Psychoanalysis and its colonial discontents: rethinking psychoanalytic theory in postcolonial studies

by

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ABSTRACT

This study looks at the role psychoanalytic theory has in colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial theory, especially with regard to the recent psychoanalytic turn in postcolonial studies. Through a close reading of Homi Bhabha's "The Other Question: stereotype, discrimination and racial discourse" the thesis outlines some of the problems with a straightforward application of psychoanalytic structures to colonial analyses. In particular, by passing over the racial logic and racialising language of psychoanalysis Bhabha reproduces the theory as a 'truth' in his text. Following Michel Foucault, I argue that psychoanalysis is itself implicated in racial and colonial discourses. Given its implication in racial discourse, I argue that an attempt to understand how psychoanalysis produces and distributes racial knowledge and racialising practices might be more productive than either using it as a theory without racial implications, or discarding psychoanalytic theory altogether. Accordingly, I discuss some recent responses and solutions to the question of psychoanalysis and race by Ann Pellegrini, Anne McClintock and John Brenkman. While these solutions are valuable, especially as they intervene in the practice of psychoanalysis itself, they do not go far enough in examining how psychoanalysis actually contributes to and intervenes in racialised and racialising discourses such as colonial discourses. The paper concludes with some specific suggestions for how analysts and historians of colonialism might use recent developments in colonial history and colonial research agendas, especially as articulated by Ann Stoler, as starting points for understanding how psychoanalysis operates as a racial and colonial form of knowledge.

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Introduction

Psychoanalysis and colonial critique: a fragmented tradition

While psychoanalytic theory, especially in its forms as a literary theory, has had an enormous impact on critical feminist, film, sexuality and literary studies, it has had a curious relationship with colonial studies.[1] Critiques, histories and analyses of colonialism have not generally drawn on specifically psychoanalytic language and theory in the way that feminist theory and film theory have embraced its insights and yet, at the same time, some of the most interesting and provocative colonial commentary in the past thirty years has been produced through engagement with psychoanalysis as a critical mode of thought. Frantz Fanon, Octave Mannoni, Albert Memmi, Ashis Nandy, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have all used psychoanalytic theory as a form of critique in their analyses of past and present colonialisms. In general this tradition of colonial critique, with the possible exception of Fanon's work, has not achieved much prominence in succeeding studies of colonialism. Sustained and explicit engagement with psychoanalysis, whether as a specific methodology or as a form of critique, has been a peculiarly absent feature of mainstream colonial studies. This would appear to have changed with the work of the most recent theorist to take up discussions of psychoanalytic theory in his critique of colonialism: Homi Bhabha.

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[1] Throughout the text I will be making references to psychoanalysis variously as psychoanalytic theory or thought, psychoanalytic influences or assumptions and simply as psychoanalysis. While in each case I have tried to make clear what form of psychoanalysis is under discussion it is perhaps best to set out what I mean here for the reader's convenience. By psychoanalytic theory I mean the form of literary or social theory that, for the most part, scholars use. By psychoanalytic influences or assumptions I mean the more broadly colloquial use of psychoanalytic concepts one hears in everyday discourse. In some cases this may even verge on the psychological rather psychoanalytic. Nevertheless I am referring to the readiness with which many of us think and speak in terms of repression, projection and the unconscious without necessarily subscribing more explicitly to any other of Freud's psychical conceptualisations. Finally, when I use the term psychoanalysis I am referring more generally to the practice of psychoanalysis, including, but not limited to, its dimensions as a therapeutic practice and as a discursive practice.

A broader interest in psychoanalytic theory and methods in postcolonial studies has grown steadily since the work of Homi Bhabha first appeared in print some fifteen years ago. Bhabha's ideas and formulations have been taken up with some enthusiasm. However, despite the length of time his ideas have been in circulation, critiques which engage deeply with his work have, until recently, been lacking.[2] Critics in the field of postcolonial studies have been on the one hand admiringly uncritical and on the other broadly dismissive of his approach and ideas.[3] Criticism has focused on his obscure language and style, the political implications of his work for fighting contemporary neo-colonialisms and the textual methods of literary studies that he brings to colonial history. However, critics have not significantly taken issue with one of the most innovative aspects of Bhabha's work: his deployment of specifically psychoanalytic methods in colonial discourse analysis.

Whether critical or uncritical of Bhabha, postcolonial critics have once again sidestepped the issue of psychoanalytic thought in colonial critique.

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[2] Robert Young's critique was for some time the only analysis of Bhabha's work which took up his ideas in any detail (*Mythologies*, 141-156). Recently Bart Moore-Gilbert has published a more deeply engaged reading and assessment of *The Location of Culture* essays that indicates the mystery of Bhabha's work is slowly being unveiled (114-151).

[3] For dismissive reviews see Arif Dirlik 328-356; Benita Parry 5-24; Aijaz Ahmad 1-20. Dirlik and Ahmad in particular have been among Bhabha's most disobliging critics. There are no similar reviews which take up Bhabha's ideas in a positive light although his work has been positively reviewed in academic journals. The positive response to Bhabha's work is to be seen largely in the way in which his ideas have been taken up by those working in colonial studies, for the most part uncritically, as practical tools for their work. See for an example of a book-length study of colonial representations, Gail Ching-Liang Low. Low examines the work of Rider Haggard and Rudyard Kipling through Bhabha's conceptualisations of stereotype and colonial mimicry. As Parry points out, the ease with which postcolonial studies has taken up Bhabha's ideas is disturbing. Where reference is made to his work it seems critics do so "to authorise their own propositions, they do so without necessarily indicating a grasp of, or interest in, the problematics within which Bhabha is writing"(Parry 7) Perhaps Bhabha is more widely quoted than understood.

While they have embraced Bhabha's work, they have ignored what I would suggest is one of the most interesting aspects of it: his deployment of psychoanalysis to investigate colonialism. There has been little serious discussion of what might be the implications of using a psychoanalytic methodology for colonial discourse analysis. Has Bhabha worked out these implications in his essays? Does his deployment of psychoanalysis work? Is his deployment of psychoanalysis sensitive to the aims and concerns of colonial studies? Can psychoanalysis be useful to postcolonial studies in other ways? If Bhabha's work continues to be as influential as it has already proved to be, it is vital to begin examining his ideas about psychoanalysis more thoroughly and carefully, especially as they draw our attention back to a tradition of colonial critique that exists but has not been developed in colonial discourse analysis or postcolonial theory to date. While I will discuss Bhabha's work in particular, I wish to suggest that he is the latest moment in a tradition that has been suppressed in colonial studies, a tradition which is deserving of careful consideration and reflection.

Most of the concerns about Bhabha's work focus on his preoccupation with language, in a double sense. Bhabha's style is a heavily textured one, even, as Bart Moore-Gilbert has suggested, "quasi-mystical" (115). Some critics suggest that such a style is fitting for the postcolonial challenge that Bhabha's work represents to received disciplinary conventions. Nevertheless, other postcolonial scholars do not agree. Both Benita Parry and Ania Loomba have criticised Bhabha's style as an unnecessarily complicated one. Parry objects to its "density thickened by improbable juxtapositions and innumerable fleeting allusions to the comments of critics, writers, and thinkers" (7).[4] Loomba's objection is directed more at the political implications of such a style: "the slipperiness of his language and construction, is itself open to criticism in work which purports to be political and interventionist" (308). It is certainly worth considering how and for whom such a clearly convoluted and academic style can claim to facilitate political discussions of colonialisms, post-colonialisms and neo-colonialisms.

However, for most critics, Parry and Loomba included, the more pressing concern about language in Bhabha's work is his use of the textual methods derivative of literary studies. As well as drawing heavily on postcolonial fiction to make his arguments and provide examples, he brings a literary scholar's way of reading texts to the interpretation of historical phenomena. "The Other Question", for example, is a strategy for interpreting and deconstructing colonial stereotypes as texts. Parry and others[5] are very uneasy with Bhabha's textual methods. In their view Bhabha's "disposal of the language model to explain colonialism's past social processes and contemporary post-colonial situations" (Parry 7) severely brackets the political and historical contexts of culture (JanMohamed 59). In other words, by focusing completely on the meanings of texts, Bhabha does not consider the historical contexts in which those texts emerged and were received.

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[4] Moore-Gilbert adds a rather discomforting angle to the slipperiness of Bhabha's language. He writes "Bhabha is not above rewriting his sources for the purposes of advancing his own arguments. In 'The Postcolonial and the Postmodern', for instance, he cites Roland Barthes's description in *The Pleasure of the Text* , of languages overheard in a bar. However, Bhabha not only alters the original, but supplements Barthes' account with details of his own to produce the impression that Barthes is actually in Tangiers and not evoking it through the mediation of another writer. *Caveat lector!* "(115) Moore-Gilbert is careful to note that this is not necessarily a problem since scholars recognise the deliberately catachrestic tendencies at work in postcolonial studies. However, as he also indicates, some caution when reading Bhabha is warranted.

[5] For critiques of the textual or literary approach that Bhabha employs see Ania Loomba 305-323; Aijaz Ahmad 1-20; Shaobo Xie 155-166; Simon Gikandi 139-150; Abdul R. JanMohamed 59-87 .

Furthermore, they suggest that these kinds of textual methods give colonialism a transactional texture rather than a conflictual one, obscuring the asymmetries of power which underlie colonial situations (Parry 12). In Bhabha's texts there is no clear battle between two parties. Instead there is a pattern of stabilisation and destabilisation of meanings to which all colonial subjects find themselves vulnerable. Parry, in particular, is concerned by the way that textual analysis of colonialism seems unwilling and unable to represent the antagonism of coloniser-colonised relations and instead represents colonialism as a mutually agreed-upon conversation. These critics suggest that if Bhabha's work is to be useful, there must be more careful attention to and consideration of the specific contexts of the colonial situations as well as the caste, class, gender and sexuality of the colonial subjects he writes about.

While the representation of colonialism as conversational is troubling in itself, critics like Loomba, Masao Miyoshi and Shaobo Xie are equally disturbed by the fact that Bhabha's approach to postcolonial studies "seems to prove incompetent for handling neocolonialism, and ironically the professed counter-hegemonic thrust of postcolonialism appears irretrievably compromised" (Xie 165). For many scholars a theory of postcoloniality cannot be considered entirely useful if it does not prove effective as a strategy for challenging contemporary colonialisms. Since Bhabha relies on the deconstruction of colonial discourse as the principal means of countering various kinds of colonialisms, Xie and others suggest that his strategies have a limited political usefulness. Moreover, if colonialism is a set of texts, the ultimate resistance to colonialism can only come from those who can read and decode those texts from the postcolonial position -- in short, from the postcolonial critic. Loomba comments specifically on this problem.[6] She cautions postcolonial scholars and students that "colonial discourse theories (like others) participate in the very processes they seek to analyse" (306), and to be in the position of postcolonial intellectual is a privileged one. Consequently, postcolonial scholars must be especially alert to the ways in which they position themselves. In particular, Loomba cautions postcolonial critics against easy dismissals of native reformers and revolutionaries. While the postcolonial intellectual has a role to play in fighting new and old colonialisms, Loomba reminds us that he or she is also obliged to attend to the work of those who do not have the 'privilege' or working in the Western academy and remain in spaces where they "have to intervene in structures worked through by colonialism, as well as earlier and later histories of domination" (Loomba 320). The 'postcoloniality' of the postcolonial critic, acting alone, is not sufficient grounds for a critical anti-colonial practice.

As noted earlier, the issues of Bhabha's "disposal of the language model" (Parry 7) and the political utility of such an approach have occupied most of Bhabha's critics to the exclusion of any other considerations of his work. With the exception of scattered remarks by Parry and Loomba and longer commentaries by Robert Young and Bart Moore-Gilbert, Bhabha's reliance on psychoanalytic models has gone unremarked. This is a curious silence since much of the originality and innovation of Bhabha's work derives from his ability to bring psychoanalytic theory back to the scene of colonialism, most especially via Fanon. "The Other Question" and "Of Mimicry and Man" both draw heavily on psychoanalytic structures to investigate and interpret colonial phenomena in new and surprising ways. The tradition of psychoanalytically-engaged colonial critique including critics such as Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi and Ashis Nandy has not received much attention or been as influential in the canon of colonial studies as Bhabha's work has recently come to be. His work is widely quoted and his strategies for deconstructing colonial knowledge have become the basis of a psychoanalytic turn in postcolonial theory.[7] However, as Parry has suggested, many scholars have been ready to accept Bhabha's ideas without the necessary understanding of the problematic he writes within or the questions his new approach raises. Since Bhabha's models have brought psychoanalysis to the attention of colonial discourse analysts and postcolonial theorists, it is vital to seriously examine the suitability and implications of such a methodology.

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[6] See also Arif Dirlik (328-356) for a discussion of postcolonial intellectuals. Much of the commentary on resistance and the postcolonial scholar in Bhabha's work has been in response to his work on nationalisms. Neil Lazarus and Ania Loomba both criticise Bhabha's dismissal of 'third world' nationalisms in favour of the postcoloniality of the critic.

