. M.P. Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion (New York, 1964) 195.

5. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "The role of Apollo in the Oresteia" CR 47 (1933) 98.

6. Herodotus 6.86.

7. Herodotus 1.65; Tyrtaeus, fr. 3 (Diehl). For a discussion of Apollo's role as law-giver see W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods (London, 1950) Chapter VII, 184ff.

8. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.5) passim.

9. Liddell and Scott, s.v. Λοξίας, cite Bacchylides, Herodotus, Aeschylus and Sophocles as authors who employ this title of Apollo.

10. Occasionally, Apollo is referred to as "Loxias" without direct reference to his oracles; e.g. Ag. 1208.

11. See R.C. Jebb, Sophocles O.T. (reprinted Amsterdam, 1966) ad 853.

12. Herodotus 8.77.

13. By the time of Sophocles, faith in the Delphic oracle was still wide-spread; but there is evidence in Sophocles' plays that some people were beginning to question seriously the validity of prophecy. See especially Sophocles, Oedipus Tyrannus 707ff., and passim. For a discussion of the beginnings of Greek scepticism, see B. Knox, Oedipus at Thebes (New Haven, 1957) 169ff.

14. Parke (supra, n.3) 38.

15. L.R. Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States IV (reprinted Chicago, 1971) 233.

16. See Eum. 283.

17. Farnell (supra, n.15) 303-304 comments that the pig was "pre-eminently the piacular animal" and that "Apollo, though he has no tie with this animal, would advise his petitioners who had sinned against these [chthonian] powers to avail themselves of its virtue."

18. See e.g. Eum. 276ff.

19. See Page (supra, n.2) fr. 217.

20. See Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.5) 98.

21. For Achilles and Theseus see Farnell (supra, n.15) 295, 196. For Alcmaeon see Parke (supra, n.3)

22. Farnell (supra, n.15) IV 301, and see I 167, n.131b.

23. cf. Homer, Iliad I. 8ff.

24. Ag. 1022-24. See O.C.D. s.v. Asclepius.

25. Scholiast on Homer, Odyssey IV. 232: καὶ Ἡσίοδος μάρτυς ἐστὶ τοῦ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸν Παιήονα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος λέγων · εἴ μὴ Ἀπόλλων φοῖβος ὑπὲκ θανάτοιο σαώσαι ἢ καὶ Παιήων ὃς ἁπάντων φάρμακα οἶδεν. See Farnell (supra, n.15) 234.

26. Farnell (supra, n.15) 235 note b.

27. Farnell (supra, n.15) 233-4, 236.

28. Farnell (supra, n.15) 239.

29. Farnell (supra, n.15) 233.

30. e.g. J. Davreux, La légende de la prophétesse Cassandre (Liège, 1942) 31; P.G. Mason, "Kassandra", JHS 79 (1959), 85.

31. P.G. Mason (supra, n.30) 80-93.

32. Davreux (supra, n.30).

33. Davreux (supra, n.30) 1.

34. Scholiast on Homer, Iliad 24.699: οὐ γὰρ οἶδεν αὐτὴν μάντιν ὁ ποιήτης, "for the poet does not know her to be a prophetess."

35. T.W. Allen, Homeri Opera V (Oxford, 1912) 102-103.

36. Page, P.M.G. (supra, n.2) fr. 1028.

37. See E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus: Agamemnon (Oxford, 1950) III, 554; G. Thomson, The Oresteia of Aeschylus (Amsterdam, 1938), 94. On this point, I disagree with the statement of Parke (supra, n.3), 30 that the story of Cassandra "shows that to the Greeks the gift

of prophecy was associated with the idea of virginity and not with the position of consort to a god." It is true that Apollo's prophetesses did not have sexual relations with mortals but this does not exclude the primitive belief that these women were literally "possessed" by the god himself.

38. Fraenkel (supra, n.37) III. 555.

39. D.M. Leahy, "The role of Cassandra in the Oresteia of Aeschylus", John Rylands Library Bulletin 52 (1959), 166.

40. Leahy (supra, n.39) 165 whilst dismissing Kuhns' idea that the institution of marriage is involved here, nevertheless suggests: "the relationship which Cassandra frustrated, it is implied, would have been an honourable one." This is only so if we accept that there is a reminiscence at 1207 of the Athenian marriage-formula.

41. Leahy (supra, n.39) 164: "The crucial point is that Cassandra's refusal meant that no children would be born of Apollo's love for her."

