The Rhetoric of Wolves

by

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B.A., University of Colorado
M.A., University of Montana

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of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Supervisory Committee

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Abstract

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This interdisciplinary dissertation, *The Rhetoric of Wolves*, attempts to answer a simple, yet broad question: What do we talk about when we talk about wolves? While even the "we" here is contentious, as there are many perspectives and positions through which the wolf is figured, there are also many kinds of wolves, but no "real" wolf. That is, this dissertation takes seriously the contention that has recently arisen in the environmental humanities and animal studies through the late work of Jacques Derrida and others that figurations of "the animal" matter, not only for multi-species relations and coexistence, but for how the subject and polity are constructed and normalized. As these discourses put "the animal" into question, that is, how the animal functions as a discursive resource in socio-political issues, so too does this dissertation question how "the wolf" functions discursively in contemporary socio-political issues in North America. To address these questions, this dissertation utilizes a Foucaultian-inspired genealogical analysis of the discourse around "the wolf" understand how rhetoric about wolves coalesces into what I call "rhetorical assemblages" that vie to become regimes of truth that are used to attempt to settle the identity of the wolf and human-"animal" relations through the productive capacity of various power/knowledges that are historically and materially grounded. To do so, this dissertation examines and analyzes the rhetoric of a series of case studies in North America where figurations of wolves produce "the wolf" variously as man-hunting machines, outlaws that disrupt the natural order, illegal immigrants threatening family and tradition, and always already potential terrorists who must be productively managed through a biopolitics that attempts to make good the expectations of the dominant neoliberal frame of contemporary social and political life.

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Dedication

To Scout, the best dog ever.

Introduction: Ecce Lupus

> "There is no wolf yet when things are looming *à pas de loup*. There is only a word, a spoken word, a fable, a fable-wolf, a fabulous animal, or even a fantasy (fantasma in the sense of a revenant in Greek…); there is only another "wolf" that figures something else—something or somebody else, the other that the fabulous figure of the wolf, like a metonymic substitute or supplement, would come both to announce and conceal, to manifest and mask."
>
> -J. Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign Vol. 1* (5-6).

> "In some cases, there wasn't a single wolf print in the mud next to the carcass. Had wolves grown wings? The evidence didn't usually match the ranchers' stories. Wolves had been absent from the state for a generation, wiped out by the same federal government that was now considering restoring them. But mention that four-letter word, w-o-l-f, and people start seeing the animal everywhere and every dead ranch animal or pet as the wolf's latest eviscerated victim."
>
> -C. Niemeyer, *Wolfer* (160).

The above two epigraphs, one from philosopher/theorist Jacques Derrida, and one from former government wolf trapper Carter Niemeyer, are indicative of how this dissertation proceeds. That is, this dissertation interrogates the ways in which the "wolf" is figured in cultural and political contexts, and articulates how these figurations effect wildlife policy and wolf-human coexistence. As such, it participates in the contemporary discourse about wolves from the perspective of what has come to be called animal studies, or questions about the human/non-human divide which invoke political and cultural theory. Furthermore, through a discourse analysis that intervenes in the human dimensions of wildlife policy, it genealogizes how the rhetoric of wolves, and the resulting figurations of the "wolf," constitute a "hazardous play of dominations" (Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" 83) that has material consequences for wolf-human relations.

As Derrida notes, the wolf is always looming *à pas de loup*, as an overwrought symbol that announces something to come that is not the wolf, namely, normative claims about political

power and the way the world works, claims about relations between the human and non-human, and how the figuration of the wolf matters in the rhetorical construction of a world in common or a common sense, or what in more Foucaultian terms might be considered a "regime of truth" (Foucault, "Truth and Power" 131). In her reading of his *Beast and Sovereign* lectures, Sarah Cain reiterates Derrida's assertion, contending that

> The wolf has historically served as a figure for animality in general, the beast whose fabular savagery provides us with a recurrent motif for the non-human, from the Capitoline wolf of Rome's foundational legend to the nursery tale of Red Riding Hood. As Derrida points out, however, the wolf has also, conversely, served as a recurrent figure for the human, whether in a Hobbesian understanding of man's base wolfish nature (*homo homini lupus*), Rousseau's confessional representation of himself as a werewolf (loup-garou), or Freud's Wolf Man…The step of the wolf is also, though, in the idiomatic French, the pas de loup, the not-wolf or no wolf, the wolf who is not there. (Cain 282)

Derrida uses the figure of the wolf to deconstruct both the "beast" and "sovereign," and to show how a deconstruction of each illuminates their continuous interpenetration and inseparability. He thus calls into question the very (political) distinction that purportedly separates the human from the animal, and which places the animal outside the political. In this dissertation, along similar lines, I use the figuration of "the wolf" to show how some wolves are subordinated to a singular universal figuration of the wolf, or truth about wolves. Wolves that inhabit the earth's northern hemisphere, or what Derrida calls "wolves out in nature [*dans la nature*] as we say" (*The Beast* 4), are swallowed by the figuration that not only takes the wolf to represent animality, or wildness, for example, but often to represent something about human nature that is regarded as wolfish. For such reasons, I contend, Niemeyer remarks, "Wolves have nothing to do with

reality" (Niemeyer 284). In this dissertation, then, I focus on how some wolves become an absent presence when they are spoken about through the figuration of "the wolf," seeking to answer the question of what it is we[1] talk about when we talk about wolves, and how these figurations of the wolf condition and limit the possibilities for wolf-human coexistence.

What Niemeyer asserts in the above epigraph is that there is a tension wherein "the wolf" imposes upon any discourse attempting to invoke wolves. As a similar French idiom states, "speak of the wolf and you see his tail"; it is as if the wolf is fleeing. The wolf does not appear, like the devil in the equivalent English idiom, but was already there, its tail metonymic evidence of its presence and deeds. The wolf's fleeing tail is there when it is spoken of despite wolves' lack of material involvement in what is spoken. It is a wolf that is looming and fleeing, but always there.

Immediately after beginning to re-inhabit places like Montana in the 1980s and early 90s (the state Niemeyer is referring to above), wolves were adamantly invoked as the cause of an extraordinary amount of depredation and death, whether cows, dogs, or elk, victimizing civilization not so much through their physical presence (though wolves are, indeed, predators) but through their over-determined figuration. Wolves were always already an immanent threat, about to appear and wreak havoc. It is this wolf, what Steven Fritts calls "the symbolic wolf" that is "a product of the human mind, a cultural construct colored by our individual, cultural, or social conditioning" (Fritts et al. 290), that is, I argue, the wolf that we talk about when we talk about wolves. It is "the sum total of what we believe about the animal, what we think it represents, and what we want and need it to be" (290). It is a discourse not just about an animal, the wolf, but the

[1] While I'm alluding to a Raymond Carver story here ("What We Talk About When We Talk About Love") that circles around its topic, the "we" here is an indication of those under the sway of these especially dominant Western discourses and figurations of wolves.

interests and desires that drive these figurations of the wolf, one that is fraught with a conflict wolves seem to bring with them whenever invoked.

Nonetheless, the recovery of wolf populations and expansion of their range is often regarded as one of the success stories of conservation efforts in the 20th century. As Luigi Boitani relates this history in the seminal anthology of scientific wolf study, *Wolves* (2003):

> With the exceptions of those in Alaska, Canada, and northern Asia, most wolf populations continued to decline until the late 1960s, when most were classified as endangered or lingering at dangerously low numbers (Mech 1982b). It appeared inevitable that the wolf's range would continue to shrink, especially in the case of the small, isolated populations of Europe. However, this realization brought strong and effective responses by governments, and by the early 1980s wolf populations had begun to increase. The viability of many small wolf populations and the tenacity of the wolf, which allowed it to survive in even the most degraded habitats, had been underestimated. Legal protection and a ban on poison was all it took in most areas. (Boitani 321)

Just prior to this recovery and expansion of wolf range, and likely an influence on it, the formal scientific study of wolves emerged around the time of WWII, not long after most wolves had been largely extirpated from the contiguous U.S. and Western Europe. As Boitani notes, "If we look back 60 years [75 now] to the first landmark monograph by Young and Goldman (1944), or just 30 years [now 45] to Mech's (1970) volume, we can see that both scientific knowledge and human attitudes toward the wolf have improved tremendously" (Mech and Boitani, "Conclusion" 341). While these improvements in both scientific knowledge and human attitudes toward wolves have led to a greater acceptance of wolves on the landscape overall, the burgeoning establishment of this new regime of truth regarding wolves has been fraught with resistance that

has prevented it from gaining more traction. In particular, what is claimed to have emerged in parallel by wolf researchers and reinforced by various media covering wolf controversies is a conflict between what is regarded variously as a pro-wolf/anti-wolf interests, or a conflict between "wolf haters and wolf advocates" (Mech and Boitani, "Introduction" xv), purportedly predicated upon an "increasing distance between urban and rural cultures" (Mech and Boitani, "Conclusion" 341).

However, rendering the conflict as one between pro-wolf urbanites and anti-wolf rural inhabitants over-simplifies the conflict, I argue. This becomes especially apparent when considering recent research that has shown gendered differences within local cultures regarding wolf tolerance (Hogberg, et al. 7), for instance, or that teens in the UK (where wolves have been extirpated for over 200 years) are significantly more fearful of wolves (65% in Northern Ireland) and held more negative attitudes than their Spanish rural teen counterparts (35%) who live in a country populated by more than 2000 wolves (Bath 191). Thus, while a binary conflict regarding wolves between rural wolf opponents and urban wolf proponents may seem attractive, with scientists caught in the middle as is sometimes portrayed, biologist Stephen Fritts notes,

> The symbolic status of the wolf, or shall we say "wolf mythology" is so strong that biological facts about the animal are often irrelevant—a situation especially vexing to biologists (Mech 2000b,c). For example, when biologists brief public officials about the actual numbers of livestock wolf kill, the officials focus instead on their constituents' perception of the problem and perhaps on their own prospects for re-election, not facts and figures about wolf depredations. What people *choose* to believe about wolves can be more important than the objective truth, or at least those beliefs can have a greater effect.

> Whether looking at the past, present, or future, it is beliefs and perceptions that primarily affect the survival of wolves." (Fritts et al. 290)

While the formal scientific study of wolves and pace of scientific research may be slow, it seems that what is of greater significance is that "wolf mythology" and the symbolic wolf seem to be much more entrenched as a yet operative regime of truth regarding what wolves are and the possibilities for wolf-human coexistence. Indeed, I argue, the re-emergence of a preference for wolf mythology is not merely a romantic turn toward rejecting science, but is a fashioning of a rhetorical assemblage to promote specific interests, drawing from folklore, fables, and fairytales that have had past persuasive currency in not only figuring wolves, but many "others" besides.

Indeed, there is a vocal and politically influential contingent in North America that not only resists many of the claims regarding wolves made by wolf biologists over the last seventy years, but contends these biologists are promoting a "harmless wolf theory." This vocal contingent in fact argues fairytales and fables reveal a truth about real wolves that is costly to ignore. Attorney Ted B. Lyon's anthology *The Real Wolf* is exemplary in this vein. As Lyon contends, "To discredit the rich legacy of wolf folklore and mythology was to invite disaster. The modern myth of the 'harmless wolf' is not only inaccurate but may also have contributed to attacks and deaths by wolves in North America in recent years by downplaying wolves' inherent viciousness" (Lyon, "Selling" 25). Indeed Lyon goes so far as to claim that wolf "fables, folklore, fairy tales and mythology from Europe and Asia" featuring wolves as characters were the first PSAs about wolves, or what he calls "the first wolf educational campaigns" (22). "These stories" Lyon asserts "are warnings, especially to children and shepherds, designed to keep people alive" (23). These claims are further supported by Valerius Geist, a former ungulate zoologist and self-made wolf expert widely quoted and cited in circles resistant to wolf-human

coexistence and featured in Lyon's anthology. Geist remarks, "Clearly, the biology of the wolf ceased to be mere matter of science, but became politicized. The politically correct version is currently the image of the 'harmless' wolf that does not attack people. Matters to the contrary are labeled derogatorily as the 'Little Red Riding Hood Lies' all historical evidence to the contrary!" (Geist, "When Do Wolves" 10). To the contrary, Geist further contends "Alas, the fairy tale by the brothers Grimm, Little Red Riding Hood, is not based on myths, ignorance, or a misunderstanding of wolves. Rather, it is based on very real and terrible experiences with wolves throughout the centuries" (Geist, "Let's Get Real: Beyond "). The Grimm's version of "Little Red Riding Hood" he further asserts, was "based on very real events and not a case of ignorant superstition. It served as a valid warning to parents and children not to enter the forests containing wolves and be on the lookout for such" (Geist, "When Do Wolves" 20).

It is significant, I argue, that Geist claims that the Grimm's version of the "Little Red Riding Hood" folktale, or "Little Red Cap," is based in "very real and terrible experiences with wolves," as if it is an ur-text reflective of the originary relations between humans and wolves. As folklorist and author of *Little Red Riding Hood Uncloaked* Catherine Orenstein remarks, "We tend to think of fairy tales as timeless and universal, but in fact they express our collective truths even as those truths shift over time and place" ("Dances"). That is to say, fairy tales such as "Little Red Riding Hood," and especially this fairy tale, have changed over time and place, transforming to serve contemporaneous interests. What I argue here and elsewhere in this dissertation is that this effort by Geist and Lyon, as well as others, is an attempt to establish a new regime of truth regarding wolves, and how the "wolf" is figured more generally, despite the fact that this truth is rhetorically framed as a suppressed, timeless truth. It is it an attempt to re-establish fairy tales as part of the true history that allows us to properly identify the wolf for what

it is. It also constitutes an attempt, I argue, to undercut scientific research about wolves and the situated truths that have arisen from such study over the last three quarters of a century. In this way, this rhetoric is reactionary, aimed quite overtly at what might be supposed broadly as the environmental movement, though this rhetorical framing intersects with other political reactions to feminism, racial justice, and immigration in vowing to return to a suppressed truth. As Derrida hypothesizes regarding fables,[2] the interests these efforts serve are most often political. Derrida remarks that the

> Political, and even politicians', logic and rhetoric would be always, through and through, the putting to work of a fable, a strategy to give meaning and credit to a fable, an affabulation--and therefore to a story indissociable from a moral, the putting of living beings, animals or humans, on stage, a supposedly instructive, informative, pedagogical, edifying, story, fictive, put up, artificial, even invented from whole cloth, but destined to educate, to teach, to *make known,* to share a knowledge, to bring to knowledge. (35)

Thus, rather than attempting to demonstrate that a fairy tale like "Little Red Riding Hood" is or is not accurate in its depiction of wolves, it is, given the genealogical method this dissertation applies, more appropriate to ask the question as to what interests such a telling of a fairy tale like Grimm's version of "Little Red Riding Hood" serves, what it "makes known," and what effects this making known has. What is consistent, I argue in what follows, is not the wolf as a species that can be identified through the fairy tale across time and place, but the figuring of the wolf, or wolf-like creature, as an investment of power that reflects particular, situated interests; to genealogize such a "wolf," as Derrida calls such a figuration, is to genealogize how the wolf matters for the symbolic power and rhetorical currency that it affords.

---

[2] And it may be presumed that this is equally applicable to fairy tales (if not more so, considering their didactic nature).

Fifty Shades of Red

Repeatedly, Geist contends that the Grimm's version of the "Little Red Riding Hood" fairy tale, "Little Red Cap" (1812), reflects actual experiences with physical wild wolves. As Geist claims, it is "based on sound evidence" ("When Do Wolves" 1) and "very real and terrible experiences with wolves" ("Let's Get Real: Beyond") that are "rooted in painful reality" ("Large Carnivores" 1). This version of the fairy tale, or an approximation derived from this version, has become the dominant version of the Little Red Riding Hood fairy tale upon which most literary versions in North America and Europe are based.

In this version, Little Red Cap is given cake and a bottle of wine to take to her ill grandmother. While her mother warns her "Don't tarry on your way, and don't stray from the path" (Zipes, *Trials* 124), Little Red Cap does nonetheless stray from the path after encountering "the wolf" who encourages her to look around at the "pretty flowers" in the woods and "lovely birds" singing. When asked where she's going, Little Red Cap, not knowing "what a wicked sort of an animal" the wolf is, naively tells the wolf exactly how to find her grandmother's house. When Little Red Cap arrives at her grandmother's house, she finds the door open and her grandmother in bed with her cap pulled down over her face. She remarks then upon the unusual features of her grandmother/the wolf, exclaiming "Oh, grandmother, what big ears you have!" (Zipes, *Trials* 125), and she continues on until remarking about the grandmother's "terrible big mouth," upon which the wolf returns, "The better to eat you with," and gobbles her up. Stuffed with both the grandmother and Little Red Cap, the wolf lies back in the bed and falls asleep snoring. A hunter, or gamekeeper[3] (depending on the translation), hears the snoring. Seeing the

[3] In German the term for hunter or gamekeeper is "Jäger," which Zipes notes is "associated with the police" (*Trials* 17) in the sense that the gamekeeper functions as an early version of the police that protects the property and game owned by nobility.

wolf, whom "he had been hunting a long time," and his girth, he slits open the wolf's belly with a shearing knife and Little Red Cap and the grandmother pop out. They then fill the wolf's belly with stones, which when the wolf jumps up from the bed somehow kills him. Later on, another wolf speaks to Little Red Cap in the woods, but this time she is prepared and runs directly to her grandmother's house, beating the wolf there. Unable to gain entry posing as Little Red Cap, the wolf scales the roof to pounce on Little Red Cap when she leaves. The grandmother orders Little Red cap to fill a "big stone trough" (126) with water from boiling sausages. Driven by the smell of sausage, the wolf peers over the roof and falls in and drowns.

However, this version was not the ur-text that Geist seems to assume that it is. Indeed, like most fairy tales, a genre popularized in the late seventeenth century amongst the haute bourgeoisie and nobility, it is based on earlier literary versions and oral folk tales. In a version of this rural French oral tale reconstituted by folklorist Paul Delarue, entitled "The Story of Grandmother," a mother tells her daughter (who dons no red hood, cap, or chaperon) to take some bread and milk to her grandmother (Zipes, *Trials* 5). Upon her way at the crossroads, "she met bzou, the werewolf," who asks her where she's going. She tells him to her granny's, and when asked whether she'll take the "path of pins or the path of needles," replies "the path of needles," and goes about her way gathering up needles on the way to her grandmother's house. Upon arriving and being ushered in by her granny/the bzou, she is told to put the bread and milk on the counter and eat some of the meat and wine on the table, which is, as the little cat notes, her granny's flesh and blood. The bzou then encourages her to strip off her clothes and throw them into the fire piece by piece, and get into bed him. After doing so, the "what big…" back and forth proceeds as usual, though pointedly focusing on very masculine human attributes like hairiness and big shoulders. When the bzou answers her remark about his big mouth with "The

better to eat you with!" (6), though, the girl gets wise and tells the bzou "I've got to go badly. Let me go outside." After convincing the bzou she cannot "do it in bed" as he suggests, he ties a woolen rope to her foot, which she then ties to a plum tree outside. When the bzou/werewolf becomes impatient and asks "Are you making a load out there?" and no one answers, he realizes he has been tricked and the little girl has escaped through her quick wit.

While this oral tale shares similarities with the Grimm's version, as well as other literary versions, the differences are significant in so far as they reflect what the tale "makes known." As folklorist Jack Zipes notes, unlike the Grimm's version, or Charles Perrault's 1697 version,

> It is obvious from this oral tale that the narrative perspective is sympathetic to a young peasant girl who learns to cope with the world around her. She is shrewd, brave, tough, and independent. Evidence indicates she was probably undergoing a social ritual connected to sewing communities: the maturing young woman proves she can handle needles, replace an older woman, and contend with the opposite sex. (Zipes, *Why Fairy Tales* 35)

In the end, the little girl has learned her lesson, as she "shrewdly outwits the wolf and saves herself. No help from granny, hunter, or father!" (Zipes *Trials* 7). As such, Zipes remarks, "Clearly, the folk tale was not just a warning tale, but also a celebration of a young girl's coming of age" (7).

This version of the little girl is drastically different then from the Grimm's version, but also from the other dominant form of the fairytale (developed from this French oral tradition) penned by Charles Perrault. In Perrault's version, "La Petite Chaperon Rouge" (1697), the first literary version of the "Little Red Riding Hood" fairytale, Zipes notes, "the girl is pretty, spoiled, gullible, and helpless" (*Trials* 9). While she doesn't partake in a cannibal meal of her

grandmother, and Perrault eliminates the striptease, she is nonetheless tragically punished for the transgressions against proper behavior. On her way to see her grandmother, she meets "old neighbor wolf" but "did not know it was dangerous to stop and listen to a wolf" (70). Here, a wolf replaces the werewolf or ogre of the oral versions for the first time (Zipes, *Trials* 16). As Barry Lopez notes, "the wolf plays the role of an ogre" (262). After giving specific directions to the wolf, Little Red Riding Hood agrees to take the longer path and gets caught up "gathering nuts, running after butterflies, and making small bouquets of flowers" (Zipes, *Trials* 70), displaying a naïve sense of nature romanticism contrary to contemporaneous Enlightenment ideals. When she arrives, and hears the wolf's gruff voice posing as her granny's she dismisses it, believing her grandmother has a cold. The wolf tells her to put the butter and biscuits she has brought down and jump into bed with her/him. Little Red Riding Hood remarks upon his big arms, legs, ears, eyes and teeth in the usual fashion, and the wolf ends by saying, "the better to eat you with," throwing himself upon her and eating her up. It's a tragedy, with no salvation, no rescue, just a punishment for young female naivety.

But while the tale ends there, Perrault includes, as he does in his other fairytales, a moral at the end in verse:

> One sees here that young children,
>
> Especially young girls,
>
> Pretty, well brought-up, and gentle,
>
> Should never listen to anyone who happens by,
>
> And if this occurs, it is not so strange
>
> When the wolf should eat them.
>
> I say the wolf, for all wolves

Are not the same kind.

There are some with winning ways,

Not loud, nor bitter, or angry,

Who are tame, good-natured, and pleasant

And who follow young ladies

Right into their homes, right into their alcoves.

But alas for those who do not know that of all the wolves

The docile ones are those who are most dangerous.

(Zipes, *Trials* 71)

What should be clear from Perrault's version is that while much as with the oral versions the emphasis is on the threat of rape or sex out of wedlock, as in most versions of the fairytale, there is no possibility of salvation. The moral "warns little girls to beware of strangers, otherwise they will deservedly suffer the consequences" (Zipes, *Why Fairy Tales* 35). As such, Zipes contends, "the key idea…is that women are responsible for their own rape, an idea not central to the oral tale." Indeed, as some folklorists have noted, the moral is consistent with a haute bourgeoisie morality about sexuality and childhood that was becoming dominant in the seventeenth century in France as this class began to intermingle with nobility. As Zipes notes, Perrault "was interested in contributing to the prevalent discourse on *civilité* through the fairy tale" (*Trials and Tribulations* 10). This meant that proper haute bourgeoisie and aristocratic young women should not speak to "charming, handsome frequenters of the bluestocking salons who seduced and deflowered young girls of the upper crust" (Orenstein, *Little* 93), figured here as "docile" wolves who are the "most dangerous." Implicit in Perrault's version then is a difference even within the species of wolf as it is figured, with some wolves more dangerous, namely those least expected

to be. In other words, this requires an assumed figuring of the wolf anthropomorphically as "tame" and "docile," and yet a dangerous threat within society. This "civilizing" of French culture in the early eighteenth century was, in Foucaultian terms, disciplinary, as "the rational purpose of such social pressure was to bring about an internalization of social norms and mores so that they would appear second nature or habit" (Zipes, *Trials* 12). As Foucault notes in *The History of Sexuality Vol. 1,*

> The most rigorous techniques were formed and, more particularly, applied first, with the greatest intensity, in the economically privileged and politically dominant classes…it was in the 'bourgeois" or "aristocratic' family that the sexuality of children and adolescents was first problematized, and feminine sexuality medicalised; it was the first to be alerted to the potential pathology of sex, the urgent need to keep it under close watch and to devise a rational technology of correction. (120)

Thus, while the wolf appears for the first time in Perrault's fairy tale, it is subordinated to its figuration, becoming an absent presence wherein there is no wolf, but only an interest in figuring the wolf as something sinful and counter to the contemporaneous, emerging morality vying to become a regime of truth.

Returning to the Grimm's version of the fairy tale, much as the Perrault version expresses an upper class and aristocratic effort in the eighteenth century "to rear children more prudently and prudishly" (Zipes, *Trials* 14), the Grimms cleaned up Perrault's version for "the bourgeois socialization process of the nineteenth century and adapted it to comply with the emerging *Biedermeier* or Victorian image of little girls and proper behaviour" (14), downplaying the sexual-awakening motif and giving it a happy ending. While the moral of Perrault's version is that young upper class women shouldn't talk to strange, charming men, lest they become

regarded as coquettes, the Grimm's version is focused on disobedience to authority. Little Red Cap's greatest sin is that she strays from the path to entertain sensual delights, something explicitly warned against by her mother. For this indiscretion, she is punished, as are those around her. However, unlike in Perrault's version, the Grimms have her saved, "first by a male hunter or gamekeeper and, second, by a shrewd grandmother. Without their protection, she is lost and unable to cope with *foreign* or strange elements in her surroundings" (16). Written during the Napoleonic occupation of the Rhineland, Zipes notes that there is a socio-political dimension to the Grimm's version, namely, as Hans-Wolf Jäger notes, the story is infused with anti-French sentiments, with the red cap and wolf symbolically associated with French Jacobinite revolutionaries. Their tale, Jäger claims, "warns against being seduced and having youthful careless relations with the corrupter" (18). Thus, what the Grimm's version arguably "makes known" are the necessity of order and obedience to authority, and the dangers of sensual pleasures and wild nature. As Zipes contends,

> Their narration of "Little Red Cap" is fundamentally a justification of law and order and against individual autonomy and imagination. The reverence to be shown toward mother, grandmother, and male gamekeeper demanded is absolute. Salvation comes only in the form of a male patriarch who patrols the woods and controls the unruly forces of nature—both inner and outer. (18)

Thus, the wolf is here associated not just with wild nature, but disobedience to social and political authority and a corruption of order. The threat of the "wolf" in the Grimm's version is not, as Geist supposes, a physical threat from real wild wolves, but a threat to the interests invested in maintaining a particular social and political ordering that promotes allegiance to authority and the state. Indeed, as Zipes notes, such a theme is taken up later in the mid 1920s by

Werner von Büllow and others who, in "highly mythopoetic interpretation linking the wolf to the early Roman Empire, Red Cap to Germania, and the hunter the great German protector or *Führer*" (34), "sought to ground all the Grimms' tales in German blood and soil" (35), despite many of them having French origins.

These interests of law and order, the patriarchal control of nature, and the need for "good" government are perhaps most prominent in a lesser known American version of the "Little Red Riding Hood" fairy tale penned by Johnny Gruelle, "All About Little Red Riding Hood" (1916). In this version, Little Red Riding Hood is far from naïve; indeed she is noted as a "brave little girl" who is "not frightened" (Gruelle18) when she encounters the wolf, specifically a "grey wolf," as the North American species of wolf is known. The wolf asks her where she is going, and though she is vague in saying she's going to her "gran'ma who lives in the center of the forest" (14), the wolf sniffs the basket and somehow figures out the location. However, after meeting the wolf, she encounters some woodcutters and informs them about the wolf. They're surprised the wolf didn't attack her, but explain, "Perhaps the wolf heard us chopping wood and knew we would come to your assistance" (19), to which Little Red replies, "I am not afraid" (20). When she arrives at her grandmother's and hears the wolf's voice, she is not fooled, thinking, "That cannot be gran'ma's voice" (23). She keeps her distance, but nonetheless goes through the back and forth with the wolf. When she mentions his large teeth, and he replies "All the better to eat you with," springing from the bed to rush her, the door immediately flies open the woodcutters rush in with their sharp axes to dispatch the wolf, after which the grandmother comes out of the closet where she was hiding, for she too was suspicious of the wolf. The woodcutters inform the two women that they "knew the wolf was up to mischief when he talked

to Little Red Riding Hood back in the forest" (37). They skin the wolf and give it to Little Red as a present to make a winter coat.

On her way home she realizes "there was nothing more to fear now that the big grey wolf was dead" (42), as if the threat the wolf represents has been extirpated through proper social ordering. A striking difference with this version is that the death of the wolf is acknowledged as an expurgated "evil" to the forest animals, as well:

> The news of the grey wolf's death traveled quickly through the forest, and, before Little Red riding hood had gone far, the little rabbits and the beautiful deer, came from their hiding places and walked down the path with her. "Now we are free to roam the forest," they cried, "for he was the last of the wolves." From that day on it was safe for Little Red Riding Hood to wander through the forest to visit her grandmother or to gather wild flowers. The forest animals would come out each time to talk with her, and together they would go scampering through the woods—happy that the evil which threatened their lives had been destroyed. (43-7)

The story ends with the following didactic lesson: "And so, we learn that, like the bad wolf, there are evil beings who will never listen to reason, and, who cannot be persuaded to do right. That is why we must have policemen and prisons" (48). Gruelle's version thus not only promotes a patriarchal ordering, but a whole system of ordering practices and institutions that it is claimed are capable of not just teaching citizens how to deal with evil, but of eliminating it. As Zipes remarks, the message seems to be that "Obviously the reigning powers are just, and anyone who questions the status quo is to be looked upon as a wolfish deviant" (*Trials* 34).

What is particularly relevant about this version of the tale for this dissertation and in the context of Geist's remarks is that order is not only restored in the human world through constant

vigilance and policing; it is also restored in the natural world by killing the very last wolf, essentially extirpating a species because it is deemed "evil" and not a part of even a natural order. Indeed, implicitly, the wolf's predation is itself represented as an evil to be extirpated from the natural world. Gruelle's version, I argue, is not just an advocating of policing the wolves of society, but of eradicating every last one in order to eliminate fear from that deemed evil in this regime of truth, whether human or non-human. Significantly, this version, published in 1916, appears not long after the systematic slaughter of wolves is taken up by the federal government after the clamouring of ranchers in the West in a campaign of wolf eradication. As Luigi Boitani notes,

> Finally, in 1915, the wolf war became the responsibility of the U.S. government with the establishment of the Division of Predator and Rodent Control (PARC) within the Biological Survey (Young and Goldman 1944; Dunlap 1988). Official hunters were paid full-time to kill the last wolves, and wolf persecution became an irrational obsession with no objective relationship to the actual threat…by1930, the wolf had disappeared from almost all the forty-eight contiguous states. (*Wolves* 320-1)

Thus, the symbolic function of wolves as representatives of evil rhetorically has material consequences, with such a construction of the wolf justifying the eradication of wolves from the landscape.

Surveying the Wolf

We can't but figure wolves, as these various versions of the wolf in "Little Red Riding Hood" and other fairy tales seem to indicate. But, I argue, this is not just the case with overtly fictionalized wolves, but with all discourse that invokes the wolf. Perhaps the greatest risk in a

study of this sort is to seek the "real" wolf, to catch its tail, so to speak, following the aforementioned idiom. To claim an extra-discursive truth about wolves, though, is to assume that there is a wolf outside of power, outside of power relations, for "we are always going to be in complex power relationships with all animals on the planet" (Taylor 264), as Chloë Taylor reminds us. That is, there is no wolf outside such power relations.

Thus, I argue, it is not a matter of disproving figurations to arrive at the truth about wolves, a position that is impossible. The goal is to remain critical about the discourses, to keep from asserting the pure unmediated presence of the wolf or centering a truth about what wolves *really* are, that can then be used as a reference point. Thus, when I use the term "actual" or "wild" wolves, or talk about material wolf bodies, I attempt to do so aware that these are conventions designated by humans to indicate these non-human animals that figure in the case studies I evaluate. It is how they are represented, or what "wolf" indicates, and the material consequences and production of certain effects, and the material resistance to such consequences and effects, that are ultimately of interest in this dissertation. As Derrida notes, it is how a researcher "gives in" to the discourse that matters. As he argues,

> The quality and fecundity of a discourse are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relationship to the history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought. Here it is a question of a critical relationship to the language of the human sciences and a question of a critical responsibility to the discourse. It is a question of putting expressly and systematically the problem of the status of a discourse which borrow from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself. ("Stucture, Sign, and Play" 521).

Thus, while I will eventually make truth claims because of the use of language, I openly admit that any such truth claims are subject to the same critique. There will always be the trace of the absence of the wolf in any particular wolf I name as an "actual" wolf.

This dissertation is thus not about contesting what has been taken to be the truth about wolves in order to replace it with some truer truth. Following Foucault in his explanation of his genealogical approach, which this dissertation takes up as well, the goal is not to determine what a wolf truly is. As Foucault notes in a late interview, concerning this method,

> We are therefore not attempting to find out what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive. What we are trying to find out is what are the links, what are the connections that can be identified between mechanisms of coercion and elements of knowledge, what is the interplay of relay and support developed between them, such that a given element of knowledge takes on the effects of power in a given system where it is allocated to a true, probable, uncertain or false element, such that a procedure of coercion acquires the very form and justifications of a rational, calculated, technically efficient element, etc. ("What is Critique?" 50)

Similarly, in this dissertation, my focus is not on which figurations of the wolf are "true or false," "real or illusory," but *how* such truths come to be, that is, how what is articulated about wolves or "the wolf" comes to be taken as truthful, or within the realm of the true. This, I argue, is a socio-political issue, namely how the "wolf," like "the animal" Cary Wolfe notes, functions as "discursive resource" rather than a "zoological distinction" (Wolfe, *Before the Law 10*).

This project thus shares much with another Foucaultian genealogy, namely Edward Said's analysis of the construction of the apparatus of "Orientalism." As Said argues, "The phenomenon of Orientalism as I study it here deals principally, not with a correspondence

between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient (the East as career) despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a 'real' Orient" (*Orientalism* 5). It is these "internal consistencies" and how they are maintained as a truth about the Orient that are Said's concern, much as it is here the internal consistencies about the wolf that produce regimes of truth about the wolf that are critically analyzed through genealogy. And so, in this analysis of wolf truth, it is not the veridity that I am attempting to settle, but how and why that veridity comes about. Like Orientalism for Said, the wolf "is more particularly valuable as a sign of…power…than it is as a veridic discourse."

This is not to say that the genealogist is uninterested in truth, or that truth is merely relative. As Chloë Taylor emphasizes in her defense of Foucaultian genealogy applied to speciesism,

> Far from being uninterested in truth or believing there is no truth, Foucault urges us to ask *how we came to have the truths that we do*. This does not mean that we could have had any other truths whatsoever—there are surely reasons why some truth claims stick more easily than others—but it is to say that we could have had different truths if we had had different discourses and different practices. It is worth noting that this is a very good thing for animals: it means that if we stopped thinking about and talking about animals as we do and stopped treating them as we do we might one day come to live in a world where there would be different truths about human-animal relations. (268)

It is this "how" that is the emphasis of genealogical analysis as Taylor, Said, Foucault, and others following a Foucaultian analysis of discourse and practices, or a Foucaultian inspired analysis of rhetoric about wolves as a species, take it. Once again, as Taylor delineates,

> The point of genealogy is to show that even if a certain way of seeing the world is deeply entrenched, is experienced as visceral, and appears natural and inevitable, it is nevertheless

> contingent and came about through a series of historical accidents. What is politically useful about this project is the insight that if things could have been otherwise, they can still be otherwise; if they came to be, they can come out of being. (266)

And so, whether a figuration contains more validity from a universalizable perspective is not my concern in this dissertation. Rather, the concern here is to demonstrate the rhetorical methods that produce the truth about wolves in which wolves and truth are coextensive. The emphasis is thus on how the wolf is produced as a sign or figure which does work, a figure which is productive of material relations through sets of discourses and practices, or what might be called rhetorical assemblages, that are invested with particular interests and desires.

In order to perform this genealogical analysis of wolf truth, I draw from a diversity of discourses and texts about wolves and wolf-human relationships. These texts can be roughly divided into four overlapping categories: 1.) Wolves in contemporary North American cultural discourse, 2.) The wolf of science, 3.) The historical wolf, and 4.) The wolf in light of "the question of the animal," or what has become known as the interdisciplinary approach of animal studies. While this dissertation is focused on a genealogical discourse analysis of particular case study materials based in specific wolf-human interactions, these four overlapping conversations and approaches inform this interdisciplinary analysis of what we talk about when we talk about wolves.

The first bucket of texts this dissertation draws from is what might be broadly called figurations and representations of the wolf in contemporary North American popular culture. These texts are the primary sources my critique focuses on, and include not only myth, fairytale, literature, and film, but also importantly wildlife and land use policy debate and public discourse as it relates to wolves. This category thus also includes newspaper and online media accounts, government documents and legislation, documentary videos, interviews, and public speeches

about wolves and their impacts. Indeed, while extensive works like S.K. Robisch's *Wolves and Wolf Myth in American Literature* focus almost exclusively on myth, literature, and fiction about wolves, my approach to the case studies I examine, while informed by mythic and literary accounts of wolves, especially focuses on this latter category of public discourse and policy documents involved in figuring the wolf. It is this focus that is distinctive about the approach to the construction of wolf truth that this dissertation undertakes, and which illuminates the specific material consequences and productive effects such figurations have in conditioning and limiting wolf-human relations. Indeed I argue there is a need for analysis that attends to such texts in their rhetorical detail in order to understand how such figurations work to assemble our common knowledges.

The second grouping of texts that informs this dissertation, and which I rely upon as a non-scientist researcher, is those that address the wolf through scientific study, including not just biology, but the social sciences as well. Formal wolf science, as will be noted more thoroughly in this dissertation, is a relatively young enterprise. While the rhetoric of science that considers wolves as a species to be managed dates back to at least the late nineteenth century, I argue, the formal study of wolf biology, ecology, and ethology dates to the post-WWII era, and ramps up significantly with the publication of wolf luminary David L. Mech's *The Wolf: The Ecology and Behavior of an Endangered Species* in 1970. It was during this era, almost a half-century ago, that prominent wolf biologists and ecologists like not only Mech, but Luigi Boitani, Paul Paquet, Douglas Pimlott, and others began their lengthy careers in wolf research. A second generation of wolf researchers, including many of these scientist's students, has followed, including prominent researchers like Adrian Treves, Doug Smith, Chris Darimont, Adrian Wydeven, John Vucetich, and Robert B. Wielgus. Many of these researchers feature prominently in this dissertation, and

conversations with many of them over the course of this dissertation research have been invaluable in my understanding how what has been learned about wolf behavior and ecology has changed over time. Indeed, the debates within this community as to the role of science in wolf policy regarding such aspects as the effects, usefulness, and ethics of, for instance, wolf hunting, culling, or protection, are most significant for this dissertation. This is especially the case given more recent social scientific research on wolf-human relations, or what is known within ecology as human dimensions research. Work like Jamie Hogberg's research on human attitudes and tolerance, Mark Bekoff's ethological research on animal emotions, and Martin Nie's political policy analysis in his important work *Beyond Wolves* (2003), has also been important to this dissertation's analysis. Particularly, Nie's work sets a rigorous standard for researching and analyzing wolf policy in the U.S. from a political perspective, especially given his recognition that "the socio-political context wolves ultimately find themselves in is still largely one of public bewilderment or dismay" (2). However, while much of the conflict over policy Nie contends is grounded in a difference in values, this dissertation differs in focusing on the power/knowledges of invested interests and desires that ground how wolves are figured that affect political policy. This difference in approaches can be attributed to Nie's more traditional liberal humanist approach to political policy, and my dissertation's more Foucaultian genealogical and discursive analysis approach.

This category of the wolf of science would be incomplete without including publicly accredited wolf experts who question much of this mainstream tradition of science. Ungulate zoologist Valerius Geist and biologist and former Alaska game manager Mark McNay feature prominently here. Geist in particular, as should be obvious from the previous "Little Red Riding Hood" analysis, features prominently in this dissertation, particularly given his strident claims

about a conspiracy in wolf research promoting an erroneous "harmless wolf theory" that disavows what wolves really are out of "political correctness." Indeed, this conflict, which has resulted in open battle in court, is an integral part of the discourse analysis I offer in Chapter One.

The third bucket of wolf texts (and deepest) this dissertation draws from is what might be called, very broadly, wolf-human histories. These texts vary widely in their scope, geographic focus, and scholarly rigor, addressing different places and eras. Some of these texts, such as Jon T. Coleman's *Vicious: Wolves and Men in America*, Garry Marvin's *Wolf*, and Brett Walker's *The Lost Wolves of Japan*, are rigorous wolf histories by professional historians. Arguably equally as rigorous and perhaps even more influential on the broader public audience, are works by non-academic researchers, such as Peter Steinart's *The Company of Wolves*; the Center for Biological Diversity's Michael Robinson's *Predatory Bureaucracy*; government trapper Carter Niemeyer's *Wolfer* (cited earlier); Jim Crumley's *The Last Wolf* (a history of wolves in the British Isles); recent texts like Ian McAllister's *The Last Wild Wolves* and Nate Blakeslee's well-regarded *American Wolf*; and most significantly, Barry Lopez's *Of Wolves and Men*. In particular, Lopez's text (1978) has remained one of the most prominent and influential wolf history texts, cited widely even by prominent biologists such as Mech and Boitani. Indeed, this dissertation makes extensive use of this text, though pushes back against some of the basis for Lopez's analysis grounded in psychological explanations reliant on psychoanalysis, derived from the work of Bruno Bettelheim, as well as archetypal analysis. Similarly, this dissertation pushes back against the aforementioned ecocritic J.K. Robisch, who claims there is a "real wolf" and "he is not a social construct" (15), and Brett Walker's historical essay on wolves and the predation of humans, and their rejection of what are claimed to be "overly simplistic"

Foucaultian-influenced “cultural-constructionist” (45) arguments. I also offer critique and rhetorical analysis of some arguably less scholarly, but publicly influential texts. These include the earlier mentioned anthology, *The Real Wolf* (2014), authored by attorney Ted B. Lyon and linguist Will N. Graves, featuring Geist and other prominent figures in wolf controversies in North America. Indeed, *The Real Wolf*, Grave’s *Wolves in Russia: Anxiety Through the Ages* (2007), and Geist’s own independent work have been cited on legislative floors in the U.S. House of Representatives, offered as submitted testimony in wolf management policy development in Montana, and featured at recent state “wolf summits” in the Midwest and West, such as one recently in Wisconsin where Lyon was a keynote speaker (Kremer). In fact, Lyon recounts in *The Real Wolf* his personal lobbying of governors and lawmakers in Western states to delist wolves in the Northern Rockies Region through legislation, an effort that was ultimately successful (Lyon, “How the” 256-264).

The final bucket of texts I draw from in this dissertation, while not explicitly topically oriented toward wolves for the most part, is the recently emerged interdisciplinary academic discourse roughly known as animal studies, or “the question of the animal.” While human exceptionalism and the species divide have been questioned at least since Jeremy Bentham in the eighteenth century, or nineteenth century with works like Charles Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* or Friedrich Nietzsche’s *Human all too Human*, the impetus for this scholarly interdisciplinary approach has been more recent works. Peter Singer’s *Animal Liberation* (1975), Tom Regan’s *Animal Rights*, and Mary Midgley’s “Animals and Why They Matter” (1983) are foundational texts for one vein of animal studies known as Critical Animal Studies (CAS), which is based in extending capacities previously considered exclusively human to animals, such as suffering, rights, and reason, and are most often based in liberal humanist

philosophy derived from utilitarian (Bentham) or deontological (Kant) frames. Another vein, following Derrida's seminal turn-of-the-millennium essay "The Animal that Therefore I am (more to follow)," focuses more on the construction of the "animal" itself in opposition to the human, critiquing how the term "the animal" implies a deprivation, or "possibility without power" (28). Such a deprivation indicates non-human inferiority and a human/animal hierarchy that is leveling and dismissive of diverse differences across non-humans, as well as affinities with humans amongst those considered animals. Again, as Cary Wolfe notes, this "human/animal" distinction is a "discursive resource" rather than a "zoological designation." While there are more Deleuzian, Agambanian, post-humanist, phenomenological, and new materialist versions of animal studies that have emerged, it is within this more Derridean vein that this dissertation advances, given its emphasis on discursive production of wolf-human (along with other non-humans) relations.

More narrowly, this dissertation follows a trend of scholars attending to discourse, especially in the humanities and literary theory, who bridge Derrida's insights with Foucault's consideration of biopower as a technical and technological ordering of life and bodies. While Foucault is rightly criticized by those such as Nicole Shukin and Donna Haraway for his "species chauvinism" (Haraway 60) in not considering how non-humans too are subject to regimes of technobiopower ordering and that "discourses and technologies of biopower hinge on the species divide" (Shukin 11), the biopolitical frame Foucault initiates has still been found to be fruitful once this is recognized and remedied. This dissertation shares to varying degrees with Shukin, Agamben, Cary Wolfe, Colleen Boggs, Chloë Taylor, and others, in recognizing this dismissal and attempting to show how, as Wolfe notes, quoting Shukin, the question of the animal "is not just conceptual or analytical but *material*, involving not just 'the semiotic currency of animal

signs', but also 'the carnal traffic in animal substances'" (*Before the Law* 52). That is, the biopolitical construction of the "animal," and especially here "the wolf," has material consequences and produces certain effects.

But while this dissertation shares much with these lines of biopolitical analysis offered by the above theorists, and those like Haraway and Temple Grandin who recognize the material effects of biopolitical regulation upon human and non-human bodies, their emphasis on domesticated species (for example, dogs, cows, and livestock) and "companion species" relations seems inadequate for analyzing more agonistic relations with predatory species, for example, wolves and cougars. Theorists, particularly geographers, such as Stephanie Rutherford (wolves in Algonquin National Park), Rosemary Collard (cougars on Vancouver Island), and Henry Buller (wolves in France) have recently helped fill this gap to some extent with, for example, analyses of human-predator constructions of the biosecurity of space, using Foucaultian biopolitical analysis to various degrees. However, this dissertation differs in its discourse analysis in attending to utterances and practices as rhetoric that is used primarily to assemble a truth about wolves that supports particular interests and desires.

While earlier work has addressed the issue of conflicting discourses, such as between scientific, social, and ethical discourses (Lynn, "Discourse") or conflicting values, such as between stakeholders in policy development (Nie), what is needed, I argue, is more detailed analysis of the power that is materially invested institutionally and practically in these ways of reasoning and valuing. Furthermore, whereas much of animal studies is ontologically focused on what non-humans and humans are, whether as subjects of rights, or in entangled relationships, this dissertation is distinctive in focusing on more epistemological issues. That is, it focuses on how we claim to know what an animal is and how that affects what can be said truthfully about

human/non-human relations given dominant regimes of truth that condition and restrain such claims. As such, the rhetorical tactics and strategies that marshal such power/knowledges are the focus of this dissertation. It is through the human encounter with wolves, I argue, that these power/knowledges can be said to coalesce into rhetorical assemblages that vie to become regimes of truth about wolves and humans. To put it bluntly, I argue that it matters how the sausage is made.

Thus, while this dissertation makes use of Derridean framing of the question of the animal and Foucaultian biopolitics, it does so with the ambition of showing *how* such biopolitical discourse builds up species truths, particularly truths about wolves that justify the maintenance of a number of divides--including distinctions between the human/animal, civilization/nature, domestic/wild, etc.--despite various contradictions that show the untenability of these divides. Indeed, this dissertation aims to show how assembling various utterances and practices into a rhetoric about wolves allows for these rhetorical assemblages to be used as strategic power/knowledge apparatuses to order and maintain species hierarchies and divisions to serve anthropocentric interests, expressing particular desires.

Indeed, the idea of a rhetorical assemblage is particularly useful for the discursive analysis of this dissertation as it allows the fluidity of "wolf truth" to be observed over time in the discourse and practices that condition and limit wolf-human relations. Conceptually, a rhetorical assemblage in this dissertation functions as a type of apparatus/*dispositif* used strategically to establish and maintain a regime of truth. Yet, the instability of such truths is revealed in how the rhetorical assemblage is amorphous and continuously modified, with some elements dropping away, while others are added from discourses that often have little to do with wolves. Such rhetorical assemblages, like the figuration of the wolf as a terrorist in Chapter Four,

draw from cultural, political, and mythical sources, which despite contradictions between them, nonetheless still maintain their currency for affectively producing a perspective that is then taken as common knowledge, i.e., truth. Here, such rhetorical assemblages function strategically as a power/knowledge that produces eternal truths about species relations. These rhetorical assemblages of the wolf, I argue, limit what can be said truthfully about wolves and wolf-human relations, including by those who study wolves through scientific perspectives.

In such a way, these rhetorical assemblages are flexible. Prior rhetoric about wolves thought to be defunct and 'gotten past', such as what many wolf biologists and conservationists contend is the erroneous demonization of the wolf in stories like "Little Red Riding Hood" or "The Three Little Pigs," is recycled as elements in contemporary assemblages that once again make them a part of the true, or a new regime of truth. These rhetorical assemblages can be flexibly adapted to contemporary scientific claims, reaching back to past rhetorically affective discourse, situating it in contemporary discourse about wildlife management policy and interspecies relations that occur in material contexts, that is, times and places, that differ greatly, especially politically and culturally in the way that power manifests itself materially. The rhetorical assemblage becomes timeless, disavowing these contexts. In this way, this effort to link this past rhetoric to more contemporary rhetoric, I argue, positions the human subject as always potentially under threat from "the wolf," where this wolf may be the immigrant sneaking across a border to cause harm, or a terrorist bent on wiping out one's livelihood, especially the livelihood of those who work and live in "traditional" enterprises such as ranching or extraction industries.

This dissertation also differs from much of current animal studies in thoroughly taking up Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism in his *Birth of Biopolitics* lectures as a factor in

contemporary biopolitical framing. While the analysis I offer follows scholars of neoliberalism, such as Wendy Brown (as in *Undoing the Demos*), who emphasize neoliberalism as a form of reason, I also mine neoliberal theorists, such as Friedrich Hayek, to bolster that analysis and draw attention to the type of subjectivity that such reasoning assumes, even when talking about wolves. While neoliberalism is "most commonly associated with laissez-faire economics" (*Encyclopedia Brittanica*) or merely as, Foucault notes, "Adam Smith revived," making it seem "to be nothing at all, or anyway, nothing but always the same thing, and always the same thing but worse" (*Birth of Biopolitics* 130), Brown emphasizes that "Neoliberalism is not about the state leaving the economy alone. Rather, neoliberalism activates the state on behalf of the economy*,* not to undertake economic functions or to intervene in economic effects, but rather to facilitate economic competition and growth and to economize the social" (62). What is often de-emphasized about neoliberalism is the discourse and rhetoric of neoliberalism regarding the specific discursive formation and practices that constitute the neoliberal subject through the economization of *all* of its choices as economic ones.

