



**BORDERS IN
GLOBALIZATION
BOOKS**

BORDERS AND BORDERING IN ATLANTIC CANADA

Edited by

**Victor Konrad
Randy W. Widdis**



BORDERS IN GLOBALIZATION BOOKS

The **Borders in Globalization Books (BIG_Books)** series provides an open-access forum for in-depth scholarly explorations of borders in the 21st century.

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edited by

VICTOR KONRAD

RANDY W. WIDDIS



University
of Victoria



**BORDERS IN
GLOBALIZATION**

Published by the University of Victoria

BIG_Books Series, # 1

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
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
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Foreword

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly

Borders in Globalization, a multi-disciplinary and international research program, funded through a SSHRC Partnership Grant and the European Union's Jean Monnet Program with colleagues across Canada and in 15 different countries, collected data on borders from 2012 to 2020. Our core research focus was to challenge the well-established conception that borders should primarily be understood as sovereign territorial boundaries that emerge out of international treaties. The research program thus addressed fundamental *how*, *why*, and *what* questions about borders, an important contribution to knowledge in a globalizing world when movement is increasingly scrutinized everywhere, and not just at the sovereign boundary line of states, and at a time when goods seem to travel more easily than humans. Indeed, the regulation of human mobility across borders is fraught and contentious, and even today, people crossing borders die in the thousands yearly.

Our team studied borders through the lenses of history, culture, mobility, security, environmental sustainability, and governance. As illustrated by this book, and the University of Ottawa Press series on Borders in Globalization, our research program initially approached those questions from the perspective of territories, regions and states, to collect evidence that there were multiple challenges to the “territorial trap” assumption.

We argued that the borders of globalization were not always contiguous or territorial. The primary reason for this paradigmatic transformation is that states that had the policy capacity to do so, were implementing border crossings at the source of movement. These new local and global border ‘markers’ appear in regulatory systems and production chains organizing the mobility of trade flows and humans. For instance, states and private sector actors are implementing data collection policies allowing for the pre-clearance of global trade flows and migration movements;

individuals and objects are cleared by authorities of their place of destination prior to leaving their place of origin. Contrary to traditional territorial bordering, a-territorial bordering obeys a fundamentally different logic: a mobile and networked logic primarily concerned with functional belonging, and driven by the development of mechanisms based on trust. This finding points towards new, yet understudied phenomena, that are continuing to transform borders in the 21st century.

Here Victor Konrad and Randy Widdis, along with Jeffrey Collins, Michael Ircha, Jaiya Jagger, Lucy Hinton, Mathew Schnurr and Alice Musabende, document and explore the socio-cultural spaces that straddle the North American North-East coast, the Atlantic region. This is a region that historically expanded across a number of Canadian provinces and United States states and has been explored in literature and history as Atlantic Canada and New England. The whole region straddles the Gulf of the St. Lawrence and is contiguous with the Province of Quebec. Historically, it kept a strong maritime culture and concurrent relations with sea culture and economy. In this book, the research focuses on the bordering, de-bordering and re-bordering processes, in a context of increasing homogeneity, i.e. common North American consumer culture, free trade, common environmental concerns. Yet, their counter intuitive findings, primarily focusing on relations between U.S. Maine, and Canada's New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, point to significant fragmentation of the historical cultural bond, and not necessarily along the scar of the boundary line itself, but along spatial forms that follow the changing nature of borders in the 21st century. These are borders that manifest themselves across the functions of territory such as trade and human mobility—employment led particularly—but also uneasy migrant retention, and tensions between newcomers and long-established residents, and also, region-wide climate and energy concerns. What emerges is an exploration of the multiple spatialities of those functions, their borders, and the relationship with the international boundary, but also with the 21st-century periphery of this great Atlantic region of North America.

All works by Borders in Globalization are available through our website <https://biglobalization.org>.

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, BIG program lead



Introduction: Borders, Bordering and Borderlands in Atlantic Canada

Victor Konrad
Randy W. Widdis

Atlantic Canada and New England share a geography and history characterized by many commonalities yet also strong differences. This book explores the role of borders, bordering and borderlands in the emergence and evolution of Atlantic Canada, and its relationship with “others” including neighboring New England and migrants worldwide who have settled in the region. Borders at all scales, from the community level to that of nation-states, delineate areas of similarity and differentiate spaces of difference. Borders may be established by law and sustained by convention and practice, or borders may be ephemeral, maintained only for a brief time or a specific purpose. Their primary purpose is, and has been, to define and control territory, from perceived or real personal space to national and even supra-national boundaries (Elden 2013). In Atlantic Canada, borders operate and are evident at all levels from the neighborhoods and communities of cities like Halifax, counties and districts, provinces, groups of provinces—the Maritimes (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick), and with the addition of Newfoundland and Labrador—Atlantic Canada. On occasion, when common interests allow or call for it, the international region is bordered from other regions of the United States and Canada, and identified loosely as the Northeast or more recently “Atlantica”.

Although bordering, forming an edge along or beside something, has been viewed mostly as controlling national borders, it is now recognized as much more. In the twenty-first century, bordering is recognized in differentiating between political and

socio-cultural spaces, as part of the “processual turn” from static borders to borders in motion, everyday intersectional bordering, and bordering in neoliberal globalization (Davis et al 2019; Popescu 2011). Boundaries once formed may be de-bordered and re-bordered in the often fluid and mobile world of borders. The Atlantic region, as already noted, offers a multiscalar display of borders, and, similarly, the region exhibits bordering that is expressed at all scales, and also extends as a dynamic process over centuries. Based on the spatial and temporal extent of bordering within the Northeastern Atlantic region, the broader region may be considered a borderland.

Borderlands, however, are also defined more specifically as the immediate and adjacent space of the border where politics, societies, and cultures engage, interact, and even coalesce to form linked or also hybrid territorial entities. These borderlands exist and persist because the border both divides and connects the space and time of the border region. The borderlands are the product and result of dynamic bordering. Borderlands may refer to the Atlantic Canada–New England international region, the more localized land and sea interactive zones astride the international boundary, or intra-regional spaces and places such as community divides in Halifax, Saint John, or St. Johns and transition zones between provinces.

Atlantic Canada: Cross-border Region to Borderlands?

I never seed or heard tell of a country that had so many natural privileges as this. Why there are twice as many harbours and water powers here, as we have all the way from Eastport to New Orleans ... They have iron, coal, slate, grindstone, lime, firestone, gypsum, freestone, and a list as long as an auctioneer’s catalogue. But they are either asleep, or stone blind to them. Their shores are crowded with fish, and their lands covered with wood. A government that lays as light on ‘em as a down counterpin, and no taxes. Then look at their dykes. The Lord seems to have made em on purpose for such lazy folks ... (Haliburton 1995, 18).

Although a controversial figure, flawed by racist and misogynist tendencies, Sam Slick, the irreverent fictional pedlar created by Nova Scotia Judge Thomas Haliburton in a series of books first



published in 1835, stands out as one of the most famous characters in the history of Canadian fiction. Slick, designed to represent the archetypal Yankee, served as a vehicle for Haliburton to offer satirical opinions on Nova Scotians, Americans, particularly from New England, and the British. At a superficial level, Haliburton, through Slick, presented humorous observations on various customs and mannerisms that distinguished Americans from Nova Scotians but more interesting to those interested in borderlands is the fact that Haliburton chose to view the Canadian or at least the Nova Scotia character through the eyes of an American caricature, a testament to the long-standing proclivity of Canadians to see themselves in comparison to the "other".

Despite being a descendent from Loyalists and a member of the Tory elite, Haliburton, as is evidenced in the quote above, used Sam Slick to air his disdain for what he believed to be the most unflattering features of his fellow Nova Scotians, namely their lack of ambition, especially when compared to Americans, and their political and religious factionalism. Yet through Slick's conversations with the Squire, his "Bluenoser" traveling companion, Haliburton's admiration for Nova Scotian loyalty to British ideals comes through. He applies the same method of two-edged judgement by lauding the American virtues of industriousness and efficiency while at the same time criticizing their opportunism and ethnocentrism. Although his satirical caricatures represented extreme and sometimes dialectical positions, pitting American democracy versus British traditions of hierarchy, Haliburton delivered what might be viewed as a liminal argument, encouraging Nova Scotians to combine "the conservative principles of Edmund Burke with the practice of frontier practicality and industry" (Cogswell 2013). Yet in forums other than the Sam Slick Clockmaker series, Haliburton warned that emulation of American traits should not extend to the point where adoption of responsible government would take place for that, in his opinion, would inevitably result in absorption into the United States (Boniskowsky 2013).

The intersection of real life and fictional figures represented by Thomas Haliburton and Sam Slick, the former from Nova Scotia and the latter from Connecticut, takes place within a regional setting and during a period in which long established traditions of cross-border intercourse continued to provide frames of reference for people and communities on both sides of the international boundary. Despite the differences in character between peoples north and south of the line noted by the

Haliburton/Slick hybrid, an embryonic Atlantic borderland that had developed prior to the American Revolution continued to function and evolve over time. On a comparative level, many have noted the features that both New England and Atlantic Canada share. It is often maintained that both regions possess a strong sense of cultural identity set apart from the rest of the countries to which they belong. Both regions also share similar geographical and historical characteristics including a comparable physical environment and an historical orientation towards the Atlantic realm. But more than sharing similar physical features and geographical orientations, their histories have been intertwined through migration and commerce that both preceded and continued after the American Revolution. Yet did such interaction and comparable geographies, economies and histories necessarily result in the development of what many believe to be a very distinctive and somewhat amorphous borderland?

This is but one of several questions about borders, bordering and borderlands addressed in the following essays that focus on Atlantic Canada. Atlantic Canada is by all accounts an incisively bordered region, with island and peninsular perimeters accounting for most of the provincial borders (Figure 1). The Atlantic Ocean and other prominent seas including the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Bay of Fundy border the region both externally and internally. The distinctive Province of Quebec encloses the region to the west and north, and an equally distinct New England defines the international boundary to the south and west. Atlantic Canada is contained by both sea and land as a region of separate provinces, isolated economies, insulated societies, independent identities, and strained cohesion. Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, all are very separate and effectively bordered provinces in a region defined more by the limited size of its adjacent components than by the similarities of its economies and geographies, and the likeness of the societies originated and sustained in each. Atlantic Canada is bordered, and the region needs to work to extend a vision and political will toward cooperation and alignment. Internal borders proclaim and sustain a geography of parts, whereas the boundaries around the region argue for a regional entity.

The borders defining Atlantic Canada are enhanced by geography, but they provide challenges for innovative cooperation and sustained initiative to create connections across boundaries to



Figure 1. The Atlantic Provinces of Canada. Map source: Shaund (CC BY-SA 3.0): https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f1/Atlantic_provinces_map.png

forge a new geography in the region. This collection of essays explores Atlantic Canada's response to endemic borders and bordering. The work is not comprehensive but rather selective of some directions of research on borders and bordering in the region, and an invitation for continued border research in Atlantic Canada. Before turning to our selected studies of bordering in the Atlantic region, the introduction seeks to accomplish two goals. The first is to provide a very brief context for Atlantic Canada border studies. The second is to introduce the essays in this volume.

Context: Border Research on Atlantic Canada

There exists a significant body of historical literature that addresses the idea of a shared Atlantic borderland (e.g., Brebner 1927; Rawlyk 1973; Wynn 1988; Hornsby et al 1989; Hornsby & Reid 2005; Mancke 2005; Widdis 2017). Although varied, earlier historical research focused primarily on the development of what Graeme Wynn calls a “Greater New England”; that is, a transnational or cross-border region linked by a common experience, interconnected economy, shared attitudes and a similar material culture (Wynn 1989). More recent work has challenged this argument, instead focusing on internal developments, growing links with central Canada and continuing connections with Britain that individually and collectively tempered New England’s influence on the Maritimes (e.g., Buckner 1993; Mancke 2005; Widdis 2017). Examination of the literature reveals that much of the historical research on connections between Atlantic Canada and New England addresses the more distant past. On the other hand, relatively little attention has been paid to more recent forces and events that have either strengthened or diminished the ties that developed during the colonial era and the so-called “Golden Age of Wind and Sail”.

Also underrepresented in the literature is substantial research on the changing “place” of Aboriginal peoples in this borderland throughout history. An exception is the extensive research and attention to the early European arrival in the land of Norumbega, the mythical yet substantiated Indigenous territory centered on the Penobscot valley in what is now central Maine, and extending north into what is now Atlantic Canada. Early cartography of this “New Land” is used as a primary source to understand “discovery”, exploration and cartography, the European encounter with Indigenous peoples, and the colonization and settlement of the region. Stephen Hornsby summarizes the contact period relationships between Europeans and Indigenous peoples in the region:

At the time of European contact, Algonquian-speaking Micmacs, Maliseet, Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, and Abenaki occupied extensive territories in the Northeast. Their seasonal rounds of hunting and fishing took them from the shores of the Gulf of Maine and Atlantic Ocean into the interior throughout much of what is now Maine and the Canadian Maritime Provinces. Even today the



Canadian-U.S. border is not seen as a boundary between native peoples, and links are close between bands in northern New England and eastern Canada (Hornsby 2005).

Compared to the extensive research on the history of the Northeast borderlands, the literature that addresses more contemporary themes of borders and bordering in Atlantic Canada is relatively sparse. While there has long existed work that has skirted these themes, only recently has such research addressed more explicitly some of the ideas and concepts that have emerged in the growing field of borderlands scholarship. One of the few books to explore the contemporary cross-border relationship is not informed by border studies theory and approaches, yet it offers a perspective on regionalism in globalization, and specifically "persistence and change in Atlantic Canada and New England" (Colgan & Tomblin 2004). In addition to this overview, there are works in topical areas that assess the impact of both intra-regional borders and the international boundary. For example, John Helliwell and Genevieve Verdier (2001) measure the internal trade distances to estimate provincial border effects. Colin Howell and Daryl Leeworthy (2017) examine the transition of sport in the North Atlantic borderlands into the middle of the twentieth century. A more extensive literature is evident on trans-boundary ecosystem management (Hildebrand et al 2002) and on shipping in cross-boundary waters (Brooks & Frost 2004). Cross-border tourism research is another field where recent studies examine cross-border management and marketing (Reid et al 2008; Parker et al 2012). Also, recent research engages with borders in globalization. Catherine Baillie Abidi and Susan M. Brigham (2008) examine the experiences of 'mail order brides' crossing global borders to end up in Atlantic Canada, and Herb Wyile (2011) assesses the reshaping of Atlantic Canadian literature in globalization. This contextual discussion is not an exhaustive overview of the literature but merely a sample of some newly established directions. Furthermore, it is a call for greater attention and focus on the borders, bordering and borderlands in contemporary Atlantic Canada.

Stephen Hornsby ends his brief overview of the relationship between New England and Atlantic Canada in the *Encyclopedia of New England* with the following summary: "Today, the spread of an urbanized American culture, little of it recognizably from New England, is helping to undermine the distinctiveness of the cultural landscapes of Quebec and the Maritimes. The same automobile-

based landscape of fast-food restaurants, gas stations, suburbs, and shopping malls can be found on both sides of the border. The attempt to create a joint Canadian-American international park encompassing historic sites relating to Acadians on either side of the border only highlights the need to set off and preserve historic landscapes before they are overwhelmed by a homogenized North American culture. The spread of gas stations belonging to the New Brunswick-based oil giant Irving into Maine reflects the new economic realities of cross-border trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement and the cultural convergence in the Northeast. Although Canadian, the stations proudly fly “Old Glory” (Hornsby 2005, 594). The borderlands of New England and Atlantic Canada are now experiencing another complex era of de-bordering and re-bordering as cultural convergence, linked tourism marketing, re-shaped trading pathways, immigration and emigration of new minority groups, environmental conservation cooperation, Indigenous crossings, internet connections, cross-border governance practices and institutions, and the imaginaries of the international region all evolve. These changes pose challenges for governance, economic development, social fabric, security and sustainability in a region that is on the economic periphery of North America. Yet, the perspective from the edges also enables a re-visioning and understanding of North American borders, particularly in this region that has the immense depth of experience derived from half a millennium of border history.

Prospectus: Borders and Bordering in Atlantic Canada

This volume offers five portrayals of borders and bordering in Atlantic Canada. The essays all engage to some extent with the six themes forwarded in the Borders in Globalization project. These broad themes are culture, flows, governance, history, security and sustainability. The themes form a framework for approaching and engaging hypotheses about how borders and bordering emerge in globalization, and how the changing nature of borders may be articulated. One hypothesis is that borders in globalization are increasingly a-territorial, that is, these borders do not necessarily align with the boundaries of the state, but rather, they are found at multiple scales away from the territorial boundary. Thus, in globalization, bordering beyond territory is as significant as sustaining and bolstering territorial boundaries. Indeed, there exists a tension between these expressions of bordering that characterizes borders in globalization.



In the first essay, Randy Widdis lays the foundation for understanding the historical evolution of the Atlantic borderland. In doing so, he identifies and discusses some of the key processes of bordering that developed in response to changing dynamics occurring at the regional, national and international levels. Widdis also considers how these processes resulted in a re-imagining of the borderland over time and concludes that despite the retention of significant integrative forces, the focus for both Atlantic Canada and New England increasingly lay elsewhere. The chapter offers extensive data to support and illustrate these conclusions.

In the second chapter, Jeffrey F. Collins and Michael C. Ircha examine the border challenges facing Atlantic Canada ports. This comprehensive review and assessment is based on interviews of senior officials in the ports of Halifax, Saint John, Belledune, and Canso, as well as officials of Transport Canada, the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA), and several container terminals. The shipping data have been updated with current statistics to provide an up-to-date picture. The authors evaluate a comprehensive list of challenges including the CBSA challenge of balancing effective interdiction with trade facilitation, improvement of border clearance through the Beyond the Border initiative, effective scanning and inspection of containers, controlling the cost and managing the fee structure of container inspection, simplifying the e-manifest system, expeditious cruise passenger on-board clearance, addressing stowaways, refugees and desertion, and finally coping with the growing problem of derelict and abandoned vessels. In addition, the authors address the underdeveloped potential of cross-border sea shipping between the United States and Canada, and the growing participation of ports in First Nation consultations. Finally, the authors offer suggestions for CBSA efficiencies and consistencies, and acknowledge the importance of viewing ports as multi-scalar border portals operating at local-through-international levels.

The third chapter offers a current overview of the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP). This conference provided the inaugural forum for cross-boundary collaboration between provincial and state governments in North America when it began in 1973. The goals of the conference included the opportunity for leaders and policy makers to discuss issues of current concern in the cross-border region. Two of the concerns—climate change and

energy—have been on the agenda of NEG/ECP regularly, and these are addressed as case studies in this chapter by Jaiya Jagger and Victor Konrad. Climate change is a global issue but it requires attention at all scales from the local to the global. At the regional level, climate change may be addressed with targets to control emissions that are based on both realistic commitments and collaborative political will. Energy policy has been an issue addressed by the NEG/ECP since its inception. In recent years the discussions and collaborative efforts have moved from expansion and sharing of hydro and nuclear capacity, and tidal potential, to renewables and greening of energy production, use and transfer. The NEG/ECP set the precedent for cross-border governance, and provided a workable and effective model that is now emulated by other regional cross-border associations.

Chapter four shifts the scale and focus on borders to the divide between newcomers and long-time residents in a locality. The study by Lucy Hinton and Matthew A. Schnurr engages with an issue that is becoming increasingly important to our understanding of borders in globalization. Namely, the authors address how newcomers displaced in a mobile population in a growing world of borders deal with transitions to form a sense of belonging. The Lhotsampa Bhutanese refugees in Halifax ease their transition into Halifax and Canada through participation in the communal and sustainable Glen Garden. The authors provide an in-depth assessment based on interviews of the Lhotsampa community. For the border dwellers, the Glen Garden offers important tools to rebuild a sense of belonging through enabling traditional diets, providing an at-home feeling with familiar plant species, offering healthy adaptation and nourishing traditions, and forming and strengthening social capital with the Halifax community. Essentially, the Glen Garden emerges as an important transition on the settlement and integration continuum for the Lhotsampa after crossing many borders over many years to find this place. The Glen Garden then becomes much more than a sustainable way to increase local food security.

The focus on cultural communities and borders continues with the final chapter in the book. Alice Musabende examines the role of cultural communities in immigrant retention. Nova Scotia has long grappled with the problem of immigrant retention in a province where opportunities for newcomers are limited, mainly by economic constraints. The authors evaluate the role of the African Diaspora Association of the Maritimes (ADAM), and the African country-based associations, in immigrant retention.



Their findings based on extensive interviews confirm that secure employment is the main factor in immigrant retention, and that social factors also play a significant role. Cultural factors associated with the diaspora umbrella group ADAM, and, to a lesser degree, the country-based groups, do play a more minor role in retention if the question is whether to stay in Nova Scotia. However, the role of the associations in cultural community cohesion is more prominent among those diaspora members who do decide to stay in the region. Crossing the border into Canada may involve several transitions. For African immigrants in Nova Scotia, these transitions may be ameliorated by diaspora associations, but these associations may need to collaborate more effectively with each other and the Indigenous African Nova Scotians (non-immigrant Nova Scotians of African descent) in order to affect greater immigrant retention in the region.

Collectively, these essays provide insights about the current attention to borders and bordering in Atlantic Canada. The glimpses do not offer a comprehensive overview of current research in the field of border studies because a range of issues are not examined. These issues extend from Indigenous borders and bordering to aspects of border art and literature, to name but a few. Also, there is not complete regional coverage due to an emphasis on focused local research in Nova Scotia. However, the first three chapters do engage with the wider geography of borders and bordering within Atlantic Canada. The contribution of the volume then is to offer some regional fundamentals—ports, governance, historical constructs, trade patterns—as well as some innovative studies on bordering in the region. Combined, the chapters address the underlying themes of *Borders in Globalization*. Each essay draws on at least several of the themes of culture, flows, governance, history, security and sustainability, and illustrates how these themes are central to our understanding of 21st century borders.

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Chapter 1

The Atlantic Borderland: Processes of Bordering and the Re-Imagining of Region

Randy W. Widdis

In this chapter, I wish to lay a foundation for understanding the historical evolution of the Atlantic borderland. In doing so, I identify and discuss some of the key processes of bordering that developed in response to changing dynamisms occurring at the regional, national, and international levels. Also, I consider briefly how these processes resulted in a re-imagining of the borderland over time and conclude that despite the retention of significant integrative forces, the focus for both Atlantic Canada and New England increasingly lay elsewhere. My focus here will be on the settler peoples who colonized the region.

Before I begin, let me say a few words about borders and bordering. Borders are never fixed; they are imagined, contested, constructed, and reconstructed through time. In this context, bordering, the process through which borders are constructed and the categories of difference or separation created (Newman 2006), involves the production of identities. Bordering practices that produce such identities vary across space and time. If we wish to understand contemporary relations between differentiated territories and the role that identity plays in their construction, then it is necessary to view bordering as a collection of historically and culturally contingent processes that take place at different levels ranging from the individual to the nation-state. It is this perspective that informs this brief historical overview of the Atlantic borderland. This background, I believe, is essential to border-related policy-making within the Atlantic borderland.



Borderland Construction during the Colonial Era

John Bartlet Brebner (1927), George Rawlyk (1973), and Graeme Wynn (1989) have described a pre-revolutionary Nova Scotia and Acadia as part of a wider economic and cultural unit whose constituent parts were linked by ties of trade and kinship (Figure 1). Before their expulsion by the British in 1755-1764, Acadians, the descendants of the French settlers, and sometimes the Indigenous peoples, of parts of what is now New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island, the Gaspé peninsula of Québec, and the Kennebec River in southern Maine, traded their agricultural surplus with New England and so New Englanders were familiar with the Bay of Fundy region. After the expulsion, farmers, then called ‘Planters’, primarily from eastern Connecticut and to a lesser extent from Massachusetts and Rhode Island, took up former Acadian lands in the Annapolis Valley, around the head of the Bay of Fundy, and along the St. John River. The Planters, with their particular English dialects, village greens, Cape Cod cottages, and Congregational and Baptist churches, introduced New England influences to the Maritimes’ cultural landscape (Wynn 1988). The result, scholars have argued, was a northern extension of New England into the former Acadia.

Largely missing from this earlier literature is the central role that Indigenous nations played in both the Maritimes and New England before the Revolutionary War. After the coming of the Europeans, Native peoples quickly became engaged in the fur trade, at first dealing with Europeans on their ships moored in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and then after on land. At this point, these groups held a position of power in this particular “middle ground” (White 1991), but soon found themselves mired in the conflict between the British and French over control of the region. In the Maritimes and in northern Maine as well, Native peoples allied themselves with the French whom they believed were more interested in the fur trade than in taking their lands. By 1720 nearly all North America east of the Appalachians was in English hands. Acadia was lost to the British in 1713 but the French still hung on to Île Royale (Cape Breton Island). The British, however, were still wary of Native peoples’ alliance with the French and so negotiated a series of treaties with the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet peoples between 1725 and 1779 (Government of Canada 2010). There were no land cessions whatsoever in the agreements but the arrival of the Planters after the Acadian expulsion of 1755 and the Loyalists in the 1780s increased pressure on the Aboriginal land and resource base. While the treaties of 1760-61 conducted



Figure 1. The Pre-Revolutionary Northern British Colonies in America. Source: “A general map of the northern British colonies in America: which comprehends the province of Quebec, the government of Newfoundland, Nova-Scotia, New-England and New-York”, Samuel Holland and Thomas Pownall, 1776, London: Robert Sayer and Jonathan Bennett. Housed in the Norman B. Leventhal Map Center Collection of the Boston Public Library. No known copyright restrictions. <https://collections.leventhalmap.org/search/commonwealth:cj82m113z>.

between the British and Native peoples following the defeat of France were once viewed in the context of British hegemony and Indigenous subjugation, more recent scholarship (e.g., Reid 2004) asserts that the Planter era was a period in which aboriginal groups remained more powerful than is commonly believed. This position of relative power, however, quickly diminished with the flood of Loyalists into the region and the subsequent marginalization of Native peoples.