Of those who do comment on the use of psychoanalysis in Bhabha's work most register discomfort with the suitability of psychoanalysis for colonial studies. Loomba questions Bhabha's use of a theory that is "problematically shot through with ethnocentric assumptions whose transfer to all subalterns is unacceptable" (307). Loomba, among others, is uncomfortable with the application of Western-derived psychoanalytic structures and categories to non-Western situations and non-Western peoples. This kind of suspicion of psychoanalysis among scholars of colonialism is not uncommon. Given psychoanalysis' history as a therapeutic practice of the socially and economically privileged, "even feminist antiimperialist critics tend to dismiss psychoanalysis as not more than an ideologically suspect Western institution which participates in the imperialism they are criticising" (Chow 363). The general approach of those working on critiques of colonialism has been to maintain a critical detachment from psychoanalysis.

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[7] For an example of a study which applies Bhabha' theory to specific colonial texts see Gail Ching-Liang Low. In an overview of colonial discourse analysis and postcolonial theory Sara Mills rightly credits Robert Young and Anne McClintock as well as Bhabha with the development of a "psychoanalytic" turn in colonial studies. Bhabha is certainly not the only psychoanalytically-friendly theorist, but I would argue that he has achieved a special prominence as evidenced by Young's remark that "Said, Bhabha and Spivak constitute the Holy Trinity of colonial discourse analysis and have to be acknowledged as central to the field" (*Desire*, 163).

Robert Young takes a slightly different approach to the issue of the suitability of psychoanalysis in colonial studies. He suggests that it is not enough simply to write off such an influential theory. Instead, he notes that Bhabha's psychoanalytic method is an attempt to dislodge the historicism perspective which has determined discussions of postcolonial nations until now. That is, Bhabha's psychoanalytic method is an attempt to develop a *contre-histoire* especially to the narrative of nations and nation-building that Western historians have generally relied on. By approaching the history of colonialism through a history of the irrational colonial psyche Bhabha takes a surprising and productive new angle on colonialism. Young takes Bhabha at his word, then, that psychoanalysis is a useful tool in the writing of new postcolonial histories. While Young acknowledges that Western values and ideas are deeply embedded in psychoanalysis, he does not rule out the useful possibilities of a historically and culturally articulated form of psychoanalytic theory. However, he does caution against the version of psychoanalysis that appears in Bhabha's work, unmediated as it is by a consideration of the history and context of psychoanalytic concepts. Even if Bhabha does not consider the context of the psychoanalytic concepts he employs, this does not prevent those who come after him from doing so.

Young and Moore-Gilbert both suggest that the most significant problem with Bhabha's psychoanalytic models lies in the fact that he does not attend to the material, cultural and historical contexts of psychoanalysis. But neither of them develops in any detail what attending to these contexts might mean. The solution here, as with suggestions for developing his textual approach, is to urge Bhabha in a general way to be more specific, more attentive to the details of differential colonial contexts. Does this mean articulating the specificities of the caste, gender, sexual or racial positions of colonial subjects? Does it mean working through how cultural or racial difference would disrupt given psychoanalytic structures or does it mean locating Bhabha's use of the theory more precisely? Do Young or Moore-Gilbert envision a version of psychoanalytic theory transformed by postcolonial critique, or simply seek some evidence that Bhabha has considered the contexts of psychoanalytic thought? What bearing would historical and social contexts bring to the premises and conclusions of psychoanalytic methodologies in colonial studies?

It is important to situate psychoanalysis in its historical and cultural contexts. As I will argue in the following chapter Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis is largely uncritical in the sense that he does not seem to attend to psychoanalysis as a theory with its own historical, and especially racial, baggage. This, potentially, leaves his readers with the impression that psychoanalysis is a useful but largely neutral and ahistorical theory. Much of the compelling work being done by psychoanalytically-influenced scholars, such as historian Anne McClintock, has demonstrated what careful attention to the history of psychoanalytic thought can produce. McClintock has developed a persuasive critique of the sexism and gendering written into psychoanalysis, together with a new model of psychoanalysis sensitive to the lives and experiences of women, especially those who lived through and against colonial practices.

Although McClintock's work enables the theorization of feminist psychoanalysis, I will suggest that cultural and historical contextualization alone does not solve the problems psychoanalysis presents to colonial discourse analysis. The solutions proposed by McClintock, Young and Moore-Gilbert suggest that attention to contexts and details will produce a modified tool more appropriate to the study of colonialism, non-Western peoples and non-Western nations. But what if, for the purposes of colonial analysis, the point is not to develop renewed models of psychoanalysis but rather to understand how psychoanalysis operates as a discourse, especially, as a discourse that, like colonial discourse, produces and distributes knowledge about race? Bhabha, following Foucault, draws the reader's attention in the beginning of "The Other Question" to the idea that colonial critique should scrupulously avoid the kinds of normalizing judgements that colonial discourse, and more generally disciplinary knowledge, is based on. Instead, he writes, "in order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is crucial to construct its regime of truth" (Bhabha 67). In other words, it is not important to examine whether psychoanalysis bears good will or ill will to people of colour. Instead, it is important to understand how the discourse operates, how it effects its truth.

This type of critique, which I understand as more or less Foucauldian, is what I aim at in this paper. In an interview for *Libération* Foucault explained his idea of critique this way:

> A critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest (*Politics* 154).

In other words, for Foucault, the point of critique is not to decide on the rightness or wrongness of things and ideas. Instead, it aims to understand why we think what we think, and how our modes of thought and practice have come to make sense to us. By taking another look at common sense this approach aims to turn our most unquestioned ideas and related practices into matters for reflection. Foucault's work consistently begins from these kinds of unasked questions. *Discipline and Punish*, for example, asks why we lock up criminals as a method of punishment, rather than torturing or banishing them as was formerly the case. Now we take it for granted that when an individual breaks the law, he or she should be locked up in a prison with other criminals, but as Foucault demonstrates, there is really nothing natural about this solution. Practising criticism, then, "is a matter of making facile gestures difficult" (*Politics* 155).

In order to pose these unasked questions Foucault produces what he terms, after Nietzsche, genealogies. The genealogy is a historical investigation into the development of modes of thought, but it is history with a difference. Although genealogies seek to find out how thoughts and practices have come to have a meaningful existence for us today, they do not attempt to impose a logic of progression or necessity onto that account. Foucault writes:

> to follow the complex course of descent is to identify the accidents, the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, but the exteriority of accidents. (*Language* 146)

This emphasis on the disorderly development of our truths is not merely a glorification of randomness or chaos. It aims to remind us that if some threads of the genealogy lead nowhere, this is not a failure of analysis. The loose threads are part of the account. Obviously a vast amount of detailed and meticulous historical research is therefore part and parcel of Foucauldian analysis. In fact, Foucault maintained that this type of analysis could not be attempted without first-hand research. It is important, then, to understand that history and historical detail is not incidental to the project of critique; it is part of its very fabric.

While his method is historical, the emphasis throughout Foucault's method of critique is squarely on the present. The purpose of the genealogy is not to improve upon our practices for a better future; it is to understand what we do and who we are now, at the very least to develop some reflexivity about our current practices. Foucault's genealogies document the practices through which particular kinds of individuals, individuals that we recognise today such as the homosexual or the patient, have been created. While he writes the genealogy for its own sake, it is also written with an eye towards disturbing people's understanding that they must inevitably take up the individualities that contemporary practices create or even prescribe for them. It is in this sense that he also describes critique as "the art of not being governed" (Truth 29). Foucault offers the following somewhat tortured definition of governmentalization: "[the] movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of social practices through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth"(Truth 32). This refers to the practices through which individuals are made in schools, hospitals, mental institutions, prisons, armies and factories. All these places are sites of disciplinary power; that which produces the fields of normality and abnormality necessary to the regulation of a disciplinary society. He is not so naive as to suggest that it is possible to oppose the practices of governmentalization point-blank. Instead, he suggests that while it may be difficult, it is possible to limit and intervene in the practices of governmentality. It is possible "not to be governed like that, by that, in the name of those principles, with such and such an objective in mind and by means of such procedures, not like that, not for that, not by them" (Truth 28). Genealogies, then, can help us understand that we do not have to be what, up until now, we supposed we had always been.

I find the Foucauldian notion of critique as a mode of understanding a particularly enabling one for colonial studies, especially as it addresses itself to the question of why we think what we think today and how this has formed us. Turning those assumptions and ideas which seem most familiar and natural to us into objects of reflection and analysis returns them to a contestable field of knowledge and power. It becomes possible to challenge and debate their truths and truth-effects once more. This is, in part, how I understand the relation between the objectives of colonial studies and postcolonial theory. Edward Said's work has demonstrated the importance of examining how colonial power operates through the production and distribution of knowledges, disciplines and practices; in short, how modes of thought and their related practices constitute colonial reality. In turn, studies that aim to uncover and account for the relations between power and knowledge in colonial settings enable the work of postcolonial theory. Such studies facilitate investigations that trace the possibilities of what can happen when we begin to understand how colonialism works.

My interest in psychoanalysis then is not to judge it as suitable or unsuitable for colonial studies since, in skilful critical hands, it could easily be either. Instead, I will suggest that it would be more productive for colonial analysis to understand how psychoanalysis operates as a discourse, how it produces and distributes knowledge, how it informs practices, how its regime of truth is constructed. Neither ignoring psychoanalysis nor using it unreflexively have brought us closer to understanding psychoanalysis (especially as a discourse which buttresses racial discourses, such as those of colonialism), or to a better understanding of colonial discourse itself. As noted above, colonial scholars either embrace or dismiss psychoanalytic theory, either position supposedly indicating something about the individual scholar's ideological or political investment in anti-colonial thought. However, psychoanalytic thought is not something colonial studies has been concerned to reflect on or to investigate in and of itself. In fact, the problem goes even deeper than this. Whether one explicitly acknowledges psychoanalysis as a methodological aid or not, psychoanalytic assumptions permeate the practice of colonial studies itself much as they permeate our everyday language. Today we speak of repression or the unconscious as though they are quite natural elements of human existence, without much thought as to the provenance of the terms, or their sexological origins. In everyday discourse, as in colonial studies, psychoanalysis is one of the "unconsidered modes of thought our practices rest [on]" (*Politics* 154). Ann Stoler has recently reminded us that

> much colonial discourse, as Foucault's argument would suggest, has been framed by a search for the truth of the European bourgeois self through sex. . . . What is disturbing is that colonial historiography has inadvertently embraced this notion of 'truth' as well. . . Freudian notions of a repressed, sublimated and projected sexual impulse are invoked to explain political projects in instinctual psychosocial terms (171).

Historical accounts of colonial relations, then, have often relied on explanations with psychoanalytic resonances without pausing to consider the implications of such characterisations. Clearly, the influence of psychoanalysis, in its broadest sense as cultural common knowledge, on colonial studies urgently requires some kind of reflection even if scholars are unwilling to engage with the specific concepts and language of psychoanalytic theory.

The type of reflection that I argue for here is historical, in the Foucauldian sense. To realise the kind of critique I describe would involve a vast range of historical research. This paper is not based on first-hand archival research. Instead, what I aim to do here to is to provide some grounds for how and why a Foucauldian approach, and therefore a necessarily historical approach, to understanding psychoanalysis might be productive. However, it is not within the aims or the scope of this paper to undertake any part of that analysis or critique. The second level on which this insistence on history-in-critique is important follows from the first. If, as Foucault insisted, critique is bound up with historical investigation, then the historical content of Foucault's work is as important as the theoretical formulations which it makes possible. Scholars have tended to use Foucault's theorisations without paying much attention to the historical accounts they emerge from. But, as Stoler observes, "I question whether issues of historiography and theory can be so neatly disengaged"(5).[8] In this paper, then, when I suggest directions that critiques of psychoanalytic theory might take, I will be influenced by Foucault's particular historical account of psychoanalysis in *The History of Sexuality Volume I.*

If making use of Foucault's concepts also means paying attention to his histories, it does not mean blindly accepting all aspects of his historical accounts. Foucault's work has been rightly criticised for the narrow scope of his historical accounts.*The History of Sexuality* for example is curiously free from reference to empire or colony even while it attempts to articulate the formation of European nineteenth-century bourgeois identity. Studies by Nicholas Dirks, Ann Stoler and Frederick Cooper, among others, strongly argue that attempts to treat histories of the West separately from the histories of the colonies are misguided. In a sense such specifically European accounts fall into a kind of colonial thought-trap; reproducing the colonial dream of blank colonizable space waiting to be inscribed with fully-formed European values. The work of Dirks and others demonstrates that "Europe's colonies were never empty spaces to be made over in Europe's image or fashioned in its interests; nor indeed, were European states self-contained entities that at one point projected themselves overseas" (Cooper and Stoler 1). In many cases, then, what we understand to be the distinctive features of European modernity, "liberalism, nationalism, state welfare, citizenship, culture and 'Europeanness' itself" (Stoler 16), have been either first invented or practised in the colonies. As Stoler has recently suggested in *Race and the Education of Desire* , this imbricated relation of colony and metropole requires that Foucault's closed account of bourgeois identity be examined in a larger colonial landscape. Foucault's histories, then, are not to be accepted as authoritative but as incitements to write our own histories.

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[8] For an account of the conceptual but not historical borrowings from Foucault, including references to articles that exhibit this tendency, see Stoler 1-18.