42. L. Woodbury, "Apollo's first love: Pindar, Pyth. 9. 26ff.", TAPA 103 (1972) 573.

Chapter II. Agamemnon

1. All references to Fraenkel are to E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus: Agamemnon, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1950).

2. Fraenkel, II. 36.

3. For examples see Fraenkel, III. 574.

4. Cf. e.g. Homer, Iliad I. 68-72.

5. See Chapter I: Apollo in Cult and Literature, pp.11-12.

6. D.M. Leahy, "The role of Cassandra in the Oresteia of Aeschylus", John Rylands Library Bulletin 52 (1969), 146: "Progressive revelation is in fact a key note of the Agamemnon." The term "progressive revelation" is commonly used by biblical scholars of the nineteenth century. Here, however, no theological reference is intended: Mr. Leahy is employing the term to refer to literary method.

7. See O. Taplin, "Aeschylean Silences and Silences in Aeschylus", HSCP 76 (1972), 57-97.

8. For a discussion of the name Apollo, and the various derivations offered by scholars, see W.K.C. Guthrie, The Greeks and their Gods (London, 1950), 73 n.2.

9. Fraenkel, III. 492 follows Wilamowitz in dismissing Stanley's suggestion that this pun on the name Apollo can be found in Archilochus 30D. The pun is made in later authors: J.D. Deniston and D.L. Page, Aeschylus: Agamemnon (Oxford, 1957), 167 cite as examples Euripides fr. 781, 11f., and Plato, Cratylus, 404d.

10. Fraenkel, III. 491.

11. Fraenkel, III. 492; Denniston-Page (supra, n.9), 167.

12. See Chapter I: Apollo in Cult and Literature, p.14.

13. On "double-motivation" or "over-determination", see E.R. Dodds, "Morals and Politics in the Oresteia", PCPhS n.s.6 (1960), 27 and n.5 for bibliography.

14. Chapter I, pp.13-18.

15. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "The role of Apollo in the Oresteia, CR 47 (1933), 98, n.2.

16. e.g. Leahy (supra, n.6) 158, 161, 165.

17. Fraenkel, III. 555.

18. Fraenkel, II. 111.

19. Fraenkel, III. 555.

20. Chapter I, pp.17-18.

21. G.S. Rousseau, "Dream and Vision in Aeschylus' Oresteia", Arion 2[3] (1963), 119 makes the following comment on Cassandra's rejection of Apollo after she had first consented:
"The personal psychology underlying this moment is difficult to understand, and no scholar has yet produced a satisfactory answer."

22. Fraenkel, III. 556; see also his remarks on the meaning of ἄνατος, "a certain emendation".

23. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.15) 98, n.2.

24. H.D.F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London, 1956) (henceforth = Kitto, F.M.) 28-31, 69-83. Professor Kitto does not apply the term 'crude' to Apollo; but he does suggest that Apollo progresses throughout the trilogy from a crude to a civilised god.

25. Leahy (supra, n.6) 145-177.

26. Chapter I, pp.17-18.

27. Leahy (supra, n.5) uses the term "sins" throughout his article without specific reference to Cassandra; but on p.157 asks whether

"we are to regard Cassandra as an innocent victim of outrage, or as a sinner justly punished" (my emphasis).

28. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24) 68.

29. Leahy (supra, n.6) 160 n.3.

30. A. Lesky, Greek Tragedy (London, 1965), 78.

31. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24) 79.

32. Later accounts, which seem to correspond with that given in the Agamemnon, do suggest that Apollo bribed Cassandra.
See (i) Apollodorus III 12.5
"Κασάνδραν, ᾗ συνελθεῖν βουλόμενος 'Απόλλων τὴν μαντικὴν ὑπεσχέτο διδάξειν."
(ii) Servius: Commentary on Aeneid II. 247
"qui cum amasset Cassandram, petit ab ea eius concubitus copiam. illa hac conditione promisit, si sibi ab eo futurorum scientia praestaretur..."

33. Denniston-Page (supra, n.9), 180.

34. Denniston-Page (supra, n.9), 180.

35. Fraenkel, III. 587.

36. Denniston-Page (supra, n.9), 186; Fraenkel III. 592.

37. Leahy (supra, n.6), 176.

38. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 70.

39. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 80.

40. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 30.

41. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 29.

42. The theory of a progressive Zeus and a progressive Apollo is argued at length by Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 69ff. I shall consider this theory in my Conclusion.

43. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 80. 79.

44. H.D.F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy (London, 1939) 88.

45. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.15) 97-104. I shall defend Apollo against this charge of inconsistency in later chapters.

46. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24), 80.

47. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.24) 28 remarks, quite incorrectly: "So far in the play [i.e. before the Cassandra-scene] we have heard nothing about him [i.e. Apollo], except for the passing reference in the first anapaests to 'some god, Apollo it may be, or Pan, or Zeus.'"

48. G. Thomson, The Oresteia of Aeschylus (Revised edition, Amsterdam 1966) I. 29.

49. See 1069, 1295.

50. J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London, 1962) 133 points out that Cassandra's pity for herself is not morbid: "the pathos is objective".

51. 1167-71; 1221; 1327-1330.

52. G. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens (London, 1941), 246.

53. W.C. Greene, Moira: Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought (Harvard, 1944), 128.

54. Greene (supra, n.53), 128.

55. Leahy (supra, n.6), 167.

56. Leahy (supra, n.6), 174.

57. Leahy (supra, n.6), 175.

58. A. Lebeck, The Oresteia: A Study in Language and Structure (Washington, 1971) 56.

Chapter III. Choephoroe

1. Part of the prologue to the Choephoroe is missing, and it is possible that Apollo was mentioned there. Some critics have assumed that he was: e.g. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "The role of Apollo in the Oresteia," CR 47 (1933) 98, says that the prologue "must have contained some reference to the divine command, and it is tantalizing that we cannot know what the tone of this first mention of Apollo was." But the style and content of Orestes' speech at 269ff. are such that an earlier mention of Apollo's oracle seems unlikely. Also, since Apollo is never mentioned in this play except with reference to the oracle, it seems unlikely that he would have been mentioned in the prologue in some other capacity.

2. See I, pp.4-6.

3. The view that there are two distinct oracles here was proposed by P. Mazon, Eschyle II (Paris 1935) 76; cf. A. Lesky, Der Kommos der Choephoren (Vienna, 1943), 18 and A. Sidgwick, Aeschylus: Choephoroi (Oxford, reprinted 1962) 23 ad 278-296.

4. A. Lesky (supra, n.3) 19; see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Aischylos: Interpretationen (Berlin 1914) 205.

5. Lesky (supra, n.3) 22 argues that χρησμοῖς (297) refers only to the penalties, and not to the god's command, which he believes could not be the object of questioning. In favour of this interpretation is the use of τοιοῖσδε, "such as these", which would seem to point to the foregoing description. Also, it is apparent from l. 300, where Orestes includes the god's command with the many other reasons for taking vengeance, that he does not really question the command itself. A. Lebeck, The Oresteia (Washington, D.C., 1971) takes the view that χρησμοῖς (297) probably refers back to the initial χρησμὸς (270). In that case, Orestes means the whole oracle, including the god's command and his warning.

6. Lebeck, (supra, n.5) 198 comments: "χρὴ denotes three types of constraint: "must", that which one is compelled to do by circumstance; "ought", that which one feels bound to do out of regard for propriety or ideal right; the necessity of fate, what is destined, must befall.... These three meanings, sometimes distinct, are here inseparable."

7. H.D.F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London, 1956) 49.

8. Lesky, (supra, n.3) 19-23, 117-123, 126-127; see 4-9 for a summary of earlier views: the kommos is the most controversial passage in the play. The two extremes of interpretation are represented by U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, Griechische Tragödien[6] II (Berlin, 1910) 143-44 and W. Schadewaldt, "Der Kommos in Aischylos' Choephoren", Hermes 67 (1932) 312-54, esp. 348-51. Wilamowitz argued that the kommos showed Orestes tormented by inner doubts and gradually persuaded to resolve on vengeance. Schadewaldt replied by emphasizing the ritual nature of the kommos, essentially a dirge for the dead king, and stating that there is no movement in Orestes' resolve from beginning to end. Professor Lesky represents the middle view, arguing against Schadewaldt's "static" interpretation of the kommos that it is indeed "dynamic" in terms of Orestes' growing resolve, but dismissing Wilamowitz's notion that Orestes is tormented by inner doubts. My own view most closely approximates to that of Lesky, with the addendum that "double motivation" in this play should not be exaggerated at the expense of the chthonic element. As A.F. Garvie comments, in "The Opening of the Choephori", BICS 17 (1970) 82: "Perhaps however one should go further, and say that Orestes' decision is not doubly but triply determined." On the kommos see also Lebeck (supra, n.5) 110-14.