While the Planters had considerable impact on the immediate period preceding the Revolution, it was the 35,000 Loyalists, American residents remaining loyal to the Crown and arriving during the war and shortly thereafter, who would have the greatest impact on the future direction of the Maritimes. Donald Meinig (1986), J.M. Bumsted (1986) and Wynn (1988) maintain that the Planters and the Loyalists introduced some fundamental American political cultural values including representative government and, consequently, were key players in the



development of a Maritimes–New England borderland. However, Mancke (1990) warns that while the cultural landscape of Nova Scotia reveals evidence of New England origins, by the end of the 18th century Nova Scotian society had already been shaped in accordance with the institutions and values of the British Empire. Most notably, the loyalist presence was overwhelmed within a relatively short period of time by immigrants from Great Britain, particularly the Scottish migrants displaced by the Highland clearances and the Irish potato famine migrants.

The Post-Colonial and Pre-Confederation Borderland

Although cross-border connections weakened somewhat after the American Revolution, the Maritimes colonies continued to trade timber and fish products with the “Boston states” in what Wynn (1989) chooses to call “Greater New England”. He divides the international region into a core (Massachusetts), a domain (southern Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, Maine, and Connecticut), and a distant sphere (Prince Edward Island, Cape Breton, and northern New Brunswick and Nova Scotia). Boston served as the metropolis of this transborder region and what Wynn (1989, 88) terms the 18th century “Boston–Bay of Fundy axis” continued to function in the 19th century as “a critical determinant of interaction”. Wynn chooses to leave Newfoundland out of the loop, which suggests that he considers it to be either too distant or too closely connected to Britain and thus too far removed from the United States to be considered part of “Greater New England”.

Using this framework, Wynn identifies several “Greater New Englands”. The first he designates a *greater New England of experience* produced by seasonal and permanent movement of people from both sides back and forth across the border carrying goods and ideas which served to integrate the region and produce a common outlook. Over time, this movement became increasingly one way but managed to maintain its direction despite the western fever gripping North America. Wynn also identifies a *greater New England of the primitive and the romantic*. Although much more pronounced later, the image of the Maritimes as a pristine wilderness was beginning to take shape at mid-nineteenth century, creating a vacation hinterland for the more urban and densely populated New England core. Borrowing from the frontierists, Wynn argues that a ready availability of land, isolation, and pioneer conditions

combined with proximity to the United States to create a *greater New England of attitudes and artefacts* which resulted in a relative decrease of British manners and customs. While he does recognize that over time the Maritimes developed regional, national and even imperial sentiments which found expression in the region's culture, a common experience, interconnected economy, shared attitudes and a similar material culture would ensure the continuation of a "Greater New England".

Others have challenged Wynn's thesis, instead focusing on internal developments, growing links with central Canada and continuing connections with Britain that individually and collectively tempered New England's influence on the Maritimes despite increasing economic integration. Mancke (2005a) maintains that Nova Scotia and Massachusetts developed differently because of different cultures of localism and governance. The British, she maintains, governed Nova Scotia more directly than New England. Different cultures of localism and institutional practices of land grants and town incorporations facilitated an ideological spirit of independence among New England's settlers and adherence to authority among Nova Scotians, even though many of the latter were recent immigrants. In particular, she argues that the Nova Scotian townships were politically impotent and isolated from each other because imperial authorities curbed efforts to reproduce New England-style local autonomy.

In another forum, Mancke (2005b, 32) applies her concept of intersecting and competing "spaces of power," by which she means "systems of social power, whether economic, political, cultural, or military, that we can describe functionally and spatially" to challenge the conventional use of the core-periphery colonial model to explain early modern empires in the northeastern part of North America. Such empires, she contends, had more to do with multiple claimants to different spaces, activities, and resources than with a metropolitan controlled settlement, meaning a transnational region dominated by Boston. Early on, political boundaries in the region, she maintains, "became defined by the functional specificity of commercial and cultural relations between Europeans and natives rather than being taken from the abstract and mathematically defined boundaries articulated in royal charters. Those political boundaries, in turn, encompassed strikingly different configurations of power than those of colonies whose boundaries more closely conformed to the spaces of power defined in charter grants" (Mancke 2005b,



45). Mancke also argues that during the 18th century, Nova Scotia was in no position to be self-financing like the other older colonies to the south and as such continued to be more dependent on imperial connections with a European core (Britain) than on links with a transnational region core (New England). Julian Gwyn (2005, 106) insists that Nova Scotia, and by implication the rest of the Maritimes, was never too dependent on New England even after economic ties strengthened. He argues that despite increasing trade over time, Nova Scotia was not the product of New England imperialism, but rather of British imperialism, in which New England played a significant role both before and after the American Revolution.

While there is little doubt that the Maritimes continued to move within the orbit of both “Old” and “New” England and that increasing trade and migration, particularly the former, ensured a significant degree of integration, the question remains as to whether economic links, historical connections and geographical propinquity ensured cultural integration during the period. Certainly, the pre-revolutionary Planters and later the Loyalists left their imprint on the colonies in terms of material culture and social and political institutions, but the Loyalists particularly were a divided group and as such carried with them a mixed bag of values and commitments to imperial, loyalist and republican ideals. American values, opinions, and ideals, as well as material goods, were indeed carried to Atlantic Canada through the mediums of trade, migration, and various forms of communication (e.g., newspapers). But this American presence, Phillip Buckner (1993, 25) maintains, was soon diminished by a flood of British immigrants which served to transform “the Maritimes from a ‘borderland’ region of the United States into a region increasingly aware of and committed to its British identity”. In his view, the Maritime colonies of this period were characterized by a population, at least an Anglophone population, which increasingly identified with their colony rather than with the wider region, British North America, Britain, or the United States. As population density increased and geographical isolation was eroded, a process of ethnic fusion took place within the colonies that created a distinctive culture that was an amalgam of British, American, and uniquely regional influences (Buckner 1993, 26).

Considerable economic integration primarily through trade and secondarily through migration and investment took place between New England and the Maritimes before 1870

but attachment to Britain, a slowly evolving but challenging association with Canada, and a developing regional consciousness counteracted further incorporation into the U.S. orbit. Few advocated joining the U.S. but much debate occurred over the direction to be taken even before the end of the Civil War and the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty (1854-1866), which mutually reduced import duties and protective tariffs on certain goods exchanged between the two countries. Support for some form of British American union was more widespread in the Maritimes during the late 1850s and early 1860s than is commonly believed (Martin 2008). Maritimers understood that Canada needed winter ports on the Atlantic seaboard and recognized the potential that the colonies to the west presented in terms of a hinterland for Maritimes products. And while Maritimers welcomed American trade and investment, they were still wary of the threat of annexation.

The Post-1867 Re-imagining of the Maritimes and Newfoundland

A strong association between the Maritimes and New England, along with a growing relationship between Newfoundland and New England, continued after Canadian Confederation in 1867 but the composition of this connection changed. The decline of the regional economy triggered a massive exodus from the Maritimes after 1870 (Brookes 1976). Newfoundland, for somewhat different reasons than the Maritimes, also experienced major economic challenges during the period and likewise experienced significant but unknown out-migration. Patricia Thornton (1985, 3) makes an important distinction between Maritimes and Newfoundland out-migration when she states: "In the Maritimes, the most commonly held view is that out-migration was (and indeed still is) a consequence of the failure of the region to industrialize successfully, whereas in Newfoundland overpopulation (and hence a lack of sufficient out-migration) is seen as a cause of worsening economic conditions."

There is considerable debate over the economic decline of the Maritimes following Confederation. At its most simple level, the argument pits a group of historians mostly from the Atlantic region (e.g. Acheson 1972; Acheson 1977; Forbes 1979), who put the blame for underdevelopment on national policies developed by a federal government biased towards a more powerful central



Canada against a group of historians, based for the most part but not exclusively outside the region (e.g. George 1971; Rawlyk 1971), who maintain that the economic problems facing Atlantic Canadians were of their own making. Others, particularly Kris Inwood (1985), argue that it was the fundamental factor of the region's geography, specifically its poor soils, lack of hydro-power and distance from growing markets, that hindered development. I believe that all these factors came into play, although there appears to be a strong consensus that the Maritimes and Newfoundland were disadvantaged during a period when the consolidation and the formation of monopoly capitalism, or, in other words, the unevenness of capitalist development, more and more favoured central Canada. Together with ineffectual federal policies and declining Parliamentary representation, these factors made it extremely difficult for the region to make the transition from the old seaborne economy to the new industrial order.

The northern woods and mill towns of Maine attracted a considerable number of Maritimers, particularly from New Brunswick. But most migrants from the Maritimes and Newfoundland located in Boston and its immediate hinterland. The 1900 census records 158,753 and 36,169 English-speaking Canadian-born residing in Massachusetts and Maine respectively, as compared to 14,547, 10,616, 7,871 and 7,744 in New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, and Rhode Island (Historical Census Browser 2004). Most of these migrants hailed from the Maritimes. Maritimers alone constituted 22 percent of the foreign-born population of Boston in 1900 (U.S. Census 1904). W.G. Reeves (1990, 35) shows that between 1885 and 1915, Massachusetts was the major American destination for Newfoundlanders, the majority at first settling in Boston and suburbs and then gradually locating in other centres in the state. The exodus continued unabated well into the new century but during the opening phases of the Depression, the US government imposed severe restrictions on continental immigration and naturalization and the flow of Maritimers to New England reduced to a trickle, never again reaching its former levels. The flow of people was primarily one-way as relatively few Americans moved to the Maritimes and Newfoundland. A struggling Atlantic Canada could not compete with the opportunities presented in both central Canada and the Canadian west.

Space constraints allow only a few general comments about the other flows that connected Atlantic Canada and New England

during the 20th century. Cross-border transportation by boat expanded but land-based transportation, while facilitated significantly by the advent of the automobile, continued to be problematic. Cross-border investment increased but remained relatively minor compared to that taking place in other borderland regions. Cross-border communication expanded but was tempered by the development of technologies that extended the information field well beyond the borders of the transnational region (e.g., cable television, internet). Cross-border trade continued but declined in relative importance considering increasing connections taking place within both Canada and the United States. Cross-border governance became more important towards the end of the 20th century but faced obstacles that impaired its effectiveness. Most importantly, over time north-south integration was moderated by nationalist forces—economic, political, social, and cultural.

The Free Trade Economic Borderland (1989-2016)

After the implementation of the free trade policies towards the end of the century (1989, 1993), all four Atlantic provinces experienced growth in U.S. merchandise trade (Table 1). However, over time, New Brunswick has been most invested in foreign trade as expressed in absolute dollar amounts of exports and imports (Table 2). It also is the Atlantic province in the free trade era that relies most on the United States as its major export market, ranking along with Ontario and Alberta in this regard (Table 3). Figure 2 shows that while there are only two American states out of 50—Michigan and Vermont—where trade with Canada exceeds 10 percent of their annual economic output, Canadian provinces, most notably New Brunswick and Ontario, are in large part overwhelmingly dependent on keeping the borders open with the United States. Newfoundland and Labrador is the Atlantic province that relies most in relative terms on markets outside the United States,

Table 1. Growth in U.S. Merchandise Trade, by Province and Territory, 1990-1999, value in thousands of Canadian dollars. Data source: Industry Canada (1999).

Province	1990	1999	% change
Newfoundland & Labrador	1,315	1,998	51.9
Prince Edward Island	101	489	381.4
New Brunswick	2,077	5,204	150.5
Nova Scotia	1,515	3,144	107.5

Table 2. Selected Trade Statistics by Province, 1994, 2001, 2011, 2016. Data source: Industry Canada, Trade Data Online 2013: <https://bit.ly/3oyubix>

	1994		2001		2011		2016	
	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports
All countries	1,618,316,815	439,654,390	3,529,415,887	1,834,711,006	12,137,154,489	3,647,221,592	8,436,761,594	5,812,530,901
United States	848,871,937	140,149,974	2,263,948,304	246,142,429	8,075,953,699	436,682,887	4,970,572,678	1,286,419,288
U.S. as % of all countries	52.5	31.9	64.1	13.4	66.5	12.0	58.9	22.1
Prince Edward Island								
All countries	295,763,388	49,055,522	676,506,940	20,058,664	754,568,888	62,196,618	1,269,670,327	66,235,876
United States	188,503,245	29,230,925	600,350,392	11,399,354	512,419,377	47,294,153	925,194,116	30,184,190
U.S. as % of all countries	63.7	59.6	88.7	56.8	67.9	76.0	72.9	45.6
Nova Scotia								
All countries	3,066,080,922	3,335,306,251	5,806,831,892	5,593,663,122	4,460,287,080	8,352,244,758	5,288,670,532	8,162,019,647
United States	2,315,926,414	461,525,275	4,795,070,459	1,063,745,807	3,267,850,539	386,555,626	3,600,969,918	1,032,875,199
U.S. as % of all countries	75.5	13.8	82.6	19.0	73.3	4.6	68.1	12.7
New Brunswick								
All countries	4,333,010,077	3,262,996,643	8,351,456,268	5,627,162,871	14,817,390,351	13,659,112,358	10,635,328,130	9,222,018,536
United States	3,158,651,754	1,469,171,150	7,433,850,794	2,203,630,599	12,484,773,466	2,818,456,692	9,730,514,367	4,100,711,678
U.S. as % of all countries	72.9	45.0	89.0	40.9	84.3	20.6	91.5	44.5
Canada								
All countries	225,678,976,582	202,736,239,508	404,085,073,347	343,110,507,927	446,688,130,368	446,665,972,704	497,389,090,342	533,301,791,906
United States	183,302,509,711	137,344,621,630	351,751,485,977	218,290,167,166	328,972,291,504	221,424,308,989	375,232,185,321	278,267,800,781
U.S. as % of all countries	81.2	67.7	87.0	63.6	73.6	49.6	75.4	52.2

Table 3. U.S. Trade Rankingsⁱ of Provinces and Yukon Territory, 1994, 2001, 2011, 2016. Source: see Table 2.

Export Rankings	1994	2001	2011	2016	Import Rankings	1994	2001	2011	2016
1	ON	YK ⁱⁱ	AB	YK ⁱⁱⁱ	1	YK	YK	YK	YK
2	PQ	ON	NB	NB	2	SK	SK	SK	SK
3	AB	NB	ON	AB	3	MB	MB	MB	MB
4	NS	PEI	NS	ON	4	AB	AB	PEI	AB
5	MB	AB	YK	PEI	5	ON	ON	AB	ON
6	NB	PQ	PEI	PQ	6	PEI	PEI	ON	PEI
7	PEI	NS	PQ	NS	7	BC	BC	BC	NB
8	YK	MB	NL	MB	8	NB	NB	PQ	BC
9	BC	BC	SK	NL	9	PQ	PQ	NB	PQ
10	NL	NL	MB	BC	10	NL	NS	NL	NL
11	SK	SK	BC	SK	11	NS	NL	NS	NS

- i Trade ranked in terms of relative percentage of world trade conducted with the United States.
- ii Increase accounted for by collapse of the Japanese export market.
- iii Increase accounted for by collapse of the Chinese export market.

Canada-U.S. trade (imports and exports)

As a percentage of state/province GDP




Figure 2. Canada-U.S. total trade as a percentage of state/province GDP, 2015. Map source: Chase (2017). This map was developed for this article by Trevor Tombe, an economics professor at the University of Calgary. I wish to thank Trevor for allowing me to use his map



continuing the historical trend. Generally, the Atlantic region imports relatively less from the United States than does Ontario, the Prairie Provinces and Yukon Territory with Prince Edward Island most reliant on this trade, followed by New Brunswick, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia.

In 1994, Maine, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire ranked in the top ten destination states for New Brunswick products, together comprising 50.6 percent and 36.8 percent of all exports shipped to the United States and the entire world respectively (Table 4). Maine and Massachusetts ranked first and second and well ahead of other American states in this regard. Non-crude petroleum, crustaceans, electricity, lumber, and wood pulp were other major products exported to these states (Kukucha 2008, 80). In 2016, the same four states continued to rank in the top ten and together comprised 69.3 percent and 62.9 percent of the U.S. and global markets respectively. By this time, New Hampshire had eclipsed all other states in terms of importance; in fact, almost half of all New Brunswick exports were sent to that state. Again, refined petroleum dominated this trade, followed distantly by softwood lumber, fish and crustaceans, and wood and semi-finished wood products. Maine's top imports from Canada included fish and crustaceans, electricity, wood pulp, softwood lumber, and paper and paperboard (Dumont 2017, 3). New Brunswick relies heavily on refined petroleum and so suffers greatly when there is a drop in the value of energy products.

While the U.S. is the province's largest source of imports (\$4,100,530,000 in 2016), New Brunswick brings in products from a diverse number of countries (Table 5). In 2016, Saudi Arabia ranked second to the U.S. as a source of imports, followed by Nigeria, Norway, and Peru. Imports from other countries totaled more in value than imports from the U.S. in both 1994 and 2016. The most important item from outside North America is crude petroleum, which is brought in from Norway, Saudi Arabia, Guinea, Nigeria, Angola, and other countries and then processed at the Irving plant, Canada's largest oil refinery. The major import from the United States is live and fresh crustaceans, which come primarily from Maine, New Brunswick's most important trading partner. Maine exports to Atlantic Canada accounted for more than 62 percent of the state's total exports to Canada in 2016, with 99.96 percent of that total sent to New Brunswick. In that year, the state's top three Canadian trading partners were New Brunswick (\$1,053,266,888), followed distantly by Québec and

Table 4. New Brunswick's Total Exports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$.
New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Maine	915,007,372	29.0	21.1
Massachusetts	556,270,326	17.6	12.8
Texas	383,577,586	12.1	8.9
New York	163,874,931	5.2	3.8
New Jersey	133,841,816	4.2	3.1
Pennsylvania	81,365,644	2.6	1.9
Connecticut	70,559,583	2.2	1.6
New Hampshire	57,588,541	1.8	1.3
Virginia	53,225,562	1.7	1.2
Georgia	50,575,648	1.6	1.2
Total Top 10 States	2,465,917,009	78.0	56.8
Other States	692,734,755	22.0	16.0
U.S. Total	3,158,651,764		
Other Countries	1,174,358,313		
Total	4,333,010,077		
2016			
New Hampshire	4,354,373,998	45.1	40.9
Massachusetts	1,425,370,853	14.8	13.4
Maine	764,692,180	7.9	7.2
New York	412,038,249	4.3	3.9
New Jersey	361,078,497	3.7	3.4
Pennsylvania	257,769,339	2.7	2.4
Puerto Rico	235,630,688	2.4	2.2
Florida	222,517,183	2.3	2.1
Texas	169,160,498	1.8	1.6
Connecticut	147,280,714	1.5	1.4
Total Top 10 States	8,349,912,199	86.5	78.5
Other States	1,310,617,373	13.5	12.3
U.S. Total	9,660,529,572		
Other Countries	974,798,558		
Total	10,635,328,130		

Ontario. Maine ranks alongside North Dakota and Montana as the U.S. states most dependent on export trade with Canada. This trade is also important for Vermont but less so for the other New England states.

New Brunswick ranked third among New Hampshire's top five Canadian trading partners in 2016 (3.2 percent of the total value of imports sent to Canada), following far behind Ontario (51.2 percent) and Québec (37.6 percent). It ranked fourth among Massachusetts's Canadian trading partners (3.2 percent),



Table 5. New Brunswick’s Total Imports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$.
New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Maine	205,269,000	14.0	6.3
South Carolina	160,774,714	10.9	4.9
Pennsylvania	75,748,741	5.2	2.3
Texas	75,360,140	5.2	2.3
Ohio	69,971,429	4.8	2.1
Michigan	63,819,067	4.3	2.0
Florida	59,331,847	4.0	1.8
Massachusetts	55,217,264	3.8	1.7
California	53,960,509	3.7	1.7
Illinois	52,219,161	3.6	1.6
Total Top 10 States	871,671,872	59.3	26.7
Other States	597,499,278	40.7	18.3
U.S. Total	1,469,171,150		
Other Countries	1,793,825,493		
Total	3,262,996,643		
2016			
Maine	1,053,274,963	25.7	11.4
Texas	534,842,401	13.1	5.8
Louisiana	402,776,687	9.8	4.4
South Carolina	210,328,339	5.1	2.3
North Carolina	158,255,240	3.9	1.7
Puerto Rico	156,586,678	3.8	1.7
Georgia	149,942,502	3.7	1.6
Pennsylvania	149,532,251	3.7	1.6
Massachusetts	125,936,635	3.1	1.4
Ohio	83,202,430	2.0	0.9
Total Top 10 States	3,024,678,126	73.9	32.8
Other States	1,070,192,164	26.1	11.6
U.S. Total	4,094,870,290		
Other Countries	5,127,148,246		
Total	9,222,018,536		

following far behind Ontario (55.8 percent) and Québec (32.1 percent). New Brunswick also ranked fourth among Vermont’s Canadian partners (0.5 percent), following far behind Québec (90.1 percent), significantly behind Ontario (8.0 percent), and just behind British Columbia (0.7 percent). It didn’t make the top five ranking for Connecticut or Rhode Island.

Certainly, the deepening level of economic integration with the U.S. and the continuing economic ties with New England, particularly in terms of an export market, has ensured New

Brunswick's place as the most pronounced province in the Atlantic borderland region. According to University of Calgary economist Trevor Tombe, trade with the U.S. accounts for 50 percent of the province's economic output. This compares with 29 percent for Newfoundland, 14 percent for Nova Scotia, and 13 percent for PEI (Chase 2017). Everything that travels by land from any point in Atlantic Canada to the United States must pass through New Brunswick. Together, New Brunswick and New England, primarily Maine, comprise a functional economic region that has developed and continues to develop based on exploitation of complementary resources such as mining, lumber, fishing, tourism, and more recently, an integrated cross-border energy sector.

Like its neighbour, Nova Scotia ships most of its exports to the United States although relatively more of its products in the recent past have gone to other markets, particularly China. Pneumatic rubber tires, produced for the most part at the Michelin Pictou County plant, took top spot in the list of exports sent to the U.S. in 2016, followed closely by seafood products, and more distantly by liquified petroleum or hydrocarbon gases, and paper products. In 1994, only Massachusetts and Maine ranked in the top ten destination states for Nova Scotia products, together comprising 24.5 percent and 18.5 percent of all exports shipped to the United States and the entire world respectively (Table 6). In 2016, the same two states continued to rank in the top ten and together comprised 27 percent and 18.1 percent of the U.S. and global markets respectively. The American market for Nova Scotia products is significantly more widespread than it is for New Brunswick goods. In 2015, New England was the destination of 23.4 percent of Nova Scotia's exports, followed by the American South-East (19.6 percent), and Asia-excluding-the-Middle-East (14.4 percent) (Nova Scotia Finance and Treasury Board 2017). Massachusetts continues to be the number one state for Nova Scotia exports, particularly liquefied petroleum and crustaceans, while tires are the major exports shipped to South Carolina and Michigan, crude petroleum is sent to Texas, and crustaceans are shipped to Maine (Kukucha 2008: 30).

Unlike New Brunswick, Nova Scotia relies more on other countries for its imports than the United States (Table 7). In 2016, the top five countries for Nova Scotia imports were Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Cuba. Imports from Germany and Sweden are primarily passenger vehicles and automobile parts which are sent to the province because it serves as the point

Table 6. Nova Scotia’s Total Exports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$. New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Massachusetts	453,104,921	19.6	14.8
New Jersey	421,203,218	18.2	13.7
Michigan	148,604,483	6.4	4.8
South Carolina	137,558,723	5.9	4.5
Maine	113,071,913	4.9	3.7
Pennsylvania	112,350,503	4.9	3.7
New York	100,832,935	4.4	3.3
Texas	86,489,005	3.7	2.8
Illinois	73,617,274	3.2	2.4
Alabama	69,852,052	3.0	2.3
Total Top 10 States	1,716,685,027	74.2	56.0
Other States	599,241,387	25.8	19.5
U.S. Total	2,315,926,414		
Other Countries	750,154,508		
Total	3,066,080,922		
2016			
Massachusetts	715,040,525	20.2	13.5
South Carolina	684,159,550	19.3	12.9
Illinois	347,760,136	9.8	6.6
Maine	240,960,492	6.8	4.6
Texas	138,105,863	3.9	2.6
New York	115,992,409	3.3	2.2
California	100,461,807	2.8	1.9
New Jersey	94,877,299	2.7	1.8
Maryland	85,584,534	2.4	1.6
Indiana	79,293,100	2.2	1.5
Total Top 10 States	2,602,235,715	73.4	49.2
Other States	944,968,042	26.6	17.9
U.S. Total	3,547,203,757		
Other Countries	1,741,466,775		
Total	5,288,670,532		

of entry for European car companies such as Mercedes-Benz, Saab, and Volvo. Imports from the United States include non-crude petroleum, passenger vehicles and machinery (Kukuchka 2008, 30). Massachusetts in 1994 and Connecticut in 2016 were the only two New England states to rank in the top ten states of origin for imports. In 2016, Nova Scotia ranked fourth among Connecticut’s top five Canadian trading partners (7.0 percent of Canadian total), following Ontario (40.6 percent), Québec (8.3 percent), and British Columbia (7.9 percent). Nova Scotia did not make the top five ranking for any other New England state that year.