In the next chapter I will discuss "The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism". I have chosen to focus on this essay largely because it is one of Bhabha's best known and most influential pieces. Critics have been particularly enthusiastic about Bhabha's strategy for reading colonial stereotypes. However, I have also chosen this piece because it outlines a specific problem in colonial discourse analysis and provides a specific response to that problem. It is therefore much more suitable for discussion than one of Bhabha's more abstract essays. Since, as noted, most critics have not engaged with Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis, I will use the chapter to outline some of the potential problems in Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis. Although, as I have indicated, it is not my intention to submit psychoanalysis itself to a judgement of 'racist' or 'not racist,' it is important to understand how Bhabha's deployment of psychoanalysis avoids engaging with the theory critically.

In the final chapter I will discuss work by Ann Pellegrini, Anne McClintock and John Brenkman that has attempted to engage with the problems psychoanalysis poses to race, gender and sexuality studies. These studies look at race, gender and heterosexuality respectively as categories as important to psychoanalytic theory as biological sex. On the basis of their investigations they offer solutions to the race and gender problems psychoanalysis presents to colonial studies. While I follow through some of the key ideas in these studies, I suggest that they do not go far enough, from the perspective of colonial discourse analysis, toward understanding psychoanalysis rather than attempting to recuperate it. As a complement to the type of studies by McClintock and others I suggest that colonial studies might usefully approach psychoanalysis as a discourse which actually intersects at certain points with colonial discourses. In this way a discursive analysis of psychoanalysis might be able to shed some light on the colonial construction of racial difference.

Robert Young is right to suggest that students and scholars of colonialism cannot simply ignore psychoanalysis. It has been too important an influence on twentieth-century thought to be disregarded. Moreover, it clearly has something to tell us about racial and colonial discourses if we listen attentively. Finally, a tradition of colonial critique which employs psychoanalysis exists, and it is perhaps timely that Bhabha's work should send us back to a reconsideration of those investigations and interventions in colonial discourse. The central impulse of this study is to suggest that it is time for a more attentive and radical approach to the intersections between colonialism, race and psychoanalysis. This study will point to some directions which a rethinking of psychoanalytic theory for postcolonial studies might take. Perhaps it may generate some further ideas for developing other reflective and politically articulated understandings of psychoanalysis.

Chapter one

Questioning "The Other Question": race and psychoanalysis in Homi Bhabha's colonial discourse analysis.

Discussions of psychoanalytic theory that take up issues of race and colonialism[1] have, until recently, been somewhat rare. While social theories such as Marxism and feminism have remained open enough to psychoanalysis to enter into dialogue with it, race and colonial studies have remained shy of such an encounter. Those studies that have taken issue with the colonial and racial problematics in psychoanalysis have had little influence on contemporary inflections of the theory. Sex and, more recently, gender, have always been seen as central categories in psychoanalytic theory. But although feminism and gender studies, fields that also centrally organise themselves around the categories of sex and gender, have come to recognise and, to some extent, integrate race into their analysis, it still seems to be a tangential issue in psychoanalysis. Throughout "The Trials of Psychoanalysis", an issue of *Critical Inquiry* intended "to make psychoanalysis the object, not the all-consuming master subject, of inquiry" (Meltzer 219), there are no articles which engage with race or colonialism as a matter of interest or importance to psychoanalysis. Neither are there discussions of the work of theorists who have drawn psychoanalysis and colonial analysis together, such as Frantz Fanon, Albert Memmi and Octave Mannoni.

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[1] Edward Said defines colonialism in this way: "Imperialism means the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory; 'colonialism' which is almost always a consequence of imperialism is the implanting of settlements on distant territory" (*Culture* 9). Said's definition makes a useful distinction between imperialism and colonialism, since as Patrick Wolfe has shown imperialism does not have a necessary relationship to colonialism (Wolfe 388-420). However, as I use it here I understand colonialism to include the implanting and development of practices, theories and attitudes in the colony as well as physical settlements, especially practices and theories of race and racialization. I use the word development deliberately since, following Ann Stoler's idea that cultural exchange between metropole and colony (Stoler 95-136) moves in both directions, the colony can be a site of development for practices and discourses that return to the metropole.

For their part, critics and theorists of colonialism and postcolonialism have also been reluctant to engage with what they consider to be "an ideologically suspect Western institution which participates in the imperialism they are criticising" (Chow 363). This suspicion seems justifiable when one considers that psychoanalytic practice has historically been the preserve of the socially and economically privileged. Unfortunately, it also means that these theorists have been equally guilty of ignoring innovative analyses by others that bring an understanding of colonialism and racism to psychoanalysis. In the context of this heavy silence between psychoanalysts and those who investigate colonialisms, Homi Bhabha's work is significant because it opens a long-needed conversation. While committed to the analysis of racial and cultural difference, Bhabha also acknowledges a methodological debt to Freud, Lacan and perhaps most significantly Fanon. In fact, though Freud and Lacan supply the psychoanalytic ideas, it is Fanon's work which casts the possibilities of using psychoanalysis in a different light, suggesting its potential to transform the lives of people marked by racial and cultural 'otherness'. It is primarily in this spirit that Bhabha attempts to reintroduce psychoanalysis to the scene of colonialism.

The essay "The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism" (1982) is one of Bhabha's earliest attempts to bring psychoanalysis and the problematics of colonial discourse analysis together.[2] It is an investigation and reevaluation of one of the most recognisable forms of colonial discourse, or what Bhabha calls colonialism's "major discursive strategy" (66), the stereotype. The stereotype exhibits two of the features of colonial discourse that Bhabha considers most important, fixity and repetition. Stereotypes are used to secure the knowledge the coloniser has and, because that knowledge can never really be secured, to repeat that knowledge as a substitution for 'evidence' of its truthfulness. Bhabha gives the following example: "the stereotype . . . is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is already 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated . . . as if the essential duplicity of the Asiatic or the bestial sexual license of the African that needs no proof, can never really be proved"(66). The stereotype, then, is a kind of mantra. It allows for repetition of the phrase "the Asiatic is duplicitous" (or its other variants) again and again in order to convince its audience that what they so desperately *want* to be a truth *is* a truth. Bhabha labels as "ambivalence" the gap between the assertion of the truth and the knowledge that the truth can never be absolutely guaranteed. It is this gap, he suggests, which lends the stereotype its vitality. It is the difference between knowing and never quite being sure of that knowledge that ensures the stereotype will have to be repeated again and again.

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[2] This essay has appeared in a few forms, but the form that appears in *The Location of Culture* seems to be the 'final' version. I will make reference to the earlier version of the essay, but for the purposes of summary I have used *The Location of Culture* version which is the version that is reprinted in most postcolonial readers.

Bhabha notes that stereotypes have not previously been theorised in this way, and suggests that "the absence of such a perspective has its own history of political expediency" (66). That is, theorising discourse as ambivalent rather than morally good or bad requires something considerably more complex than a simple judgement of the discourse. Judging the accuracy or moral content of the stereotype, as Bhabha observes, can only dismiss stereotypes, it cannot displace them. Displacing the stereotype would mean challenging its claim to represent anything, whether accurately or otherwise. Dismantling the knowledge and power of the stereotype, then, requires the critic to engage with and scrutinise stereotypes for their truth-effects, that is, the reality they claim to represent. Bhabha here turns to Foucault: "in order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is crucial to construct its regime of truth, not to subject its representations to a normalizing judgement. Only then does it become possible to understand the productive ambivalence of the object of colonial discourse . . . What such a reading reveals are the boundaries of colonial discourse and it enables a transgression of these limits from the space of otherness" (67). In other words, in order to go beyond the discourse of colonialism and its representations (in postcolonial theory as well as contemporary race relations), the postcolonial critic must understand how colonialism constructed its truths rather than analyse how 'truthful' those claims were. Bhabha is suggesting that we should not be misled into investigating the relation of stereotypes to real Asians and Africans. Instead, we should direct our attention towards investigating the claims of colonial discourse to represent the 'real'.

Before going on to develop his analysis of the stereotype as ambivalent knowledge, Bhabha proposes to briefly discuss critical texts which, in spite of their commitment to the articulation of difference, have marginalised particular "forms of racial/cultural/historical otherness" (67). These texts include Stephen Heath on Orson Welles' film *A Touch of Evil* and articles in the "Racism, colonialism and cinema" issue of the film studies journal, *Screen*. Bhabha's readings of these pieces suggest that they are limited by a "traditional reliance on the stereotype as offering *at any one time,* a *secure* point of identification" (70). That is, Heath and others are still working from the premise that the stereotype bears some relation, however distorted, to reality. Bhabha concludes the first section of the article by reiterating that if we are to displace the effects of the stereotype we must learn to read it as a "complex, ambivalent, contradictory mode of representation, as anxious as it is assertive" (70). In other words, we should not take for granted that any reality stands behind the stereotype. Instead, we must examine the ways in which the stereotype is staged as a representation of what the coloniser constructs as "real".

Having outlined the problem as he sees it, Bhabha sets out his precedent for reading colonial discourse as structured by ambivalence. He turns to Edward Said's *Orientalism.* In spite of the fact that ambivalence is crucial to the operation of colonial discourse Bhabha argues that colonial discourse must still produce the colonized as a social reality to be able to control it. In order to do this colonial discourse employs a system of representation that "will designate, name, point to , fix, what [he] is talking or thinking about with a word or phrase which then is considered either to have acquired, or more simply to be, reality" (Said qtd. in Bhabha 71). In other words in order to maintain control, colonial discourse says the Oriental *is* while all the while it is understood that it is impossible to say what or who the Oriental is. Said's work is sensitive to the construction of 'reality' that colonial discourse attempts and, in turn, he attempts to intervene in those structures. He examines the ways in which the regime has operated and continues to operate, thereby displacing its discursive power.

Nevertheless, the ambivalence which Bhabha sees as crucial to the effectiveness of colonial discourse must still be accounted for. He suggests that *Orientalism* is significant because Said's work already hints at, though it is not able to engage with, that ambivalence. He reads Said's binary categories of analysis, such as the fantasy content of orientalism versus its historical and discursive form, as an attempt to contain the ambivalence of colonial discourse. Bhabha suggests that this is where the problem lies, since "the productivity of Foucault's concept of power/knowledge lies in its refusal of an epistemology which opposes essence/appearance, ideology/science" (72). Orientalism, as Bhabha reads it, works because it shifts back and forth between these contradictions, not because it maintains clear distinctions between them. It disavows *and* recognises difference, it is afraid and it desires, it "vacillates between the West's contempt for what is familiar *and* its shivers of delight in-or fear of-novelty" (Said qtd. in Bhabha 73; my italics).

It is at this point that Bhabha finally reveals how he proposes to insert the ambivalence Said and others have ignored into the analysis of colonial representations. His solution is to interpret stereotypes, and the ambivalence they embody, through the Freudian structure of fetishism. The fetish, like colonial discourse, equivocates between recognition and disavowal. In classical psychoanalysis the fetish stands in for the mother's penis, an object which the subject knows does not and cannot exist but for one reason or another is not willing to give up. The stereotype–as–fetish operates as "a 'play' or vacillation between the archaic affirmation of wholeness/similarity . . . 'All men have the same skin/race/culture-and the anxiety associated with lack and difference' . . . 'Some do not have the same skin/race/culture'" (74). In other words, the coloniser knows that there is no difference between the colonized and the coloniser but cannot quite give up the idea that difference exists absolutely. The stereotype does not work to simplify a complex reality; rather, it works to control the threat of difference. The stereotype, then, cannot engage with racial difference. It has no other way to speak of race except as a threat which must be managed.

Bhabha begins the third and final section of the article by recounting two incidents from Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*. The first is a scene in which a little white girl identifies Fanon as a Negro and then turns away from him in fear. The second incident is a consequence of the first. The black body recoils from itself in this encounter (and similar encounters, as when black children encounter "white heroes and black demons" (76) in the stories they read) and identifies completely with the ideal of whiteness. Bhabha casts these two scenes as 'primal' ones in a colonial culture (a casting he does not explain), scenes which "illustrate . . . that looking/hearing/reading as sites of subjectification in colonial discourse are evidence of the importance of the visual and auditory imaginary for the *histories* of societies" (76). Having designated the above incidents as significant ones, Bhabha determines to draw links between the stereotype-as-fetish and the problematic of seeing and being seen around which colonial and racist discourses turn.[3]

If Foucault's concept of power as productive (disciplinary *and* pleasurable) is to remain effective, Bhabha argues that surveillance as an exercise of colonial power must be theorised in relation to the Lacanian theorisation of the scopic drive. In Lacan's theories visual pleasures and powers play a significant role. The scopic drive, then, is a general term used to describe a set of pleasures and powers derived from seeing or looking, including voyeurism, fetishism and the self's identifications with external images. Accordingly, Bhabha locates the fetish in the Lacanian Imaginary, a space where the subject identifies with visual images outside him or herself in order to posit his or her own wholeness. This process is always already disrupted as the subject recognises itself through images which are ultimately alienating and can never help the subject achieve the wholeness the images suggest. In Lacanian terms these identifications are narcissistic, identifying oneself with the wholeness of others, and aggressive, identifying oneself with images which are alienating and conflictual. Bhabha suggests that colonial discourse works by the same double strategy of aggression and narcissism. The stereotype offers at the same time an image of wholeness to identify with and an image of difference that threatens the whole process of identification.