9. Sophocles, Electra e.g. 37, 197, 1391-97.

10. See Garvie (supra, n.8) 85 on Hermes Dolios and on all these passages.

11. For references to Apollo's cave at Delphi, see H.W. Parke and D.E.W. Wormell, The Delphic Oracle (Oxford, 1956) I. 11 and 19ff., and E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1963) 73, 91-92, n.66.

12. The identification of Apollo and Helios is first evidenced in Euripides, and it later became common. See L.R. Farnell, The Cults of the Greek States (reprinted Chicago, 1971) IV 137ff. Farnell dismisses, however, the theory that Apollo was in origin a solar god.

13. Kitto (supra, n.7) 53; cf. J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London, 1962) 102: "In his [Pylades'] one utterance we sense an awful authority, as if the god had possessed the seeming-mute and spoken through him."

14. The phrase is ambiguous, in Greek as in English: The "sworn oaths of Apollo" can mean either "the oaths which Apollo swore" or "the oaths sworn to Apollo" (and hence belonging to him). The Scholiast gives the gloss: ὁρκωμάσια ἃ συνωμόσαμεν, "the oaths which we swore", clearly referring to a covenant between Orestes and the speaker, Pylades. It is unlikely, however, that Aeschylus would thus draw attention to Pylades, who does not take an active part in the matricide before Euripides' Orestes. But it is impossible to be sure whether the oaths were sworn by Apollo to Orestes, or by Orestes to Apollo. There is no evidence in the play of oaths sworn by either god or mortal, and so Pylades' oblique reference here is conceivably a remnant from the tradition before Aeschylus.

The concept of a god swearing an oath to a man is not impossible, but rare. A possible parallel exists in Ag. 1290: ὀμώμοται γὰρ ὅρκος ἐκ θεῶν μέγας. The line is deleted by Professor Fraenkel in his edition, who remarks in his note that the sworn oaths at Cho. 901 are not to be interpreted as sworn by the god. See E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus: Agamemnon (Oxford, 1950) III 600f., and n.1. The line is retained, however, by Denniston-Page; who find the gods' promise that Orestes shall avenge his father in Homer, Od. I, 37ff. sufficiently close to the Agamemnon passage to provide a convincing literary precedent. See J.D. Denniston and D. Page, Aeschylus: Agamemnon (Oxford, 1957) 187.

It is possible, then, that Apollo swore an oath to Orestes. At Cho. 269 Orestes declares that Apollo's oracle will not betray him, and at Eum. 64 Apollo in person makes that promise to Orestes. The use of προδιδόναι in both cases suggests that Orestes and Apollo both view the god as being under obligation to stand by the mortal. Nevertheless, the immediate context makes it more feasible that the oaths were sworn by Orestes to Apollo; for Pylades'

emphasis is upon the enmity which Orestes will incur if he should fail to perpetrate the vengeance (902).

15. Wilamowitz (supra, n.8) 143-144.

16. Wilamowitz (supra, n.4) 205.

17. Jones (supra, n.13) 101.

18. Jones (supra, n.13) 102.

19. Wilamowitz, G.T. (supra, n.15) 144.

20. See F. Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (New York, 1949) 186 n.34: "It is, after all impossible to regard the μητρὸς ἔγκοτοι κύνες in one play as 'Gewissensqualen' and in the other as real deities."

21. For evidence of the concept of conscience as probably later than Euripides, see V.A. Rodgers, "Σύνεσις and the Expression of Conscience", GRBS 10 (1969) 241-54. For the traditional Greek concept of pollution, and the differences between this concept and our own concept of guilt, see A.W.H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1960) Chapter V, pp.86-115.

22. Jones (supra, n.13) 104.

23. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 97-104.

24. Chapter I, p.2.

25. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 98.

26. Kitto (supra, n.7) 39-42.

27. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 98.

28. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 99 cites Cho. 250-51: οὐ γὰρ ἐντελεῖς θήραν πατρῴαν προσφέρειν σκηνήμασιν as one of his "unmistakable symbolic references to the sacrifice of Iphigenia" (98) by explaining that Agamemnon's prey was "Troy at the cost of Iphigeneia" - This is true, but not implied by the Greek here.

29. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 99.

30. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 99.