Table 7. Nova Scotia's Total Imports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$. New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Ohio	59,217,386	12.8	1.8
Michigan	54,374,536	11.8	1.6
South Carolina	30,987,778	6.7	0.9
Minnesota	27,596,806	6.0	0.8
California	25,191,063	5.5	0.8
Massachusetts	21,204,732	4.6	0.6
New York	21,126,959	4.5	0.6
New Jersey	20,581,128	4.5	0.6
Illinois	19,823,105	4.3	0.6
Georgia	14,807,539	3.2	0.4
Total Top 10 States	294,911,032	63.9	8.8
Other States	166,614,243	36.1	5.0
U.S. Total	461,525,275		
Other Countries	2,873,780,976		
Total	3,335,306,251		
2016			
Texas	680,995,248	65.9	8.3
Connecticut	145,289,653	14.1	1.8
Virginia	57,539,052	5.6	0.7
Louisiana	20,727,079	2.0	0.3
Pennsylvania	20,624,512	2.0	0.3
Illinois	18,405,702	1.8	0.2
Colorado	11,720,572	1.1	0.1
Wisconsin	9,325,980	0.9	0.1
New York	8,619,176	0.8	0.1
California	8,610,551	0.8	0.1
Total Top 10 States	981,857,525	95.1	12.0
Other States	50,750,678	4.9	0.7
U.S. Total	1,032,608,203		
Other Countries	7,129,411,444		
Total	8,162,019,647		

Prince Edward Island's economy remains one of the country's most fragile, with a heavy reliance on agriculture, the fisheries, tourism, and federal transfers. The province historically has depended on the U.S. in general and New England in particular for buying its products and for supplying many of its tourists. Prince Edward Island's trade is so small compared to other provinces that any shift in fortune has significant impact on relative numbers. That is evident in Table 8 which shows the significant increase in the percentage of exports, as measured in value, directed towards the United States between 1994 and

2016. This continued to be high in the early 2000s until relative percentages declined towards the end of the decade when a higher Canadian dollar depressed the sale of Canadian exports (Kukucha 2008, 32). In 2016, PEI exports were dominated by frozen potatoes, followed by lobsters, and more distantly by turbojets and turbopropellers. In 1994, only Massachusetts and Maine ranked in the top ten destination states for PEI products, together comprising 35.4 percent and 22.5 percent of all exports shipped to the United States and the entire world respectively. That year, all six New England states comprised 45 percent of the

Table 8. Prince Edward Island's Total Exports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$. New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Massachusetts	45,090,044	23.9	15.2
New Jersey	25,842,613	13.7	8.7
Maine	21,731,798	11.5	7.3
Pennsylvania	10,618,365	5.6	3.6
Florida	9,411,530	5.0	3.2
New York	9,323,896	4.9	3.2
Puerto Rico	7,077,108	3.8	2.4
Michigan	6,273,915	3.3	2.1
Texas	5,923,900	3.1	2.0
Georgia	5,458,851	2.9	1.8
Total Top 10 State	146,752,020	77.7	46.5
Other States	41,751,225	22.3	14.1
U.S. Total	188,503,245		
Other Countries	107,260,143		
Total	295,763,388		
2016			
Massachusetts	170,819,231	18.5	13.4
New York	119,266,682	12.9	9.4
New Jersey	113,776,571	12.4	9.0
Texas	64,531,623	7.0	5.1
New Hampshire	57,634,338	6.3	4.5
Maine	42,415,248	4.6	3.3
Pennsylvania	39,769,085	4.3	3.1
Florida	35,183,314	3.8	2.8
Illinois	33,624,938	3.7	2.6
California	27,847,380	3.0	2.2
Total Top 10 States	704,868,410	76.5	45.4
Other States	216,256,258	23.5	17.0
U.S. Total	921,124,668		
Other Countries	348,545,659		
Total	1,269,670,327		

entire U.S. export market for PEI. In 2016, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine ranked in the top ten destination states, together making up 29.4 percent and 21.2 percent of all exports shipped to the United States and the entire world respectively. New England constituted 30.6 percent of the total export market for PEI that year, considerably less than the relative percentage in 1994. Like Nova Scotia, the American market for PEI products is more eclectic than that for New Brunswick products.

PEI has always depended more on imported goods from the U.S. than other provinces in the region. However, by 2016 the province imported more goods in value from other countries than the United States (Table 9). While PEI imports a wide variety of goods, the most important product by far in 2016 was phosphates (fertilizer), which made up 74.7 percent of the value of imports from all countries. Obviously, the importance of agriculture to the economy is evident in both the exports from and imports to the province. Maine in 1994 and Connecticut in 2016 were the only two New England states to place in the top ten states of origin for imports and they ranked relatively low in that list. Because of its small size, PEI did not make the top five ranking for any New England state either in 1994 or 2016.

Newfoundland is the Atlantic province in the free trade era that relies least on the United States as its major export market, ranking along with Saskatchewan and British Columbia in this regard. In 1992 Newfoundland shipped 50.7 percent of its total exports (in dollars) to the U.S. market (Kukucha 2008, 32); two years later, this figure increased to 52.5 percent (Table 10). Thereafter, Newfoundland exports to the United States fluctuated considerably. In 2016, the United Kingdom, China, the Netherlands, and Belgium ranked second to fifth as export markets for Newfoundland. In 2016, shipments to the U.S. were dominated by crude and non-crude oil, followed distantly by crustaceans and newsprint. Like New Brunswick, Newfoundland relies heavily on the oil and gas industry although it depends primarily on the shipment of crude, as opposed to non-crude, oils. In 2016, \$2,986,838,321 worth of crude petroleum oils was sent to the United States (77.3 percent of world total).

In 1994, Massachusetts and Maine ranked in the top ten destination states for Newfoundland products, together comprising 27.5 percent and 14.4 percent of all exports shipped to the United States and the entire world, respectively. Together, all the New England states that year consumed 29.2 percent of



Newfoundland exports sent to the U.S. In 2016, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Maine ranked in the top ten and together comprised 13.7 percent and 8.1 percent of U.S. and global markets respectively. Together, New England states that year consumed 14.2 percent of Newfoundland exports sent to the U.S.

As was the case for Nova Scotia, the U.S. has not always been the major source of imports for Newfoundland (Table 11). In 2016, the top five countries for Newfoundland imports were South Korea (49.7 percent of the world total), the United States

Table 9 Prince Edward Island's Total Imports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$. New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Michigan	5,967,222	20.4	12.2
Minnesota	3,526,238	12.1	7.2
Ohio	3,216,035	11.0	6.6
New York	2,896,089	9.9	5.9
Florida	2,212,027	7.6	4.5
Maryland	1,915,628	6.6	3.9
Maine	1,235,344	4.2	2.5
Kentucky	1,187,961	4.1	2.4
Illinois	1,178,645	4.0	2.4
Texas	1,084,819	3.7	2.2
Total Top 10 States	24,420,008	83.5	49.8
Other States	4,810,917	16.5	9.8
U.S. Total	29,230,925		
Other Countries	19,824,597		
Total	49,055,522		
2016			
Florida	22,535,076	79.1	34.0
New York	1,087,202	3.6	1.6
California	1,056,282	3.5	1.5
New Jersey	1,024,909	3.4	1.5
Wisconsin	927,746	3.1	1.4
Iowa	552,223	1.8	0.8
South Carolina	517,225	1.7	0.8
Illinois	337,532	1.1	0.5
Delaware	226,406	0.8	0.3
Connecticut	215,120	0.7	0.2
Total Top 10 States	28,479,721	94.3	43.0
Other States	1,704,469	5.7	2.6
U.S. Total	30,184,190		
Other Countries	36,051,686		
Total	66,235,876		

(22.2 percent), Norway (6.5 percent), Nigeria (6.4 percent), and the United Kingdom (4.9 percent). No country outside the U.S., however, has consistently been the major source for imports. Imports to the province are dominated by crude petroleum from the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, Nigeria, Russia and Iraq (at least in 2011); and machines and appliances from South Korea. In this small but resource-rich province, “contracts and individual forms have a strong impact on ... [the] economy” (Kukucha 2008, 32). Massachusetts in 1994 was the only New England state to rank in the top ten states of origin for imports.

Table 10 Newfoundland’s Total Exports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$. New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Massachusetts	167,282,873	19.7	10.3
Maryland	109,618,096	12.9	6.8
Texas	88,682,601	10.4	5.5
Pennsylvania	81,204,894	9.6	5.0
Maine	65,694,013	7.8	4.1
Indiana	60,008,580	7.1	3.7
Virginia	41,382,366	4.9	2.6
Ohio	37,940,824	4.5	2.3
Puerto Rico	33,686,018	4.0	2.1
West Virginia	20,576,118	2.4	1.3
Total Top 10 States	706,346,383	83.3	43.7
Other States	142,524,554	16.7	16.8
U.S. Total	848,870,937		
Other Countries	769,445,958		
Total	1,618,316,895		
2016			
New Jersey	2,407,262,110	48.9	28.5
Pennsylvania	826,400,746	16.8	9.8
Massachusetts	527,321,231	10.7	6.3
Louisiana	177,073,314	3.6	2.1
Maryland	172,073,314	3.5	2.0
Florida	145,948,783	3.0	1.7
Texas	138,092,783	2.8	1.6
Puerto Rico	103,336,422	2.1	1.2
Rhode Island	75,959,209	1.5	0.9
Maine	73,570,433	1.5	0.9
Total Top 10 States	4,647,277,960	94.4	55.0
Other States	278,979,173	5.6	3.3
U.S. Total	4,926,257,133		
Other Countries	3,510,504,461		
Total	8,436,761,594		

Table 11. Newfoundland’s Total Imports by U.S. States, 1994, 2016, in Cdn \$.
 New England States are bolded. Source: See Table 2.

<u>State</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of U.S.</u>	<u>% of all countries</u>
1994			
Michigan	22,585,862	16.1	5.1
Ohio	15,612,315	11.1	3.6
Maryland	15,190,710	10.8	3.5
Minnesota	14,582,210	10.4	3.3
Illinois	7,451,057	5.3	1.7
Louisiana	7,366,263	5.3	1.7
New York	7,027,931	5.0	1.6
Texas	5,361,946	3.8	1.2
California	5,241,246	3.7	1.1
Massachusetts	4,695,656	3.4	1.1
Total Top 10 States	105,115,196	64.9	23.9
Other States	35,034,778	35.1	8.0
U.S. Total	140,149,974		
Other Countries	299,504,416		
Total	439,654,390		
2016			
Louisiana	709,020,860	55.1	12.2
Texas	512,964,882	39.9	8.8
Virginia	19,803,434	1.5	0.3
New Jersey	19,444,214	1.5	0.3
Wisconsin	13,637,667	1.1	0.2
Pennsylvania	3,608,687	0.3	0.1
California	2,994,909	0.2	0.1
Georgia	1,473,731	0.1	0.03
New York	1,260,412	0.1	0.02
Washington	325,159	0.03	0.01
Total Top 10 States	1,284,533,955	99.9	22.1
Other States	1,884,531	0.1	0.03
U.S. Total	1,286,418,486		
Other Countries	4,526,112,415		
Total	5,182,530,901		

In that year, most U.S. imports hailed from the Midwest (motor vehicles) and Maryland (aerials). No New England state in 2016 made the top ten list; most imports came from Louisiana and Texas (crude petroleum). Together, the New England states sent \$716,295 worth of imports to Newfoundland, only 0.1 percent of the American total and 0.01 percent of the world total.

While Newfoundland has developed a closer trade relationship with the U.S. during the era of free trade than it had ever experienced in the past, New England plays a relatively small

part in this commerce. As well, the province still relies heavily on trade with other countries, particularly in terms of imports. Increasingly, Newfoundland has depended on trade in petroleum products which leaves it vulnerable to the ups and downs of the energy industry.

As shown, New Brunswick has a stronger spatial and economic orientation to the United States in general and New England particularly and thus is more susceptible to economic downturn when the prices for its major export commodity—refined petroleum—fall. While early in the free trade period, all Canadian provinces except Newfoundland increased their share of exports to the U.S. (Andresen 2009, 191), more recently, the dependence of Atlantic Canada on American markets for exports has fluctuated, the sole exception being New Brunswick. Over the last twenty years or so, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island have had larger shares of their imports from the U.S. than Nova Scotia and Newfoundland, but these figures have vacillated significantly. What can be gleaned from these statistics is that except for New Brunswick, the Atlantic provinces have not experienced significantly greater economic integration with the United States through trade during the free trade era. And as shown, much of the trade that has taken place is with states outside the New England region.

History, Culture and the Idea of a “Greater” New England”

While proximity and a shared environment ensured the development of many interdependencies, there is little evidence, outside of the unique case of Madawaska, of the emergence of a “Greater New England”, i.e., a hybrid space where cultural antecedents were altered by the process of cross-border mixing. Scholars of the Atlantic borderland (e.g., Craig 1986; Konrad 1991) generally point to the Madawaska region of the upper St. John River as the place where cross-border culture is most pronounced. By the middle of the 19th century, Madawaska had developed as a unique district in the northeast, a place where Acadians, Québécois, Anglo-Maritimers, primarily from New Brunswick, and Anglo-Americans, primarily from Maine, came together to form a cultural fusion that was clearly different and more distinctive from any other borderland place within the wider region. Arguably, it was the French “fact” that distinguished this particular borderland place; the dominance of



the French language, architectural styles, customs and Catholic religion enabled Acadians, Québécois and Brayons, despite their internal differences, to control space and create a place that would offer protection from an overwhelming Anglo-American and Anglo-Canadian cultural presence. However, over time, the French “fact” played less of a role in joining the New Brunswick and Maine sides. While the French language has survived in New Brunswick, it has significantly declined in Maine.

Nevertheless, cultural similarities do exist; for example, New England Loyalists and Planters introduced architectural and urban designs to the Maritimes but this was cultural transfer, not cultural hybridization. Strong historical and geographical similarities between Atlantic Canada and New England included a shared Anglo-Celtic settlement and a pronounced French presence, while a marked orientation towards the sea also ensured connections. Along the Maine–New Brunswick border, frequent contact generated trans-cultural processes which transcended and/or mediated cultural differences. For example, the lumber woods of New Brunswick and Maine fostered a vibrant folksong tradition during the 19th and early 20th centuries (Konrad 1991). Over time, U.S. culture in the form of media (e.g., cable television) and consumerism, more often conveying messages and values from outside than from within New England, made increasing inroads into Atlantic Canada but these influences were more than counteracted by the interweaving of a developing national culture and a strongly entrenched regional culture. As Colin Howell (2005, 279) documents, cross-border cultural connections also existed in sport where during the period between the world wars, “Maritimers and New Englanders developed a sense of shared sporting culture through connections on sporting diamonds, in hunting grounds, on the ocean, and along long-distance race courses”. However, after World War II, he asserts, the imagining of the northeast as a coherent transnational sporting region gave way to other constructions, most notably a pan-Canadian sporting connection that served as a countervailing force to a borderland sporting culture (Howell 2002, 266).

For most of its history, Newfoundland and Labrador operated in a different context, primarily as a resource-dependent society that had developed from a small though important residential population in the early modern era, and as a result developed a culture, economy and society unlike that of the Maritimes. It did develop over time ties with the Maritimes and New England but

remained significantly different. After it entered Confederation in 1949, the province established strong economic links with the rest of Canada. Although U.S. troops stationed in military bases in Newfoundland and Labrador during World War II brought American popular culture to Newfoundlanders, the province's isolation from New England meant that its music remained relatively isolated from that market even though over time the national media of Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in particular, ensured that the folk music culture of Newfoundland would expand beyond its borders to the rest of the country.

After Confederation, the orientation of New England and Atlantic Canada took different directions, resulting in a reconfiguration of the Atlantic borderland. Historical ties remained strong but increasingly the focus for both regions lay elsewhere. Except for that part of northern Maine contiguous to the border, New England largely pursued connections with other regions of the United States and elsewhere in the world; few New England capitalists and citizens invested in or moved to Atlantic Canada. While New England was more important to Atlantic Canadians than Atlantic Canada was to New Englanders, the flows and mobilities of people, capital, goods, and ideas increasingly integrated Canada's eastern provinces with the rest of Canada. Despite resentment towards Ottawa and central Canada over the lack of economic development and resultant dependency on federal subsidies and the consequent reservations that many people in the region expressed at various times about Confederation's unfulfilled promise, Atlantic Canada's major frame of reference was increasingly national. A number of developments including the new federalism articulated in the Rowell-Sirois Report, the nation building that accompanied the war effort, Newfoundland's entry into Confederation (and the concomitant reimagining of the Maritimes as Atlantic Canada), the establishment of national standards in education and health, hospitalization and universal healthcare, and the creation and elaboration of new cultural institutions forged a deeper allegiance to Canada after World War II. Even under somewhat adverse conditions, interprovincial trade increased and international trade including that with the U.S. in general and New England in particular declined in relative terms, more so for the Maritime Provinces than Newfoundland. At a comparative level, the divergence in the fortunes of the two regions, particularly towards the end of the 20th century, further separated Atlantic Canada from New England. It was within Canada that the Maritimes, and Newfoundland after 1949, chose



to delineate their cultural identities. The United States in general, and New England particularly, continued to play a role in this project but it was Atlantic Canada's relationship with Canada that served as the dominant frame of reference which shaped the re-imagining of this region over time.

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Chapter 2

Border Challenges of Atlantic Canada Ports

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Canada is fortunate to have many deep-water, natural ports along its Atlantic and Pacific coastlines. It also is blessed with the world's longest marine corridor, the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence River that serves the continent's industrial heartland. The country's economy is underpinned by international trade and depends on efficient and productive ports serving as important border gateways. Much of Canada's maritime trade crosses international borders, including continental cargo movements to and from the country's major trading partner, the United States. Located on the border between land and sea, ports link domestic and international cargo movements.

In Atlantic Canada, ports handle more than 11 percent of the country's international maritime tonnage. This significant cargo throughput is more than double the region's contribution to Canada's Gross Domestic Product (Transport Canada 2018) as many commodities are destined inland to Central Canada and the U.S. mid-West. Atlantic Canada's many ports range from Canada Port Authorities (Halifax, Saint John, St. John's and Belledune) to former Transport Canada Ports (e.g., public ports in Charlottetown, Strait of Canso, Sydney, Corner Brook, Argentia), to numerous small fishing and ferry harbours.

Maritime trade underpins the global economy. The important role of maritime transportation was demonstrated in the continuance of international supply chains throughout the COVID-19 pandemic; essential goods and supplies continued to



flow despite national economic lockdowns around the world. Ships carry about 80 percent of the world’s merchandise trade by volume and 70 percent by value (Premti 2016). Ensuring the continuity of international trade requires the effective integration of ports with efficient and extensive intermodal transportation systems moving commodities to and from inland points.

Although maritime trade through ports is essential to Canada’s economy, ports serve other environmental and community functions. Canada Port Authorities are responsible for ensuring sustainable marine environments in their waters as well as contributing to the wellbeing of their contiguous communities.

This chapter considers Atlantic ports through: their role as border gateways; their support of global and regional maritime trade; their actions dealing with environmental concerns; and their community contributions, including critical relationships with First Nations. Research is based on secondary literature and in-depth interviews undertaken in April–June 2016 with senior port officials in Halifax, Saint John, Belledune, and Strait of Canso Superport, senior government officials in Transport Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency, and the managers of several container terminals. The interviews were open-ended discussions based on pre-set questions relating to borders and ports. The chapter concludes with a discussion of challenges that face the ports and an examination of the role they play in supporting communities, ensuring environmental sustainability, and underpinning regional and national economies.

Ports as Border Gateways

Throughout history, ports have served as a trade nexus for the exchange of goods, ideas, and peoples. Ports themselves were and continue to be centers of intermingled cultures where foreign trade agents, seafarers, merchants, diplomats, and others intermingle. For millennia, maritime trade has served as an essential instrument in the development and maintenance of civilization. For example, in the Late Bronze Age, the Phoenicians rose to prominence as successful Mediterranean seafarers, traders, merchants and colonists. But in the 11th century BCE, a rapid decline in marine trade resulting from attacks on port cities and trading centers by marauders, who had been displaced from their homes by climate change, contributed to the end of the Bronze Age (Cline 2014). Several centuries later, maritime

trade rebounded and supported the growth of subsequent civilizations including the Greeks, Carthaginians, Romans, and the imperial powers of the modern era.

For centuries, Canadian ports have welcomed waves of immigrants to the country. Halifax's Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 is a memorial to the port's role as a welcoming gateway to the country. Urban theorist Richard Florida suggests port cities are vibrant communities because of their cultural and economic diversity (Florida 2002). John Eger (2017) argues that, "port cities have an advantage in the effort to reinvent their community for the new economy—an economy vitally dependent on creativity and innovation". In a 2014 report, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) declared that ports "energize" the interchange of goods and services, making them "spatial clusters for innovation, research and development". Florida's, Eger's and the OECD's views are reflected in the vibrancy, diversity, culture milieus, and economic innovations underway in Canada's major port cities—Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax and Toronto.

David Newman (2003) contends that defining borders is a complex process. They can be construed in many ways. They can be identified with governance policies, for example, the entry requirements for associations and institutions. They can also be simply interpreted as lines drawn on a map. Borders often act as barriers controlling the flow and contact between "insiders" and "outsiders".

Ports clearly lie on the border between the sea and land, providing a gateway for the two-way flow of goods, ideas, cultures, and peoples. In the maritime sector, ports have a specific border role as ships plying the world's oceans are required by the United Nation's Law of the Sea (UN 1983, Article 91) to fly the flag of the nation-state in which they are registered. This means foreign vessels arriving at Canadian ports are essentially independent nations with the rights and responsibilities of their flag state. For example, ships plying Canada's coastal waters have the right of "Innocent Passage" (UN 1983, Article 17) and do not actually arrive in the country until they physically touch land either by berthing or anchoring.

The foreign nationality of ships in ports is well recognized in maritime law and practice. For example, the ship's rail often defines the division of cargo liability for insurance and other



purposes. Traditionally, this meant that one party insured cargo on board the ship, with liability being transferred to a second party once the cargo crossed the ship’s rail. In today’s integrated digitalization era, the same insurer often covers liability for the cargo’s full journey. Regardless, the ship’s rail remains an important physical border between two nations—Canada and the ship’s flag state. As a result, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and their federal partner, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), actively control the ship’s rail border crossing including import and export cargo and people (such as passengers and ships’ crew).

In Atlantic Canada, many ports welcome commercial and recreational foreign flag vessels. CBSA and RCMP provide border control and security along the region’s lengthy coastline and for the many ports stretching from New Brunswick to Labrador.

Maritime Trade

The global economy has been forecast to more than double by 2050 with an annual growth rate of 2.5 percent. Most of this growth will take place in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Turkey, while G7 countries are expected to grow at a lesser pace (Hawksworth 2017). Global population is expected to rise by over 2 billion in the same period, supporting continued trade growth (UN 2019). By 2050, Canada forecasts an additional 6.5 million people (PolulationPyramid.net 2019). This projected growth is expected to double the world’s seaborne trade from 10 billion tonnes in 2014 to 22 billion tonnes by 2030 (Global Marine Trends 2013). However, the recent COVID-19 pandemic has slowed global economic growth and may lead to a reconsideration of the benefits of economic globalization. Many firms are considering “near-shoring”—realigning some of their manufacturing and supply sources on a regional rather than global basis (Jorge & Bergen 2020).

In the past, national economies became increasingly global as industries sought international sources for inexpensive raw materials and lower cost manufacturing. The maritime sector’s “container revolution” underpinned global economic growth. Over the past several decades, the rapid rise of containerized shipping led to significant freight rate reductions. This, in turn, fueled the expansion of the global economy, making “the world smaller and the world economy bigger” (Levinson 2006).

For example, shipping goods is so inexpensive today that it is cheaper for Scottish cod to be sent to China for filleting and then shipped back to Scotland for retail sale than having the higher wage Scottish fish plant workers do the same job (George 2013, 18).

Many North American container ports serve as key distribution hubs for retail and consumer goods. Distribution centers have been established in Canadian ports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to ensure supply chain diversification. Such supply chain resilience allows shippers to continue to distribute commodities despite occasional disruptions caused by labour strife in specific ports or natural and man-made calamities. The World Bank has recognized Canada's relatively high level of logistics performance, ranking it 20th in its Global Logistics Performance Index (World Bank 2019).

Ships travel well-defined international sea routes. Today, however, traditional maritime routes are shifting from the expansion of the Panama Canal for larger vessels and the widening of the Suez Canal. These significant shipping bottleneck expansions are altering trade patterns, which in turn impacts ports, as shipping lines seek the most cost-effective routings.

As global warming melts Arctic sea ice, international shipping along Russia's Northern Sea Route and Canada's North West Passage continues to grow. Currently, Russia is operating ice-breaking LNG tankers year-round from Sabetta, Siberia to South Korea. This routing cuts the traditional journey through the Suez Canal in half – from 30 days to 15 (Total 2020). Although ship traffic is not as dense as the Northern Sea Route, over the past several years, Canada's North West Passage has seen an increasing number of vessels, including large cruise ships, traversing its waters. The Port of St. John's is often used as a base for Arctic expeditionary and supply voyages (Ircha & Higginbotham 2016).

Many non-Arctic nations and shipping lines are considering emerging Arctic routes for their potential in reducing future shipping costs. For example, China is building icebreakers for Arctic and Antarctic research (Malik 2019). Similarly, India has acquired an icebreaker for polar region research (Tejonmayam 2015). As Arctic shipping grows in the future, Atlantic ports such as Halifax's and St. John's may find new roles in serving this emerging northern trade route.

As trade has grown, so have ships. Indeed, the increasing size of vessels and their growing specialization continue to challenge ports and landside intermodal systems. For example, container ships have grown to gigantic proportions, larger than aircraft carriers, carrying over 23,000 TEUs (twenty-foot equivalent container units). Their increased length, beam and draught limit their ability to operate in many of the world’s ports. Ultra-Large Container Carriers (ULCCs) and similar larger ships in other trades (cruise ships, dry bulkers and tankers) create a need for improved passenger handling systems, increased shoreside storage, greater terminal peaking, and faster ship-to-shore transfer velocity, while also increasing truck congestion at terminal gates and surrounding urban streets. Several Atlantic Canada ports are large and deep enough to handle these larger ships.

The introduction of ULCCs into the world’s container fleet led to the cascading of older, yet still large 10,000 plus TEU container ships into other routes, including those serving Atlantic Canada ports. Figure 1 shows one of the largest container ships to visit Halifax carrying 11,400 TEU.

Cascading larger container ships to medium sized ports will require further capital investments. For example, the Port of Saint John is engaged in a \$205 million investment to upgrade and consolidate existing terminals to handle larger container ships (Peters 2019).Halifax’ Angus L. Macdonald Bridge underwent



Figure 1. CMA CGM Libra, the Largest Container Ship to Visit Halifax.
Photo copyright: Steve Farmer, 2019.

a \$207 million refit to increase its height by 2.1metres, in part to permit the passage of larger container ships to the Fairview Cove Container Terminal in Bedford Basin (Halifax Harbour Bridges 2019).The South End Container Terminal (PSA Halifax) recently received its fifth Super Post-Panamax quay crane to complement a berth extension allowing it to serve two larger vessels simultaneously (PSA Halifax 2019).

In anticipation of future container growth, the ports of Sydney and Canso are promoting the development of new container terminals. After many years of planning, the Port of Sydney partnered with the China Communications Construction Company to undertake the design, construction, and ownership of a \$1.2 billion deep-water container terminal (King 2015). In 2019, a New York-based investment fund agreed to provide financial and operational support to develop a \$440 million deep-sea container terminal in Sydney (Morley 2019). Similarly, the long awaited \$350 million automated Melford container terminal in Canso announced a partnership with SSA Marine and Cyrus Capital Partners to move the project forward (Peters 2016). To date, however, none of these projects have had significant development.