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[3] The discussion that follows is rather difficult to summarise clearly since Bhabha himself seems to have decided that certain things, such as the 'visual' aspect of racist discourse, are significant rather than in fact demonstrating that they are. The links between colonial discourse and Lacanian theories of visibility may therefore seem rather forced. Moore-Gilbert finds this link curious. He writes, "Bhabha devotes a section of 'The Other Question' to analysis of the 'primal' scenes where the native subject becomes racially marked in colonial discourse, this focus is soon subsumed into a general theory of surveillance and the scopic drive which is not in any way particular to the colonial situation" (146).

Summarising Lacan's ideas, Bhabha writes, "the construction of colonial discourse is then a complex articulation of the tropes of fetishism – metaphor and metonymy – and the forms of narcissistic and aggressive identification available to the Imaginary" (77).[4] What this rather complicated sentence expresses is the link Bhabha has forged between the classical Freudian idea of the fetish, which is a private psychic drama, and the Lacanian field of identification, which is a relational drama between the self and its 'Other' images. The fetish, Bhabha suggests, is not simply an expression of ambivalence about sameness and difference; it is a contradictory locus of identification for *all* colonial subjects.

Bhabha sees in the narcissism-aggression model a 'structure and process' for all subjects of colonial discourse. Accordingly, he proposes to address "the problem of discrimination as the political effect of such a discourse" (78). He wants to investigate the problems that follow from such a contradictory and ambiguous model. He reminds us that although the multiple beliefs of fetishism allow the subject to disavow difference, multiplicity also permits the knowledge of difference. The ability to know (recognise, understand, describe) difference, then, is vitally important to the operations of discriminatory discourses. Once again his argument begins with a quote from Fanon that in the colonial situation "the Negro is a demand, one cannot get along without him" (78). Colonial discourse requires that 'raced' figures must be made 'palatable' (why or for whom Bhabha does not specify). In order to unpack this rather cryptic remark, Bhabha elaborates on how a fetish is to be understood in terms of a colonial setting.

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[4] Bhabha connects the trope of metaphor to narcissistic identifications since metaphors attempt to mask difference in the same way the narcissistic projections cover inadequacy by identifying with others. Metonymy, a series of substitutions or deferrals, is linked to aggressive identifications which recognise the impossibility of (achieving) the wholeness that external images offer (Bhabha 77).

First, he argues that unlike sexual fetishes, racial fetishes are not secret but rather are highly visible; their signs are literally written on the body. Second, the classical fetish has enabling properties. It is the object that completes and makes pleasurable sexual relations for the fetishist. In the same way, the stereotype-as-fetish enables colonial relations and makes possible the exercise of colonial power. Fetishism as an enabling form of discourse, according to Bhabha, accounts for the wide range of 'positive' as well as 'negative' stereotypes that circulate in racist discourses.

If this all seems rather disjointed then it is an accurate reflection of Bhabha's argument at this point. He announces his intention to address the problem of discrimination and then makes a series of assertions about raced figures and how the fetish works in colonial settings. What he seems to want to establish, for the purposes of investigating discrimination, is first of all that the stereotype-as-fetish works through visibility. His second point is that the stereotype-as-fetish makes relations between colonisers and colonised possible. In other words, the fetish works through knowledge and desire as much as through power and revulsion. Having accounted for the productivity of colonial discourse as well as its apparently positive representations, he suggests that the only thing that remains to be considered is the construction of the skin's signification as racial and cultural difference within the realm of the visible and the discursive.

Taking his starting point from his reading of another passage from *Black Skins, White Masks,* Bhabha suggests that in order for skin to work as a signifier of discrimination it must be produced as visible. Everyone must be able to see the difference between 'us' and 'them', 'black' and 'white'. Colonial discourse, then, is not about the repression of difference. On the contrary, it requires all its subjects to understand the radical and absolute separation that skin or race denotes. It is also vital for all subjects to understand that such difference is *entirely natural*. However, as Bhabha has already demonstrated with regard to the stereotype, colonial and racist representations can never be secured since there always exists the threat that the object of the look (the one known and marked by 'skin' and race) will return the gaze.[5] The Negro (or Oriental, or Indian) disrupts the 'demand for the Negro' that Fanon refers to. Once more, the stereotype is not simply a false image which is established for the purposes of discrimination. Instead, it is an ambivalent text which covers over and fragments official and imagined knowledges in order to construct subject positions for the colonised and the colonisers.

Bhabha concludes the article with some remarks on the highly visual strategy of racist discourses that are worth quoting at length:

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[5] Bhabha's formulation of the object returning the gaze is very much influenced by the theories of Lacanian psychoanalysis.

> [colonial discourse] practices recognise the difference of race, culture and history as elaborated by stereotypical knowledges, racial theories, administrative colonial knowledges, and on that basis institutionalize a range of political and cultural ideologies that are prejudicial . . . By knowing the native population in these terms, discriminatory and authoritarian forms of political control are considered appropriate. (83)

In other words, making difference knowable and visible prepares the ground for the *necessary* control of that difference and allows colonial discourse to locate its cause and effect in the same place–the body of the colonized.

In the context of the silence between psychoanalysis and colonial studies alluded to earlier, Bhabha's work must certainly be acknowledged as a deeply intelligent and productive intervention. His theoretical deftness with Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic models, together with his insightful reading of a variety of texts committed to the deconstruction of colonial and racist discourses, produce new ways of reading representations as apparently 'common-sensical' as the stereotype. His work has forced us to rethink the axioms of colonial discourse analysis, not simply in terms of their descriptive accuracy but also in terms of their political effectiveness. He has challenged postcolonial scholars not to work on the terms colonialism has already set, for example accepting that stereotypes represent a reality. He suggests that we look in a different direction, challenging the right of a stereotype to represent anything.

As discussed in the introduction, criticisms of Bhabha focus primarily on his textual approach and the perceived lack of historical, political and cultural contextualization that approach entails. His focus on texts seems to leave little room for consideration of the contexts in which the texts emerged or the people who used or resisted those texts. In "The Other Question" Bhabha seems to be articulating a general theory of colonial discourse rather than examining particular moments in colonial history and this is indeed a significant problem. While it is conceivable that a general theory may be outlined, it is unlikely that one theory can hold across a time period as long and a cultural milieu as rich as the historical span of colonialism and imperialism. Colonialism has different aims in different places and at different times, and discursive practices are variously adapted to those circumstances. Bhabha's work would seem to be specific to an analysis of British Imperial India even if he proposes a theory of general colonial processes. His attention to the social, economic, cultural and geographical specificities of the colonial phenomena he writes about is selective at best. A second objection to Bhabha's textual model is the resulting representation of colonialism as a kind of conversation between colonisers and colonised. Critics such as Benita Parry suggest that by collapsing binaries such as colonized and coloniser, Bhabha writes out the violence of and unequal power relations inherent to colonial situations. Although colonialism necessarily involves an encounter between two groups, it does not follow that the two enter into a mutually empowering conversation. Parry seems to suggest it is more likely that many colonial 'conversations' are monologues by the coloniser to which the colonised are forced to listen.

The problem that I want to focus on here, however, is Bhabha's deployment of psychoanalysis. I have already suggested that this is one of the most innovative aspects of his work, given the general absence of contemporary work that speaks of psychoanalysis and colonialism in the same breath. However, it is also the most under-studied aspect of his work and urgently warrants some investigation, especially if his work continues to be as influential as it has become. Although he has been using psychoanalytic theory heavily for the better part of his career, Bhabha's critics will only comment that his use of psychoanalysis is unreflexive. Here I will examine the extent of his unreflexivity and some of the implications this might have for psychoanalytic methodologies in colonial studies and postcolonial theory.

Throughout "The Other Question" Bhabha refers to the fetish in what seem to be purely psychoanalytic terms. This is a curious narrowing of the concept for a scholar so committed to the articulation of multiple historical and social resonances in other contexts.[6] As both Robert Young and Anne McClintock remind their readers, "fetish" is a term with a long and varied history.[7] Though the concept of fetishism existed in the European imagination as early as the late middle ages it only took on racialized connotations later. In 1760, for example, French philosopher Charles de Brosse used the term fetishism to describe 'primitive' religions. Primitive religions refers, in this context, to those who worshipped inanimate objects believing them to be imbued with spirits or magical properties. Some hundred years later Karl Marx took up the term, in the form of "commodity fetish", to refer to the magical qualities that appear to inhere in commodities in industrial economies. Freud took up the term in 1905 to define, as already discussed, a sexual condition in which an object not usually associated with sexual practice is invested with erotic qualities and must be present for sexual relations to take place. McClintock draws these three instances of the fetish together by reminding us that they are are all predicated on the idea of the

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[6] Robert Young defends this narrowing by suggesting that the fact that Bhabha uses such a racialized concept as the fetish to talk about colonial discourse brings the idea 'full circle'. That is, his use of the racialized concept for work committed to the deconstruction of racist thought justifies his use of the tool. I am not compelled by this argument as it sidesteps the question of the truth-effects of psychoanalysis.

[7] Anne McClintock in particular provides a rich and diverse account of the history of the fetish in its pre– and post–psychoanalytic forms (McClintock 181-203). McClintock's work derives in large part from the work of William Pietz, who explores figurations of the fetish that are not phallus-oriented. I will take up her discussion of non-phallic schemes of the fetish presently.

'primitive' worshipping and celebrating an inappropriate object, thereby "displacing what the modern imagination could not incorporate onto the invented domain of the primitive" (McClintock 182). The term fetish, then, bears traces of more than just psychoanalysis; it is, in each case, organised by a racialist logic.

Taken strictly in its psychoanalytic form the concept of the fetish is still a troubling one. Although Bhabha takes Freud at his word about how the fetish works and uses it to explain the stereotype, he does not take into account the terms in which Freud sets up the theory. The language is an implicitly racialized one. In one of his earliest accounts of fetishism Freud writes that the fetish itself, an object "very inappropriate for sexual purpose," is "with some justice likened to the fetishes in which *savages* believe their gods are embodied"(Freud 66; my italics).[8] In fact, throughout his work Freud employs metaphors of the 'savage' or the 'primitive' (or children or women, all of these being approximately equal for Freud) to illustrate aberrant and archaic behaviours. Classical psychoanalysis, as Moore-Gilbert observes, "constituted itself as a form of modern knowledge . . . which contributed significantly to the Othering of non-Western cultures, by defining them, explicitly or implicitly, as 'lacking' or 'anterior' in comparison with domestic metropolitan 'norms'" (142). The point here is not to take Freud to task for his racialized language and thought. Freud can hardly he held accountable for thinking within the discursive limits of his time. Rather, the problem lies in Bhabha's deployment of Freud's racialized model. Bhabha makes no indication to his reader that Freud's work must be understood in the context of the racialized discourse he is attempting to deconstruct, and his analysis thereby loses much of its theoretical and political sensitivity.

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[8] In a related strategy of racialization Freud suggests in his 1927 article on fetishism that the Chinese practice of foot-binding is another example of fetishism, one in which the fetishist celebrates the mutilated foot as a sexual object. Constructing the cultural practice of foot-binding in his own terms Freud writes, "it seems as though the Chinese male wants to thank the woman for having submitted to being castrated" (Freud 357). The Chinese male becomes, in this account, a perpetual fetishist.

Problems with the fetish are not confined to its racial traces. The whole scheme is thrown into confusion when one considers it in terms of sexuality and gender, a topic which I will turn to in some detail presently. Consider, as an example, the idea that the fetish stands in for the mother's penis. Freud theorises that the male child believes that men and women all have penises just as he does.[9] The child assumes that everyone looks the way he does and when he finds that this is not the case, that women look different, Freud argues that he becomes deeply afraid. Freud sympathetically observes that "probably no male human being is spared the fright of castration at the sight of female genitalia" (354). This being the case, Freud suggests that the fetish "saves the fetishist from becoming a homosexual, by endowing women with the characteristic which makes them tolerable as sexual objects" (354). In other words if one did not develop a fetish, one would be forced to become a homosexual. The fetish, Freud suggests, is a far more attractive choice. Fetish theory, then, especially in the original Freudian text, has overtones of sexism, racism, and homophobia.

Bhabha's use of Lacanian psychoanalysis is as unreflective as his use of Freudian psychoanalysis. Indeed, Robert Young suggests that ready acceptance of Lacanian psychoanalysis, "the schemas of which are almost given the status of truth or actuality"(153), is Bhabha's main weakness. Lacan's model is certainly a more sophisticated and nuanced one than Freud's. Nevertheless, as critics like Anne McClintock have observed, it reinscribes many of the most problematic aspects of classical psychoanalysis. Freud's theory does not make provisions for female fetishists, or rather he insists that female fetishism does not exist. To theorise otherwise would place the idea of the castration complex, and phallic symbolism in general, in doubt. Freud cannot explain why the fetish must be a substitute for the mother's absent penis (rather than, say, the father's absent breasts) except by fetishistically privileging the penis in the scene of fetishism (McClintock 190). Consequently, in the schema of fetishism women can only exist as different and incomplete, the always already castrated.

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[9] In fact, Freud assumes that female children believe in the universal penis too. When they realise that they do not have penises, they attempt to compensate for their lack in other ways.