Much of the critique of neoliberalism, even when it is focused on subjectivity, is focused on *homo eoconomicus* as origin for that subjectivity, as this is the rational economic agent that has been transformed from Adam Smith's first classical coinage to the subject as a rational choice maker and self-entrepreneur. However, this neoliberal subjectivity also shares in the classically liberal Lockean notion of the subject, individuated in its acquisitions. It is in the discourse around, and interpretation of, that Lockean subject that the discursive formation of the neoliberal subject is partially constructed as a justification for a self-given individuality premised on liberty as entrepreneurship. That is, it is here that the subject is naturalized. It is this subject through which acquisition becomes justified and which the law, or natural law, is premised upon.

As a self-entrepreneur in the mode of neoliberal subjectivity, then, the subject can be said to be himself commercialized as an individual. The individual becomes isolatable and hyper-individuated as a corporate person or brand, with market interests, ruled by the "ethic of enterprise" (*Birth of Biopolitics* 147). As such, the neoliberal frame does not offer a hands-off free market as many suppose, but a "politics of life" or "*Vitalpolitik*" (148) that constitutes a way of governing that seeks to manage "a social fabric in which precisely the basic units [have] the form of the enterprise" (148). Subjectivity thus emerges as entrepreneurship, as the subject is essentialized as an enterprise, with life reduced to economic choices regarding how time and resources should best be spent to maximize the growth of one's brand. This means law is there to satisfy not those choices per se, or guarantee or do things to make better realizable those choices, but to enforce the ordering implicit in the economization of life. This, I argue in much of this dissertation, has discursive and material effects that consistently allow wolves and other such non-humans to be figured as law-breakers who must be brought under order by whatever means necessary.

Thus, as an interdisciplinary work that engages questions in animal studies and environmental policy, this dissertation should be of interest to those practically concerned with how policy development is productively and functionally conditioned and restricted through discourse and practices that have become sedimented as truth. But so too, those concerned with how rhetoric functions productively in constituting not only natural species, racial, and other cultural boundaries should find much of interest. The rhetoric of wolves almost surprisingly, I argue, illuminates issues of race, gender, and political subjectivity, and how such constructed truths about wolf/human and human/non-human relationships reflect power/knowledges that express particular invested interests. It is unconcealing these interests through close reading

figurations of the wolf which I hope should be of interest to many readers, whether their interests are in the question of animality, wildlife policy, or wolf-human relations, or broader questions of political subjectivity.

Chapter Summaries

In each of the following chapters, I present a case study of a particular wolf incident, wherein the figure of the wolf is discursively analyzed to reveal the interests and desires it assembles to make it rhetorically cohere as a truth about the wolf that has material consequences for wolf-human relations, and focally, wolf lives.

In the opening chapter of this dissertation, the focal case study is the discourse regarding wolf–human relations and the truth about wolves that emerged after the death of Kenton Carnegie at a uranium mining encampment at Points North Landing, Saskatchewan in 2005, an incident which has become widely claimed as the first death of a human by healthy, wild wolves in North America in at least the last hundred years. Here, my discursive analysis of the rhetoric that emerged from the coroner's inquest testimony and media accounts reveals a rhetorical assemblage whereby wolves are figured as problems, or problematized, I argue, as a species, that is always already potentially a "man hunter," "junkyard dog," or even werewolf. Figuring wolves as having this liminal existence, I argue, problematizes wolves not only as an inherent threat to human safety, but to the boundaries of civilization and species. These figurations of the wolf not only become construed as a suppressed truth about wolves and wolf identity, but also, I argue, are productive in naturalizing the practices and neoliberal reason that arguably made Carnegie's death possible and killing wolves necessary.

In the second chapter, I examine how a wolf attack/self-defense incident ending in the death of wolf in the northern Montana wilderness is used to figure wolves as outlaw, foreign, Canadian wolves that are dangerous, diseased, and voracious animals that do not belong, even in wilderness, as they unnaturally wreak havoc on the natural order. This figuration of the wolf, I argue, allows for a claim that order must be restored through more intensive policing and violence upon wolf bodies, whether through state culls or hunting seasons, or vigilante/"frontier justice," in order to defend "the nation" from such foreign threats to law and order. Such rhetoric, I argue, justifies the killing of wolves in the name of preserving the nation, and restoring order through a re-enacting of a founding violence that establishes civilization in the first place.

In the third chapter, based on a case study in Catron County, New Mexico, wolves becomes fabularly figured as illegal immigrants, threatening the "custom and culture" of the American West, and leading to an embattled existence where the safety and integrity of family structures and communities are at stake. This perception of embattlement and imminent threat is grounded in a fabular construction of the wolf that, despite inherent contradictions, or maybe even because of them, does work. The work that it does, I argue, is to satisfy a desire for sovereignty that so too is contradictory, a sovereignty grounded in a mythic West that seeks to conserve its "custom and culture" while simultaneously demanding the naturalization of a neoliberal exploitation of the land and resources that make such conservation impossible. The threat to public safety wolves are figured as in this fable, I argue, thus conceals an intent of normalizing not so much a time-honored tradition as a patriarchal sovereignty re-grounded in the zero sum game of hyper-individuated neoliberal entrepreneurship, where it is either humans or the wolves, whether four or two-legged, that will win out in the West.

In the final chapter, I show how, based on a case study of culling the Profanity Peak Pack in Eastern Washington, wolves are figured as terrorists who threaten property and disrupt the efficiency of commerce, creating a bio-insecure space. Such wolves, it is argued, must be managed scientifically if they are allowed to exist. In genealogizing this scientific management of wolves, I argue, scientific management marshals the rhetoric of science, contradictorily conflating the discourses of science and technology in order to make the technologically efficient slaughter of wolf populations benign, culminating in a "ranching" of wolves in an industrial fashion that makes wolves productive only in their deaths.

I. The Truth About Wolves

> For every sufferer instinctively seeks a cause for his suffering; more exactly an agent; still more specifically, a *guilty* agent who is susceptible to suffering—in short, some living thing upon which he can, on some pretext or other, vent his affects, actually or in effigy.
>
> -Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals* (127)

> The wolf is neither a saint nor a sinner except to those who want to make it so.
>
> - David Mech, "Is Science" (143)

In this chapter, I show how wolves become rhetorically figured as "man hunters" through the death of a young mining engineer at a uranium mining camp settlement in Northern Saskatchewan, but also how such a figuration of the wolf becomes construed as a suppressed truth about wolves and their identity as a species. I argue such a figuration constitutes a disavowal of the very practices and neoliberal reason specific to the place of the mining encampment at Points North Landing that likely made his death possible, constructing relationships that make wolves, humans, and other animals vulnerable. In naturalizing these relationships and problematizing wolves, the very practices that likely led to this death, namely an unregulated dump that drew in various non-human animals, became bracketed as a factor in his death, with the blame focused not on anything humans do, but on what wolves are. The incident thus becomes an attempt to reassert what might be called a naturalist, or perhaps neo-naturalist, identity of the wolf as a force of nature, a regime of truth that focuses on the violent potential of wolves as predators, reducing them to "man hunters" (McKean) in an effort to undermine what is taken as the "politically correct" "harmless wolf theory" (Geist, "When do Wolves" 1).

On November 1st, 2007, two years after it occurred almost to the date, the death of Kenton Carnegie became the first documented fatal wolf attack on a human by a healthy wild wolf in North America. Prior to this, leading wolf experts in the fields of biology and ethology consistently reiterated that while there had been a few attacks by wolves on humans, the vast majority of these attacks were by rabid, habituated, or provoked wolves, or wolf-dog hybrid pets. Yet, it was widely accepted that there were no verified accounts of a wild, healthy wolf attacking and killing a human being in at least the last century.[4] As David Mech, regarded widely as the founder of contemporary wolf biology and ethology, noted prior to this incident, “Wolves rarely attack humans,” and “there is no record of a nonrabid wolf killing a human in North America since the arrival of Europeans” (cited in Coleman 3). While there have been a handful of attacks on humans by wolves over the years, particularly by rabid and habituated or captive wolves, even these were, and continue to be, rare and noteworthy for their anomalousness (Linnel et al.). As former lead biologist for the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources wolf program Adrian Wydeven notes, “During 1950-2000, Linnel et al. (2002) found records of only 4 people killed in Europe, 4 in Russia, and none in North America” (Wydeven 1335).

However, the significance of Carnegie’s death became immediately apparent to the public, as multiple media outlets reported upon what was assumed confirmation that a healthy wolf, or wolves, had indeed attacked, killed, and partially consumed a human being in North America. The CBC reported that, aside from Carnegie’s death, “there are no documented cases in North America of a healthy wolf killing a human in the wild” (“Ontario Man Killed”).

[4] Something that is perhaps not surprising, given the infrequency of wolf attacks on humans relative to other wild North American predatory megafauna (such as cougars, and black, grizzly, and polar bears).

Likewise, reporter Chris Purdy, covering the outdoors beat for CanWest News Service, noted that the incident was "the first documented case of a fatal wolf attack in the wild in North America" (Purdy, "Student's Death"). Yet even two years prior to this public declaration of the first fatal wolf attack in North America, multiple media outlets suggested Carnegie's death was indeed a fatal wolf attack, even before the official coroner's investigation was concluded. CBC News' headline on Nov.10th, 2005, just days after the death, declared "Ontario man believed killed by wolves in Saskatchewan," despite an initial autopsy determining no more than that "he was likely killed by animals" and that "the injuries…are consistent with animal bites," according to the RCMP spokesperson. In a more sensational article published in *Outdoor Life*[5] less than a year after Carnegie's death entitled "Man Hunters," writer Andrew McKean noted that "The death of Carnegie is the first documented wolf-caused fatality of a human in North America in at least a 100 years, and maybe the first ever on this continent, period." Yet, it is not just that the claim is speculatively made as the truth about the matter prior to the conclusion of the investigation that is significant. In addition, sources such as *The Northern Miner* (a weekly mining trade journal) claimed just two weeks after the incident, in their headline from Nov. 24th, "Saskatchewan gov't denies wolf attack" (Sylvester), creating the impression that there was a government cover-up to protect wolves from responsibility for Carnegie's death, claiming that "the province's Ministry of Environment refuses to acknowledge that Carnegie likely died as a result of a wolf attack" (Sylvester). As in the CBC article, the reporter speculates from the more limited RCMP claim of an animal attack. Furthermore, both make use of local hunting outfitter

[5] One of the foremost publications for the "hook n' bullet" (hunting and fishing) crowd.

and lodge owner Wayne Galloway as a source,[6] a source who claims to multiple outlets that the incident was caused by government wolf protections and an absence of wolf control, creating a "bad situation" with "an increase in wolf numbers and decrease in the wildlife they prey on"[7] ("Ontario Man Believed"). Galloway thereby generalizes the wolf as a problem when not lethally controlled, presuming that a failure to lethally control wolves will inevitably lead to further attacks on humans, as Galloway's statement that "Can I see [a death] happening again? For sure" (Sylvester), further indicates.

Seemingly unanimously and unambiguously, Carnegie's death was significant as the first of its kind. However, it also appeared to portend something more ominous in setting a precedent in North America that wolves clearly, if not naturally, perceive humans as prey. What is further significant about this incident is that the determination of the first human killed by a healthy wolf in North America was made not at the remote mining encampment at Points North Landing, Saskatchewan[8] but almost two years later in a magistrate's courtroom in Prince Albert by a six-person jury.

But, perhaps no other statement did more in constructing the truth about what happened to Kenton Carnegie than the initial message sent by Mark Eikel (co-owner and president of the Points North Group of Companies) to the RCMP constable in Wollaston Lake after discovering the body: "He was torn apart by wolves" (Paquet and Walker 6). Eikel based his claim on wolf

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[6] As a hunting outfitter, Galloway arguably has an interest in eliminating protections for wolves, given the species they hunt, like moose and caribou, are species he relies upon for his hunting business.

[7] This claim is disputed by biologist Tim Trottier, who notes "[The wolf] population is in balance with their prey base" (McKean) in Northern Saskatchewan. Likewise, the director of the International Wolf Center, Rob Schultz, notes regarding a documentary on the incident, "To suggest that wolves have consumed all of their natural prey and are beginning to feed on humans is ridiculous and demonstrates a lack of understanding of our natural world" (Myrick).

[8] A site where Carnegie, a third year University of Waterloo geo-engineering co-op student, interned.

tracks "in the area" (not at the scene) seen in the dark with a flashlight from ten metres' away[9] (6). As Paul Paquet, the wolf biologist who conducted the province's official investigation and co-authored the final coroner's report, later remarked, "How and why this conclusion was reached by the search party is unclear" (13). As Paquet notes in the official coroner's report, Eikel's assertion to the RCMP that wolves had "torn apart" Carnegie likely influenced not only the investigation on the ground,[10] but was clearly rhetorically influential in setting the public perspective as to the truth about what happened. This truth likely became difficult to unsettle, especially once pitted against the more equivocal conclusion later arrived at by Paquet and the lead coroner, Walker, in the final coroner's report.

While the government of Saskatchewan's official coroner's report[11] concurred with the initial RCMP officers report ruling out murder or foul play, and determined Carnegie's death was caused by a "wild animal attack," the report did not attempt to make claims about the danger of wolves, or bears, beyond the incident itself. After investigating the scene and performing an autopsy on Carnegie's body, Walker and Paquet concluded in their report that the available evidence showed the most likely culprit was a black bear[12] or, at the very least, that it was

[9] Neither Eikel nor those accompanying him saw wolves (or bears) during their search (Paquet and Walker13).
[10] Such as leading investigators to unconsciously ignore non-wolf signs, such as the "quite prominent" bear-tracks Paquet and the bear biologists saw in the photographs taken at the scene, and which "were not mentioned in the RCMP report detailing [the] accident scene" (Paquet and Walker18).
[11] A report issued by RCMP forensic anthropologist, Dr. Ernest Walker and world-renowned Canadian wildlife biologist, behavioral ecologist, and wolf specialist, Dr. Paul Paquet (after investigating the scene and bodies).
[12] Evidence that included the distance the body was dragged, tracks at the scene, the way the skin was 'peeled,' and what organs were consumed. As such, "all outside experts conclude[d] independently that the most probable predator was a black bear" (Paquet and Walker 17-8).

"equivocal" as to whether wolves or a bear had killed Carnegie.[13] While in initial interviews, Paquet indicated that he suspected garbage habituated wolves, as this was a "common thread in most wolf attacks," after investigating the scene and looking at photos taken the day after the incident, Paquet "immediately saw bear tracks"[14] ("Wolves Killed"). Additionally, after examining the corpse with Walker and coroner Dr. N. Brits, Parquet noted "characteristics common to bear kills" ("Wolves Killed"). While necropsies of the two wolves shot near the scene seemed to show digestive tract contents that might be human remains, upon examination the sinew was determined plastic, although analysis of hair samples found in one wolf did appear to be human upon examination[15] (Paquet and Walker 17). In an interview given to the National Wildlife Federation, Paquet reiterated his conclusion from the official coroner's report, noting, "the circumstances link closely to what we know of bear attacks. That said we can't completely rule out wolves" (Tolmé). While Paquet adamantly maintained that it was possible wolves were involved in the attack, and had almost certainly scavenged the body, the precise cause of death remained uncertain.[16]

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[13] Meaning, in other words, that it was possible both wolves and a bear were involved, but that it remained unclear as to which parties attacked and killed Carnegie, and which scavenged his body.
[14] As did the bear experts Paquet contacted (Paquet and Walker 17).
[15] Meaning it is likely the wolf did at least scavenge Carnegie's body.
[16] A private investigation, conducted by forensic anthropologist Dr. Gary Haynes and animal behaviorist and wolf specialist Dr. Jane Packard for *National Geographic* in early 2006 reached a similar conclusion to Paquet and Walker after Haynes' onsite investigation of the incident site and Packard's review of photographic evidence prior to and after the incident. This investigation, released publicly as an episode of the popular cable television show *Hunter and Hunted* was framed as a somewhat disappointingly inconclusive 'who done it', concluding "the mix of uncertain circumstantial evidence implicated both wolves and bears, precluding the possibility of a definitive conclusion as to which predator was responsible for Carnegie's death" ("Shadow Stalkers"). In this way, the television episode is strikingly atypical of the genre, though consistent with expert claims regarding the investigation.

After reviewing the official coroner's report, Carnegie's parents remained dissatisfied. This was apparent not only from the posts and letters[17] of Kenton's father, Kim, but also from interviews given by the Carnegies to the press, in which Lori Carnegie, Kenton's mother, states succinctly, "I want the truth" (Vyhnak, "Inquest into"). In interviews with the press prior to the inquiry, it was unambiguous as to who the Carnegies thought was to blame for their son's death: Kim claimed to the press that not only were wolves the culprits, but that "public safety has taken a back seat to the glorification of wolves" (Vyhnak, "Inquest into"). During the first day of the inquest, Kim Carnegie was adamant: "We're hoping the Saskatchewan government admits our son was killed by wolves….It's hard to have closure when people are trying to lie about how your son died" (Vyhnak, "Inquest into"). Thus, the Carnegie's take on the coroner's report was not merely that it was unsatisfactory in its ambiguous conclusion, but that it was a falsification of a "truth." Further, in claiming that Paquet "wrote a biased report based on his ideals as a wolf conservationist"[18] (Carnegie), purposefully lying to absolve wolves and blame human behavior for the incident, the Carnegies seemed convinced that certainty was to be had, but was being suppressed by Paquet and the provincial Ministry of Environment.

At the coroner's inquest hearing,[19] members of the jury concluded Carnegie had died from "injuries consistent to that of a wolf attack" (Jobin), a conclusion that clearly conflicted

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[17] These posts/letters were disseminated online through a site in memoriam of Kenton's death asking for financial support to hire attorneys and expert witnesses for the coroner's inquest hearing they pressed the Saskatchewan government to hold.

[19] A coroner's inquest hearing is conducted at the discretion of the Office of the Chief Coroner in cases where "sudden unexpected or unnatural death" occurs, and "is fact finding, *not fault finding* and is not a criminal or civil proceeding"; it is a procedure held before a judge in which witnesses are called and evidence is heard by a six-member jury of the local public ("Coroner Inquests"). In this case, the coroner's inquest hearing was held largely to determine how and by what means Kenton Carnegie was killed, and to determine if further recommendations should be made to help avoid preventable deaths in the future (Paquet and Walker).

with the province's official coroner's report submitted a year and a half earlier. The coroner's jury inquest decision thus represents not merely a contrary conclusion to the report, but a rejection of the coroner's report conclusion via a process where the truth regarding the cause of death is determined through jury verification that eliminates inconclusiveness and ambiguity. While a coroner's jury inquest decision does not carry the same weight as a criminal or civil trial proceeding, it does constitute what legal scholar Paul MacMahon terms "soft adjudication": that is, such a procedure produces highly consequential "official determinations about past events by authoritative decision makers that lack formal binding effect, but may influence other institutions and the public" (279). Thus, while non-binding, a coroner's inquest ruling is rhetorically and materially consequential in influencing policy recommendations beyond the case itself, but perhaps just as significantly, perceptions, including here perceptions of interspecies relationships based on a regime of truth by which wolves are indeed "man-hunters."

While the jury was convinced by the case presented by Carnegie's attorney and made recommendations to prevent future incidents by securing and fencing the dump,[20] after the conclusion of the inquest, statements by the Carnegies seemed to indicate that the inquiry not only determined how their son was killed, but revealed a truth about wolves as a species. Dismissing human causes, Kim Carnegie asserted, "Public safety is important, but to have that public safety you have to identify the problem—in this case wolves—to come up with the right solutions"(Jobin). Thus, the Carnegies were not merely claiming that wolves were responsible for their son's death, but that wolves were "the problem," and that to claim otherwise was to

[20] The recommendations put forth by the jury regarding fencing and securing unregulated garbage dumps has since been inconsistently applied at mines in Saskatchewan, arguably because no legislation was passed to mandate such fencing (Purdy, "Wolves Drawn). Indeed, internal records show that the mining company responsible for the dump in Points North was fined in 2015 for failing to maintain fencing (Hopper); additionally, the lack of fencing at a nearby mine likely led to an attack in 2016.

deny what wolves 'truly' are. "Now the truth is out there," Carnegie told reporters. "The whole benign wolf theory was shot down and the jury's findings were that our son was attacked and predated upon by wolves. These are dangerous animals" (Vyhnak, "Parents Find").

This rhetoric echoes the truth-making efforts of the Carnegie's expert witnesses and advisors. Though ungulate zoologist Valerius Geist[21] was not allowed to testify for the Carnegies due his lack of credentials regarding wolf biology and behavior, his written testimony at least rhetorically aligns with the Carnegies' interpretation of the results. The Carnegie family echoes rhetoric from Geist's rejected affidavit released online, which contends that the testimony of Paquet was biased by "political[ly] correct [ness]" and the "lethal myth of the 'harmless' wolf"[22] (Geist, "When Do Wolves" 1-2).

Prior to the conclusion of the inquiry, Kim Carnegie adamantly disavowed any human responsibility for his son's death, claiming "There has been much controversy regarding [Kenton's] death and much effort expended to defend the behavior of the wolves and in turn blame the actions of man" (Carnegie). Harold Johnson, the Carnegie family's attorney, likewise reiterated this claim in an attempt to minimize human culpability as relevant to the case by deeming the presence of an unregulated garbage dump a "straw man" ("Lawyer Raises"). After sitting "through three days of testimony, looking at graphic photos and listening to disturbing details of how Carnegie was likely attacked and eaten," the jury concluded that wolves were to blame (Purdy, "Student's Death"). This disavowal of human culpability thus denotes a denial of human responsibility for Carnegie's death, as well as a disavowal of the multiple relationships that link the human and non-human animal bodies that inhabit Points North Landing.

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[21] An emeritus professor of environmental design and ungulate specialist
[22] Purportedly espoused by North American wildlife researchers and environmentalists.

Subsequent media coverage of the incident not only held the wolves responsible for Kenton Carnegie's death, but deemed wolves (ontologically and historically) as a threat to humans as a species, a threat that had largely been dismissed by the public because of political correctness.[23] After the jury delivered their verdict, Kim Carnegie told the *Prince Albert Daily Herald* that the situation is only getting worse, that "the attacks are increasing all over Canada. Where wolves are protected is the biggest issue because they've lost their fear of man. Kenton's death is basically sending out a big message to people that there is something wrong, not only in Northern Saskatchewan but in other parts of Canada, as well"[24] (Jobin).

Paquet, along with other scientists interviewed after the verdict, maintained the jury discounted crucial evidence indicating a black bear was most likely responsible for Carnegie's death (Liepins). Paquet called the jury's conclusion "a poor one, which I'd put in the same category a 'O.J. Simpson is innocent'" (Liepins). Thus, despite the official coroner's conclusion that Kenton Carnegie died by "wild animal attack," Eikel's presumptive claim that he was "torn apart by wolves," and the truth about wolves it implies, seem to have won out rhetorically. Indeed, the jury's conclusion that Carnegie died "from injuries consistent with a wolf attack" is consistent with the supposition that tearing apart people is something wolves typically, and therefore, naturally, do. While certainly the death of someone caused by a healthy wolf is significant, to name wolves more broadly as "the problem" is to assert something further,

[23] As I'll argue later in this chapter and elsewhere in this dissertation, this accusation of 'political correctness' is a pejorative which does much work in helping to rhetorically produce and reiterate in contemporary terms a binary within wolf-human relations where there are those who hold the truth about this relationship and those who deny it, a move that relies upon the force of what might be called a rhetorical constellation or 'rhetorical assemblage' posited through what Nietzsche would term "good and evil" framing.

[24] While there is no evidence for such claims, this rhetoric is consistent with what both Geist and others critical of wolf protection claim. It's what I would call a rhetorical assemblage aiming to become 'truth'.

namely, the ontological truth about wolves as a species that can be predicted by tapping into that truth. In other words, the problem is wolves *per se*.

The Will to Truth about Wolves

As noted, the purpose of the inquest was not to determine if the two wolves were guilty, but to offer recommendations to minimize such occurrences as Kenton Carnegie's death in the future. Nonetheless, in treating the wolves at Points North as partial legal persons who can be found guilty, these wolves are at least extended a kind of subjectivity associated with humans, namely, humans who act aberrantly/criminally. However, this concession is erased when they are again made representatives of the species wolf to condemn them in the abstract as a species of "man hunters" (McKean). Wolves are essentially granted subjectivity anthropomorphically to condemn their species identity. In so doing, the coroner's inquiry process is an attempt to settle or reinforce a norm for human-wolf relations, focusing on what a wolf is as an isolatable animal species, and how wolf and human bodies should naturally interact, thereby concealing the interests that normalize those relations. Furthermore, the reaction to the verdict seems to indicate that the incident can be generalized in regard to wolf-human relations universally, and is an indication of a previously unacknowledged problem that wolves represent, namely, a problem to established species hierarchies. This incident likewise indicates a previously unrecognized problem. Wolves, as a species, are thereby made to suffer sufficient revenge to satisfy the requirements of punishment consistent with retributive justice for disrupting or resisting that hierarchy, becoming the accountable other upon which revenge can be satisfied, disavowing more dispersed and systemic causes.

In Nietzschean terms, such scapegoating is a kind of "ressentiment," where an internal affective frustration is turned outward toward an other.[25] In so doing, the "direction of *ressentiment* is *altered*" (*On the Genealogy of Morals* 127). Revenge upon the scapegoated other requires that the other suffer, to justify one's own suffering, as a subject that can be isolated and held to account. It is especially in our relations with animals, Nietzsche claims that this cruelty toward the other is revealed: "If an animal harms us we seek any means of *destroying* it, and the means are often sufficiently cruel" (*Human All Too Human* 324), even despite any human complicity in creating the specific situation that led to the harm. In this way the suffering becomes calculable, even balanced, in framing punishment not merely upon individuals but upon classes, categories, and populations that cause harm. Wolves thereby become the subject, or proxy, for retributive justice and the restoration of order. At the same time, wolves are regarded as driven by instincts, devoid of reason, and incapable of subjectivity, and may be put to death not as individuals, but as representatives of an aberrant class of animals that may be killed. Wolves are thereby decoupled from context and human relations, and defined as aberrant in any actions that would bring them into interaction with human beings.

Consistent with this, in his early, short essay "Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense" (1873), Nietzsche critiques the assumption that the truth is the inevitable result of accumulated facts that lead to a certain conclusion. As Foucault remarks in his own analysis of this text, it is a truism that the purpose of knowledge is to reveal truth. This assumption about truth is a given throughout much of Western philosophy from Plato forward, and is assumed by many to be the contemporary relationship between knowledge and truth in the process of science. Knowledge, it

[25] Such incertitude is assuaged in the realization that "someone or other must be to blame for my feeling ill…I suffer: someone must be to blame for it" (*On the Genealogy of Morals* 127).

is assumed, exists to lead us to a truth, and not just truth or truths, but "fixed, canonical, and binding" (Foucault, "Nietzsche" 87) truth about the "real."

This is to say that humans forget that truth is created, that it is something added later. This is not to say that there is no truth, but it is to say that there are no absolute truths to be found or discovered, and that more significantly that truth is not the purpose of knowledge, whether in philosophy, science, history, or even other disciplines such as mathematics. As Foucault notes, "knowledge is not made for understanding; it is made for cutting" (Foucault "Nietzsche" 88).

While humans need concepts that allow us to generalize about the world we find ourselves in, our mistake, Nietzsche suggests, is that we take the truths we create to be "more solid, more universal, better known, and more human than the perceived world" but forget that we have done this ("On Truth and Lies" 4). In other words, humans take concepts as expressive of the unadulterated real which particular material instantiations reflect, yet it is the particular and situated that make truth-claims possible.

It is often popularly assumed that in the sciences the study of a particular animal leads to certainty about its species and, thus, its essence.[26] However, as Nietzsche scholars Robert Solomon and Kathy Higgins point out, even science acknowledges that the truths it achieves are interpretations of evidence not essences; otherwise they would be unchanging (208-9). Indeed, uncertainty is often a product of scientific inquiry and its conclusions, which are situated, particular, and perspectival. Nietzsche later contends that since situated truths are not absolute, human beings would rather have the certainty of a stable, universal, absolute concept or essence, even if it is "nothingness," than will some truth that is not absolute (*Genealogy of Morals* 163).

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[26] Such a rendering of animal behavior is a kind of crude stimulus-response behaviorism. Contrary to much contemporary animal ethology and biology it: 1.) Assumes all individuals of a species will respond identically to the same stimuli and environment, and 2.) Animals, unlike humans, are not adaptable, and for the most part, learning is specific.

As evidenced in the Carnegie case, Kenton Carnegie's parents posited a demand for the truth that would dispel ambiguity even if experts deemed that ambiguity conclusive given the best available science. This same demand arguably drove the coroner's jury to deem the illusion of certainty preferable to an uncertain or ambiguous result proffered by the foremost experts in bear and wolf biology.

If truth as an absolute is not emergent, but constructed, it is constructed by particular people in particular places with particular relations to others. What Nietzsche calls "the will to truth" is agonistic and often asymmetric; that is, it often involves a relationship of power between unequals. "Truth," then, is the perspective of those who have the power to enforce that perspective. In the case of wolves, 'the wolf/a wolf' in the singular and abstract is taken as primary, as a concept which nonetheless is applied to wolves in their particularity, with 'the wolf' presumably "derived from the essence" of wolves. Whether demonized or idealized, it is this wolf, I argue, that dictates policy and conditions further interactions between wolves and humans, disavowing the very material relationships and asymmetries of power that creates those relations in their particularity. Disputes over the possibilities for human-wolf coexistence are kept at a conceptual level where wolf essence or identity becomes the primary site of struggle. What a wolf is ontologically displaces through the force of language a more complex discourse regarding wolf-human interactions in their particularity and always already situatedness. The diverse material lives of wolves are replaced with an abstract identity of the wolf, which is then cited to establish a certainty of how humans normatively relate to wolves in their particularity, and how wolf bodies are to be managed. It is a knowledge that assumes the truth it is presumed to lead to. That is, we assume the purpose of knowledge, even in its situated particularity, is to lead to such truths, namely, absolute, universal, and often metaphysical, truths. This can be said

to be a “will to truth,” a human predilection or bias toward certainty, though not for the sake of certainty itself, but to restore the presumed order such a purpose serves. Punishing aberrant wolves and putting them in their place. This is what I have termed earlier, as demonstrated by Carnegie’s parents, as a demand for the truth, an expelling of doubt and ambiguity, even if that ambiguity is deemed conclusive, as it is often within the sciences, where probability is often as good as it gets.

This demand, I argue, is what drove the conclusion the coroner’s jury came to. Namely, they preferred an unambiguous narrative that determined wolves were the culprits, rather than the much more complex claim that human-wolf relations were conditioned over time to produce the very incident that led to Kenton Carnegie’s death. Such a narrative conceals the practices that made their son (and the wolves) vulnerable, dismissing practices that reflect a neoliberal order that individuates humans and non-humans in their choices as autonomous agents. Not only does making wolves wholly responsible provide closure, but it makes the coroner’s inquiry process into a revelatory procedure in which a previously under-appreciated threat is revealed as a truth that has been previously concealed. This makes their son into a martyr in the cause of revealing the truth about wolves, his death representing a negation of the “harmless wolf theory.”

Thus, the truth that is sought in the death of Carnegie is two-fold: It is both 1.) A search for a truth in which the knowledge of the case (facts, evidence, etc.) will lead to a binary decision that either wolves were or were not the culprits (on this account truth must only be found, rather than constructed), and 2.) A truth about the species wolf that has been denied by those opposing “the good” of truth-seekers seeking to establish its universal veracity. In other words, the truth about wolves sought is naturalized as definitive, as a truth about the being of wolves or wolves in their essence. To claim otherwise, that wolves do not have a universal species essence, is thus to

disregard the necessity of truth following from knowledge, and is also then to deny that the certainty of truth is not always already available if we just open ourselves up to it. Thus, what is a discursive truth constructed so as to protect specific interests, is construed instead as a natural result of the process of knowledge seeking. Truth, as such, is thus objective, unsituated and unmoored from a position/agenda/ideology/interest; thus, knowledge (the interpretation of evidence) is not perspectival or situated, but a component of truth, i.e., it too must be objective. Any conclusion otherwise is thus not truth and reflects invalid truth-seeking.

Such truth-making is also integral to the construction of the truth as "problems." A key claim in this chapter and elsewhere in this dissertation is that wolves are constructed as inherently problematic. That is, there is a truth, or what Foucault calls a "regime of truth," by which wolves are said to be problems, and that the problem wolves present can be calculated, accounted for, and resolved through proper management of wolf bodies in general to restore order through practices that act on individual wolves. Indeed, it is argued that the truth is that wolves are a public safety problem whenever encountered, as Kim Carnegie, the hunting outfitter Galloway, and Geist himself contend, often not just for humans, but for elk, caribou, cattle, pets and others wherever they coexist. This is part of Geist's point in insisting that wolves and humans cannot exist around each other, and why he unrelentingly criticizes the claim from Linnel et al. and other scientists that wolves should not be solely regarded as creatures of wilderness but "conserved in multi-use landscapes surrounding houses, farms, villages and cities" (Linnel et al.1). According to Geist, this inevitably and necessarily leads to wolves attacking humans, especially when they are protected by regulations that do not allow people to kill them if they are perceived to be "misbehaving" (Geist, "Seven Steps" 92).

Furthermore, the claim that wolves are a problem is exemplified in the case of Kenton Carnegie's death when his father notes, and his family's attorney identifies, wolves as "the problem," due to something in their nature. That is, there is something about wolves as a species that makes them problems. This is not merely the claim that wolves may sometimes be in conflict or agonistic relationships with others, but that there is something in wolves' nature that demands a response from humans to deal with them always already as problems wherever they may be found and whatever they may be doing in particular. In other words, this problematic nature is part of what the truth about wolves is.

So how did wolves become a problem, especially as it seems they likely were not much recognized as a problem in the recent past according to those who claim they are problems? As noted, some argue that it was the recognition of wolves as not a problem in the "harmless wolf theory"[27] that has been the problem. That is, in this version of wolf-human history, the truth about wolves was dismissed or suppressed for a time (presumably because of environmentalists and wolf advocates), and once again revealed itself, much in the way that many other truths are said to be revealed—one need only pay attention to history and this truth is revealed. Indeed, Geist's "7 stage model of habituation"[28] is a truth about wolves of this sort, which he says "emerged" (Geist, "Seven Steps" 96):

1.) Wolves move in closer to people…due to increased predation on prey animals, but also by prey evacuating home ranges en mass, leading to a virtual absence of prey.

2.) Wolves begin to approach human habitations at night in search of food.

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[27] Notably, Geist contention that this model "emerged" is further indication that he is naturalizing the model as revealed truth, rather than something constructed as an interpretation.

[28] Geist notes that in Finland this "progression" is known as the "Seven Steps to Heaven."

3.) Wolves appear in daylight…observe people…[and] approach buildings.

4.) Wolves act distinctly bolder in their actions. Small bodied livestock and pets are attacked close to buildings even during the day.

5.) Wolves explore large livestock…. [and]the actions of wolves become more brazen, and cattle and horses may be killed close to houses and barns

6.) Wolves turn their attention to people and approach closely, targeting people as prey.

7.) Wolves attack people. (Geist, "Seven Steps" 97-8)

In such a case, attending to knowledge about wolves leads inevitably to the conclusion about the truth about them as always potential man-hunters. Wolves are problems humans must always deal with and manage, often and usually through lethal means. As wolves are "hard-wired" creatures dominated by instincts (Geist, "When Do Wolves" 9), we can uncover their inherently problematic nature through attention to knowledge learned about them in history. This "problematization" also means that it is a matter of determining how much of a problem wolves are, but never whether or not they are a problem. In presuming such a coherent narrative about wolves, it is assumed knowledge humans acquire about wolves can give them certainty in how to deal with them as problems, again, despite any particularities (the particular wolves, humans, others, habitat, human attitudes, previous interactions, context, etc.). And thus, there is no place for co-adaptation *in situ*; the adaptiveness of both wolves and humans to each other is dismissed, disavowing any relational understanding, and treating their interactions in dynamic environments as mere stimuli (at least for wolves).

Following Foucault, however, I argue that the truth about the wolf as problem is not something revealed, and that really no truth is as such revealed, but is constructed; indeed, the

problem of wolves is itself a construction of a particular perspective based in discursive and institutional practices conditioned by specific interests. Consistent with Foucault's analysis throughout his works, I argue, wolves are problematized in much the same sense as the prisoner, children, the homosexual, the insane, or those of particular races have been in through specific discourses in certain specific eras. As Foucault accentuates in the end of his lecture "Discourse and Truth: the Problematization of Parrhesia," where he says his "intention was not to deal with the problem of truth, but with the problem of truth-teller or truth-telling as an activity" (74), he calls what he is doing "problematization" to denote a process of genealogical analysis, specifically, "how and why certain things (behavior, phenomena, processes) became a problem" (75). It is this sense of a process of problematization that I contend is relevant here in deciphering just what the "problem of wolves" denotes.

This is not to say that there is no material basis for claiming wolves are a problem, but also, that it is not merely a matter of pointing out what wolves are and then recognizing it historically. Yet, I argue, both Geist and others do exactly this in reducing wolves to some species being where they are defined as predators who always already look at human beings as a possible meal. While historian Brett Walker, one of the few humanities scholars to address the Kenton Carnegie incident directly, and whom I'll discuss in more detail shortly, uses Foucault as a stand-in for cultural constructionists who he claims would treat nature and naturally evolved creatures "simplistically" (47) as abstractions wholly constructed through cultural and linguistic means, thereby denying the material reality of wolves as predators and humans as always their potential prey, this claim itself seems to be a simplistic rendering of exactly what Foucault is getting at by saying that problems, like wolves, in this case, are constructed. As Foucault notes, "when I say that I am studying the 'problematization' of madness, crime, sexuality, it is not a

way of denying the reality of such phenomenon. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which was the target of social regulation at a given moment" ("Discourse and Truth" 66). That is, there is a real material basis upon which such problematizations are exacted. Indeed, "real exitent" is crucial to understanding how things become problems, as these material particulars are the site and differences upon which such regulation then acts, whether it is against others identifiable as black, homosexual, mentally disabled, or of a particular identifiable species, such as wolves. As he notes, "there is a relation between the thing which is problematized and the process of problematization. The problematization is an 'answer' to a concrete situation which is real"(67). However, and this is key to understanding any problematization whatsoever,

> We have to understand very clearly, I think, that a given problematization is not an effect or consequence of a historical context or situation, but is an answer given by definite individuals (although you may find this same answer given in a series of texts, and at a certain point the answer may become so general that it also becomes anonymous). (67)

To claim such is thus to say that problematization is not a recognition of the reality of a situation that should be self-evident given enough information, facts, knowledge, etc., but that problematization is itself something created through power/knowledge to serve specific interests, much the same as with the process of creating truth earlier evaluated and noted. Indeed, Foucault ends the lecture noting "A problematization is always a kind of creation; but a creation in the sense that, given a certain situation, you cannot infer that this kind of problematization will follow. Given a certain problematization, you can only understand why this kind of answer appears as a reply to some concrete and specific aspect of the world" (67). In other words, it can be said that in this case, the problematization of wolves in the conclusion given by Geist, the

Carnegies, and their attorney, and disseminated through media after the event and on into the present through more popular media (from books, to film, to documentary), is something based on concrete interactions with wolves, but is a perspectival truth-claim, an interpretation, in Nietzschean terms. This problematization of wolves is taken as a singular truth for all time that is absolute and universal; it is a truth that has been sedimented through will to power which demands this truth be the only one conceivable as a historical truth. It is a truth that acts as a rule and norm upon which we must base our policy, perspectives, and imagination when we encounter wolves. It is to say that this is what wolves are in their being, and everything to the contrary is ideology, error, or political correctness.

Wolves as Man-Hunters

Ultimately, in the case of Kenton Carnegie's death and subsequent coroner's inquiry, his parents and their attorney disavow any human complicity, whether Kenton Carnegie's own actions, those of other humans at Points North Landing, or, most significantly, the systemic practices and operating procedures associated with the mining encampment. That is, they argue against any significant negotiation of relationships between humans and animals at Points North, ignoring factors such as the dump, where humans disposed of unwanted refuse, food remnants, and other such attractants that likely brought human and non-humans into close physical proximity and contact,[29] or the fact of the mining camp's existence in a physical place that was previously less densely occupied by humans and lacked industrial development. It is also a place where various predatory and scavenging species like wolves, bears, foxes, and porcupines were

[29] Some wolves and bears regularly awaited the offloading of fresh garbage from the edge of the woods (Paquet and Walker 14), an occurrence I myself have observed on the Kenai Peninsula in Alaska.

known to exist. In neglecting these factors, they maintain an expectation of separation between the humans and non-human animals in this place, despite that both humans and non-humans of various sorts feed from the same food containers quite literally.

This presumptive separation is arguably emphasized in the aforementioned *Outdoor Life* article “Man Hunters,” where the author, McKean, quotes trucker Bill Topping, who frequently hauled goods to Points North and other encampments in the area and witnessed the results of Carnegie’s death. As Topping comments, “It wasn’t pretty…It was just as though those wolves had taken down a moose or a caribou” (McKean). McKean notes that, while Carnegie may have been treated by the wolves, as Topping alludes, as typical ungulate prey, or a sort of animalized human, Topping fails to acknowledge that the wolves’ victim “wasn’t an animal. The wolves’ victim was a human, and the incident has stunned the conservation community which has almost universally maintained that wolves don’t, and won’t, attack people” (McKean). Clearly, here, McKean posits a distinct separation between animals (wolves, moose, caribou) and humans (which are not animals). In this way, the wolves seem to be crossing a line, acting aberrantly in mistaking or treating humans as prey.

Historian Brett L. Walker, in one of the few scholarly articles that addresses the incident (as earlier mentioned), challenges McKean’s distinction between the animal and the human. Walker then further uses McKean’s claim as not only an opportunity to re-assert the disavowed animality of Carnegie and humans generally, but to critique as “overly simplistic” “cultural constructionist” arguments specifically, claiming the incident is evidence that animality is not a cultural construct, as Walker claims theorists contend, but something historically shared through evolution (Walker 48). Walker goes so far as to contend that such claims “expose a lingering devotion to human exceptionalism, one that is inherent in the humanities and social sciences and

historically rooted in Cartesian philosophy" (48). This perspective culminates, Walker claims, in seeing everything as a cultural construct, including animals. As Walker argues, "humans are indeed animals, sometimes even a meaty prey species, and that, as such, they are not external to nature or fundamentally different from other animals" (48).

In Walker's leveling of species distinctions at the level of the animal, however, he misconstrues what a Foucaultian genealogical analysis might reveal about Carnegie's death. Moreover, Walker's criticism also reveals a bias toward a reductive, deterministic, origin-focused version of the history of inter-species relations. In Walker's rendering of a strawman version of a "social constructionist" argument based in the "linguistic turn," what is particularly significant is that, in his leveling claim about animality and nature, Walker proposes that the incident occurred because humans are meat to predators.[30] If it was merely the case that sometimes humans are prey to wolves, then one would expect many more incidents that end as Kenton Carnegie's did,[31] whether the actual culprits were wolves, a bear, or a combination thereof. And this is exactly what Walker attempts to contest in supposing, through argument from absence, the recorded/verified number of attacks on humans by healthy wolves must be erroneous. Indeed, he contends Carnegie was not likely the first case of a healthy wolves killing a human in North America, "because it is hard to imagine that, given wolves' opportunistic natures, unreported killings have not taken place" (46). For those like Geist, it is much the same: they do not trust the numbers because they don't fit their theory about the inevitability or always

[30] Such a historical reductionism plays into an account of history in line with one Geist too espouses, denying the complexity and particularity of interspecies relationships, especially, as in this case, between humans, wolves, and other species, but also the neoliberal space and practices of the mining encampment.

[31] Linnel et al (2002) make this same point.

imminent possibility of a wolf attack on a human based purely upon biology: that wolves are predators and humans prey.

In short, the particularity of the relationships between the humans and non-human animals at the Points North Landing encampment matter, and those relationships are profoundly saturated with inter-species social aspects, the denial of which perhaps led to Kenton Carnegie's tragic death. Indeed, the unregulated dump is symptomatic and reflective of the neoliberal practices and interests in avoiding regulation to most efficiently maximize profits.[32] Thus, it is not merely a matter of over-coming human exceptionalism through a leveling recognition of human animality as Walker contends, but that human subjectivity itself is always constructed via the encounter with non-human others.

In this light, Brett Walker's contention that "cultural-constructionist" arguments regarding "the animal" are "overly simplistic" in supposing "our understanding of nonhuman animals is entirely culturally generated" (45) is suspect. Walker uses this claim he purports cultural-constructionists hold to make the further claim that these theorists dismiss that humans too are animals. Yet, less simplistically, it can be argued that while many cultural constructionists/Foucaultians would indeed agree that our understanding of non-human animals is culturally generated, they may also argue so too is the human, as is animality itself, as it can be generalized as a separation of the human from other species (humans v. animals), as Walker does indeed seem to recognize. Nonetheless, Walker argues that what is denied by "cultural constructionists" is that humans are meat and cultural constructionists deny this natural, non-

[32] As Bethany Haalboom (2014) notes, not only did the mining companies downplay environmental and practical risks to local First Nations prior to the opening of new mines in Northeast Saskatchewan in the 1980's before their development, but essentially naturalized the mining itself as an inevitable development consistent with social progress.

constructed reality. Humans may be sacs of meat and even prey, but what makes them so does not lie solely in their biology, i.e., that they are animals.

But Carnegie wasn't just killed because he was a piece of meat to a wild animal predator, whether wolves or bear, or merely because wolves are "opportunistic." He was arguably more likely killed because of previous relations between humans, wolves and bears at Points North and other mining encampments, where, because of individuating neoliberal practices, risk is passed on to individuals who are regarded as self-entrepreneurs pursuing individual choices and interests. Industrial corporate giants such as Cameco and Points North Holdings have disavowed responsibility and obligations to recognize those relations through the operation of unregulated dumps because they are allowed to, and have taken advantage of the government's unwillingness to regulate dumps. This is despite claims by a Ministry of Environment official who notes during the coroner's inquest that "the big mining companies have the money and resources to build good landfills," but "there is no legislation requiring fences or other security measures" (Purdy, "Wolves Drawn"). In other words, companies are supposed to regulate themselves. A question period in the Saskatchewan legislature from March of 2006, just months after Carnegie's death, makes this point clear.

MLA Glen Hart repeatedly questions Saskatchewan Environmental Minister Nilson: "Why won't [you] put some regulations in place so we don't have another tragic accident?" (*Second Session* 889). However, Nilson avoids the question of regulation specifically. Instead, he contends, individuals are supposed to be cautious of wolves and learn from native peoples, as if it is not the dumps themselves and the neoliberal practices they reflect that have put individual workers and wolves in lethal jeopardy. Instead, Nilson claims, that a lack of "predator plans" and an understanding that there is a "substantial wild animal population" is largely to blame (888),

stating "Everybody who lives in the North should recognize that one of the advantages of being there is the wilderness; the other side of that is that it can be quite dangerous" (889). What is disavowed in these remarks is that these neoliberal practices isolate workers from "natural" relations where they can be easily killed, i.e., the way neoliberal institutions manufacture vulnerable subjects whom individually, rather than collectively, assume risk. And it is the quest for greater efficiency to maximize profit and minimize costs that make this possible.

While perhaps underappreciated by some that humans are indeed animals, as Walker notes, those who reductively naturalize the incident as exemplary of the fact that human and wolves are prey and predator, respectively, dismiss the materially invested neoliberal interests and power invested in the mining encampment itself. This includes the unregulated dump, as well as the broader neoliberal context that makes the incident possible. Arguably, it was the subsumption of this risk that subjected Carnegie to his death as an individuated subject and entrepreneur of the self, as replaceable as any cog in the encampment.[33]

Wolves as Junkyard Dogs

As with many of the media pieces written about the Carnegie incident, even McKean's sensational "Man Hunters" article at least pays lip service to non-reductive scientific explanations by including the perspective of wildlife biologist Tim Trottier, as when McKean reports "according to Trottier, the wolves that killed Carnegie were acting less like wild timber wolves and more as *opportunistic junkyard dogs*"[34] (McKean). However, this comment is curious for a number of reasons. First, it relies on an overt metaphoricity in the simile that the

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[33] Given Carnegie's job was a co-op position, the turnover for such positions is likely especially high.
[34] My emphasis.

wolves were acting like "junkyard dogs" and not like "wild wolves." While the simile indicates that the label concerns what their behavior is and not necessarily what wolves are, the construal is that the wolves had changed from a behavior in keeping with wild wolves to one like junkyard dogs, as an adaptation to the circumstances into which they were thrown. What Trottier alludes to is that the wolves had become habituated.[35] This is why Trottier later says, "these wolves were in a very unnatural state, so it's not surprising that they might behave unnaturally" (McKean). Here Trottier's supposition of the wolves' natural/unnatural *state* implies not just that their behavior has changed or adapted, but that they have become something else because of their environment.[36] It's as if the wolves became bad or criminal because of their environment, and that was clear by their behavior, such as waiting at the dump for humans to drop off refuse (as many other animals do around such mining dumps). Mentioning other mines in the area where animals similarly gather, McKean refers to the garbage-eating wolves as "garbage hounds" (McKean). Likewise, the head of the federal wolf program in the U.S. Rockies, Ed Bangs, says that because of the dump the wolves "were turned into big dogs" (McKean), as if they had become not just habituated, but domesticated. What these candid canid metaphors suggest is that these turns of phrase are not merely metaphors—the wild wolves became dogs, unafraid of humans.

However, habituation does not equal domestication. What is claimed by Trottier and Bangs is essentially that the habituation led to domestication, but domestication is not a process that occurs within a generation; that is, it is not a part of ontogenetic development, but occurs

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[35] Most biologists agree that habituation, in fairly behaviorist terms, is to respond to a certain stimulus in a regularized fashion. With wild animals, habituation means responding with particular behavior to a human-caused stimulus.