Canada Port Authorities in the Atlantic Region (Belledune, Saint John, Halifax, and St. John's) handled 38.7 million tonnes of cargo in 2019, more than 11 percent of the total tonnage handled by Canada Port Authorities (Transport Canada 2020A). Other non-CPA public ports, such as Canso, handled more than 17 million tonnes (Table 1). To some degree, Atlantic Canada ports tend to specialize in terms of the cargo they handle. For example, container shipments move primarily through Halifax and Saint John, with a small domestic throughput in St. John's. As shown in Table 1, Saint John is Atlantic Canada's largest port in terms of tonnes handled, primarily petroleum products. Canso follows with the second highest tonnage, primarily crude oil, while Halifax dominates in container throughput. Other ports such as Belledune and St. John's handle smaller tonnages. Similarly, other smaller ports in Atlantic Canada have relatively low throughputs and tend to specialize in handling regional cargoes and serving ferries. Figure 2 shows the location of Atlantic ports.

Today, the global maritime economy faces a turbulent operating environment. The COVID-19 pandemic has led to throughput reductions in most world ports. For example, Los Angeles, one of the world's largest ports, reported a 17 percent reduction in

Table 1. Atlantic Ports Commodity Throughputs (2019). Source: Peters (2019), Transport Canada (2020A) and various port websites.

Ports	Tonnage (million)	Containers (1000 TEU)	Cruise Ships	Cruise Pax	Primary Commodities Handled
Saint John	25.4	68.9	79	196,032	Petroleum products, potash, containers
Halifax	8.6	546.7	179	323,709	Containers, Autoport (>100,000 cars/trucks), petroleum, gypsum
St. John's	1.7	n/a	30	30,000	Containers, fish products, off-shore energy supply
Belledune	2.6	----	----	----	Coal, pet coke, lead, wood pellets, aggregate
Argentia	----	----	----	----	General cargo, ferry service
Canso	17.0	----	----	----	Crude oil, aggregates, metallic ores and coal
Charlottetown	----	----	87	128,000	Cruise passengers
Corner Brook	----	----	19	29,500	Forest and fish products
Sydney	----	----	100	153,797	Ferry service




Figure 2. Atlantic Canada Ports. Source: Google Maps.

commodity throughput in the first half of 2020 (Schuler 2020). Atlantic ports were not immune to similar cargo throughput reductions, although all continued to operate during the pandemic. For example, Halifax reported a 16 percent reduction in container throughput in the first quarter of 2020 (Port and Terminal 2020). Along with cargo reductions, Atlantic ports have had their cruise ship activity curtailed for the 2020 season due to COVID-19 restrictions—a significant revenue loss for the ports and their surrounding communities.

Canadian ports, including those in Atlantic Canada, face many challenges, including: the service of larger ships, shifting trade routes resulting from the Panama and Suez Canal expansions, environmental and climate change concerns generating new shipping regulations, and growing safety and security demands. Automation and expanding information technology have enhanced supply chain efficiency and created more rapid decision-making. At the same time, digitalization and increased interconnectedness creates cyber security vulnerabilities. Successfully navigating today's turbulent maritime environment by ships, ports, and their supply chain partners is critical to the country's continued economic activity during and following the pandemic. The following sections consider these challenges.

Border Challenges

Canada and the U.S. are each other's major trading partners and have "the highest level of integration in the world between two large economies" (Brunet-Jailly 2012). Such economic integration was advanced through various bi-national instruments such as the 1988 Free Trade Agreement and the 1994 North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Recently, NAFTA was renegotiated and updated to establish the United States-Canada-Mexico-Agreement (USMCA). However, the events of 9/11 tended to harden the border. "Securitization" Brunet-Jailly states, "has had a huge impact on trade, and is now seeping through and influencing all policy arenas that are concerned with and establish borderland policies" (Brunet-Jailly 2012, 275).

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the U.S., port security in both countries changed dramatically. Shipping lines, port authorities, and governments recognized inherent vulnerabilities in international maritime trade. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) added the "International Ship and Port



Facility Security Code” (ISPS) to its pre-existing International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The Code provides guidance to ports, ships, and their national governments on preparing security plans. Canadian and American ports were quick to respond to the IMO requirement by undertaking risk-based security studies and accessing matching federal funding to address identified vulnerabilities.

Despite heightened border security, border officials in both countries have sought to maintain relative ease of trade access through various “trusted trader” programs. One of the earliest cross-border agreements included the Smart Border Declaration which enables border officials to work together on security, trade, immigration, firearms, and drug trafficking concerns. Over time, a variety of other joint trade-related initiatives were established. The Container Security Initiative Partnership Agreement (CSI) allows for the exchange and joint training of customs officers to pre-screen containers destined for their country in each other’s ports. Halifax, Montreal and Vancouver were the first ports to join CSI. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) works with trusted industrial traders in both countries. Their firms and internal security processes are randomly inspected. To maintain C-TPAT status that enables relatively quick access across the border, firms agree to conform to best practices and procedures. Canada and the U.S. established and accredited Transport Workers Identity Cards (TWIC) to verify the security status of individuals working in ports. Technological advances have significantly enhanced container security screening with X-ray based digital large-scale-imaging (LSI) devices installed at all Canadian container ports.

Moving cargo and goods between Canada and the U.S. is relatively easy given these various joint border programs. Such openness has led to a continental transportation system where inland consignees are often “port-blind” in the sense they are not aware or concerned where their cargo enters the continent. As a result, there is a diverted container trade with Canadian boxes entering American ports and then shipped over land to their destination and vice-versa. For example, about a quarter of the containers processed through the port of Vancouver are destined for or originate in the U.S. (Mongelluzzo 2019). Normally, such container diversions occur with little concern in either country. However, issues sometimes emerge. For example, in 2011, the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) was concerned that U.S. shippers might be using Canadian container

ports to avoid payment of the Harbor Maintenance Tax—a fee of 0.0125 percent of the cargo value coming through U.S. ports that is used to provide funding for dredging and similar projects. Following a year-long investigation, including lengthy hearings with the U.S. and Canadian shipping industry and ports, the FMC concluded that U.S. shippers used Canadian ports for their location and efficiency, not as a means of avoiding the Harbor Maintenance Tax (Ircha 2014).

Canada Border Services Agency

Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officials have an unenviable task. They protect the border by preventing contraband and undesirable persons from entering the country, but at the same time, they are expected to ensure efficient and speedy border crossings to facilitate trade and the movement of people. The challenge lies in finding an appropriate balance between these, at times, competing objectives.

During interviews undertaken for this study, some respondents suggested CBSA seemed to favour protectionism in contrast to their U.S. counterparts, Customs and Border Protection (CBP). One terminal manager reflected on his previous U.S. experience: “in the U.S., CBP does not step in the way of commerce, unlike Canada’s more intrusive approach”. On the other hand, when discussing the impact of examination fees for the consignees of targeted containers, a senior CBSA official demonstrated his interest in facilitating trade by supporting a fee reduction. He also said there was a reluctance to target specific importers too many times as the impact of repeated container examination fees could put them out of business.

CBSA, along with the RCMP and local police, provide security in Canada’s ports. Although none of the government and industry respondents expressed any security concerns on the ports’ landside operations, issues were raised about waterside security. CBSA was particularly concerned about the effectiveness of shore-based boats in screening anchored foreign flag ships in harbours.

Beyond the Border Initiative

In 2011, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper issued the “Beyond the Border – A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness” (BtB). Their aim was to “enhance our security and accelerate the legitimate flow of people, goods



and services” (Public Safety Canada 2016). Among other goals, the BtB initiative focused on security, trade facilitation, and economic growth.

The BtB led to increased cooperation and harmonization between the U.S. CBP, and CBSA, including processes to speed legitimate shipments across the border. A key step was the introduction of an integrated cargo security strategy through a harmonized approach to screening and clearing imported international cargo. The aim was to focus on the continental perimeter and reduce the level of re-examination of imported containers crossing the Canada-U.S. border, adopting the concept of “cleared once, accepted twice”. Pilot projects were initiated at the ports of Prince Rupert on the West Coast and Montreal on the St. Lawrence, where, on behalf of CPB, CBSA conducted examinations on U.S.-bound containers. The success of these pilot projects led to improved border clearance procedures. The BtB also generated other successful initiatives including: tamper evident technology for container seals, standard regulations on wood packaging materials, harmonized trusted trader programs, and electronic single window data transfer (Stolarik 2014).

The full impact of BtB is still to be felt in Atlantic Canada ports. However, despite this, CBSA does target some U.S.-bound containers for inspection on behalf of CBP. There continues to be good cooperation between the two border agencies such as at the international ferry crossing between Yarmouth and Portland, Maine.

Container Inspections

CBSA has a significant role in inspecting containers and other international cargoes imported and exported through Canada’s ports. In smaller ports and coastal areas between ports, cross-border enforcement is an RCMP responsibility. Almost all import containers (95 percent) pass through CBSA radiation portals in each container port. Less than one percent of containers trigger an alarm and of those, some 80 percent are cleared quickly as radiation occurs naturally in various commodities such as bananas and gypsum used in drywall (CBSA 2012). In the event of a radiation alarm being triggered at CBSA headquarters in Ottawa, analysts check the signal against the declared commodity to determine whether it is naturally occurring. If there is a concern, a spectral analysis is undertaken to determine whether it is a natural occurrence. This may lead

to an on-dock inspection with specialized car-borne radiation analysis equipment. This equipment can test from a distance and so suspect containers can be stacked 2 or 3 high without the necessity of moving them to a separate area. Terminal managers claim the radiation portals have had no impact on container throughput productivity.

More detailed container inspections are undertaken in two ways—a random selection of boxes chosen through a CBSA algorithm or targeted inspections of suspect containers based on an assessment of various risk factors. The actual inspection of selected containers include: a dockside or pier examination; the use of nonintrusive large-scale imaging (LSI) devices; and, if required, a full container de-stuff and detailed examination at a designated off-dock marine container examination facility (MCEF).

Pier examination of suspect containers is often undertaken as contraband drugs may be put into the back of containers either before the doors are locked and sealed, or later in the journey as seals can be broken and the doors resealed with a similar lock. A quick pier examination can be done while the container is on the trailer awaiting movement to the container yard, thus not necessarily slowing down container throughput.

Mobile and fixed LSI units are new technologies deployed in container terminals for non-intrusive X-ray examinations of suspect containers. This technology allows CBSA officials to see what is inside the container without having to open the box. Unlike the former VACIS system based on gamma ray inspections, LSI provides a high-definition digitized image enabling inspectors to zoom in on suspect items within the container. Anomalies deep within a container, such as contraband or weapons, can be detected, depending on commodity density. The LSI inspection is useful in determining whether a more intensive and intrusive examination at a MCEF is warranted.

Marine Container Examination Facilities

Moving containers to an off-dock MCEF involves a cost to the shipper. Normally, the MCEF is a customs sufferance warehouse operated by a private contractor under CBSA supervision. The importer's cost includes moving the box to and from the container terminal and the charges for de-and re-stuffing the container. The cost for a container examination can range



between \$150 to \$7,375, with an average of \$2,030 (Snowden 2016). These fees do not include the costs associated with the importer’s delays from the inspection. The Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association (CIFFA) has raised concerns about the impact of container examination fees arguing that they often penalize small, new entrepreneurial importers who are entering the international market. CBSA’s selection processes tend to target such new entrants, as they do not have the clean track record of other more established major importers. CIFFA’s concerns include: lack of national standards (the costs and procedures in one port vary from another); lack of accountability; and lack of transparency with no record of the examination being provided to the importer. A further concern is the lack of standardization across the country. As pointed out by the British Columbia Chamber of Shipping, “the container examination program has evolved over the years and there is no consistent approach to the governance of these facilities across Canada. The tariff will depend on the arrangement established with the facility operator in each region” (Norbury 2012).

The introduction and use of LSI has reduced the number of containers being sent to MCEFs. This, in turn, has led to a higher fee per container for those that are inspected. The cost of operating privately owned MCEFs is divided by the number of inspections. Thus, fewer inspections generate a higher per container fee for the importer. Steps are being taken in Halifax to reduce these costs. MCEF contractors have reduced operating hours from 0800-2400 to a single eight-hour daytime shift. In addition, they have sought permission from CBSA to reduce the size of the secure warehouse to permit other non-secure commercial uses. Container examinations and their associated costs are a particular problem in Atlantic Canada as many shipments arrive from high-risk drug-related areas such as the Caribbean and Latin America. This has led to a higher-than-average number of examinations in Halifax and other Atlantic ports.

As discussed by CIFFA, there is a need to change the fee structure for container examinations. One approach would be to establish a flat fee per container to cover the costs, in a manner similar to CATSA’s standard airport security fee assessed on each passenger. Australia applies an Import Processing Charge (IPC) on each imported container to cover their MCEF costs (Bux 2016). This spreads the costs over all importers rather than only on the one whose container was selected for inspection, as is the Canadian case. CBSA would likely support this approach, as it

could reduce complaints from medium- and small-size shippers and make the examination process equitable. On the other hand, larger shippers, such as big-box retailers, would likely oppose this step because as trusted traders their containers are not checked as frequently which supports their argument that they should not subsidize other shippers.

While most of CBSA's attention appears to be placed on examining imports, they also inspect exports. A 2014 CBSA audit found that export examinations rely on intensive manual screening of declaration documents. Halifax and Montreal were the two major Canadian ports with the highest export examination rates, where stolen vehicles in containers are discovered primarily through pier examinations (CBSA 2014).

eManifest and Single Window Initiative

eManifest is one of CBSA's ongoing initiatives designed to modernize cross-border commercial processes through the use of electronically transmitted and processed data. It requires all carriers, importers, and freight forwarders to send advance information about their shipments prior to arrival at the border. eManifest enables CBSA officials to detect high-risk shipments while speeding the border crossing of legitimate, low-risk trade (CBSA 2018). A companion program, the Single Window Initiative (SWI), spurred on by Beyond the Border, aims to reduce the administrative burden on cross-border traders. With SWI, CBSA electronically transmits import information to appropriate government departments and agencies responsible for regulating imported goods. The SWI's data requirements are aligned as closely as possible to those of the U.S. CBP (CBSA 2019).

Despite the efficiency gains from LSI inspections, eManifest, and SWI, there continue to be inspection challenges. CBSA officers have considerable discretionary powers in carrying out their mandates. As one industry interviewee stated: "inspectors seem far too willing to pull out the Customs Act, which gives them the authority to act as they see fit". On arrival, CBSA officials may demand the terminal printout a copy of the ship stowage and loading plans to allow them to determine which container bay to select for random inspections. This occurs as some shipping lines do not provide stowage plans electronically prior to arrival. Currently, providing electronic plans is voluntary but this may become mandatory in the future.



In addition to following a pre-determined list of targeted containers to be set aside for LSI inspection, CBSA officials may choose to randomly inspect containers being unloaded by one of the terminal's ship-to-shore gantry cranes. Each selected container is then inspected at a nearby mobile LSI unit, a process taking three to seven minutes per inspection. Following inspection, another offloaded container is shunted to the LSI unit for inspection. Although this process may reduce the terminal's productivity, adding an additional tractor-trailer unit to the gang serving the container crane usually offsets productivity losses.

Port and terminal officials desire greater consistency in inspection procedures and processes among different CBSA officers and among CBSA units across the country. Several interviewees pointed out that the lack of consistency generates uncertainty and is disruptive to commercial trade. As one respondent put it: “CBSA needs to recognize that container terminals need speed in identifying and inspecting target containers, less interruption and intrusion in the terminal's operations, and less confusion during ship operations”.

Cruise Passengers

Customs clearance for visiting cruise ships visiting Atlantic ports is effective and efficient. Passengers are cleared on board with targeted individuals being pulled aside for secondary clearance. Generally, passengers are cleared within 15-20 minutes of ship arrival in port. Cruise ships normally arrive from low-risk areas such as the U.S., leading to quicker clearance. CBSA officials also observe disembarking passengers for anomalies. Typically, cruise passengers carry small personal bags and cameras leaving their other goods on board and thus are likely to return. However, if a passenger disembarks with luggage, CBSA intervenes. Ship crews are treated similar to passengers and are usually cleared quickly for short visits ashore. At “home ports” like Vancouver where cruise ships end their voyages with a full passenger disembarkation, CBSA undertakes a full primary and if required, secondary inspection similar to international passenger arrivals at airports.

Concerns have been raised about CBSA's need for customs space in cruise terminals. In Halifax, dedicated space for cruise passenger checks is readily provided by temporary partitions in the cruise terminal. In Saint John, such space is also provided. However, there was concern in Saint John about CBSA's demand

for personnel space and jail cells on the first floor of the Port Authority's Diamond Jubilee Building. Although Section 6 of the Customs Act requires the Port Authority to provide such space at the port's cost, there were concerns that at times CBSA has had excessive space requirements. For example, the City of Saint John has jail cells close by and the CBSA cells have never been used. Such concerns about CBSA requirements for cruise terminals have been raised in the past (Ircha 2009). CBSA is reviewing its requirements and standards seeking consistency in its maritime operations across the country.

Stowaways, Refugees and Desertion

There are few incidents of stowaways and refugees seeking access to Canada via Atlantic ports. Normally the ship's master is aware of them prior to arrival and advises Canadian officials. Port terminals cooperate with CBSA and RCMP in dealing with stowaways and refugees. Occasionally, there is desertion by the ships' crew. In this case, the ship's master informs CBSA and RCMP who take steps to apprehend deserters. Some deserters leave their ship to seek refugee asylum in Canada although as one respondent noted, Atlantic Canada's relatively sparse population and lack of proximity to major urban areas is likely a disincentive for would-be stowaways and deserters.

Derelict and Abandoned Vessels

Derelict and abandoned vessels are a concern in Canadian ports and communities and for shoreline property owners (Nortak Software 2012). Such vessels can be a hazard to mariners, create negative environmental impacts, and affect commercial and recreational activities. Removing derelict vessels is costly and may require technical resources unavailable in the local area. In many cases, the vessel owner cannot be identified, resulting in a cost burden for shoreline property owners and public entities.

The issue of derelict and abandoned vessels appears more challenging in some Atlantic ports than others. For example, Canso is careful about which vessels it accepts because of previous difficulties with abandoned ships. Abandoned vessels use berth space without payment to the port. Furthermore, rusting hulks distress local politicians and communities who do not wish to see such eyesores on the waterfront. A number of years ago, a dredge coming through the Canso causeway was



arrested and sent to Canso but no one paid for its berthage. Ironically, the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico resolved this issue as the abandoned dredge was acquired to assist in the Gulf oil spill cleanup.

From a border perspective, some abandoned vessels are foreign flagged with crew remaining on board. Looking after abandoned crewmembers often falls upon the local community until such time as they are repatriated to their home countries. The Seafarers’ International Union of Canada assists in highlighting the plight of abandoned crewmembers and their need for repatriation (SIUC 2014). This can take time as federal authorities search for vessel owners and seek payment for crew salaries and repatriation costs. CBSA provides temporary status to the abandoned crewmembers allowing them to remain in Canada until the repatriation process is finalized. CBSA has not deported abandoned crewmembers. The Federal Government is addressing abandoned and derelict vessel concerns through its recently adopted Bill C-64, the Wrecked, Abandoned or Hazardous Vessels Act (Transport Canada 2019).

Cross-border Short Sea Shipping

North America faces increasing gridlock on highways and railways, particularly in urban areas. Developing enhanced cross-border short sea shipping would relieve highway congestion and offer a more environmentally friendly marine mode for cross-border continental trade. Short sea shipping has not been well developed in North America due to cabotage restrictions in Canada and the U.S. Cabotage is used by nation-states to protect their domestic coastal trade for their own carriers. For example, in Canada and the U.S., short sea shipping is restricted to national flagged vessels if more than one domestic port is being served. In other words, a Canadian flag vessel is required for transporting cargo from one domestic port to another, such as between Halifax and St. John’s.

In the U.S., the “Jones Act” (Merchant Marine Act of 1920) restricts the movement of cargo and passengers between two American ports to ships that are U.S. flagged, U.S. owned, and crewed by U.S. citizens or permanent residents. Similarly, Canada’s Coasting Trade Act restricts cargo movement between any two Canadian ports to ships that are Canadian-flagged, owned, and crewed. However, in the Canadian case, a temporary Coasting Trade License may be acquired to permit the entry of

foreign-flagged vessels into cabotage-protected trades if there is no Canadian-flagged ship suitable or available. There is no equivalent provision in the U.S. coastal trades.

Cabotage restrictions are intended to protect national marine commerce as well as other safety, security, and national defense objectives. However, given the high level of cooperation and collaboration between Canada and the U.S., there seems to be little justification for cabotage restrictions between the countries on national safety or security grounds. Marine cabotage has hampered the development of international short sea shipping. Unlike the European Union's extensive use of short sea shipping, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA did not remove marine cabotage among the trade partners. In particular, during the NAFTA negotiations and subsequent bi-lateral discussions, when Canadian negotiators pressed for cabotage changes, U.S. marine interests lobbied strongly against any relaxation (Brooks 2006). The failure to eliminate or relax marine cabotage provisions has hampered the development of an effective cross-border short sea shipping regime on the Great Lakes and along both coasts.

Domestic short sea services exist in Canada. Oceanex's successful shipping service between Newfoundland, Montreal, and Halifax has been in place for many years, providing transshipment services for domestic and international containers and trailers (Oceanex 2019). The Icelandic Shipping Line, Eimskip, operates an international short sea shipping service on the East Coast linking Portland, Maine with Halifax, Argentina, and St. Anthony as part of its trans-Atlantic service to Iceland (Eimskip 2019).

From a Canadian perspective, there are two significant impediments to developing a viable international short sea shipping regime—U.S. cabotage restrictions embodied in the Jones Act, and the application of the U.S. Harbor Maintenance Tax on imported marine cargo. Given the resistance of U.S. shipping lines to any relaxation of the Jones Act, it is doubtful cabotage changes will occur in the foreseeable future. For example, in recent years, U.S. Senator John McCain led persistent, but ultimately unsuccessful challenges to the Jones Act (Lee & Cavanaugh 2017). The U.S. Harbor Maintenance Tax that is applied to marine-borne cargo is also an impediment, as a North American short sea shipping service would compete with cross-border trucking. Trucked commodities into the U.S. do not pay this tax while marine cargoes would be charged.



Free Trade Agreements

Beyond NAFTA, Canada has been actively pursuing bi-lateral free trade agreements (FTA) with many countries and trading blocs around the world. In 2019, Canada had 14 free trade agreements with 51 countries (Canada 2020). From an Atlantic perspective, ports have anticipated increased trade from the Canada-European Union Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). For example, Canso expects expanded fisheries and liquid natural gas exports. Other ports anticipate increased throughput of agricultural commodities and other products.

Marine elements in CETA may encourage the development of short sea shipping by relaxing some of Canada’s cabotage restrictions. For example, the CETA agreement permits European Union registered vessels to provide feeder services for containers and bulk commodities between Halifax and Montreal as well as allowing the repositioning of empty containers. In addition, from a ports perspective, CETA has opened commercial dredging, allowing ports to obtain services from private entities using vessels of any registry (Transport Canada 2018).

Protecting the Marine Environment

The Canada Marine Act requires that Canada Port Authorities “provide a high level of safety and environmental protection” (CMA 1998, Section 4(D)). Ports understand their operations may create externalities that could harm nearby communities. As a result, each CPA goes to considerable lengths to eliminate or mitigate environmental irritants. All CPAs and several other Atlantic ports are members of the Green Marine Alliance, a Canada-based environmental organization seeking to reduce the marine sector’s environmental footprint by sharing best practices and certifying green ships, ports, and terminals. Canadian ports are committed to a wide range of environmental protection practices, including: reducing air emissions and monitoring and mitigating dust, reducing shore-side and underwater noise; decreasing light emissions; protecting fish habitat; and, undertaking shoreline rehabilitation. Canada and the U.S. were early implementers of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) emissions control area (ECA) setting limits on ship emissions of sulphur and nitrogen oxides and ozone-depleting gases. The North American ECA requires ships sailing within 200 nautical miles of the coast to burn low sulphur fuels or use approved stack scrubbers. In keeping with

carbon and emissions reductions, Canada Port Authorities are reducing carbon and other air emissions through a wide range of initiatives, such as using electric cargo-handling vehicles and providing shore-power to docked vessels. Halifax has installed shore power systems to enable vessels to “plug in” and “turn off” their engines in port, reducing idle-generated emissions.

The IMO has also tackled the introduction of invasive species into local marine environments through the discharge of ship’s ballast waters. Canada is signatory to the IMO’s 2017 International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments. The country has had a long-standing requirement for ships to exchange ballast water outside the country’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone. Under the IMO convention, ships with type approved ballast water management systems can eliminate invasive species without exchanges at sea.

Protecting endangered whales in Atlantic waters is a continuing concern for ports and the shipping industry. In 2003, Transport Canada Marine Safety worked with the IMO to reroute ship traffic separation lanes in the Bay of Fundy for vessels travelling to and from the port of Saint John to avoid striking Right Whales. A similar step to protect Right Whales was taken in 2008 in designating the Roseway Basin, south of Nova Scotia as an “area to be avoided” (CWI 2020).

Climate change is raising ocean water temperatures that result in the northern migration of various whale populations away from their traditional feeding areas. This migration has led to ships striking whales in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In 2017, the federal government introduced mandatory slower speed for larger ships in shipping lanes that crossed migrating whale routes. Transport Canada subsequently refined the ship speed restrictions in various parts of the Gulf based on monitored Right Whale movements (Transport Canada 2020B).

Ports are adapting to the impacts of climate change through resilience planning to ensure continued operation in the event of a climatic incident or environmental disruption. Climate changes, such as extreme and unpredictable weather patterns along with rising sea levels, will have a significant impact on port infrastructure. New technologies, materials, and techniques are being developed ranging from climate resilient concrete mixes to innovative pier design. Sea level rise in Atlantic Canada will



be exacerbated by long-term coastal land subsidence (Canada 2019, section 7.5). Changing sea levels requires port infrastructure investments to protect facilities from future flooding and storm surges.

The Port of Saint John supports a range of coastal and harbour research initiatives by various groups funded by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. The Port of Halifax has invested in a port relighting project to reduce energy use as well as launching a pilot electric vehicle project, and is recycling clean dredged rocks for berth infill. In Newfoundland, the Port of Saint John's is actively involved in marine mammal protection program.