31. Winnington-Ingram (supra. n.1) 99.

32. Winnington-Ingram (supra. n.1) 99-100.

33. Winnington-Ingram (supra. n.1) 97. My own view is similar to that expressed by Garvie (supra, n.8) 82: "Apollo's oracle at 269ff. reads more like a statement [his emphasis] of what will happen to

Orestes if he fails to avenge his father.... He will be pursued by the Furies of Agamemnon..."

34. Winnington-Ingram (supra. n.1) 100.

35. Kitto (supra, n.7) 39.

36. Kitto (supra, n.7) 39.

37. Kitto (supra, n.7) 48.

Chapter IV. Eumenides

1. It is apparent, from 38, that the priestess is an old woman. At Delphi, Apollo's mouthpiece was always a woman, called the "Pythia".

2. The tradition that Apollo slew the Python is recorded in the Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo, 388ff.. The Hymn does not present the slaying of the dragon as other than incidental to the founding of the prophetic shrine. But later, the Python was interpreted as an embodiment or symbol of the earth-goddess whom Apollo dispossessed. See J. Fontenrose, Python (Berkeley, 1959); also, for a briefer discussion, H.W. Parke, Greek Oracles (London, 1967) 35-36, and H. Lloyd-Jones, The Eumenides by Aeschylus, (London, 1970) 9-10.

3. Lloyd-Jones (supra, n.2) 14 comments: "The blood is presumably the pig's blood used by Apollo to purify Orestes from the pollution caused by murder." This is clearly not the case. The audience have not, at this stage, seen Orestes or Apollo and they could not conceivably have leaped to the conclusion that Orestes had already been purified. Moreover, the priestess refers to the blood as dripping from Orestes' hands. It is quite obviously the blood which stained Orestes' hands at the end of the Choephoroe (1055), the blood of Clytemnestra which he had shed. It is this blood which draws on the Erinyes in their pursuit of Orestes. Lloyd-Jones' explanation of the blood is probably an attempt to rationalise the fact that Orestes still has this blood dripping from his hands, after all his travels; but this is to understand the blood too literally. Cf. 204, where the Chorus refers to the blood as "fresh".

4. Cf. M. Croiset, "Le Role d'Apollon dans les Euménides d'Eschyle" REG 32 (1919) 103:

> "Il faut nous bien représenter l'allure fieŕe et hautaine que le poète a vouler certainement prêter à son personnage et que le jeu de l'acteur devait traduire conformément à ses instructions."

For a study of representations of Apollo, see L.R. Farnell, The Cults of Greek States (reprinted Chicago, 1971) 329-355, and Plates XVII-XLIX. Prior to, and contemporary with, the Oresteia, representations of Apollo characterised him as youthful, strong, intellectual, and stern.

5. A. Lebeck, The Oresteia (Washington, D.C., 1971) 138.

6. Lebeck (supra, n.5) 140.

7. Eum. 186-190; translation by H. Lloyd-Jones (supra, n.2) 22.

8. F. Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (New York, 1949) 182.

9. G. Thomson, Aeschylus and Athens (London, 1941) 262.

10. Lloyd-Jones (supra, n.2) 23.

11. C.J. Herington, Aeschylus: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. M. McCall (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.), 152-153. This study first appeared in Arion 4^3 (1965) 387-403.

12. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "The role of Apollo in the Oresteia", CR 47 (1933) 101.

13. For the probable existence of a Delphic epic version of Orestes' matricide, see I, p.2, and note 3 to that chapter.

14. Unfortunately, the end of this line is disputed. The MSS read ἀξιαντεπαξιων. Kitto accepts Hermann's proposal of ἀει' ἀντ' ἐπαξίων, which, taken with σέβουσαί, means "We pay you honour worthy of the honour you have paid us." See H.D-F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London, 1956) 62-63. This interpretation strengthens Kitto's argument that Athena is superior to Apollo, by respecting the Erinyes where he repudiates them. The more obvious reading, however, is ἀξίαν κἀπ' ἀξίων, "worthy and of worthy parentage". This reading of Arnoldus fits with the scholiast's explanation (ἀξίων οὖσαν γονέων) and is accepted by Page, in the most recent Oxford edition of Aeschylus' plays, and by Lloyd-Jones in his recent translation.