[36] Much in the way that young black men are regarded as less than human criminals because of their environment, yet are still contradictorily regarded as naturally criminal.

over many generations.[37] Essentially, domestication is the selection of traits that would cause wolves that have already been selected to fear humans to be selected over generations to not fear humans. What Trottier, Bangs, and especially those like Geist seem to imply is that the wolves had been naturally selected to not fear humans, meaning those that did fear humans would not have survived and bred. Significantly, Trottier adds that while there may have been the advantage of an easy meal at the garbage site for the wolves, it was not the case that there was inadequate prey. Since "their population is in balance with their prey" (McKean), there wasn't the selective pressure to kill off wolves that didn't eat from the garbage. Thus, the wolves didn't necessarily "lose their fear of humans" but took risks as adaptable animals to make their lives easier; and the risk was not that great, as the humans tolerated them, along with other animals at the dump, "including black bears, porcupines, hare and other wildlife" (McKean). Had all of these other animals too changed into "circus bears" or "movie rabbits" or "junkyard porcupines" becoming less wild?[38] As Paul Paquet argues, "it would take many generations of human contact before wolves lost their fear—longer still in the remote location where Carnegie was killed" (Liepins).

Furthermore, the "junkyard dog" simile does not merely invoke domestication, but denotes an aggressive demeanor. The "junkyard dog" is not only not afraid, but fearless. The junkyard dog idiom implies a dog that is not feral, but highly selected and treated across generations to bring out combative traits, especially toward perceived transgressors in protection

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[37] As has been shown in wolves and dogs, as well as the (in)famous Russian silver fox domestication experiments (Goldman).

[38] This is an especially interesting question concerning porcupines. While many people consider them clearly a wild species few would actively habituate, wild porcupines are highly associated with human structures, making use not only out of garbage dumps, but especially outhouses, where they not only seek out nitrates and salts, but use them for a rather memorable sort of mating ritual also involving urine.

of its master's property.[39] When applied to wolves, the junkyard dog has a peculiar rhetorical resonance; the designation implies that within every wolf is the potential of the junkyard dog. As such, they are not just wolves habituated to garbage, but unnatural, liminal canines.[40]

This rendering of wolves as junkyard dogs oddly brings wolves closer to humans in their subjectivity: they are associated with or proximal to humans, but nonetheless still feared within human society. This slippage indirectly reveals the kind of autoimmune logic[41] behind the neoliberally framed interspecies relationships at Points North: while humans find themselves directly in contact with wild wolves, bear, hares, foxes and porcupines there, it is disavowed that these non-humans are members of the social and physical relationships there; the wolves disrupt this disavowal that they are not meaningfully included. And thus, it is only by metaphorizing wolves as aggressive dogs that humans can account for these wolves within the physical and conceptual place of the mining encampment.

This rendering of the wolves at Points North as junkyard dogs is arguably undermined by the series of photos of wolves taken by the two pilots, Svarckopf and Van Galder, before Kenton Carnegie's death. The significance of these photos is evident in Geist's interpretation and rhetorical framing of them. Taken four days before the incident at the landing strip, Geist claims the photos show the two wolves "attacking" the men while Svarckopf "beat back the wolves" (Geist, "Seven Steps" 94-95). However, Paul Paquet, wolf biologist and co-author/investigator of the province's coroner's inquiry report, notes that in two of the three photos, the wolves are

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[39] It protects those it is loyal to (the junkyard owner) from outsiders who would steal his (it's always a his) junk.
[40] This makes them almost the equivalent of what werewolves are for humans.
[41] In Rogues, and elsewhere, Derrida uses the term "autoimmune logic" to describe a logic that brings about its own destruction through its own defense. Here, fighting for a lack of regulation to allow the free-flow of capital could be said to be a neoliberal logic that nonetheless also lets wild animals into civilization and capital flows to disrupt them.

"relaxed" and "clearly not behaving aggressively" (Paquet and Walker 5). Likewise, animal behaviorist and wolf specialist Jane Packard remarks that in these two photos the wolves' postures indicate they were "not threatened or threatening" ("Shadow Stalkers"). In a third photo, where Svarkopf is wielding a large stick as a club and appears to be stepping toward one wolf, Paquet notes the wolf is "retreating defensively" from Svarkopf (Paquet and Walker 5). Packard indicates this wolf is showing "mixed emotions" in the midst of a "flight or fight" situation. More importantly, this photo contains a second wolf that Geist conveniently crops out in *The Real Wolf*, which is turned quartering away, essentially turning its back to the men. As Packard notes, this second wolf has "broken eye contact," in an attempt to "de-escalate" the encounter ("Shadow Stalkers"), leading Packard to speculate the men had "provoked the two wolves" ("Kenton Joel" 3). Thus, what is neglected, or disavowed, in Geist's interpretation of the photo are the wolves' perspectives. That is, Geist fails to acknowledge what each wolf was communicating rhetorically, how they were persuading both the humans and each other, given what they likely took as behavior portending human aggression.[42]

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[42] Indeed "Notably, workers at Points North Camp had accused Svarckopf and Van Gelder of 'teasing' the wolves they encountered" ("Kenton Joel" 3).

Fig. 1: "Photo of Todd Svarkopf encountering two wolves near the Points North Landing airstrip" taken by Chris Van Galder from: Zakreski, Dan. "Wolf Attack in Northern Saskatchewan 3rd in 12 years" *CBC News*, 30 Aug. 2016, www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatoon/saskatchewan-wolf-attack-1.3740927

What is interesting is that there is an assumption that losing fear of humans is synonymous with aggressive behavior: it is claimed that wolves attack *because* they have lost their fear of humans, discounting all of those wolves that don't show fear of humans and do not attack them. As evidenced in the area around Points North, there were major mines within thirty kilometers, along with outfitters and First Nations communities that operated unregulated dumps where not only wolves, but bear, foxes, porcupines, and other creatures frequented. Indeed, to a significant degree, human passivity can be construed as tolerance from the perspective of the wolves and other creatures. This is perhaps a reason for the ambivalent display of behavior by one of the wolves. Harry Frank, the biologist Geist contacted to review the photos Svarkopf and Van Galder took, relates the following:

> The boldness, confidence, etc. of a wolf cannot be judged outside of interactive context….First, the wolf is exhibiting both vertical lip retraction, which is characteristic

> of threat, and horizontal lip retraction, which is more often and expression of uncertainty and appeasement. The right ear is curled back, not pricked forward (contrary to Geist who claims both are pitched forward). The hindquarters appear to be lowered (low posture-carriage, which is the only completely consistent postural sign of submission that van Hooff and Wensing identified in the analysis of some 50 indices), but I can't be certain because the angle. Finally the tail is not raised, but appears to be tucked beside the right hip. Far from expressing boldness and confidence, I'm afraid I have to say that this image could almost have been a model for Eric Zimen's line drawing of a wolf expressing uncertainty—fear mixed with protest ("Kenton Joel" 12).

Additionally, although Svarckopf and Van Galder did not initially provide statements regarding their encounter, four months after Carnegie's death in an interview with the RCMP, Svarckopf indicated that the wolves did not growl or bark as wolves do when they defend territory, "but snapped their teeth and jaws," which Paquet remarks occurs only "when wolves are threatened and under extreme stress or possible attack" (2). Indeed, as Harrington and Asa (2003) indicate, such snapping of teeth by wolves is characteristic of more intense dominance/submission interactions and "ritualized fighting," and is known as "defensive snapping," occurring as "an empty, snapping movement…by a wolf under threat of attack" (94). Thus, it would appear that the wolves are the ones in this case who felt that they were under attack, quite possibly regarding Svarckopf and Van Galder's actions. The men's actions seem to be perceived as an unexpected, and confusing turn of events, given the general tolerance both humans and wolves had shown of each other in the area. As biologist Packer in the National Geographic investigation notes, "that negative experience might have caused the wolves to behave aggressively toward humans in future encounters" ("Kenton Joel" 3).

Were the two wolves that Svacrkopf and Van Galder encountered[43] "junkyard dogs" who had lost their fear of humans? Clearly, if they had lost their fear of humans, the wolves did not behave aggressively initially. In the photos Svarckopf and Van Galder showed others, the two men were initially not showing fear, nor were the wolves, showing aggression. They approach each other in what seems to be a mutually confusing episode. To make it seem as if it is the wolves that are acting oddly dismisses the mutual co-construction of this relationship. While usually the complaint within animal studies is that non-human animals are typically not granted agency, or given status as actants, that is not the case here, as they are purported aggressor "junkyard' dogs" confronting the humans from whom they are apparently protecting the junkyard/dump. In this way they gain a kind of subjectivity predicated on their acting as agents representing their own interests in confronting the humans. However, this metaphorical rendering disavows the agency of the human animals with whom they are engaged. Indeed, this is part of how the autoimmune logic at the camp is fractured: it is not that the wolves so much break through into what is meant to be civilization, but that civilization itself is revealed as a construction that material animal relations undermine.[44] The only way to account for the wolves is through tropes that domesticate their behavior such that they become 'bad dogs' rather than adaptable wolves. Or, to put it another way, they cannot be wolves, but must be something else, perhaps werewolves, or more properly, wolf-men or lycanthropes who become more human. Curiously, the humans are not regarded as having changed at all—they are not 'junkyard men' or some other non-civilized or changed humanity in their actions of wanting to interact with the

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[43] And apparently had been "teasing," according to some accounts ("Shadow Stalkers").
[44] Construing wolves as creatures of wilderness not only limits how we imagine encountering them, but it removes them from quotidian consideration, as if there is a firm boundary between wildness and civilization.

wolves. They are just men working at the camp who were criticized for teasing the wolves; their behavior does not change their identity as a species. This autoimmune logic is predicated on framing the mining encampment as a place for purely anthropocentric economic flows which the wolves can never be a part of relationally except as an indirect result—it's something that has changed about them and not the humans.

Thus, one of the more interesting and significant aspects of the Carnegie inquest is how much focus is on what wolves are and do based on their species identity as predators that kill cruelly in "tearing apart" their victims/prey, and how little interest is shown in what the wolves at Points North were doing in relation to other animals, including humans. What is down-played is not just what wolves were doing around the encampment, such as feeding from the garbage dump, but what wolves had been doing over time in this specific place. This focus instead on what wolves are can be seen in the rendering of them as having become "junkyard dogs," as previously mentioned; to define them as such is to make a statement about what they are or have become, essentially, their identity—no longer wild, they had become habituated (even domesticated), and thus, vicious dogs or werewolves. Yet I think this reveals something about the concept of habituation itself as a state of being, especially if we are to contrast it with tolerance.

Typically, habituation is defined as a state of becoming conditioned to a particular stimulus, given a positive or negative stimulus that then leads to an animal (whether human or non-human) associating that stimuli with a reward or punishment. As such, it is claimed that the wolves at Points North had become habituated to humans via the dump, and thus associated humans positively with food. This is a non-controversial statement regarding habituation, but I would venture that this definition makes it seem as if this process is something mechanistic; in

behavioristic terms, wolves react to such stimuli predictably, and hence such habituation becomes not merely an association of humans with food, but humans as food. Thus, while clearly humans too can be habituated, there seems to be much less agency involved in the animal that is habituated when that animal is non-human. It entails that habituation is formative and fully engrossing in ‘lower’ species, as humans can override such reactions through consciousness and rational contemplation, which is purportedly denied the animal as one of many unbridgeable differences. Yet, if we do grant other non-humans agency and complexity of thought, as many ethologists do with regard to more social animals, such as wolves, orcas, horses, etc., then to regard wolves as merely habituated and reacting to stimuli seems a simplistic rendering of their complex engagements within or across species. Indeed, if we look at “tolerance” as a concept, I think we get much closer to explaining the specific wolf behaviors at Points North, and many other places where humans find themselves with wolves. On this reading, habituation is an unredeemable state, meaning that it is permanent, and may require euthanization. The logic of “lyconomy” that Derrida emphasizes comes into practice: it is necessary to use violence against such wolves because they are bent on violence themselves, given their being and latent potential (*The Beast* 96). This is why habituated predators *need* to be put down as a matter of responsibility—it is a moral claim about the rightness and necessity of such actions.

While we may typically encounter “tolerance” in the realm of human ethics, wherein humans overcome some sort of bias or prejudice, tolerance is something likely present across species. The close proximity of the two wolves Svarckopf and Van Galder encounter may be evidence of mutual tolerance. At the very least, while the wolves were perfectly capable of engaging in an aggressive response, they failed to do so, even when threatened. Framing the wolves’ behavior as tolerance also allows us to understand the wolf’s ambivalent response once

Svarckopf showed aggression toward it. The wolf responds "in protest" to the situation, as if something had changed in that moment that broke with an earlier standard of the relationship established and negotiated over time. While such relations may be agonistic, this conflict is deferred to some degree by the wolves' tolerance of humans and the humans' tolerance of the wolves. In this way, they are not merely unnaturally and passively manipulated into habituation, but weigh and choose risks they have detected and act accordingly, responding by coming close, but not too close; indeed, much can be said of the humans at Points North and other camps, as many humans and wolves encounter each other in such places (much more frequently, it would seem according to accounts, than typically in other locales where both are found). This mutual tolerance is revealing, as it necessitates that wolves are indeed responsive and not merely reacting to stimulus in scripted, predictable ways.

This tolerance can be unpacked effectively by looking at this situation through an embodied perspective resonant with the late work of Merleau-Ponty on animality and evolution, particularly in the intertwining of "flesh" involved in the "seen seer" (*The Visible and the Invisible* 139). The "seen seer" is Merleau-Ponty's way of pushing back on the God's eye perspective of much positivistic, 'objective' science, but also Western philosophy and politics and religion. In the latter, the objective position is one of seeing without being seen; in this way, as Derrida notes in his rendering of the Sun King Louis the XIV's elephant autopsy, the seer is sovereign and unseen, and those seen lack agency in not seeing in any meaningful way (*The Beast* 280). Yet, what Merleau-Ponty points out is that seeing is derived from being seen—there is no unseen seer, as seeing is always potentially reflective. That is, seeing an other always means the potential to be seen, as well; and while we do not deny this to other humans typically, we sometimes do assume it. With non-humans it is often the default perspective; we watch

animals, but neglect to take into account that they are watch us, as well. It is this aspect of the interspecies relations between wolves and humans in particular at Points North, I argue, that is neglected and even disavowed. What I argue is that the wolves seemed aware as to what was at least tentatively tolerated. And, whether they knew it or not, the humans should have known to what extent they had been tentatively tolerated without it leading to more overt, open conflict. Thus, it may be interpreted that the wolves saw a breach in this tolerance and reacted with "protest" and "confusion" to this change in mutual tolerance. In many ways, a purely intolerant situation would be less confusing than one that breaks down.

Yet, as the Carnegie's attorney stated in interviews with media, the trial should not focus on human actions, whether Kenton Carnegie's own actions, that of other employees and contractors working at the mine, or that of Cameco, the Points North Group of Companies, and others running the mining encampment, dump, and facilities at Point's North Landing. Instead, Johnson argues, "the focus of the coroner's inquest should be on proving that wolves killed Carnegie and that they are potentially dangerous predators that deserve our respect" ("Lawyer Raises"). By taking human practices and institutions out of the picture, such statements isolate the wolves that fed at the garbage dump (along with many other species), from the actual context that they have been recently thrown into across the Canadian North. That is, it is argued, this is not an issue about how wolves and humans construct their realities in multi-species relations in particular places, but an issue about wolf identity.

It may be argued that the perception of Carnegie's death is representative of a tension between rural and urban populations regarding wolves typical of other places where wolves and humans find themselves co-habiting the landscape with humans. For instance, it might be argued a local jury composed of rural citizens from the area better appreciates the risk wolves pose to

the lives and livelihoods of such rural communities, a reality that urbanites, biased scientists and academics, and wilderness romantics just don't appreciate adequately, given their unfamiliarity with such encounters. In this way, the incident can be said to be one typical of the purported rural/urban, or professional/blue collar, divide, which is often taken as the basis for the contemporary pro/anti-wolf divide.

However, such a binary perspective dismisses the particular context in which wolves, humans, and other species like bear, moose, and caribou, find themselves in this remote outpost—a place that was a "former wilderness area [that] is a hotbed for uranium mining, as well as gold and diamond exploration" (Myers). Indeed, it is this area of northern Saskatchewan that makes Canada the largest exporter of uranium in the world (Wong) and led author Miles Goldstick, in his book *Wallaston*[45] to describe "Saskatchewan as the Saudi Arabia of the uranium industry" (Goldstick 73). Thus, focusing solely on wolves as the cause, as the Carnegies, Geist, and the Carnegies attorney do, or at least essentially the cause, as others I show do, is to dismiss the neoliberal influences on the place around Points North Landing itself.

While Geist may pit the resolution of Kenton Carnegie's death as a battle of ideology versus truth amongst pro-wolf and wolf realist factions, in which "politically correct" conservation activists attempt to detract from the danger wolves pose to humans by idealizing wolves, I would argue that the question of human practices, actions, and discourse is necessary in order to understand what actually occurred on this site. Not only did Carnegie's death likely result from a human failure to understand the relationship between wolves, humans, and other species at the site, but its rendering represents a denial of the particular ways in which resource extraction in the North disavows the neoliberal reason and practices which lead to the

[45] Named after the lake around which this mine as well as the second largest uranium mine and others are situated.

exploitation of the land, human employees, non-humans, and native human communities. Leery of the long-term environmental effects on water and food resources, First Nations peoples in the area who had lived there for millennia began protesting uranium mining in the area in the 1980s when mining was first proposed (Haalboom 288).[46] Uranium mining elsewhere in Saskatchewan (in sites mined out and still in operation) has contaminated surface and groundwater, fractured First Nations' peoples traditional ways of life, and now poses unknown long-term effects on the environment and the resources local populations depend on (Haalboom 288).

While mining of uranium, diamonds, and gold have profited Canada's mining companies[47] and the provinces' coffers, the management of capital flows, the capitalization of water resources, and development through extraction of non-renewable resources has led to, as elsewhere in the Canadian north, ephemeral employment opportunities in one the world's most dangerous occupations[48] and environmental devastation of local community resources.[49] One need only look to other former uranium mining sites like those on the Navajo Reservation in Arizona, where "Many Navajo people have died of kidney failure and cancer, conditions linked to uranium contamination. And new research from the CDC shows uranium in babies" still being born today (Morales). Meanwhile, the Wallaston Lake mining area will eventually be tapped out, though the effects to the ecosystems disrupted and polluted will still exist, like other now defunct uranium mining sights in Northwest Saskatchewan, such as Uranium City. Furthermore, such development will likely have effects on the health of humans and non-humans who inhabit the

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[46] Indeed, the Dene word for uranium is "dand-thay," which translates as "death rock" (Wong).
[47] 75% of mining corporations in the world are Canadian (Dean)
[48] According to Monster Canada, it was Canada's second most dangerous job, with 46.9 deaths/100,000 workers (compared to 52 deaths/100,000 for commercial fishing) (Swartz).
[49] Indeed, Cameco, the uranium mining company that is the largest employer in Northern Saskatchewan announced significant job cuts with the closing of one of its mines due to falling uranium prices (MacPherson).

area that remain for many generations to come. Not to mention, the development of roads, airstrips, dumps, and other infrastructure itself will continue to bring species like wolves, bears, and humans into contact at sites where such contact would not normally be possible. Such industrial scale development creates the opportunities for such negative encounters, and accompanied with a disavowal of human responsibility, conceals the very neoliberal reason, practices and institutions that create such situations.

Thus, at the site of Points North Landing, it might be said wolves are blamed for disrupting the given-ness of neoliberal subjectivity, revealing the vulnerability that such industry foists upon both humans and non-humans alike. In accentuating, persuading, and demanding that subjectivity is always created, not given, these wolves help reveal the constructedness of human neoliberal subjectivity, exposing its individuating reason, revealing that this logic, despite its normalization, is always shot through with the traces of others.

The Greyness of Wolves

Director/writer Joel Carnahan's 2012 action film *The Grey*, which features a wilderness battle for survival between men and wolves in the far north, opens fittingly with the howl of a wolf resonating across a vast twilight expanse of rugged, snow-covered mountains and seemingly impenetrable forest. Set in what is presumably Alaska's North Slope landscape of isolated oil encampments and pumping stations,[50] the scanning wilderness shot breaks abruptly to an industrial landscape, with the film's protagonist, Liam Neeson's Ottway, narrating his walk through an amalgam of steaming pipes and humming engines: "A job at the end of the world. A salaried killer for a big petroleum company. I don't know why I've done half the things I've

[50] A setting analogous, if not similar, to the uranium mining encampment at Points North Landing, Saskatchewan.

done, but I know this is where I belong. Surrounded by my own: ex-cons, fugitives, drifters, assholes. Men unfit for mankind." Pushing open the door to the local watering hole, he's greeted by a cacophony of blaring heavy metal and a background bar brawl breaking out as if a common occurrence. Truly, this is the "end of the world," a place where only the most ostracized humans survive.

Not long after, many of these same men board a plane presumably for leave away from the encampment, some time back in civilization. However, not long into the flight, turbulence hits, and the plane is soon careening out of control, breaking apart and scattering its wreckage across the snowy landscape. While Ottway and less than ten other men survive, with various injuries, they soon realize an *Alive*-style scenario[51] where rescue is the least of their worries, as wolves begin feeding off the bodies and attacking the men relentlessly. After suffering a wolf attack while trying to chase a wolf off a dead body, Ottway nonetheless hopefully remarks, "They're probably only passing through." However, he cautions forebodingly when asked what if they're not that "Wolves have a territorial range of 300 miles, and a kill range of thirty. If we're close to their den, and we're within that radius, then they'll come after us." And the wolves do come after them, apparently defending that territory, as the men band together to survive. Though the rag-tag group of men learns to work together as a "pack" (with Ottway their "alpha") to dispatch one "omega" wolf, inspiring the ex-convict Diaz to declare, "You're not the animals, we're the animals!"[52] the wolves inevitably pick the men off one by one. In the end, only Ottway is left to face the enormous "alpha" wolf in the middle of the wolves' den, charging

[51] Indeed, one of the men actually alludes to the film and the cannibalism it depicts.
[52] A fitting remark, as after being bitten near the plane crash site, Ottway jokes, "Maybe I'll turn into a wolf-man now."

him in the climactic final scene with sharpened airline mini liquor bottles taped between his fingers.

As film critic Roger Ebert notes, the film is intense, with the men struggling to survive the "punishing weather," landscape, and wolves, leaving Ebert "regarding the screen with mounting dread" (Ebert). In the end, he comments, "When I learned of Sarah Palin hunting wolves from a helicopter, my sensibilities were tested, but after this film, I was prepared to call in more helicopters" (Ebert). Clearly, given Ebert's reaction, the film was affective in its portrayal of the wolves as relentless adversaries for which lethal control seems more than appropriate and reasonable.

Soon after the film's release, protests mounted against the film for its supposed "bloodthirsty" (Lynch) portrayal of the wolves. PETA, The Wolf Conservation Center, Wolfwatcher.org, and other organizations and individuals supporting wolves challenged the portrayal of the wolves in the film, with Wolfwatchers recommending passing out their printable fliers at theaters "describing the true nature of wolves" (Lynch). In an interview with wildlife-ecology professor Dan McNulty, National Geographic sought to "parse wolf fact from wolf fiction" (Berlin), and the International Wolf Center in Ely, Minnesota awarded the film its 2012 Scat Award for "wolf misinformation in the media," after a harsh review of the film's depiction of wolf behaviour.

While many clearly objected to the highly affective but questionable portrayal of the wolves, in an interview, Carnahan emphasizes "I never intended [the wolves] to be the aggressor; I look at them as the defenders. I think these guys are in a very territorially sensitive place. [The humans] were trespassing and intruders" (Kuipers). Indeed, what is interesting about Carnahan's film, as he reveals in an *LA Times* article, is that he takes the setting of the North Slope oil

encampment as a hubristic industrial intrusion into the wolf and other species' territory. He emphasizes that rather than being anti-wolf, "I'd like the movie to remind people that we're just visitors here, and the defiling and destruction of the natural world puts us at odds with our environment and we're ultimately provoking a power that is supreme, overwhelming and merciless" (Kuipers). In this light, Carnahan's tale comes off as a perhaps naturalist (or maybe "neo-naturalist") tale akin to those of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Jack London or Stephen Crane, wherein nature is a force that is heartless and unforgiving. It is a return to nature as unresponsive to human whim, "red in tooth and claw," placing the human back as a speck upon the earth overwhelmed by the sheer power of nature. As Carnahan relates, "he meant to point out that industries like petroleum extraction are often interlopers in pristine — if hostile — environments" (Kuipers). Thus, he attempts a critique of the oil encampment as leading to an inevitable conflict in which each member of the oil encampment's airplane crash party is picked off by the wolves in an existential, neo-naturalist fantasy. As Carnahan proclaims, the film isn't anti-wolf, but pro-natural world, as the "wolves win" (Kuipers). "I am absolutely an animal activist and have a dog and three horses, and this was never in any way to suggest that wolves are vicious animals," Carnahan says. "But they are part of nature, but they're not different in the movie from the blizzard, from the river, from the cliff-side. For all its beauty, it's also very hostile and unforgiving" (Kuipers). Thus, the wolves, as a force of nature, inevitably "win," given the naturalistic world depicted. In further objecting to criticism that the film makes wolves look bad, he offers a score-keeping (perhaps unsurprising given his action-movie background): "Carnahan says to anyone who thinks he has demonized the wolves: 'Look, the wolves do OK in the movie. If it was a football game it would be like 41 to 3! [laughs] They do all right' " (Kuipers). The wolves, for Carnahan, are not intentionally demonized, but instead are

merely an unstoppable force of nature, attacking humans to defend their territory from perceived trespassers.

Thus, while superficially Carnahan's film offers a critique of the invasiveness and destructiveness of extraction industries in the wilderness of the North, he nonetheless reinforces an image of the wolf that draws rhetorically from a naturalistic, or neo-naturalistic, attitude where wolves are mere forces of nature in a man-vs.-nature battle. Carnahan just recognizes this broad, hostile nature as a reality in much the same way as Werner Herzog does in his documentary about Timothy Treadwell, *Grizzly Man*, where Treadwell and his girlfriend Amy Hugenard are killed and consumed by wild brown bears in Alaska after Treadwell spent years around such bears along salmon streams. Much as with Carnahan, Herzog depicts the natural environs, and the brown bears in particular, as reflective of the "overwhelming indifference of nature" (Herzog), stating, Treadwell "seemed to ignore the fact that in nature there are predators. I believe the common denominator of the universe is not harmony, but chaos, hostility, and murder."

However, while it may seem reasonable that wolves might attack a bunch of people who have supposedly invaded their territory and threatened their den[53], as Ottway's flashback shows early in the film, the wolves have been attempting to attack and kill the men from the beginning, even within the oil encampment. Indeed, his job, as a "salaried killer for a big petroleum company," is to prevent this. He is a "marksman… [whose] job is to shoot wolves" (Ebert). As a wolf sniper, he's charged with protecting the employees who work the oilfield equipment from what must be assumed are fairly regular wolf attacks. As Ottway retorts when challenged by

[53] Though, The International Wolf Center's board chair Nancy Jo Tubbs in her review notes "wolves den only in the spring in order to bear and raise their pups, and then only for 8-10 weeks" (Tubbs).

Diaz as to when he "became king shit animal expert all of the sudden": "They pay me to kill those things, to keep them from killing you. So it makes sense for me to know they're man-eaters, and they don't give a shit about berries and shrubs." Indeed, in a flashback early in the film while he sits at the bar, Ottway is hunkered down in a sniper's blind near an oil pumping station where workers are bent over welding pipes. Ottway watches from his nearby cover in the trees as a wolf stalks and then bolts toward the unsuspecting oil workers in what is clearly a predatory attack. As *LA Times* reviewer Dean Kuipers notes, here "the threat is established: These wolves are on the offensive." As the huge wolf charges at terrifying speed, Ottway quickly raises his rifle and releases a shot, crumpling the wolf at the men's feet in a spray of snow.

By treating the wolf attack behavior as a norm, the director/co-writer Joel Carnahan not only normalizes the attack as quotidian, but more significantly the very job for which Ottway is employed. Carnahan's film presumes a need for wolf sharpshooters in the North (as Ebert recognizes), where it is assumed wolves regularly predatorily attack people, as wolves are by nature "man-eaters." We are asked as viewers, in essence, to envision countless others like Ottway, or at least enough of a wolf problem to necessitate hiring people like him. Indeed, Ottway's occupation is quite literally to protect the flow of capital and resources, whether the oil or the men. The assumption that there would be a wolf-killing job thereby normalizes the Kenton Carnegie incident, as if this is how wolves and humans relate elsewhere around resource extraction sites in the North, whether oil/gas fields or mining camps. Thus, in normalizing these attacks, I argue, the neoliberal logic of these extraction enterprises themselves is normalized, regardless of Carnahan's critique of industrial effects on nature or the way such industry is complicit in the dehumanization and animalization of the characters in the film.

Indeed, the question of whether there is an unregulated dump at the oil pumping station encampment that is attracting the wolves, like at Points North and elsewhere where wolves have bitten or attacked humans, is moot. Much as in the Kenton Carnegie inquiry, it is the wolves and what they are that the focus must turn to. And in *The Grey*, whether at the encampment, the crash sight, or in the forest, the wolves attack—no context is ultimately needed, as that's what wolves do as always already potential man-eaters. Wolves just kill humans as prey because they are animals that are prey (similar to Walker, McKean, and Geist's contention that humans are natural prey to predators like wolves). As much as the men are "animalized," the wolves are "bestialized" (something Derrida contends is reserved for the human) in so much as they take on the capacity for anthropomorphic sovereign violence. The only way to resist wolves from doing so is to resort to a relentless "animal"-like violence in parallel with the figuration of the wolves.

We are synonymously left with a "nature faker" critique that dismisses wolf-human coexistence as fantasy, as outside the regime of truth. Instead, Carnahan naturalizes wolves again as an element of nature, like the cliff, the storm, or the river in the film. This, I argue though, is a reductive naturalism/naturalization that dismisses the particularity of wolf-human relations, eliding what it is about such a neoliberal industrial extraction industry that makes both humans and non-humans vulnerable. While it can be said that Kenton Carnegie doesn't meet his fate without the dump, wolves don't do what they do as antagonists unless it, or similar circumstances, is dismissed. Indeed, neither *The Grey*, nor Kenton Carnegie's death, happens, I argue, unless such contexts are.

II. The Law of Nature: How a Wolf Becomes the Wolf to Man

(The Restoration of) Law & Order

Mark Appleby was still "pissed" ("Montana" 8), telling the assembled audience and reporters, "I'm getting mad talking about it" (Mann). On November 4th, 2010, he and fellow Western Montana hunter Raymond Pitman held a public press conference to recount to the media how in attempting to recover an elk carcass shot days earlier in the mountains above Columbia Falls, they were attacked by a pack of wolves, shooting and killing one in self-defense. Appleby was "pissed that he couldn't get the meat back from his elk" ("Montana" 8), according to the Montana Fish and Wildlife officer's report, but he also seemed pissed that the events happened in the first place.

After shooting the elk a couple of days earlier up the Deep Creek fire road just west of the peaks that formed the boundary between the Flathead National Forest and Great Bear Wilderness Area, he dressed and quartered the bull elk out in the woods with another hunting partner, removing the trophy head to take back that night, leaving the bulk of the meat, including the hindquarters, tenderloins, and backstrap on the side of the fire road.[54] After packing up his trophy, he left a sweaty cap atop the pile of meat. That sweaty cap was his deterrent, a staking of claim, and the intention and symbolic meaning were obvious as far as Appleby was concerned, as he told MT FWP "the hat was to put human scent there to try to deter predators" ("Montana" 7). He seemed surprised by the wolves, as though they shouldn't have been there--in a place where for many years, long before wolves returned, hunters, and not a few biologists, had come to believe that during elk season in places like this in Western Montana, grizzly bears consider

[54] Rather than suspending/hanging the meat from a tree, as is the most common practice with most Western hunters in North America.

gunshots a dinner bell (McMillion). While neither the men nor their horses were bitten or had any contact with the wolves, aside from the single slug that killed the wolf, the incident was nonetheless immediately claimed by the men as an attack necessitating self-defense. A later necropsy of the dead wolf performed in the field by the MT FWP officer revealed, “a bullet wound just behind the head in the neck area. The bullet entered high on the left side and exited partway down the neck on the right side” (“Montana” 9), essentially entering the left back of the wolf’s neck and exiting behind the right front lower jaw, meaning the wolf was quartering, or turned away, from the shooter when shot. Appleby and Pittman were nonetheless adamant that not only was it an attack that justified self-defense, but that something was wrong out there in the woods, something was out of order, “something needs to change” (Appleby 13).

The press conference, “organized by former Flathead County Commissioner Gary Hall, a friend of Appleby’s” (Mann), was advertised as an opportunity for the men to "warn the public about the problem" (Scott). Thronged by 'multi-use' advocates critical of federal management and a state senator advocating the immediate delisting of wolves in the Western U.S. as an endangered species, the hunters unfurled the story of their escape. In the end, surrounded by wolves bent on killing them and their horses, they shot their way out in a scene seemingly reminiscent of a Western film bank heist, with the wolves giving chase. As Appleby remarks in his written account to MT FWP,

> Raymond said we need to get the hell out of here and I agreed with him as we both feared for our lives at this point. I dropped the backstrap and started to follow Raymond down the road as his horse was almost dragging him and mine was doing the same. We got about 50 to 75 yards down the road when the wolves were howling right next to us on the side of the road. I said the bastards are following us maybe trying to kill us or the horses.

I told Raymond to shoot in the trees at them as we were trying to get away down the road. And that's what he did. (Appleby 14)

While the scene the hunters depicted in their story was chaotic, dramatic, and affective, repeatedly emphasizing the fear of the hunters, it was the certainty of the threat and what the wolves were that was unambiguous: "Those wolves were not afraid of us at all" Pittman told a reporter at the press conference, reiterating his written statement to MT FWP, "They are killers" (Scott).

Though their story depicted behavior atypical for wolves (such as howling before they attacked), the rhetoric was entirely consistent with Western stereotypes of wolves threatening human civilization. Given federal protection of wolves at the time,[55] it's understandable that the two hunters would preemptively claim they shot the wolves in self-defense. Not only does the claim of self-defense help position the events as an attack, but helps to justify the killing of these federally protected wolves. However, the two hunters and their advocates went beyond making this claim pertaining to their legal guilt or innocence, asserting the story was evidence of a larger "problem" with wolves and the way we regard them. The publicly politicized environment of the press conference shows a larger intention, accomplished by the press conference format itself to legitimize the narrative of their experience (prior to completion of the investigation) and Appleby's emphatic, conclusive certainty that "There's too many wolves!"(Scott) and "something needs to change!" While clearly given the context, it may be supposed that the intention is to help bring about a change in the protected status of wolves, and help initiate a hunting season as

[55] Prior to 2010, in 2009 the first wolf-hunting season was held in Montana and Idaho. However, after a federal court decision re-listing wolves in mid-2010, the 2010 fall wolf-hunting season was cancelled. It would be restored through legislation in 2011. Part of the implicit argument of this chapter is that this incident likely affected that decision, or at least reflects the kind of rhetoric in circulation at the time.

proposed by many in the West as a need, more broadly, the intention, I argue, seems to be to cement the idea in the public that wolves are a problem for which the only solution is lethal control. I argue that there is a perception that the wolves do not belong there, even out in de facto wilderness. They are regarded, at least rhetorically, as outlaws. Thus, inhibiting lethal management amounts to oppression of individual human rights to safety, security, and property, which can only be upheld through enforcing the law as a natural order, defending civilization against criminal species.

Indeed, less than a year after U.S. District Judge Donald Malloy's ruling temporarily relisting wolves in the Northern Rockies region under the ESA, and less than six months after the Appleby and Pittman incident, the Idaho legislature drafted and passed a "wolf emergency" bill (which was then signed into law by Governor "Butch" Otter) to protect the state's citizens, animals, and culture from the threat of wolves. This statute, I argue, reflects how, as Foucault emphasizes, the modern security state seeks to not only minimize apparent risks, but to calculate such risks in consideration of public desires, which could well be based not in any material claims, but in common concerns and fears. Such fear can thus be normalized, considered 'natural' in such situatedness as a fear of the population. In effect, security can be maintained by tolerating the intolerance of another species--it might even be encouraged, as Foucault notes, "the state's role…will be to respect these natural processes…intervention of state governmentality will have to be limited.…It will be necessary to arouse, to facilitate, and to laissez faire, in other words to manage and no longer control through rules and regulations" (Foucault, *Security* 352-3). As a result, suitable wolf habitat and population numbers, for instance, can be even further restricted by anthropocentric whim. Current wolf hunts in Idaho and Montana, and culls in BC and Alaska, serve as a reminder of the reach of security apparatuses in satisfying such desires. It is not

individual “problem” wolves, but wolf populations that are targeted. Within a year after federal protections on wolves in the Rocky Mountain States were lifted, the state of Idaho set out to hunt, trap, gas, and aerially gun down the 1000 odd wolves in the state down to the minimum 150 wolves the state is ordered to maintain under the Endangered Species Act. These ambitions reflected well Idaho’s House bill 343, which declared the entire state a "disaster area" due to "the wolf emergency," framing the state's duty in terms of a security that is as Foucaultian as it is laissez-faire liberal in the American tradition:

> It is the duty and right of the legislature and the governor to protect the state, its citizens and property....The legislature finds and declares that the state’s citizens, businesses, hunting, tourism and agricultural industries, private property and wildlife, are immediately and continuously threatened and harmed by the sustained presence and growing population of Canadian gray wolves….the legislature finds that public safety has been compromised, economic activity has been disrupted and private and public property continue to be imperiled. The uncontrolled proliferation of imported wolves on private land has produced a clear and present danger to humans, their pets and livestock, and has altered and hindered historical uses of private and public land, dramatically inhibiting previously safe activities such as walking, picnicking, biking, berry picking, hunting and fishing. An emergency existing therefore, it is the intent of the legislature to regulate the presence of gray wolves in Idaho in order to safeguard the public, wildlife, economy and private property against additional devastation to Idaho's social culture, economy and natural resources, and to preserve the ability to benefit from private and public property within the state and experience the quiet enjoyment of such property. (Legislature 1-2)

While similar to bills passed after natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, or fires, the rhetoric is also reminiscent of "war on terror" statutes, proclaiming an imminent and ongoing threat to liberty, ways of life, and even the institutions that ground a liberal society. First, wolf populations are claimed as a "clear and present danger" to public safety--similar to how terrorists are often rhetorically framed--but also to wildlife, making them seem to be an especially unnatural threat. Additionally, wolves in general are claimed to have "disrupted" and "imperiled" not only "businesses" and "economic activities," but quotidian leisure activities like "walking, picnicking, biking, berry picking, hunting and fishing," giving the impression that almost all outdoor activities are now restricted solely because of wolf population numbers, leading to "devastation to Idaho's social culture." Furthermore, wolves are deemed to be an institutional threat to institutions like private and public property, and are accused of disabling human residents from the "ability to benefit" from such institutions, thereby defeating their purpose. Such rhetoric, I argue, is the rhetoric of the security state responding to the threat of crisis, presuming a coherent risk that the modern security state must respond to, address, and normalize to satisfy the desire of the population. What is asserted in this rhetoric, I argue, is the need for a preserving violence of law enforcement to deal with the threat to health, safety, and economic freedom such foreign "Canadian wolves"[56] present. As such, "security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life" (Foucault, *Security* 246). Here, this "random element," that must be managed by the state as its minimal duty is wolves, figured as a foreign, unnatural, diseased, and a lesser species/race that threatens the nation.

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[56] The rhetoric of "Canadian wolves" will be addressed in more detail in what follows.

Problematizing the wolf-human relationship politically through such rhetoric as both Appleby and Pittman and the Idaho bill express restricts the possibility that such relationships may show up otherwise, such that more ambiguous narratives regarding the relationship between wolves and humans become discredited in their resistance to hegemonic modes of biopolitical discourse. Significantly, the hunters' actions and comments seem to belie their expectations that the wolves should not have been there, despite the publicly known presence of at least one pack in the area for over a decade. Their actions thus befit biopolitical expectations that wolves should be accounted for and managed as a population with a species identity that must be recognized for effective, efficient species management. Where wolf-human relationships resist expectations of hegemonic modes of biopower, these actions may be interpreted as a problem in the execution or modes of biopower, particularly as it relates to policing. Yet, this is clearly not merely a critique of policing focused on disciplinary procedures directed toward individuals who behave abnormally in, for instance, Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*. Such lethal management shouldn't be carried out merely because wolves are acting aberrantly and must be disciplined as individual problem wolves to make them docile bodies that stay where they are supposed to. Wolves themselves as a species population are considered a threat to civilization, and indeed a threat to the extended self that grounds neoliberal subjectivity biopolitics is tasked with addressing in this contemporary moment.

The biopoliticized expectation Appleby, Pittman, and their supporters advance is thus not only that individual transgressors must be punished (per disciplinary procedures), but that wolves themselves present a danger to the liberty of humans as a species and civil society in general (in terms of Foucaultian security). The material evidence of the account and questionable testament of wolf behavior that it represents are subordinated to the narrative of the danger of wolves to the

security of the human species population and the need to defend civil society from disorder. Under this rendering of biopower, in terms of security, a coherent narrative, or rhetorical assemblage, is thus fomented, wherein wolves represent an unacceptable risk to economic circulation whose territory is conceivably limitlessly expansive, extending even out into a public lands wilderness.

What should be clear from the outset here is that the goal of this chapter is not to prove to some level of satisfaction that Appleby and Pittman entirely fabricated their account to make a claim of self-defense. Nor is the goal to show that the two men were not genuinely in fear for their lives, or that their horses were not. To do either of these things would be impossible and tangential to the focus of this chapter. While I will offer what I consider evidence that calls into question their account, it is not my place as a scholar to refute their account. What is the focus of this chapter is the rhetorical currency of their claims and how their rendering of the wolves they encountered leads to such a conclusion that the wolves were "violent" "killers," as the wolves didn't ever physically contact the men or commit any acts of physical violence, and they didn't kill anything that the men saw, but at most were attempting to steal or scavenge the elk carcass/meat. While wolves do kill prey like elk, obviously, anthropomorphically figuring them as "killers" resonates as both a moral and legal claim, making what wolves do immoral and illicit. Indeed, the framing of the incident as an "attack" is itself much more metaphorical than one might expect, as the wolves never came closer than thirty yards from the men, which would be a considerable distance to be considered attacked from unless by a projectile weapon of some sort like a gun or bow and arrow. This rhetoric of the attack, and the fear that it seems to have engendered is rhetorically significant in the discourse analysis of this chapter.

This chapter also attempts to show how this rhetoric implies a larger discursive assemblage, pieced together to not only support the questionable claim of self-defense, but to constitute the problem that "something needs to change," as Appleby emphasizes both at the end of his written statement and at the press conference. The perception is that wolves have made things out of order or balance, leading to an abnormal/unnatural situation that needs to be regularized to meet public expectations. Such an expectation aligns with the kind of biopower Foucault notes, "consists in making live and letting die[57]" (*Society* 241). And, I will argue, something did change, as the hunting season was re-opened through precedent setting legislation the following year, solidifying the claim of a 'wolf problem' that required a lethal response, and further justifying policing of wolves by monitoring and responding to wolves, and claims about wolves, as if they are legitimate regardless of evidence. Furthermore, I argue the fear engendered itself as well seemed justified and, like "social tolerance,"[58] becomes used to justify and naturalize lethal force against "the wolf" humans fear and may react to on sight with lethal force in what Derrida call a "lyconomy" of "placing the other outside the law" (*The Beast* 96), meeting savage violence with the like. While this single incident did not likely determine the renewal of the wolf hunting season in the Northern Rocky Mountains, I argue this incident, and rhetorically similar incidents, conditioned the rhetorical framing of discourse and policy around wolves. This

[57] As I'll argue, "letting die" a number of wolves in a population through hunting, by outsourcing the state's violence, is nonetheless authorizing lethal force (action on action, per Foucault) to make one species healthier/safer with a preserving violence that re-enacts the physical and epistemic founding violence of society/civilization imagined.
[58] "Social tolerance" is frequently cited as a criterion for determining "suitable" wolf habitat in wildlife management policy (something that will be expanded upon in Chapter Four). While frustratingly rarely defined, social tolerance is here taken as a willingness of humans to tolerate the presence of wolves in places where wolves and humans potentially or actually coexist. Such social tolerance is considered a key factor in wolf management plans in Wisconsin, for example (see Treves & Bruskotter 2013; Stepp 2013; United States District 2006).

rhetorical framing, I argue, not only affected wolf policy in the Northern Rockies region where the delisting occurred, but set precedent for subverting the ESA and similar laws elsewhere through legislation based on issues of public safety, taken as both physical well-being and valued ways of life. Thus, I argue in this chapter that the rhetoric revealed in these incidents conditions and limits both policy and the way wolves are encountered on a quotidian basis. It creates a climate that makes claims like Pittman's that he "won't go in the woods without a side-arm ever again" (Pittman 16) seem reasonable. Thus, the significant effect the normalization of such rhetoric has is that what seems reasonable or normal is a truth about wolves that is a renewal of a truth about wolves in which all wolves are violent killers waiting for a chance to strike, and will do so if they are not treated themselves with violence and lethal force when encountered at close quarters, which may be as far away as thirty yards.

Appleby and Pittman's basic claim is that the 'attack' wouldn't have happened if "something" was different, namely the policy toward wolf populations in general. Delisting wolves from the ESA is clearly what is meant, but that political act itself would not have a material effect unless along with it came both a huntable and killable status that would have made the self-defense claim moot. In other words, Appleby and Pittman shouldn't have had to even claim self-defense; people should just be able to kill wolves when they are present, as they are always already a potential threat necessitating lethal force given what they are. A hunting season alone wouldn't have necessarily resolved the immediate situation unless wolves were in season and they had wolf tags. Thus, one must not only be allowed to hunt wolves, but to kill wolves when one feels fearful or threatened; the desire is to use force at one's choosing, as liberty is now tied to the ability to use lethal force to enforce species hierarchies. That is, what is desired is a signaling from the state that wolves are killable as a lower species in the species

hierarchy, that they are not protected from killing when that is what a human sees as fitting the situation. What is wanted is a legitimation by the state sanctioning individual violence to enforce the law (in a broad sense) and restore order. I would argue that this is what is meant by the regularly repeated, if not clichéd, claim that people's "hands are tied" (Mann 2) in dealing with wolves. Permits to kill a single problem wolf or pack are inadequate; people must be allowed to use lethal force whenever they deem necessary if populations are to be managed properly.

The "attack" Appleby and Pittman purportedly experience in their run-in with wolves thus represents a notable failure in the expectations of policing in both disciplinary and biopolitical forms, as well as evidence of societal disorder created by regulations which restrict human freedom. The two men's press conference announces this and calls it to significance, and State Senator Bruce Tutvedt, a representative of Kalispell and "an outspoken critic of federal wolf management" (Scott), is likewise referring to it in his claim after the press conference that "This is a horrible situation, but our hands are tied" (Mann). Tutvedt's repetition of this is a commonplace, namely, that the state and individuals are restrained from policing and managing populations through hunting and whatever other methods they deem necessary for management.

Thus, while framed as a "safety issue" in Tutvedt's and Appleby's claims that "there could be more incidents in the future" (Mann), this issue of safety, I argue, is directly tied to an understanding of liberty as non-interference. It may seem from some perspectives that what is being lobbied for is a law that allows order to be maintained through the sanctioning of hunting and defense against wolves. However, what is key to understanding this incident is that those like Appleby and Tutvedt perceive the situation as one of governmental intrusion and oversight that works against the law and order that would exist without such interference. That is, law and order is, in what I contend is a neoliberal reasoning, a product of an organic and spontaneous

order which rules as laws are meant to preserve. In this way too, Appleby's and Pittman's rhetoric reflects one of Foucault's main arguments put forth in his *Society Must Be Defended* lectures, wherein he argues that such policing amounts to not just a preservation of the State's forces (as he often repeats in *Security, Territory, Population* lectures), but an integral component in defending "the nation" against the "the state."

Under this interpretation of events, we can see the way that, first, policing is not merely invested in the police force or even formal law enforcement, such as US Fish and Wildlife law enforcement, or perhaps preferably Montana FWP wardens/officers, but is integrated into the very subjectivity espoused in neoliberal reason in the liberty of individuals who police in the name of protecting their own individual life ambitions/projects and self-entrepreneurship. This is because under such a rendering of subjectivity in neoliberal terms, self-entrepreneurship is used as a kind of extended Lockean subjectivity and property acquisition[59] wherein non-interference by other subjects and parties (both the wolves and the federal government in this case) is an expectation. Indeed, the promotion of property acquisition and self-entrepreneurship is the entire purpose of government given in Locke's *Second Treatise on Government* as many libertarians, neoliberals, and anarcho-capitalists read it.[60] And this is intimately tied to a particular rendering of Locke's theory of property acquisition:[61] if you put your work into something, especially to

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[59] Locke's definition of property acquisition in the Second Treatise is "He hath mixed his *labour* and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *property*" (19).
[60] This is evident in the anarcho-capitalist Murray Rothbard's *Classical Economics: An Austrian Perspective on Economic Thought*, but is also evident in the work of fellow neoliberals like Milton Friedman, Freidrich Hayek, E. Von Mises, and the classical libertarian Robert Nozick in his *Anarchy, State, Utopia*.
[61] That is, what I'm arguing here is that these versions of liberalism variously elide or water down the Lockean proviso to leave "enough, and as good, left in common for others" (19), such that property acquisition can be easily justified when no one gaining an economic benefit or profit off of a resource. Arguably, Locke himself already does this, according to James Tully

acquire it out of non-use, as the bull elk Appleby shoots is treated and reduced, that is, as property or at least potential property work has been put into, it is yours, and in effect, through neoliberalism, you—it becomes a part of your material being as a self-branded entrepreneur of the self.

Furthermore, this interpretation of the incident reveals secondly that the wolves and the federal government become co-complicit. This is how bumper stickers, such as "Gov't Sponsored Terrorism…Canadian Wolves!!", "Canadian Wolves…illegal aliens in Idaho!" and "Idaho's #1 poacher…Canadian Wolves!!," put out by organizations like Save Our Elk and The Idaho Anti-Wolf Coalition, come to be meaningfully circulated as a rhetorical appeal. These bumper stickers signify a multi-valent constellation of rhetoric, or rhetorical assemblage, that is not only xenophobic, but neoliberal at its core, resting upon an idea of individuated subjectivity and sovereignty to be protected from the tyrannical regulation of the state. Indeed, most interestingly, it is not legislation Tutvedt claims he is calling for in the remedy of "congressional action that would delist wolves" from the Endangered Species Act in Montana, the Northern Rockies, and elsewhere in turn, but an absence of regulation that would restore 'law and order' by "restor[ing] the state of Montana's authority to manage wolves" through hunting and other management techniques to allow the free flow of work to achieve its natural, organic fruits in a way expected by those who put labor into the material world. Whether the wolves too have a property claim is disavowed, especially as they are taken as essentially foreign 'Canadian wolves' who are where they don't belong—not just outside the designated wilderness where they

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who contends, "Locke defines property in such a way that Amerindian customary land use is not a legitimate form of property" (Buckle 246).

were expected to stay, but even within the boundaries of the United States where they were not democratically authorized by 'the people'/the nation to be.