Supporting Port Communities

Historically, ports have driven local and regional economic development as well as shaped community quality of life. The contiguous nature of ports and communities creates the need for continuous mutual interaction, involvement, and understanding (Ircha 2012). This is particularly the case in Atlantic Canada where a coastal way of life has always reflected a strong relationship with the sea. From earlier indigenous communities to the modern era, the fisheries and marine trade have been the underpinnings of Canada's East Coast culture.

Global economic growth has increased commodity throughput in Canadian ports. Such increased throughput may have little, if any, relevance to the local or even regional community as commodities are often destined for far inland Canadian and American markets. The port's inland beneficiaries are not affected by negative externalities from port operations, but local communities are. Thus, local communities have not always welcomed increased port throughput. Potential travel delays from lengthy freight trains and congested highways; limited public access to waterfronts; and environmental pollution from air, dust and noise emissions, along with light spillage from night time operations and water contamination, are viewed as negative side effects of port expansion. Thus, port cargo growth has, at times, led to “global change—local pain” (McCalla 1999).

Canada Port Authorities understand the importance of their role within their local communities. They strive to safeguard and invest in the communities' social, cultural and environmental fabric. From 2010 to 2014, port authorities contributed over \$22 million in donations and investments in their respective

communities and continue to do so (InterVISTAS 2017). Further, port authorities devote a portion of their revenues to build and support innovative local businesses. Such port support creates jobs and the growth of new markets that, in turn, generates further cargo throughput.

In many communities, ports are major employment and income generators. Canada Port Authorities create over 200,000 jobs (direct, indirect and induced), generating \$14 billion in wages and \$2.1 billion in taxes paid to the federal government (\$1.4 billion), provincial governments (\$684 million) and municipalities (\$22 million) (InterVISTAS 2017). In Atlantic Canada, the Port of Halifax creates some 39,000 jobs (direct, indirect and induced), providing some \$2.2 billion in wages and paying more than \$330 million in federal, provincial and municipal taxes (Halifax 2019). An economic impact study of the fourteen smaller Atlantic public ports conducted by the Independent Marine Ports Association of Atlantic Canada (IMPAC) found that together these ports created almost 2,500 jobs (direct, indirect and induced), generating \$219 million in wages and salaries and contributing \$27 million federal and \$22 million provincial taxes (Gardner Pinfold 2018).

Although economic impact studies of the three other Atlantic Canada Port Authorities (Saint John, St. John's and Belledune) are not available, it can be seen that beyond providing cargo-handling services (essential during the COVID-19 pandemic), Atlantic ports contribute to their local and regional economies by generating employment and wages. During the COVID-19 pandemic, most port jobs were maintained to ensure the continuity of domestic and international supply chains.

Beyond economics, Canada Port Authorities contribute to a myriad of community projects and activities. From west to east, Canada Port Authorities provide significant contributions to the social, cultural, economic and environmental wellbeing of their communities. Many ports have established formal processes to seek suitable proposals for their community contributions. In New Brunswick, the Port of Belledune, as part of its "Anchored in the Community" program, provides annual contributions to several charities and community organizations. Similarly, the Port of Saint John hosts over 8,000 visitors to its community and ports day event as well as supporting the annual Harbour Lights campaign and Helping Hand charities. Saint John has also developed extensive school curriculum materials to assist in educating children about the port and its important role



in protecting the marine environment and supporting the community and Canada’s economy.

The Port of Halifax in association with St. Mary’s University has established an intern program for students involved in international studies. The port donates staff time and expertise along with financial support for many charities, cultural groups, and skills-development organizations. The Port of St. John’s supports annual post-secondary student scholarships across the province, the Harbour Lights charitable fundraiser, the Computers for Schools program, and hosts a variety of local community events on the waterfront. Recently, the Port decided to contribute 0.5 percent of its port operating revenues to United Way charities in Newfoundland and Labrador.

As federal agents, Canada Port Authorities pay special attention to consultations with their First Nations communities. Meaningful consultation must occur before action is taken on port projects that may affect claimed or proven Aboriginal and treaty rights (Sterling & Landmann n.d.). Within the proximity of Canada’s port authorities, there are more than a hundred Indigenous communities living and practicing their constitutionally protected rights. These communities are diverse and their interaction with ports vary significantly. Engagements between CPAs and Indigenous communities are wide ranging, varying from informal engagements to more formal and detailed Protocol and Partnership Agreements.

However, as port authorities have found, because First Nations consultations are complex, no one model suffices. Some ports operate on ceded lands, while others are on un-ceded territories; some ports are on treaty lands, while others are in a non-treaty situation; some ports face overlapping claims from multiple First Nations, while others do not. In 2017, the Port of Belledune signed a formal consultation agreement with its First Nations communities. As pointed out by the Port’s CEO: “The Port of Belledune is situated on the traditional land of the Mi’gmaq people. As a neighbour, the Port is seeking to develop long term relationships with the First Nation communities that are based on good faith, respect, and transparency” (Caron 2017). In 2016, the Port of Halifax entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Millbrook First Nation on infilling a portion of the Tufts Cove water lot adjacent to Millbrook land. The Port’s CEO claimed: “Our goal is to find a solution that will benefit the members of the Millbrook First Nation and support community development” (Oldfield 2016).

Conclusions

International trade is essential to Canada's economy and ports serve as key nodes in the country's supply chains. Atlantic ports contribute to the development of the region's and the country's economy. However, ports face major challenges including: the costs associated with great distance from markets in central Canada and the U.S. mid-west; the issues presented by larger vessels; the impacts associated with climate change; the recognition of and response to environmental concerns; the engagement with communities; and the demands associated with growing security and safety concerns. Primary port-border security rests with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) which inspects and clears international commodity flows and people (passengers and crew). CBSA is currently modernizing its operations. Electronic information systems such as eManifest and the Single Window Initiative will soon dominate port inspection and clearance processes. Anticipated increases in port commodity flows arising from Canada's many free trade agreements means CBSA must ensure inspection and clearance processes are undertaken as quickly as possible to reduce commercial delays. As pointed out by one interviewee, "Canada's ports must continue to be efficient to remain competitive with their U.S. counterparts in serving continental trade requirements".

A continuing CBSA inspection issue rests with the differential fees being charged for full de-stuffing examinations undertaken in marine container examination facilities. High examination fees for importers' containers penalize newer entrants to international importing and exporting—the same entrepreneurs that governments are encouraging to grow internationally. One approach to consider involves setting a flat standard fee per imported container to cover the examination costs for the small percentage of containers that require full de-stuffing examination. Further, as suggested by one CBSA official, having such a standard small fee would allow for frequent inspections of suspect containers without concerns about the financial burden on the individual importer.

Another challenge raised by several interviewees is the need for national consistency in CBSA's inspection and clearance process. There appears to be some inconsistency among individual CBSA inspectors and the regions across the country in the application of CBSA procedures and processes. CBSA is addressing this



concern through training, developing electronic processing standards, and reviewing national consistency.

Climate change and associated marine environmental issues are major concerns for Atlantic ports. Most ports participate in a variety of federal and provincial programs aimed at eliminating or mitigating the detrimental environmental effects of their operations. Ports are actively engaged in monitoring and reducing air emissions, protecting marine life, reducing energy use, and generally minimizing their carbon footprint.

Notably, this study of Atlantic Canada ports has highlighted that not all border concerns are international. There is a significant argument that ports have a responsibility to cross jurisdictional borders to support neighbours, including First Nations communities.

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Chapter 3

Cross-boundary Climate and Energy Policy in Eastern Canada and New England

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On October 21, 2020, Newfoundland and Labrador Premier Dr. Andrew Furey chaired a videoconference of the Council of Atlantic Premiers to discuss the health, social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic (CAP 2020). The Premiers continued their commitment to the “Atlantic Bubble” of regional containment and bordering on the advice of the Atlantic Chief Medical Officers of Health. During the spring of 2020, the Atlantic Bubble was initiated by the Atlantic Provinces to restrict non-essential travel into and out of the region. In effect the region was re-bordered to limit the spread of the virus, and to sustain the low number of infections throughout Atlantic Canada (CAP 2020). Only travel deemed essential was allowed to pass the land, air and sea boundary between the Atlantic Provinces, the adjacent United States, and the rest of Canada. Security barriers and checkpoints were imposed along the provincial boundary with Quebec; Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland and Labrador restricted access to create additional provincial bubbles within the Atlantic Bubble. During the summer of 2020, travel restrictions were eased to allow the entry of second home owners from other regions of Canada, but they were required to quarantine for 14 days. Meanwhile, the Canada-U.S. boundary section between Atlantic Canada and New England has remained closed since March 2020, to all but essential travel, and likely will remain closed into 2021.



The pandemic has revealed the complex and malleable structure and function of borders in the north eastern Atlantic region. As established in both the introduction and first chapter of this book, Atlantic borders have long halted and enabled flows of people, goods and information in various and changing ways as the international region evolved over centuries. The international region is intricately bordered yet it contains effectively dispersed jurisdictions in an insular and Appalachian geography. New England and Atlantic Canada delineate four Canadian provinces and six New England states concentrated in an area that could fit easily into either Ontario or Quebec. In order to coordinate governance and collaboration in climate change and energy policy, among other shared concerns such as trade, tourism, pollution, information technology, and economic development, the provincial and state governments in the international region decided that it was in their interest to cooperate as regional alliances not only within their countries but also across the international boundary. When the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers Conference (NEG/ECP) was established in 1973, it was the only sub-national partnership of states and provinces in North America. During the 47 years since the establishment of the NEG/ECP, the partnership has developed, waned, and evolved/devolved into other partnerships. In effect, the borders among the constituencies have changed over time although the state and provincial boundaries have remained consistent. Also, the collaborative interests and commitments have changed. From the perspective of border studies, the experience of the NEG/ECP offers an opportunity to explore how cross-border collaboration governance emerges and changes.

In this chapter, we aim to accomplish several objectives. First, we will review the formation of the NEG/ECP and its evolution over almost 50 years in order to reveal the characteristics and impact of this model of cross-border governance. A second objective is to place this form of cross-border governance into context with regard to border theory and practice, and more specifically with regard to similar governance initiatives along the Canada-U.S. border. Finally, in order to illustrate how this form of collaboration works in north eastern North America, we focus on two sustained policy initiatives of the NEG/ECP: climate change and energy collaboration.

Overview of the New England Governors/Eastern Canadian Premiers (NEG/ECP) Conference

The NEG/ECP currently includes the membership of six American States and five Canadian provinces: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Quebec. Originally, Quebec was not included in the membership but as hydroelectric energy sales between Quebec and New England grew in the 1970s, the Province of Quebec became an active participant in and regular host of the conference. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Premier of Ontario and the Governor of New York also met on occasion with the NEG/ECP. The Conference was scheduled annually (except 1991, 1992, 1996 and 2004) and hosted by a State Governor or Provincial Premier in rotation. Forty-two Conferences have been convened between 1973 and 2020. In 2019, the Conference was cancelled due to the approach of Hurricane Dorian (CAP 2019), and in 2020 the annual meeting has been cancelled due to the pandemic. Nevertheless, videoconference options are being utilized to maintain connections in both a cross-border context and among provinces and states.

Currently, the NEG/ECP is administered by the Council of Atlantic Premiers (CAP) and managed by the CAP secretariat in Halifax, Nova Scotia (see <https://www.cap-cpma.ca/about/>). The secretariat is a catalyst for Atlantic (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick) and Maritime (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, New Brunswick) intergovernmental cooperation. It serves the goals of CAP, the Council of Maritime Premiers (CMP), and the Eastern Canadian Premiers (ECP) (with the addition of Quebec). Also, the secretariat provides a central service to these various associations of provincial premiers, ministers and officials in the operation and coordination of regional programs and projects. The secretariat provides the institutional memory for intergovernmental cooperation and continuity in the various intra-regional associations of provinces in eastern Canada, and, significantly, in the international region of eastern Canada and New England. Moreover, the secretariat performs the head office function for regional agencies and employees, and provides services to the Council of Atlantic Ministers of Education and Training (CAMET) and the NEG/ECP. In essence, the secretariat has become the focal point in sustaining multiple conceptions of regional collaboration, and plural visions of the region and its borders.



Yet, these plural visions are linked by common concerns and five streams of cooperation at the international level of the NEG/ECP: developing networks and relationships; taking collective action; engaging in regional projects and endorsing projects by others; undertaking research; and increasing public awareness of shared interests (<https://cap-cpma.ca/fr/new-england-governors-and-eastern-canadian-premiers-neg-ecp/>). For example, “The Conference is a unique and highly effective international relationship of eleven jurisdictions that builds on historic ties. Specific accomplishments include:

- adopted action plans to reduce the impacts of climate change (2001), acid rain (1998), mercury deposition (1998), and greenhouse gas emissions from the transportation sector (2008);
- implemented a regional program and achieved reductions in greenhouse gas emissions;
- sponsored international forums on energy, the environment, and published energy inventories/profiles;
- adopted the Mystic Covenant, a pledge to strengthen and promote trade relations;
- established agreements for international assistance in Emergency Management and Preparedness; and
- examined issues associated with changing demographics and its effect on the economy.

The 2019 NEG/ECP Conference agenda for regional collaboration was to focus on energy grid modernization, electric vehicles, energy diversification, cybersecurity, trade, climate adaptation and, significantly, disaster mitigation (CAP 2019). The NEG/ECP was the first conference focused on cross-boundary collaboration in North America and the Conference has set the standard against which all other cross-boundary governance bodies have been based. Since its establishment, the Conference has created a unique place where Canadian and American leaders can meet and discuss important issues facing their respective jurisdictions at the time.

The Conference discusses a variety of issues of cross-jurisdictional concern, including climate change and energy, both of which are highlighted and examined in detail in this chapter. Climate change and energy were chosen for reasons including the increasing relevance of the conversation on climate change and global warming, and its relationship

to the evolving energy and renewable energy sectors. A case study approach has been utilized to provide relevant examples and to place them in the context of current policy. Cross-boundary collaboration represents the future of public policy, and the NEG/ECP creates the setting for its members to discuss pertinent issues of the day and to work together. This chapter aims to examine how the Conference works with reference to these core issues, its applicability to other regions, and how it has impacted public policy and cross-boundary cooperative efforts. Before we focus on the NEG/ECP work on climate change and energy in the international region, our aim is to contextualize the accomplishment of the NEG/ECP through a brief review of the literature on cross-boundary collaboration.

Cross-Boundary Collaboration: Theory and Practice

Cross-boundary (or cross-border) collaboration is a term that refers to both intra-national and international political, social and economic cooperation (Waddock 2013). Our focus in this



Figure 1. Map of New England and Eastern Canada. Source: Bruce Jones Design Inc. © 2009 (<https://www.freeusandworldmaps.com/images/USPrintable/USACanadaPrintText.jpg>).



discussion is on collaboration of political entities, although the forms of collaboration extend from policy fields related to environmental considerations, to resources, education, economy, culture, technology, security and other cross-border interactions. Cross-boundary collaboration is essentially a non-traditional, and to an extent, an a-territorial form of governance because cross-border governance steps beyond nation-state confines. This has been epitomized in the European Union (Hooper and Kramsch 2004), and in a more restrained approach in the “secondary foreign policy” of cross-border governance between the United States and Canada (Dupeyron 2017). In both North America and in Europe, cross-border collaboration has roots in cross-border regionalism (Scott 1999; Brunet-Jailly 2008), and characteristically is driven by economic development goals (Peck and Mulvey 2018). These goals are often linked with environmental concerns (Norman and Bakker 2009), scientific and technological advancement (Makkonen 2015), and other incentives such as tourism, resource development and management (Timothy 1999). Ultimately, in cross-boundary collaboration, political jurisdictions elect to cooperate not only within but across borders to gain economic, political, and social advantage.

Cross-boundary collaboration is a step in the direction of debordering states. In Europe this debordering has created a multi-level system with new cross-border regional configurations; in North America the result appears to be a multi-polity system connecting existing jurisdictions (Blatter 2001). In both instances, cross-border cooperation has created new forms of institutionalization (Blatter & Clement 2000). The literature examining cross-boundary collaboration identifies four major types of cross-border institutions that categorize nation-to-nation collaboration, and provide insight into how cooperative initiatives work (Blattner 2004).

Nations cooperate and communicate with one another in pursuit of joint initiatives through the establishment or adjustment of commissions, connection, coalition, and consociation. Commissions are set up as official bodies that nations implement in order to find solutions for “problematic cross-border interdependencies” (Blatter 2004, 5). Examples in the Canada-U.S. context are the International Joint Commission (IJC) established to manage the health and flow of boundary waters, and the International Boundary Commission tasked with assuring the clarity and maintenance of the boundary. A Commission for

Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was formed as a side-agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between Mexico, the U.S. and Canada to deal with environmental issues across the continent. Commissions are a formalized process by which nations can jointly pursue solutions for a shared issue. However, commissions are not established as a matter of course because they require laws to be passed in order to be implemented. The second type is a connection, and connections are similar to commissions in that they are created to serve a specific purpose, but connections do not attempt to solve the issues. Instead, connections assist in overcoming shared obstacles that hinder cohesion, and they are beneficial because they can be created and adjusted with increased flexibility and grant nations the ability to adapt easily (Blatter 2004, 5). In the Canada-U.S. context, connections range widely from negotiation agreements in resource sectors to emergency preparedness linkages between communities connected by the border. A third institution is a coalition, which is defined by political will across borders to join forces in disputes and conflicts with other political actors either locally or internationally (Blatter 2004, 6). Coalitions are typically used to define Canada's international activities and province-to-province relationships (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999). Coalitions do not choose their partners based on shared material dependency, instead based on idealistic affinity (Blatter 2004, 6). The NEG/ECP epitomizes a cross-border coalition. The final institution is a consociation which "influences individual behaviour not by providing organizational rules...but by symbolizing ideas which shape identities and contain an encompassing 'image' of a cross-border community" (Blatter 2004, 6). Consociations aim to mobilize private and public actors for cross-border actions and are indicative of North American cross-boundary collaboration efforts, generally speaking, such as the Western Climate Change Initiative which began when subnational actors sought a joint climate change strategy (Blatter 2004, 11; Lawrence 2008). Each of the frameworks described above have been employed by Canada, the United States, and European countries, but coalitions are more recently favoured and applied in Canada-U.S. cross-border governance.

In Canada, numerous bodies exist that define its intergovernmental relations within the nation, specifically: The Council of the Federation (COF), the First Ministers Conference (FMC), and region-specific bodies such as the Council of Atlantic Premiers (CAP). COF and FMC are horizontal bodies that encompass all thirteen provinces and territories, while CAP represents the



Atlantic Premiers of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland (Bolleyer 2006, 484). Canada's inter-governmental bodies are significantly less institutionalized and federally regulated as they are in the U.S., and in general these bodies emphasize coordination and flexibility to ensure their own needs are represented (Bolleyer 2006, 485). Finally, the competitive pressure that exists within bodies such as COF affects the intergovernmental arena which is exhibited by the individual actors' continuous attempts to maintain "maximal flexibility... to have the capacity to react to internal political demands and prioritize autonomy protection over stable intergovernmental relations" (Bolleyer 2006, 486).

In the United States, the system by which international relations are governed is distinctly different from Canada's system and the literature strongly emphasizes the fact that the federal government is the exclusive actor in foreign relations and the states are severely limited in their authority over international or interstate affairs (Lawrence 2008, 1244). American states are severely limited by the Constitution in areas of treaties and international relations and thus, most of their cross-boundary collaborative efforts have been defined by one word, voluntary (Lawrence 2008, 1244). Despite the Constitutional limits placed on individual states, significant cross-boundary relationships have been created and continue to persist to this day.

Currently, the most extensive, and arguably the most successful cross-boundary collaboration is the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER). Former U.S. Ambassador to Canada Bruce Heyman has identified PNWER as the gold standard in advancing U.S.-Canada relations (<http://www.pnwer.org/history.html>). PNWER encompasses the five northern and western states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho, and the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan, and territories of Yukon and the Northwest Territories. The coalition is based on the Pacific North West Legislative Leadership Forum (PNLLF) initiated in 1988. Leaders from the legislatures of the original seven jurisdictions (Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, Alaska, British Columbia, and Alberta) designed the organization to be statutory and PNWER was established in 1991. The original vision was to establish a collaborative region-wide organization to address common issues and interests. All state and provincial legislators were members. In 1993, governors and premiers were added to the governance structure. Then, in 1994, the organization expanded

its membership and mandate and incorporated official private-sector participation including the non-elective public sector, non-profit organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Dual private sector and legislative councils lead the organization and collaborate through an extensive working group structure. PNWER is funded by balanced public and private sector support to host a conference that annually attracts more than 500 participants, features numerous sessions and networking events, and more than 100 speakers from both countries. Working groups include: agriculture, Arctic caucus, border issues, cross-border livestock health, economic development, energy, energy and environment, forestry, infrastructure finance, innovation, invasive species, mining, tourism, and transportation. The collaborative accomplishments of all of the working groups are substantial and have led to numerous significant policy changes and enhancements in the international region, and between Canada and the U.S. in general, because PNWER has emerged as the model for Canada-U.S. cross-boundary collaboration (<http://www.pnwer.org/accomplishments.html>). Perhaps, the key to PNWER's success rests in the effective private-public partnership that guides the organization and sustains its collaborative vision and cooperative programs.

Examining North American relationships alone is insufficient in explaining cross-boundary collaboration trends. Therefore, the European Union (EU) model is also pertinent. There are two significant and intertwined trends identified within the literature: the first is that the EU operates as a gated community, and the second is that preferential treatment is granted to members of that community (Ganzle 2009, 1717-1718). A trend emerges in EU cross-boundary collaborative efforts, namely the inclusion and exclusionary policy that dominates EU relationships within the Union and without. Whereas inclusion and exclusion also operate in Canada-U.S. cross-boundary collaboration, these parameters are not as fundamental in the vision, design and structure of the collaboration. This flexibility and adaptability is apparent in both PNWER and NEG/ECP.

Cross-boundary relationships defined in the cross-border governance literature have been classified into four categories as discussed above. Whereas Canada's intra-national and international intergovernmental relationships are defined largely as coalitions, the categories fall short of explaining the U.S.-Canada, and EU relationships that exist. Each of these categories are valuable starting points, but many of the



nation-to-nation relationships exist at a higher level of complexity dominated by politics, constitutional limitations, and evolving governance models. The following sections provide case studies of climate change and energy policies and their evolution. The aim is to provide concrete examples of how cross-boundary cooperative organizations like the NEG/ECP serve as conduits for successful or unsuccessful policy choices made by state and provincial leaders.

Case Study 1: Climate Change and the NEG/ECP Conference

Beginning with the policy addressing acid rain, climate change policy has seen many forms at the NEG/ECP Conference since its inception in 1973 and it continues to evolve to this day. This case study aims to first outline the background of climate change initiatives at the conference. The study then examines current initiatives, and concludes with a brief conceptualization of how changing attitudes regarding climate change have the possibility to alter the conversation at the Conference. Climate change is an issue that Canada’s federal government has re-prioritized in recent years, and the Eastern Premiers have been focused on climate change as an issue for decades. Therefore, the following discussion will provide some possible conclusions for climate change policy and the future of cross-boundary collaborative efforts related to solving the numerous issues involved with climate change.

A Short History of Climate Change Policy

In 1981, acid rain was the first significant issue related to climate change brought to the Conference. The issue was discussed at length with both federal governments involved (Rausch 1997, 10). The Canadian and American federal governments ordered national status reports related to acid rain and were supportive of the NEG/ECP leaders’ initiative in creating policy that addressed this issue. In response, the NEG/ECP founded the Committee on the Environment to cooperatively find a resolution to acid rain that all jurisdictions could agree upon and implement in a reasonable fashion. The Committee on the Environment is indicative of the power the Conference has had in introducing cross-boundary entities that can operate independent of state-based politics in pursuit of significant policy changes that impact both sides of the border.

However, acid rain fell out of focus as the 1980s progressed, and in 1987, the NEG/ECP announced the Principles of a Good Neighbour Environmental Relationship, “which included foremost the consultation of the other jurisdictions in the case of major accidents affecting the environmental quality of another’s territory” (NEG-ECP 1987). Therefore, the Committee on the Environment refocused its efforts towards issues such as shoreline cleanups. Finally, in the late 1980s, two fields of focus were developed, climate change and sustainable economic development, and each of these fields came to be intertwined deeply in the following years of the Conference (Rausch 1997, 24). From the 1990s onward, the NEG/ECP refocused its efforts to address climate change more broadly and to examine the implications and impacts climate change will have on the future of the region.

Current Climate Change Initiatives

As early as July 2000, the NEG/ECP recognized the global atmospheric warning and the related climate change impacts and the threat they posed on the future health of the region’s population and economy (The Climate Change Steering Committee 2013, 2). The NEG/ECP has been leading the continent on issues relating to climate change and cross-border cooperation efforts to solve it. The current policy in place is called the *Climate Change Action Plan* (CCAP) and it was the first international plan to present a long-term vision to address climate change within a region by setting jointly agreed upon regional greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction goals (The Climate Change Steering Committee 2013, 1). The CCAP was originally adopted in 2001 and it has been updated most recently in 2013 with clear long-term vision of GHG emission reductions with 2020, and 2050 reduction targets (The Climate Change Steering Committee 2013, 1) (NEG/ECP 2016). The CCAP indicated that the NEG/ECP governors and premiers would be prioritizing a healthy and competitive economy focused on ensuring the reduction of GHG emissions through innovative technology research and creation (figure 2 below).

The Climate Change Steering Committee

Along with the CCAP, the NEG/ECP members introduced *Resolution 39-1 on Climate Change* at the 39th Conference of the NEG/ECP. The resolution directed the Committee on the Environment to examine areas of further collaboration by




Figure 2. GHG regional targets for 2020 and 2050. Source: NEG/ECP report.

identifying strategies and polices that can guide the region to implement another target year, 2030 (Exploring Energy and Greenhouse Gas 2016, 2) Resolution 39-1 also tasked the Climate Change Steering Committee (CCSC) with the responsibility for producing a NEG/ECP climate change framework that identifies strategies whose implementation would make possible the region-wide and economy-wide GHG reductions needed to meet the reduction goals set out in the CCAP (Exploring Energy and Greenhouse Gas 2016, 2). The NEG/ECP’s commitment to climate change has been made clear, but the policy stance of the U.S. during the Trump administration is directly at odds with the initiatives of the NEG/ECP. Will the imminent change to a Biden administration provide an opportunity for the NEG/ECP to realize its commitment and goals?