Lacan's work does little to disturb the idea that women are secondary characters in psychoanalysis. If anything, he is rather more explicit about women's life-long 'lack' and 'otherness'. Women inhabit the non-rational arenas such as the pre-Oedipal and the Imaginary, never making the journey which the (white) men make into the realm of the Symbolic. In metaphorical substitutions which echo Freud, Woman is figured in racialized terms as the 'Dark Continent' or the 'Riddle of the Sphinx.'[10] Although he puts it in rather more subtle terms, Lacan agrees with Freud that women can only be victims in a system that privileges phallic authority. It is of no importance to account for the ways in which that authority was obtained; such an investigation would perhaps jeopardise the whole framework. McClintock finds this second assertion of woman-as-lack disturbing and paralysing to any attempt at theorising agency and change (192-200). She makes the radical suggestion that Lacan's work is an attempt to recuperate paternalistic authority at the moment of its imminent demise.[11] Her case is compelling, but even without assigning any deliberateness to Lacan's theory one can see that he reaffirms the authority of the white man who figures as the protagonist in most psychoanalytic dramas. Bhabha leaves these implications aside in his use of Lacanian psychoanalysis even as he attempts to insert 'difference' into theoretical discussions of colonial discourse. Nevertheless some questions remain. Can women, white women and women of colour, act as agents in colonial discourse as Bhabha describes it or must they be relegated to a more passive role? Does Bhabha assume that he can write men of colour into psychoanalysis without attending to the ways women, white and of colour, participate in and produce colonialist practices? Critics assume that women can be added to the scheme, but as McClintock points out the 'addition' would itself seriously disrupt the whole psychoanalytic framework.

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[10] Lacan has, in turn, left his own legacy. French feminists, such as Helene Cixous and Julia Kristeva, follow Lacan, admittedly with a different aim, in representing women in racialized terms. The language of French feminist psychoanalytic theory often leads to a third inscription of women of colour as ciphers in a theory of development, the non-rational par excellence.

While Bhabha expressed discomfort with the gendered fetish model in the earliest version of "The Other Question," he did nothing to displace it. As McClintock writes, "Bhabha . . . footnotes his unease that 'the body in this text is male'" (183), but nevertheless "defers 'the question of women's relation to castration and access to the symbolic; until he has worked out 'its implications for colonial discourse'" (415 n. 13). Interestingly, the footnote has disappeared from the *Location of Culture* version of the essay but his use of the fetish model still remains to be modified in terms of gender. McClintock observes that "Bhabha does not concern himself with the possibility that returning the footnoted female to the body of the text might radically throw into question the Lacanian theory of phallic fetishism and the scene of castration itself" (183). The fetish as it is theorised in psychoanalysis seems to suit Bhabha's purpose quite adequately, deferring the need for a closer investigation of its gendered and racialized terms.

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[11] Brenkman refers to this possibility in his more extended discussion of psychoanalysis and its affirmation of patriarchy in the work of Freud, Lacan and Ricoeur.

Drawing on the work of William Pietz, McClintock prompts her readers to remember that the insistently phallic imagery and organisation of the psychoanalytic fetish is not the only possible version. The idea of fetishism existed and continued for at least three centuries before its organising principle was narrowed down to the phallus. The term was originally used by the Portuguese to condemn the 'magical' practices of their non-Catholic population and as a term to control female sexuality.[12] When the Portuguese began trading with people on the West coast of Africa the term developed a colonial meaning, in reference to the various "mysterious" objects valued by West Africans.

William Pietz suggests that in this Portuguese-West African encounter two different value systems met and the question of trading on unequal terms became a mutual dilemma. How to trade with people who value different things than you do, or indeed are indifferent to the things you value most? Fetishes were the objects onto which the unresolvable question of value could be projected, and thereby managed. The fetish was a meaningless object to the European which could be traded to the 'primitives' as an object of value. McClintock argues that the valued but valueless fetish became a central trope of Enlightenment thought, as a "recurring paradigm for what the Enlightenment was not" (187). Whereas the savage and primitive attached arbitrary importance to insignificant objects, the European understood the true place and value of things. By the middle of the nineteenth century the trope of colonized peoples and their fetishes was well known to those acquainted with travel and anthropological narratives. Once again, far from being a self-evidently phallic narrative, the fetish is implicated in racist and colonial discourse. That Bhabha does not even consider the history, or the possibility of alternative histories, of the fetish makes his use of the psychoanalytic concept dangerously insular.

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[12] McClintock points out that earlier the fetish was "associated with an *excess* of illicit female agency over natural and bodily authority, unlike the Freudian inscription of fetishism as associated with female *lack*" (186). Fetishism, then, is not self-evidently organised around male authority and the disavowal of female sexuality.

If Freud and Lacan provide the tools for Bhabha's analysis, it is Fanon who inspires the articulation of difference within the psychoanalytic framework. Throughout "The Other Question" Bhabha makes continual reference to Fanon's work, using it as a jumping off point for his own work as well as an authoritative source on the 'real' conditions of life in colonial society. However, while Bhabha glosses over the problems of classical psychoanalytic theory, he also glosses over Fanon's reworking of psychoanalysis in a colonial setting. Rather than bringing Fanon's critique of psychoanalysis to bear on his critique of colonialism, Bhabha attempts to reconcile his reading of Fanon with the orthodox psychoanalytic models "The Other Question" is built on.

Fanon did not regard psychoanalysis as a universal model. His theorisations of colonialism and psychoanalysis were firmly grounded in his sense of psychoanalysis as a regional, Eurocentric practice. His writings attempt to work out "patient and detailed critiques of the founding concepts and analytic frameworks of its major luminaries, from the 'Oedipus complex' and the 'inferiority complex' to the collective unconscious" (Moore-Gilbert 144). One of Fanon's major dissensions from classical theory concerns the assumed universalism of the Oedipus complex. In direct contradiction of this article of faith, he writes:

> It is too often forgotten that neurosis is not a basic element of human reality. Like it or not, the Oedipus complex is far from coming into being among Negroes . . . it would be relatively easy for me to show that in the French Antilles 97 per cent of the families cannot produce one Oedipal neurosis. This incapacity is one on which we heartily congratulate ourselves (152)

The implications of this statement are not entirely straightforward but the point is clear.[13] The Oedipus complex is not a universal process. However, this insight does not appear to colour Bhabha's argument in "The Other Question". He does not mention Fanon's discomfort with the Oedipal model or account for Fanon's sense of the limited importance of Oedipal schemes in his own work. Instead, Bhabha seems to take the model at its word. Given that the theory of the fetish and the argument of "The Other Question" both depend on the meaningfulness of the Oedipal theory, it would seem fitting to reflect on Fanon's speculations about the Oedipal complex. However, Bhabha's deployment of the Oedipus complex is straightforward. He writes,"fetishism, as the disavowal of difference, *is* that repetitious scene around the problem of castration"(74; my italics). The 'problem' of castration is naturalised, taken for granted in its Freudian form, and transposed onto colonial situations.

Fanon remained similarly cautious of Lacan's theorisations, reformulating the 'mirror stage' to account for the varied material and psychic conditions of colonized people's lives (Moore-Gilbert 145).[14] Fanon brings a consideration of the historical relations between the black man and the white man to bear on the identification processes of the mirror stage. Considering that Bhabha relies heavily on the Lacanian theory of identification to develop the stereotype–as–fetish, it is curious that he does not discuss Fanon's critique. In both the Freudian and Lacanian case psychoanalytic theory, Fanon suggests, does not transfer neatly to a colonial setting.

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[13] It is worth considering that Fanon's repudiation of the universality of the Oedipus complex may have had other motives. Ann Pellegrini, quoting Diana Fuss, observes, "He points to 'the absence of the Oedipus complex in the Antilles' as the reason homosexuality is unknown to Martinique. Homosexuality is outside Fanon's direct acquaintance . . . For Fanon, homosexuality is 'culturally white'" (110). At the very least we may say, homosexuality is not 'white' even if it has 'white' manifestations. Homosexual practices have an ancient tradition in Indian and Chinese cultures, for example.

[14] For Fanon's discussion of the mirror stage see 161-164.

Perhaps more valuable than the reformulation of any particular complex or stage is Fanon's insistence that his readers attend to the social, or more accurately, the political context of colonized people and their psyches. Although Freud's later work entered into the realm of the social, it was Fanon's innovation to bring a more political edge to this encounter between the psychoanalytic and the social. Fanon's assertion was that, at least in colonial settings, mental disorders were "the result of an insupportable colonial structure of inequalities" (Anderson 1369), not the inevitable costs of civilisation. Thus, Fanon wrote, "The analysis that I am undertaking is psychological. In spite of this it is apparent to me that the effective dis-alienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition of social and economic realities" (12). For Fanon, then, mental illness and psychoanalytic practice for men of colour could never simply be about the individual. A practice sensitive to the psyche of men of colour would have to take into consideration the society and material circumstances in which those men lived.

Accordingly, Fanon is careful to situate his work, speaking of particular men in particular circumstances regardless of the generalisability of his conclusions. Oddly, Bhabha suggests that the most disturbing aspect of *Black Skin, White Masks* is Fanon's consistent lack of historicisation. But Fanon's insistence on bringing the socio-political into psychoanalysis belies this. Fanon insists on taking into account a range of factors–class, history, race, geography, culture, and gender. In this spirit, he writes about the black man of the Antilles, cautioning his readers against the idea that this is the same black man as in Africa or that his conclusions about the Antillean can always be transferred to other men of colour. In this spirit, he writes about the middle-class educated native, careful not to confuse his situation with that of the labouring classes of French colonies. In this spirit, he also makes distinctions between women's and men's experiences of colonialism.

Sometimes these specifications are in themselves problematic, as in the case of Fanon's treatment of sex-gender differences. Fanon's discussion of the 'woman of colour' in *Black Skin, White Masks* arguably opens Fanon's work to a charge of sexism.[15] Women of colour do not figure as active agents in this particular work. Indeed, the chapter entitled "The Woman of Colour and the White Man" might have been more accurately titled, "The Man of Colour and the White Man."[16] Nevertheless he recognises and attempts to theorise a colonial psychoanalysis on the basis that women and men of colour bear very different relations to colonialism, and perhaps more pertinently, to colonial desire. Bhabha's work continually defers the question of women's relations to colonialism. This prompts the question that Robert Young poses so concisely: "how can you talk about structures of desire in psychoanalytic terms outside the structures of sexuality?"(154)

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[15] As with Bhabha's use of Freudian psychoanalysis this is not a question of judging Fanon's sexism. Rather, it is a question of examining how Bhabha deploys Fanon's work in his own text. Ironically, sexism is one of the charges upon which Bhabha defends Fanon. In one of his more notorious footnotes Bhabha excuses Fanon's generalised use of 'man' in this way: "Fanon's use of the word 'man' usually connotes a phenomenological quality of humanness, inclusive of man and woman and, for that very reason, ignores the question of gender difference . . . . I have therefore chosen to note the importance of the problem rather than to elide it in a facile charge of sexism" ("Remembering", 123). Oddly, Bhabha subdues the deconstructionist in himself and chooses to defend Fanon's 'phenomenological quality of humanness' rather than tease out Fanon's recognition of the crucially different role of women in colonialism. The recognition of women's relation to colonialism is apparent in *Black Skin, White Masks* and increasingly so in his later work on Algeria.

[16] White women are similarly effaced in the following chapter, "The Man of Colour and the White Woman". The bodies of white women, like the women of colour, are simply objects in the racial drama enacted between the men. Fanon is not able to account for the agency, in its revolutionary form or otherwise, of any women.

All the challenges Fanon presented to the institution of psychoanalysis are subdued in Bhabha's deployment of Fanon's work. This happens partly as a result of the fact that Fanon's critique of psychoanalysis is not discussed, but also because Bhabha presents Fanon's work as convergent with his own. Neil Lazarus suggests that Bhabha deliberately "inverts the historical trajectory of Fanon's thought in order to propose a vision of Fanon as preeminently a theorist of 'the colonial condition'"(88). By focusing on Fanon's earliest work and freezing our attention to that theoretical moment he is able to efface the mature Fanon's turn away from psychoanalysis and a corresponding turn towards a theory of revolution, and of psychic as well as material recovery for colonized peoples. Bhabha suggests that he is recuperating the real value of Fanon's work in concentrating on his psychoanalytic investigations. Nevertheless he is compelled to explain the frequent and various non-psychoanalytic and humanist moments in the text that contradict his position. Bhabha does this by casting all Fanon's non-psychoanalytic commentary as a failure on Fanon's part, that is, the failure to fully develop his most radical insights. Bhabha becomes a curious figure of telepathic translator in his own text, rewriting Fanon's critique of psychoanalysis and purporting that he somehow knows that this is what Fanon meant to say, and would have said had he only had the words to say it (Lazarus 88).[17] Bhabha's failure to engage with Fanon's critique is curious, but his attempt to rewrite and ultimately efface that critique is much more disturbing.

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[17] Lazarus suggests that "Bhabha wishes to construct a portrait of Fanon as a poststructuralist avant la lettre," but "to the extent that Fanon's explicit formulations seem to render such a construction implausible, however, they need to be reproved for preventing Fanon from saying what he would have said, had he been able" (88).