Indeed, since the reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone and Idaho over two decades ago, protestors have consistently reiterated the rhetoric of invasive, non-native, foreign "Canadian" wolves. While the wolves that founded the initial populations there (and which have now expanded to Washington, Oregon, and California) were indeed from southern Alberta and British Columbia, they are not, as Doug Smith, the coordinator for the Yellowstone re-introduction, emphasizes, different genetically, morphologically, or behaviorally from other North American gray wolves out West (Orhai). Nonetheless, beginning with a failed lawsuit filed in 1993 prior to reintroduction (Lyon, "The Real" 12), the contention that these wolves from the Canadian Rockies are a different, bigger, more ferocious, diseased species of wolf has been a constant in wolf discourse in the West. Attorney Ted Lyon's contention in *The Real Wolf* is exemplary of this narrative when he claims, "Canadian wolves are a larger subspecies than the lower 48 states' native wolves and have voracious appetites" (8). Likewise, Idaho State Representative Phil Hart contends in an op ed that "the Canadian Gray Wolf runs in packs of up to twenty wolves. For every one animal they kill to eat, these Canadian wolves kill about three more just for the fun of it" (Hall). Furthermore, there is also the recurrent claim that these "non-native" wolves carry a disease that "native" wolves did not: "Before the introduction of Canadian wolves in Montana and Idaho, there was no known incidence of hydatid disease in Montana, Idaho, or Wyoming…a parasitic infection of various animals that can also infect humans. The disease is caused by a small tapeworm living in canids, especially wolves" (Lyon, "The Real" 8). As Hall concurs, "The most significant problem is a more latent one, yet more dangerous. It is that of communicable diseases carried by the wolves. Given what wolves do for a living, it is

easy to understand that they could be carriers of disease" (Hall). However, as Doug Smith and others have noted, the risk of contracting hydatid or other diseases from wolves is almost non-existent. Not to mention, as Smith points out,

> The [hydatid] tapeworm was already here. Wolves didn't bring it in. The coyotes, foxes and domestic dogs likely had it before wolves. The human risk from tapeworms is almost nil. If anyone should have [hydatid] tapeworm it's me. I've handled over 500 wolves in my career. I take their temperature with a rectal thermometer. That's where the tapeworm eggs come out. I now wear rubber gloves, but I wash my hands in the snow, then eat my lunch. I wouldn't worry much about it. (Orhai)

Yet despite the corrections of Smith and other biologists, the rhetoric that the reintroduced wolves were diseased, exceptionally voracious, foreign terrorists remains amongst many in wolf country. Not only are these wolves othered in this way, but they are regarded as imposed by the federal government.

Thus, because the federal government is protecting wolves through the legislation of the ESA, it is considered in neoliberal terms an economic "taking" by a foreign entity, which those following the neoliberal or libertarian definition of liberty consider unconstitutional. Therefore, by this argument, this is not just an attack by wolves, but worse, an undemocratic, unconstitutional attack by the government on individual liberty. It is therefore a claim in defense of what Sarah Palin famously invoked, "the real America" (Eilperin) against the state, or in more Foucaultian terms, defense of "the nation" over "the state," where it is the duty of the state to abide by "we the people" of the nation, assumed to be the true foundation of the state. Thus, criticism of neoliberalism that treats neoliberalism as contrary to the institutions of democracy and liberty arguably misrepresents the perspective that grounds such neoliberal reason, as this

perspective is founded upon an assumed organic ipseity and an order of rules, or "law and order" upon which the spontaneous foundation of liberty is guaranteed. In other words, the offense is that there was ever legislation that created new rules giving government a purpose beyond the securing of the rules of economization that protect the spontaneous order of liberty.

Thus, Appleby's and Pittman's lethal use of force, claim of self-defense, and publicly circulated comments that "something needs to change" represent an attempt to restore law and order through what Derrida, following Benjamin, calls a "preserving violence" in which "the violence called founding violence is sometimes 'represented' and necessarily repeated, in the strong sense of that word, by the preserving violence" ("Force of Law" 260). The preserving violence is thus an act and discourse of not only physical violence against wolves, but an epistemic violence with ontological effects/consequences. It constitutes a claim about the inadequacy of policing to secure species hierarchies and protect the population of human species from accidents, and therefore the need for a wider distribution of the means and techniques of policing in an extra-legal force/violence of vigilantism.

Arguably, Appleby and Pittman held the press conference to (re-)assert liberty as the foundation of subjectivity, and demand policing that disciplines aberrant rule-breakers, thereby promoting the health and safety of the human species population, while fostering economic expansion into public lands through the management of various other species. Foucault calls this a "way of separating out the groups that exist within a population," allowing power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races" (*Society* 255). In this way, such reasoning is speciesist, in a manner consistent with biopolitical framing that is likewise the reasoning of structural/state racism.

Thus, Appleby's and Pittman's claim of self-defense is an assertion in defense of neoliberal subjectivity and governmentality—it is not their fault, much as with the Kenton Carnegie incident, but the government's inability to adequately police to secure freedom, thereby defying the very purpose of such institutional policy and government as minimally construed in neoliberal framing. Such freedom, as Foucault notes is "an element that has become indispensible to governmentality itself….Failing to respect freedom is not only an abuse of rights with regard to the law, it is above all ignorance of how to govern properly" (*Society* 353). The state, thus, must "untie the hands" of citizens and allow for more ubiquitous policing invested in the population itself, namely, vigilantism. In other words, Appleby's and Pittman's claim is a complaint against "big government," that it is not minding "law and order," the very rules of the game of life ensconced in the customs and traditions of Western civilization that, as Foucault notes, must be defended. Their demand constitutes a neoliberal expectation of biopolitical enforcement/policing directed at wolves as a population.

Thus, the press conference is particularly significant for its timing, that is, rhetorically speaking, its kairos or the moment that is seized. As of August of 2010, a little less than a year after the first Montana and Idaho wolf hunts (following federal delisting of the wolf in early 2009), wolves were once again protected as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. This re-listing was largely due to successful efforts by the Humane Society and other non-governmental organizations which successfully argued in federal court that wolves should not have been delisted as recovered in Montana and Idaho when Wyoming's wolf management plan had yet failed to find approval, as the wolf population existed over an area that covered the Northern Rockies region of all three states (United States District). This ruling by Judge Donald Molloy was met with great ire, as many advocating delisting objected to the closing of wolf

hunting in Idaho and Montana, accusing the judge of government overreach into state wildlife management, and basically perpetuating disorder in the West.

In response, not long after the ruling, a "wolf summit"[62] was held in the community of Kalispell (in the same town Appleby and Pitman would hold their own press conference less than a month later) in early October of 2010, organized and emceed by Tutvedt and featuring U.S. Representative Denny Rehberg. At this meeting, Myers Reece reports the ranchers and outdoorsman present "made it clear that they wanted three things: the return of state management, revised wolf population numbers, and in the absence of local control, federal rule changes that better protect livestock in Northwest Montana" (Reece). While the first desire, the return of state management, simply means that they want wolves delisted and turned over to the state, which they rightly assume would mean a return to wolf hunting and looser regulations on killing wolves perceived a threat, the other two demands require further explanation. In claiming they want "revised wolf population numbers," these ranchers and outdoorsmen are essentially claiming they do not believe the federal estimates, not because of any critique of methodology, but simply because they don't have any faith in those relaying the numbers. At the wolf summit, "they offered their own statistics, in quantities of lost livestock and diminished game sightings during hunting season. Ranchers argue that many livestock kills aren't confirmed or documented. Hunters say they don't harvest or see nearly the number of elk and deer as in years past" (Reece). They distrust the federal government, presuming there are more wolves than what has been determined, as if the USFWS is suppressing the true population of wolves in Montana,. I would argue this signifies that their perception of the threat of wolves does not square with the

[62] Something that has become increasing popular over the last decade both in Montana and elsewhere, and preceded the ruling in the form of protests outside the federal courthouse in Missoula.

numbers; it is as if they are arguing that the magnitude of their fear is out of proportion to such numbers, so the numbers must be wrong.

As far as the third desire is concerned, that they want changes to federal regulations in Northwest Montana, what they are arguing is that wolves in Northwest Montana are being treated too leniently in comparison to elsewhere in the state. In the area around Yellowstone National Park, wolves are considered a “non-essential experimental” population that can be hazed and killed with less restrictions compared to the rest of the state where they have come down across the Canadian border and have thorough ESA protection as an endangered species. Thus, they are asking for wolves throughout the state to be treated as if they are “inessential” and can be killed by private citizens with significantly less restrictions. In other words, they want these wolves to be more killable.

Clearly, this temporal context is significant here, as Appleby’s and Pittman’s attack and press conference followed on the heels of the relisting ruling (which they clearly disagreed with), protests, and the wolf summit. This sequence of events to many seemed to be evidence that the claims anti-wolf protection advocates had been making were valid, namely, that there were too many wolves, that they were a public safety threat, and that wolves were direct competitors responsible for reducing wild game numbers, particularly of the elk so many hunters covet as the ultimate trophy. Due to laws that protected wolves, people’s “hands were tied,” as they had to make a claim of self-defense in order to avoid prosecution for killing wolves. It is also unsurprising that many outside the community advocating against wolf delisting and hunting may have found the Appleby and Pittman incident suspicious and convenient[63]—the timing was extraordinary, especially given that no other incident like it had ever been reported in the fifteen

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[63] This is particularly evident in comments from articles which covered the events (see Mann *The Daily Interlake* Nov. 5, 2010; Scott *The Missoulian* Nov. 5, 2010)

years since wolves repopulated the area. It also occurred surprisingly close to the very town that had been the epicenter for resistance to wolf listing, Kalispell, the Flathead County[64] seat.

As should be clear from this, even within the boundaries of designated recovery areas, wolves in North America have become regarded by some out West (especially in states such as Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming wolves have repopulated) as a pervasive hindrance to the realization of anthropocentric values. While the tradition of demonizing wolves appears in much of Western literature and folklore, a recent dimension to this narrative in North America regards wolves as something unnatural, acting aberrantly *within* non-human nature (killing for fun, torturing animals, scaring elk into the hills), while also imminently threatening to spill *outside* the non-human realm to wantonly destroy traditional Western livelihoods. Wolves are not merely competitors, but existential threats to a traditional way of life in the West, or what Friedrich Hayek would call "savages" to the liberal "open society" (*Law* 174), threatening a perceived order of frontier values and ideals of justice fought for over the course of colonial expansion. Wolves thus begin to gain their subjectivity, but only as criminals to be held accountable as the "wanton killers" (Graves 15) they actually are, as self-proclaimed 'independent wolf researcher' Will N. Graves claims. Wolves become a threat not in their aberrance or abnormal behavior, but because of their species being. They thus can be regarded as representing an inherent, always potential danger both to individual lives and to the life of the human species. As such, tolerating wolves potentially threatens the economic well being of the population, creating a security risk to the state by their mere presence, not unlike a terrorist sleeper cell or rogue state.

[64] Flathead County is widely recognized as a resettlement destination for multiple extremist right-wing movements, from white supremacists like Richard Spencer and April Gaede, to libertarian anti-federal government white nationalists like Chuck Baldwin, to the sovereign citizen and militia movements like the Montana Freemen (Lenz).

This highly anthropocentric (and anthropomorphizing) perception, offered in various anti-wolf blogs and at wolf protests, is overtly espoused in much of the rhetoric resistant to wolf recovery and aggressively disseminated by a community of collectively-reinforcing 'wolf experts.' The operative story follows a version of the settling of the frontier narrative: when white Europeans 'settled' out West, they killed off a lot of the native animals through predator control and hunting. While this allowed them to tend cattle, game stocks were depleted. Realizing the mistake, ranchers and hunters worked to conserve (through hunting license fees) the elk, deer, and other game populations. Game numbers rebounded and were plentiful until the federal government and environmentalists imposed "non-native" "Canadian" wolves on the populations of the West who never wanted them in the first place.

Both those who support and resist wolves' presence out West seem to expect that wolves, as symbols of wilderness, not only need wilderness, but will stay there. Though not articulated in the wolf re-introduction in Idaho and Greater Yellowstone Area (GYA) programs, it became a presupposition that the wolves would not only stay in the park or wilderness, but that they would stay off private land and public lands humans were already making use of (for hunting, grazing, etc.), as they are part of nature (and not culture) in the nature/culture, wilderness/civilization dichotomy. While this may allow for a seemingly respectful 'letting nature be' in the order of things at best, it also reinforces the separation of species, and species hierarchies.

Even at just outside the border of a designated wilderness, in a de facto wilderness, this crossing over into a different legal status of public land designation is also a potential crossing over into potential subjectivity. This change in status is consistent with a liberal humanist extension of subjectivity common to animal rights and welfare arguments that grant non-humans standing as subjects of rights. However, I argue, this provokes in reaction a reinstitution of the

originary, founding violence of civilization to restore law and order in which, according to Derrida (following Benjamin), "the violence called founding violence is sometimes 'represented' and necessarily repeated, in the strong sense of that word, by the preserving violence" ("Force of Law" 260). In this way, it re-authorizes the violence of species hierarchies as a mythic non-violence against a non-subject, stripping the subjectivity extended to wolves and other non-humans as species and sub-species to restore and preserve order.

It's a lyconomy of violence, where beast-like violence against the wolf is justified by the ontological claim about the wolf's own violence as a species; such violence is necessary. Thus, it could be argued wolves are potentially granted subjectivity (or extended it) only in their crossing over, only to make the rhetoric of "violent" "killers" good. Effectively, it is an argument that pushes back on a liberal-humanist extension of an anthropocentric subjectivity to non-humans to restore the tradition of law and order. In other words, wolves are made killable not solely because they are just animals, but because of their liminal/abject positioning as subjects in competition, a competition in which they should not be allowed, according to the tradition of species hierarchy order.

Foremost in Appleby and Pittman's claims in the press conference is that lethal force was necessary to protect the lives of the men and their horses. Appleby's statement, first given to FWP and reiterated at the press conference that "I feared for my life and the horses and my friend and I started to shoot" (Mann), makes this clear and justifies the claim of self-defense the two men made for killing a wolf protected under the ESA. Indeed, Appleby claims (apparently philanthropically in a gesture invoking public safety to reporters) to be "more concerned about what an inexperienced hunter or unarmed person could do in the same situation" (Mann). This claim seems to make at least two things clear in so far as Appleby is concerned. First, his

experience as a hunter is what led him to take what he considers appropriate action, namely, that he was armed and ready for a wolf attack, and that his randomly firing into the pack is something that only a seasoned, responsible hunter/outdoorsman would know is the appropriate reaction to the circumstances. Second, the assertion reveals that he believes someone who was not armed would have been physically attacked and killed by the wolves; in other words, firearms are necessary when one encounters wolves, as one wouldn't be able to "do" anything about the circumstances without them, making his lethal use of the firearms and killing of the wolf necessary. Indeed, it was not just Appleby's random rifle shots that saved the men and horses, as Appleby "is convinced that his friend's pistol bought him the time to get to his rifle. 'If he didn't have that .44 on his side, we wouldn't be talking to you'" (Mann). That is to say, what saved the men and their horses was the lethal use of firearms as "there was no time to think" (Mann).

Thus, what he is claiming is that the lethal use of firearms is the only solution in circumstances where there is no time to think; that is, you just have to know from experience when it is time to start shooting to protect yourself. If we consider this as a responsible reaction, then, that responsibility is grounded in carrying a firearm and being willing to use it without thinking or consideration of other responses. In other words, the lethal use of firearms is not a backup in case things turn dire, but is a first response wholly legitimated by the perception of the threat; there is no consideration of actions and trained solutions usually recommended by wildlife professionals, field biologists, or hunters and hikers, such as shouting, making yourself 'big' and threatening, using air horns or cracker shells, or the most proven effective non-lethal or lethal means for dealing with a variety of predators, bear spray (which has been proven to be significantly more effective than firearms in encounters with everything from bears to cougars) (Smith et al.).

Additionally, this claim about the necessity of using lethal force may seem even more suspect when considering the necropsy of the wolf performed by the Montana FWP officer showing that the wolf that the two men killed was shot as it was quartering away from the shooter (as noted earlier), with the slug entering through the back left side of the neck and exiting out the right lower neck underneath the jaw, meaning that at least this wolf which they decided to kill was turned away from them at a distance of sixty yards ("Montana" 9). This makes it difficult to understand how this individual wolf in particular could have been said to be attacking them, and yet it was this wolf that they killed and were being potentially charged for killing.

This factor, I argue, makes the scenario analogous to such incidents as one in Sanford, Florida in 2012 where George Zimmerman shot and killed a young black male, Trayvon Martin, who was walking through the cul-de-sac where both Zimmerman and Martin's father resided (Robertson and Schwartz). In both cases, I would argue, it is not the circumstances that actually allow for the claim of self-defense to be made good, but the perception of the identity of the perceived threat, namely a wolf and a young black male, respectively, both of which are regarded by some as an inherent threat that causes even armed adult white men to fear for their lives. What does make such a claim of self-defense good is that the men doing the shooting in each case were of a particular favored and empowered race/species, namely, both can be coded as "white" men[65] armed with a firearm protecting white spaces, while the victims in each case were

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[65] While George Zimmerman has been described as a "man of white American and Peruvian decent" (Onwuachi-Willing 1115), his German surname, lack of a "Latin" accent in his American English speech, standing of his "white" father in a position of power (judge), and behavior in patrolling his gated community neighborhood from racial others, namely "black" males, code him as non-black, arguably make him "white" in most contexts and spaces. At the very least, I argue he is patrolling the space of his gated community to protect a dominant "white" order.

non-white men taken as disrupting the order of those spaces. In other words, the species/racial hierarchy makes the claim good in its result of restoring order.

As should be clear from this comparison, I am asserting that the killings of both this wolf and that young black man are products of a perspective that makes such figures a threat for which the lethal use of force, even in the absence of the equivalent available lethal means by the entity being encountered, is justified and reasonable. Indeed, such lethal force does not even need to be justified above some non-lethal response—it is itself the most appropriate response as the shooters are concerned, but also as tradition and customs of societal order are imagined and naturalized. The perceived violence against order is met appropriately with lethal violence.

This is because, I argue following Foucault, the preservation of race or species is already tied to and predicated upon the killing of other races/species. That is to say, such violence is inherently racist or speciesist; such lethal violence is applied along a break in the biological field wherein it is assumed that inferior races or species not only should, but must be killed, in order to not only preserve a privileged species, but also to purify the population of the nation that constitutes, or potentially constitutes, the state. As Foucault considers late in the *Society Must Be Defended* lectures, "What is in fact racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die" (254). In this way the paradox of a biopolitics that "makes live" but nonetheless kills to do so is resolved. It is not a war as between states where one state fights another to overtake or secure territory, but is a biological relation in which the internal population is purified to make it live by eliminating threats, accidents, and abnormalities that threaten its health and safety. Thus, as a biological relation, and not a warlike one, the racism and speciesism of biopolitics functions as a normalizing force that utilizes and disseminates biopower to strengthen the population or

make it live. As Foucault notes, this reasoning amounts to, “The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race [or species or sub-species, I would add], of the inferior race (or degenerate, or abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier; healthier and purer” (*Society* 255). Thus, the biopolitical promotion of life must always entail the death of others.

The press conference is thus a political statement about the necessity of violence to restore order. The something that needs to change is not some sort of advocacy of progress or moving forward, but is a restoration of species/race hierarchies under new guises tied to the entrepreneurship and limitless economic expansion associated with neoliberal subjectivity under a biopolitical frame. In this way, Derrida observes “the very violence of the foundation or *positing of law* must envelop the violence of the *preservation of law* and cannot break with it. It belongs to the structure of fundamental violence in that it calls for the repetition of itself and founds what ought to be preserved, preservable, promised to heritage and to tradition….A foundation is a promise” (“Force of Law” 272). This founding violence is demonstrated in the way the elk Appleby kills becomes an object acquired in a sort of Lockean originary acquisition of property; that is, because Appleby put in the work of taking the elk (an object) through his own work, he has taken it from the state of nature where it could be claimed by anyone (and presumably, this would have to include wolves and their own ‘labor’ in predating and killing their quarry) and not only made it his own, but a part of himself. In this way, the sweaty hat Appleby left upon the pile of meat out in the de facto wilderness is a claim of ownership that gives him sole propriety of the meat; anyone who took some of it, whether a raven, a wolf, or another human, would be stealing. Such stealing amounts to a threat that is not only one of

robbing someone of what is justly his, but amounts to a violence against one's person and body. Indeed, this figuration of the elk as Appleby's property is further evident in how the elk is dressed, both in being field dressed and made for human consumption, and in the way in which he places his personal clothing (his sweaty hat) upon the elk. Doubly dressed, the elk is made proper to civilization: it is made ready for human consumption, and becomes human property. It is as if the elk is borrowing the hat to indicate its inclusion in civilization, making it proper to the human world through sovereign declaration. It is made a part of Appleby's life and body, not only through his work, but in wearing his very personal clothing. And this remains the case even though the elk was left miles from human habitation on the edge of one of the lower forty-eight's largest and most rugged wilderness areas. Such stealing is thus regarded as an animal or bestial violence in defiance of property claims for which the only recourse is a counter-violence against the offending party/parties, whoever they may be. In this way, such violence reflects what Derrida has called a "lyconomy" wherein one must, when faced with a wolf (which is always acting outside the law), resort to lethal violence. It is necessary to use such lethal violence against those who commit violence against the law in their terrorization of the population in order to preserve and restore law and order.

It then makes sense that Pittman would call the wolves "violent" in his statement, even though the wolves didn't do anything physically/materially violent except purportedly charge in close, howl, and contest the claim on the meat. Feelings of fear or terror, in other words, are enough to substantiate a claim of self-defense against such others who are blamed for causing it. This is especially the case as Appleby considers the meat his and, under neoliberal reasoning, literally a part of him as a self-made man. Thus, trying to take the meat is an "attack" upon his person and the grounds of civilization that he may rightfully defend. And he is further justified

by the speciesism that locates the wolf as an inherently violent and hierarchically inferior species he has rights over and above. It is, thus, as philosopher Glenn Mazis notes, the logic that one must terrorize and kill not only to protect one's individual body, but "for the good of the whole and the survival of the law" (7). In this way, Appleby and Pittman are acting in the interest of preserving a regularity which the law is meant to uphold, performing the actions of policing that are both disciplinary in acting on individual wolves, but also biopolitical in acting to preserve the safety and security of the population of humans as a whole. It is for this latter reason that "something needs to change"—current policing is inadequate for such security. And so the claim of self-defense is not merely personal and individuated, but a claim about defending the population which composes the nation and which the state is meant to defend as its purpose. Thus, the state's policing can always be regarded as potentially inadequate, necessitating more ubiquitous policing, much as Foucault notes in his analysis of Nazi state racism, where "the power of life and death, was granted not only to the State, but to a whole series of individuals. Ultimately, everyone in the Nazi State had the power of life and death over his or her neighbors…so murderous power and sovereign power are unleashed throughout the entire social body" (*Society* 259).

Appleby and Pittman restore law and order through going beyond the legal code to defend the nation and regularize relations between species, re-instantiating the species hierarchy even if by baiting the wolves intentionally or unintentionally into the conflict; that the wolves would challenge them reveals their aberrance, much as, in another perverse historical parallel, a slave challenging his or her master would reveal his own aberrance. In this way, the dissymmetry of power that is at the heart of liberty even as construed under liberalism is revealed—it is always about the right to make good on claims of ownership that grounds it.

Thus, to grant the wolves a claim to the carcass would be to attribute some sort of rights, citizenship, or subjectivity to the wolves, an effort that the animal rights perspective does take up in granting even wild animals a right to life.[66] It also forecloses the possibility of recognizing mutual vulnerability in finitude, something which may be a more effective argument in critiquing the animals as property and extensions of the self, for it allows a recognition of the primacy of interspecies relations in sharedness. To extend subjectivity though is to buy into the gambit of recognizing natural rights, and then the ground that is staked is in how deserving another species or race is of such subjectivity. It is always about proving the criteria of subjectivity (which is always human) are met, rather than recognizing the vulnerability and finitude shared as embodied beings (Wolfe 17). Lethal force is a reaction to this; it is a reinstitution of hierarchy, with preserving violence as founding violence.

In other words, the effort to extend subjectivity to non-human entities is inconsistent with the episteme that makes species differences meaningful in the established regime of truth of species and racial hierarchies. As such, an effort like this is bound to lead to objections and reactions of just the sort Appleby and Pittman make and imply in their statements. Saying that the wolves were "violent" and "killers," despite providing no evidence from their encounter that would substantiate such a claim (whatever version of events one may find plausible), is then not a claim about the wolves' actions but their identity in the order of things that has been constructed, and yet, contradictorily, naturalized. Indeed, to extend subjectivity is not a challenge to such order, but is an error, a category mistake by this episteme. Furthermore, it risks eliding

[66] But, in doing so, that argument becomes whether they do or don't have rights and liberty tied to the human, i.e., an anthropocentric subjectivity extended to include non-humans, yet still clumsily and dangerously human all too human (Wolfe 16)

differences that might otherwise be meaningful for resistance to more thoroughly challenging this epistemic framing by undermining subjectivity itself.[67]

Furthermore, species distinctions are based in human supremacy, and racial distinctions are based in white supremacy, xenophobia, and nativism. These are not arbitrary groundings, but the marshaling of historically and materially grounded institutions and practices, expressed in specific but mobile rhetorical assemblages that sediment into common sense as regimes of truth. This is why the practices and institutions based purportedly in custom and tradition have weight—they are not "just" rhetoric, but are rhetorical assemblages that refer to material relations invested with power and enforced through lethal violence to make the claims persuasive and commonplace. Indeed, they have the effect of making lethal violence always potentially necessary to maintain order.

(The Inadequacy of) Policing

"Quand on parle du loup on en voit la queue."
(When one speaks of the wolf, one sees its tail.)
-French Proverb

The recent recovery of wolf populations and other large predators in North America is often attributed to changing attitudes about the need to preserve wild nature in remaining wilderness areas, particularly those "last, best" places out in the West of the United States lower forty-eight states, but also in Alaska and vast stretches in Canada and Europe. As such, wolves have become symbols of wilderness. But, as wolf numbers have rebounded and wolf range has expanded widely from core holdout habitats and areas of reintroduction (areas of either

[67] A similar problem exists for horizontalizing/leveling species yet maintaining their independence, as deep ecology, many new materialisms and OOO arguably do.

designated or de facto wilderness), conflict between humans and wolves has increased, revealing the limitations protecting wilderness has for living with wolves. Thus, a cultural narrative relegating wolves to national parks and "rock and ice" wilderness denies the growing complexity of human interactions with wolves. It reveals the perception that wolves are not to be a part of our daily existence, that wolves are exempted from places of human habitation, creating the expectation wolves can be isolated and engaged at our own choosing. Wolves that transgress these boundaries, that kill cattle or pets, or compete with humans for ungulates like deer and elk are regarded as aberrant. They are treated as part of the "wolf problem," a challenge to a regulation and biopolitical management of wildlife established to promote largely anthropocentric interests, or at the very least, anthropocentric valuing of particular species over others in the interest of reinforcing animal hierarchies. The reinforcing of these hierarchies, paradoxically, amounts to restoring a naturalized law and order through a normalized vigilante policing, a policing that is grounded, I'll argue (perhaps counter-intuitively), in a neoliberal nativism.

Given wolves' association with wilderness, wolf management has thus been characterized by efforts to keep wolves in wilderness, and to discipline them for crossing wilderness boundaries. For example, wolves introduced into the Blue Range Mountains along the New Mexico/Arizona border are classified under the U.S. Endangered Species Act (ESA) rule 10j as an "experimental, non-essential" population. These wolves are "largely prohibited from leaving the confines of the Blue Range area in New Mexico and Arizona. If seen outside the Blue Range, and between an area bordered by Interstate 40 to the north and Interstate 10 to the south, they are to be returned to the Blue Range" (Steller). In Wyoming, the recently approved state wolf management plan designates wolves as "predatory" animals that may be shot on sight

year-round in nearly 85% of the state, leaving an area adjacent to Yellowstone and Grand Teton National Parks where seven breeding pairs of wolves are permitted to exist as "trophy game animals" (Preston).

Of course, the problem is that wolves, unlike other large predators in North America, such as mountain lions or grizzly bears, are highly adaptable. Their rapid recovery is a testament to this. In effect, they do not require what has been deemed "wilderness." This erroneous impression of "equating wolves with wilderness," Fritts et al. argue, "is an artifact of wolves being exterminated in most areas except wilderness, creating a misconception that they *require* habitat free of human influences to survive" (300). Yet, as a result of this misperception of associating wolves solely with wilderness, management of wolves in much of North America has attempts to contain wolves within such specific habitats with the expectation that they can be compelled to stay there, whether by relocation or extermination. This misperception has unfortunately conditioned wolf management, particularly the perception of what is deemed "suitable" wolf habitat.

While it is certainly debatable whether "wilderness" itself is anything more than a historical construct, as William Cronon asserts in his influential essay, "The Trouble with Wilderness," the more insidious effect of attempting to contain wolves within such areas is what philosopher Thomas Birch calls the "incarceration of wildness" (Birch 443). Utilizing Foucault's analysis of Bentham's panopticon prison in *Discipline and Punish*, Birch claims wilderness areas constitute a reassertion of homocentric control, the imperial gaze attempting to contain and discipline even that which resists control by definition, "wildness" (445). While such places may provide a refuge for biodiversity and wildness in the form of wolves, and appear to be a recognition of the right of wild animals like wolves to exist at all, they have the corollary

effect of containing, if not segregating, such wildness apart from human habitation, contrary to the will of wolves to seek out new habitat. Additionally, while only seemingly obliging to wolf interests, wolf management can also be highly invasive into the lives of wolves. While wolves that stray from wilderness areas may be punished with death or relocation from pack/family members, wolves within wilderness are regulated by the anthropocentric panoptic gaze and what Foucault has elsewhere called "biopower," or regulation at the level of life. In essence, such animals are disciplined to act wild. In Yellowstone National Park, regarded by many as the site of the pre-eminent wolf recovery success story, park literature proudly proclaims that no more than 50% of any one pack is allowed to be radio-collared. While this may seem preservative of wolf autonomy in limiting the scientific gaze, the reasoning given for such a practice is to meet the expectations of the tourist gaze instead—tourists don't want to take pictures of wolves wearing radio collars, they "like to see wild wolves looking wild" (Crumley 178) and so the wolves are disciplined to be wild within the confines of the park. Thus, wolves' lives in Yellowstone are at least partially determined by both the scientific gaze and the tourist's expectation for how wolves should look and behave. Management of wolves in a place like Yellowstone, perhaps especially in Yellowstone, is thus clearly anthropocentric in its aims, designating a place for nature apart from human habitation, thereby reinforcing the nature/culture divide and the concurrent Western perception of humanity as differentiated from nature, especially wild nature. Yet, as the tourist or biologist perspectives belie, humans nonetheless engage wild nature, but only so much as to maintain the discipline that keeps such wild animals wild.

Such wolf management even within wilderness areas and national parks, however, reveals the limitations of the disciplinary model that Birch applies, namely in that it is no longer

the case that wolves are surveilled solely within wilderness areas or parks to keep them inside and keep them in their place, segregated from civilization. While they are disciplinarily engaged within such spaces as evidenced above, outside they are further managed in non-disciplinary, biopolitical ways, as they are managed not so much as individuals, but as a species, or species population, wherever they may occur. That is, they are policed in a way in which "greater attention is paid to public health, social welfare, and regulating the marketplace" (Johnson 6).

As a result, policing has been turned over to non-traditional policing forces. From the 1980's and well into the twenty-first century, Carter Niemeyer was one of the go-to investigators, trappers, and wolfers (a hunter of wolves) for the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal Damage Control unit (now known more benignly known as Wildlife Services). Given that experience, Niemeyer notes, "I had the confidence that I could tell a rancher what killed his animal—or, more often, what didn't" (Niemeyer 151). When someone called blaming a wolf for killing their calf, cow, or horse in the western U.S., it was often Niemeyer who responded. While personally responsible for trapping and killing numerous animals (from coyotes, to bears, to eagles, and wolves) that predate livestock or disrupt agriculture, his experience, he notes in his memoir *Wolfer*, changed his attitude not only toward wolves and other animals, but toward the culture and politics of governmental institutions that responded to such claims of wolf attacks. While he did concur with complainants and fellow ADC employees in his investigations that wolves were occasionally responsible for depredations, "just because the wolves were present didn't make them guilty" (204). To his surprise, both his colleagues and the ranchers he worked with began to regard him as a wildlife enforcement officer of sorts. As he notes, "I didn't consider myself a crime-scene investigator until I learned that everyone else did. In their minds, a crime had been committed against their livestock by wild animals and it needed to be

answered—preferably with a gunshot" (151). However, while claims wolves were responsible for such deaths and maimings were common, Niemeyer found that it was rare that wolves were to blame. This is likely because, he notes, "Most trappers I knew did their investigations with the tips of their boots, rolling the animal to one side, never taking their hands from their pockets. Yep, they'd say, looks like a wolf did it, or at least was 'possibly' or 'probably' responsible. It quickly became the fashion to blame wolves for all things dead" (152).

In contrast, the much more thorough investigatory process he employed involved actually examining and skinning the animal to look for what did kill it, rather than starting with the assumption a wolf was likely responsible and attempting to verify it. This process revealed that not only was a wolf rarely to blame, but that a whole host of other causes of death, from disease, to weather, to neighbor's dogs, were more likely the cause. As one of the many examples he offers, Niemeyer notes, over a period from 1991-1994, just prior to reintroduction of wolves in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming, he "had cut open more than 100 sheep and cattle, four horses, one foal, and a mule. All were reportedly killed or injured by wolves. Of that number, I found that only five—four calves and a lamb—were legitimate wolf kills" (184). In other words, 95% of depredations blamed on wolves were caused by something else.[68] However, these conclusions were neither satisfactory to ranchers nor to his supervisors at ADC who were dogged by various interest groups and legislators to show statistics (i.e., the aim and technology of policing) reflecting the wolf problem they were all so certain was endemic and needed to be addressed through culling and trapping wolf populations. As Niemeyer notes, "I went out and did what I thought was a thorough, honest job and because of it, I was branded a traitor. Every time I said a

[68] This scapegoating of wolves remains a constant in wolf recovery/reintroduction throughout North America. As wolves have expanded their range into Washington and Oregon, these claims have likewise followed them.

wolf didn't do it, I got my ass chewed by a supervisor" (210). As a result, claims that wolves were responsible was enough to declare it the case, which then drove the statistics, which in turn drove policy (214). As Niemeyer failed to adequately realize, "police makes statistics necessary, but police also makes statistics possible….Police and statistics mutually condition each other" (Foucault, *Security* 315). Thus, despite the fact that "the evidence didn't usually match the rancher's stories," wolves were considered the default culprit as soon as they were invoked: "mention that four-letter word, w-o-l-f, and people start seeing the animal everywhere and every dead ranch animal or pet as the wolf's latest eviscerated victim" (Niemeyer 160).

Branded a traitor, Niemeyer was not just regarded as a bad or rogue federal employee and wildlife investigator, but a policeman who refused to adequately police wolves. That is, he was deemed as deficient in meeting the demand to see wolves as a biological threat to the lives of the ranchers and rural population he serves. His evidence that wolves are usually not responsible is actually proof of this, as he is focusing on individual instances, rather than the species truth about wolves as a threat in general, as it is at this level, that of populations, that species are managed biopolitically. His duty, as a kind of police, is to assure the safety, security, and economic liberty of the area's human population consistent with their fear of the threat, while also providing statistics that reflect this threat.

The significance of this threat is a key consideration in understanding the claims put forth by Mark Appleby in the press conference he and Pittman held after being "attacked" by wolves and killing one in self-defense. What they accentuate in claiming "something needs to change," I argue, is that the something that needs to change is that there needs to be fewer wolves, as

"there's too many wolves," implying the population/numbers[69] must be lowered to address the threat and prevent future incidents where wolves attack hunters trying to recover the game they have killed and cached. This is to say that the regulations/"protections" at the time (fall 2010) regarding when and where wolves could be killed were to blame. Thus, what Appleby and Pittman are referring to in their comments is that things are out of order, showing a need for more policing of wolves; that is, wolves should be put in check through more disciplinary tactics which properly treat aberrant wolves like those they encountered, but so too, wolf populations generally should be further policed, as they contend there are "too many" in total (a claim that has not desisted even today after the wolf hunting season was reinstated).

However, such policing, they and others implicitly argue, should not be merely carried out by what we typically think of as police, that is, the "simple police" (Johnson 14)—the cop on the beat, the urban law enforcer, or police who manage urban populations during protests, celebrations, etc. on the streets. Such policing instead occurs in other spaces, such as public lands, and is invested not in city police departments, or highway patrols, or the RCMP, or even sheriff's offices, but in institutions where it has dispersed over the last hundred plus years. These public lands police include Forest Service Law Enforcement (L.E.), which manages the land where the incident occurred; the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) L.E., which manage and enforce laws regarding endangered and threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA); institutions such as Wildlife Services,[70] which is tasked with resolving wildlife

[69] It should be noted that most state wolf management plans are based upon the minimum number to keep the ESA from kicking in and re-declaring them endangered; the hunting quotas reflect this.

[70] Wildlife Services (formerly Animal Damage Control) kills a lot of critters in particular, including wolves and about 30,000 coyotes a year. Notoriously, while they obligingly release the total numbers of animals killed publicly, they do not record or release the reasons why lethal control was necessary (Ketcham).

interactions that threaten public health and safety, as well as agricultural property and natural resources, protecting those resources from damage or threats posed by wildlife; and the various state and provincial agencies/institutions, such as Montana Fish Wildlife and Parks (MT FWP) in this case, which are tasked with managing wildlife within the several states and provinces. As such, while we may typically think of policing as carried out by police departments and officers, much policing in North America is carried out by various other entities, much as Foucault recognizes in claiming "policing should not be identified with *the* police….Policing is undertaken partly by the uniformed public police, but their actions are coordinated with agencies of policing situated throughout the state" (Neocleous xi).

Furthermore, policing in contemporary society, especially if considered under a contemporary neoliberal frame, not only invokes disciplinary powers and tactics, but biopolitical ones that attempt to "protect against health threats, to manage and not control populations, and to foster economic expansion" (Johnson 13). As such, policing is expanded and diffused throughout various public organizations that attempt to coordinate the state's forces to accomplish these tasks. However, what I argue is also implied by Appleby's and Pittman's claim is not merely that the police need to step in to protect people from wolves, but that regulations put on the killing of wolves make policing impossible where and when it is most needed. The perception is, as Foucault notes, that

> Not only is there a certain course of things that cannot be modified, but precisely by trying to modify it one makes things worse….Police regulation is pointless because…there is a spontaneous regulation of the course of things. Regulation is not only harmful, even worse, it is pointless. So a regulation based upon and in accordance with

> the course of things themselves must replace a regulation by police authority. (*Security* 344)

In other words, there is a need for policing which, despite policing being invested in so many institutions, is inadequate policing. It is the wrong kind of policing, enforcing prohibitive regulations, rather than productively serving interests. Policing, on this reading, does not do what it is supposed to do, namely protect humans from public safety threats, manage populations, and allow for the expansion of economic benefits to the human population.

And thus, there is a need for more policing, meaning, I argue, policing by private citizens and non-governmental institutions that may be considered extra-legal policing. This, I argue, is a consequence of the type of biopolitical subjectivity that neoliberalism assumes, wherein individuals are self-entrepreneurs protecting themselves as human capital that may increase or decrease dependent on policing to maintain the expansive flows of capital, even at the edge of a wilderness area, where this incident occurred. The claim of self defense that Appleby and Pittman make is based on an expectation of adequate policing, and thus the claim is that there was inadequate policing in this case, and that it will always be inadequate if not turned over to the individual. They were forced to defend themselves because policing mechanisms were inadequate in managing wolf populations because of regulations that prevented it, but also because they themselves as private citizens had their "hands tied." As such, what is really called for is not so much more police presence (in the form of state and federal land and wildlife agencies), but more private citizen policing. This increase in policing can, perhaps ironically, be accomplished by loosening regulations on hunting and trapping wolves, and by allowing citizens to act as vigilantes who enforce the law extra-legally in the absence of adequate policing by state and federal institutions responding to threats the population considers imminent. As such, the

perception is revealed that there must be an allowance for policing which is not carried out by police agencies at all, but by private citizens who police the territory they inhabit and venture into, i.e., their "milieu" (Foucault, *Security* 22-23). This milieu is infinitely expansive, concomitant with economic flows and the expansion of individual interests and work. As such, individuals become the police of their own brand, as only they can know what interests should be protected.

Indeed parallel modes of policing can be found in U.S. gun laws that allow for open carry of firearms, "stand your ground" statutes that allow private citizens to use lethal force on perceived threats, and "castle doctrines" which allow for lethal force in defense of home and property. More directly equivalent are laws in the States that now allow for open carry of firearms in National Parks and Monuments, where the policing force of the USNPS (National Park Service) may not be around to do the adequate police private individuals may perceive as necessary to protect not only personal liberty, but one's brand, which is the main focus of neoliberal subjectivity.

Much as with the Carnegie parents' claims that wolves are "the problem," Appleby and Pittman too sought to frame wolves, and not anything humans were doing or do, as the problem. Indeed, the two men, as noted, ostensibly held the press conference to "warn the public about the problem." This problem I contend, is a perceived inadequacy of policing, given the assumed biopolitics of neoliberal subjectivity. Namely, it is a problem when wolves threaten health and economic ventures (of which hunting may be considered one—i.e., there need be only economic, not capitalist reasons) of the population and the individuals who expect adequate policing to secure these foundational liberties. Built into the biopolitics of neoliberal self-entrepreneurship is thus the expectation of non-interference if you play by the rules, which Appleby and Pittman

certainly seem to claim they did. That is why, despite evidence that makes the claim that they were attacked questionable, they were yet able to make good their claim of self-defense[71]; the expansive range of economics, even into the wilderness, allowed them to construe their actions as a defense from unauthorized "takings" of property, which quite literally occurred when the wolves tried to claim and defend the elk bull Appleby had killed. Wolves that fail to respect property claims are thus necessarily a problem.

Furthermore, when fear is generalized and ubiquitous, a policing that is biopolitically focused on managing and promoting life across physical habitats (encompassed by an assumed milieu of a population that is continuously expansive) is nearly impossible and will always be arguably inadequate (especially if invested solely in institutions tied to the state). The demand for policing is thus limitless when it is the fear of a species, and not anything particular individuals are doing, that grounds management. The effects of such demands became apparent just on the other side of the valley from where the Appleby and Pittman incident occurred, in Kalispell, Montana, where a single wolf sighting set off a panic of numerous false wolf sightings around the town. Though the wolf that was originally spotted was, according to attending predator biologist Ken Lauden, "just running for its life" (Tabish) on the outskirts of town when spotted, its mere presence was taken as a threat to security by the population. Lauden notes, "One call came in from someone who claimed to be following a wolf that was running through a neighborhood. The caller told police they were trailing the wild animal but then 'the wolf' ran into a yard and a person opened the front door of the house and it went inside" (Tabish).[72] While amusing, such claims must nonetheless be taken seriously and investigated (by police) to assess

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[71] As one U.S. attorney told to me after discussing the case, it's a loser, despite the evidence
[72] It's an incident eerily paralleling another perceived security threat in recent news, namely the Trayvon Martin case in Florida where George Zimmerman, on his cell with police, followed a young black male he perceived as a threat in his neighborhood.

the threat to the population each and every time, or the police (in whatever form) lose credibility and the trust of the public. Yet, by checking out the calls, credence is given to the purported threat and concern.

Under similar circumstances, the build up to voting on a proposed wolf hunt in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan further demonstrates how dispositifs of biopower are enacted and reified through discourse about wolves. Here too, wolves were thought to be prowling the rural towns. As a *Michigan Live Media Group* investigation revealed, “when state lawmakers asked Congress to remove wolf protections, they cited an incident in which three wolves were shot outside an Upper Peninsula daycare center where children had just been let out. That never happened, *MLive* found” (Barnes, “Michigan’s”). Likewise, a Michigan state trapper, Adam Bump, claimed to the local NPR affiliate, “You have wolves showing up in backyards, wolves showing up on porches, wolves staring at people through the sliding glass door while they’re pounding on it exhibiting no fear” (Barnes, “Michigan’s”). These things did not happen, as Bump later conceded; however, Bump nonetheless emphasized, “But the fear in certain areas is real.” Thus, despite the fact that the incidents that helped manufacture that fear are false, Bump seems to contend that fear should be taken as a legitimate factor in policy development, as it expresses a deeper truth.

Furthermore, a *USA Today* article published prior to the vote, entitled "Michigan Residents Say Wolf Hunt Will Control a Killer" (Matheny) begins with the story of sixty-eight year old John Koski, who, with "knobby hands weathered from a lifetime of farming" lifts a blanket back to reveal to the reporter "the mutilated cattle carcasses," "the latest casualties in his ongoing war with wolves," just two of the "119 cattle he's lost in the last 3 years." Koski's story is construed in the article as exemplary of typical wolf-human conflict. Not only did it

necessitate the lethal removal of dozens of offending wolves by state sharpshooters, but led to the assumption that the wolf is an inherently problematic animal, necessitating not just the removal of the particular wolves that attacked his cattle, but a need to end wolf protections and reduce wolves generally through the statewide hunt. The assumption is that such a hunt would stop depredations like those Koski experienced. Yet, Koski's story is anything but typical; indeed, "Koski has had more cattle attacks by wolves than almost all other farms combined—122 verified killed or injured out of 248 statewide since 1996" (Barnes, "Tour the farm"). Much of the reason for this, it was determined, was due to the fact that the farm was uninhabited by humans and the cattle unattended. Reporters who visited his farm the October before the vote noted: "they found the bones of past cattle deaths—either by wolves or natural causes, or both--strewn across the pasture, plus [a] decaying carcass in his barn" (Barnes, "See how Michigan"), despite a state veterinarian explaining to Koski "that by doing that he was essentially providing a bait pile (for wolves)," which is illegal. In all, USFWS spent more than $230,000 in staff hours and compensation to address these incidents, visiting his farm twenty-one times in forty-five days in 2010 alone due to wolf attacks (Barnes, "Cattle Farmer"). Perhaps most disturbingly, while the state of Michigan provided Koski with three guard donkeys to protect his cattle, two of the donkeys died and "a third had to be removed because it was in such poor health" (Barnes, "See how Michigan"). Thus, while anomalous, Koski became a poster child for the need for wolf delisting and a hunt to address the generalized wolf problem. His experiences, and the statistics they drove, were taken as evidence that something had changed, and that there was an imminent problem that needed to be addressed: people need to be able to protect themselves and their property from wolves.

Thus, I argue, claims like the Appleby's at the press conference that "something needs to change" with regard to wolves constitutes not merely an assertion that the hunting season on wolves needs to be re-opened, but carries with it an expectation for greater policing. The hunt is one extension of this, as it is not claimed to be done for sport or food, but out of need, out of a public safety threat to people and their economic well-being. Thus, I am not arguing solely that the perception is that more law enforcement needs to be carried out to police the behavior of wolves. To be sure, there is the seemingly ubiquitous policing that Foucault notes is been taken up by various institutions, such as policing carried out by the aforementioned law enforcement units of the various land and wildlife management agencies. More significantly, however, I am arguing that this ubiquity of policing is an expectation itself of neoliberal governmentality, decoupled from the state in much the same way as disciplinary tactics and reason make docile bodies; such governmentality too is productive, producing policing in the neoliberal subject himself. Such policing is decentralized, if not de-institutionalized. It is akin to the type of policing administered in purportedly law-less, or inadequately law-governed, territories like the Montana frontier before statehood, for instance, or the vast publicly-owned and federally monitored national lands, such as forests, wildlife refuges and designated wilderness areas. I argue that, much as in these frontier or de facto wildernesses of the late nineteenth century, the vast public lands held in trust for "we the people" by the federal government are taken to be lawless and in need of policing that accomplishes the goals of policing in the modern neoliberal state. Namely, following Foucault, the security, safety, and expansion of economic ventures should be protected through force, with lethal force always implicitly a significant component of such law enforcement.

I argue, this neoliberal form of biopolitical policing is in fact a policing that is almost entirely decoupled from the state; indeed, as I will later argue, it is often taken as in competition with the state to the point of open conflict. This decoupled, neoliberal biopolitical policing in the U.S. (and elsewhere though, as well) takes at least two related forms: that of paid mercenaries and private contractors, and that of the militia movement and individual vigilantes. While these two sets of non-governmental police may differ greatly in their relationship to established law, they are similar in their extra-legal enforcement of a law that is beyond such established law. Namely, both seek to enforce the naturalized, spontaneously evolved law and order, or natural law, upon which society and civilization are purportedly based in many classically liberal, libertarian, and neo-liberal renderings of the law.

In so far as the former are concerned, such privately contracted mercenaries/contractors operate more under the guise of being an extension of policing institutions, operating at times and in places where the law is supposedly inadequate. Such mercenary/private protection companies, such as Blackwater/Xe, provide protection to various diplomats and function as extra-legal extensions of the existing security/police forces. In ostensibly, providing the security military or traditional police forces may be incapable of carrying out because of limited resources, they act as extensions of the existing law; however, their obligation is ultimately not to the state itself, but to clients that have hired them, which may mean protecting other contractor clients in warzones, but also, more ominously, corporate clients operating internally within countries without current military conflicts. In this way, they function much as the Pinkerton

protection services of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century did in the U.S., doing the violent bidding of their corporate clients[73].