Canada and the United States

As discussed in the literature review, significant differences exist between the Canadian system and American system with regard to the relationship between the federal government and the provinces/states, specifically related to their ability to implement legislation. This is a significant point to re-iterate as it impacts the ability of NEG/ECP members to implement the policies introduced and agreed upon at the Conferences. A governor does not have the ability to introduce legislation into the federal legislature and, therefore, the governor cannot commit definitively to a project agreed upon at the NEG/ECP, while a premier can act with more authority (Rausch 1997, 6). The differences in legislative powers influence significantly the

conversations at the NEG/ECP, but they do not inhibit the abilities of either side in reaching agreements. While the governors have no formal powers, they have strong relationships with the private sector which, in conjunction with the state governments, are capable of pursuing the policies agreed upon at NEG/ECP with more leeway than their provincial government counter-parts.

In 2015, Canada introduced a new climate change policy following the federal election and the Paris Agreement where Canada was a signatory member (United Nations Treaty Collection 2016). Canada then launched the *Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change* which provided funding for programs across Canada that promoted solutions to climate change in the country (Government of Canada August 12, 2016; Government of Canada 2016). The United States, prior to the 2016 election, supported the implementation of policies that addressed issues related to climate change and was also a signatory of the Paris Agreement. However, with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, the country's climate change policy has been abrogated (United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). Conclusions regarding the future of climate change discussion at the NEG/ECP, however, are difficult to make as the Trump administration's stance on climate change is based largely on conjecture and misinformation. The governors and the premiers need to continue to coordinate their efforts to address climate change and use the NEG/ECP as a forum for this conversation. The governors and premiers cannot be deterred by the policy of either federal government, and one must remember that the previous Canadian government was not a strong advocate of climate change policy but the NEG/ECP was still able to pursue the significant policies outlined above. The NEG/ECP members must remain on course and pre-emptively pursue policies; climate change will continue to be an important issue and the NEG/ECP must continue to be a leading front in this initiative in North America.

Case Study 2: Energy Policy and the NEG/ECP Conference

Energy has been a topic of significant concern for the NEG/ECP since its inception. Energy as a policy focus was initiated in the 1970s and 1980s when the Conference members attempted to find solutions to the ever-growing dependency on foreign oil and the whims of nations outside of their control. The conversation



on energy is heavily intertwined with that of climate change and economic development, because as the conversation shifted away from dependence on foreign oil, the members began to seek alternative, greener renewable energy sources. The following analysis offers a brief history of energy policies at NEG/ECP, and then it addresses current policy. Overall, the intent is to assess the nature and the effectiveness of the energy conversation at NEG/ECP. Significantly, the NEG/ECP members have worked together to pursue policies relating to transportation and green infrastructure to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. Transportation is targeted as a specific example in this paper as transportation represents a large portion of the region's greenhouse gas emissions, and the NEG/ECP policies in the area of transportation represent the strength of the relationships developed at the Conference.

A History of Energy Policy at NEG/ECP

The issue of energy supply began with the oil crisis of the 1970s when the members of the NEG/ECP met to discuss alternative sources of energy, specifically: nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and tidal power that all could be generated within member states (NEG-ECP Energy Resolution 1973). Energy became the primary field of conversation before environmental issues and economic development rose to prominence. In fact, in 1973, the NEG/ECP created the Advisory Committee on Energy to begin assessing the issues related to energy supply and transport within the region (Rausch 1997, 9). In conjunction with the Advisory Committee on Energy, the NEG/ECP created the Northeast International Committee on Energy (NICE) in 1978 to monitor and act upon energy issues in the region, and since its inception NICE has facilitated numerous round table discussions and conferences to address energy concerns in the region (Rausch 1997, 9).

A significant and successful early cross-boundary collaborative effort would be the hydroelectric power trade between New England and New Brunswick. Specifically, following the talks in the 1970s, New England was primarily purchasing its power from New Brunswick Power (Rausch 1997, 9). Also, Hydro-Quebec engaged in negotiations with the New England Power Pool to develop a framework for the transfer of hydro-electric power to New England (Rausch 1997, 9). The energy industry in New England and eastern Canada was transformed through the work of the NEG/ECP, the bodies it created, and the relationships it

fostered. Each of the policies discussed pushed the region away from continued dependence on oil and towards more renewable and reliable energy projects such as hydro-electric power. Further, as discussed previously, the U.S. federal government has exclusive legal rights to international relations and their involvement would be essential should energy policy at the NEG/ECP succeed. The members resolved to urge their respective federal governments to create freer policy that would allow the flow of energy supplies between regions (NEG-ECP Energy Resolution 1973). Therefore, as early as 1976, the Canadian and U.S. federal governments became heavily involved in the energy conversation at NEG/ECP and offered to support projects. Significant examples of federal support of energy projects in NEG/ECP states include the establishment of the Atlantic Wind Test Site at North Cape, Prince Edward Island, which was among the first projects of its kind in Atlantic Canada (Rausch 1997, 9). However, in the late 1980s it seemed as if the oil crisis had ended as prices returned to normal levels. The cooperative relationship at the NEG/ECP to address the region's dependency on oil was no longer a significant concern and membership relationships devolved to one of buyers and sellers of energy. The NICE agency fell out of significant use when oil prices dropped again; hydro-electric power remained a significant source of energy in the region but the desire to seek renewable energy sources or a more permanent solution was lost for a few decades.

The Path Towards Today's Policy

In 2001, the NEG/ECP identified an ongoing issue with continued dependence on a fossil fuel energy source that was significantly impacting the environment, and was leading to climate change. As outlined in the previous case study, in 2001, the NEG/ECP adopted a Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP) that established a set of regional targets related to GHG reduction (The Climate Change Steering Committee 2013, 3). The CCAP outlined strategies such as renewable energy that members could pursue individually or collectively in order to reduce their GHG emissions. The CCAP was reviewed and updated in 2013 and the document introduced a set of guidelines related to renewable energy, specifically the members aimed to increase renewable energy use by more than 20 percent and to increase the region's renewable energy generation capacity by 10 percent over 2006 levels by 2020 (The Climate Change Steering Committee 2013, 4; NEG/ECP Resolution #30-2, 2006). In the 2000s, the conversation shifted towards seeking renewable energy solutions



that would allow the NEG/ECP members to reduce their GHG emissions in line with their climate change goals, and transition towards cleaner and more efficient ways of producing and using energy (NEG/ECP Resolution #30-2, 2006; The Climate Change Steering Committee 2013, 6).

With this policy shift in mind, the NEG/ECP members have now been exploring the concept of Electric and Alternative Fuel Vehicles and the creation of an Electric Vehicle Corridor to allow the creation and transport to consumers of what could be the new generation of vehicles. The movement has largely taken place in the U.S., with Canada benefiting from the creation of this new industry. In October 2013, a *State Zero-Emission Vehicle Programs: Memorandum of Understanding* called for the eight member states to collectively invest zero-emission vehicles on the road by 2025. Four members of the NEG/ECP are involved in this initiative: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Connecticut are in pursuit of electric vehicles (EVs) and zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs). While Canada does not directly invest in these important initiatives, the NEG/ECP members benefit from the increase in ZEV on their roads.

The majority of the vehicle creation is taking place in the U.S., but Quebec and Vermont are currently working together to create a ‘Green Corridor’ between Burlington and Montreal which will involve “deploying electric vehicle charging equipment along the route to facilitate electric vehicle travel...eventually, this EV corridor could extend through the region for through travel to Boston” (Transportation and Land Use Planning 2014; see also Haley 2015). Additionally, Quebec and Maine partnered at the 2016 meeting to create more charging stations between Quebec and Portland with the intention to branch out to other cities in the future (Bryan-Baynes 2016). Quebec, as an NEG/ECP member, is using the connections made available through the Conference to pursue green initiatives that represent the future of renewable energy. Electric vehicle charging stations (EVCs) are just one of many energy policies being pursued at the Conference and it represents a significant area of discussion going forward. Accelerating and promoting the creation of ZEVs and EVCs will help states and provinces protect public health and the environment through the reduction of GHGs and transportation-related air pollution (ZEV Program Implementation Task Force 2014). Renewable energy has been prioritized by the NEG/ECP member states because of concerns about lagging




Figure 3. NEG/ECP GHG Emissions by Economic Sector, 1990 and 2011. Source: The Climate Change Steering Committee (2013, 10).

economic conditions, and EVCs will help to reduce one of the most significant areas of GHG emissions—transportation. Transportation has grown from 34.35 percent of GHG emissions in the NEG/ECP region in 1990, to 41 percent in 2006. It represents the most significant area of growth for energy technology and is an area that the NEG/ECP can aggressively pursue because the technology promises to continue to improve.

Conclusion

As we have established in this chapter, cross-boundary collaboration is not a new concept pioneered by the NEG/ECP Conference but the NEG/ECP has helped to initiate and fashion the concept in North America. Each of the four collaborative institutions outlined in the chapter—commissions, connections, coalitions, consociations—created the basis upon which entities like the NEG/ECP were able to build their structure and understand the needs of



their members. Whereas other models like the NEG/ECP exist, this coalition represents the first significant body in North America that sought to solve the issues the two adjoining regions in countries faced at the time. The oil crisis in the 1970s effectively slowed down the economies of both Canada and the United States and without intervention, the vulnerable populations of New England and Eastern Canada who were dependent on oil, would have suffered. With those historical roots in mind, the NEG/ECP Conference has successfully created a cross-boundary body that allows its members to collectively examine issues and pursue public policy choices that attempt to benefit both sides. North America features many examples of cross-boundary collaboration, but the NEG/ECP is unique in that it was the first such body established, and it has had significant success implementing meaningful policies that impact the lives of Americans and Canadians, particularly in the Northeast. Specifically, because of the limitations placed on New England governors in terms of their ability to introduce international legislation, the NEG/ECP allows governors to discuss issues of joint concern with their Canadian neighbours without breaching their constitution. The examples offered above, such as the Green Corridor Initiative, were only made possible because of the space created at the NEG/ECP for Quebec and Vermont to discuss the creation of the energy corridor from Burlington to Montreal, and the intent to extend the corridor to Boston. Discussions such as the Green Corridor Initiative were made possible through the NEG/ECP coalition and represent the possibilities for success in the area of cross-boundary work. Also, the examples relating to Climate Change policy, specifically the establishment of the cross-border entities like NICE, indicate that through the pooling of resources and time, the NEG/ECP has created an organization that can facilitate the implementation of cross-boundary relationships between individual members or organizations within the states and provinces. Finally, cross-boundary collaboration efforts at the NEG/ECP set the precedent for the rest of North America to emulate and improve. Currently, with a major shift imminent in North American cross-boundary relations after the U.S. election of 2020, all cross-boundary collaboration, and the organizations and institutions associated with this collaboration, will be crucial in efforts to stabilize and enhance relationships between the United States and its neighbours. In order to prepare and respond to this shift, policy makers need to be aware of the accomplishments of sub-national institutions and organizations like the NEG/ECG, and their role in helping Canadians, Mexicans and Americans understand the borders in North America, and how we may collaborate to work across these boundaries (Correa-Cabrera & Konrad 2020).

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Chapter 4

Newcomers and Belonging: Community Gardening as a Tool to Ease Transitions

Lucy Hinton

Matthew A. Schnurr

*I think of my little garden here as the same
as my three acres in Bhutan.*

— Kavita

Community gardening is experiencing a resurgence. As grassroots approaches to improving food security increase in popularity, community gardening is where civil society can re-engage shared spaces to increase access to fresh, healthy food and strengthen communities (Shisanya & Hendriks 2011; Corrigan 2011; Harris et al 2014). This chapter examines how a community garden contributes to the adaptation process for refugee newcomers from Bhutan. The study took place in Glen Garden in Halifax, Nova Scotia. The garden provided fresh and nutritious food to participants, but due to small plot sizes, represented only very minor enhancements to food security.¹ However, Glen Garden was instrumental in easing the transition of many in the Lhotsampa community to Nova Scotia. By enabling the maintenance of traditional diets and culture, the feeling of being at home through reconstructing past landscapes and solidifying through identities as gardeners, and by acting as a hub for building and strengthening different forms of social capital, Glen Garden's strengths were more related to healthy adaptation and nourishing traditions in Canada than to any perceived increases in food security.

Lhotsampa Refugees in Halifax

A refugee is recognized by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (UNHCR 1951). By nature of relocating, some scholars have thought of refugees as short- or long-term border dwellers (Alberts et al 2010), described in this way based on their residing in two cultural contexts (Bilge 2017). In this case, the Lhotsampa have lived through complicated stages of cross-cultural contact, not only in Canada (the current host culture) but also in transitions through India and residing in “temporary” Nepali camps. The Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI) suggests settlement and integration be viewed as a continuum. This study used ideas of acculturation and adaptation to explore integration, described in the 2012 OCASI report on settlement in Ontario as “the long-term, two-way process in which immigrants and refugees become full and equal participants in the social, political, cultural and economic dimensions of society” (OCASI: 11; see also CCR 1998; Drachman 1992; George 2002). Over the course of the study it became clear that the community garden was an important component of the long-term process of adaptation for this group of newcomers.

Between 1990 and 1992, Bhutan, a country affectionately known by the international community as “the Last Shangri-La”, was subsumed by a political crisis that resulted in a large proportion of the population fleeing to refugee camps in Eastern Nepal (Hutt 2003). These refugees are known as Lhotsampa in Bhutan, which in the Bhutanese national language of Drukpa translates to “the people who come from the southern borderlands”. The Lhotsampa are Nepali in ethnicity and came from rural, predominantly agrarian, traditions and mostly practice Hinduism rather than the majority Buddhism in Bhutan (Dhurba 2004). After two decades of protracted and ultimately unsuccessful dialogue between Nepal, Bhutan, and the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR), countries such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia agreed to resettle Bhutanese refugees. Approximately 100,000 refugees have now been resettled in these countries, with the bulk of Lhotsampa immigrating to the United States and Canada.

According to the Immigrant Services Association of Nova Scotia (ISANS), a provincial non-governmental organization (NGO)



focused on newcomers and settlement issues, approximately 575 Lhotsampa had settled in Halifax, Nova Scotia, by 2015. In 2012, ISANS teamed up with the Ecology Action Centre (EAC), a local environmental NGO, to establish a community garden at the request of the Lhotsampa and other newcomers who sought space where they could revive a version of agrarian activity that had been their livelihood. Though shared with other refugee communities, Glen Garden was established largely with Bhutanese refugees in mind, because the community showed such sustained interest in it. This pattern has been replicated across North America, where Bhutanese refugees have collaborated with community groups to establish gardens in Dallas, Philadelphia, Omaha, Concord and Baltimore (Solis 2014; Shaw 2014; Healy 2013; Wilson 2014). Glen Garden was established across from an apartment building complex in a neighbourhood where many newly resettled people lived.

In 2015, the primary author interviewed 20 Lhotsampa gardeners about their experiences leaving Bhutan, living in camps in Nepal, resettling in Canada and the role community gardening played within these transitions. The study was expected to uncover ways the garden acted as a tool for food security, given the literature that demonstrates the impact of community gardening on household food supply (Armstrong 2000). But community voices quickly shifted the narrative to a story of adaptation in Canada. This research used a grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006), allowing patterns to emerge from the interview data that was then analyzed through Nvivo software. The 20 gardeners who were interviewed varied in age (from 33-years old to late 80s) and gender, but the majority were middle-aged to older men. Names have been changed to protect the gardeners' identities, but some characteristics have been retained alongside quotes to achieve the community's requests for their own voices to be prominent in the research.

Research has emphasized the crucial role community gardens can play in helping immigrant communities feel integrated and acculturated in new countries (Airriess & Clawson 1994; Baker 2004; Alaimo et al.2008; Corrigan 2011; Gerodetti & Foster 2012). The Lhotsampa recount a similar story. While ‘the garden’ is commonly heralded as a method for increasing food security through supply (Armstrong 2000), its cultural benefits—in supporting health, wellbeing, and integration—are much more profound.

In this chapter, we explore how Glen Garden acted as an adaptation tool for some of the Lhotsampa community's transition to Canada. First, it gave the community access to culturally appropriate food. This food supports refugees in two ways: allowing maintenance of the "healthy immigrant effect" (described below) and providing the ability to pass on traditional food knowledge (TFK) to children and younger generations. In this way, the Lhotsampa explicitly aimed to reduce the impacts of potential cultural loss over time, induced by forced migration. Second, by growing plants they would have traditionally grown in Bhutan, the Lhotsampa purposefully mimicked the landscapes they grew up in in a literal, if small, way. Lhotsampa gardeners evoked a feeling of comfort and home in a new society and created opportunity to build new negotiated identities. Both as Canadians and gardeners, the Lhotsampa partook in constructing these negotiated identities after decades of living outside of traditional conceptions of belonging (in camps and as newly settled refugees). The garden further provided the Lhotsampa with a sense of responsibility and meaning that seemed to improve self-esteem and dignity. Through the ability to provide for their families, and in the absence of paid employment, the production of food supplemented household budgets and offered both agency and structure to daily lives. Finally, the garden has enabled the Lhotsampa to increase forms of social capital on multiple levels, strengthening integration within the neighbourhood and the ability to interact with community power brokers.

Gardening as an Adaptation Tool

Gardening to Access Food in Traditional Ways

The Lhotsampa used Glen Garden to grow food that wasn't readily available in Canadian grocery stores, or that they could not find in the preferred form. For example, while local gourds are found seasonally in Nova Scotia, the Lhotsampa traditionally harvest the shoots of gourds for *pickles* (chutneys). By growing pumpkins and gourds in the garden, the Lhotsampa could preserve this approach to traditional cuisine. Alongside vegetables that are common in Canadian gardens, such as beans, pumpkins, potatoes, tomatoes, peas and garlic, the Lhotsampa also often grew less common foods such as buckwheat, sesame and daikon. These are plants that newly arrived Lhotsampa could not usually find in the condition that they preferred,



such as the unprocessed buckwheat that is used in *dhedo*, a dough-like mixture of grains eaten alongside vegetables or curry, that is similar to polenta or porridge. While other studies have shown that being able to grow culturally appropriate food was a primary motivator for participating in a community garden (Baker 2004), the Lhotsampa gardeners did not emphasize this in conversation, instead suggesting that the majority of what they wanted could be found in mainstream or specialty Asian grocery stores.

Instead, the Lhotsampa emphasized the garden as a means of accessing food that was familiar to cook with, especially the importance of freshness: a condition that *only* garden produce was able to fulfil. A commonly told story in the community centered on the first Lhotsampa families that arrived in Halifax, who were initially given hotel accommodation while the settlement agency made housing arrangements. During this time, hotel staff provided newly arrived families with meals, but since meals were based on Canadian dietary norms, many families experienced severe anxiety stemming from the lack of familiarity. Community members reported that the first few families did not eat very much at all and that subsequent families were much better off since the community was able to support their dietary preferences and food sourcing. Krissaran, an active community leader and father of two teenage boys, explained:

...at that time the [newcomers] didn't have rice and vegetables like we [ate] in our country and the hotel provided them [with] different kinds of food items and they just threw them out. They just smelled and tasted it and it was totally different... sometimes they ate the bread and threw the food they got from the hotel ... into the garbage...ISANS ... they introduced different places here where we get rice...I think somebody told them we don't like to eat this, [it is] tasteless and it makes us very sick. Those people helped [us] to find rice, vegetables, oil and everything.

Similarly, Ganga, an 81-year-old grandmother who spent 19 years in refugee camps in Nepal, described her initial experience in Canada the following way: "When we arrived here we lived in a hotel and the first two or three days the people served us. We weren't used to that food and [we] didn't like it and we cried a lot. After three or four days when we didn't want to eat the Canadian food we just found the rice and started to cook for

ourselves and we got better after that”. These testimonials demonstrate how integral food experiences are immediately after arrival in the resettlement community and how common it may be for newcomers to experience significant apprehension about food and eating. The transition period to a new culture and home can be an important first phase in forming new eating habits and dietary patterns in settlement countries (Delavari et al. 2013; Tarraf et al 2017). Having access to culturally appropriate food therefore becomes even more important than simply eating what is familiar and feels good. It also enables two important components of healthy dietary transition in a settlement country: contributing to overall health status in the face of new foods and dietary culture and maintaining traditional food to preserve culture and knowledge.

Maintaining traditional diets during transitions to new settlement countries can be critical for newcomer health. Dietary acculturation has been linked to weight gain and diabetes, and significant differences have been found between newer immigrants who recently settled and long-term residents (Creighton et al. 2012). As migrants adapt to new environments, they often adopt host country food cultures. Depending on the country of settlement, studies have shown that migrants often increase consumption of cheaper, calorie-dense foods such as noodles, chips, pizza and sugar-sweetened beverages and shift away from diets that were higher in vegetable and fruit consumption (Burns 2004). This is known as the “healthy immigrant effect” (Tarraf et al 2017). This change becomes more pronounced with the length of time in country and manifests differently according to generational differences (Creighton et al. 2012). Ayush, who had shared a farm with his three brothers in Bhutan, described how much the fresh garden produce that was cooked in traditional ways meant to him and his wife, but differed for his children: “When I cook at home, me and my wife always feel the same, but our kids don’t like to eat our own food”. The Lhotsampa consistently associated “Canadian food” with fast food, like hamburgers and pizza, further implicating the health risks associated with shifting away from traditional diets. From a health standpoint, access to culturally appropriate food seemed to enable the Lhotsampa to preserve traditional, and potentially healthier, dietary patterns.

This commitment to maintaining traditional cuisine and diet includes the culture and knowledge associated with these foods. Kwik’s (2008) conception of traditional food knowledge



(TFK) in immigrant populations demonstrates how subsequent generations lose familiarity to cultural foods and methods in the kitchen, and consequently miss out on both the culture and recipes their parents’ generation understood innately. Arguing that TFK and other cultural knowledge can be lost through acculturation, Kwik (2008) also connected TFK with the healthy immigrant effect. Underlining that preservation of cultural knowledge is both important to preserving multicultural communities and enriching the community. Kwik (2008) noted it also produces healthier populations. Lhotsampa gardeners were firm on the garden’s role in teaching children about growing and cooking Nepali foods, demonstrating their focus on preserving TFK. This was especially important, for example, to those young enough to have been born in Canada and only knew Canada as their home, or for those who never experienced farming because they grew up in refugee camps. Krissaran (2015) explains: “we need this garden for ... children to teach them, we just want to keep this culture going generation to generation, not only our kids, we want to teach our young generations from any communities, this is what or this is where we get vegetables”.

The Lhotsampa community resolved to teach both their own children and the wider community about the importance of growing food and cooking it, about health and the environment. Enriching the wider Canadian community became an important goal of Glen Garden. The community garden provided more than culturally appropriate food as a pillar of food security—it enabled the preservation of healthier diets and traditional food knowledge.

Gardening to Reconstruct Landscapes and Negotiate Identities for Belonging

Growing culturally appropriate vegetables had other effects on the Lhotsampa community that were more related to the physical act of gardening, including using the garden as a sensory tool to supplement memory. Gerodetti and Foster (2015: 812) encapsulated some of the literature that explored the potential of gardens: “Gardens are containers of memory (Mazumdar & Mazumdar 2012) as is food itself (Sutton 2001) and this theme emerges strongly in studies of migrants and food production.” Gardens tend to reflect the socioeconomic heritage of their owners (Airriess & Clawson 1994). In one sense, the garden seemed to act as a stand-in for Bhutan, where the Lhotsampa

can dissolve into a refabricated, South Asian agrarian landscape. A common refrain among participants was that they felt “at home” in the garden. Other gardeners were more explicit, as when Kavita thought of it as: “my little garden here as the same as my three acres in Bhutan”. The sensory experience of memory transcended from actively gardening into cooking—processes that recreate past, familiar experiences through both growing and eating (Gerodetti & Foster 2015). Mitesh explained that “I feel like now when I start working in the garden here, I dream like [I’m in] Bhutan”. These experiences appeared to be soothing to community members, as descriptions of growing food in Bhutan were characterized by bucolic simplicity. While Amita, a mother of six, described how the act of gardening makes her feel, she brushed her fingers through the beans she was growing: “in Bhutan I have big land but ... the garden reminds me. When I was in Bhutan I [grew] vegetables like all [of these in] this area”. Glen Garden symbolized a tool for remembering the past, crossing borders in imagined landscapes, and supplementing these memories with the sensory experiences of smell and touch.

At the same time, gardening in Nova Scotia is substantially different from farming in Southern Bhutan. The Lhotsampa’s gardens are filled with the same kinds of learned and hybrid growing techniques that characterize migrant gardens around the world (Airriess & Clawson 1994; Baker 2004). The Lhotsampa adapted growing food as their knowledge of local conditions and climate deepened, further cementing negotiated identities in their adopted country. Krissaran had been experimenting growing chilies in his small plot, working to understand the effects of the Canadian climate on the growing season and needs for coverage to survive winter. The physical manipulation of the landscape by their own hands not only recreated past landscapes, it also created new landscapes that take on new Nova Scotian and Lhotsampa hybrid identities. The landscape became characterized by a mixture of traditional and new growing techniques, and the resulting environment gave rise to what Baker (2004) has described as the new cultural landscapes of North America. While most of the vegetables the Lhotsampa grow are not uncommon in Canada, the combination that is grown is dictated by traditional Nepali cuisine and becomes a visible marker of the presence of this diet and the people who eat it in Nova Scotia.

As a result, the Lhotsampa became recognized in the local community as *gardeners*, enabling them to negotiate their



belonging in Nova Scotia. Other scholars have understood gardeners' desires to be recognized as 'good' at gardening as a method for achieving status and identity in resettlement countries, thereby cementing their physical and emotional place as part of society (Agustina & Beilin 2011). The Lhotsampa adopted these externalized, negotiated identities as gardeners and were recognized as such in the local community, creating a sense of belonging through gardening. Other neighbourhood residents honked car horns while driving by the garden, serving to acknowledge them as gardeners and members of the neighbourhood. Krissaran described the effect this has on the community: "The people feel happy: they think 'I don't know him, but he recognizes me' [and] that makes them proud at least somebody know[s] me".