To suggest that Fanon rejected psychoanalysis would be disingenuous. His work came out of a deep understanding of psychoanalytic theory (in its Freudian, Adlerian and Lacanian modes) and, as a psychiatrist, a certain amount of faith in Western therapeutic practices. For some scholars this faith, whatever its misgivings, prevailed and Fanon's work "passed over its own complicity with the processes it condemned"(Anderson 1369). Nevertheless, he attempted to bring a political tone to the practice of psychoanalysis. He looked over its terms and models with the skeptical eye of a critic who recognised that "Freud, Adler and even the cosmic Jung did not think of the Negro in all their investigations" (Fanon 151). Although Bhabha's work demonstrates his commitment to the articulation of difference in colonial discourse analysis, he stops short of challenging the tools he employs and, indeed, insists on writing out the challenges articulated by Fanon.

Bhabha's work is considered innovative because of the postcolonial perspective he brings to critical methods and theory. Derrida, Foucault, Said and even Fanon to some extent, are all examined and duly criticised for the gaps and fragments in their work. In this context, then, the fact that Freud and Lacan somehow escape this scrutiny is troubling. In "The Other Question" alone, the structures and concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis and Lacanian psychoanalysis are taken at face value. Moreover, while Bhabha seems to consider Fanon a mentor, he fails to take account of Fanon's colonial critique of psychoanalytic models in his own work. Although Bhabha describes his approach as committed to the articulation of difference, he does not comment on or account for the racial logic and racialized language of the psychoanalytic theory he employs.

Why doesn't Bhabha feel that he has to critique or qualify the psychoanalytic structures and concepts in his work? Robert Young suggests that Bhabha's use of psychoanalysis is itself an intervention in the conventions of Western History. However, Bhabha does not indicate to his readers how his use of psychoanalysis might function specifically as an intervention. Psychoanalysis, no less than the discipline of history, derives from the conventions and assumptions of Western knowledge, so it is not clear how it could intervene against other Western disciplines without some significant reconfiguration. Moreover, Bhabha's unqualified adoption of the language and theory does not suggest that he is framing psychoanalysis differently. The fact that he, as a postcolonial critic, uses psychoanalysis does not make his deployment of psychoanalysis a postcolonial one.

Instead, the effect of bringing psychoanalysis so uncritically to the scene of colonialism is to powerfully reaffirm its status as 'truth'. By passing over the problems in classical theory and effacing previous critiques, Bhabha is able to leave psychoanalytic theory itself largely intact. In fact, throughout "The Other Question", "the colonial situation often seems to provide new materials to illustrate and 'authorize' psychoanalytic theory" (Moore-Gilbert 146). He does not simply leave the theory intact; he appears to find further evidence of its 'truthfulness' in its ability to represent colonial relations. Young and Moore-Gilbert both note that in several places the psychoanalytic interpretation Bhabha offers does not appear to be specific to colonialism at all. Instead, colonialism is presented as another set of case-studies that exemplify the structures and concepts of psychoanalysis. In "The Other Question", as discussed earlier, Bhabha's description of how "the native subject becomes racially marked in colonial discourse . . . is soon subsumed into a general theory of surveillance and the scopic drive which is not in any way particular to the colonial situation" (Moore-Gilbert 146). At some points in the text the psychoanalytic language takes over and the specific colonial moment appears to be almost secondary.

Bhabha seems to employ psychoanalysis to interpret colonialism because he is, at least partially, convinced of its truth-claims. That is, he is persuaded of psychoanalysis' capacity to represent reality, in this case the reality of colonial relations. The question of why a Western theory of selfhood would provide a language for describing and interpreting colonialism is never posed. Nevertheless, this is a curious move in a text which proposes that "in order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is crucial to construct its regime of truth, not to subject its representations to normalizing judgement" (Bhabha 67). The problem here, then, is not so much that psychoanalysis is a racialized and racist discourse. Naturally, psychoanalysis does bear the traces of racism and racialization which many Western forms of knowledge carry. The problem is in Bhabha's deployment of this racialized language and theory. Psychoanalysis, in Bhabha's work, seems to stand outside the productivity of colonial power. Bhabha does not seem to find it necessary to construct its regime of truth. Although he scrutinises contemporary texts such as Stephen Heath's and Said's for the moments in which they fall back on the fixity (or, put another way, the 'truth') of representations, psychoanalysis somehow slips past his field of critical vision.

On closer examination, then, Bhabha's contribution to the dialogue between psychoanalysis and colonial studies is less innovative than it might have appeared. While his work brings psychoanalysis back to the scene of colonialism, it seems to do so in order to reaffirm and authorise psychoanalytic thought rather than to bring a colonial critique to bear on Western thought and history. Nevertheless, the very act of bringing psychoanalysis back to the attention of scholars of colonialism can function as an incentive to re-examine it.

Chapter two

An other question: psychoanalysis and the construction of colonial knowledge

What might it mean to bring psychoanalysis into the field of critical vision of colonial studies? Bhabha draws on an ultimately orthodox and colonially non-specific version of psychoanalysis in his work. Moreover, he dilutes the critique of psychoanalysis present in Fanon's work even though he relies on Fanon's as a precedent for psychoanalytic investigations into colonialism. In part, then, a critical approach would mean attending more closely and carefully to the tradition of colonial psychoanalytic critique that already exists; critical studies by Memmi, Fanon, and Nandy among others. These psychoanalytically-informed critiques have not gained a central place in colonial studies, even as psychoanalytic ideas continue to suffuse colonial historiography. In some cases these critiques seem, like Bhabha's, to pass over the question of psychoanalysis' implication in the very racial and colonial discourses which they are attempting to analyse. This is a problem that needs to be worked out. Nevertheless, without work within colonial studies that follows through on these kinds of critiques, psychoanalysis remains a curiosity in colonial analysis, vaguely ever-present but not fully or openly discussed or critiqued. Reassessments of this body of work that remain open to the full thrust of the criticisms might prove remarkably productive for colonial studies.

Another possibility, the one which I will explore more fully in this chapter, is to go back to psychoanalysis itself. Critics recognise and frequently allude to connections between colonialism and psychoanalytic subject formations. What do these allusions point to specifically? In what relation do psychoanalysis and colonialism stand to each other? Investigations of classical psychoanalytic theory's relation to the social realm have come in large part from feminist and gay and lesbian scholars. Feminist scholars have long questioned the position of women in psychoanalytic narratives since, according to Freud's theory of development, woman is just an inferior version of man. At the very least woman is a term definable only in reference to man, her personality forever marked by the lack of a penis. There is a strong tradition of feminist critique of psychoanalysis which has carried the dialogue between psychoanalysis and feminism in many productive directions; it has extended the psychoanalytic universe, as it were, into the lives of women. Gay and lesbian scholars have similarly suggested different accounts of homosexuality than the accounts Freud offers. He theorized homosexuality to be the result of failed resolutions of the Oedipus complex. Homosexuals were individuals who did not quite complete the successful transfer of attachment that heterosexuals did. The interventions of gay and lesbian scholars have generated alternatives to this pathological story. Scholars active in the analysis of race and racism, as noted, have been less involved in the appropriation and reassessment of psychoanalysis with respect to the category of race. However, this has recently begun to change and scholars who have come to psychoanalysis with an interest in gender and sexuality are starting to carve out the place of race in psychoanalytic theory.

In her recent book *Performance Anxieties*, Ann Pellegrini suggests that race and racialization are fundamental aspects of psychoanalytic thought, and calls for "the engagement of psychoanalysis on very altered terms"(3). Pellegrini makes this claim for the importance of race based in part on Freud's consciousness of his own position as a racialized person, a Jewish man in late nineteenth-century Austria. However, she also takes seriously the importance of race as a category of analysis. Instead of taking psychoanalysis' claim that sexual difference is the most important difference (the one worth emphasising above all others), she proposes to articulate racial difference in the psychoanalytic scheme. This is not to suggest that racial difference should be given priority over sexual difference. Rather, Pellegrini is intent on finding ways to articulate difference without prioritising sexual difference over racial difference, or class difference over gender difference. She suggests that psychoanalysis itself is potentially one of the best ways to think about difference in non-hierarchal terms since it is a discourse that aims to destabilise simple oppositions and find ways to deal with the anxiety that encounters with difference produce (1). By thinking through the place of race in psychoanalytic theory Pellegrini proposes to work out how we can think and write about difference without becoming undone by the anxiety the gap between difference and sameness is assumed to produce. In a sense, she attempts to turn the ambivalence Bhabha describes into an instrument of political change. Taking her cue from gay and lesbian studies, she focuses her discussion through the process of identification (in its psychoanalytic form) and by extension through the concept of identity as performance. While gender and sexuality have been theorised as performative by scholars like Judith Butler, race has not. This is the gap that Pellegrini proposes to theorise.

As we saw in Bhabha's account, the development of an individual's subjectivity is considered to be formed by a series of identifications and misidentifications. The subject is simultaneously drawn to and alienated from the images and others he or she encounters. Pellegrini notes that there is more than a touch of the colonial in this psychoanalytic account; "the colonising gesture which is identification is more than just a metaphor" (70). By way of evidence she draws attention to the fact that the process of identification has been mobilized in the project of colonialism. Although she does not offer specific examples of how this mobilization has taken place, she refers to Bhabha's account of stereotyping in colonial societies as a demonstration of how this might work.[1] Nevertheless, she suggests that there are recuperative ways of interpreting identification. As she describes it, the psychoanalytic account theorises a unique space between the self and the other, a space which potentially offers "the possibility of glimpsing the other in the same and the same in the other" (70). In between the many negotiations and renegotiations of identity between the self and the other(s), Pellegrini observes an opening where sameness and difference can be seen at the same moment. While she is cautious about romanticising this opening, she is optimistic about its potentialities and sets it up as a methodological model for reading racial difference into psychoanalytic theory.

In her succeeding chapters Pellegrini attempts to read apparently contesting texts with and against each other, such as Freud and Fanon on group psychology. The obvious tension between Freud's and Fanon's accounts lies in Freud's scrupulous attention to the realm of the family and sexual difference in contrast to Fanon's insistent focus on a larger colonial society and racial difference. Her approach opens up some interesting possibilities for the use of psychoanalysis in social and historical analyses of race. Rather than attempting to verify or shore up the truthfulness of psychoanalytic accounts, Pellegrini finds unexpected ways to use psychoanalytic insights in the service of feminist and anti-racist accounts of subjectivity. By reading psychoanalysis sometimes with and sometimes against the grain, she is able to develop new openings for understanding and representing difference.

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[1] To some extent Pellegrini considers the process of identification's colonising tendencies to be so obvious as to be not worth explaining. She begins the chapter by noting that, "identification is appropriative, aggressive and highly theatrical. To say this is to state the obvious" (68). Accordingly she does not provide concrete examples of how identification operates in this way, but simply refers to Diana Fuss' and Bhabha's readings of Fanon as evidence for the mobilization of identification in colonising projects (see Pellegrini 70).

Anne McClintock's study, *Imperial Leather*, shares some of the same aims as *Performance Anxieties*. Like Pellegrini, McClintock objects to the narrow focus of psychoanalysis on sexual difference alone. Instead she proposes that race and class, like sex, should be inserted into psychoanalytic theory as "crucially formative categories" (183). McClintock's work is more directly concerned with the history of colonialism than Pellegrini's and her attempts to rework and reinvent psychoanalytic truths stem from a desire to turn them into historical tools. In this study she focuses on the concept of the fetish. She speculates that "refusing the narrow scene of phallic universalism allows one to open fetishism to far more powerful and intricate genealogies that would include both psychoanalytic insights . . . as well as nuanced historical narratives of cultural difference and diversity" (185). In other words, opening up psychoanalytic accounts to racial, sexual and class difference allows one to read a much broader range of historical phenomena as fetishistic and, by the same token, allows one to escape from the problem of having to explain all fetishes as phallic surrogates.

As described in "The Other Question", the formation of a fetish is a compromise in the individual's development. There comes a moment, perhaps several moments, when the individual encounters difference and in spite of this develops the consoling idea that the difference doesn't really exist. In the classic Freudian scheme a little boy sees that his mother does not have a penis and in an attempt to mask her difference invests some object with the value of the missing maternal phallus. In fact, in classical psychoanalysis, it is only boys and men who have fetishes; only men who can be fetishists. McClintock takes issue with this psychoanalytic "article of faith" (182) and suggests that this is not the only explanation for what a fetish is and how it comes to be. She writes that "Freud does not explain why the fetish object must be read as a substitute for the mother's (absent) penis and not, say, as a substitute for the father's (absent) breasts. Indeed the logic by which Freud privileges the penis in the scenario of fetishism is itself fetishistic" (190). She argues that there is no reason to consider the penis or phallus as important as it is in fetish theory, except that Freud said so. It was Freud's fetish and has thereby become the fetish of most psychoanalysts after him. The fetish, then, can represent any number of things, can be the result of any number of encounters with various kinds of difference, and women, just as much as men, can be the agents of fetishism.