The latter militia movements and individual vigilantes are more informally organized, as well as more clearly decoupled from the state and state interests (though not the "nation" as I will argue). In particular, it is this type of policing that I argue is most prominently advocated as a solution to any number of perceived threats and fears individuals feel are inadequately policed. They may include everyone from wolf poachers, to volunteers 'patrolling' the U.S.-Mexican border to capture immigrants, to individual vigilantes like George Zimmerman who police their neighborhoods patrolling for anything that might stir their fear, particularly young black man. It is these latter groups and individuals that are the real heart of what I take to be Appleby's expectation for more policing. And there is good justification for such individuals and groups to feel empowered in such advocacy, as the legal system has signaled to them the need for more policing of this sort and lethal force in the past three decades. This signaling includes loosening firearm restrictions like assault rifle and gun-show loopholes, as well as various laws that essentially vigilantize/deputize U.S. citizens, such as open and concealed carry permits, stand-your-ground laws, and castle doctrines. All of these statutes allow for the use of lethal force in the protection of not only self, but property as an extension of the self, and even others perceived to be threatened or in fear for their lives (an almost ludicrously easy claim to substantiate, given the belief of fear of threat that constitutes its basis). This basis in fear is most significant

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[73] These contemporary private mercenary groups have just recently been in action at places like the Standing Rock reservation where they beat and sicced dogs upon peaceful protestors to protect the pipeline company's interests (Brown), or in Northern Wisconsin, where an Arizona based private contractor sent special forces-looking, assault rifle wielding mercenaries to protect mining claims for Gogebic Mining on public, state-run forests (forests and land that was incidentally stolen from the indigenous Ojibwa) (Seely).

ultimately, as it has allowed for the normalization of lethal force as a first response to threats. Threats that put one in fear for one's life justify the immediate use of lethal force as a first and primary response; this is particularly concretized in wolf killing, as wolves are figured, I argue, as non-native, foreign threats to the nation, a nation whose purity and integrity must always be policed.

(The Necessity of) Vigilantism

As those who study the history of political movements in North America are aware, there is a purportedly time-honored tradition of respect for vigilance, if not vigilantism, in much of the American West, whether in the expansion of the frontier or in contemporary militia, sovereign citizen, and county sovereignty movements. Even in the Canadian West, in a country perhaps reactively averse to formal vigilante justice, a neoliberal vigilance is nonetheless rising with the ever-expansive commodification of large swaths of Alberta and B.C., where the control of wolf populations through bounties and raffles reveals that vigilance is always a matter of property and public safety. In the biopolitical management of species in the Canadian west, bounty systems subsidize unpopular government culling programs, and liberal, even unlimited hunter takes distract from the impacts of neoliberal capital expansion. Rather than curtailing or modifying resource extraction like mining, logging, or real estate development to assist caribou or moose recovery, wolves are eliminated as numbers on a spreadsheet.

However, it is in the U.S. (and particularly the American West) where vigilantism began that it seems to find its most openly fervent adherents and advocates, namely those willing to take matters into their own hands, meeting violence (or even the perceived threat of violence)

with violence to regulate what is perceived as the social order (Culberson 2). As William Culberson notes in his *Vigilantism: Political History of Private Power in America*,

> The American people often use private violence; the psychology of private violence extends from the various American frontiers and is deeply ingrained in the concept of popular sovereignty. Deep-seated beliefs have led to confrontations and implementations of private will amounting to violence, against the state and against groups viewed as harmful to existing values.

While Culberson goes on to maintain that "America does not have a tradition of violence but it does have a history of violence," I would argue that such a claim is a disavowal of the integral place that such violence has in functioning to preserve the law and order and founding violence upon which the nation, and thus civil society, is based. It is a foundational violence that is premised and predicated on a speciesism and racism "against groups viewed as harmful to existing values" without which claims regarding the nation, "the people," or "real America" cannot be made coherent. That is, the argument of the Western tradition of vigilante law arises not as any content (i.e., historical) but as an invocation of the idea of law as custom. As Christopher Kilgore notes in summarizing Derrida's position in "Force of Law," the violence of the law "posits its own existence in a future-perfect tense in order to define (retrospectively) its own foundational unjustifiable violence as just" creating a "(remembered) belief and messianic avenir" or future (Kilgore 107).

While the purported wolf "attack" incident and concurrent claim of self-defense invoked by Appleby and Pittman may at least seem reasonable from certain perspectives, given their need to defend their killing of a wolf that was protected under the Endangered Species Act, it seems even more reasonable, from a certain perspective if the temporal context of wolf listing and de-

listing under the ESA is considered. The act makes sense from a political perspective, as it can be construed as justification to advocate for a return of wolf hunting. And this is the case even if the incident was staged, that is, even if, as some commenters have accused (Scott), Appleby essentially baited the wolves to bring about the incident or knew full well that wolves and other species like black and grizzly bears may scavenge the carcass. However, again, it seems that it is not merely a return to legalized wolf-hunting that is the broader goal of such advocates like Appleby and Pittman, or the state representative, Western politicians, ranchers, and hunting outfitters who want to see a reduction of wolf numbers, if not an outright elimination of wolves.

What seems desired in the utmost, given the rhetoric and political figures present at the press conference, such as state senator Tutvedt, "an outspoken critic of federal wolf management" (Scott) and the former Flathead County commissioner who flanked the men at the press conference, is a relinquishment of federal management in the West. This would allow state-level (but preferably local and individual) management, wherein individuals may be allowed to take it upon themselves to kill wolves if they personally believe the wolves are a threat. In this way, this advocacy of eliminating federal management is consistent with what I would call a position and rhetorical assemblage in line with the rhetoric of the sovereign citizen movement that arose out of the 1980s Sagebrush Rebellion. This movement envisions a West controlled by far-away urban elites bent on depopulating the land for various reasons. Adherents typically advocate for militia and/or vigilante resistance to laws which they deem are in violation of civil rights they perceive ensconced in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, particularly Article V wherein "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation" (Constitution). Indeed, it might be argued, as biologist Adrian Treves has, that compensation for cattle

depredations blamed on wolves, or for hunting dogs run in Wisconsin to hunt bears, actually encourages this interpretation of the law, as if the wolves are agents of the federal government committing such "takings" that should be compensated (Treves). Furthermore, such compensation reinforces claims that the wolves shouldn't be there. There is an expectation that these individuals can run bear hunting hounds because it is legal, and a concomitant expectation that there will be adequate policing or managing of wolves to prevent 'abnormal' and 'unnatural' conflicts. If not, then it seems to signal that people should be allowed to extra-legally police as vigilantes who uphold the law, whether via hunting, vigilante acts, or through state tolerance of poaching. If these mechanisms of management are disallowed, then many argue they are forced to poach and "shoot, shovel, and shut up," indeed there are t-shirts and bumper stickers that use the "S.S.S." abbreviation to advance just that. What is thus advocated is not just compensation, but greater policing of wolves at the local level, whether that is by state authorities, through hunting seasons, or through individual force.

For example, not long after wolf hunting was once again permitted in the three Northern Rockies states (Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming) upon federal delisting, Colby Gines, a Grand Teton and Greater Yellowstone Area hunting outfitter, posted a photo to Facebook that immediately went viral and seemed to indicate that a hunting season alone does not constitute adequate policing. Taken in Wyoming, the photo, with the accompanying post, seems to argue that even this most extreme state management plan (the approval of which was fraught with controversy and opposition, given its effects on surrounding state wolf populations) is inadequate, as it is in just such an area of the latter type of "trophy" wolf management zones where the it was taken:

Fig. 2 "FED up in Wyoming!" Wind River Outdoor World Facebook post, Oct. 2013 from: Landers, Rich. "Wolf Vigilante Photo Raises Hackles, as Intended." *The Spokesman-Review*, 4 Nov. 2013.

My own first impression of this image, like many other commenters, was that this was a photo of a poached wolf these men had illegally killed. On this reading, it is an image of public defiance, with the masks giving the impression of a need for anonymity, as if the wearers would be otherwise punished or investigated for the illegal act. The caption Gines attached, "FED up in Wyoming" (Gibson), amplifies that impression, as if these are vigilantes acting against a federal government mandate to protect wolves. They are not only "fed up," as in tired of or frustrated by wolves, but are "fed up" with the *fed*eral government whom they suppose oppresses them by foisting wolves upon them through tolerance, re-introduction, and regulations. Clearly, given the American flag, they consider themselves to be patriots defending America against the government, a consideration I'll unpack in the following analysis.

As Gines claims in comments below the photo on Facebook, it is intended to represent, "A little Wyoming justice by some folks that are fed up with wolves and the effect they are having on wildlife populations, livestock, and our way of life as hunters and Wyoming residents" (Landers). In claiming the killing of the wolf was an act of "justice" in defense of a "way of life" he appears to regard the wolf as someone or something upon which justice can be meted out. At the very least, the wolf is an agent of an oppressive force, namely, the federal government with which they are "fed up." In this way, the wolf is recognized as a subject, but only as an outlaw/outsider who should not be regarded as such; the men are merely enforcing, if not restoring, the law, a law that transcends legal code and is in essence natural. In other words, the men, in displaying the dead wolf, (re-)iterate this opposition—they have caught an outlaw or terrorist in their midst and have dispatched him/her/it. Echoing a sort of Agambianenian "state of exception" (Agamben, *State* 1), the wolf becomes a sort of *homo sacer* (one who may not be sacrificed, but may be killed by anyone at any time). But in becoming more human in this regard, it is also regarded more as a subject capable of being violent (as Derrida seems to suggest animals cannot be in a side note in "Force of Law" 246-7) and criminal, if not unnatural, by violating the transcendent, natural law. As such, government regulation of wolf killing is perceived as erroneously granting subjectivity to an entity that is undeserving of it, siding with animal rights advocates who wish to extend subjectivity to non-humans; only complete deregulation which allows anyone to kill a wolf at any time would resolve such a situation. This would place the wolf where it belongs, as an entity incapable of responding, and incapable of being the subject of ethical consideration**.**

In some ways, this granting of subjectivity to the non-human shows the limitations of Agamben's bios/zoe distinction, in that he seems to dismiss the possibility of non-human bios, or

life that is more than mere material existence; indeed, such a distinction leads to the very one that Gines and his defenders too make in regarding these wolves as "invasive species"/foreigners who while materially existent are undeserving of being regarded as having bios or the rights due one who is considered as such. In Gines' online comment to James William Gibson's article in the *Earth Island Journal* in which the photo was reposted, his defense of himself and the men featured in the photo is consistent with such a rendering:

> "Everyone is waiting anxiously to hear from me, I'm sure! This wolf was taken LEGALLY with a license…The masks and photo are to make a statement from us who actually get to see the devastating effect the wolf is making. The masks are vigilante not KKK but of course most of you want them to be cause you are so stuck on racial issues…Do these wolves belong in Wyoming? No, they are an invasive species. Since they are here now, they do need to be managed just like everything else. (Colby Gines)

Thus, so far as Gines maintains, this is not, in fact, an illegal killing of a wolf. Indeed, it is fully within the law, as the year before, Wyoming's wolf management plan, including a hunting season, was approved by the federal government. What is less clear is the "statement" the masks and photo are meant to "make." Presumably, it is at least that wolves (and especially non-native wolves) do not belong in Wyoming and they will be treated as criminals, or at the very least, will be killed to make an example out of them—i.e., if you put them here, we will kill them.

However, it may be legitimately asked: Does this photo depict this "need to be managed just like everything else"? Are we to take the pseudo-lynching of this wolf as a norm for proper management? If so, then it would seem that the photo does indeed render the wolf as lynching photos did "the negro" in the South, who needed to be better "managed"/segregated and made an example for others. Of course, it may be assumed that, unlike African Americans who might be

clearly affected fearfully by such photos, wolves would be incapable of recognizing such symbolic resonance. However, I would argue the rhetorical audience is not limited to those who are meant to be made fearful in this sense. On the contrary, much as with lynching photos, the audience is meant to be humans who may feel threatened by wolves. In this way, the vigilantes in both the above photo and in lynching photos can be regarded as heroes for restoring order and strengthening the species, much as many of the comments defending Gines and his crew do portray the men, reiterating their claim of meting out "justice," or enforcing the law (Gibson).

Gines' response thus illuminates a number of apparent contradictions in the photo. First, behind one of those masks, presumably, is Gines, a hunting outfitter who has most likely made a buck this day off a wolf hunt, despite complaints about threats to his livelihood or "way of life." Second, it is of a group of hunters masked to protect their anonymity when they've done nothing punishable by law. And third, it advances an anti-government sentiment in the caption over a photograph where an American flag is displayed prominently and defiantly.

First of all, there is the very contradiction that Gines claims to be under threat of his way of life. Yet, given high elk numbers and the addition of wolves as a huntable species, as a hunting outfitter he is directly making money off of killing wolves, at least potentially, and can likely gin up business under such a "heroic" guise. Thus, while he is claiming the federal government is threatening his and others' economic well-being and ability to make a living, wolves actually provide another economic option for him.

In so far as the second contradiction is concerned, the hunters don vigilante hoods as if they are committing an illegal act, or at least one which authorities of some imagined sort would disapprove. They are thus depicted either as committing illegal or extra-legal "frontier justice," as Gines proclaims. While Gines responded with a denial to the many reactions online in both

articles and comments that took the vigilante masks as Klu Klux Klan hoods (Colby Gines), leading to accusations of racism, the invocation of vigilantism is nonetheless resonant with the aims of the Klan. It too was, and is, an institution that advocates extra-legal justice based in species/racial distinctions and restoring law and order. This includes enforcing laws, which are from their perspective, unenforced, namely, the transcendent law of naturalized species and racial hierarchies. Behaviorally, Gines and his party are portrayed as in-line with enforcement of the law of the nation, and thus, individuals acting on behalf of the citizens or "the people" where government has failed. As such, in their anonymity, they become not only enforcers of the law, but are naturalized as an anonymous force of nature that disavows any moral claims upon their actions.

And this brings us to the third, perhaps most striking and interesting contradiction, that Gines and his clients/party are protesting the U.S. federal government, yet display an American flag proudly in the background, as if what they are doing is truly American, something a "real" American would do. While the photo alone could be taken as a celebration of the change in federal law allowing them to kill wolves in Wyoming, the caption that "Wyoming is FED up" marks it as a protest against the wolves and government. It is as if not enough is being done, and they have to take it upon themselves to carry out such vigilance and policing. In other words, what they are doing is necessary to protect civilization. In this way, in Foucaultian terms (*Society* 216-8), they could be taken to be defending "the nation," or "real America" against "the state," or federal government.[74] The setting in the photo helps establish this, as it is a clearing in the thick forest, a redoubt or outpost on the boundary of the wilderness, where the trees have been

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[74] Though this is often expanded in such rhetoric to include the U.N. and other international governments and organizations apparently colluding against people like Gines' "way of life" they imagine under threat.

cleared, and the snow stomped flat by human feet, signifying a taking back of the wilderness from wolves for America. Thus, they can be paradoxically against "big government" but patriotic toward "America"; as such, they become vigilantes enforcing the customs and traditions of law and justice they take the American flag to represent, fighting off criminal immigrants and terrorists that have infiltrated American territory with the federal government's complicity.

It is, I argue, the very invocation of vigilantism that actually brings coherence and lends rhetorical currency to Gines' narrative. As vigilantes, I would say, these men are claiming to uphold The Law, with a capital L, namely, a transcendent, natural law. They are not so much "taking the law into their own hands," or performing the law in its absence, as the secret vigilance societies of Montana's mining towns in the 1860s purported to do. But, much like these early vigilantes presumed, "The Law" that they are invoking is the same sort of natural, evolved law those such as Friedrich Hayek invoke. This is the law of "law and order" presumed in various versions of the libertarian and neoliberal "minimal state" or "nightwatchman" state (Nozick), theorized and popularized in the 1970s and '80s. Such law justifies, or at least rhetorically resonates with, the Sagebrush Rebellion and *posse comitatas* movements of the 1980s and militia movements of the 1990's up to the present. Under such a Hayekian form of law, all authority is derived from such law; and such law is predicated upon customs and traditions that pre-exist any society, thereby making it not only natural, organic law, but transcendent law. This neoliberal conception of law protects property and capital from threats to its infinite expansion, wherever these threats may be perceived or however they may be embodied. For Hayek, Gines' vigilantes uphold the law in opposition (so they imagine) to institutional authorities that seek to create law over and above the individual—the latter thus misunderstand what Hayek claims is the true nature of law, and the demand that "all authority

derive[s] from law…in the sense that authority commands obedience because (and so long as) it enforces a law presumed to exist independently of it and resting on a diffused opinion of what is right" (Hayek, *Law* 95).

This law exists nowhere and everywhere. It stands above particular laws and authorities as originary rights of individuals. This law is projected as these faux vigilantes' motivation, and allows them to claim themselves, like other contemporary vigilantes, as anti-"big government," yet fiercely pro law and order. For them, the law is a higher power, organically grounded in custom and tradition, and imagined as that which protects them as economized neoliberal subjects who seek to guarantee the infinite possibilities of their capitalized selves. The law, they demand, by definition, should protect them from possible threats to their individual livelihoods. This is why seemingly absurd claims that wolves reintroduced over a decade ago, long before President Obama's election, are nonetheless regarded as "Obama's wolves", as one fishing client of mine and his friends referred to them, or are regarded as "state sponsored terrorists" (Weaver, "Ranchers"), illegal immigrants, invasive species, or foreign invaders (or all of them simultaneously). This is why one prominently vocal state of Washington rancher who grazes cattle on federal land, Les McIrvin, at a public hearing in 2013, accused the director of the state Fish and Wildlife department of "promoting government-sponsored terrorism," listing several criminal "indictments" purportedly committed by state and federal agencies, and proclaiming, "This is absolutely a government taking and theft of our private property…My civil rights are definitely being violated" (Weaver, "Ranchers").

And this is also how the wolf in the photo (a dead wolf) becomes abstracted as a representation of "the Wolf," or the real truth about wolves as a species. This wolf is meant to function as a signifier in a border war at the edge of Yellowstone, pitting "the Law" against

authorities that misunderstand the true nature of the law[75]. What it is thus meant to signify is the threat from such unnatural, non-native, foreigners to American civil society, but also to other species.

Yet, in the end, this wolf nonetheless haunts the photograph, in a Derridean sense, as a particular, living wolf, even in its death. Its presumed lack of identity is instead undermined, as it is the only face of all of those in the crowd that is not covered, that is not anonymous. Furthermore, by hoisting the wolf up under the shoulders, the wolf appears to almost be standing on two feet, further signifying its human likeness. Thus, while these faux vigilantes attempt to preclude any face-to-face engagement with the wolf or outsiders, the wolf is there to face the viewer as almost human, affectively resonating even, and especially, in its very particular death, regardless of whether it was killed legally or illegally, much as the photos of lynchings of African Americans resonate beyond their original intentions.

[75] This may also give good reason to push back against those, such as political scientist Martin Nie, who advocate stakeholder solutions which assume horizontalized power relations amongst participants, as such a process legitimizes their interpretation of governmental authority and framing of themselves as the authentic "we the people" of the Constitution and nature and function of the law.

III. A Very Real Wolf Fable

> "In the fable, within a narrative that is itself fabulous, it is shown that power is itself an effect of fable, fiction, and fictive speech, simulacrum."
> -Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign I* (218)

The Fabular Wolf

While the Oxford English Dictionary notes that the "most prominent sense" of a fable, the one most are familiar with, is that of "a short story devised to convey some useful lesson, especially one in which animals or inanimate things are the speakers or actors," as Derrida's statement above reveals, there is something left out of this dominant definition. Namely, the fable not only imparts a lesson, but as earlier etymological evidence indicates, the fable is also "a fiction meant to deceive; a fabrication; a myth or legend often about current or popular beliefs." It is a narrative that "makes known" (*The Beast* 218), as Derrida points out, an order of power. But in doing so, it simultaneously deceives, concealing traces and contradictions, providing imaginary solutions to intractable problems. The fable (or myth, or fairy tale) thus provides a fictional continuity, naturalizing its conflicts and resolutions, and resolving its contradictions rhetorically.

In this chapter, I argue, much of the rhetoric around wolves in the American West (and elsewhere) is premised upon a fable of an embattled existence for those who live where wolves are present. This perception of embattlement and imminent threat is grounded in a fabular construction of the wolf, that despite inherent contradictions, or maybe even because of them, does work. The work that it does, I argue, is to satisfy a desire for sovereignty that is contradictory; it is a sovereignty grounded in a mythic West that seeks to conserve its "custom and culture" while simultaneously demanding the naturalization of a neoliberal exploitation of the land and resources that make such conservation impossible. The threat to public safety

wolves are figured as in this fable, I argue, thus conceals an intent of normalizing not so much a time honored tradition, as a patriarchal sovereignty re-grounded in the zero sum game of hyper-individuated neoliberal entrepreneurship, where it is either humans or wolves, whether four or two-legged, that will win out in the West.

On the evening of Dec. 14, 2011, Wildlife Services officers in New Mexico lethally removed a lone, endangered Mexican wolf from private property within the Gila National Forest after "concerns for public safety became an issue" (Buckley). In a documentary two years after the incident, local rancher Crystal Diamond, whom the narrator remarks "has experienced firsthand what it means to be a mother of young children living in wolf country," relates her encounter with the wolf at her home the night before its removal:

> "My first encounter that was actually a fearful encounter was when I had my children, and I was actually talking on the phone at the time. I looked out the window and at first glance I could just see the reflection of the Christmas lights staring back at me. And, after a while I focused and could actually see two eyes within inches of my face, and his breath, of this wolf, with his nose pressed up against the windowpane. And I was startled, stood back and looked at him for a moment, and he didn't go anywhere. In fact, he didn't go anywhere for the next 12 hours. He spent that night on that porch. I'm held hostage in the house, with two dogs now inside and two children, in the middle of a snowstorm, with a wolf at the door all night long." (Spady, *Wolves in Government Clothing*)

Diamond continues that when she awoke the next morning, the county commissioners, the sheriff, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife representatives were all there at her family's property, "and

the hunt for this wolf…it was clearly displaying some disturbing behavior…" began (Spady, *Wolves*).

Crystal Diamond's narrative, in its fabular, fairy-tale like construction of a wolf at the door, seems to comport well with attorney and co-author of *The Real Wolf* Ted Lyon's claim that "the rich legacy of myths, fables, folktales and fairy tales" should be taken as literal "warnings" about wolves, as they were "the first wolf educational campaigns; most all of which teach the wolf is dangerous, a lesson that is far from wrong" (Lyon "Selling" 22). Indeed, Diamond's account of the incident features some of the very same tropes fairy tales such as "Little Red Riding Hood," and wolf encounter tales more generally, capitalize upon. The wolf surprises her, *he* is persistent, *his* (bated) breath fogs the window just inches from her face, pressing *his* nose against the pane as if wanton, holding her (a seemingly defenseless woman) and her children hostage in their own home during a snowstorm, until rescued by a cadre of men with guns. The wolf displays "disturbing" behaviors not only consistent with the wanton, persistent wolf in the Grimm's version of "Little Red Riding Hood," wherein Little Red Riding Hood and her grandmother are saved from the wolf's belly by the gamekeeper, but with the terrorizing wolf that holds his prey hostage within their own homes in "The Three Little Pigs."

Her account also seems consistent with the assertion that the presence alone of wolves necessarily represents an inherent threat to humans, as if this is the moral or lesson of her story. Retired ungulate zoologist, and "wolf-expert" within some circles[76], Valerius Geist would seem to concur, claiming there is an inevitable process when humans encounter wolves on their land,

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[76] These circles include namely those who oppose wolf recovery, but especially those who, as noted in Chapter One, aim to dispel what they consider the dominant "harmless wolf theory."

which he calls "The Seven Stages" of wolf "habituation" (Geist, "Seven Steps" 96).[77] First, prey in the wolves' territory become scarce from over-predation; second, wolves searching for food approach human habitations at night; third, wolves begin to approach human habitations in the day; fourth, the wolves attack domestic pets and small livestock in the daytime close to buildings; fifth, the wolves attack larger livestock, harass humans, and "mount verandas and look into windows"; sixth, wolves approach people and make seemingly playful attacks, ripping clothing and such; seventh, wolves attack humans, and if it's a pack, for even a "mature, courageous man…there is no defense" (96-98). Essentially, the stages signify a slippery slope, where encounters between humans and wolves around human habitation are viewed as inevitably leading to attacks. In other words, the mere presence of a wolf around human habitations is coded as inherently a threat, as it is the first step in an inevitable process that doesn't end unless the wolves (or humans) are killed.[78]

This is largely the contention too implicit in the documentary that features Diamond's account so prominently, *Wolves in Government Clothing*, sponsored and funded by the politically libertarian, but more properly neoliberal, Koch Brother founded think-tank Americans For Prosperity (AFP), whose stated mission is "economic freedom" and "building a culture of freedom at local, state, and federal levels ("About"). Narrated and directed by David Spady, the California chapter director of AFP, the documentary further reifies the contention that wolf presence equals an inherent threat, helping to construct a consistent narrative that wolf presence imprisons and restricts the freedom of humans who have to live around them.

[77] Interestingly, Geist notes it is translated as "The Seven Steps to Heaven" in Finnish, Swedish, and German ("Seven Steps" 99).

[78] This does beg the question, as Linnell et al. (2002) and others have suggested, as to why there are not more attacks given wolves' presence around human habitation throughout much of the world and human history.

The problem with taking Crystal Diamond's account alone as definitive evidence that the presence of a wolf constitutes an inherent threat, is that the account Diamond gives in *Wolves in Government Clothing* is not the only account of the incident she publicly relates, nor is it the only perspective she gives on this particular wolf. As U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (USFWS) authorities contend, and documents obtained by the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) attest, authorities and area residents, including Diamond, were well familiar with this wolf. *She*, a four year old female designated Mexican wolf F1105, "was seen frequently visiting private property" (Buckley) over the prior three years, and had mated with local dogs at least twice prior to the incident, rearing a litter earlier that year of which four of the five pups were captured and subsequently euthanized by Wildlife Services. She was noted by the CBD New Mexico director Michael Robinson as a "lonely" (Robinson, "Feds Shoot") wolf in heat, looking for a mate, her wandering "a result of the Fish and Wildlife Service's refusal to release enough wolves into the wild to allow this single female to find a mate of her own kind" (Robinson, "Feds Shoot). To comply with a FOIA request, USFWS released "video segments taken by a private land owner of the wolf 'interacting' with that person's dog, with no effort on the part of the videographer, and in fact, lewd, excited comments accompanying the video" (Robinson, "New Mexico").

Indeed, Diamond's account in a letter she released publicly through the New Mexico Cattle Growers Association, "a longtime opponent of the government's wolf reintroduction program"(Steller), immediately after the incident on Dec. 16th indicates her awareness of the wolf prior to its appearance at her window as a big, bad male wolf. As Diamond relates, early in the afternoon on the night of the incident (Dec.13th), she had been informed by her father in law that a collared wolf had been seen around the ranch headquarters and been chased off. She

learned FWS was aware of the wolf and would be out to take a look in the morning. After taking her kids out of the car, she began unloading her groceries with her dogs nearby "play[ing] rambunctiously around my vehicle and the yard"(Diamond, "Collared Wolf"). As she was doing so, a neighbor came speeding up the driveway, yelling for her attention, "pointing to the dogs who were roughhousing with a collared wolf."

And this isn't the only difference in Diamond's account when contrasted with the story she tells two years later in the documentary. Not only does she say she was aware that her dogs had been playing with the wolf, but once the wolf does appear at the window, Diamond comments, "*She* remained at the window watching me for just a few seconds before I ran out of the living room"[79] (Diamond, "Collared Wolf"). This indicates that at least at the time of writing her letter, she was aware that the wolf was a female. Indeed, she immediately notes thereafter that "throughout the evening my male border collie whimpered at the front door aggressively trying to get out," likely to mate with the wolf. Furthermore, the trope of the defenseless damsel in distress held hostage by a male wolf[80] is seemingly undermined by her earlier letter. Not only was she not alone, but "at my husband's request, my neighbor returned to my house. He sat on my front porch with nothing but a blanket, camera, and gun in freezing temperatures until midnight when my husband returned home" (Diamond, "Collared Wolf").

In this chapter, I argue, the construction of this fabular wolf, despite any inconsistencies and contradictions (and maybe even because of them), is nonetheless a politically effective and affective tactic in generating a rhetorical assemblage wherein the wolves appear as a presence that is always already a threat to the interests and lives of the local community as envisioned and

[79] Italics are my emphasis.
[80] As Mark Robisch reminds us, this highly sexually-charged trope is a feature of most versions and interpretations of "Little Red Riding Hood" (Robisch 264-265).

rhetorically sedimented in their cultural perception. It does not matter rhetorically if the wolf is male, female, or both. Indeed, both versions of the Crystal Diamond wolf story reinforce the threat to the patriarchal, popular form of sovereignty that is claimed as grounding the culture of Catron County. The male wolf is figured as a terrorizing male usurper of the father, threatening the patriarchal structure with the possibility or murder, rape, and infanticide. The female wolf is evidence of miscegenation and the mongrelization of bloodlines, pointing to the federal government as a bad father, or incapable patriarch. Regardless of the contradiction, both renderings of this wolf rhetorically solidify the threat to the culture, and especially when accepted together.

As Derrida cryptically, yet pointedly, maintains in the opening of his *The Beast and the Sovereign* lectures, fables are not merely tales told to children,

> The fabulous also engages act, gesture, action, if only the operation that consists in producing narrative, in organizing, disposing discourse in such a way as to recount, to put living beings on stage, to accredit the interpretation of a narrative, to *faire savoir,* to make knowledge, to make performatively, to operate knowledge. (36)

So the question is: If Diamond's construction of the wolf is a fable that "makes known" through its performative reiteration, what is it that it makes known?

I argue the fabular wolf she helps construct, regardless of the version iterated, "makes known" a specific rhetorical assemblage, a political fable, wherein the mere presence of the wolf on the land becomes a threat which imprisons children in their own homes, threatens the family structure with the unpredictability of a patriarchal violence, and puts the community and culture in jeopardy of dissolution. This is the case whether the wolf as fabularized signifies the Mexican wolves that inhabit Catron County and the surrounding area, or the federal employees tasked

with managing and maintaining the public lands and endangered species; both the collared Mexican wolves and these federal employees are figured as "wolves in government clothing" (Spady, *Wolves*) creating a constant crisis and "state of emergency" (*County in Crisis* 38) that makes such wolves always already an imminent, existential threat to their imagined "way of life." This view is not only consistent with an imagined, historically grounded "custom and culture" of the West these locals and their allies espouse in earlier land use planning, but with a more recent neoliberal construction of an economized subjectivity rhetorically naturalized through consistently strategic diction and practices aimed at maintaining the material power structures of extractive resource development this tradition is invested in. Thus, what this fable does produces (or assembles) because, not despite, of the coherence in contradiction that it manufactures, is a threat that is in excess of any particular event or story. The rhetorical assemblage is an attempt at mythos and *parahessia*, or truth-telling. This assemblage is a mythos driven by a neoliberal reasoning and order that mobilizes an earlier mythos of the West, yet, as will become more clear in this chapter, contradictorily eliminates the conditions of the latter's possibility.

In this way, the wolf becomes, as Derrida notes all fabular wolves do, an absent presence, "It is looming, an object of apprehension; it is named, referred to, even called by its name; one imagines it or projects toward it an image, a trope, a figure, a myth, a fable, a fantasy, but always by reference to someone who, advancing *à pas de loup*, is not there, someone who is not yet present or represented" (*The Beast* 5), like a terrorist cell, and/or a lurking immigrant, sneaking across the border.

As Derrida argues late in the first series of his *The Beast and the Sovereign* lectures, where the figure of the wolf features prominently from his "stealthy" beginning,

> The essence of political force and power, where that power makes the law, where it gives itself right, where it appropriates legitimate violence and legitimates its own arbitrary violence--this unchaining and enchaining of power passes via the fable, i.e., speech that is both fictional and performative. (217)

That is to say, the essence of political power, Derrida argues, is fictional and performative; it is fabular, and as such, it is rhetorical in attempting to persuade its audience of the veracity of the claim as it is articulated and put into practice. The fable is a rhetorical assemblage vying to become a regime of truth about wolves and humans that is simultaneously, and contradictorily, founded and restored. In the end, what matters is not so much what wolves are really like or what they really are, but why the wolf is constructed as such, that is, what constructing the wolf as such does. Indeed, regardless of what the wolf does, the fable itself can be dangerous, even deadly.

Thus, as with previous chapters, for each case study, I aim to show not how wolves are falsely portrayed, but how a particular apparatus in regard to the wolf, and indeed how an "actual" wolf (here a wolf designated F1105 in particular, a real female wolf who is now dead), is used as a symbolic engagement which is then supressed and disavowed. As Derrida notes early on in the lecture series,

> One does not have the same experience of the wolf in Alaska or in the Alps, in the Middle Ages or today. These idiomatic expressions and these figures of the wolf, these fables or fantasies vary from one place and one historical moment to another; the figures of the wolf thus encounter, and pose for us thorny frontier questions. Without asking permission, real wolves cross humankind's national and institutional frontiers, and his sovereign nation-states; wolves out in nature [*dans la nature*] as we say, real wolves, are

> the same on this or the other side of the Pyrenees or the Alps, but the figures of the wolf belong to cultures, nations, languages, myths, fables, fantasies, histories. (*The Beast* 4-5)

Here, that the wolf crosses these boundaries, namely, from the designated Mexican wolf recovery area to outside it (upon which by law it must be returned, removed, or put to death), or from public national forest (much of which is designated wilderness) onto private property in-holdings within the Gila National Forest, matters, because the figure of the wolf does differ between "cultures, nations, languages, myths, fables, fantasies, histories."

Indeed, it is just such a figure of the wolf that the citizens of Catron County and their allies attempt to construct, and through which they attempt to expose what they take to be a repressive political power. Using this particular figure of the wolf, they, perhaps ironically, assert their own wolfish sovereignty (as sovereignty is always about becoming wolf), justifying their political claims against the wolf by constructing a discursive truth through a broad rhetorical assemblage about their culture and civilization more generally, what they specifically refer to as their "custom and culture" (*Catron County Comprehensive Land Plan* 2-17). They strive to sediment this rhetorical assemblage discursively and practically in policy and management to establish a new regime of truth through what Foucault calls an "art of governmentality" predicated on a neoliberal biopolitics that formulates a very particular concept of individual sovereignty or "sovereign citizen"-ship vis-à-vis the wolf. While arguably recent and contemporary, these citizens claim it is only a return or reiteration of an age-old tradition regarding not only real wolves and humans, but the human (and really man) that is a wolf to man. In this way, they follow the logic Derrida claims makes necessary the submission of the wolf, or beast, to the political sovereigns they take themselves to be, and which founds the law,

thereby reiterating the analogy between the beast and the sovereign where both act outside the law as beasts in confrontation.

And so, I argue, Diamond's fabular, contradictory accounts are not surprising, as both sediment the relationship between the wolves and rightful sovereigns, even in their contradiction. In the first instance, it is not difficult to imagine that Diamond knew what was driving the incident; namely, the wolf was not trying to eat her kids or her, or even her dogs, but attempting to procreate because she was in heat and had few other options. Indeed, Diamond and other residents had previously complained when USFWS could not locate the fifth pup from F1105's euthanized litter earlier in the year, and used that failure as evidence that the Mexican wolves are not wild animals, but hybrids with impure bloodlines, which would make them not covered under the ESA.[81] In fact, in a later editorial Diamond publishes in *The New Mexico Statesman* on July 14, 2013, she recounts wolf F1105's entire history, including her mating with a Labrador retriever in 2010, claiming that even prior to her encounter, "disturbing reports of encounters and the habituated patterns of 1105 were overlooked" (Diamond, "Raising" 26). She calls the wolf a "misfit" with a "tainted bloodline," further claiming that "As ranchers living among these wolves, we know their wild behaviors perhaps better than anyone. And the truth is that there isn't anything wild about them" (27). In other words, what is emphasized in these renderings of the incident is the unnaturalness of the wolf, its non-wild, "misfit" identity, and its "habituated" behavior. This is a constant refrain in the rhetoric of Catron County, where citizens argue the Mexican wolves are not really wild wolves, but feral dogs, despite genetic testing that has revealed otherwise (Fitak et al. 372); indeed, not just wolf F1105 is regarded as such, but all of

[81] There is no evidence for this claim. Although many of the wolves were raised in captivity, USFWS has maintained that all of the Mexican wolves in the wild are genetically Mexican wolf from three different "certified" lineages (Nie 118). Indeed, recent research by Fitak et al. (2018) shows "There is no domestic dog ancestry in the endangered Mexican wolf" (372).

the Mexican wolves, both those bred and released from captivity and those born in the wild. It is thus a story about the impurity of the bloodline of the wolves, where these wolf "misfits" not only do not belong, but threaten civilization through interbreeding with civilized dogs. As such, the female wolf is seen as impure, but also a threat due to the possibility of miscegenation she represents.

However, as earlier noted, this threat of miscegenation is not the threat operative in Diamond's retelling of the story in the Spady documentary, as the story changes slightly in this version, with the wolf now a male wolf. Here, the threat is arguably not so much a threat of miscegenation and polluted bloodlines, but of rape and murder in one's own home by a male intruder/perpetrator, figuring the wolf as an illicit sovereign usurper. Thus, specifically, the sexing/gendering of the wolf as male makes the threat one to a defenseless mother and her children from a male perpetrator while her husband is away. As such, this version of the story invokes, at the very least, the threat of a male intruder when there is no patriarch around to properly protect his family. The women and children are alone and defenseless in their home, making them easy prey (as the cattle and sheep too are portrayed in the documentary when noted by Wink Crigler as "gentle" and "defenseless") to such a male victimizer. I would argue that, while it may be considered metaphorical to some degree, the threat is one of the rape of white women and the murder of white children historically associated with especially perceived non-white male outsiders, whether black men in the South like Emmit Till, Native Americans in captivity narratives such as that of Mary Rowlandson, or in accounts criminalizing Mexican immigrants as done during the 2016 Republican presidential primary. It is not only rhetorically consistent with these other racist and xenophobic narratives, but is of the same logic and diction, making it not just analogous, but rhetorically synonymous as part and parcel of a particular

assemblage wherein the other is a rapist and murderer because he is a predatory animal that cannot control himself; these Mexican wolves are Mexican rapists and criminals. Indeed, the construction of this fabular wolf marshals the persuasive power of such rhetoric.

This rhetoric echoes such statements as President Trump's own early on in the 2016 presidential election where he warns, "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people" (Washington Post Staff). Much as in the documentary, where Spady as narrator calls himself "an environmentalist, but…" and other ranchers claim they don't hate wolves, but want to "see wolves thrive in remote areas where they belong," Trump hedges his statement, from generally criminalizing Mexican immigrants in the U.S., to conceding there are a few 'good ones' out there who mind their place. However, of course, these assumed "some…good people" are an exception to the species, that is, both Mexican wolves and Mexican immigrants are treated as generally dangerous, with some civilized exceptions—it is only when they mind their place in societal hierarchies and are not perceived as disrupting entrenched power relations and hierarchies that they will be tolerated. Essentially though, this is never the case, as policy should not be made or dictated by the few exceptions, but to suit the general population and perceived problem wherein both foreign immigrants, whether Mexican human beings or Mexican wolves, are regarded as an inherently problematic subspecies that threaten civilization. This is especially the case under a contemporary neoliberal biopolitical order where it is populations, and not individuals, that are the focus of management.

While the details conflict in the two versions of Diamond's story, one following the "she" wolf, emphasizing miscegenation, purity, and the immigrant threat (it's about the *other's* impurity), the other following the "he" wolf, emphasizing the threat to patriarchal order (it's about the threat to *your* domestic order), they yet converge in the rhetorical assemblage of a particular threatened "custom and culture," a "way of life" that is nonetheless amorphous in its practices and iterations. That is, both narratives can exist as the truth about the problem with wolves simultaneously despite their contradictions, maybe even because of them, as the contradiction nonetheless coheres, to paraphrase Derrida, to forcefully express the desire to sediment the ubiquity and imminence of the threat. These contradictory narratives complement each other rhetorically in persuading their audience, despite that both cannot be simultaneously true as to the gender of the wolf and other significant details. That is, both versions represent the threat to the valued "customs and culture," and therefore, both are true. Both represent a threat to the "way of life" that is an extension of the neoliberal subjectivity embraced.

But this incident with Crystal Diamond and the she(/he) wolf, or hybrid fabular wolf, did not happen just anywhere, nor do the encounters and incidents featured elsewhere in this chapter. The material setting of these segments in Spady's film is significant. Catron County, New Mexico's history as a bastion and exemplar of resistance to the federal government in the name of custom, tradition, and law and order is well documented, giving rise to what in the early '90s became known as the county supremacy movement, which is still ongoing today. On the heels of the first Sagebrush Rebellion of the late '70s and early 1980s,[82] paralleling chronologically the rise of anti-regulation fervor and the ascension of neoliberal economic reason and policies, the county passed a number of county-wide ordinances in the late 1980s and early 1990s to

[82] Which ended after the tenure of Reagan's Secretary of Interior, James Watt.

purportedly protect local residents from what was seen as unconstitutional federal oversight, asserting in the preamble to the *Catron County Comprehensive Land Plan*" that "federal and state agents threaten the life, liberty and happiness of the people of Catron County" (vii). Not only do the ordinances assert constitutional violations broadly, but accuse the federal government specifically of civil rights violations and property takings. These range from trespassing to manage endangered species, to discontinuing grazing leases they assert are private property they have a historic right to that predates the U.S. as a nation. As one of the authors of the ordinances, attorney Karen Budd-Fallen, contended at the time (1992), "such unconventional measures are necessary to gain local control of resources and preserve the 'heritage' of commodity production in the West" (Williams).

In recent times, this trend has continued, especially with the reintroduction of the Mexican wolf, as county residents have fought back against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and other federal authorities by refusing to recognize their jurisdiction or authority. For example, a 2016 Department of Interior Inspector General's report arising from local complaints about the coordinator of the Mexican Gray Wolf Recovery Program (MGWRP)—who was accused of failing to attend to public safety issues and depredations—notes the following:

> Within the wolf's U.S. territory lies Catron County, NM, a large county comprising mostly public lands. Since the reintroduction program began, the county has complained that the reintroduced wolves have affected both the economy of the county and the personal safety of its 3,500 residents. In April 2006, Catron County hired an employee to investigate and document the interactions between wolves and county residents. He does not share with IFT [Interagency Field Team] the information he gathers, and he has publicly expressed opposition to wolf reintroduction on behalf of Catron County and

> reported to MGWRP and others on the psychological and economic impacts wolves have had on county residents (*Investigative Report* 3).

In essence, the Catron County Commission Board, which also passed the 1992 ordinances, is running a parallel wolf management program to the USFWS recovery program. Jess Carey, their wolf investigator, a former Texas police officer, not only is opposed to wolf reintroduction, but works adversarially against it by collecting complaints about sightings, challenging depredation claims (for which he has no expertise), and not sharing the information he collects with the USFWS employees running the MGWRP. As such, he was arguably undermining the program's work and credibility.

And, much as with the 1990s ordinances, Catron County has grounded their claims to county sovereignty in the "custom and culture" they cite in various documents. In the 2006-2012 report, *Catron County, New Mexico Impacts from the Mexican Grey Wolf Non-Essential Reintroduction Program: A County in Crisis*,[83] this custom and culture is expressed in what Alexander Thal, the co-owner of The Land Center, an organization which "writes land-use plans at the county level that attempt to weaken federal authority governing public land," (Williams 10) calls "The Code of the West," an informal tradition of law and order claimed to predate the U.S. Constitution, but which is also claimed to be ensconced in it so as to protect it. While this unwritten code may have been taken from a 1934 Zane Grey pulp Western romance novel,[84]

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[83] Hereafter referred to as the "*County in Crisis* report."

[84] Grey doesn't use "Code of the West" aside from the title for his novel. In the novel itself, the code is "the Tonto Code," named after the valley where it is set. There too it is not formally set out or listed.

Thal and others contend that, though unwritten, this code is the basis for the Western "way of life" now under threat.[85] As Thal contends in the *County in Crisis* report:

> Community stability entails an environment where people and their customs and cultures are left to their own democratic means; where every community is the arbitrator of its own survival; where people, subject only to the rule of nature and free markets, are masters of their own destinies…With the onslaught of the wolf habituating around human use areas and the depredation of livestock, it could lead to the irreversible & irretrievable destruction of this land based culture. These are the same shared values and beliefs from the ranching communities, referred to as the Code of the West:
>
> - Respect for self and others.
> - Accept responsibility for your life.
> - Be positive and cheerful.
> - Be a person of your word.
> - Go the distance.
> - Be fair in all your dealings.
> - Be a good friend and neighbor.
>
> With the cumulative impacts from the wolf, the customs and cultures are at a cross road. (Thal, Alexander 33)

In other words, Thal is claiming these values (which differ markedly from many of the other lists of values claimed to be the "Code of the West" elsewhere) are threatened by wolf presence.

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[85] While the "Code of the West" is frequently noted as unwritten, it nonetheless appears in various forms on internet blogs and forums celebrating the West as it is imagined, often in the form of lists that vary widely from author to author. It is also the basis for a series of popular business advice books by former hedge fund guru James P. Owen, "who would like to see Wall Street adopt the frontier values of self-reliance and personal responsibility before the industry is regulate to death (Martin, Robert 9).

Because of the presence of wolves, Thal is claiming, it will no longer be possible to respect others, be positive, fair, or a good friend and neighbour. Yet, it would seem that these values are corrupted mainly because of the way wolves purportedly challenge the functioning of nature and free markets that he claims enable residents to be "masters of their own destinies." Thus, it would seem that what wolves purportedly threaten is not so much values, or customs and cultures, but individual economic aspirations.

However, given the above history, it is not surprising that a strong contingent of area residents, many in local positions of power (whether on county or local and state agricultural boards) have fought against Mexican wolf reintroduction vociferously since its inception. And they have done so in a fashion typical of the county supremacy and sovereign citizen movements in their current modes, that is, with voluminous barrages of paperwork asserting a particular interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that does not recognize the federal government as having control over state and county locality land, nor do they recognize the right of the federal government to own or control any lands outside the District of Columbia. While these assertions have been tested and failed to hold muster at the federal level (Donahue 45), such citizens nonetheless continue to assert these rights as recognized by their interpretation of the law. In other words, their efforts are premised on their own assertion. What has made their assertions credible, in some sense, is that they continue to hold power in local political offices such as county boards and sheriff's offices. They elect people like Catron County Sheriff Braca who, like many residents, implies, if not threatens, the use of force against federal agents and employees, warning "There is no way I am going to allow any Federal agent to come into my county and arrest someone for protecting their livestock or their family by killing a wolf" (Spady, "Kid Cages"). In this way, the sheriff reflects a current obsession and ubiquitous claim within the

sovereign citizen and county supremacy movements that only recognizes the authority of county elected officials, with the highest authority in that power structure the county sheriff.

Thus, while it may seem odd at first that these ranchers would ally themselves with someone like David Spady and the Koch Brothers' sprawling global conglomerate, their interests and political perspective, I argue, not only overlap, but are grounded in the same theories of personal sovereignty. Both the Catron County residents and the Koch brothers aspire to privatize public lands, lands that they consider owned by a distant entity called the U.S. government, rather than the American people in whole as a democratic nation, which was the goal of the Sagebrush Rebellion and various offshoots. In other words, they invoke their work on and use of the land as giving them a property right to the land over and above the general public. This is to essentially deny the idea that these lands are held in public trust for the American people and future generations. It is also a demand that the federal government has any right to restrict their use of public lands, as such restrictions impinge upon what they take as their freedom/liberty to do what they want on their private land and the public lands they utilize, interests they expect the government to respect and promote through effective and efficient dispositifs of security.

Yet, it is this perceived right to pursue one's individual economic interests as one sees fit that has led to the state of environmental degradation and decimation of Catron County and much of the surrounding area. While those in the county supremacy movement, and associated movements (sovereign citizen, wise-use), argue the lands would be better off if turned over to the counties and ultimately privatized,[86] it is unfettered extractive enterprises, namely grazing, logging, and mining (the core activities claimed to constitute Catron County's "customs and culture") which have led to the destruction and decimation of the lands within Catron County

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[86] This is the very aspiration that drove the original Sagebrush Rebellion and subsequent county supremacy movement, but also drives many libertarian-minded "environmentalists."

and the surrounding Gila National Forest and Wilderness Area (and which led to the protection of the latter) years ago (Davis). "The poverty" of the county, High Country News reporter Tony Davis notes, "has a simple explanation. The county has always lived off grass, trees, and minerals, and today those natural resources are in terrible shape" (Davis). It is also these practices which led to the near extinction of not only the Mexican wolf, but multiple other species, such as all of the local native fishes of the Gila River Basin, making it, according to ASU zoologist W.L Minckley, "the only riparian area in the world where every native fish species has been extirpated or has been listed or recommended for listing as endangered or threatened (Davis). Yet, rather than admit to the destruction these prior extractive industries and enterprises have caused on the environment and shared resources, the residents have vehemently doubled down, demanding protection for these "traditional" uses as naturalized "custom and culture," blaming federal regulations like the Endangered Species Act (ESA), federal employees, and environmentalists for the situation that has been created by pursuing private interests. It is a cycle in the West that is familiar, notes the former Colorado governor Richard Lamm in his book *The Angry West*, as "Extractive wealth by definition is ephemeral. So the West rides a roller coaster, rides boom, rides bust, while its riches disappear. It is the Matchbelt, not the Sunbelt, where economies blaze brilliantly, then die. Leaving the West with its historic residue—the desert and the anger" (Lamm 325).

It is also arguably this anti-federalist, county supremacy/sovereign citizen/wise-use movement attitude, rhetoric, and practices that has made the reintroduction of the Mexican wolf such a difficult effort to implement, leading to highly restricted and heavily managed lives for the wolves the USFWS has attempted to introduce. What is less acknowledged in the "wolf crisis" in Catron County by many of the residents is the pack structure of the wolves themselves,

and how Mexican wolf families and packs more broadly have been disrupted through aggressive biopolitical management that enacts such continuous violence upon wolves. This discursive situation has also led to a highly compromised management plan and mandate that the wolves (up until recently) stay in the designated recovery area, with boundaries determined not by watershed or geography, but political compromise: south of Highway 41. This makes Mexican wolves, according to Michael Robinson, "the only terrestrial mammal managed by Fish and Wildlife Service that is supposed to stay within political boundaries" (Dougherty). The release of new wolves to maintain genetic diversity and prevent inbreeding amongst the Mexican Wolf population has been limited and geographically restricted due to pressure from extractive industries and highly vocal and powerful stockmen's organizations. This has led to incidents such as Crystal Diamond experienced with the female wolf F1105, who had lost prior mates to illegal killing, after which she attempted to mate with local dogs who were apparently all too happy to oblige. Yet, this disruption to the lives of the wolves is disavowed, and the stunting of the growth of the Mexican wolf population due to local resistance is instead portrayed as evidence of the inevitable failure of the wolf reintroduction program and need to end it. As I argue in this chapter, this is due not to anything about the wolves themselves, whom locals often deem evolutionary "losers" (United States House H7164), but the unwillingness of the population to tolerate their presence. The focus is instead on any impingement to what residents and their supporters take as their freedom and economic security. The problem is instead, they claim, those who do not play by the customary rules—the inherently criminal, the impure, the other and outlaw, whether real wild wolves or the men and women they consider as such.