Since many of the Lhotsampa gardeners were farmers, identifying as gardeners in a new place is more than just belonging; it also provided daily work that could aid in the adaptation process by providing a sense of responsibility and dignity. Community gardens have been shown to help elderly migrant gardeners to acquire more self-esteem, based on the daily required attention to gardens and the resulting sense of responsibility, commitment, and accomplishment (Airriess & Clawson 1994). Like other former refugee gardeners from similar backgrounds, most spoke little English upon arrival in Canada; studies have shown that elderly migrants struggle with a lack of facility in English, an absence of locally marketable job skills, an overdependence on children, a lack of mobility (whether physically or in terms of transportation) and the breakdown of extended family (Matsuoka 1999; Corlett et al 2003). These challenges contribute to low self-esteem in elderly migrants, a process which gardening can help to mitigate. A study of Vietnamese gardeners in New Orleans documented how participants sold their surplus produce and could therefore "create order in a new socioeconomic environment over which they otherwise have little control" (Airriess & Clawson 1994, 19).

The Lhotsampa use similar tactics, but by supplementing groceries rather than selling surplus. Most gardeners interviewed in this study were unemployed and supplementing the household budget through the act of providing food was important. Plots were too small to make much financial difference: when Kavita was asked if the garden saved her money she replied, "Not that much but once a week I can avoid buying veggies when they are more expensive at the store". Krissaran also explained that

the Lhotsampa were still dependent on the local food bank to make ends meet. While plots didn't supply enough food to impact finances significantly, the agency gardeners exhibited in providing something for their family made a real impact on their perceived self-worth. The Lhotsampa gardeners emphasized the quality and freshness of their vegetables over the store-bought ones, highlighting the contribution this made to their family, and especially in the absence of paid work. Kavita, a mother of three, surmised why gardening was important to her and the whole community:

When I was born in Bhutan I went to the garden with my parents and learned how to grow everything. I did it in [the camps in] Nepal as well and I knew how to make my food and eat it. When you eat fresh vegetables it is much healthier, I am very proud of the food that I grow. When I eat the vegetables, I am very proud of what I have grown.

Migrant gardens have been interpreted as expressions of self-worth as participants attempt to connect to the host culture (Moreno-Black et al 1996), and the Lhotsampa embody this struggle. Gardening helped the Lhotsampa reconnect to the one activity that used to define their daily lives: farming. At 81-years old, Prem had farmed nine acres of land that he had inherited from his father in Bhutan and registered the return to an activity that he identified with: "I feel good about being able to garden and know how to do something that I used to do".

The daily commitment required by the garden seemed to produce a sense of ownership and responsibility. While the Lhotsampa's plots were small, the gardeners visited the garden often for about 30 minutes, two-to-three or even four-to-six times a day. Gardeners who were unemployed or elderly usually visited the garden more often and working there became a form of structure for daily living in Canada, while also connecting with each other and demonstrating dignity in 'work' in both the neighbourhood and cultural community. Of those who were unemployed, some had plots in more than one community garden and spent their days travelling the city on public transport to maintain different gardens. One volunteer explained: "I work three days at Common Roots [another garden] and three days at the school. Yes, very busy". Glen Garden, and other gardens in the city, served as substitute employment for many Lhotsampa gardeners. While it is traditionally men who are expected to leave the home to find a job, those who have found employment tend



to be younger and more proficient in English. Those who were employed were evidently proud of the achievement, like Kabir, who explained that his wife did most of the gardening because he was too busy with his job at a bank. Dignity was associated with employment, but where that was not possible, *work* in the garden was being substituted because of the daily responsibility it required and the ability to provide something for their family.

The provision of some food acted as a small substitute for income, making the act of gardening effective in strengthening self-esteem. Gardening as a substitute for employment became a strategy the Lhotsampa used to be useful both to their family and their community, as they struggled to integrate into the local economy in more formal ways. The Lhotsampa, and particularly the middle-aged to older men in the community, used the garden as a way to achieve the structure, responsibility and status that paid employment would otherwise provide. Manjeet, a man who dreams of purchasing land for farming in Nova Scotia, explained what it meant to him to bring food home to his family: "I feel good and these vegetables add something in my family like healthiness and [satiated] appetite and we save some money".

The association of gardening with their former farming livelihoods became an important way for Lhotsampa gardeners to construct negotiated identities in Canada, both in terms of dignity of livelihood and in creating spaces of belonging. Using the garden allowed the Lhotsampa to recreate spaces that reminded them of home and transcended spatial realities and borders; while hybrid growing techniques allowed the gardeners to negotiate identities of expertise and encourage a feeling of belonging, rather than ways of being known before as constantly refugees. At the same time, paid employment and status, self-worth and a sense of responsibility were difficult given the transition in language and culture, and gardening became a functional substitute to ease into the adaptation process for the community.

Gardening as Social Capital

Social capital, a concept popularized by Robert Putnam (1993), provides a useful lens through which to understand the interactions of the Lhotsampa with others in the garden. According to Putnam, there are three forms of social capital that build strong communities: *bonding social capital* is represented by the strong ties between those in similar sociodemographic

environments like family or neighbours; *bridging social capital* brings people together from across diverse socio-demographic environments, such as loose friendships; and finally, *linking social capital* is concerned with the connections between people in very different situations and especially those in positions of power, politically or financially (Firth et al 2011).

While bonding social capital is already extraordinarily strong in the Lhotsampa community, the garden acts as a hub or a container where this can take place. In particular, the Lhotsampa stressed the importance of having somewhere outside where elders in the community can interact with others. This was seen as important because of the long, cold winters in Nova Scotia, which Lhotsampa elders found particularly difficult. Many suggested they did not leave their apartments until the snow melted each spring. The garden also strengthened bonding capital through teaching young people the cultural and growing traditions. Often, as parents were working, volunteering, or attending English lessons, children from the community were playing in between the beds while grandparents and others supervised. Dipesh's daughter, who stayed with him while we spoke, only liked to eat the mushrooms and potatoes from the garden and nothing else. But having her with him in the garden enabled knowledge transfer as she learned about gardening technique and helped to harvest. Bonding capital helped to keep the community grounded in specific traditions as they continued ongoing integration processes in Canada.

The garden also provided occasions to strengthen linking social capital. As this type of social capital is concerned with power differentials, it is notable that the garden often acted as a focal point for local politicians and community leaders. The most visible example of this was the fallout from an act of vandalism on the garden in 2012. Police estimated that 70 percent of vegetation in the beds was destroyed (CTV Atlantic 2012) and it looked as though taller plants had been knocked down (Fairclough 2012). Vandalism is not uncommon in community gardens and the paradoxical increase in community support after a case of vandalism has been noted in other communities (Block et al. 2010). In response, local businesses donated transplants and seeds. The community in the surrounding area came together to help rebuild Glen Garden (Fairclough2012). This became an opportunity for politicians and community leaders to show support for the community and gave the



Lhotsampa access to leaders with political power, which they used to demonstrate how meaningful the garden space was and request expansion. Financial power was also on display as local businesses donated supplies to rebuild the garden. Though the vandalism represented a case of destruction and an indicator of seeming low social capital in general, the aftermath provided the entire community with an opportunity to strengthen it.

Most importantly, the vandalism and the continued effects proved to be integral to building the bridging social capital in the community that the Lhotsampa were most touched by and symbolized their perception of belonging in Nova Scotia. The community’s response to the vandalism was meaningful to newcomers, who were felt connection to the broader community in the aftermath. One perspective was especially telling:

Two years ago, when we had first garden over there, there was [some] big vandalism there. Many Canadians from around this community came with some seeds, some plants, something like that to help our community here. That touch[ed] our heart[s], we are all human beings, whenever there is trouble people help each other, so that g[a]ve a good relation between different communities and that [made] people understand better each other . . . Due to that incident, since then, people learn[ed] a lot, we are all human beings, [with the] same thinking and [the] same thoughts (Krissaran, August 4, 2015).

Since the incident, the Lhotsampa observed a noticeable increase in the number of neighbourhood residents who stopped by Glen Garden to greet them. Passersby asked questions about what they were growing and how the gardeners used the food. Deepika explained how this had motivated her to change her language learning strategy: “I collected all the seeds from the different areas and I put them in front of my teacher and I ask[ed] her what is this called what are the name[s] of those seeds and that makes it [so I can] explain when anyone asks questions about my garden”. Since the vandalism incident, neighbourhood residents began to wave and honk car horns as they drove by, sometimes stopping to see how the garden was progressing throughout the summer. Not only did this help the Lhotsampa gardeners to integrate by improving their English, it also seemed to help their understanding of themselves as valued by their neighbours and contributed to a sense of belonging.

The garden proved to be an environment capable of increasing all forms of social capital, including that within the Lhotsampa community, between those in different power roles, and most importantly, between the Lhotsampa and the wider Nova Scotian community. By building on their identity as gardeners in this location, the Lhotsampa were touched by residents' outpouring of support that followed the vandalism, and knowing this support existed further enabled them to solidify their negotiated identities within the community. This bridging social capital is integral to the Lhotsampa's perceptions of belonging in Nova Scotia and facilitating the transition of a persecuted group into their new home.

Conclusion

While the popularity of community gardening as a means of sustainably increasing food security continues to expand, this study corroborates others that underline the importance of community gardens that go beyond simply enhancing a (culturally appropriate) food supply (Shisanya & Hendriks 2011; Corrigan 2011; Harris et al. 2014). In the case of community gardens designed for new immigrants, these spaces can help to ease transition into new spaces and society by maintaining traditional diets and culture, reconstruct past landscapes and negotiate identities to feel at home, and act as a space for building and strengthening different forms of social capital. The Lhotsampa can continue to teach future generations TFK through harvesting and preparing food in traditional ways. In the garden the Lhotsampa transcended Canadian spaces through reconstruction of landscapes, metaphorically crossing borders, and then used their expertise and hybrid spaces to negotiate identities and relationships in Canada. It substituted for employment, especially for older and male community members with limited English, by reconnecting them with former livelihoods and increasing a sense of responsibility and self-worth. The vandalism against the garden precipitated outside support to rebuild, reinforcing a sense of belonging.

The Lhotsampa's experience demonstrates that a community garden can be much more than a sustainable way to increase food security in the community. Instead, it represents an easing of transitions, showcasing the capacity for gardens to be tools in the settlement and integration continuum. In some ways it feels that the Lhotsampa gardeners came home in Glen



Garden, crossing many borders over many years to find home in this space. Originally from the Southern border of Bhutan, the Lhotsampa continue to occupy bordered space in Nova Scotia, demonstrating the sensory experiences of how newcomers negotiate identity in a new place. The Lhotsampa showed that a community garden can act as one component in the ongoing integration continuum, unraveling borders and barriers to rebuild a sense of belonging.

Note

- 1 Initially defined in 1974 by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as the “[a]vailability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and prices”, the definition of food security has evolved over time. The multi-dimensional concept used by the World Food Summit in 1996 is now the more widely accepted definition: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (1996), but alternative concepts such as food sovereignty have also appeared as critics have pushed back against the emphasis on supply and access that is foundational in food security.

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Chapter 5

Cultural Communities and African Immigrant Retention

Alice Musabende

Despite new immigration policies that have made it significantly easier for Africans to immigrate to Canada, and despite the fact that Canada's provinces and territories increasingly rely on immigration as a source of skills and knowledge, African born immigrants continue to experience difficulties settling in beyond border crossing and arrival (Tettey & Pupilampu 2005). Concurrently, the question of how to develop a sound immigration and diversity management strategy is one that many Canadian provinces and cities are grappling with (Paquet 2014). In the province of Nova Scotia, while immigration has been increasing the provincial population, retention remains relatively low: a study conducted by Goss Gilroy Inc. (2005) revealed that of the 25,493 immigrants who arrived in NS from 1991 to 2001, only 10,290 settled permanently, reflecting a retention rate of only 40 percent. In February 2019, the provincial government announced that Nova Scotia had welcomed over 15,000 newcomers in the three years prior, 71 percent of whom chose to permanently settle in the province (Nova Scotia Office of Immigration 2019).

While recent changes suggest the province may be starting to turn a corner, Nova Scotia has long struggled to attract and retain immigrants and for the last three decades has worked on crafting strategic objectives mainly focused on creating employment opportunities for newcomers and opening up more access to settlement assistance. It was a difficult endeavor and in the case of African immigrants, Nova Scotia's attempts to improve retention was a particularly complicated task. First, because existing data on the immigrant populations in Nova Scotia were not disaggregated,



they could not capture and reflect the characteristics of the African immigrants. Without knowing who these immigrants were and, critically, how to help them settle and thrive, the data failed to inform policy in meaningful and effective ways. For example, while the African Canadian Immigrant Action Research identified that African immigrants in Nova Scotia came from about 30 African countries, it did not provide any other information about who they were (Government of Nova Scotia 2004).

Second, there is a dearth of research on how immigrants organize and work together. Very little is known about the organizations and activities of the African immigrant cultural communities in self-facilitating their settlement and retention within Nova Scotia. A 2014 report produced by the Nova Scotia Commission on Building our New Economy underscored the pressing nature of this issue. The report stated that Nova Scotia’s “low rates of attraction and retention for immigrants, along with our negative inter-provincial migration trend contribute to our weaker economic growth over the past 30 years” (Nova Scotia Commission 2014, 26). It also emphasized the importance and role that culture plays: “having clusters of people with shared cultural backgrounds helps with attraction and retention for future immigration” (59).

But the Commission’s report as well as the overall provincial immigration strategy are problematic because they fail to provide a critical and practical analytic perspective on how such “clusters of people” are formed, the role they play and how to foster immigrant communities’ resilience. This research seeks to explore deeper the characteristics of African immigrants’ communities and the interlinks between these cultural clusters and retention of immigrants in the province. To start that conversation, we ask: What role do cultural communities play in immigrant retention among recent African arrivals in Nova Scotia?

This paper presents findings of a research project that investigated the most prominent cultural organizations of African diaspora communities in the province, including the African Diaspora Association of the Maritimes (ADAM), the Ugandan Canadian Association of the Maritimes, the Ghanaian Nova Scotia Association, the Nigerian Nova Scotia Association, the Liberian Association in Nova Scotia, and the Sierra Leonean Association in Nova Scotia.

Below, we outline the project’s purpose, methodology and theoretical framework, and findings. To a rather unexpected high

degree, the research helped clarify the obstacles to successful retention in Nova Scotia. It also highlighted the utility that ADAM, the African Diaspora Association of the Maritimes, has in aiding provincial immigrant retention. However, the findings remained inconclusive concerning this organization's objective of collaborating effectively with country specific diaspora associations as well as indigenous African Nova Scotians (non-immigrant Nova Scotians of African descent). The research adds voice to the policy implications, with a special focus on current debates over immigration in Nova Scotia.

This study seeks to deepen an understanding of cultural identity within the African immigrants' communities in Canada and the role of culture as a unifying force beyond original borders. By investigating the role played by immigrants' cultural organizations, we are reflecting on new forms of cultural practices created by transnational groups of African immigrants as they seek to establish themselves in Nova Scotia. Understanding the settlement behavior of different immigrant cultural groups of African descent in Nova Scotia is important for several reasons. First, the issue of immigrant retention is an important public policy priority in Nova Scotia and Canada. According to Federal Citizenship and Immigration Minister, Chris Alexander (2013, para. 4), "Immigration is one of Canada's most vital public policy issues... It's a question of our economic future. It is about nation-building". But as Akbari, Lynch, McDonald and Rankaduwa (2007, 19) point out, such lofty ideas are much more difficult to operationalize in Atlantic Canada: "If immigrants are to make a durable contribution to NS, the province's success in retaining its immigrants is critical". It is important, therefore, to understand the place of culture and collectivity within the process of immigrant retention.

Second, such questions about immigrant retention are particularly important in Nova Scotia, since immigrant retention in the province has long been compounded by the broader trend of out-migration (Statistics Canada 2018). In its 2011 immigration strategy, the provincial government was seeking to "increase retention of new immigrants to 70 per cent or better" (Government of Nova Scotia 2011, 11). During the 2013 provincial election, the leader of the Official Opposition Progressive Conservative Party, Jamie Baillie (2013), campaigned on the objective of being the first premier to increase the population of the province to one million. The Nova Scotia Commission on Building our New Economy (2014) argues that there is a need to "develop a current profile of our immigration attraction, retention, economic activity and



geographic distribution” (Nova Scotia Commission 2014, 36). For these reasons, it is important to shed light on under-utilized capacities—notably immigrant groups’ endogenous approaches to retention and how they might be coordinated with the efforts of government and other community partners.

Theoretical context

Culture and acculturation are the foundational concepts within this proposed study. Our study draws on Zimmerman’s (2012) definition that “culture is the characteristics of a particular group of people, defined by everything from language, religion, cuisine, social habits, music and arts” (para.1). From a psychological perspective, Berry (1980) argues that acculturation refers to changes in behaviors, attitudes, values, and identities of individuals. Acculturation occurs at the level of the individual, but also for groups, a dynamic that will be critical to our investigations. Drawing on two interrelated theories of acculturation—dissonant acculturation and social conformity—we critically examine what can be done to facilitate the settlement and retention of African diaspora communities. Towards this end, we engaged the leaders of the respective African immigrant cultural communities in Nova Scotia, and probed the assumption that some cultural communities have stronger and hence more successful settlement and retention capacities than others because of differences in their communal organizational, acculturation and settlement strategies. Berry (2005) argues that “not all groups and individuals undergo acculturation in the same way” (704). In this context, examining and drawing upon the distinctive capacities of various diaspora associations may be of particular value in facilitating integration and encouraging retention.

The theory of dissonant acculturation holds that there may be different patterns of acculturation within the same family (Portes 1999). We intend to adapt this theory with the supposition that there may be different patterns of acculturation within a cultural collective of interrelated, independent immigrant cultural communities. Replacing family with a collective of cultural communities retains the analytic logic of the theoretical supposition because cultural communities, among African diaspora peoples, have comparable importance to families (Nyemah & Vanderplaats 2009; Chareka et al 2012). This research validates this theory in part, as it highlights that to a certain degree, the existence of cultural communities has helped members of the African diaspora feel welcome and more

included in the community at large and has effectively helped many of them navigate a socially and administratively complex system that was their new home province.

The theory of social conformity, on the other hand, presupposes that the acculturative behavior of immigrants as it relates to a collectivity is driven by “the desire to fit in with others, strategic benefits from coordination, incentives to free ride on the information of others, and the tendency to interact with people similar to oneself” (Bednar et al 2010, 414). We analyzed how the coordinated cultural activities of the respective African immigrant cultural collectives differentially influence their settlement and retention capacities. The combination of the two theories of acculturation is crucial because it allowed us to understand not only the settlement and retention differences between cultural communities, but also differences in their motivations.

Methodology and research population

To explore how African immigrants’ cultural organizations might be engaged in immigrant retention processes in Nova Scotia, it was important first to understand who these organizations are, their memberships, and barriers they have identified to integration and settlement in the province. To achieve this objective, a series of interviews with representatives of each prominent cultural organization were conducted. This research adopted a qualitative approach comprised of structured, semi-structured, and informal interviews with leaders of the most prominent cultural organizations of African immigrants in the province. These discussions contained open-ended questions to give participants an opportunity to develop their ideas and opinions on the subject with the hope that in the end, they could help us understand why some cultural communities have stronger settlement and retention capacities than others.

The total number of interviews planned was between 15 and 20 leaders of the organizations; the goal was not to have a representative sample of leaders of African immigrant organizations but instead one that offered depth and detail on how these organizations operated and what particular factors allowed them to influence the retention of some of their members in Nova Scotia. In the end, not all the interviews could be obtained. Nine semi-structured interviews were conducted with official leaders of the aforementioned organizations, because soon after the



research project started, I realized that the fact that I was seeking to speak to representatives of these organizations meant that only the president or founding member or official spokesperson of the organization felt they were the right and often only persons to speak on behalf of the organization. My numerous attempts to speak with more people were unsuccessful as subjects I had identified as potential respondents kept referring me to the “official” leaders of the organizations. Nonetheless, I was able to speak with representatives who had been part of the organizations since their beginning and in all but one instance were founding members of the organizations themselves. This provided for a more complete picture of the origins of these organizations and a contextualization of how they relate to their members and to each other.

Although the site of our research was Nova Scotia, all of the organizations and their representatives were located in Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM). All the respondents reported living in the area, and we do not have evidence about any other African immigrant cultural organizations outside of Halifax. Although some of the representatives said some of their members lived outside of HRM, they could not account for exact numbers of these members, both the total numbers of their memberships or those of the immigrants living outside of HRM.

African diaspora organizations in Nova Scotia: Mission statements and membership

The roots of country-specific African diaspora organizations in Nova Scotia are fairly young. The Ghanaian and Nigerian associations of Nova Scotia are the oldest, and they were founded in the late 1980s at the initiative of international students originating from these countries. Other prominent cultural organizations were created in the late 1990s and throughout the early 2000s as a response to an increase in the number of immigrants from countries like Uganda in the late 1990s, as well as the influx of refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia following the civil wars in these countries. The African Diaspora Association of the Maritimes (ADAM), the umbrella organization of people and associations of African descent, was founded in 2005 with a goal to encourage, foster and welcome newcomers from the Caribbean, South America and Africa. Because of the special status of ADAM, I will dedicate a section to it later on. For now, I will start by considering the country-specific associations to

understand how these organizations came into being, who they represent and how much influence they hold vis-a-vis their membership.

The Association of Nigerians of Nova Scotia (ANNS)

Founded in Halifax in 1983, this association was first called the Nigerian Students Association and later became the Association of Nigerians of Nova Scotia in 1986 after a decision was made to include all Nigerians living in Nova Scotia. In its mission statement, the ANNS stands for the preservation and promotion of the socio-economic, cultural and civic interests of all Nigerians by birth, marriage or descent, living in Nova Scotia. It is unclear how many members the association currently has. Because the majority of the members are still international students attending school in one of Nova Scotia's higher education institutions, many members are by definition in transition, which means that the association is almost always in some measure of flux.

The current leadership of the association estimates the number of Nigerians living in Nova Scotia to be around 4,000 people, though they are not all active members of ANNS. It is unclear what the current leadership of the association bases this estimate on, but the association's representative said it has tried to keep up with those who register to be members as well as those who attend the numerous events the association regularly organizes.

The Ugandan Canadian Association of the Maritimes (UCAM)

UCAM was founded in 2002 and has the status of a non-profit community organization. In its mission statement, UCAM strives to bring together Ugandan Canadians living in the Maritimes by way of "organizing social and community events to help promote networking and to have a good time". The Association is also part of the larger Ugandan Canadian National Association (UCNA). Because the association covers the Maritimes as a whole, and because its membership is open to non-Ugandan Canadians, UCAM does not have an exact number of its members. The current leadership estimates its membership in Nova Scotia to be between 25 and 50 Ugandan-Canadians, based mainly in the Halifax region.

Sierra Leone Canadian Association of Nova Scotia (SLECA)

Prior to the influx of refugees from Sierra Leone in the 1990s



following the civil war, it is not clear how many immigrants from Sierra Leone lived in Nova Scotia. The original association was called the Association of Sierra Leoneans in Nova Scotia (ASLINS), and was set up with the objective of contributing funds monthly to help with the settlement of the refugees from Sierra Leone in the mid 1990s. By the early 2000s however, the association had become dormant due to the fact that many former refugees had moved on to other parts of the country. The association was later subsumed into a new organization, the Sierra Leone Canadian Association (SLECA) and the current leadership estimates its membership to be under 100 in Nova Scotia.

Nova Scotia Society for Cultural Preservation and Empowerment of Liberian Diaspora

The story of the Liberian association of Nova Scotia follows closely that of the Sierra Leonean community. The association started in the 1990s following the influx of refugees fleeing the Liberian civil war. The Liberian association of Nova Scotia was founded to help with resettlement programs in Nova Scotia. But internal management problems caused by a number of members of the leadership team moving to different provinces made it difficult for the association to continue its operations; as a result, it was dormant between 2006 and 2013. The current association officially started operating in early 2015 and it counts around 60 members, split between students and established families.

The Ghanaian association of Nova Scotia (GANS)

One of the oldest African diaspora associations in Nova Scotia, the Ghanaian Association of Nova Scotia (GANS) was formed 1989 in response to the increase in the size of the Ghanaian community. Its mission statement is to promote unity and love within the Ghanaian community and to preserve the culture of the Ghanaian people in Nova Scotia. It is also the only diaspora association in the province that makes it clear that it is independent of political or religious ideology. Its current leadership counts between 150 and 200 members.

The African Diaspora Association of the Maritimes (ADAM): An Umbrella Organization

According to its internal documents, the African Diaspora Association of the Maritimes (ADAM) was founded in 2005 as a

non-profit, community-based organization dedicated to providing various services to assist Africans in the Maritimes. Members consist of individuals of African descent, non-African spouses of Africans, as well as individuals who share the mission, vision, and objectives of ADAM. ADAM's mission is to foster successful participation and integration of members of the African Canadian Diaspora in educational, social, political, civic, and economic activities in Nova Scotia and in the Maritimes. ADAM's purpose is to provide services to its members and network with all levels of government and with other public and private organizations for the benefit of its members and the community at large.

We will elaborate later on how this organization operates and how it collaborates with country-specific African diaspora associations in the province. Although its name refers to an organization that is servicing African diaspora members in the Maritimes, the current leadership said that the primary focus has been in Halifax and in the HRM, though the organization was seeking to expand its reach to other regions of Nova Scotia and to the Maritimes in general. ADAM is a service-providing organization, which serves close to a thousand people; but as a membership-based organization, it has only approximately a hundred members. It is a challenge to know exactly how many people are served by ADAM and who benefits from these services. The people that ADAM engages with and assists come to the organization because they were referred by other organizations or because someone told them about it. In many cases, newcomers come to ADAM when referred by settlement organizations. From a statistical standpoint, the organization is currently restructuring its membership and liaising with different community partners to gather more information on those who already do or can benefit from its services.

Research findings

a) Inclusivity and influence of African immigrants' organizations in Nova Scotia

To understand how much influence cultural organizations hold, it is important to examine first how representative these organizations are. The data provided by the five most prominent cultural organizations of African diaspora in Nova Scotia is inconclusive as to how representative the current leaderships are. These are the only organizations that are registered with the province, that have existent structures and for which an elected—or



self-designated—leadership could provide information for the purpose of this research.