15. Kitto, F.M., (supra, n.14) 60.

16. Kitto, F.M., (supra, n.14) 63.

17. Croiset (supra, n.4) 102.

18. Croiset (supra, n.4) 103.

19. Orestes here uses the verb ἐξηγέομαι of Apollo's instruction, just as the Erinyes employed it at 595 of Apollo's instructing Orestes to kill his mother. The verb is most frequently employed to denote instruction in some religious sense; either to instruct by means of an oracle, or to expound the meaning of an oracle or dream. Apollo's priests at Athens were known as ἐξηγηταί, and Apollo himself had the title of πάτριος ἐξηγητής.

20. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "Clytemnestra and the Vote of Athena" JHS 1947, 142.

21. Croiset (supra, n.4) 104.

22. Croiset (supra, n.4) 105.

23. Thomson (supra, n.9) 259.

24. Croiset (supra, n.4) 101.

25. Croiset (supra, n.4) 104.

26. Lloyd-Jones (supra, n.2) 50.

27. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.20) 142-3.

28. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.14) 39.

29. Solmsen (supra, n.8) 193.

30. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.20) 143 n.107.

31. There was a tradition that Zeus did unloose Kronos' fetters, and made him ruler of the Isles of the Blest. The story is told by Pindar, in Olympian 2.

32. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.12) 103.

33. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.14) 67.

34. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.14) 67.

35. Croiset (supra, n.4) 108.

36. Aristotle, De generatione Animalium, 1. 763b 30ff.

37. For the repetition of ξένος see e.g. Cho. 668, 674, 700, 703, 710, 712. On this aspect of the initial confrontation of Orestes and Clytemnestra, see Lebeck (supra, n.5) 126-27.

38. Lebeck (supra, n.5) 124-128.

39. Lebeck (supra, n.5) 125.

40. Kitto (supra, n.14) 58; Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.20) 143.

41. Cf. Lebeck (supra, n.5) 203, n.41.

42. Kitto (supra, n.14) 58.

43. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.12) 103.

44. Whether Athena actually casts her vote or not is still a controversial issue; but one which does not affect my argument.

45. Solmsen (supra, n.8) 194n.65.

46. Thomson (supra, n.9) 269.

47. J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (London, 1962) III.

48. Lebeck (supra, n.5) 135-38.

49. K. Reinhardt, Aischylos als Regisseur und Theologe (Bern, 1949) 151-52. Herington (supra, n.11), contends that the Eumenides shows the influence of Old Comedy. See Herington, "The influence of Old Comedy on Aeschylus' later trilogies", TAPA 94 (1963) 113-25.

50. See Lloyd-Jones (supra, n.2) Appendix, 76.

51. H.D.F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy (London, 1939) 92.

52. Kitto (supra, n.51) 87.

Conclusion

1. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, "The role of Apollo in the Oresteia", CR 47 (1933) 98.

2. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 98.

3. Chapter III, 73.

4. H.D.F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama (London, 1956) 68.

5. Chapter II, 41-42.

6. Winnington-Ingram (supra, n.1) 103.

7. H.D.F. Kitto, Greek Tragedy (London, 1939) 90.

8. Chapter IV, 93-94.

9. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.4) 68.

10. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.4) 69.

11. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.4) 69.

12. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.4) 69.

13. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.4) 69.

14. Kitto, F.M. (supra, n.4) 70.

15. This has been the subject of much controversy. See, for opposing sides of the argument, H. Lloyd-Jones, "Zeus in Aeschylus" _JHS_ 76 (1956) 56-57 and H.D.F. Kitto, _Poiesis: Structure and Thought_ (Berkeley, 1966) 57-64.

16. Kitto, _Poiesis_ (supra, n.15) 57.

17. Kitto, _GT_ (supra, n.7) 92.

18. Chapter II 44, 45.

19. It has also been argued that Aeschylus' presentation of Zeus in the _Prometheia_ was designed to show, not a "progressive" Zeus, but two permanent aspects of his nature. See H. Lloyd-Jones, "The Theology of Aeschylus", _CR_ 22 (1972) 179.

20. Euripides' _Bacchae_ provides a useful contrast. The ambivalence of the god, demonstrated throughout the play, is overtly stated at 859ff.:

    γνώσεται δὲ τὸν Διὸς
    Διόνυσον, ὃς πέφυκεν ἐν τέλει θεός,
    δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ'ἠπιώτατος.

    "He shall recognise the son of Zeus, Dionysus,
    who is by nature a god with a god's authority,
    most terrible and most gentle to mankind."

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(Abbreviations of titles of journals or periodicals correspond to those designated by the American Journal of Archaeology 74[1] (1970) 1-8.

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Author 

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