The Threat to Children: It's just a matter of time…

> "I will tell you that we heard testimony in the Resources Committee that described the most provocative sound to a wolf is a crying baby or a laughing baby. It's a matter of time until a wolf catches one of these children. Their blood will be on your hands, my friend."
>
> -Rep. S. Pearce, NM 2nd District, to Rep. N. Dicks, WA 6th District (United States House H7170 June 26, 2007)

Fig. 3 "Kids in a Cage" from: Spady, David. *Wolves in Government Clothing*, 9 Oct. 2013, http://wolvesingovernmentclothing.com/#prettyPhoto[3425-Photos%20from%20the%20Film]/10/.

Perhaps the most provocative aspect of Spady's documentary addressing the Mexican wolf "crisis" in Catron County is the focus on what he dubs "kid cages" (pictured above), a term he uses in the documentary and his article on the popular rightwing newsite Townhall, and adopted by more mainstream media soon after (*Fox News*, *HCN*, etc.). These wire and wood shelters are purportedly intended to protect children from wolf attacks while they wait for the school bus. While many have recognized the provocativeness of the "kid cages" featured in

images of children clinging to the bars, what is particularly significant rhetorically is Spady's and others' contention that they are an attempt at a solution to a real problem:

> The threat has become so ominous the local school district has decided to place wolf shelters (kid cages) at school bus stops to protect school children from wolves while they wait for the bus or parents. These wolf proof cages, constructed from plywood and wire, are designed to prevent wolves from taking a child. The absurdity of this scenario is mind-numbing. What kind of society accepts the idea of children in cages while wolves are free to roam where they choose? (Spady, "Kid Cages)

As in his documentary, *Wolves in Government Clothing*, released around the time of the above article (fall 2013) and screened at an anti-wolf rally in nearby Albuquerque sponsored by Americans for Prosperity, Spady makes certain to emphasize the *necessity* of the "kid cages." What he finds absurd is not, as many have noted, including Fox News, that people would think it necessary to construct such "cages" to protect people from wolves when the risk of a wolf attack is so miniscule, but that it *is necessary* to have them. Spady doesn't doubt the need for such cages to protect people from wolves; it's an implicit premise of his offense. Thus, the threat is taken to be legitimate, and "the absurdity of the scenario" is that "wolves are free to roam where they choose" while "society accepts the idea of children in cages."

Thus, rhetorically, the limits of the discourse are set—this is not an argument of whether the cages are actually necessary; it is assumed that they are, and any discussion must start with that premise in order to be within the realm of the true, as Foucault's mentor Canguilhem would say. That is, the discussion is whether one is to be an advocate of en-caging children to protect wolves or not. Typically, many would consider that it is the non-human animal, especially if a dangerous predator, who should be in the cage and not a human being. But, in siding against the

Catron County residents and Spady, one would purportedly be advocating to en-cage human beings in favour of non-human species like Mexican wolves and, specifically, of tolerating the inherent threat that they represent.

As Spady's comments clearly reveal, this is furthermore a threat not just of a wolf to humans, but a threat to the natural order, a threat to the species hierarchy. As Spady claims, "the preeminent problem is contrasting values that juxtapose those who believe in mankind's superiority to animals with those that place animals and humans on a level of equal value, or in some cases, give higher value to an animal, bird or fish" (Spady, "Kid Cages"). The concern, then, is that non-humans are being valued equally to, or even above, human beings. Such a concern, I argue, reflects the idea that freedom/liberty is a zero-sum game, much like a big freedom pie with a limited number of slices; if you go around giving that freedom/liberty to non-humans, there is less of that freedom-pie for humans. Thus, any valuing of non-human life leads to a lesser valuing of human life.

But, this is a striking rendering of valuing lives for a few reasons. First, it clearly parallels racist sentiments against minorities like that against African Americans and the Black Lives Matters Movement ("All lives matter!"), Native Americans and what anti-treaty leaders in Wisconsin in the '90s called their "special Indian rights" that make them more than equal to white Europeans (Aguilar-Wells & Smith 3), Mexican immigrants who purportedly 'take jobs away from hard-working Americans', and refugees who's potential to terrorize and bring with them foreign values leads to a degeneration of American values and those trying to assert those values (e.g., the supposed Sharia law threat). All of these are about losses to "traditional" ways of life, which are essentially predicated on both the naturalization of human and white male

superiority and priority, and can be regarded as attempts to conserve entrenched, arbitrary, but historical, relations of power and material benefits that accrue from this system of relations.

Second, Spady's claim about freedom is consistent with a belief that, as Foucault notes in *Society Must be Defended*, killing the other considered outside the preferred population, or "the people," makes the population healthier and stronger; it is a means of purification by which the population becomes healthier in proportion to the other's weakness or death. This means that the ideal situation is the extermination of the other, and here, namely, the end of the Mexican wolf reintroduction program, which would ultimately lead to the extermination of the wolves. And this is exactly what people like vocal wolf critic Laura Schneberger, president of the Gila Livestock Growers Association, implies in her letter to Congress when she admonishes, "I pray every night that this program will go away, before it is too late for us before it is too late for the game and the whole country is too dangerous to live in the way it used to be" (United States House H7158). The problem, as owner/operator of a dude ranch Wink Crigler implies, is that it is a zero-sum game. As she notes in a University of Arizona Agricultural Department documentary, "In reality, when you have wolves, there is not coexistence. Something will live, and something will die" ("Mexican Grey Wolves Reintroduced"). And it is for this reason, Spady claims (echoing those like Geist, Graves, and Ted Lyon), that "there were very valid reasons why [wolves] were driven from the lower 48 states through government wolf eradication projects in the early 1900's…with the return of the wolf, and their destructive behaviour, rural America is quickly learning why wolves were removed from settled area" (Spady, "Kid Cages" 2). In other words, Spady (like Schneberger and Crigler) is implying there is no room for compromise; it's either humans or wolves. There is no possibility of having both humans and wolves on the landscape together, as "wolves are not compatible with civilization…including most of the

settled territory of the lower 48 states" (3-4). Given that Catron County, New Mexico's biggest and least densely populous county, has only 3500 residents in an area bigger than Connecticut and Rhode Island combined, this would seem to leave little place for wolves most anywhere in the lower forty-eight states.

While many have questioned the need for the "kid cages" constructed in Catron County to purportedly protect local children from Mexican wolves while they wait for the school bus (Miller), what should be clear is that whether they do or do not protect children from wolves, they certainly *work*. That is to say, they serve a function rhetorically in normalizing a certain type of discourse around wolves and human relationships, namely, one predicated on the always-imminent threat wolves represent. They constitute a *dispositif*/apparatus that conditions and limits the conversation around policy; "kid cages" are, in Foucaultian terms, a dispositif that maintains the exercise of power within the social structure. Thus, to say that "kid cages" work is not solely to say that they are practically or directly effective in stopping or preventing real attacks on children at bus stops. Nonetheless, they do work in a few senses.

In a Foucaultian sense, the "kid cages" *work* in the sense that they *do work*. They are productive discursively and rhetorically in framing and focusing discourse and practices, and help to produce a truth about Mexican wolf and human relations. And they do so in a couple of further senses of doing work than the sense of working as an effective solution to a practical problem. First, they work by producing fear in the population, and the subsequent need *not* to manage that fear, but to remove the cause, as psychologist Dr. Martin-Luce claims in testimony submitted the U.S. Congress (Martin-Luce 5).[87] This can be seen in a number of ways. As the

[87] Martin-Luce contends, "The solution is to manage the wolves that become problems and possibly remove those that are affecting this group of children. That is the only solution that will have a positive affect [sic] on the problems facing these children…" (5).

David Spady quote about the absurdity of the need for the cages implies, the kid cages are arguably meant to both manufacture and justify fear of both wolves and a government that is out to get the local population, or at the very least, is dismissive of their safety and security (an offense to the very purpose of a biopolitical neoliberal minimalist state). As Laura Schneberger snarkily counters in her chapter in the *Real Wolf*, "USFWS wolf managers still insist that nothing is amiss in this program. Some of them have even called these accounts hyperbole and blame parents for instilling fear into their children. Fear is not always a bad thing"(Schneberger 194). Of course, it can be if it is out of proportion to the threat.

Indeed, this assumption about the legitimacy of the level of fear has been a consistent retort in Catron County Commission ordinances and declarations of emergency, where most often the focus is on the safety of children and the threat to the established customary way of life espoused. As Crigler claims to *The Los Angeles Times* at an anti-wolf event in Albuquerque, New Mexico, sponsored by Americans for Prosperity, "guests at her tourist cabins fear they might be attacked by wolves" (Cart). And she further notes that she understands their fears, as she relates, "I can't tell them that they are perfectly safe. There is some degree of risk…they are meat-eaters--savages"[88] (Cart). Like the Spady comment regarding the necessity of the kid cages, what is here significant is that this rhetoric is affective; that is, her telling her tourist guests that they are "not perfectly safe" and that the wolves are "savages" is productive in working to manufacture fear in her guests of the wolves, who as "savages," she implies are irrational, uncontrollable, and unpredictable. They are to be feared when figured as such; in other words, she helps to manufacture that fear in telling them that they are not safe, and the reason is wolves.

[88] This is a particularly rich comment coming from someone who in the Spady documentary claims she's in the "business of feeding the people," providing a "quality protein product" (*Wolves in Government Clothing)*, namely, the cattle she raises and sends to slaughter, and which she calls the wolves "savages" for eating.

Much the same is the case with the testimony of child psychiatrist and Arizona rancher Dr. Julia Martin-Luce in an informal study she conducted in the region, which she includes in the *County in Crisis* report and submits as testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives Oversight Committee on Natural Resources. In this informal study of a total of "6 or 8 ranching families" (Martin-Luce 2), Martin-Luce contends that the majority of the children in these families in New Mexico and Arizona suffer from symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), claiming "it became very, very evident that there was a great deal of post traumatic stress disorder and the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder showing up in the children impacted by wolf presence"(2). While PTSD is typically associated with personally traumatic experience, here it is used by Martin-Luce to show that children are afraid of wolves because they know they are present in the area, that is, it is "wolf presence" (Martin-Luce 1-3) she notes, that is the cause. She claims her study shows that

> since wolves have been reintroduced… 93% of children…startle much more easily than they had, in fact they reported that most of them had not startled easily at all prior to wolf presence…87% were feeling that the wolves were a danger to themselves and to the people they love,…80% felt helpless to control or stop what was going on,… 80% were getting up and going to sleep with their parents,…73% would wake up at night screaming with nightmares related to what was happening with the wolves, and 67% or the parents [reported] their children had become much more clinging. (3)

While there is the side issue that she claims these "symptoms had not been present in any of the children prior to the introduction of, or experience with the wolf" (3),[89] she fails to note that few of these children (ages 3 to 11) were born prior to the 1998 re-introduction of Mexican wolves

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[89] Note: she here uses *the* wolf not *a* wolf—in other words, these are not necessarily experiences of the children with real wolves, but of living in "wolf presence"

(or at least would be too young to make a useful comparison given her standards in the study), meaning there is no baseline for comparison.

However, what is most revealing is that, as these children did not necessarily have negative experiences that would have led to such high percentages of PTSD symptoms, what could have led to their fear, nightmares, etc., is the discursive construction of that fear in the locale; that is, it is the parents and community discourse that have arguably created the sense of fear in the children, in much the same way Crigler rhetorically induces fear in her ranch guests by telling them they are not safe. It is the equivalent of saying white children made to fear black people by their parents and community suffer from PTSD when a black family moves into the neighborhood (blaming the children's fear on the presence of African Americans), or from being told that immigrants crossing the border are an inherent threat (and then blaming that fear on the presence of immigrants). The fear, to be certain, may be real (even if the threat isn't), but it takes the rhetoric of fear to create that fear in the children.

Furthermore, the "kid cages" work in so far as they help to generate the wolf problem rhetorically that it is then subsequently deemed necessary to address through changes in legislation and policy. As is evident in Americans for Prosperity's screening of *Wolves in Government Clothing* and circulation of video and images of the kid cages at the Albuquerque event and across the West and Midwest,[90] the kid cages work as political rhetoric to persuade their audience of their necessity; indeed, the audience is meant to assume their necessity, as well as the "wolf problem" they symbolize.

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[90] Interestingly, while the video of the documentary on YouTube has only about 10,000 views, references to it's screening at various well-attended anti-wolf rallies and summits from Wisconsin, to Washington, to Montana, are numerous.

This rhetoric of fear of Mexican wolves, and wolves in general, and the threat they purportedly represent, is prominent in much of the political advocacy seeking to end the Mexican wolf program. This has been the case since its inception and planning stages in the early 90s, years prior to the plan's implementation and the first Mexican wolf releases in 1998. Since then, there have been multiple efforts by Western politicians and lawsuits to end or defund the program, with the threat to human safety, and children in particular, one of the main justifications. Such was the case with the Congressional representative of Catron County and New Mexico's Second District, Steve Pearce. In 2007, Pearce introduced an amendment to a bill funding the Department of the Interior that would effectively end the Mexican wolf reintroduction program. The text simply states: "No funds made available in or through this Act may be used for the continued operation of the Mexican Wolf Recovery program" (United States House H7152). Without funding, the program would still exist in name, but anyone working for it would be pulled from the program, and the approximately fifty-eight Mexican wolves left would likely face the same fate as the seventy-two Mexican wolves that had previously been removed. Many of the wolves were removed due to public complaints or for leaving the recovery area, while others were illegally killed or disappeared without a trace.[91] Pearce's primary contention was that the program was a failure as "they're killing too much livestock and they're endangering people and pets in the district that I represent" (H7152). This is despite the fact that "Mexican gray wolves are known to have killed 110 head of cattle in the Blue Range Wolf Recovery Area between March 1998 and October 2007, according to Fish and Wildlife Service records. That's only slightly more than 10 cows each year, out of the approximately 35,000 head that roam largely unattended across more than 4.4 million of acres of public land" (Dougherty).

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[91] The latter two of these scenarios are known in the West by the initialism "S.S.S." (shoot, shovel, and shut-up)

Yet, more affective than any claims about livestock losses is Pearce's claim about the effects the wolves have on the lives of children, gleaned mainly from the letters of local residents he submitted with his amendment. A number of Schneberger's letters are featured in this submission. In one, she recounts how upon encountering a Boy Scout troop camping out in the Gila National Forest, she warns them about the wolves because she "was worried sick about the kids," claiming "within a year or two, nobody will be comfortable camping out here with kids" (United States House H7178). She further claims her son "just turned 9 and his whole life has been affected by wolves…our son is locked into a yard and has to be watched constantly." Likewise, Preston Bates, a local ranch owner claims, "My 11-year-old son will not nor will I let him go hiking or adventuring away from the house and barns. No more playing in the woods near the house building forts and doing things a kid should do. He is emotionally and mentally held captive by the wolves…these wolves will kill a child soon"(H7161). Much as Spady's claims about caged youths in the documentary and elsewhere, these citizens too are claiming their children are imprisoned in their own homes, unable to have what they consider a normal childhood.

As far as some are concerned, the only option left is to arm their children against the wolves. As Mary McNabb claims, "Children old enough to venture out on their own and all others, to be safe, must carry a firearm when leaving home" (H7163). While it could be noted, again, that there have been no aggressive behaviors by the wolves directed at any human being on record, MacNabb and other locals clearly take any wolf presence as a threat, or at least a sign of habituation (a popular claim in the area to justify removal of wolves deemed not really wild), or what she calls "prey testing (staring at, stalking/following, show no fear)" (H7163). This behavior is considered serious enough by locals that children, and all people in the area, "must,"

she claims, carry firearms to protect themselves.[92] Such is the claim when Representative Pearce literally uses Micha Miller, who was diagnosed by Martin-Luce with PTSD, as the poster-child for the wolf threat to children. Pearce shows her photograph to the House representatives noting,

> Micha Miller is about 100 yards from her front door pointing to a wolf print that is there in the dirt. What is startling about this picture is the gun which Micha is wearing while she goes about her chores. The Durango pack of wolves have been in and around Micha's house for so long that her parents insist that she carry this gun with her while she does her chores, works or plays in the yard. (H7152)

And, as Micha Miller notes in her own submitted letter, "I am Micha Miller the 13 year old that has to carry a firearm when I go outside…I hate the wolves in our yard because I feel that I am trapped in my house!…I can no longer due [sic] any of these things without being afraid…I have nightmares about the wolves attacking my family and pets." Thus, like the kid cages, firearms are regarded as necessary because of the "wolf presence" rather than any aggressive actions toward humans by any Mexican wolf itself. Here it becomes clear that the "wolf presence" is the threat, and not just to children, but to the very way of life and livelihoods of those in Catron County and the rest of Mexican wolf range.

Clearly, those submitting these letters undeniably claim that their children and themselves are under threat of physical attack from the wolves, regardless of any actual evidence that the threat exists other than "wolf presence," which amounts to wolves living around them and sharing their habitat, a habitat which is almost entirely composed of federal forest lands within which the majority of these families have private in-holdings. Thus, despite the benefits they

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[92] Something that would not be that difficult, as the Catron County Commission passed an ordinance in 1991 (well before wolf reintroduction) making it mandatory that all residents own a firearm.

receive in access to public lands for (subsidized) grazing, hunting, and recreation, they feel their "way of life" and their children's childhoods are being taken away from them--and not only by Mexican wolves, but perhaps more significantly from their perspective, the federal government itself. It is a psychology of embattlement for which the only solution seems to be an end to the Mexican wolf reintroduction program. By framing the threat as an emergency and zero-sum game where children are at stake, Catron County locals benefit their cause of gaining control of land management to serve entrepreneurial interests over wider public interests.

Thus, as many of the letters attest, it is the federal government that is regarded as to blame and threatens their communities, as it is they who introduced the wolves. As Tom McNabb contends, "the wolf program…is yet another illegal, treasonous act by a corrupt government designed to dispossess the citizens of their property and turn them into helpless victims…we are watching our communities and culture die… This is oppression! A war on the people!" (United States House H7164). Others call the USFWS employees "pogrom personnel," claiming the program has "no where to go but cultural genocide," calling the Mexican wolf reintroduction program "planned and deliberate acts of terror directed against the people" (H7164). As ranch manager Charlie Gould claims, "When a wolf howls and you know it's threatening your family, your livelihood, the whole custom and culture of where you live, you don't have a warm and fuzzy feeling" (H7162). Rhetorically, the safety of children is highly affective, pathetically resonating here where the federal government, and particularly USFWS employees, is essentially accused of abusing their children. And thus the conflation of Mexican and government "wolves" becomes obvious, as both are regarded as responsible for destroying the residents of Catron County's lives, with the former an extension of the latter. The Mexican wolves become anthropomorphized agents of the government, or government sponsored

terrorists, and the USFWS and other government employees become wolves, preying upon the population, who, according to Laura Schneberger, "Go to the bar in Alpine at night. Oh yes, they go to meetings where they plot and plan on how to make sure the people out here are impacted as badly as possible" (H7160).

While it may seem that these complaints have fallen on deaf ears in the federal government agencies running Mexican wolf reintroduction, the Inspector General's report addressing complaints from residents submitted by Rep. Pearce reveals that there seems little USFWS or other federal agencies can do to assuage these fears. Efforts to do so by federal agencies are essentially ignored or circumvented. As the Mexican Grey Wolf Recovery Program (MGWRP) coordinator explains to the Inspector General's investigators,

> Although MGWRP attempted to conduct outreach about the wolves, Catron County did not allow wolf outreach in its schools or signs posted in the community, fearing that MGWRP wanted to "brainwash" the residents' children. MGWRP attempted instead to find other ways to share information with residents (e.g., public meetings, the MGWRP website, face-to-face visits, and informational flyers). [USFWS District Director] Tuggle told us that MGWRP had printed small cards with information on how to contact the program if residents saw a wolf or had related concerns. He said that he worked with Congressman Pearce's office to create the cards, but 2 weeks after the cards were printed, the Congressman was on the floor of the House of Representatives stating that FWS had printed the cards because it knew that wolves endangered the public. (*Investigative Report* 7)

Not only does the Catron County Commission "fear" that Fish and Wildlife educational programs in their schools will "brainwash" their children about wolves, but Rep. Pearce

essentially baits a USFWS director into a faux-collaboration in order to misrepresent and undermine his community outreach efforts.

While it may seem inaccurate to cast ranchers in New Mexico who claim they merely want "big government" and wolves out of their lives as neo-liberal advocates and proselytizers, the coincidence of ideas in economic terms and alliance in political policy advocacy with entities such as Americans for Prosperity and other neoliberal and libertarian think tanks and politicians is telling. Consistently, whether it is the economic analysis of "collateral damage" as "takings" (Carey, "Mexican" 100-101) in the Catron County *County in Crisis report*, Alexander Thal's quantified extrapolation of economic losses to Catron ranchers, or attorney Karen Budd-Fallon's claims regarding the effects of federal intervention and regulations on the "way of life" of extractive industry on public lands, or the destruction of "custom and culture" as above, the rhetoric and logic is consistent with neoliberal analysis. Namely, it is about economizing the decisions of individuals in terms of an economic game which the federal government and their agents, whether wolves or humans, act upon, and for which they may be criticized in terms of economic effects on individual "enterprises." In Foucaultian terms, what is being marshaled is "neo-liberal analyses" through the "economic grid," making it possible to "test governmental action, gauge its validity, and to object to activities of the public authorities on the grounds of their abuses, excesses, futility, and wasteful expenditure" (Foucault, *Birth* 246).

What such a neo-liberal analysis of these actions thus entails, is "a scrutinizing of every action of public authorities in terms of the game"(Foucault, *Birth* 246) whose rules have been set out and must be abided. In this way, especially in American neoliberalism, Foucault notes, "the market is no longer a principle of government's self-limitation [as he notes it is for French neoliberalism]; it is a principle turned against it. It is a sort of permanent economic tribunal

confronting the government" (246). As such, the government is necessarily subordinate to the economic order, and for it to intervene in ways which go against the presumed set out rules of the game threatens the capital returns on the investments enterprises (individual citizens within the game) make according to that understanding; thus, "players" are doubly threatened by both unpredictability (changing the rules of the game, such as they interpret the Endangered Species Act did) and inefficiency (which is tied to the unpredictability of the rules, making risks taken incalculable). Thus, the introduction and then sustained presence of wolves can be said to be such an imposition that is ripe for critique from this perspective.

This critique is apparent in how the various documents related to claims regarding "county supremacy" and the Mexican wolf "crisis" (seemingly disparate issues) are conflated as economic problems associated with government overreach. This is particularly evident in the framing of the effects of wolves on the lives of the children of Catron County. As many of the documents which comprise the one hundred and thirty-six page *County in Crisis* report claim, as well as the rhetoric of the *Wolves in Government Clothing* espouses, and much of the rhetoric regarding the threat to "public safety" maintains, it is children who are the main focus. Not only is it the purported, constantly re-iterated threat that it is just a matter of time before a wolf gobbles up a child, but also the threat to the child's opportunity to capitalize on his or her own self as an enterprise, an enterprise the parents have invested their time and capital in to get a return on this investment. As Foucault notes, the investment in the child under neoliberal analysis is an investment in an "abilities-machine" that has a "lifespan" (*Birth* 229). Thus, investments in education help build the child as capital, but so does "time parents devote to their children outside simple educational activities" (229), meaning there is an investment in the formation of a human capital predicated on "care", "affection", etc. Thus, in performing a

"whole environmental analysis of the child's life" (229), the prospects of that child, or any child, can be calculated in economic terms to show which choices of the parents will help maximize the choice-making of the child. If there are barriers to the efficiency and predictability of those investments in the child, then the government may be critiqued and its actions corrected to make these investments fair.

In other words, "wolf presence" is presumed to not only threaten a child's lifespan and ruin the parents' investment, but it affects the child's ability to maximize their own capital if they are emotionally and psychologically damaged or traumatized. This is because "the health of individuals," and I would say, their health and safety, is negatively affected, leading to a stunting of human capital and a failure to "preserve and employ it for as long as possible" (Foucault, *Birth* 230). As such, regulations that protect wolves are viewed as illicit "takings" from the child in their development of capital that would otherwise accumulate without them, that is, if the chosen "way of life" whose risks have been unknowingly increased were not threatened by the actions of public authorities.

The Threat to Family: The Violence of Domesticated Bliss

Like the threat to children and culture, a consistently reiterated theme in the rhetorical assemblage regarding the "wolf crisis" is the threat to family, and particularly the family structure as it is rhetorically articulated in the fabular construction of the place of Catron County. As noted in the Miller family's collectively submitted letter (dated June 15, 2007), Mike Miller, Micha's father and the sole full-time cowboy in charge of taking care of "several thousand" (Dougherty) cows on the Adobe-Slash Ranch owned by an absentee "wealthy Mexican business man" (Dougherty) and "one of New Mexico's largest spreads," complains his "hands are tied

when dealing with the Wolf Recovery people." He felt disempowered to do what he felt was necessary to caretake for the animals and his family, and particularly unable to do anything about the Durango pack (a female, her mate, and their newborn pups) who shared the 275,000-acre ranch where the Millers lived and he worked. The Millers call the wolves "habitual" (they likely mean habituated) for their "coming into yards & hanging around people." As the Millers conclude in their letter, "the only way to stop a habitual wolf is to permanently remove them by any means necessary!" (United States House H7159).

And this is essentially what Mike Miller did, as he claimed to be, according to the county wolf inspector, Jess Carey, "worried about more than cattle; he's worried about his family" (Dougherty). At the time, wolves that were involved with three cattle attacks, or "strikes" in one year, were required to be removed from the land under what the rancher controlled Adaptive Management Oversight Committee (created in 2003), or AMOC, called the "3-strike rule" (WELC, "3 Strikes")[93]. During the time that AMOC dictated management to the USFWS, a situation the Western Environmental Law Center noted as "a perfect example of how a single interest can dominate a policy decision-making interest" (WELC, "Restoring"), Mexican wolf numbers which had been increasing, declined, as numerous wolves were eliminated from the population under the rule (WELC, "Restoring"). As the rule of the game now being played, Miller took it upon himself to work within that ruling to intentionally remove the Durango pack, essentially criminalizing their presence.

On June 21st, 2007, using the telemetry receiver USFWS had provided him and other local ranchers with to keep his cattle away from the wolves by locating the signal from their collars, he located the Durango pack's den, and "branded cattle less than a half-mile from the

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[93] Meaning a number of wolves could be blamed for an attack on a single animal, or be held blamed for three attacks in a singular incident if three livestock animals were attacked.

wolves' den, the enticing aroma of seared flesh surely reaching the pack's super-sensitive nostrils" (Dougherty). The female wolf of the pack had two strikes against her at the time, and, as Miller admits to *High Country News*, "We would sacrifice a calf to get a third strike" (Dougherty). And that is essentially what he did. After this first attempt at enticing the wolves failed, on June 23rd, just three days before Rep. Pearce appeared on the House floor and used Micha Miller as the poster-child of wolf victims, and hours after the Catron County Commission's independent wolf investigator Jess Carey was stopped by federal law enforcement officers from illegally trying to trap the wolf to "protect the family," Carey notes, "a freshly branded cow about to calve was left unattended near the wolves" by Miller (Dougherty). As he admits, "We left her out there." Not unexpectedly, the Durango wolves "found their mark" killing and eating on the cow and newborn calf. By July 5th, the Durango female was "lethally removed." By late September, after the Durango male found a new mate from the Luna pack, the County was calling once again demanding their removal as "habituated" wolves. While USFWS refused, by November 1st, none of the Durango pack wolves' collars were sending out signals and "their fate is unknown" (Dougherty). And so it might be said the "sacrifice" worked to untie Miller's hands.

What becomes evident from this incident is, first, the intensive neoliberal biopolitical management the wolves are constantly subjected to with the three-strikes rule, similar to criminal policies enacted during the 1990s which imposed mandatory life sentences on repeat offenders, eliminating judicial discretion to consider both mitigating and aggravating circumstances (ACLU). Rather than being held responsible for the direct, illegal poaching of the female wolf, Miller was able to deny any responsibility according to the rules: he was just branding cattle, had every right to leave the pregnant cow and calf where he wanted on his property, and did not

directly participate in the killing of either the cows or the wolves. In essence, this is the bloody secret of the biopolitical management of species, one need not "put to death, or allow to live," as with sovereign or disciplinary violence, but "let die, and make live"; that is, the state, in becoming responsible for upholding the rules of the game for the neoliberal entrepreneur, lets the wolves and a cow and calf die, so that others may live more robustly (namely, the Millers and other cows), and the state does so because of the choices individuals (namely, wolves) make within the rules of the game that has been set up.

But perhaps more significant for this section of this chapter, is what the incident says about the violence that is an integral, and argued as necessary, part of the rationale of caretaking associated with ranching and ranch families, even in sacrificing the cow and calf. As historian Karen Merril notes, this is consistent with how the purported "domesticated bliss" idealized by ranching since the mid twentieth century functions, as "ranchers still hoped to exterminate predatory animals, but interpreted the danger they represented in highly melodramatic ways" (Merril 171). Ranchers were no longer figured as the rough and tumble cowboy individuals earlier romanticized, but "constructed their desire to dominate the animals in proximity to them as part of a domestic vision, and their manipulation was closely hitched to perceptions of themselves as caretakers" (171). As such, masculinity became redefined, premised upon the patriarch's ability as entrepreneur to care for their family, the livestock, and the wild game around them. This amounts to reasserting a sovereignty premised on an economic subjectivity that necessitates the always present threat of violence in what Merrill calls a "patriarchal protection" of the caretaker, that yet disavows the violence and "killing required for profit" (182). In this way, Merril notes, "ranchers were protectors who ultimately did not protect," sending their cattle off to slaughter. Thus "the very occasion when they gained profit as the

heads of their households…was the very moment when they abandoned their roles as domestic guardians" (182).

One of the more consistently reiterated and purportedly pernicious effects of wolf reintroduction, or re-colonization, of the Southwest is the supposed effect the program and presence of wolves has allegedly had on the aforementioned "way of life" of those who live around wolves, or what Merrill has theorized as the "domesticated bliss" of ranching life as imagined in the mid-twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Indeed, the domesticated bliss of ranching life, she notes, is a recent development that was not necessarily the theorization of ranching life in earlier times. Tellingly, many of those who purport to embrace such an imagined "traditional" "way of life" are newcomers to Catron County and similar environments in the Southwest and West, seeking their own little piece of the West. They include the woman in Spady's documentary who complains about wolves after moving to Catron County "nine years ago," or 2004 (six years after re-introduction), and "the owner of the cattle on which the Gavilan Pack had scavenged and then begun to kill, who two years previously had left her job with Bank of America in Colorado to buy a New Mexico ranch and become a rancher, [and] waxed eloquent on the rural lifestyle threatened by the wolves" (Robinson, *Predatory* 358). They also include a relatively greenhorn rancher who blames the Mexican wolves and "USFWS wolf management program and actions" for "adversely affecting our civil rights and property rights and investment-backed expectations[94] and way of life…and negative stress on our family" in his

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[94] Attorney Karen Budd-Fallen, who co-authored the early 1990's Catron County ordinances and 1992 Land Use Plan has encouraged ranchers to use this specific rhetoric. Budd-Fallen not only encourages ranchers to claim their grazing allotments as part of their "ranch," but "also says the allotments [despite being public land] represent an 'investment-backed expectation,' meaning if you put money into maintaining the allotment with fences, ditches, and so on, then you must be compensated if the government lowers its value by removing cattle." Or, in this case, by allowing wolves on the land (Williams).

letter included in Rep. Pearce's testimony, despite having begun ranching on his public lands allotment in 2004, only three years earlier, and well after wolf reintroduction. It's a story similar to that of Preston Bates, who grew up on the "East Coast" and started a dude ranch as his "life long dream" nine years earlier before failing (United States House H7164).

Indeed, many of the most vocal proponents of the county supremacy movement and critics in Catron County's initial clashes with the federal government as part of the Catron County Commission in the early '90s were born out of state (Davis). As *High Country News* reported in 1996, "Fifty-three percent of Catron County's population was born outside of New Mexico," and "thirty-two percent of Catron's population has lived in the county for less than five years, compared to 23 percent of all New Mexicans" (Davis) As Merrill notes, modern ranchers imagined themselves as frontier homesteaders long after the frontier had closed, "concerned with carving out a danger-free zone of domesticity" (171), one that provides the security of freedom from danger provided by the government through a very contemporary neoliberal governmentality. Thus, it is upon this vision of a traditional, ahistorical, yet recently embraced and idealized domesticated bliss that the "attack" by wolves, and "wolves in government clothing" is claimed to have had the direst consequences.

As Crystal Diamond emphasizes in both her letter and in the documentary, and many others have in both Catron County and across the West, the greatest threat from wolves is the threat to her family, namely, that wolves (of any sort) may appear at her doorstep, or when her children are waiting for the bus, or playing in the yard, when her husband is away, as did indeed happen. Yet, contradictorily, it is also claimed that even if he were present, the head of household (or even another male neighbor?) would be able to do little to defend his family from this always-imminent threat. This is not only because he cannot be everywhere at once, but

because the regulations and protections on wolves "tie his hands" from taking what he may deem appropriate action, i.e., the violent use of lethal force to kill what is feared and felt to be threatening to that domesticated bliss.

In the psychological evaluation of thirty-five Catron County residents submitted to USFWS by the Catron County Commission as part of the *County in Crisis* report conducted by local New Mexico rancher and instructor in psychology at Western New Mexico University Alexander Thal, Thal argues, "the professional psychologist assessment report finds that with no hope, no way to defend family members or protect lifelong investment and livelihoods, nor any recourse, the family head of household will remain helpless and have a real possibility for violence" (Thal, Alexander 36). While Thal's claim that "the family head of household will remain helpless and have a real possibility of violence" may seem to indicate that this "real possibility of violence" stems from the threat of violent wolves predating on livestock, pets, children, etc., an earlier statement by Thal to FWS Mexican wolf program director David Parsons in 1994, four years prior to reintroduction and almost two decades before his "study," indicates that what Thal means is not so much the violence of the wolves per se, but violence within the community, and particularly, *domestic* violence. That is, this meeting between Parsons and Thal and Howard Hutchinson (whom Robinson characterizes as an "anti-environmental activist in Catron County") "was intended to properly document the county commissioners' insistence that social pathology—unemployment, alcohol and drug abuse, and family violence—would result from the effects on ranchers of releasing wolves" (Robinson, *Predatory* 355). Thus, the claim that the commissioners and Thal made, even prior to reintroduction, was that reintroducing wolves would turn ranching from a lifestyle/way of life of domesticated bliss, to one of domestic violence for which not only the wolves, but the federal government would be to

blame. As Thal "repeatedly warned the government biologists and bureaucrats…'Someone is going to get shot over this' " (355).

What is implied in the Mike Miller account, Crystal Diamond's wolf encounter, and the rhetoric of the psychological analysis of the effects of "wolf presence" in the *County in Crisis* report, then, is that what is at stake is individual sovereignty as part of a rhetorical assemblage of "custom and culture," namely a patriarchal sovereignty once more re-imagined as a tradition but which, as Derrida notes, is nonetheless constantly re-constructed in fabular fashion, rather than natural, as is claimed. Such a sovereignty is therefore deconstructable, meaning that it is grounded in a history through which it acquires power through force. Arguably, it is grounded on the same Hobbesian notion of sovereignty Derrida analyzes in *The Beast and the Sovereign* lectures wherein he shows how such sovereignty is "indivisible," and is thus always a relation of pure domination in which the sovereign does not respond. That is, such a sovereign has no responsibility to the other he is sovereign over; there is no exchange or address. Thus, in Hobbes (and, I would argue, in Hayek and the sovereign citizen and county movements), sovereignty "presupposes the right of man over the beasts" and ties this to the "right of parents over children" which he then "demonstrates that this sovereignty, within the family, belongs to the father, who is…'a little king in his house' "(*The Beast* 29). This is so, again, because sovereignty is always posited as indivisible, and thus, cannot be shared or reduced; otherwise, it is not sovereignty. As Derrida emphasizes in his analysis of Hobbes and sovereignty,

> It is the father who, in a "civill government," has at his disposal authority and Power. And so just before treating "OF the right of parents over children and on the Patrimonial Kingdom" (and therefore *the absolute right of the father in civil society*), at the end of chapter 8, entitled "of the right of Masters over slaves," Hobbes posits the right

> of man over the beasts. So we have here a configuration that is both systematic and hierarchical: at the summit is the sovereign master, king, husband, father: ipseity itself, and below, subjected to his service, the slave, the beast, the woman, the child. (*The Beast* 30)

The father is the proper wolf to man of the family. That is, the father is the sovereign who holds the natural right of dominion over both beast and family, and must at the same time become the beast/wolf to defend against beasts/wolves who threatens such order by supposing their own sovereignty. But as sovereignty is not divisible, if it is to be located at the level of sovereign citizenship, that is, the level of the individual, then it is located within the father.

As Alexander Thal notes in his Catron County assessment report in the Catron County *County in Crisis* report*,* it is the "family head of household" who will "have a real possibility for violence" (36). It is the father who may turn violent against those he is sovereign over (his family) if he is not allowed to assert his sovereignty over beasts and the land, whether they are wolves or wolves dressed in government clothing. And so, it is not difficult to see how Spady makes the conflation that he does in the title of his film *Wolves in Government Clothing*, and why the federal government claiming sovereignty through the federalism of the "supremacy clause" and "property clauses" of the Constitution is regarded as an attack nonetheless on the sovereignty these individuals assert as an ipseity that is naturalized; as sovereignty is indivisible, any assertion of sovereignty by the federal government is taken as an attempt to strip individuals of sovereignty—there cannot be a reduction of sovereignty that is not a dissolution. Hence, the head of household is stripped of his sovereignty, as it is given over to the wolves, both "the wolf" and human federal wolves.

Further, sovereignty, as Derrida notes here, is "the principle of life, life, vitality" (*The Beast* 28) and "this political discourse of Hobbes's is vitalist, organicist, finalist, and mechanistic" (28). This is much the case with the sovereignty Hayek assumes in his notion of liberty and subsequent "law and order" which grounds and makes possible civil society. As something organic, it is natural and evolved. But whereas sovereignty arises from contract in Hobbes and numerous other liberal theorists, in Hayek and, I argue, the rhetoric that undergirds the county supremacy movement, there is no contract until after there is society. However, there is a liberty or nascent sovereignty which grounds law and order, making both the former and latter natural and given. Thus, for Hayek, and a number of libertarians, as well, individual sovereignty trumps all other political claims; society is effectively extinguished when the latter are asserted through force, as this constitutes a violation of the law established through "custom and culture"/"culture and tradition" as reflected in such apparatuses as the purported "Code of the West." This is also why there is no other solution to the "wolf crisis" and "emergency" than to eliminate the wolf (and any and all regulations) completely.

The Threat to Community: The "Custom and Culture" of Sovereign Citizenship

> "The rancher (with a few honorable exceptions) is a man who strings barbed wire all over the range; drills wells and bulldozes stock ponds; drives off elk and antelope and bighorn sheep; poisons coyotes and prairie dogs; shoots eagles, bears, and cougars on sight; supplants the native grasses with tumbleweed, snakeweed, povertyweed, cowshit, anthills, mud, dust, and flies. And then leans back and grins at the TV cameras and talks about how much he loves the American West"
>
> -Edward Abbey, "Cowburnt" (1).

There is a history of conceiving of liberty as a closed system, as something perceived as a resource that is in limited supply, competitively sought by individuals seeking to make good on

claims of liberty in a classically liberal, Lockean sense through property claims. Indeed, there is a specific history in Catron County in particular, which in the 1990s, piggy-backed on the rhetoric of *Posse Comitatus* groups formed in the 1960s and Sagebrush rebels of the late 1970s and early 80s that regarded the federal government as limiting and restricting the liberty enshrined in the sovereign "We the People" of the founding documents of the United States. *The Declaration of Independence* grounds sovereignty in this collectivity of representative democracy wherein "the People" replaces the individual head/king. However, while this idea of "the People" as sovereign has been reified through judicial precedent, there yet remains an interpretation of the sovereign "we the people" that is not predicated on any collectivity.

Instead, the tradition of sovereignty that is invoked is premised in a more abstracted, generalized account of Lockean liberty, one that is often referred to as the liberty of classical liberalism. In this interpretation of liberty, which we can see prominently featured in the rhetoric of frontier expansionism of the nineteenth century in North America, and later in objections to federal enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment post-Reconstruction, and school desegregation in the 1950s, liberty is a resource to be owned and gained through individual sovereign claims. This claim is grounded in the Lockean justification for the acquisition of property, wherein one's work put into the land or a natural resource grants a claim of ownership. Land that is not "developed" for anthropocentric and economic use (farming, industry, etc.) or capital acquisition for sale is considered unused and fair game, with everything undeveloped considered what Heidegger would call "standing reserve" (Heidegger 8).

What is significant with the sovereign citizen's movement, and classical liberal/libertarian interpretations of Locke on the acquisition of property, such as those of Hayek, Strauss, von Mises, Friedman and Rothbard, is that Locke, in the *Second Treatise of Government*

where he addresses property acquisition, does not assume a world of scarcity, but one of plenty. He assumes there is the possibility that each person may find land or resources to make good their claim of ownership. This presumption was reinforced in the U.S. by Jefferson's push for the yeoman farmer ideal and the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase from France, which made such a scenario seem practically feasible. The contemporary difference is that when the "state of nature" Locke presumes regarding property does not hold, that is, when there is a scarcity of resources, libertarians still attempt to enforce the Lockean mode of acquisition, if not through original acquisition, then through contract or leases from large owners like the federal government (BLM land in the U.S., or Crown land in Canada, for instance) deemed to not be 'using' the land in Lockean terms of development. This is also the basis for claims for a right to personally profit off such lands, and even acquire subsidies to do so. Furthermore, this classically liberal/libertarian idea of property acquisition also relies upon eliding the Lockean proviso that purposefully limits acquisition to leaving "enough, and as good, left in common for others" (Locke 17). They therefore deny the claims of property-less, resource deprived persons of the collective "we the people," bracketing their claims, and asserting that natural acquisition is justified solely through work. Thus, federal land that is not put to work to develop resources for anthropocentric and economic gain is considered to be in a state of nature, and can be acquired rightfully. This is why those like Karen Budd-Fallen have encouraged ranchers to include their grazing allotment as "their ranch," rather than land rented by contract.

This interpretation of the sovereignty of "we the people" as individual, rather than collective, forms the basis for the objections of members of groups like the *Posse Comitatus* in the 1980s in the Midwest, the Freemen movement in Montana in the 1990s, and the ordinances in Catron County in the early '90s that attempted to restrict federal authority on land considered

owned in common by "we the people." This especially includes BLM and National Forest tracts, lands and resources generally considered held in common under the guise of the "public trust doctrine" which conserves/preserves resources held in common for both present and future generations ("The Public Trust"). These sovereign citizen groups claim that their use of these federal lands, through mining and grazing leases, gives them ownership of these lands and resources under the guise of this particular interpretation of the natural acquisition of property. Their work gives them at least partial ownership, but certainly more ownership than other individuals or the government itself who they see as impinging on their individual liberty.

What is important to understand is that these sovereignty advocates actually are claiming to be upholding and demanding the enforcement of the law as they interpret it as existing. While much of the sovereign citizen and county supremacy rhetoric may seem incoherent and legally at odds with established legal theory and precedent, these proponents do not regard it as such. Indeed, Karen Budd-Fallen and Tom Catron's references in the *Catron County Comprehensive Land Plan* to *The Treaty of Guadalupe* (1848), which ended the Mexican-American war, is actually an attempt to use the law to make their claim. Finding references to preserving existing "culture" and "traditions" in this text, they interpret it as preserving ranching, mining, and logging "culture" rather than the culture of the Mexicans or Native Americans that were soon to be displaced over the next forty years by these resource extraction industries, ending with the removal of the Apache after the surrender of Geronimo in 1884. What this rhetoric indicates is that these are not citizens who deny the authority of federal law or want to be independent from the U.S. as a nation, they merely insist that the purpose of the government is to preserve extractive entrepreneurial enterprises above all else.

Thus, while some do often reference a God-given natural liberty and law, more often what is emphasized is the lack of federal departments and institutions enforcing or understanding the law themselves. As Howard Hutchinson, a Catron County citizen and board member and co-founder of the Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties, claims in an article in *Range Magazine* (2007) praising the county sovereignty[95] movement, "All of the ordinances and plans put forward by the member counties mirror federal, statutory requirements. The counties have never initiated anything outside of existing federal law" (Cade 54). As the author of the article, ranching consultant Mike Cade, claims, the county sovereignty movement is misunderstood, portrayed and "often reviled by opponents as…seek[ing] to usurp federal authority, its true mission is simple—hold the federal government accountable for obeying its own laws" (54).

While some may dismiss the claims of these sovereignty movements as unsupported by legal precedent and without legal standing, the rhetoric they espouse nonetheless gets taken up by those who desire not revolution, but a return to what they see as a time when the federal government enforced the law properly by not overstepping its bounds. This is why they consider federal regulations, such as the congressionally created *Endangered Species Act* of 1973 as violating prior established law based in custom and culture or "custom and tradition" (as Hayek would have it). Given their theory of property, it should thus not be surprising that they would consider anything they imagine as not further subsidizing them as a civil rights violation and takings. Indeed, it does not matter if their cases fail (as all of Budd-Fallon's county sovereignty cases have) and ordinances are ruled unconstitutional, so long as pressure is kept up to undercut federal management through the normalization of their rhetoric in the public.

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[95] From what I've found in my research, I'm reasonably certain Cade is here referring to the "county supremacy movement" when using "county sovereignty movement," which typically refers to an Irish republican group that split off Sinn Féin.

Another example of this interpretation of the ESA as federal overreach appears in the article “Quartering Species: The Living Constitution, the 3rd Amendment, and the Endangered Species Act,” by legal scholars Morris and Stroup, who represent a right-wing think tank that addresses land policy and private property rights. As they claim, “Any property holder who currently farms his land, utilizes it for extractive purposes, or contemplates making improvements in the future must worry about the ESA…The ESA, in short, is every property owner’s nightmare” (Morris and Stroup 770). But rather than construing protecting/not harming endangered species as a taking of property, these scholars base their argument of unconstitutional federal overreach upon the much more specific and little used 3rd Amendment, known as the “Quartering Clause.” This clause states simply “No soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.” What Morris and Stroup contend is that endangered species are the contemporary “equivalent” (800) of soldiers. That is, they “conclude that…the ESA's ‘quartering of species’ on private land violates the Third Amendment’s ban on quartering soldiers” (769), as property owners are being forced to house, feed, and not harm the species that are protected just as they would soldiers. As such, endangered species are the contemporary equivalent of soldiers, as both are imposed on a population by the federal government, making both federal agents.

As noted, it is the phrase “custom and culture” that is treated as the foundation and juridical “open sesame” of the county supremacy movement, and which grounds the claims made in both the *Catron County Comprehensive Land Plan* and other ordinances passed by the county in the early 1990s, a period regarded by some as “Sagebrush Rebellion II” (Williams). This rhetoric/diction also grounds the *County in Crisis* report, as well as the objections and complaints issued by the Catron County Commission to the Department of Interior (DOI) Investigative

Report into the USFWS Mexican Wolf Reintroduction Program. These documents rhetorically indicate a consistent lineage, making it evident that this contemporary rhetoric signals a continuation of the Sagebrush Rebellion in what may be called, along with such provocative incidents like the Bundy standoff in Nevada in 2014 and Malheur Wildlife Refuge takeover of 2016, “Sagebrush Rebellion III.”

The consistency of a grounding of “law and order” in “custom and culture” as the true essence of the law echoes the theory of the evolution of the law in the later work of Freidrich Hayek which is based in a “custom and tradition” which precedes law, and a law which precedes society. This “spontaneous” and organic emergence of the law in Hayek is the very reason that he, in this later work, revises his arguments in his earlier work such as *The Road to Serfdom* and *The Constitution of Liberty* to emphasize this foundation as an objection to legislative law. In doing so, Hayek creates a break in the law where legislation is associated with government overreach, conditioned by a misunderstanding of the law; this thus makes for a division between the “true” law, the law of “custom and tradition” upon which law and subsequently society are founded, and law which attempts to control individuals through legislation. The latter makes the law inefficient and creates disorder by making the defining choice-making essence of the individual illicitly unpredictable, in a sense, changing the rules of the game after they are originally set. In this way, the “custom and tradition” that grounds the law in Hayek shares with the county supremacy and sovereign citizen perspectives a grounding in “custom and culture,” and it does indeed seem that it is this tradition of liberalism, namely neoliberalism, that the contemporary Sagebrush III hyper-individuation and self-entrepreneurship shares with Hayek. It is also for these reasons that the Endangered Species Act is considered as onerous and illicit as it is in these movements, and has made the ESA the primary focus of the movement’s ire from

Sagebrush I to the present, whether the issue is conserving spotted owls, sage grouse, or Mexican wolves.

Such legislation is thereby regarded as violating the premise of a governmentality restricted to ensuring the rules of the game are respected. And this must inevitably lead to restoration of law and order, a situation where Hayek argues "society must temporarily suspend the basic principles it is otherwise committed to when the preservation of that order is itself threatened"(Hayek, *Law* 124), wherever or from whoever that threat comes from. As Jörg Spieker notes, "What [Hayek] does make clear is that…a state of emergency will be declared when disobedient subjects become a threat" (Spieker 317). It does not matter whether those disobedient subjects are federal law enforcement, environmentalists, or Mexican wolves—all "forfeit the exemption from coercion" (Hayek, *New Studies* 133) when they commit such violations of the economic order. And, as such, it is an order that is nonetheless organic and evolved, according to Hayek. What is authorized in such a suspension is a violence that then paradoxically restores the "discipline of civilization" which "has gradually evolved through a process of natural selection" (Spieker 317). As such, re-introducing a species that has been economically selected against, such as Mexican wolves who were on their way to extinction, is a clear violation of the evolved "custom and culture." As Spieker notes, for Hayek, "to let die is to kill what has already been selected against in the struggle for life" (Spieker 317). Or, as Catron County resident Jim Taylor summarizes, "I [feel] our tax dollars…could be put to better use than feeding a bunch of wild dogs. Seems pretty darn silly to be messing with obsolete evolution" (United States House H7159).