Having designated the fetish as not being about the phallus exclusively, but rather "the displacement onto an object (or person) of contradictions that the individual cannot resolve as a personal level," (184) McClintock goes on to interpret a wide range of historical phenomena as fetishistic, from British advertisements for soap in the nineteenth-century to displays of national Boer history in 1938 South Africa. For example, she examines the Pears soap campaigns of the late nineteenth-century and looks closely at the objects such as soap, white clothing and monkeys which predictably recur in the advertisements. In one such advertisement a little black boy is almost-but-not-quite washed white by Pears soap. Read as fetishes, these objects tell a story about how domestic trade and imperial conquest buttressed each other. The civilizing force of imperial rule is embodied in the soap, and the soap is a commodity readily available to the domestic consumer. By focusing on class and racial difference, as well as sexual difference, as sites of fetishistic anxiety and contradiction, McClintock is able to develop nuanced accounts of imperial history from what before only looked like crudely racist imagery.

Pellegrini and McClintock both focus on race as a crucial but neglected or repressed category in psychoanalysis. In the last study that I will discuss the author takes a slightly different direction.[2] While John Brenkman's critical study of psychoanalysis, *Straight, Male and Modern,* does not engage with issues of race directly, it does attempt to constructively rethink the truth-claims of classical psychoanalysis. While Pellegrini and McClintock were concerned with opening up the psychoanalytic economy to more than just sexual difference, Brenkman is fundamentally uncertain about the truth-value of Freud's original accounts of sexual development. Feminists have tended to work from the premise that while Freud's account of masculinity is valid, his view of female sexuality is skewed and needs rewriting. As Brenkman notes, "Freud's account of the masculine Oedipus complex has been relatively immune from critique"(2). Given this, he approaches the question of masculinity in psychoanalysis slightly differently: "if the Oedipus complex applies only to men, then it is not about what Freud thought it was about. It is not about the inevitable shaping of libido, but about the shaping of masculinity" (2). In order to articulate more clearly an account of the 'shaping' of masculinity Brenkman suggests that he must put "gender and the history of sexuality at the center of psychoanalysis"(3), a move which according to him runs counter to the practices of psychoanalysis to date. Gender, in psychoanalytic discussions, has been limited to something that, depending on the theorist's inclinations, travels back and forth between biological sex and cultural representations of gender. But what Brenkman proposes with his critique is to attend to the various ways in which gender informs social relations: "the practices and institutions that distribute wealth, work, capacities, knowledge and power unequally between men and women" (Brenkman 3). By placing gender at the centre of psychoanalysis Brenkman hopes to demonstrate how, rather than describing the way things are, the Oedipus complex describes how a patriarchal society would like things to be. It describes "the pattern of emotions and relationships that typically leads boys in our society into the roles, habits and practices of compulsory heterosexuality"(8). In light of this, he sets himself two tasks. The first is to develop a revised version of the Oedipus complex. The second is to understand how the complex is linked to the production of patriarchal masculinities.

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[2] I have included a discussion of this work because although it might seem to travel in a different direction from Pellegrini and McClintock, and away from the issues of race and colonialism which concern me in this paper, it has a great deal to say about a critical approach to psychoanalysis--an approach that can perhaps be extended to colonial studies.

It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss broad developments in psychoanalytic theory, therefore I will keep discussion of the revised Oedipus complex brief. Brenkman introduces two 'new' characters in the Oedipal drama: the real-life mother and the real-life father are characters quite distinct from the symbolic mother and father who figure in the original drama. The symbolic characters represent clusters of gender representations and roles. In a patriarchal society these imagined and ideal parents are a male authority figure and a female figure who is simultaneously degraded and revered. The real-life mother and father are the two individuals who take up the complex role of parent in modern culture. The Oedipus complex, then, becomes a five-character structure, a more nuanced structure that recognises the complex negotiations individuals make when they take up the roles demanded by social relations and personal choices. Brenkman is able to develop a version of psychoanalysis that speaks to the importance of the social realm in any individual's life and development. In particular, he is able to account for the way in which parental roles interact with, reaffirm and challenge the patriarchal imaginary.

By revising the Oedipus complex, by interpreting it as an account of how compulsory heterosexuality is produced, Brenkman claims he is able to turn psychoanalysis into a critical mode of thought. Although psychoanalysis has consistently refused to engage with the social, he suggests that it contains the seeds of a critique of masculinity. For example, Freud observed that boys almost never resolved their Oedipus complexes successfully (that is, "the achievement of a strongly masculine identity and unambiguous heterosexual desires" (226)), but recognition of this failure did not prompt Freud to develop a critique of heterosexual masculinity. Brenkman, however, is prompted -- and convincingly demonstrates the value of psychoanalysis as a source for a critical understanding of masculinity.

Pellegrini, McClintock and Brenkman's studies all open up new possibilities for psychoanalysis in colonial and race studies. Pellegrini and McClintock draw attention to the importance of multiple categories of difference in psychoanalytic theory and in particular to the importance of race and racial difference. Their work, unlike Bhabha's, brings race and colonial history to psychoanalysis, not the other way round. Moore-Gilbert notes that Bhabha seems to find renewed authorization of psychoanalysis' structures in colonial history. Instead, Pellegrini and McClintock force psychoanalytic structures to answer, at least partially, to the question of racial difference. If race is important, how does it change the idea of fetishism; if race is important what role does it play in the process of identification? This is a development which remains innovative -- race is by no means an established category of interest to psychoanalysis -- and must be of special interest in the field of colonial studies. A psychoanalytic method which takes race to be a category of interest in its own right can be useful to the historian and critic of colonialisms. Brenkman's work is just as useful, perhaps more so, since his work goes even further in challenging the truths of psychoanalysis. While his study focuses on the issue of heterosexuality in particular, he manages to turn psychoanalysis generally into a critical mode of thought. By reading psychoanalysis not so much as a truthful account of development, but as a theorisation of how an individual learns the expressions and practices of socially acceptable masculinity, Brenkman demonstrates that psychoanalysis, read against the grain, can generate a critical understanding of the 'normal' subjectivities it is supposed to describe.

As Brenkman and Pellegrini make explicit, these kinds of interventions are important for the development of a contemporary therapeutic practice that is sensitive to the social factors that operate on and through an individual, such as race and sexuality. Brenkman points to clear links between the current failures of clinical psychoanalysis and its consistent refusal to attend to the social world (245). Moreover, women of colour are still trying to work out "the (im)possibility (at this point in history and discourse) of appropriating -- even of deploying -- either traditional or continental psychoanalytic theory for black feminist critical and theoretical practices"

(Iginla 31), a concern that might easily be expanded to include other people of colour. The work of Brenkman and others enables therapists and their clients to recognise and work through the very real demands, psychically as well as materially, of living in a patriarchal and racist society. This kind of work has similar value in the academic arena since it encourages theorists who work with psychoanalysis in historical or sociological studies to attend to the implicit racisms, sexisms and heterosexisms in psychoanalytic theory and to work through the implications of these prejudices for their methodology and results.

Nevertheless, while it is crucial to develop this kind of critical psychoanalysis, it has a limited usefulness for colonial studies if it is not complemented by a more extensive critique. Brenkman himself alerts us to the importance of this in his discussion of the lack of societal accountability in psychoanalytic theory:

> psychoanalytic theory approaches the family not as a living set of ongoing relationships but as an intrapsychic representation. Moral relations become irrelevant. Psychoanalysis may compel you to take responsibility [for your desires] . . . But there is actually nothing to hold anyone, yourself or others, responsible for. (243)

In other words, however closely a therapeutic practice attends to questions of race and sexuality, it does not account for the relations of power and knowledge in a racist and homophobic culture. This is entirely appropriate for clinical practice. A patient does not come to therapy to solve the problems of the world, but to realistically resolve his or her place in and among those problems. For colonial studies, however, it is not enough to acknowledge the importance of race as a category of social analysis; it is *also* important to understand how that category has come to have meaning, how it works.

McClintock and Brenkman both point to the fact that while psychoanalysis is based on close observation of social relations, it refuses to account for the effectivity of those relations. In political terms, for feminists and anti-racist scholars, this creates a frustrating sense that there is no escape from the discourses which represent women, people of colour and gays and lesbians in negative terms. Brenkman notes that "while Freud can entertain the possibility that civilization as such is a pathological process, he eschews the alternative possibility of specifying which processes, institutions and practices are pathological. Such evaluations would bring psychoanalysis too close to politics" (4). McClintock concurs; Lacan, she writes, "cannot account either descriptively or analytically for historical contradictions and imbalances in power" (197). Instead, he remains "curiously indifferent . . . to accounting for the institutions of violence that gave the phallus and the patronym their political power in the first place" (McClintock 197). Brenkman and McClintock both suggest that this leaves readers with the idea that what is described in psychoanalytic theory is somehow real; that it is the way things are, and must inevitably be.

The solutions McClintock and others offer are to challenge the reality under description; they insert gender, sexuality and race into the scene of psychoanalysis. Pellegrini explores the ways in which racial as well as sexual difference is understood through psychic identifications; McClintock opens up fetishism to various kinds of difference, whether racial, sexual or class-based; and Brenkman questions the monolithic account of (heterosexual) masculinity in the Oedipus complex. These are all powerful interventions in the psychoanalysis that is traditionally blind to social relations. Nevertheless, these authors also fail to account for the relations of power and knowledge that produce racist, sexist and homophobic practices. They open readers' and theorists' eyes to the importance of multiple differences and go straight to the next stage of modifying psychoanalytic theory to take account of these various categories of difference. The crucial middle step, which attempts to locate the place of psychoanalysis itself in the production and distribution of racialized and sexualized thinking, is missing. While this gap may not impair psychoanalytic practice, it misses the point of colonial analysis. Colonial studies is very interested in how racialization, as the primary justification for colonialism, is understood, produced, practised, distributed and transformed.

For some theorists there has never been much of a question about psychoanalysis' place in the production of racialized thought and practice. Foucault's work repeatedly points to "the normalizing functions of psychoanalysis" (*Sexuality* 5). He places psychoanalysis in the centre of the bourgeois "discourse of sexuality [that] articulates and eventually incorporates a racist logic" (Stoler 22). *Anti-Oedipus,* Deleuze and Guattari's examination of psychoanalysis and capitalism, makes an equally confident argument that psychoanalysis, especially in its insistence on the logic of the Oedipus complex, safeguards modern bourgeois culture. Nevertheless, the actual work of tracing how psychoanalysis performs its normalizing function has not been taken up by many scholars, either in colonial studies or in other forms of critical social analysis. Critics either ignore the implications of Foucault's work for psychoanalysis, as Stoler has recently reminded us, or they take his work on psychoanalysis to be misguided resistance to a valuable theory.[3] Deleuze and Guattari's work on psychoanalysis is often dismissed as a product of its time and nothing more.[4] There may be many reasons for the reluctance to pursue this particular idea of psychoanalysis; this is a subject for critical reflection in itself. However, since the interventions of Pellegrini, McClintock and Brenkman do not account for the power-knowledge structures of race and sexuality, it seems productive to work through the idea that psychoanalysis is itself implicated in the discourses of sexualization and racialization.

Until recently it may not have appeared obvious that colonial studies could learn anything about racial discourse from psychoanalysis. However, in the second half of this chapter I will try to suggest two of the places students of colonialism might look to understand how psychoanalysis is bound up with processes of racialization. The first is the intersection between colonial and metropolitan practices. Increasingly, historians of colonialism are recognising that what was happening in the colonies was not separate and distinct from what was going on in the metropolitan centres. If aspects of metropolitan culture were derived from colonial experience, this places psychoanalysis, as a European metropolitan practice, in a different light. The second point to consider is the resonance between racial and sexual categories in nineteenth-century discourses. Historians of sexuality are beginning to explore how the language of medical and sexological texts makes implicit reference to questions of race. If all the talk of sex and sexuality in the European metropole was also talk about race, what does this mean for psychoanalysis?

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[3] Brenkman, for example writes, "Foucault cannot ultimately, therefore, provide the blueprint for this project. He considers psychoanalysis too complicit in the power-knowledge regime he analyzes in the 18th- and 19th-century discourse on sexuality"(9). In fact, Brenkman suggests that Foucault underestimates "how psychoanalysis taps alternative sources of knowledge about sexuality"(9). I think this is a serious misunderstanding of Foucault's approach to psychoanalysis. In his work, as noted above, psychoanalysis appears as the prime discourse of the normalizing society. Psychoanalysis is at the centre of the practices and knowledges that create and defend bourgeois bodies and his work is an attempt to think his way out of those structures. He estimates psychoanalysis only too clearly. See Toews for a discussion of how psychoanalysis critically informs Foucault's work.

[4] For a commentary on this response to Deleuze and Guattari see Nick Heffernan 110-165.