First, though these organizations are membership-based, they lack rigor as to who may be a member, who may be elected and why. Moreover, recruitment seems to follow a word-of-mouth strategy, where new members are brought in when someone tells them that there is a local organization of their fellow countrymen and women in Nova Scotia. At this moment, there is no accurate information on how the leadership is elected, nor how influential the associations are among their respective communities. This however does not mean that the information we were provided with by the current leadership is skewed but rather that they have a limited reach among members and potential members. Because none of the country-specific organizations has clear numbers on their memberships, it is more likely that those who get actively involved in the activities of the organizations are those who are in the proximity of the leadership or the area where the cultural activities are held.

There is no conclusive information as to how many African immigrants are in Nova Scotia, what their occupations are and more importantly, how effectively represented they are by their cultural organizations. The sporadic information that is offered by the current associations’ leaderships suggests that most African diaspora members are in Halifax, and that they are a rather revolving door, made up mostly of international students who are very active but tend to move out of the province once their studies in Nova Scotia are done. A caveat is that the experiences of the African students attending institutions and other diaspora people of the Halifax region are not accounted for by the current structures of these associations.

There are also political considerations that need to be taken into account. In communities where there are ethnic divides, such as the Nigerian community for example, though the current leadership maintains that the association is open to everyone of Nigerian origin, the association itself may not be representative of the majority of Nigerians in Nova Scotia and thus not reflect their realities. This is particularly troubling when the local cultural association states—as in the case of the Nigerian association—that it fosters collaboration with the High Commission or the government of their country of origin. This might influence the decision of the members on whether to participate in the cultural activities it organizes.

The five organizations focused on in this research are very aware of the importance of politics to foster inclusivity of their communities and this could be the reason why they all say that they are open to members that both originate from the countries they represent and those who are their supporters. To be more to the point, the associations' leaders told us that they were very aware of the need to be more inclusive of people of all political allegiances, and made it a point to include everyone, for fear of being seen as politically or ethnically biased against certain groups. But because it is not clear how many of these members they have, since none of these organizations has an exhaustive list of members or enforce membership requirements such as monetary fees and attendance, it is unclear how inclusive they really are.

Representatives said that although all their members are at different stages in the immigration processes, they tend to see two specific categories: the international students and the more established New Canadians (those with a newly acquired citizenship). International students are those attending different universities and other post-secondary institutions in Nova Scotia and all the organizations' representatives agreed that this is the most mobile membership they have as they tend to move elsewhere in the country, in the USA or back to their home country once their studies are completed. The rest of the memberships of these organizations are also diverse but have no new arrivals who are refugees in the process of immigration. This reflects the fact that their countries of origin are more or less stable and new immigrants are more likely to be economic migrants rather than refugees. This also means that these associations have moved away from traditional refugee settlement goals, although because they still count students as members, they intervene in helping them through their temporary work permit or permanent residency processes.

Members of the five identified associations are English speaking, though English is their second or third languages in many cases. Their occupations vary in the case of the more established associations such as the Ghanaian and Nigerian associations: most of their non-student members are professionals (medical, academic and others), while the rest work in a range of industries. Although the 'quality of life' of their memberships vary, there seems to be a common denominator: it depends on the reasons why their members first immigrated to Nova Scotia.



Associations with a more established membership, with members who have been in the province for two or three generations, are those who came for economic or professional reasons. In the case of GHANS for example, there are no Ghanaian refugees in Nova Scotia, because their home country has been violence-free for four decades, although there were some tumultuous times in the Rawlings era. This means that the majority of members are either international students or other professionals who immigrate to Canada for economic reasons. The case of the Sierra Leonean association is a good example here because despite the fact that the association maintains that it helped hundreds of Sierra Leonean settle in Nova Scotia in the 1990s during and at the end of the Sierra Leonean civil war, the majority has moved away over the last 10 years. This is important to understand because it defines the nature and characteristics of the organization. Associations that were started by former refugees in Nova Scotia tend to disaggregate while those formed by economic immigrants are better organized, structured around an educated and professional membership.

b) Nova Scotia as a ‘transit area’ for members of the African diaspora: Culture as a stabilizing force only in an economically secure environment

Diaspora-association representatives suggest that generally, Nova Scotia’s African diaspora immigrated to Nova Scotia because of one of four reasons: refugee settlement, school, employment or marriage to someone from Nova Scotia. Those interviewed indicated that the initial motivation for moving to Canada was either linked to wanting a safe place for them and their families or to better employment prospects. For many of the African diaspora, Nova Scotia was the first point of entrance into Canada and North America and most likely into the world outside of Africa.

All those interviewed said that they take for granted that for international students who come to attend post-secondary school, Nova Scotia is a ‘transit area’ from which the students will go to other parts of the country or even of North America. In fact, these associations do not consider their student membership to be full-fledged immigrants because they have not made a decision yet where they will be going next.

*You know—some finish, they will go back—they will finish.
Others go back or go to another province in search of jobs.*

The reasons why students move once school is finished vary but they all have employment as a common thread.

People leave for different reasons, some of which we can't explain because they are personal but the common things we hear from most of the students are lack of opportunities of course, lack of jobs, some of them don't feel comfortable with a small city and they want to go to a big city. Or they just want to change. What I would say it's just jobs.

But perhaps to be able to capture the sentiment that African diaspora members have when asked why they do not stay in Nova Scotia, this representative's words are particularly illustrative.

So, why don't the immigrants stay? Why don't the immigrants do what everybody else does, it's a naïve, it's an uninspired question. It is the wrong question.

These words were echoed by other representatives where the consensus is that African immigrants' decisions to leave the province are no different from anyone else's decisions. This representative thinks that the province should accept this fact.

I think traditionally and historically, Maritimers have always moved out west, even before the immigrants came. There is go west young man, that's what they say, "Go west, young man". So, it shouldn't be looked at in terms of that. I think they should welcome it.

Representatives also said that the movement of African diaspora members out of the province is motivated by the lack of economic and social incentives necessary to build a decent life in the province.

The answer is to grow the economy and people will flock to Nova Scotia and to the Maritimes from all over the place. Grow the economy. What is lacking is a sufficient mass, a critical mass of entrepreneurship culture.

In this instance then, the decision to stay in Nova Scotia is informed by economic conditions rather than the immigration experience itself. And it is significant in terms of retaining international students who are still in their immigration decision-making process.



Those who get employed right after school will tend to stay in the province but those who feel they have no prospects might want to move away as soon as school ends.

Representatives interviewed said that most people in the diaspora knew little or nothing about living in Canada, let alone in Nova Scotia, before they arrived, even though people tend to know one or two other people who live elsewhere, mostly in large cities such as Calgary or Toronto or Montreal. This is unsurprising given the small number of African diaspora members in Nova Scotia.

None of the interviewees said that they had tried to encourage members to stay in Nova Scotia or to join them here. One representative told us that after years of being in Nova Scotia, she had also made her personal decision to leave the province because she felt the province was far from being an open society.

I'll be leaving soon too—I give myself the next two years. It's good to bring up the children in Nova Scotia but after that there's nothing here in Nova Scotia because Nova Scotians are not open. They're not accepting.

The issue of racism is a thorny one. All the interviewees' acknowledged that some of their members have been discriminated against in one way or another but there is no clear answer as to the nature of this particular form of racism.

People say that people here are very nice, but that is not true. In order for you to understand Nova Scotia very well, you have to live here for as many years as I have.

On this topic, one of the issues that three out of the nine representatives raised has to do with the relationship between Africans and indigenous African Nova Scotians. One of the representatives told us that some of her association members felt that they are competing with African Nova Scotians for jobs that are designated for 'diversity and visible minorities'. Another representative echoed this, saying that a lot of social programs were created for African Nova Scotians, and that the province has been unable to move to accommodate newly arrived Africans by considering distinct programs.

When you come here as a black and you are trying to get an idea on those sort of things, you find that some of the issue that you are addressing are already covered by those

programs. So, that means that we as a group cannot really push our agenda too far, unless either push it gently with indigenous or try to navigate somewhere because the funding they give cannot be split into two parts.

These anecdotes about forms of latent racism in Nova Scotia demonstrate awareness on the part of African diaspora members of the social context of their new post-immigration environment. This awareness may be limited, since most of them have not been living in Nova Scotia long enough to fully grasp the existing complexities between indigenous African Nova Scotians and the rest of the population, but it is still noticeable that new immigrants perceive disadvantage compared to the rest of the community in Nova Scotia. It is not clear if this alone is reason enough to deter staying in Nova Scotia, but complex social relationships in an unfamiliar and economically unstable country can prove challenging even for the most resilient immigrants.

Representatives interviewed said that some of their members living in Nova Scotia had positive experiences but they concerned mostly those who had been in the province for a long time and were professionals working for the public service rather than newcomers or international students. Interviewees all said that the decision to stay in Nova Scotia depends on employment opportunities and all touched on the issue of a lack of opportunities both for skilled jobs and unskilled jobs.

High-end jobs here are quite limited and the low-end jobs are so limited. I mean, if you happen to be in Calgary, you have a meat packer where people can work shifts. Here competition is very interesting because when you go to the shopping mall, for example here, you would find that—even when you go to the airport, even in this Tim Horton's here, the one cleaning the floor and washing the toilet is a blonde Nova Scotian.

Another representative made a similar comment and both reflected on the fact that low-skilled jobs, which are traditionally the hub of immigrant employment, are highly competitive in Nova Scotia. They also reflected on the fact that when competition is high in the local market, the African immigrants are less likely to be hired for the job, a fact that they attribute to a form of latent discrimination.

It is and even I find that some of the things maybe they are sensitive, I know that. I go to the airport and I see, even

people at Tim Horton's out there, the cleaners there are white. I say, where would the immigrants work if they don't work there? So there is a bit of that and I don't know who is to blame, but that's the make of Atlantic Canada.

They also spoke about the lack of information in terms of what the province has to offer to new African immigrants, saying that most people leave because they don't realize the full potential of opportunities in the province, such as how social and economic programs and other cultural programs compare to what other provinces have.

c) Limited influence: Country-specific cultural organizations and the decision to stay in Nova Scotia

All the associations' representatives that I interviewed were unanimous in saying that diaspora organizations do not directly influence the decision of their members to stay or to leave the province. Instead, they all saw the prominent roles of their associations as one of helping the diaspora connect with their fellow countrymen in Nova Scotia and other Africans.

I don't know whether we really help much in terms of their staying here. The only thing I can say that what we do is to help them feel a little bit comfortable in their stay, particularly when they are studying, and we also try to foster a sense of networking so that as they network, presumably they link up.

When it came to describing the immigration experiences of their members, several representatives said that people were generally happy after they arrived in Canada but that they soon realized that there were not many job opportunities for them in the province. It is in this sense that representatives reflected on the fact that they had witnessed African communities that came to Nova Scotia in the 1980s and 1990s such as the Somalians and Sudanese struggle to stay in the province mostly for reasons linked to employment but also because they longed to be in larger cities such as Calgary and Toronto where they had more family members and friends.

How, then, to explain why some communities have stayed and flourished in Nova Scotia? When asked this question, particularly relative to the apparent success and stability of the Ghanaian association and its members, one representative said that “*it's because Ghanaians have been in the West longer than other*

Africans which helped them to come here, study and build a life here and bring their family members too”.

There is a clear gap between organizations that have been established for a long time and those that are new, in the sense that the structures seem more solid within long-established organizations. But perhaps the key information in what the representative said is to be found in the access to education that certain diaspora members have had. The Ghanaian association of Nova Scotia is the only one that reported having a membership divided between professionals and students, with the professionals working in mostly skilled jobs in the health industry, in academia and in the public service. All the association representatives said they do not envision their role as helping their members stay in the province.

However, two associations have in their mandate to assist newcomers or students with finding apartments or immigration information. They also set up an informal network of students and other professionals who can provide support to students. The associations also try to help their student members navigate the local job market while they look for employment opportunities by informing them of where they could look for jobs.

In industries such as engineering we do know there are opportunities. We have a lot of students in IT for example who might choose to stay probably because in the last few years we found a few IT and financial companies moving out here to set up shops so most of the students who would like to get an opportunity here stay.

In general, associations of African diaspora in Nova Scotia are very culturally active and events and activities they organize are intended not only for their direct members but also for the African diaspora community at large, where everyone who identifies as African, regardless of their country of origin, or as a friend of Africa, is welcome to attend and participate. In fact, one representative remarked that cultural activities of these associations make it look like a “permanent party”. One representative saw his organization’s biggest accomplishment as “*creating stronger bonds among Africans out there*”.

All the representatives of African diaspora associations did indeed know each other on a personal level and had information and details on each other’s associations. They reported helping each



other with events organization and advertising. For example, they all reported having encouraged their members to attend cultural activities and independence parties organized by other associations even if they were not from the same countries. They reported encouraging a sense of “African-ness” beyond their particular country of origin. In fact, I found that these representatives tended to see themselves and to speak of themselves in terms of being more African and less about their specific countries of origin. For this reason, one of them explained that they had made their association’s membership open to everyone, a family of Africans, “*to make sure that all Africans in Nova Scotia felt welcome*”.

In conclusion, country-specific diaspora associations in Nova Scotia have a limited role in influencing their members’ decisions to stay or leave Nova Scotia. However, they all reported striving to organize cultural events that make their members and other Africans in Nova Scotia feel less isolated. These associations reported increasing rates of participation in these cultural events, both from the African communities but also from other members of the local communities.

One of the key challenges is that, though all of them are membership-based, monetary participation (i.e., dues or membership fees) is not enforced and they have very limited funds. They all said they raise money to help a member in bereavement or who is going through economically challenging situations but all the activities and programs they put in place are informal and carried out by volunteers. One of the association’s representatives explained that his association was trying to set up an afterschool program for families who had younger children but his association had been unable to raise enough money for the last two years. This suggests that even the most organized associations with a more-or-less stable membership have limited means to support their members in the long run.

ADAM: The Untapped Potential

To understand ADAM’s distinctive position in the province and its role in immigrant retention, it is important to understand first its rather complex structure. Initially, the organization was thought of as an umbrella organization under which specific country organizations would locate themselves, as well as other individuals who desired to be members. But given the level of

services and programs that this organization has put in place, it looks more like a settlement agency than a cultural organization. This is not a criticism, per se, but rather an observation that seeks to cast a light on models of integration that can emerge when members of diasporas take the initiative of facilitating their own settlement. In fact, a number of representatives of other cultural associations voiced concern over this new identity that ADAM had acquired over time, veering away from what they felt it was initially intended to be. Some of these representatives were among the founding members of ADAM back in 2005. As one representative who was also part of the founding team told me, the most contentious point seems to have been and to this day remains one of representation within ADAM.

We wanted ADAM to be an umbrella organization for the different African associations which initially it is. But in practice, it's not and it hasn't been able to work out like that.

The idea was that to be a member of ADAM, one had to be a member of a country specific cultural organization, which would be represented by a limited number of people on the board of ADAM. But the founders quickly realized that this model would exclude those members of the African diaspora who did not belong to any country-specific association. Moreover, there was also a fear of a potential take-over by members of more powerful communities or that if the members are sent by the individual organizations, they then may be subject to pressure from those organizations and may take partisan rather than broader, more encompassing perspectives. This observation is important to understand how ADAM operates today, and its role in the individual decisions of the people it serves.

In its current positions, ADAM works with all the other African cultural associations but there was no indication that these associations hold a central role within the organization. There is cordial collaboration between them and ADAM's leadership and although their goals seem aligned in theory, in practice ADAM takes on a more formal role of providing integration and settlement assistance to members of the diaspora whereas the country specific associations seem more attuned to particular cultural integration of their immediate members. In the relationship between ADAM and country-specific associations, it seems there is just a working relationship where they can share working space and collaborate on special projects. For example,



if national organizations want to get the message to the broader Nova Scotia African diaspora community, they often pass this through ADAM’s communication channels for its broader reach.

ADAM’s programs serve everyone from professionals who have emigrated from the African continent recently, to people who have come as refugees from the African continent and everybody in between. The association also serves indigenous African-Canadians and a high proportion of people who are international students are involved in the organization in volunteer capacities. In terms of helping people settle in the province, ADAM’s leadership reported being committed to that role, though they define it in a different way from country-specific organizations. For ADAM, because they see a broad range of people with different immigration experiences and at different stages of the immigration process, they have adopted a rather practical approach that meets people where they are. In that sense, the organization can help with practical settlement assistance to people with immediate concerns or needs, such as refugees. But they can also help an African immigrant who is taking a job in Halifax and just needs to know about a good neighborhood or school for his children. One interesting point was that the current representative of ADAM found it hard to ‘quantify’ the organization’s role in helping African immigrants settle in Nova Scotia. But the association chose to see its existing role as being in line with common sense.

It’s probably a good idea if there is somebody who is coming to Halifax, it just makes that sense that it will probably be more good than harm if they have a group that is able to welcome them, if they are able to see some faces from that community. That is just kind of like the common sense of this thing.

Nonetheless, this is an interesting reflection because it brings into question the link between settlement assistance and the decision to stay in the province. It raises the question of the quality of assistance that an immigrant receives when they first arrive in a province and their decision to settle. ADAM has not done any research on this issue and there is no data on this.

In terms of how the organization sees its programs filling in for the government in terms of immigration assistance, the leadership’s views are that the association is better equipped because it understands that Africans have a unique culture and a number

of people coming from the African continent have unique needs that are tricky to understand without having a very good grasp of the culture itself. The reasoning is that the organization's principles are based on the cultural perceptions of the people coming to Nova Scotia from the African continent. They have set up programs that are reflective of this cultural understanding: they have people speaking different languages, they set cultural socialization programs and they conduct classes that are flexible in accommodating the experiences of their clientele.

Just that voice alone in their head from somebody they can relate to in a place where they feel comfortable, they can now say, "Okay, now I see the point of going there," and then they come to that service with a better perspective and they can be more relaxed at that service. That connection I feel is useful.

Settlement is a cornerstone of ADAM's programs, and as such, ADAM organizes cultural mixers, holiday galas and other activities on a regular basis in an attempt to help with cultural integration, by facilitating mingling activities among different people—Africans and non-Africans alike. ADAM's representative said that his organization is dedicated to fostering an intercultural environment to help their members and clients with their integration into Canadian culture. This dedication to cultural integration is recognized and shared by other African community leaders who reported that for African immigrants in general to settle in Canada, it was important to be exposed and to be able to interact with other cultures, particularly Canadian culture.

One observation here has to do with an overarching sense of community that one feels when interacting with both ADAM's representative and the other associations' representatives, a sense of 'togetherness' among the African diaspora. This is a particularly positive thing, because it suggests that for those African immigrants who are involved within cultural organizations or who are involved in one way or another with ADAM, they get to experience a sense of community and ultimately of belonging that those who are isolated do not. But perhaps the most important contribution of ADAM is that it serves those members of the African diaspora who do not belong to any country specific cultural associations, either because there are too few of them or because of other reasons for not wanting to approach their fellow countrymen. As the president of ADAM put it, his organization adds value to the benefit of the community as a whole.



Through participating in these kinds of events, it is a way for people to be connected as well to the broader or larger African community...

ADAM's views on the reasons African immigrants and other immigrants leave the province do not differ from those of other community leaders. Some move for better economic opportunities but the organization is aware that others have moved out of the province for cultural reasons, because some people feel isolated. It is in this respect that the organization sees its role expanding.

What we can definitely do is make sure that the warmth and the cultural aspect is not a problem for this province. So, I think something that we can definitely shoot for is we can definitely work in such a way that if African immigrants are leaving Nova Scotia to go out west, they are not leaving because they can't connect with other Africans or because they feel isolated, or because they feel like they are all alone here or they don't really feel any sense of community and Nova Scotia feels a little bit cold for them, not temperature wise. I mean in terms of community warmth.

ADAM sees the issue of cultural integration as part and parcel of a positive immigrant experience in Nova Scotia, and advocates for a solid strategy of connecting African immigrants and people of African descent with each other as a way of making their experiences in the province more positive. The organization suggests a need/opportunity to tap into that population and get them to engage with ADAM, which in turn will make them engage with each other and become better aware of each other. ADAM's president summarized it in these words: “*So, nobody will have that feeling that there are no other Africans here, because people have alternate solutions*”.

The notion that stronger connections among immigrants will foster more positive experiences still has to be fully explored by researchers and practitioners, but it is one domain where ADAM has more experience than any other local cultural organization in the province. In this sense, it is an organization that holds considerable potential for defining immigrant experience in the context of a small but highly diverse environment where different cultures mix and redefine each other.

Finally, the last component of ADAM's activities concerns the pursuit of a special relationship with indigenous African Nova

Scotians. In its official mandate, the organization caters to all people of African descent who are in the Maritimes. Though there were many discussions as to who was really African and who was not at the beginning of the organization, these discussions were never settled. According to the current leadership, contemporary policies reflect the fact that it serves everyone, from new African immigrants to people of Caribbean descent, to indigenous African Nova Scotians. Though the objective of the research was not to assess how credible this claim is, it is worth mentioning here that ADAM has indeed instituted a number of projects through which it serves and collaborates with indigenous African Nova Scotians.

So I think that is a nice, open and practical base of people to cater to. Anything narrower than that gets gray and tricky and complicated because it's going to be very hard to narrow that.

In a practical sense however, the organization reflects a cross-cultural environment where the issues of indigenous African Nova Scotians and those of the new African immigrants meet. ADAM's challenge in serving these populations is to understand their particular differences and serve them according to their individual settings.

We have to understand what those differences are so we don't put ourselves in situations where we minimize it. We don't want to exaggerate the differences for one because then we can create problems where there may not be but we want to acknowledge them where they are though and we want to respect them, the differences that is.

The choice of ADAM to include African Nova Scotians has not always been unanimously agreed upon by prominent leaders in the African diaspora in Nova Scotia, but was taken out of necessity. It was clear that if African immigrants wanted to advance their agenda in the province, as one representative said, they felt they had to work with African Nova Scotians. There was sense that the programs that ADAM was interested in setting up, such as a mental health programs, were already existing within the African Nova Scotian communities and it would be like creating a replica within the African community.

You come with an issue and trying to address it, but some of those issues are in relationship with an indigenous Nova Scotian here. Whatever issues you are dealing with, they



would say, “That doesn’t belong to you. That issue belongs to... or if you want to address that issue, maybe you should link with the African Nova Scotians”.

The situation has evolved and ADAM’s leadership reports a higher level of cross-communication between the organization and members of the African Nova Scotian community. They run a community mental health awareness program with the indigenous African Nova Scotian communities in the HRM area that is reportedly successful thanks to effective collaboration. It is not clear if this pursuit of close collaboration is reflected in individual relations between African Nova Scotians and members of the African diaspora in Halifax. One representative made a joke that one can be in Halifax for a week not knowing that there are entire black populations: “*And they are here, but they are hidden*”. There is a sense, among African diaspora representatives, that individual relations between African Nova Scotians and the African diaspora are still limited to formal settings and official collaborations on projects such as the ones that ADAM organizes.

Nonetheless, the organization is aware that moving forward, it will need to solidify its collaboration with the African Nova Scotian community. Currently, ADAM is applying for a grant around mental health and according to its president, there are two ways to go about it: applying alone for a smaller grant or applying for larger grants by forming a collaborative relationship with a pre-existing African Canadian association. The choice is obvious as the organization makes it clear that it will continue to foster relationship and understanding with the African Nova Scotian community, as a way to ensure its own survival. But the question is and will remain one about the viewpoint of African Nova Scotians on this relationship.

Conclusions and Recommendations

This modest research project suggests that cultural organizations that cater to members of the African diaspora in Nova Scotia have a limited if not minimal influence in the decision of their members to stay or to leave the province. Instead, secure employment and other social factors are the main issues that will influence their retention. Cultural factors, such as a warm and welcoming community, as well as bonds with other Africans are important but only to enhance a quality of life that is already ensured by a secure job.

The first recommendation of this research is to suggest a number of actions that Nova Scotia authorities can undertake in order to make the province more welcoming. It would be a good step to look at what other provinces are doing, particularly in Quebec and Ontario, to market themselves to immigrants. For example, the province of Quebec has a rather interesting approach to immigration, centered mostly around clarifying its expectations vis à vis immigrants as well as what is commonly acceptable in the province. Nova Scotia needs to approach potential immigrants while they are still students (through international students' offices associated with universities for example), to tell them about the province, its people and its economy as a way to help them feel wanted and assist them in making informed decisions.

Second, it would be wrong to dismiss the role—however unclear—that diaspora organizations play in defining the overall experience of African immigrants. Such a move would understate the potential they hold: for example country-specific cultural organizations have a direct and intimate knowledge of issues that their members encounter while navigating the system. In this sense, they should be seen as an ally for strategies that target an understanding of immigration trends in the province. Positive and sustained relations between these associations and local authorities (municipal and provincial) have the potential to influence immigrants' shift in perception particularly on issues of racism and discrimination. Most of these organizations undertake activities that foster integration. It is important that they receive adequate support and resources, given the direct access that these associations have to their members.

Third, given the fact that ADAM has been able to redefine itself as a solid service provider for the community, and given its large outreach and its dedication to cultural integration, this research recommends that Nova Scotia authorities draw on their policy capacities as well as resources to make ADAM's role more prominent both within the community and in relation to other policymakers across the province.

And finally, ADAM's collaboration with African Nova Scotians, though still in its infancy, has the potential to make the experiences of (new) Africans more positive and with time create a more inclusive environment. But for this to happen, it is important for Nova Scotian authorities to explore what courses of action would aid in fostering closer links between diaspora and African Nova Scotian communities. For example, immigration policy makers



could team up with higher learning institutions across the province to actively invest both time and resources into researching and learning about intercultural living, with the goal of creating cross-cultural exchanges between the two communities as a way to foster a rapprochement and a socially positive environment in which both African newcomers and indigenous African Nova Scotians can meet and thrive.

The findings of this study reveal some of the reasons why African immigrants do not settle in Nova Scotia, from the perspective of the representatives of diaspora organizations that cater to their needs. It is important to note that the scope of this study was limited to nine representatives of the most prominent African diaspora organizations in the province. As such, other researchers might want to carry out further inquiries with more members of the African diaspora in Nova Scotia as a way to explore further some fundamental factors affecting their settlement in the province. The conclusions of this research are not to be generalized to all African immigrants in Nova Scotia. Rather, they should be used as a starting point for further research and insights into the nature and extent of their settlement in the province and how these insights can influence the existing policy on immigration in Nova Scotia.

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