Thus, to say that the rhetoric circulating in and out of Catron County and as expressed in the different tendrils of the sovereign citizen movement and county supremacy movements

regarding wolves is a rhetorical assemblage about "custom and culture" is to say that it is vying to become a new regime of truth. That is, while the rhetoric may often be contradictory, or logically lead to conclusions inconsistent with what is contended, it nonetheless forms a type of mobile constellation, drawing from both earlier established regimes of truth and from rhetorical assemblages seemingly unrelated to the perceived wolf issue or human-wildlife, and human-wolf, relations as they are constructed, or have been constructed in the past.

Thus, it does not matter that there is both a call for sovereignty apart from the federal government, but also simultaneously a demand for continued and even increased federal subsidization of grazing rights and compensation for losses tied to individual choices (which form the basis of the subjectivity espoused in neoliberalism, viz., the subject is not one selling his labor on the market, but is a self-entrepreneur or brand, or entrepreneur of the self, wholly individuated). This is because the rhetorical assemblage of "custom and culture" (Budd-Fallon) or "custom and tradition" (Hayek) is mobile and amorphous, drawing from a number of incompatible and conflicting government documents, conspiracy theories, etc. It does not matter rhetorically if there are contradictions, ultimately, because the rhetoric works. It does not matter as a whole whether what is assembled and associated is incoherent. It is much as with Donald Trump's claim about the harshness and inaccuracy of his rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election; when asked whether he had "gone too far" in his "rhetoric" after persuading the public to elect him, he answers, "No. I won…I'm the president." (Langley and Baker). What matters is whether the assemblage is persuasively effective, whether it produces actions and practices that then give it truth, or establish it, at the very least, as within the true.

Much the same is the case with the amorphous, ambiguous, and malleable claims to "custom and culture"/"custom and tradition." Similar to Sarah Palin's coinage of "Real

America," they are recent rhetorical assemblages that contains numerous, often conflicting elements that compose the rhetorical constellation they refer to. However, as Governor Lamm admonished more than three decades ago, in practice, "by asserting, even flaunting, a regional independence that never existed, the proud West becomes the foolish West. Worse by continuing to act today as though it still has no need for federal government, even as it continues to profit from federal largesse, it compounds its hypocrisy and undermines its credibility" (Lamm 321). Nonetheless, this assemblage is rhetorically effective and affective.

Thus, the representation of wolves that results from this, whether of the Mexican wolves inhabiting the area, or the human beings who work for the federal government and environmental NGOs, serves to maintain the power of (neoliberal) extraction industries and entrepreneurial ventures which seek to profit off public lands. It allows them to treat these lands as an extension of themselves, making them an extension of private interests of individuals on the backs of the much broader community of public land owners (for whom the federal government holds these lands in trust) at their expense. To disallow this exploitation is considered a "takings," as it contravenes the fabular domesticated bliss and Old West utopia these entrepreneurs imagine themselves upholding as part of their "custom and culture," a seemingly originary claim of entitlement that is grounded in a discourse and practices that are of recent coinage and lineage. That is, while they refer back to frontier settlement, they are more so grounded in the rhetoric of the late 1970s and early '80s reactionary political movement of the Sagebrush Rebellion, which gave rise to the county supremacy, wise-use, and sovereign citizen movements, all of which have sought to privatize public lands for personal profit, a profit to be accumulated from the extraction of public resources from ranching, logging, and mining of public lands. As such, it is revealed that the civil society imagined is not to the benefit of

everyone. As Foucault notes, such a “civil society is not humanitarian, but communitarian…lead[ing] individuals to enlist on the side of one tribe or community…the family, village, and the corporation” (*Birth* 302). And so, as Scott Reed observes, “the maverick myth retains its appeal. Return the power to the people, more accurately to ‘our kind’ of people” (Reed 94-5), thereby subordinating, if not dismissing, all other interests, whether human or non-human, including and especially non-humans like Mexican wolves, to the interests of a specific, yet constantly produced economized subject.

IV. The Scandal of Wolf Management

> "Reintroducing wolves was a colossal mistake. Compounding that mistake by changing management practices to better suit a vicious predator is not a solution to a problem that is much better solved with a hollow-point bullet."
> -Frank Priestley, President Idaho Farm Bureau

Killing Wolves to Make Them Live

Priestly's comment expresses a sentiment common in the West that applies not only to wolves, but many predators and other species ranchers consider a threat to their livelihoods. The gray wolf, though, stands apart as a particularly attractive object for such sentiments. Priestley's further comment that ranchers shouldn't be asked to try to tell a "'good wolf'" from a "bad wolf" (Priestley)[96] presumes not only a rejection of adapting practices and institutions to acknowledge and respond to their presence, but presumes the technological efficiency and efficacy of death as a solution. This attitude, I argue, is not only a dominant assumption in wildlife policy still active today, but constitutes the core of "scientific management" of wildlife and the industrial system of slaughter in which livestock, wolves, and other species are caught up, and which is meant to manage life productively to support commercial interests.

This chapter argues that policy cannot be dictated purely by science as many aspire and assume would resolve much of the conflict over wolf management. Rather, scientific management of wolves operates as a regime of truth in which science and commerce are coextensive and, as this chapter demonstrates, is always already political. Recognition of this co-extensiveness constitutes a "scandal" in the sense Derrida uses in his critique of Levi-Strauss'

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[96] Priestley's full quote is even more revealing about his attitude: "To believe a livestock owner should trust that the good wolves and coyotes will protect their herds from the bad wolves and coyotes is beyond foolish. Trying to tell a 'good' wolf from a bad one is like looking into a box of chocolate covered candy. You might pick the delicious caramel center, but then again, you might pick the slimy cherry." In putting "good wolf" in quotes, he not only frames the issue as one of good and bad wolves, but questions the possibility of the former as "foolish."

analysis of the incest prohibition as being both natural and cultural. As in that deconstruction, here too scientific management can be deconstructed to show that there is not merely a binary or dialectical relation within which science is set against commerce, but that commerce dominates the logic of scientific management. That is to say, the logic of such management is a “coherence in contradiction [that] expresses the force of a desire” (Derrida “Structure” 518) for an efficiency that is fetishized in biopolitical economic reason that in turn grounds the political, especially in its contemporary neoliberal biopolitical form. Scientific management thus appeals to a disinterested Enlightenment empiricism through a conflation of scientific rhetoric with the language and principles of commerce, prioritizing the efficient and properly ordered use of resources.

In terms of wildlife policy regarding wolves (and other predators too, it may be supposed), scientific management functions as a euphemism for the commodification of death. As wolves are regarded as a threat to commercial enterprises, particularly the livestock ranching industry, the question in policy, and in perceptions of wolves more generally, becomes at what point wolves should be killed. This perception is based on the presumption that lethal removal of wolves is the most efficient means of dealing with them, as death is supposed as final and effective in preserving the order of commercial enterprises such as ranching.[97] Scientific management of wolves, then, is about this threshold at which wolves should be killed, and this requires using “science” to focus on numbers of wolves and other statistics about wolf behavior that can be used to determine their effects on commerce. This allows wildlife agencies to manage them with lethal force to keep wolf populations at numbers acceptable to invested commercial interests, while also helping to inform political policy decisions. This is what scientific

[97] Though, even the internal logic of this assumption has been recently and controversially questioned by Chapron and Treves(2016) and Wielgus (2014), as will be shown later.

management, as a regime of truth regarding not just wolves, but populations of numerous species, including humans, is about, as Foucault notes in defining biopolitics as predicated on "the power to make live" (*Society* 247). Indeed, following Foucault's biopolitical framing, wolves as a population do not exist unless they are lethally managed, as managing makes wolves a population. As such, much as with livestock ranching, I argue, wildlife too is "ranched," or at least that is what is expected in their scientific management. But while for livestock or wild game the biopolitics of scientific management seeks to efficiently produce such species so as to deploy them on the land for the maximal profit (whether to ranchers or hunting outfitters), the conservation of wolf populations is arguably based on " 'conserving' the least number of wolves in the smallest possible area for the shortest period of time" (Lynn "Recovering Wolves"), or killing wolves to make them live--a claim consistent with the near unanimity of wildlife managers who argue that you have to kill wolves to conserve them.[98] Thus, wolf conservation amounts to a begrudging acceptance of allowing some wolves in some places by taking into account in scientific management such factors as "social tolerance,"[99] which is measured to determine "suitable habitat" for wolves. Social tolerance thus becomes the basis for determining the number of wolves deemed acceptable, as well as when wolves should be, or justifiably can be, killed. This, I argue, involves a constant code-switching between the language of science and

[98] For example, see Mech and Boitani ("Conclusion" 342); Russ Morgan's comments (Lies); or Mech (1995): "There is every reason to believe that wolf control will parallel wolf recovery wherever it takes place" ("The Challenge" 275).

[99] "Social tolerance" is frequently cited as a criterion for determining "suitable" wolf habitat in wildlife management policy. Social tolerance is here taken as a willingness of humans to tolerate the presence of wolves in places where wolves and humans potentially or actually coexist. Habitat with high social tolerance is considered "suitable habitat." While frustratingly rarely defined, such social tolerance is considered a key factor in wolf management plans in Wisconsin, for example (see Treves & Bruskotter 2014; Stepp 2013; *Humane Society of the U.S. et al. v. Dirk Kempthorne,U.S. Dept of Interior, et al. 2006*).

the language of commerce where the rhetoric of commerce dominates, and the language of science is used to rationalize this commercialized wolf policy as benign, neutral, and natural.

To demonstrate this conflation of science and commerce in wolf policy, and in the framing of wolf interactions more specifically, I utilize a recent controversial case study regarding wolf-livestock interactions in Washington State as a site from which to argue how this works contemporaneously and materially. This chapter then genealogizes the rhetoric of the scientific management of wolves in a curious but exemplary text on “wolfology” or the “science” of slaughtering wolves titled *Corbin’s Advice or The Wolf Hunter’s Guide* (1900). Finally, this chapter highlights challenges to the biopolitical framing of the scientific management of wolves that undermine the fetishization of efficiency that dominates wolf management and policy. These alternatives to the discourse, practices, and institutions that naturalize lethal removal as the default for multispecies encounters involving wolves, humans, and other species give occasion to embrace a highly inefficient, but more responsive, co-existence with wolves that is mutually adaptive and recognizes the agencies of humans and non-humans involved in these relations.

More specifically in this chapter, I begin with a case study from the state of Washington, where wolves have returned in the last fifteen years. As with many other places in the Western U.S. where wolves have returned, there has been concern over the assumed effects and affects generated by that return. While earlier chapters have shown how wolf presence is thought to usher in a revelation of the deadly danger of wolves to humans, shown them as criminals who threaten liberty and economic freedom, and demonstrated how they function as the equivalent to illegal immigrants that threaten the cohesion of family and community, this chapter shows how wolves are figured as always already potential threats that disrupt economic efficiency and threaten civil rights rendered in the rhetoric of commerce. I demonstrate this by accentuating

how, like terrorists, wolves must be treated with technological, lethal force to deter further terrorist activities like the killing or terrorizing of livestock made vulnerable to wolves. That is, I show how the "lethal removal" of wolves by technological means, such as radio collar tracking and helicopter gunning, parallels the lethal removal of suspected terrorists through satellite monitoring and drone attacks. In both scenarios, such killing from a distance is portrayed as not only technologically sophisticated, but scientific and benign because so.

In other words, killing becomes "humane," benign, and efficient because it is scientific, where science is conflated with or is subsumed under technology. This, I argue, is the essence of "scientific management," something that, paradoxically, all sides in the debate over wolves seem to be demanding more of. While many wolf advocates demand managers use the "best available science" to manage wolves, the same refrain is echoed by those who oppose wolf recovery or seek to limit wolf expansion. They too advocate using science, but to kill wolves, claiming the only reasonable position that can be agreed upon is that wolves need to be managed, and managed through scientific means.[100] The problem with such deferrals to science is that wolf and wildlife management is, and always has been, predicated upon a purportedly scientific perspective of efficiency that is in turn predicated upon efficient killing to make live. As seemingly every wolf coordinator and manager, and now many environmental groups participating in stakeholder projects (like Washington state's Wolf Advisory Group, or WAG), contend, "sometimes to preserve and animal, you have to kill an animal" (Lies).

Given this assumption, the debate is not whether wolves should be killed, but when and how—this is where science enters, in the technological efficiency of a killing that wildlife managers can sell as scientific, neutral, and objective. But what is lost in such a rendering of the

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[100] For example, Martin Nie relates, in his book *Beyond Wolves*, that wolf biologist and expert David Mech "believes wherever we have wolves, we must also have management" (43).

killing of wolves to make them live is the scandal that enables the logic of commerce to be conflated with the logic of science such that technological efficiency becomes a form of reasoning that dictates wolf management. Yet, as I argue, such efficiency is undermined by the particularity and situatedness of such killing. When killing wolves as numbers goes awry, as it did in this case study when a helicopter shooter wounded one wolf, the gambit of efficiency is revealed. The wounded wolf, I argue, is a disruption of efficiency, revealing the scientific management system for what it has always been, an attempt to harvest death in the name of commercial profit, whether it is the death of predators like wolves, coyotes, bears, and others, or the death of the livestock that is disavowed by the ranchers who claim to care for their animals like family (despite the fact that the average cow is raised for less than a year before sent to industrial feedlots to be fattened and marbled for slaughter). Thus, at no point is such scientific management about the particular lives of non-human animals, but only lives whose death humans manage as a population.

And thus, the purpose of this chapter is to show how the scientific management of species is grounded upon reactions to quantified population numbers premised upon killing wolves to make them live; that is, death lies at the heart of the scientific management of wildlife. Wildlife managers often claim that the public must accept the lethal management of wildlife, particularly predators, and especially wolves, if there are to be wolves on the landscape. Thus, the claim of "science" is used as a justification for what might be called, following Foucault, a thanatopolitics (Agamben 1998, Esposito 2008), or a politics premised upon death, and namely, the death of the excluded, yet included, other. But while those like Agamben claim such a thanatopolitics is something that has always been a part of biolpolitics, in more situated, genealogical terms, I

argue such a thanatopolitics, or discourse of life grounded in death, emerges with the biopolitics of life and the life sciences in the late nineteenth century. As Foucault notes,

> This formidable power of death…presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars" (*History of Sexuality* 137).

I argue, such a basis in "scientific management" forecloses other possibilities for relating to wolves, situating them outside of "the true"[101] possibilities. This dominance of slaughter as a means of managing wolf populations, or what I will call "killing (or more properly, slaughtering) to make live," has a genealogy that can be traced back to show exactly how death functions in the management of such populations, that is, how death functions as a premise of contemporary biopolitics in regard to wolves, namely how the interests of capitalist efficiency invested in technology construed as science makes the slaughter of wolves benign.

However, this is not merely the death at the whim of sovereign power that kills or lets live (as Agamben claims in *Homo Sacer*), focused on individual wolves, but is a death that is disavowed in a biopolitical focus on life, such that "One might say that the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death… Now it

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[101] For example, as one Ojibwa tribal biologist in Wisconsin notes, "anyone anti-wolf harvest was not allowed on the panel" that would advise the state Department of Natural Resources on wolf policy (David et al.).

is over life, throughout its unfolding, that power establishes its dominion; death is power's limit, the moment that escapes it; death becomes the most secret aspect of existence" (*History of Sexuality* 138). Foucault here differentiates between a sovereign power, that holds the right to kill or let live, and a disciplinary power that atomizes the individual to be controlled, and a biopower that massifies and "makes live" and "lets die" at the level of the population/species, thereby managing populations instead of controlling individuals. In light of Foucault's nominalism, it is possible to understand these power relations as framed in terms of biopolitical making live. While all these forms of power may be working simultaneously, they do not always work complementarily or even coherently, as some institutions may be at odds in the practical application of power. Nonetheless, an argument regarding controlling/killing/saving individual wolves may be put in terms of population management of wolves. As such, wolf population control aligns with biopolitical management, as the individuated wolves become data points as a part of statistical analysis.

Thus, while Agamben argues that thanatopolitics is tied to an ancient biopolitics predicated on the sovereign right of life and death, I argue along more Foucaultian lines in what follows that what is advised by Corbin, and is still operative today, is a system of biopolitics that hides death, that, as with ranching livestock, disavows death in "making live." It does so by making such slaughtering of wolves and other predators "scientific." When life is managed through technology conflated with science, such biopolitical management is made benign. That is, life is managed to make killing benign, eliding industrial, commercial slaughter and the production of docile wolf bodies as objects to be managed for efficient slaughter at the population level. Death becomes an externality of profiting off the slaughter of bodies, a cost that is passed on from the rancher to the public.

As such, while it may be claimed that the best results in wildlife relations, or at least the ideal, would be to get politics out of management and base wildlife policy decisions purely in sound science, Foucault's biopolitical analysis suggests such scientific management is always already political; that is, scientific management is always *management* that is treated as science. As biopolitics takes the population as its problematic, it is inherently political and scientific "as a biological problem and as power's problem" (*Society* 243). Thus, populations are considered a political problem to be managed through the very "sound science" that would purportedly save species relations from the invasion of the political into science (thereby prejudicing it upon some version of partisan politics or political agenda).

Genealogically, the basis of scientific management of wildlife in the political, namely the biopolitical, can be traced through the development of land and wildlife management in North America. Starting with the burgeoning conservation movement at the beginning of the twentieth century, this period birthed not only federal land management regimes at the closing of the frontier, but led to the development of national parks, forests, etc., and the various agencies that bureaucratically and practically attend to these different classifications of land, for instance, the Forest Service, National Park Service, etc. What becomes apparent in analyzing these histories is that these departments, while premised upon conservation, were ultimately dedicated to using public lands as reserves of resources for humans, or "standing reserve" (Heidegger 8), particularly the Pinchot version of conservation associated with the wise use of natural resources in utilitarian terms (Nie 54). Furthermore, practically, the Forest Service, Wildlife Services, and other agencies were formed under the umbrella of the Department of Agriculture. Thus, the "science" involved was from the beginning premised on the ambition toward greater efficiency of resources, i.e., satisfying commercial agricultural interests. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 is

evidence of this movement toward scientific management, as in creating grazing leases on federal lands (rather than the prior free-for-all of the past) it sought to end rampant abuse of public lands that led to not only unproductive land but certainly contributed to effects like the Dustbowl and Great Depression.

A singular but exemplary text of the time, *Corbin's Advice or the Science of Wolf Killing,* clarifies how the efficient biopolitical management of species through a thanatopolitics takes root to become a dominant and enduring regime of truth about wolf management, while also becoming a model of wildlife management and populations management more generally. In this regard, it becomes more obvious why scientific wolf management programs considered liberal and innovative, such as Washington State's, built upon a broad coalition of stakeholders and input, are nonetheless still grounded in death. Even here, individuals who are lethally removed are treated as numbers of a population the state intends to make live through benign slaughter in the very biopolitical way Foucault describes in his later work and lectures. And, I argue, extending Foucault (and differing with Agamben slightly), saying wolves must die in order to live is the ultimate biopolitical statement, as wolves are killed to make them live as a population; thus, death is the premise and practical, productive power utilized to make wolves live.

Ranches with Wolves

On August 5th, 2016, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) attempted to lethally remove the eleven-member Profanity Peak wolf pack from the Colville National Forest--a heavily wooded, rugged area in Ferry and Stevens counties that borders British Columbia to the north. By the end of the state-run culling, sharpshooters had killed seven of the pack from a helicopter, hunting down one wolf on foot, killing it three days later after a

misplaced shot from the helicopter sharp-shooter wounded the wolf. Unable to eliminate the entire pack, despite the costly effort ($150,000 of Washington state taxpayer's money), the shooter wound up accidentally killing a breeding female, leaving only a young female and three wolf juveniles alive in the end (Mapes, "Profanity Peak"). WDFW's assumption seemed to be that that was sufficient; the wolves, they presumed, had learned their lesson by seeing their packmates killed in front of them.[102] They hoped that killing their packmates had taught the remaining wolves to stay away from cattle on the 30,000 acre allotment upon which the U.S. Forest Service permitted the rancher, Len McIrvin, to graze his 500 head of cows and calves.

Weeks later, when the public learned that the state wildlife agency was in the process of wiping out the Profanity Peak Pack (the third such lethal management effort conducted by the state since wolves had recolonized much of Eastern Washington in the mid 2000s), the lead researcher at Washington State University's Carnivore Coexistence lab, Dr. Rob Wielgus, suggested to the *Seattle Times* that there was more to the incident than just wolves who'd taken to killing cattle (Mapes, "Profanity Peak"). Wielgus attributed much of the blame for the depredations and lethal remove of the pack to the actions of the rancher who grazed the allotment, emphasizing, "This livestock operator elected to put his livestock directly on top of their den site; we have pictures of cows swamping it. I just want people to know" (Mapes, "Profanity Peak"). Wielgus suggests that the rancher knew of the den location, as it was public information known to WDFW, Wielgus' research group, and the local community before the depredations occurred. Yet, McIrvin and his Diamond Ranch outfit put salt lick attractants within 200 yards of the den site, attracting his cows to the area. After Wielgus informed the state of the location of the salt blocks, "The livestock were still on the den site. We got video monitoring of

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[102] This rational of killing a few wolves and then waiting to see the effects is currently being tried as a compromise in both WA and OR.

wolves trying to chase them away from the den site, but the livestock kept returning because of the salt blocks. Then the livestock started being killed by the wolves" (Morrow). Both photographs and video recordings from camera traps show that days before any of the depredations of cows or calves occurred, wolves were filmed chasing cows away from the direction of the den, attempting to run them off.[103] Nonetheless, attracted to the salt lick, the cows remained, and eventually, the wolves attacked and killed these "slow elk," both attacking and killing them, treating them as both unwelcome invaders and an easy food source right outside their den.

While the killing of the Profanity Peak Pack fell within the protocol set by the state[104], as Wielgus' research suggests, the specific context was significantly underappreciated in this incident. Not only did the ranchers arguably lead the cattle into harm's way, but the ranch who held the grazing allotment permit, the Diamond M, and the ranchers who owned the cattle (the McIrvin family), were also involved in one of two other lethal wolf removal incidents four years earlier in 2012, when WDFW eliminated the Wedge pack through helicopter gunning from the same grazing allotment. The McIrvin's were thus involved in the removal of two of the state's fifteen to nineteen wolf packs at the time, constituting the majority of the wolves culled by the state under the protocol rules.

While two lethal removal actions by the state on the same allotment could be considered bad luck, or even evidence of heavy wolf densities in the area, the majority of wolf depredations in the state occurred on McIrvin's allotment. Indeed, ranchers in the immediate area did not

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[103] Video released by Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), the organization defending Wielgus in his lawsuit against the Washington State University, is available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9umv3j1yBP4&t=0s&list=PLYh37YWsbqAn2-8nxFATVef__nGr7q3pe&index=12.

[104] Four attacks could justify lethal removal (a sort of four strikes rule for offending wolves).

suffer losses similar to those reported by the Diamond M (especially those participating in Wielgus' deterrence program). As Wielgus notes, while area ranchers participating in his study reported losing "fewer than 1% of estimated livestock losses [to] wolf depredations", McIrvin lost thirty times that over the same period (Wielgus, "Wolf Livestock").

Len McIrvin's and his family's comments over the years give some insight into the situation. Not only have they publicly claimed wolves are "terrorists" (Weaver, "Ranchers Vent") coming over the border, but both he and his son have claimed long before the Profanity Peak Pack incident that "wolves have never been compatible with livestock" (Saul). Furthermore, the McIrvins have consistently called for the lethal removal of any wolves involved in depredating their cattle, despite "refus[ing] to participate in non-lethal control measure that other area ranchers agreed to, including a range riding program that other ranchers support" (*"Bill McIrvine"*) to prevent such incidents, including Wielgus' the state financed study and mitigation program. As Mitch Friedman, spokesperson for Conservation Northwest noted, this is not just resistance on McIrvin's part, but is reflected in "his attitude toward government measures" (*"Bill McIrvine"*). Not only has he claimed "groups with a 'radical environmental agenda' are conspiring against ranchers to re-introduce wolves to the state," additionally, "he [has] said that the wildlife department is a 'rogue government agency' that supports that agenda" (*"Bill McIrvine"*). Furthermore, in the interim between effectively lobbying to have both the Wedge Pack (2012) and the Profanity Peak Pack (2016) lethally removed, McIrvin, at a public meeting with the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife, "accused department director Phil Anderson of 'promoting government-sponsored terrorism'," proclaiming "This is absolutely a government taking and theft of our private property…My civil rights are definitely being violated" (Weaver, "Ranchers Vent"). Yet, despite claiming he is being subjected to

government-sponsored terrorism and civil rights violations through "theft" of his property by wolves, McIrvin and his sons have reiterated that they refuse to accept compensation for their losses. As his son Bill has noted, the family feels "compensation is a trap, that accepting it is like accepting the wolves" (Elgin). Thus, Len McIrvin's claim that his civil rights are being violated suggests he is not so much complaining about inadequate compensation for lost property,[105] but that wildlife managers are failing to efficiently order and manage wolves so as to protect the circulation of his capital.

Thus, these ranchers/stockmen seem to argue that, just as they manage their own livestock, the federal or state government fish and wildlife departments should manage wolves. Hunting outfitters and outdoorsman groups seem to concur that wolves, like other game and trophy species, should be managed, "just like any other species." And, if we are to consider the practice of biopolitical management of species as the management of population at the level of species, then it is indeed the duty of government, whether at the federal level under the Endangered Species Act, or at the state level through fish and wildlife regulations, to manage wolves as a population with the utmost efficiency if they are going to have them. This assumes they have an ownership stake, and thus, a duty. Wolf management is thereby commercialized, grounded in the rhetoric of commerce.

In essence, ranchers like McIrvin seem to argue that government, in whatever form, should "ranch" their wolves to make them as docile and manageable as the bodies of cattle[106]. That is, from their perspective, the government decided that they have a desire and interest to

[105] Which is the very remedy suggested in what is known as the "takings clause" in Article Five of the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights.

[106] Carter Niemeyer remarks about McIrvin, "It's 'Come get your wild dogs, you said you would, and you set the protocol, and I want these wolves out of here,' and he (McIrvin) has a good track record of demanding that" (Mapes, "Profanity Peak").

have wolves, and that if such is the case, then they have taken ownership of those wolves and must direct their behavior so as to maximize flows of capital. In other words, they can have wolves for the public to view, for example, but these wolves must not interfere with established commercial interests. Thus, ranchers and outdoorsmen consistently claim they are not against wolves *per se*, or are seeking to eliminate them. However, if government bureaucrats have an interest in having wolves, then they must manage them as efficiently and effectively as possible. This means that, necessarily, such management should be highly invasive and include culling wolves so that they do not interfere with the efficient management of other species, such as livestock and game animals. This makes slaughtering wolves the state's business, much as slaughtering cattle is the ranchers'. In other words, this perspective views all animals as essentially property of some human. All responsibility is cast in terms of human duties to other humans, and as such, it is the property owner or person with a property interest who has the duty to ensure that the management of that property does not interfere with other established regimes of property.

Thus, ranchers like McIrvin do not frame the issue as wild animals attacking their cattle, so much as wolf owners negligently failing to control their animals. As such, they seem to regard predators like wolves not as autonomous beings, but animals driven by instincts that restrict their ability to control their bodies; wolves are thought merely to react to stimuli. This makes it clear that not managing wolves is not a possibility. Perhaps, it may be argued, that this is because of the way that ranchers and many hunters regard their own animals and their domesticated dependence upon humans. They thus deny the independence of wolves (who are clearly regarded as slaves to their instincts) and their adaptiveness; when they do not act as expected, they are acting unnaturally, aberrantly, or are habituated.

What is not taken into consideration is that the specifics of the particular animals matters; namely, there are some aspects of the domestication of livestock in North America and animal husbandry that matter. Particularly, the "gentleness" (Spady, *Wolves in Government Clothing*) emphasized in claiming livestock are defenseless is not inaccurate. That is, livestock in North America, whether cattle or sheep, have been bred to be defenseless and helpless docile bodies. They have had some evolved instincts suppressed in favor of attributes that make them easier to manage and slaughter. That is, they have been bred to be efficient for ranchers, cowboys, and cattlemen to work with and do work upon. While such selective breeding and biopolitical management has made it easier keep and raise cattle for slaughter, it also makes them ill adapted to current contexts, as range specialists like Matt Barnes (Barnes 9) and Temple Grandin (Mortenson) have recently pointed out. Indeed, the only context livestock seem adapted for is one in which there are no predators or threats. It may seem common sense to some that you can't just leave a bunch or cows or sheep out in the forest or open range public lands lightly supervised and not expect predatory attacks, whether from wolves, bears, lions, bobcats, coyotes, eagles, or even feral dogs (the culprit for most livestock attacks). However, when the perspective is focused upon animals as property, what is expected is that one's property will not be threatened, regardless of what it is, how it behaves, and where the attack occurs, even if it is on public land, as with the McIrvins' cattle.

The practical problem for scientific management of wolves as is, though, is that more responsive practices, such as adapting livestock to predator behavior are deemed inefficient, which makes them less ethical in the dominant neoliberal biopolitical frame. The lack of efficiency is not just taken into account as a negative in calculating alternatives, but violates the game that economizes neoliberal subjectivity; efficiencies should be optimized as such, as

ordering and efficiency form the basis of this technological enframing, and it is this that drives the scientific management of species.

The point here is that in the name of efficiency, cattle and sheep are vulnerable not just because there are predatory animals out there, but because they have been made essentially helpless and vulnerable to make them easily slaughterable. Instincts that would enable livestock to protect themselves, or protect each other collectively (through herding to protect weaker members like the young and feeble), have been bred out to make them more docile, and thus efficient, animals. While this is something range specialists and theorists have attempted to change, they have been met with resistance, as Priestley's "hollow point bullet" comment reflects.

And it is clearly this efficiency that is idealized in the ranching community, as articles like that in the Capital Press[107] laud the McIrvin's Diamond M Ranch for this very thing, its focus on efficiency. However, this "uncompromising" (Weaver, "A Family") efficiency arguably has contributed to, if not been the indirect cause of, the high numbers of depredations and predator conflicts the Diamond M has suffered on their allotment. In other words, being efficient could be said to be merely passing on the costs to others, including the state that must then manage wolves, but also the wolves themselves who are killed as a result of the McIrvin's practices. In other words, the claim to efficiency breaks down, and reaches its limit to make it inefficient. In this way, because certain ranchers have not adapted to a changed situation through both their behavior and breeding, they pass the buck, treating their inaction as side effects they are not responsible for, much as any polluter or entrepreneur that fails to accept the costs upon

[107] One of the leading ranching newspapers/online journals.

others they create in pursuing their own interests. Thus, it is not a matter of a difference of values in what to own and how to live, but a difference in the perception of obligations to others.

Thus, the efficiency for them to be profitable is only efficient because they are externalizing their costs, passing them onto the government and public, as well as the lives of the wolves and the cattle they make vulnerable. As Carter Niemeyer explains in a similar situation regarding a rancher who claimed range-lambing was his "business model" and the "only way for ranchers to make a profit" claiming shed-lambing was too expensive (Ketcham):

> Peavey's range-lambing operation is also expensive, but the cost gets shifted onto the federal government. "The history of John Peavey over the years has been that when he's out range-lambing, it's led to a lot of calls to Wildlife Services for the removal of wolves and coyotes," he said. "His range-lambing is a long way from home, out there in sagebrush. When the sheep are lambing, the herders aren't supposed to crowd them. You leave them alone. So you've got sheep strung out for miles, ripe for the picking. All you're doing is inviting attack. In some cases, when you put livestock way out there in the backcountry where it's beyond the capability of the owner to protect them, it's a form of animal cruelty. Do we continue to reward this bad behavior by bringing in gunships to kill predators that are simply reacting to lambs on the range as predators should and must react? (Ketcham)

Much as with Peavey, McIrvin's practice of calving on the range, rather than in stockyards, as is the dominant practice in the industry (Weaver, "A Family"), is arguably equally as costly, though those costs, again, are not calculated into the maximal efficiency they tout and are admired for.

Of further significance to the Diamond M Ranch/Profanity Peak Pack controversy is the reactive nature of both the state of Washington and the McIrvin's in the implementation of non-lethal means deployed in the incident. These efforts can be characterized as "reactions" in at least two ways relevant to creating the situation of livestock depredations: First, the Diamond M's efforts to meet the minimal standards of the protocols for non-lethal deterrence in the WAG recommendations were minimally adopted only after livestock calves and cows had been turned out and depredations occurred. This is despite the fact that both the state wildlife agency and local ranchers were aware through radio telemetry that the Profanity Peak Pack wolves were denning where McIrvin had been placing his salt lick to attract his cows to higher ground. While the wolves' den site was indeed new that year, as they were forced out of a formerly used den due to the previous summer's wildfires, it was public knowledge. While some recommended deterrence methods were employed by the Diamond M, such as putting calves out at higher weights (which has been questioned by some) and deploying range riders, the second was only begun after the depredations had occurred. Indeed, the salt lick was not moved until Aug. 8th, almost two weeks after the depredations had begun. In this way, the efforts could be said to be reactive, rather than pro-active, meaning these efforts were not likely made in response to the changed situation, but to satisfy the conditions of the WAG recommendations for lethal removal. Efficiency becomes following the rules minimally, despite the ineffectiveness in doing so in minimizing depredations.

A second way in which these efforts are reactive, rather than responsive, is that the efforts to satisfy the protocol to justify lethal removal of the wolves, and the killing of the wolves by the state, both treat individual wolves as data points of the wolf population. These practices constitute not just a disavowal of the ability of non-human individuals to respond in a more than

Cartesian, mechanistic way, but also illuminates the reactive propensities of human beings, that is, that humans do often react rather than respond. In Derrida's analysis of the difference between reaction and response, Derrida argues Lacan assumes non-humans "do not respond but react; they merely obey a fixed program, whereas the human subject responds to the other, to the question from or of the other" ("And Say the Animal Responded?" 123), to which Derrida replies, "This discourse is quite literally Cartesian" (123). It is thus often denied that there is any point in replying to wolves responsively, as they are essentially Cartesian machines. Furthermore, the difficulty and uncertainty of response, as well as the inefficiency, is rejected in favor of a more Kantian following of protocol that is essentially reactive at its core in deploying a formula rather than engaging in the messiness and particularity of response, a critique those from Nietzsche to Derrida to Haraway and Wolfe have made regarding Kantian/deontological ethics.

In this way, not only is the non-human denied the ability to engage in response, but the human need not do so to claim they are acting ethical, they just have to follow a protocol. Thus, to be ethical in this biopolitical framing is to merely satisfy the protocol and implement at least two non-lethal preventative measures, whether those measures are those best suited to the particular circumstances or not. Having done so, the wolves can be justifiably killed if they then total four depredations (whether kills or injuries to livestock or pets). Furthermore, while the wolves in the Profanity Peak pack are treated as individuals in marking their offenses, they are done so solely to place them within the protocols for population management.

Wolves that violate the protocols become "problem" wolves, anomalies for which the protocols provide a solution. As Foucault points out in his analysis, such anomalies must be brought under "scientific norms." It is part of the total ordering, which is not about negation, or

exclusion, but inclusion. And so such wolves labeled as "problem wolves," and not just part of a problem, are included as something that biopolitics must take into account and order. So there is not just socialization into norms for behavior for wolves (to make them docile bodies), but more significantly, a normalization of the population where a percentage of "problem wolves" is anticipated and accounted for in species management, and may be killed or let die. Thus, the focus on wolves as individuals is made only in so far as to categorize them as problems within the population, treating them as a group for counting depredations and collective punishment.

Indeed, treating wolves that kill cattle as anomalies (or at least the livestock depredations as anomalous) in a sense *is* what Wielgus and others claim in noting that livestock depredations are "rare and acute," rather than widespread and frequent. However, this is a claim about incidents, not a percentage of the population that is anomalous like an object. And the focus on the interspecies context, rather than incidental wolf acts and attacks, helps to bring to light the rhetorical focus on the wolves as part of an anomalous situation, rather than anomalies in themselves. Wielgus, it can be said, under the biopolitical frame of scientific management, thus mistakenly treats incidents rather than the wolves themselves as anomalies.

Nonetheless, biopolitical management does not let such anomalies exist unaccounted for and uncategorized, as it is always a matter of disciplining individuals in terms of preserving the population, allowing them to be justifiably killed through their inclusion in the population. The wolves, and not the incidents of livestock deaths, become categorized as "problem" wolves, a category that does indeed put them in a state of exception or includes them to exclude them through death; they are wolves that can be slaughtered.[108]

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[108] This is despite the fact that wolves are large carnivores and cows and sheep are ungulates, which are often preyed upon by large carnivores and omnivores (like bears, but most significantly, by humans.)

Furthermore, the Wielgus/McIrvin/Profanity Peak pack controversy illuminates that evidence of regulatory capture[109] is clearly present in the exchanges between livestock interests, Washington state legislators, lobbyists for the Washington State University, and WSU administrators (from Dean of the School of Agriculture to the president of the university). In email chains recently uncovered by Seattle Times reporter Linda Mapes,[110] it is clear that from at least the time just prior to the publication of Wielgus' 2014 paper,[111] to his final press release to the Wolf Advisory Group, there was political and administrative pressure to silence his work and discredit his findings (Mapes, "A War"), particularly his advocacy for changing rancher behavior rather than focusing on wolves themselves.

During this time period (late 2013 to August 2017), Wielgus' research was regarded as a threat to entrenched interests—namely, those of livestock growers, state politicians, and university administrators. On at least three separate occasions (in 2014, 2016, and 2017), university administrators attempted not only to suppress Wielgus' research findings by prohibiting him from sharing his results publicly with the media, but disavowed his public statements, pulled grant funding for ongoing research, and challenged the veracity of his claims, especially his conclusions that were contrary to the purported interests of livestock growers/ranchers in Washington. WSU administrators even launched a misconduct investigation into his actions (which later cleared him of any wrongdoing) and even reviewed his work in an attempt to discredit it, despite a lack of any challenge to the findings from specialists in the field.

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[109] Regulatory capture is here defined as the domination of the regulatory institutions and mechanism that regulate an industry by the industry.
[110] Mapes has been covering wolf re-occupation in Washington since 2002.
[111] Which shows how killing wolves actually increases depredations, counter to the assumptions of policy, by destabilizing pack dynamics.

In email chains from 2014, Washington State University lobbyists contend that, due to ranching interests pushed by conservative state lawmakers, there was a threat from state legislators to pull funding for the planned medical school if Wielgus' funding continued. In an email from WSU lobbyist Dan Coyne to fellow WSU lobbyist Jim Jererning,[112] Coyne warns that "If wolves go poorly, there won't be a new medical school" (Mapes, "A War"). In the end, Jererning concurs and passes on the message to the WSU Director of State Relations, claiming, "We are making the medical school not doable." As a result, news stories on both the 2014 Wielgus paper, as well as a research paper on Wielgus' cougar research, were "spiked" by the university. Furthermore, in 2016 and 2017, in light of his comments and research claims regarding the Profanity Peak pack incident, the WSU Agriculture School attempted to censure Wielgus, leading to a lawsuit over academic freedom Wielgus recently settled.[113]

As University of Wyoming environmental law scholar Debra L. Donahue contends in her article, "Western grazing: the capture of grass, ground, and environment," this regulatory capture by agricultural interests is nothing new, nor is the attempted silencing of criticism of wildlife management policy. As Donahue notes, ranchers "enjoy substantial support from public officials (who are themselves important figures). They have long had powerful supporters in Congress, especially in the Senate and on the relevant committees, as well as in western governors' mansions and state legislatures" (Donahue 10). Indeed, as Donahue points out, Phillip Foss, in his study of the "capture" of public lands management by the livestock industry,

> Described the stockmen's political power as a "monopolitical" system, and grazing decision makers (advisory boards and permittees, agency managers, and western

[112] A former state legislative representative and former director of the Washington state Department of Agriculture.

[113] WSU agreed to pay Wielgus $300,000 to settle the lawsuit, though he was forced to end his tenure at WSU and give up his directorship at the Predator Lab as a result.

> legislators) as "a special private government," which in many ways "functions as a private, commercial organization." "There are few groups of comparable size, if any," Foss asserted, "which are as politically powerful as are the western stockmen." (11)

Indeed, as Martin Nie notes, Donahue herself was subjected to such political power, as well. As Nie points out, “Challenges such as this do not go unnoticed in the West, and especially places like Wyoming. Following the publication of Donahue’s meticulously cited scientific and legal challenge, the University of Wyoming and its College of Law were seriously challenged by the state’s ranching industry and political representatives” (Nie 49). Nie goes on to note that “Republican Jim Twiford, president of the Wyoming State Senate drafted a bill…to close the University of Wyoming College of Law” (50), and, similar to the threats leveled in Wielgus’ situation, “Influential ranchers are cutting off contributions to the university and are asking the school to do a better job of weeding out ‘troublemakers’ ” (50).

Thus, while a recent paper by Kyle Artelle, et al. (2018) critiques state and provincial departments of natural resources and wildlife management for failing to use science in policy development and decisions—by showing how these departments fall short of eleven criteria set out as scientific gold standards—the authors note that these institutions claim that they do take science into consideration in their management policies (Artelle et al.). These departments can make such a claim, I argue, because what they are doing is scientific *management*, where science is used as an adjective to describe management as management made scientific through the conflation of biopolitical technologies that make killing and making live efficient with science.

The claim of regulatory capture is acknowledged by Artelle et al. in their paper as an influence on why scientific management so often fails their standards of the “best available science.” However, capture by entities and individuals in asymmetrical power relations not only

has effects on access and power in participation in policy recommendations, but has discursive effects, given the genealogy of the scientific management of wildlife. This genealogy privileges the efficiency of management through lethal control as always already the primary value in any scientific management over and above any science or scientifically grounded data or studies. Such management is grounded in efficient slaughter. This hegemonic perspective fetishizes efficiency as what it is maximally desired, despite scientific reviews like Wielgus' (2014) that reveal its inefficiencies in wasting life and resources.

Thus, of particular concern to these entrenched ranching interests are Wielgus' findings that killing wolves to decrease livestock depredations has the counter-intuitive effect of actually increasing them over the long-term, and that wolf depredations were not of the epidemic proportions that the livestock industry and other aligned interests claimed. Both of these claims can be taken implicitly as accusations that discredit the practices of ranchers like McIrvin. In other words, Wielgus' fate has been largely determined by an anomalous rancher who has become an exemplar of an assumed general pattern that exists at this magnitude largely on his own public grazing allotment. Indeed, it may be regarded that Wielgus' findings and advocacy of inefficient practices were ultimately the problem, especially when the controversy could be better resolved, or more efficiently, "with a hollow point bullet," as Priestly, the Idaho stockgrowers president, suggests. As Len McIrvin's grandson claims, "We've got 73 years of learning how to be the most efficient we can be on our ranch. What we have right now is probably the most efficient we could have as of today" (Weaver, "A Family"). Yet, such a claim of efficiency in their ranching is made possible only because the costs of their practices and business model are externalized and placed on the public who fund through taxes the slaughter of predators. To reduce the risk of predators means decreasing the efficiency of their ranching, the

efficiency of docility, dependence, and vulnerability they have created and cultivated. It is easier to rely on and normalize the system of slaughter than to adapt to changing circumstances, or recognize the nonhuman agency of wolves or cows.

I argue there is a genealogy for this perspective of managing and owning animals, even wildlife, that has deep roots in the West, but also in Western thought more generally in such economic theory as Taylorism, but more specifically in the forms of management associated with such scientific management. This is apparent in the way scientific management is framed in early turn of the twentieth century texts such as *Corbin's Advice or the Science of Wolf Killing* (1900). Here, Corbin's "advice" is not just to prospective wolf "ranchers," but to the government itself. Corbin makes this clear in detailing his heroic lobbying efforts to sediment his "research" as a "science." His numbers and quantifications are norms and truth upon which efficient management can be based and entrepreneurship promoted, whether in the ranching of livestock or wolves and other predators.

Wolfology: The Birth of Wolf Killing as a Science

> "Father used to hear the wolves howl and it made him smile when he was camping out; for he knew there were dollars for him in every howl"
>
> -Ben Corbin, *Corbin's Advice* (13)

There is a familiar narrative about the purported progress of human and wolf relationships which seems to dominate public perceptions that goes something like the following: Wolf killing in North America (especially out West) prior to the late nineteenth century was largely incidental, done by trappers, ranchers and cowboys as good sport or easy money for the pelt (Lopez 177-8). As wolves became almost entirely exterminated, they were honored as wily outlaws requiring heroically intrepid bounty-hunting wolfers to eliminate them (Lopez 191), as

featured in such tales as Ernest Thomas Seton's "King of the Currumpaw" (1898). As the last of wolves were extirpated from the lower 48 states, some, even those who had exterminated them for federal agencies thinking "no wolves would mean a hunters' paradise," like Aldo Leopold, began to regret the loss, after watching the "green fire die" in the eyes of the wolf he shot (Leopold 130). With Farley Mowat's criticism of wildlife agency practices in his bestselling *Never Cry Wolf* (1963), and the burgeoning environmental movement of the 1960s and 70s, legislative protection for threatened and endangered species, as well as tolerance and acceptance of wolves has grown, such that there are once again wolves re-inhabiting the landscape from Yellowstone National Park, to the Gila Wilderness of New Mexico, to Northern California. It is a comforting narrative that seems to be evidence of progress toward more ethical relationships with wolves and the embracing of a multispecies coexistence, but it is only part of the story.

Federal agencies like Wildlife Services (a division of the U.S. Dept. of Agriculture) would also seem to be evidence of such a transition toward increased tolerance of wolves and other predatory species, given its "mission is to provide Federal leadership and expertise to resolve wildlife conflicts to allow people and wildlife to coexist" ("Wildlife Services Program Overview"). Considering this mission statement, it may seem that multispecies coexistence is indeed its aim. Yet, in 2014 alone, Wildlife Services was responsible for killing 322 wolves, 61,702 coyotes, 2930 foxes, 580 black bears, 796 bobcats, five golden eagles, three bald eagles, and an unverified number of "non-target" pets and other animals (Ketcham). Clearly, by Wildlife Services' definition, co-existence with wildlife entails a significant, if not constant, slaughtering of predatory species.

Some insight into why such management practices remain entrenched in wildlife management is available by genealogizing scientific management through an exploration of a

fairly obscure, but rhetorically exemplary work: Ben Corbin's *Corbin's Advice or The Wolf Hunter's Guide: Tells how to catch 'em and all about the Science of Wolf Hunting.* As a monograph, it is an odd book: part memoir, part technical manual, and part advocacy screed. It contains a mish-mash of pamphlets and circulars on starting a "wolfing" business; newspaper articles and features on Corbin and his business; folktales and humorous anecdotes; records of Corbin's lobbying speeches before legislatures in the West; statistical extrapolations on wolf counts; and, oddly, Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address." In *Of Wolves and Men*, Barry Lopez remarks: "It is typical of hundreds of other such memoirs in that it has very little to say about how to actually kill wolves but a great deal to say about the Bible, free trade, the privilege of living in a democracy, and the foulness of the wolves ways"(184). However, Lopez further warns "Corbin's naiveté would be amusing if such reasoning had not been taken seriously by so many people, including state legislators"(185). Given Corbin's extensive lobbying efforts depicted in the text, and the legislation that arose in the following decades (particularly the Animal Damage Control Act of 1931), the latter does appear to be an accurate claim. However, I would argue the former claim, that Corbin's text has "little to say about actually killing wolves" is inexact. Not only does Corbin tell his reader how to kill wolves, but how to do so on a technological, industrial scale. Indeed, it is this aspect of Corbin's advice that has arguably been taken up by federal, state, and provincial governments in North America to disavow the slaughter of individual wolves in the scientific management of wolves as populations.

What should become evident in the following analysis is that Corbin's text is representative of a discursive transition wherein the figuration of wolves mutates around the turn of the twentieth century, along with the practices and institutions that take wolves into consideration. This transition, I argue, is one from the taming of the frontier to its domestication

and economization. Before the turn of the century, wolves were considered individual outlaws appropriately dealt with through the sovereign violence of putting to death purportedly offending individuals or notorious packs/gangs of wolves, like those of rustlers and outlaws featured on "wanted" posters.[114] But under the more domesticated, agricultural model of biopolitical violence directed toward wolves, wolves are figured not so much as individuals (unless instrumentally as data points), but as a population to be normalized as a product of commercial enterprise. This entrepreneurially based, systemic biopolitical species management no longer just kills outlaws, but slaughters wolves through a code-switching between disciplining individual wolves and naturalizing the lethal management of wolves as a population to make them live (as docile beasts), but most importantly die, as a product of an inevitable evolutionary progress of civilization. Most significantly, this rhetoric of a systematic "scientific management" of wolves, or the agricultural model of wildlife management (Beck 23) that, I argue, "ranches" wolves and other wildlife, still dominates wildlife policy in North America, and elsewhere, today. That is, the rationality, rhetoric, practices and institutions for which Corbin advocates are still dominant today as scientific wolf management. Indeed, his work is representative of a transition in the role of government, from a state concern with disciplinary control promoting individual well-being, to a universalized systemic management of life at the level of populations, essentially privileging the rhetoric and power-knowledge of political economy (rather than individual well-being) as the justification of the state's existence. As Foucault notes,

> A quite particular relationship of power and knowledge, of government and science appears…an art of government that would be both knowledge and power, science and decision, begins to be clarified and separated out, and anyway two poles appear of a

[114] As mentioned, in Ernest Thompson Seaton's "The King of Currumpaw," Seaton heroically dispatches one of the last notorious outlaw wolves in the Southwest.

> scientificity that, on the one hand, increasingly appeals to its theoretical purity and becomes economics, and, on the other, at the same time claims the right to be taken into consideration by a government that must model its decisions on it (*Security* 351).

As such, in this governmentality of civil society, science becomes yoked to the social, not only coloring, but naturalizing the technological efficiency of economics as something objective that defines civilization. There thus emerges a "new problematic of freedom: not just rights of individuals against sovereign power, but freedom of economic activity, circulation of goods, the action of markets, etc." (353). As such, these individual rights become conflated with industrial economic activity, making both essential to any definition of civilization. Wolves and other predators, in this light, are thus regarded as an existential threat to a civil society defined by naturalized flows of capital that must be managed technologically, and thus efficiently, in good governance. Corbin, early on in his text, seems to recognize this, when he claims, "Largely, my life has been spent in protecting these flocks against the incursions of ravenous beasts of prey. I know it is but a step and the first step, which counts in the march of civilization" (Corbin 6).

What should be apparent, and is of the utmost significance in this analysis of Corbin's text, at least for my purposes in this chapter, is that, much as today, the rhetoric of "science" is utilized to resolve both a tension between science and technology, as well as that between the individual and the collective. Namely, "scientific" rhetoric is used to conflate scientific objectivity with the technological system of slaughter, and that as such, the slaughter of individual wolves is conflated with the management of populations, which treats individual wolves instrumentally as data points in population management. This has the effect, I argue of making the slaughter of individual wolves through technological means predicated on efficient killing benign. Such a system hides these individual deaths within the technological management

of populations, making this slaughter seem natural and necessary. As Foucault notes, this is the result of a re-focusing of "the government's economic-political action" where

> The multiplicity of individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is…But within the system of knowledge-power, within the economic technology and management, there is this break between the pertinent level of the population and the level that is not pertinent, or that is simply instrumental. The final objective is the population. The population is pertinent as the objective, and individuals, the series of individuals, are no longer pertinent as the objective, but simply as the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the population. (*Security* 42)

Consistent with Foucault, Corbin reflects these burgeoning techniques of governance focused on populations in his admonishment that what is needed is a government supported, systematic control of wolf populations. Corbin states early on the text that

> On grounds of public policy, hunters like Ben Corbin should be stimulated and encouraged to perform the public function of assisting in destroying an enemy as persistent and annoying and expensive as the wolf. Were the state invaded by an armed foe, who would question the policy of offering a bounty to volunteers, as the government did during the civil war, to drive out the common foe? One not less dangerous, not less common, than such a hostile force, threatens to destroy one of the peaceful and most prolific and honorable industries of the state. Is it not the duty of the state—that is, of its citizens collectively—the legislature—to assist in the expulsion of the enemy? "What is everybody's business is nobody's business." It must be done by a system. It must be done for the common good. The state must take the matter into its own hands for the common weal. (11)

Thus, what should be apparent is that Corbin is not merely advocating for a rise in the price of wolf bounties, but the development of a system of wolf slaughtering on an industrial scale, even an industrial scale of warfare. Yet, Corbin uses the rhetoric of economics to frame the situation, stating, “[It] being true and the fact that the western part of the state is over-run with wolves that do thousands of dollars worth of damage every year, it behooves the stockmen of North Dakota to make it an object for those who can slay wolves to devote their time to this important industry” (20). Thus, Corbin configures wolf slaying as an industry in parallel with the livestock industry, and might be suspected, with the industrial scale of slaughter it entails, making wolves, like sheep and cattle, valuable in their deaths.

Furthermore, Corbin argues that this wolf slaughtering industry should be based upon a “scientific,” or technologically efficient, means of slaughter. And this is where Corbin, despite Lopez’s claim, does indeed tell the reader (especially anyone who might be interested in going into the wolf slaughtering industry) how to kill wolves for profit. His rhetoric, (appropriately, if ill-fittingly) as his title suggests, is that of “science.” As he declares, “Wolf-killing is a science, and only educated men—edu-cated, I mean, in Wolfology—can successfully combat and destroy these varmints. This science is not taught in any of the schools of the state, but it is a science nevertheless…Only experts can make any headway toward the destruction of these pests” (16). Corbin thus conflates science with technological expertise, thereby giving a gloss of credibility and objectivity to his enterprise of wolf slaughtering. Indeed, he takes on the roll of pseudo-professor, delivering his “lecture on wolfology…all across the west” (19). And he is willing to share his expertise for a fee, promoting this industrial slaughter as an entrepreneurial practice that “can be made more profitable than stock raising” (44). He relies heavily on the rhetoric of science to build up his credibility as an entrepreneur, noting in a circular, "I furnish all the stalk

and teach all you want to know; but you will have to stay with me two weeks to learn all the science, and for the two weeks' board I charge you $15, and at the end of your time you git your diplomy as a 'wolfologist' " (45).

However, Corbin does not just use the rhetoric of science to bolster his credibility, but as a launching point to legitimize the technological slaughtering of wolves on an industrial agricultural scale at his "wolf farm" (22). Seemingly inspired by his father's claim that there "were dollars in every wolf howl," Corbin explains how his wolf farm works:

> I took a long-handled shovel when I moved here, and dug out forty-two wolf dens, put the dirt at a distance so the wolves would suspect nothing, and these dens have been little gold mines to me—for the wolves went there and I too, in due time when the pups began to bark...I know where to find them and hook the cubs out in the breeding season you see. I catch them with pole and hook and do not disturb the den, but leave it for the next year's crop. (23)

What becomes clear is that, while he is admonishing legislatures about the damage and destruction wolves are causing to the livestock industry, necessitating an industrial scale wolf slaughter. He is literally "ranching" or "farming" wolves for the slaughter, collecting bounties for wolves he is cultivating, cleaning the pups out of the dens, leaving the adult females to produce further litters, claiming to have "twenty old females on my farm of twenty-five miles square" (39). He is making wolves productive through their deaths. As he notes, he does not use poison, as his "wolf code of honor bars poison. It is unsafe, unfair, uncivilized. I draw the line at honest fresh bait, fish pole and hooks for the purpose, and my trusty dog and gun" (20). Of course, poison would also likely eliminate the breeding females he's relying upon for his next wolf "crop." And in the contemporaneous industrial, entrepreneurial spirit, he is also

engineering technologies to most efficiently make wolves live in order to slaughter them for profit. Corbin's preferred fishhook and steel line method, which he attempted to patent, is depicted below.



Fig. 4 "Pulling out of den when one month old" from: Corbin, Ben. *Corbin's Advice or The Wolf Hunter's Guide: Tells How to Catch 'Em and All About the Science of Wolf Hunting*. Bismark, N.D.: The Tribune Co., 1900, p. 14.

Despite his claims to a "wolf code of honor," though, the efficiency of this technological means of slaughtering for profit is as obvious as it is brutal. Not only is it effective for removing wolf pups, but as a technology conflated with the rhetoric of science, it is anonymous because of its systematicity. That is, as depicted above, the hands holding the steel tether and the pistol are disembodied, as if it is not Corbin, so much as the industry and technology that slaughters the wolves, making the killing seem almost an act of God, or at least, an act of the gods of industry.

Thus, in his raising and harvesting of a "wolf crop," Corbin reflects an emerging biopolitical governmentality concerned not so much with disciplining individuals (e.g., criminal wolf individuals), but with managing populations at the level of life and death (biopower)

through practices that kill and make live, or kill to make live—a rationality applied at the level of species.

Corbin's Advice not only predates but also anticipates more formalized institutions and forms of "scientific management." Such institutions continue to exist in various forms in the U.S. and Canada today, such as the Biological Survey (now Wildlife Services), the Forest Service, and National Parks Service. These institutions would later be tasked with the very systematic and "scientific"/technological killing of predators perceived as potential threats to commercial interests. But perhaps the most significant work that reflects Corbin's advice is Frederick Taylor's *Principles of Scientific Management* (1913) wherein he states,

> This paper has been written:
>
> First. To point out, through a series of simple illustrations, the great loss which the whole country is suffering through inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts.
>
> Second. To try to convince the reader that the remedy for this inefficiency lies in systematic management, rather than in searching for some unusual or extraordinary man.
>
> Third. To prove that the best management is a true science, resting upon clearly defined laws, rules, and principles, as a foundation. And further to show that the fundamental principles of scientific management are applicable to all kinds of human activities, from our simplest individual acts to the work of our great corporations…Whenever these principles are correctly applied, results must follow which are truly astounding. (7)

Thus, while human-wolf relationships have perhaps improved during the past half-century in North America, the rhetoric that led to a "scientific" wolf management in the past still drives it today, making killing seem benign because systematic, scientific, and natural, despite, contradictorily, being a constructed system. Indeed, not long after the publication of Corbin's technical manual for wolf slaughter (1900), the U.S. federal government's Agricultural Department (USDA), under the newly founded Bureau of Biological Survey and Forest Service (USFS), released their own pamphlets to address complaints from livestock owners about wolves, coyotes, and other predators on the federal public lands they grazed their livestock. Former Wildlife Services Associate Deputy Donald Hawthorne relates that "Between 1905 and 1907, the Forest Service and the Biological Survey both investigated predator/livestock problems, and each had publications that described approved and familiar methods of shooting, trapping, poisoning, the development of den hunting, and wire-fencing to manage predation" (Hawthorne 13). The Biological Survey (founded in1886), which originally had as its mission "to educate farmers about birds and mammals affecting their interests, so that destruction of useful species might be prevented" (Hawthorne 13), morphed into a pest control unit to serve private livestock interests. This became especially apparent when "for the first time, in 1915, Congress allocated funds for experiments and demonstrations on the control of predatory animals, establishing the Eradication Methods Laboratory" (Bacon 365), which became the first formal governmental unit to attempt to study techniques for the lethal management and eradication of predators. It would eventually come to be known as the Denver Wildlife Research Center (which it remains today). As legal scholar Tiffany Bacon notes, the same year, a division of the Biological Survey was also founded whose mission was to "destroy injurious animals, primarily those injuring property" (366). It is this division of the USDA that, with the Animal

Damage Control Act of 1931, would become Animal Damage Control, later re-named more benignly Wildlife Services in 1997.

This is not to necessarily to say that *Corbin's Advice* was the cause of this re-orientation in objectives, but that the discourse conflating science with the technologies of lethal control that serve commercial interests, making technology "science," is evident in this text, and has remained the basis for scientific management. Not only is this discourse of lethal, technological control grounded in a Spencerian social Darwinist "survival of the fittest" reasoning and Taylorist industrial system of maximally efficient wolf-slaughtering, but this discourse conflating science and technology is still operative in wolf management today. Scientific management, in marshaling the rhetoric of science, thus becomes a benign (because scientific) slaughter of populations, ranching wolves in an industrial fashion where they are valued only in their deaths, hiding the individual deaths in the data.

The Intolerance of "Social Tolerance"

While Wildlife Services and other contemporary state and provincial level wildlife agencies in North America cannot be accused of digging out wolf dens to "harvest" a wolf "crop" as Corbin did in his burgeoning form of scientific management, the agricultural model of scientific wildlife management that ranches and slaughters wolves as a population through technological means to support commercial interests is nonetheless driven by the discursive framing Corbin deploys. As Thomas Beck notes in a 1998 article, "wildlife management…has changed little in the past 60 years while American Society has changed greatly" (21). This would place this philosophical anchoring roughly around the time the ADC Act was passed (1931). Though, as Martin Nie points out in *Beyond Wolves*, "the wildlife professional subculture is

largely based on the Progressive Era ideals of utilitarianism, scientific-technical expertise, bureaucratic management, and Pinchotian wise use" that frames wildlife as "a commodity"(54), which dates such scientific management earlier, around the turn of the twentieth century, when *Corbin's Advice* was published. As retired Wildlife Services trapper Carter Niemeyer, explains: the purpose of these agencies hasn't changed over time, as "the focus of a government trapper is protecting livestock industry by killing predators… Ranchers call us up, and the system kicks in, guns blazing" (Ketcham). Much as Wielgus has noted with wolves (2014) and mountain lions (2012), Niemeyer notes, using the example of coyotes,

> We keep family units broken up, leading to a lot of dispersal, a lot of subadult coyotes moving into other country after their families are broken, and younger coyotes breeding sooner than they would if they weren't thrown into being alone," Niemeyer said. "It's all very self-serving for the Wildlife Services program. You create steady work by steady persecution. (Ketcham)

Thus, despite the continuous slaughter of "nearly a million coyotes during the past decade…the number of coyotes in the seventeen Western states today has remained the same" (Ketcham). Yet, despite being ineffective, the slaughter continues apace, essentially giving agencies like Wildlife Services a purpose in line with their philosophical basis that killing wolves and other predators is part of the agricultural model of scientific management. And while such trappers are not independent entrepreneurs like Corbin and those he aimed to teach, a Humane Society white paper reveals Wildlife Services "state directors are allowed, and indeed incentivized by [cooperative service agreements money from state wildlife agencies] to be entrepreneurial in marketing themselves to existing and potential customers" ("Wildlife").

Thus, the agricultural model of wildlife management is, essentially, a regime of truth that,

in a biopolitical mode, focuses solely on managing populations through slaughter predicated on commercial interests. As such, Thomas Beck points out,

> Allegiance to the agricultural model has led to another false paean of the profession: the population is all that counts. Ignore the welfare of the individual animal; we are concerned with the population and its output of "product." This attitude may work for soybeans, but in a nation that, at least verbally, strongly supports animal welfare issues (Mighetto, 1991), it not only does not work, it is misguided. The profession is trying to control the boundaries of the discussion—"play by my rules and definitions or don't play." (Beck 23)

In other words, this agricultural model that focuses on population numbers is not only the only game in town, but is integral to what wildlife scientific management is institutionally, as a practice, and as a discourse. As tribal biologist for the Bad River Band of Ojibwa in Wisconsin, Peter David points out, this focus on populations and quotas is essentially a numbers game that has little to do with the composition of the population, or whether it is continuously persecuted and subject to lethal control, disrupting pack family structures (David). David notes, for instance, that "wolf management plans" are not "coexistence plans." They do not regard individual wolves as significant, or anything more than numbers of a population. As he claims, wolf management does not take into consideration the health of the pack, but

> Remains mired in a management perspective that measures health of wolf populations by the single criteria of number…Wisconsin likes to say their goal is for a healthy and viable population of wolves, and then define that as 350. It doesn't matter is it's made up of sixty packs of five animals each with ten-percent loners, or a hundred

> packs of two to three animals and twenty-percent loners in a population under intense persecution…Too often we think that a population is recovered when it meets this minimal definition of the Endangered Species Act, but being off life-support is not synonymous with recovery" (David).

"Each wolf," David emphasizes, "has unique responsibilities within a pack, and these are not replaceable or interchangeable," so it should perhaps be unsurprising that this constant disruption of pack structure has unintended effects.

Indeed, killing wolves may increase depredations of cattle and sheep, contrary to what has been taken as intuitive by wildlife managers in practice. This is relevant not only in so far as practical applications are concerned regarding what works and what does not (especially compared to what might be assumed to work, or expected to work or presumed to be the truth of the relationship between killing and behavior), but also in revealing the underlying intuitions, beliefs, and folk science and psychological theories that ground such claims. This is apparent in Wielgus and Peebles' claim that "Predator control and sport hunting are often used to reduce predator populations and livestock depredations, – but the efficacy of lethal control has rarely been tested" (Wielgus and Peebles 1).

First of all is the assumption that killing wolves is effective and efficient, that it works to decrease depredations and increase game numbers, such as deer, elk, and moose. It has long been assumed that killing wolves will prevent attacks on/depredations of livestock. The seemingly reasonable, if not intuitive, assumption is that killing a few wolves will decrease attacks on livestock generally (overall numbers) and specifically (by eliminating problem wolves). However, as Robert Wielgus notes in his own research, this can actually lead to an increase in depredations (Wielgus and Peebles).

The former is assumed because fewer wolves would seem to lead to less possibility of attacks, as it is assumed each wolf would relatively attack the same number of animals. However, there have not been correlations between a lesser number of wolves and lesser attacks or higher game numbers unless the number of wolves is reduced by 25% of the population of wolves in an area (Hervieux et al. 2014; Wielgus and Peebles 2014); however, below the threshold, wolf populations become unsustainable and decrease. In other words, in order to eliminate wolf depredations on livestock or stabilize (not necessarily increase) numbers of wild ungulates (such as caribou, in the Hervieux et al. study), wolves must be annually killed to reduce the population to where it is no longer sustainable.

Perhaps more striking is that there is evidence to show that even eliminating "problem" wolves does not decrease the number of depredations on livestock and may even increase the attacks the culling of these specific animals is meant to reduce. As Wielgus and Peebles show,

> The number of livestock depredated the following year was positively, not negatively, associated with the number of wolves killed the previous year. The odds of livestock depredations increased 4% for sheep and 5–6% for cattle with increased wolf control - up until wolf mortality exceeded the mean intrinsic growth rate of wolves at 25%. Possible reasons for the increased livestock depredations at 25% mortality may be compensatory increased breeding pairs and numbers of wolves following increased mortality [as with coyotes]. After mortality exceeded 25%, the total number of breeding pairs, wolves, and livestock depredations declined. However, mortality rates exceeding 25% are unsustainable over the long term (1).

In other words, killing wolves to decrease wolf depredations likely has the opposite effect intended: the more wolves you kill, the more they either compensate through increased birth

rates, or, as has been argued by Matt Barnes during research in Montana, new packs move in to replace the pack that has been eliminated. This is likely why some ranchers in the Blackfoot Valley in Montana and elsewhere have claimed ostensibly that non-lethal management and relations are preferred. As one rancher related to me from his seat at the bar at Trixie's Antler Saloon, "I'd rather deal with the devil I know than the one I don't" (2013).

This effect has been shown in the very study area where some of Wielgus' work in Eastern Washington was recently conducted. Not long after the Wedge Pack was exterminated (2012) on the Diamond M Ranch grazing allotment, another pack settled into the habitat. This is because the habitat in the Colville National Forest and across the Canadian border along the Kettle River Valley is quality wolf habitat, containing sufficient game, cover, etc. In other words, if you kill a pack out of there, another will just move in. It is thus "suitable" habitat for wolves, despite what some may assume; indeed, what seems to make it "unsuitable" habitat is the failure of some ranchers to take responsibility for adapting to the circumstances.

It might also seem that eliminating a percentage of the pack will work as a method of deterrence: by killing most of them off, it will teach the remaining wolves a lesson, namely, to be more fearful of predating livestock. The assumption here is that wolves can be terrorized into changing their behavior, as if they will realize the supremacy of man as a species and the cows as a part of him. In other words, the expectation is that wolves will associate the cows left out in the woods to basically fend for themselves as nonetheless someone else's property. Furthermore, killing wolves to raise tolerance amongst ranchers doesn't likely work either, and can, counter-intuitively, increase intolerance. Instead of increasing tolerance, it vindicates perceptions that wolves are not valuable (Chapron and Treves) and signals that killing them is acceptable and encouraged, thereby leading to increased poaching (Treves et al.).

Thus, to fail to begin discussion of wolf management with the question of when wolves can be killed is to fail to understand wolf management per se. That is, to not begin discussion with when wolves may be killed, is to be unreasonable, it is to begin dialogue with something that makes no sense, given the institutions and practices that have come to determine and condition relationships between humans and non-humans. Killing must always be an option that cannot be taken off the table; indeed, even in discourse dedicated to using "non-lethal" practices, lethality is nonetheless assumed the standard default, as the qualification of "lethal" indicates.

This is evident given the genealogy of science-based management itself, which is always already biopolitical; that is, it deals in the life and death of populations and species, not individuals or situated relations in their particularity. The question is never whether to kill or not, but how to do so more humanely or less cruelly. In this way, there is an attempt to sterilize the killing at the heart of killing biopolitical management; it does not kill individuals (or at least, not with any focus), but manages populations. Too easily, then, management becomes premised upon almost entirely anthropocentric concerns based on an extended notion of the human subject. Under a neoliberal frame this includes the subject's property or valued economic associations, and anything that contributes to his/her brand—livestock, pets, children, a business, a reputation, their ability to bring in an income, and their liberty to make economic decisions unencumbered. All of this is co-extensive with the subject; these are not merely values or external interests, but extensions of the self that may be defended as one's life may be defended. They are inherent to oneself as a "brand," which is the very focus of the ranching industry's claim to property and identity.

This also further leads to ranchers, first and foremost, questioning when it is all right to kill a wolf or have it slaughtered, rather than what can be done to stop wolves from eating or

attacking their livestock and pets. When the focus is on when slaughter is justified, those desiring to implement lethal means upon the belief that such killing will solve the problem by literally eliminating a component (what they take as the sole cause) will work to make the conditions for such killing align with their own sense of threat to their extended self. To question the extension of that self and interests, then, is to attack one's identity, not to mention a whole assemblage of rhetoric that that extended self may deem definitive of that self, including what is taken as traditional ranching practices. This is often why accusations of ideological blindness or an "agenda" are often leveled—they think they are engaging with the person in front of them as a representative of an agenda or ideology, rather than a person involved in a situated, particular assemblage of relations.

Thus, in the "making live" of biopolitics, the wolf is also subject always already to death as a condition of biopolitical management. That is, they are monitored through tracking collars, given designated "suitable habitat" in which they are allowed to thrive, studied to determine their health and numbers, etc. But, within this making live, there is always already the threat that they will be slaughtered or that disciplinary tactics will be applied that ultimately end in death. That is, death is always a threat, and likely one the wolves are completely unaware of. Thus, in making wolves live by keeping an eye on them through telemetry, for instance, tracking them and keeping them out of "trouble" through hazing and such, there is also always the possibility that that tracking collar, that biopolitical monitoring system, will be used to cull the population, either by finding the offending collared wolf and putting it to death for being present at the scene of a crime, or through using that collared wolf to find other members of their pack. The latter is a scenario in which collared wolves, which some have called "Judas wolves," unwittingly (it's reasonable to assume) "betray" the other wolves, leading to the pack's slaughter (Fox and

Beckoff 123).[115] In the reintroduction of wolves to Idaho and Yellowstone, USFWS wolf recovery coordinator Ed Bangs noted that "Judas wolves" in Southern Alberta (Westell)[116] were darted and collared to locate pack members for capture and release in the U.S. However, more recently, while wildlife managers questioned about the tactic have disavowed the label itself, the tactic itself remains a tool for technologically slaughtering wolves under the guise of science. As Idaho Fish and Game notes on their website, "The collars help biologists know where to find wolves, and in some cases, help locate those responsible for killing livestock; a rare-but-important use of radio collars [is] to ensure targeted removal of offending animals" (Demick). However, in a phone interview with the Timber Wolf information Network, Idaho F &G biologist Jennifer Struthers relates:

> "So sometimes you collar a wolf with other wolves, and you collar one and then that wolf then can be used later to locate the pack to remove more wolves." When asked what they call the method she said they didn't have a name for it but it was 'collaring for later control.' When asked if the collared wolf is used indefinitely she said, "Well, it just depends, sometimes, well, usually that animal is left alive. They remove what they can of the rest of the pack, and it may not be all of them because of the conditions and the trees, so it may only be a few out of the group, (but the group) continues on. ("USDA").

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[115] Etymologically, the first usage of the Judas-animal modifier was in an article about a slaughterhouse goat named "Judas Iscariot" that led herd upon herd of goats up the slaughterhouse ramp until he met his fate.[115] Judas goats fitted with radio collars have also been used at least since the second half of the twentieth century to clear feral goats from islands from the Galapagos to Catalina (Campbell & Donlan 1362).

[116] About 15 "Judas" wolves that were previously trapped - with a $2,000 payment to each trapper - and released wearing radio collars "will finger the pack" for the hunters, he said. Using a helicopter, a "darter" will tranquillize one or two wolves from a pack large enough to lose several members, Mr. Bangs said. The wolves will be airlifted to kennels in a base camp or out to a road where a truck will pick them up (Westell).

This "collaring for later control" technique is described in almost identical terms to the explanation that the B.C. Director of Resource Management offers in March 16, 2016 inter-provincial meeting minutes regarding lethal wolf control in the South Peace River region, where he relates, "they did initiate an aerial wolf cull to protect the South Peace Caribou herds under SARA...In the end, 73 wolves were culled. They were hoping for more. They will continue this winter in October. They have collars on the wolf packs; they kill all non-collared wolves within the pack. In 5 years they hope to kill about 700 wolves" (Frank). Thus, the Judas wolf tactic is used not just to target offending wolves, but, as if something out of the Phillip K. Dick's *Minority Report,* to monitor presumed future offenders. As a technologically efficient means of slaughtering wolves, it is treated as part of the practical toolset of scientific management of wolf populations. Indeed, when the Idaho F&G was sued in court for illegally collaring four wolves in the Frank Church Wilderness during an elk collaring program, they fought to keep access to the data gleaned from the collaring the federal judge ordered destroyed, arguing "We're proceeding with the appeal to ultimately allow us to use these scientific data in future decisions" (Ridler).

As mentioned earlier, this scientific management of killing to "make" the population "live" is a consistent refrain in wildlife management, especially with predators, and especially when it is wolves that are considered. Exemplarily, Oregon's wolf coordinator, Russ Morgan, notes, "Sometimes to preserve and animal, you have to kill an animal...The population is the big thing. The individual is less important." Notably, the article states that Morgan "won't weigh in on the wolf controversy" as "weighing in on the controversy [specifically, of killing a wolf pack] isn't a part of his job" (Lies). However, I would argue that that is exactly what he is doing. Indeed, in such a statement, he disavows that biopolitical management of populations is a position at all amongst others; instead, it is taken as a truism about human-wolf relations.

However, this same biopolitical logic of killing to make live does not apply to livestock. That is, it cannot it be said that sometimes to make cows live you have to let a few get eaten, "the population is the big thing. The individual is less important." Such a claim would be considered unreasonable, especially if these are wolf-killed cattle. This reveals the asymmetry of power that makes such a proposition not make sense within the established regime of truth. It may be argued recreational opportunities to see and photograph wolves have significant economic value, and additional public value to those who benefit from these recreational and tourist dollars—especially in many of the places like N.M. and Washington, Montana, etc. where people go hoping to see wolves, or just be in their presence. However this value does not trump those already established.

Livestock are an extension of the neoliberal subject's self as a brand in a way that wolves are not. Thus, wolf lives, in order to be "preserved" as a population made to live, must not interfere with already established preferred populations of humans and their commercial enterprises, namely white European humans who inhabit places with wolves. This is essentially the same logic of segregation or lynching someone for being in the wrong place. Those considered less than fully human by a dominant class, such as non-whites by whites, may be said to be allowed to be killed in order that others are made to live, or even slaughtered to protect invested commercial interests the state is expected to protect.

What is more, continuously slaughtering wolves doesn't seem to have the intuitive effects imagined. As recent research has shown on a whole range of expected results, death does not seem to deliver, despite its finality. Surveys show allowing hunting, legalized killing by ranchers, and culling wolves does not increase tolerance of wolves as many had assumed. This assumption is understandable, considering many people surveyed who claimed to be intolerant of

wolves before a wolf-hunt was implemented further claimed they would be more tolerant if a hunt was allowed. However, allowing lethal force against wolves likely increases intolerance of wolves (whether culls or hunts) and further justifies the use of deadly force as the only way to deal with/manage wolves, as the work of Jamie Hogberg and Adrian Treves (2014) has recently shown. It also does not seem to decrease illegal killing or poaching, for much the same reason, but has actually increased it, as shown in studies in both Wisconsin and Sweden (Chapron and Treves 2016). Perhaps most importantly, as previously noted, killing off wolves doesn't decrease livestock depredations or increase game numbers as supposed, and likely increases depredations (Wielgus and Peebles 2014) by disrupting pack structures unless wolves are killed at a pace that will likely lead to wolf extirpation.

Nonetheless, as Jamie Hogberg observes in her research, there has been a shift toward prioritizing lethal removal as "the only way" reasonable management can proceed (Hogberg et al.). As her human dimensions research surveys in Wisconsin have shown, allowing the hunting of wolves, as was done in the three year period from 2011-2014, actually increased the social acceptance of intolerance of wolves, as it "reinforces social acceptance of intolerance" of wolves (Hogberg). Furthermore, much like the presumption that culling some pack members will deter other wolves left alive from killing livestock, as has been done in Oregon and Washington, there is also, as Hogberg claims, no behavioral sense that hunting wolves has positive effects on depredations, as wolves themselves do not associate the two (whether members are killed by culling or hunting). Thus, it would seem that what is most efficient, and considered most reasonable, and easiest to get approval for given intuitions about wolf management, is actually what is merely desired by humans given the biopolitical frame of wolf management as is.

Even the Endangered Species Act (ESA), to some degree, is predicated on death, namely, on not killing, or protecting from killing, or regulating killing, to avoid extinction. Sometimes this is reflected in a moratorium on killing when a species is classified as endangered or threatened, but a significant component that has been the most contentious is the protection of habitat through wilderness classification or other classifications that regulate public lands uses. While the former draws ire for the assumed restrictions of human activity that protection affords threatened and endangered species on private or public land, the latter scheme of protecting habitat for an endangered species is most often practiced upon public lands where the point of contention concerns types of use of public lands. Either way, it seems the battle hinges on the prevention of death of the protected species, not it's flourishing.

Thus, ultimately, the premise is not preservation, but an absence, curtailing, or restriction on killing that would otherwise occur without it. This is the case whether the killing is done directly through hunting, poaching, trapping, or culls, or indirectly through public and private land uses that would prevent the species' survival and flourishing by eliminating possible habitat the species could occupy. Thus, in this light, the ESA, rather than promoting the preservation of species to allow them to flourish and thrive instead creates an exception within the scheme of scientific management, which is always predicated on the lethal removal of species others would otherwise enact, either directly or indirectly. Thus, even the ESA is not so much predicated on making species live, but preventing them from getting killed or being "let to die" in Foucaultian terms. While an "endangered" status prohibits (hunting or nuisance killing) and mandates actions (such as habitat protection where the species occupies and where it might later recover more robustly), these actions are based on preventing extinction, not encouraging a species to flourish,

and this is clear by the instituted quotas (here, the ideal maximum number) of wolves states have set as goals in their wolf recovery programs.

For instance, the stated "ideal population" of wolves Wyoming Game and Fish is allowing in the state is "160 wolves," a maximum number that is just above the "150 wolves, including 15 breeding pairs" standard below which the state would have its "management powers revoked again," prompting federal protections (Spina). State wildlife managers claim this "ideal population" number is based on the "sustainable carrying capacity" of wolves in the state given what they claim is the amount of "suitable habitat" in the state. Yet, even this number is clearly based on social tolerance, not whether there is quality habitat for wolves, as revealed in wolf management specialist Ken Mills' claim that "the distribution of wolves expanding into areas that are not suitable habitat went up" (Spina). However, as Hall et al. argue, "the term 'suitable' habitat should not be used because if an organism occupies an area that supports at least some of its needs, then it is habitat. So, by definition then, the habitat is suitable. Thus, there is no such thing as unsuitable habitat" (Hall et al. 178). In other words, "suitable habitat" has little to do with science, aside from functioning as scientific rhetoric that circularly reinforces claims about "social tolerance."

The effect is that this makes the threshold for delisting often minimal; that is, delisting occurs immediately at the minimum level at which the species can be said to have recovered from the threat of extinction. Of course, the issue is that, practically speaking, legislation and management policy most often set the maximum for species populations at that minimum recovery number (whether numbers of breeding pairs or individuals). That is, species often remain at the threshold essentially, or just a degree above it, so as to avoid the relisting and the re-initiation of ESA protections. This is reflected in the Idaho program, which seeks to ensure

that wolves are kept right at the fourteen breeding pair minimum required to avoid relisting. The hunting season quota is predicated upon this number and is raised based on the number of wolves that can be killed without reinitiating federal protections and regulation. Again, as argued throughout this chapter, this is because "scientific management" is predicated on death based in anthropocentric whim, or what biologists refer to "the human dimension" of wildlife management, which is grounded in "social tolerance." Such "social tolerance" is assumed as something that informs both these wolf "quotas" but also what is determined as "suitable habitat." As philosopher W. Lynn notes, the minimum number in the smallest space possible is the goal. In other words the minimal threshold to delist is the maximum goal because this determination is often invested with interests and practices that are still ongoing. Yet, there are often those that put the species on the endangered species list in the first place. That is, there is no tolerance beyond the minimal number to prevent relisting; the necessary number becomes the sufficient number.

This is also why initiating hunting and trapping seasons immediately after delisting predators such as wolves, mountain lions, and bears are the assumed norm. It is assumed that such species can, should, and must be killed for good reason, namely, to keep the species in check from getting so "out of control" that it exceeds the minimal number to keep it alive as a species and prevent relisting to prevent extinction. In other words, saving endangered species means getting a predatory species to the point at which they will not go extinct and then keeping them at this point, particularly with wolves. This is what is regarded as necessary for maintaining "social tolerance." This has the additional effect of restricting habitat claims, as well: if the minimal number can be achieved without an expansion of the species territory or occupation, then all other potential habitat can be considered "unsuitable," as it is based in a "social

tolerance" which restricts any expansion of range whatsoever. While this rendering of "suitable habitat" has been successfully challenged in court for disregarding future wolf range expansion into historically occupied territory (United States District), such as in the relisting in the Midwest region, this is the crux of what legislators are attempting to override through arguments that "social tolerance" should determine range and habitat suitability. Social tolerance thus becomes *the* factor that drives species recovery of predators, and is additionally treated as something that cannot be easily overcome, or is unlikely to change.

Another one of the more difficult issues in wolf management is the determination of what exactly may be considered "suitable wolf habitat." This question of policy and debate on wolf habitat essentially comes down not to necessarily where wolves can live, that is, where there is habitat available, i.e., the physical "resources and conditions in an area that produce occupancy" (Hall et al. 178), but to where wolves may live. Thus, the question is not merely "Where *can* wolves live?" but "Where *may* wolves live?" This interpretation of "suitable habitat" contains within it this very indistinction at its core; namely, it is not a question of determining "suitable habitat, where wolves can exist, but where they will be allowed to exist, where they have permission to exist/live. Thus, "suitable habitat" is an attempt to define the biological not in terms of the animal's perspective (or Umwelt), but from the perspective of the human, as a social and political definition of the biological, and one, as Peter David notes, that has come to dominate wildlife and natural resource science (David).

This move to define habitat suitable for wolf occupation is thus inherently political at its core, and as such, any claims, whether quantitative or qualitative, will be based in political and social questions. This is not merely to say that human interests, or lives, or habitat, must be taken into consideration in determining available wolf habitat, as if what is being argued is that other

occupying species needs to be taken into consideration in such habitat determination, but is the highly anthropocentric and political claim that non-human lives are only relevant in relation to human interests, which are always both economic and political.

Thus, it can be argued that when the "best available science" does not include such factors as human "social tolerance," those scientific claims become non-sensical and outside the realm of the true. And, as Peter David notes, there is an equivalency between basing quota numbers on "social tolerance" and basing social programs on racism:

> In the wolf context, one of the big problems is far too great acceptance of "social tolerance" being the primary driving force in setting Wisconsin's population goal. I think that that's important science, but it needs to inform what's done, it needs to inform education programs; it shouldn't be setting the quotas. And I think you could argue that basically setting a wolf quota based on social tolerance is equivalent to using racism to do urban social programs. It's highly arbitrary biologically, and we need, and probably not just in wolves but in natural resource science in general, to move away from that (David, et al.)

In the case of wolves, then, what he is arguing is that habitat, even if used or able to be used by wolves to produce occupancy (i.e. the resources and conditions to produce occupancy are present from the organism's perspective), is not suitable if the people refuse to tolerate wolves there. This, David suggests, is no different than arguing for segregation on the grounds that white people won't tolerate non-white people in their neighborhood and will act to remove them, regardless of the law, if you allow them to move in. In this way such intolerance is framed as natural or for the good of all species, races, etc. Thus, such a basis can justify laws to keep these others out or defend oneself from them. It also helps to signal such violence is acceptable, as one

may of course defend oneself from someone or something that one considers a threat, or simply refuse to tolerate.

What the rhetoric of scientific management does, thus, is highjack science's persuasive force to make social and political claims. In attempting to borrow that persuasive force, it betrays scientific objectivity. Thus, a concept like "social tolerance" is smuggled in as objective science, as descriptive fact, rather than a claim predicated on unargued for premises, such as that social tolerance is something constant and measurable. As such, scientific management constitutes a regime of scientific truth that always already includes elements of non-science. There is thus a paradox wherein scientific management empties itself out of science that conflicts with management to become more scientific. This is not a conflict in policy development between science and non-science, but a discursive fiat wherein science is forced to accept non-science.

Multiple scholars using Foucaultian biopolitics to analyze human-animal relations, or what has become called "animal studies" in the humanities and elsewhere, seem to assume that, as the human subject is treated as a species to be managed at the level of the life of populations that the biopolitical discourse and apparatuses focus upon, so too can other species be regarded as such, namely, as species also made to live and left to die through biopolitical discourse and practices. Arguing from the instability and constructedness of the human species, some have unproblematically applied biopolitical analysis to non-human animals to show how they are managed, controlled, etc., disciplinarily or as populations. However, what is often underappreciated is the historical and material power invested in particular relations between species, such that biopolitical analysis seems relevant only to those animals tied tightly to human experience, particularly the generalized quotidian experience with domesticated animals.

However, I would argue that biopolitical analysis does not make the same sense for animals speciated as wolves in the same way that it does for dogs, for instance, or cows.[117] Indeed, without considering the evolved and ongoing relations between wolves and cows in North America, for instance, it does not become clear as to how biopower is invested in making each species live through letting die. What is revealed in the biopolitics of Western ranching is that livestock are made to live, in consideration of their vulnerability and selected for "gentleness," by protecting them from predators that may kill them, such as wolves. In other words, wolves are managed not to make them live themselves, but to make cattle live (for humans). The health of the wolf population is not considered in this calculation in anything more than minimally tolerated numbers that must be slaughtered at times, just as cows.

Significantly, in the biopolitics of ranching, cows are only appropriately let to die when they are sent to slaughter. They are made to live right up until that moment, at which point they are slaughtered. Indeed, these deaths are disavowed in claims that ranchers caretake livestock to keep them healthy and alive, which they consider their duty and livelihood. As such, death is bracketed out as part of this process, yet is integral to understanding the real offense that wolves represent in a biopolitical frame, namely, that wolves kill cattle before their time. That is, they kill cattle before the rancher can slaughter them, and before that particular cow's death is disavowed. Indeed, the logic of this ethics of this relation is built on metaphors of commerce, and the real offense is that wolves disrupt this logic of commerce. They are not human offenders, like cattle rustlers who make choices and can be weaned out. Instead, wolves are thought merely to react instinctually. As such, the only way to deal with them is to kill them for the health of the preferred population, like a disease, or like terrorists who themselves are animalized to place

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[117] This may be partially due to the assumption wild animals like wolves are already granted some semblance of agency apart from humans.

them out of the population to make them killable. Once again, we have wolves in a liminal zone, where they are not even a legitimate species, because they are always crossing into criminality under the rhetoric of commerce. To depredate or commit "depredations" (the commonplace coinage for attacks or predation on livestock) is to "steal" and "plunder" ("depredation"). They become moral agents, but not in any relation besides a commercial one; they are regarded as agential, but only in so much as they are thieves. And this is a position that they constantly occupy, where they are agential subjects only in so much as they can be figured as aberrant, law breaking, right violating pseudo-subjects, whether as outlaws, thieves, illegal immigrants, non-natives, government sponsored terrorists, or threatening subspecies/racial others who/that may be defended against justifiably with lethal force. In other words, it's the flip side of granting them rights, which those such as Derrida and Wolfe recognize as always an extension of the human. Indeed, the historical material relations that have developed with wolves reveals the assumed inherent species hierarchies where the human species is always already assumed to have a superior being or value that must be protected. Below the human species is the biomass of domestic species humans keep that dominate the world, and amount for the majority of all the biomass on the planet. These relations are specific. And you cannot theorize the animal in a contemporary analysis, biopolitical or otherwise, without dealing with this situation and the power invested in maintaining it. Thus, scientific management is not just the biopolitical management of various species, but the maintenance and conservation through biopower of these specific hierarchies and relations.

While many scholars and activists associated with animal studies, and critical animals studies especially, critique the livestock industry as a disavowed holocaust,[118] what is often

[118] These include Derrida, Wolfe, Shukin and Boggs.

disregarded is the power generated by the rhetorical emphasis these livestock producers place on the preservation of life. They claim to care for their cows and treat them as part of their "livelihood" and "family" (Len McIrvin, Wink Crigler, etc.), emphasizing the animals' docility and gentleness, something that may resemble, at least rhetorically, a recognition of shared vulnerability, in some way. In this light, wolves are regarded as attacking the vulnerable who are too gentle to know the threat—they prey not only on their bodies, but their vulnerability, and by extension, the cattleman's own.

Yet that vulnerability has been selected for in a systematically dominating tradition over time to make livestock docile bodies to fit in as regularizable data points in the efficiency of industrial agriculture, in which they are standing-reserve. As such, scientific management aims to produce commercializable bodies to be sold and circulated efficiently. What wolves do when they kill livestock is not just an offense because they kill before the animal is slaughtered by the rancher and industrial system of agriculture, but because they consume directly, extracting the cow from the industrial system, and exposing an unsaid claim of death upon it. In some way, this direct killing and eating by wolves is more efficient as a predator-prey relation, but it is not efficient in terms of the system of industrial killing, and is thus regarded as an unjust, if not unethical, situation that must be accounted for, and managed with scientific lethality.

Conclusion: A "Lone Wolf" is Never Alone

On July 10, 2012, the local CTV Vancouver Island five o'clock news opened with anchor Hudson Mack informing viewers,

> We begin tonight on Discovery Island off Oak Bay, where there is a mystery lurking. There is an animal of some kind roaming the island, first reported by campers in May. A strange dog of some kind, perhaps, making its home on the uninhabited island that's half park and half First Nations reserve. Whatever it was, it was skittish and wouldn't come close. And now there have been more sightings and more stories, and park rangers and conservation officers think that this is not a dog at all." ("Coastal Wolf Spotted").

Indeed, it wasn't a dog, but a coastal wolf, making it's home a mere two kilometers off the coast of Vancouver Island and the metropolitan area of Victoria, British Columbia. It was a thrilling mystery to many as to how a wolf could have made it through the urban Victoria/Oak Bay corridor to swim out to the island, and where it came from, considering the nearest known established wolf packs were at least forty kilometers away around Shawnigan Lake. The wolf's presence surprised B.C. Parks officials, conservation officers, and even wolf researchers. What seemed clear from the discourse around this wolf was that it shouldn't be there. As B.C. Parks official Joe Benning noted at the time, the island archipelago of Discovery and the Chatham Islands (the latter of which are entirely Songhees First Nation Reserve) offered a "very limited area for a wild animal like that. There's limited food supply, and there's ample opportunity for human contact that could lead to habituation of the animal." While park officials and conservation officers hoped the wolf would "do its own thing and leave the area on its own,"

reporter Louise Hartland noted that, nonetheless "They're setting a trap here. Not to catch the wolf, but to get it used to the cage in hopes of catching and relocating it in the future."

This wolf almost immediately became a concern for the biopolitical management of species, presenting a potential threat to the biosecurity of the park and the humans who used the Discovery Island BC Parks to recreate. While clearly there was also concern for the wolf, that concern amounted to necessitating its removal. While the traps were removed a month later after failing to catch the wolf, B.C. Parks officials seemed adamant about removing the wolf. But not only was the wolf considered a potential public safety threat, there was also concern that the wolf was acting unnaturally, or out of character with what a wolf is. However, University of Victoria marine-terrestrial ecologist Chris Darimont noted it was "doing exactly what coastal wolves do, but in a bizarre place" (Lavoie, "Lone Wolf Goes"). While B.C. conservation officer Peter Pauwells noted, "the wolf has shown no sign of being a risk to people," he also related that "We believe the wolf can survive there indefinitely, but we don't think she[119] would want to, given the nature of wolves. They are social animals" (Lavoie, "Staqeya"). Thus, it was not just the potential future threat to humans and the bio-insecurity the wolf represented, but the anomalous, if not "unnatural," behavior conservation officers and parks personnel were concerned the wolf was displaying in relations to their expectations of the species. Discursively and practically, this wolf was a problem that needed resolving through management—the wolf needs to be managed as part of the wolf population; responding to it as an individual was outside the realm of truth of wildlife management.

This coastal wolf, it could be said, was disrupting the wildlife management paradigm in its essence, seemingly flaunting established species relations. The Songhees First Nation

[119] Photographs later revealed that the wolf is actually a male.

challenged the figurations of the wolf as an unnatural safety threat that needed to be removed. As Songhees bylaw enforcement officer Trevor Absolon noted at the time, “the band wants the wolf to stay…A lot of band members find it interesting that Chief Robert Sam passed away in about the same period that the wolf appeared” (Lavoie, “Staqeya”). As Songhees education liaison Butch Dick notes, “The wolf is a symbol of the Coast Salish people.” The Songhees gave “the wolf the name Staqeya, which means wolf in Lekwungen,” personalizing the wolf. It can also be said that the wolf for the Songhees symbolized resistance to settler hegemony, as it was inhabiting lands where band members had lived for millennia until 1957 when their wells went dry. As band elder Joan Morris relates, living on the islands allowed the Songhees to “save our language and culture” and kept her grandparents and parents out of residential schools (“Songhees First Nation”).

The Songhees thus challenged the figuration of the wolf as an unnatural safety threat with their own figuration, one arguably incompatible with established biopolitical species management. When BC parks once again decided to trap the wolf the following February without consulting the Songhees, the band membership “passed a motion that the wolf should be left alone,” further stating that they were “not convinced the wolf will allow itself to be trapped and are hoping to persuade it to stay in the reserve area” (Lavoie, “Trap Set”). As councilor Ron Sam relates, “The wolf showed up for a reason, and there is no need to interfere with nature…the wolf is eating seals, otters and geese, and is looking healthy.” Nonetheless, the Songhees were essentially ignored, as once again B.C. Parks personnel and conservation officers set out to trap the wolf on the B.C. Park portion of Discovery Island “in the best interest of the animal and public safety,” stating that “B.C. Parks and conservation officers agree that relocation of the wolf prior to this year’s high visitation season is a priority.” They reasoned, “While the wolf has not

demonstrated any habituated behavior to this point, it seems to be showing increased interest/curiosity toward humans." Once again, the figuration of the wolf as an unnaturally behaving potential safety threat, much as the Mexican wolves of Catron County are regarded, became the default figuration.

However, the "wily" (Lavoie, "Wily Discovery") wolf did indeed avoid the traps B.C. Parks personnel set out, and the traps were eventually removed later that month. Parks personnel decided, after observing the wolf in camera trap photos that the wolf "is probably stable enough in that environment that it can just be left alone." Instead of removal, parks staff would focus on human management, relying on signage noting wolf presence, as well as "education and special food containers in the campground." Songhees bylaw officer Tim Absolom remarked that "It is great news that it completely avoided the traps…our message got through to enough people and it made a difference." However, that message would be challenged once again three years later when once again the default figuration of the wolf as an unnaturally acting threat to public safety re-emerged.

By the end of summer 2016, news about the wolf living on the islands of the Discovery/Chatham archipelago had died down. According to B.C. conservation officer Pauwells, there were "no incidents of concern" and "the wolf keeps its distance form members of the public" and remains in "good condition" (Lavoie, "Lone Wolf"). However, on the evening of Sept. 12, CTV's senior anchor Andrew Johnson opened the local Vancouver Island with the following: "It's a story that's half *mystery*, half *horror*, and it unfolded on Discovery Island. Rescuers say a family became trapped, pinned on the roof on an abandoned lighthouse station after being stalked by a lone wolf. They called for help and were brought to safety, but from there the trail goes cold" ("Family Rescued"). As the CBC reported, "The rescue centre

dispatched a Coast Guard vessel and armed fisheries conservation officers escorted the campers back to their own boat" (Wilson). The death implicit in biopolitical management seemed about to be realized. Indeed, I argue, this is what Darimont was alluding to four years earlier when he too advocated relocation and asserted that the "longterm prognosis is not good"; implicitly, I argue, he was attempting to forestall or prevent the death at the heart of wildlife management. Thus, what had become, as the CTV reporter on the scene describes, "Canada's true lone wolf" ("Family Rescued") was now figured as monstrous, or perhaps in line with another resonance of "lone wolf," a terrorist. It was finally revealing its true potential as a threat to the lives of the local population that it always already had been when it was first discovered living on the islands. But while the rhetoric of the newscast amplified the figuration of the public safety threat from a horrifying beast, there were factors that likely led to the incident that, as with much of this dissertation, were human caused and dismissive of the wolf's own agency. Not only were the family trespassing on Songhees territory when the incident happened, but, significantly, they brought their dog (another canine) with them, something prohibited on the islands (whether B.C. Parks or Songhees lands), but also something that might unsurprisingly draw the interest of a lone male wolf.

Nonetheless, it is as if the human element cannot be but elided in telling such stories. In focusing on the "mystery" and "horror," the wolf becomes the focus of any figuration—it is not anything people do, but what wolves are that is the problem. While no previous interactions with B.C. Parks personnel and the public had been reported aggressive, and the family expressed only "concern" with the wolf's proximity, the park personnel recommended the closure of the park and "a behavioral assessment on the wolf" (Lawrence). After the incident and subsequent closing of the park, Songhees Marine Enforcement officer Ian Cesarec applauded the decision, saying

"the more attention this wolf gets, in fact the more risk it will run into with human interaction" ("Rescuers"). Chris Darimont concurred, telling CTV News, "If we were ever to give an animal a whole island, this is the context that we should consider this." However, Cheryl Alexander, who is writing a book about her encounters with the wolf and would like to see the wolf (she names Takaya) become a "poster child" for a Salish Sea UNESCO world heritage site, thought it was "a shame"(Lawrence) the park was closed. Alexander, who has "taken thousands of photographs from as close as 10 feet" (Counter), and is considered by some an ambassador for the wolf (Sinn 27), claims, contrary to Cesarec, "the more people know about him the better protected he will be" ("Takaya"). While the park was re-opened in the summer of 2017, the figuration of the wolf as a potential safety threat remains always operative, threatening to turn a celebrated "lone wolf" who has become a "rock star" (Counter) into an anomalous lone wolf terrorist.

In this way, the Discovery Island wolf illuminates how the rhetorical figuring of the wolf proceeds in this dissertation. As with the wolves in Points North Landing, this wolf is problematized in its identity, revealing the truth about wolves and what they are. So too, as in Chapter Two, it is an outlaw "lone wolf" (maybe even a terrorist) that doesn't belong there. In this figuration the "lone wolf" is considered abnormal, an anomaly even on an uninhabited island. It must be calculated into population management through monitoring and policing its behavior, so it does not become a threat to the established order by disrupting human interests, such as tourism. Furthermore, as the Mexican wolves in Chapter Three, this wolf becomes an imminent threat people had to be rescued from. It not only doesn't belong there, but disrupts the vested interests assumed in the space of the park. And finally, the wolf becomes a potential threat to the biosecurity of this space that must be managed so as not to disrupt productive public use of

the park. These figurations, as I have argued throughout this dissertation, are defaults in the biopolitical management of non-humans, and those regarded as less than human, as should be apparent. Even isolated and imagined on an uninhabited island, the wolf is never free of all of these figurations. Any incident will always be read through these figurations, as if the figuration always precedes the event itself, and the prohibition precedes its advent. Even without the wolf, that is, even if the wolf on Discovery Island were to leave or die, these figurations will persist, awaiting the next wolf or wolfish creature that must be managed not only materially, but rhetorically. There is no leaving the wolf alone.

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