The creation of the bourgeois individual has generally been considered a domestic project of nineteenth–century western nations. Certainly in his account of the bourgeois body Foucault is referring to events and discourses circulating locally in nineteenth-century France, and not in its faraway colonies. However, Ann Stoler, among others, has recently argued that this is a rather narrow way of looking at nineteenth-century history, given that the project of creating the bourgeois individual was never as secure as historical representations of it have suggested. The reproduction of western values, practices and bodies in the colonies was not "about the importation of middle-class sensibilities to the colonies but about the making of them" (Stoler 99). In other words, the projects of creating bourgeois bodies and civilizing savage bodies were much more deeply imbricated than was previously understood. Colonisers did not carry with them and implement a fully-developed theory of how to create a civilized body when they arrived. Instead, debates about the creation and defence of the civilised body (as opposed to the savage body) intersected and resonated with debates about the defence of the bourgeois body at home. While Stoler cautions that there may be many ways of understanding such a resonance, she argues that the languages of race and class were not always the distinct tongues that historical scholarship suggests. If the discourses of race and class were "at once overlapping and interchangeable ones, then some notion of race must figure much more organically in the making of bourgeois distinctions than we have assumed" (Stoler 127). Once again, nineteenth–century discourses on race were not simply outgrowths of earlier or domestic discourses on class; the two had always depended on each other. Or, put another way, racism was as central to the embourgeoisement of the nation at home as middle-class sensibilities were to the civilizing project in the colonies. Indeed, as Uday Mehta has demonstrated convincingly, exclusion on the basis of race was central to the political theory of liberalism which shored up the nineteenth–century bourgeoisie.[5] Read in this context it may be that psychoanalysis, as an articulation and defence of the bourgeois body, was not so thoroughly Eurocentric as we have supposed. Instead, it was part of the project of creating and defending normative 'whiteness'[6] at home and in the colonies.

The discourses of psychoanalysis and colonialism were both built upon the same assumption that an opposition exists between civilization and savagery. Colonialism was a series of projects organized and justified on the basis of a 'real' division existing between civilized men (for the most part meaning Western European people) and savage, primitive or barbarian men (for the most part, Asian, African and Aboriginal peoples). One of the projects of colonialism was to define and manage the categories and structures that comprised the divide. In a sense, colonialism defined what civilization was. Consequently, in construction and defence of that definition, places and bodies that did not match up to the standard were conquered, settled and managed. It was the duty of the West to civilize the barbarian races of the world. Psychoanalysis was also built upon a divide between civilization and the savage. While colonialism identified civilization and savagery by differentiating between bodies, Freud located both civilization and savagery in the minds of every man. In the mind of every individual the battle between civilization and savagery was enacted daily. Freud taught us to locate the enemy within ourselves, rather than outside ourselves. This seems like mere analogy on the one hand. One could argue that Freud merely took the familiar language of the day to describe his new vision of the mind. On the other hand, it could suggest a critique of the bourgeois individual. That Freud took the structure of colonialism and turned it inwards suggests to some that his work was a critique of colonial and imperial projects. More specifically, some scholars suggest that his work was an attempt to draw attention to the problems within the bourgeois body rather than in the uncivilized world beyond Europe.

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[5] Mehta traces both the inclusionary and exclusionary aspects of liberalism. Liberalism opens its membership to all people, it declares all people free to join in the society it proposes. However, at the same time the membership is restricted to individuals of "a certain breeding". This, Mehta argues, translates into a certain education, a certain access to education, a certain class and inevitably a certain race. The same argument could also apply to psychoanalytic theory. While psychoanalysis is understood to be a universal theory it is only individuals who live at a certain level of 'civilization' who are susceptible to the kinds of traumas psychoanalysis treats. The term civilization, like breeding, is part of a racial lexicon.

[6] Whiteness is a recently developed term in race and colonial studies and in this context refers not simply to the colour of a person's skin, but to a whole range of 'normative' markers: white, male, middle-class, heterosexual. These categories until recently formed the silent centres of race and colonial studies, not generally coming under scrutiny themselves. While 'whiteness' as a term remains racially articulated it can be a useful way of approaching the blind spots of cultural criticism.

Whatever truth there may be to the notion of psychoanalysis as a critique of the bourgeois, and I think it is fair to say that there are radical critical impulses in Freud's work, this is a much too optimistic reading of a discourse surrounded on every side and permeated by racialized structures of knowledge and thinking. It assumes that Freud's work can be read outside the context of debates on race, colonialism and the 'white' body current in the late nineteenth-century, that any similarities of form or language are innocent coincidences. Read within this racialized context, we see something else, something in addition to the potentially liberating effects of turning the colonialist's eye inwards rather than outwards. As the age of Empire reached into the twentieth century there was a broadening of the focus on the 'savage' within the civilized man. Concern about colonials 'going native' had existed since the beginning of colonial settlement. However, towards the end of the century the sources of what could dilute the colonial settler's 'whiteness' multiplied. The colonial officers and their families who had been living in the outposts were the favourite targets of debates as to whether life in the tropics would break down the civilized bodies of the white race.[7] Freud's turn to the 'savage within', then, does not so much denote a critique of colonial projects as it does a continuation of a colonial discourse about how civilization was to manage the savage. Indeed, if breakdowns of civilized men in the tropics did suggest that white bodies were unfit to govern the colonies, it was never a question of giving up colonial command. Instead, what interested colonial officials and administration was how to govern a colony from further afield. The project of colonialism itself was never at risk of being abandoned: "It was a question of how white males might civilize the tropics (resident or distanced), and whether that region deserved their best efforts-–*they remained the only possible agents of civilization*. Colonial optimism always won out over colonial pessimism" (Anderson, "Trespass", 1367; my italics) It was, until the end, a question of how the white man could remain in control of uncivilized bodies: there was never a question of giving up that control.

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[7] See for example, Young, *Colonial Desire,* Warwick Anderson, "Prospect", 506-529 and Mark Harrison, 68-93.

The intersections and resonances between colonial and metropolitan practices are promising grounds for understanding how psychoanalysis both participated in and was shaped by racial discourse. This is far preferable to simply becoming stymied by the apparent silence of psychoanalysis on the subject of race. How did psychoanalysis create the racial object and subject of its discourse? Warwick Anderson has recently suggested that white men were the subjects of psychoanalysis in the colonies, that their mental distress was, in a peculiar turn of colonial logic, emblematic of their racial superiority. The native population was not considered racially competent to undergo psychoanalysis for their nervous diseases. The native male elite became psychoanalysable only later in colonial history, when they had been sufficiently civilized. How and when did (other) colonised people become psychoanalysable? How did colonised people become inserted in the psychoanalytic machine? What racial meanings did this insertion carry for the coloniser and the colonised?

These questions focus on the practice of psychoanalysis, but the knowledge which made the practices possible also invites examination. In recent years the study of colonial knowledge has lead to the remaking of fields like anthropology and ethnography into critical modes of investigation. Anthropologists have reflected on the ways in which anthropology contributed towards the management and surveillance of native populations. Indeed, Bernard Cohn suggests that some colonial scholars saw themselves as having "a very particular role to play in mediating between the colonial subjects and rulers" (11). Texts like Freud's *Civilization and its Discontents* clearly draw on the fields of anthropology, ethnology and archaeology, as do particular psychoanalytic concepts, such as the fetish, but what does this indicate? How and what does psychoanalysis take from these fields? In turn, how does psychoanalysis inform and inflect these fields? It is interesting to note how favourable commentators on Freud's work are always impressed by his ability to "draw on such a vast range of ideas" (Gay 481). They hardly ever comment on the implications of Freud's reliance on disciplinary models which have since been the topic of much insightful and transformative cultural criticism with regard to race and racialization. There are, of course, many more types of questions to ask. Formulating the right questions is naturally part of the project of critique. I have only attempted to give some sense of how the intersections between colony and metropole open up some possibilities.

While the aims of psychoanalysis resonate with colonial aims, it may still be objected that psychoanalysis does not explicitly address itself to the racialized body. It speaks about the sexualized and gendered body. Colonialism, intuitively, is understood as being organised through race while psychoanalysis is understood as being organised through sex and sexuality. However, just as the creation of the bourgeoisie is not separate from colonial endeavours, the separation between these categories is not so neat. Siobhan Somerville, for example, argues that these categories were very much interrelated: "the concurrent bifurcations of categories of race and sexuality were not only historically coincident but in fact structurally interdependent and perhaps mutually productive" (38). That is to say, the discourses on race and sex did not merely happen in the same time and place: rather, they braced each other, each making possible the work of the other. If race does not appear as an explicit concern in the writings of psychoanalysts, psychiatrists and sexologists, this is not because it is an irrelevant concern but rather because it so underpins their discussions as to be taken for granted. Race had been from the beginning of the nineteenth century a way of talking about sex and sexuality. The racial difference of bodies was created and defined by examination and description of their sexual peculiarities.[8] Such techniques of comparative anatomy, which had been developed as a way to read the 'race' of a body, were the basis of later medical discourses on sex and their attempt to read the 'sexuality' of a body. Doctors investigating sexuality, like scientists of race before them, detailed the bodies of 'deviants' by measuring heads, arms, genitalia, and other body parts in order to arrive at a description of what the normal body was and how other bodies deviated from it.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was a shift away from the biological models, away from reading the body purely for its visible signs of abnormality. Attention shifted towards what the inner characteristics of the individual might tell the scientific eye. Barbara Fields has noted that a complete lack of physical evidence to support the idea of absolute racial and sexual difference was what prompted the shift away from the physical body towards its internal qualities (Somerville 40). Nevertheless, as in the case of the arguments about the 'savage within', the turn inwards should not be assumed "as evidence that the racial aspects of sexual aberration had become unimportant" (Carter 166). As it became less important to read the physical body the instincts, drives, choices and desires of the individual became much more important. Even the person who looked perfectly normal could be suffering from a sexual pathology. In the choices, desires and instincts of individuals, as with the body previously, sex and race were very much interconnected. Now scientists argued that perverse sexual choices were indicators of the individual's progress, or lack of progress, towards civilization. Those who suffered from sexual perversions were evolutionary throwbacks, set further back on the racial timeline than the civilized normal people they lived among. For example, miscegenation, as Somerville argues, was increasingly viewed as a perversion in the late nineteenth century (45). The desire to have sex with a person of a different race was considered, much like homosexuality, to reflect an abnormal sexual object choice. Actually producing children from such a perverse union was a far greater problem, giving rise as it did to racially mixed children.[9] It was this imbricated relation of sex and race, in part, that gave rise to discussions of eugenics. As the purity of the race increasingly depended on civilized and normative sexual behaviour, scientific discourses on sex and sexuality had everything to do with race.

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[8] See for example Somerville and Ann Fausto-Sterling on how comparative anatomy "located the boundaries of race through the sexual and reproductive anatomy" (Somerville 41) of the woman of colour's body.

Where does the interdependence of sexual and racial discourse lead? At a minimum it places all the talk of sex in psychoanalytic theory in a different light. If racial discourse buttresses sexual discourse, what does psychoanalysis say about race? How did the account of sexuality in psychoanalysis draw on and shape racial discourses and anxieties? How did the normalizing judgements psychoanalysis produced on sexual behaviour inflect racialization? To some extent these questions are posed by Foucault's account of sexuality; he writes, generally, of a discourse that "articulates and eventually incorporates a racist logic" (Stoler 22). But how this articulation and incorporation, specifically with respect to psychoanalysis, takes place is not clear from The *History of Sexuality* and it seems to me that an account of psychoanalysis' role in racialization discourses would involve addressing precisely these kinds of questions. Historians have relied upon The *History of Sexuality* in performing their own investigations of nineteenth-century medical and sexological discourses. As noted above, historians are now beginning to read sexological literature for its racial resonances. But somehow psychoanalysis has slipped out of this critical net. Foucault considered psychoanalysis the central point of these discourses on sexuality and yet it continues to be the theoretical blindspot of many scholars of colonialism. Perhaps we are blinded to the necessity of this project by the fact that, for us, psychoanalysis is a living form of knowledge, whereas sexology has a ring of the past about it. But this is precisely what makes it all the more important to investigate. If psychoanalysis still bears truth for us, and still has effects in our daily lives, then we need to understand why this is the case. Moreover, from the point of view of colonial studies, we need to understand how psychoanalysis, as much as other discourses on sexuality, is as much about race as it is about sex.

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[9] Medical and scientific discussions of mixed race children illustrate further the intimate connection between race and sex in nineteenth–century science. The fact that sex with a person of a different race was considered a perversion is revealing in itself but the characteristics and tendencies that children of such unions were presumed to exhibit are even more revealing. Children of mixed race parentage were presumed to be more sexually precocious and sexually irresponsible. See for example, Stoler 95- 136.

What I have attempted here is to provide a sense of the possibilities for understanding psychoanalysis that lie *between* colony and metropole, and between race and sex; to provide a sense of how the opening up of what discourses mean and how, where and when they operate creates new ways of approaching old problems. As noted, scholars of colonialism and race have had an intensely ambivalent relationship to psychoanalysis. Many critics have been convinced of the utter impossibility of its usefulness for anti-racist and anti-colonial work. Others, like Bhabha, have attempted to turn psychoanalysis to postcolonial ends, and have frequently ended up passing over psychoanalysis' entanglement with racial discourses in order to engage it in postcolonial critique. What I have attempted to show in this chapter is how, for colonial studies, understanding the relation of psychoanalysis to racialization and colonial discourses might be more productive than either of these approaches.

Conclusions

I began this study by looking at how Homi Bhabha employs psychoanalysis in his critique and analysis of colonialisms. His work has brought psychoanalysis into prominence in colonial studies in a way that no other scholar has quite been able to achieve. But while discussion of the language and politics of his approach has been loud in certain quarters, it has not extended to a specific look at how Bhabha actually uses psychoanalysis. The very thing which seems to characterise his method has received the least amount of interest. There is, in some senses, nothing new about this reticence. If Bhabha has been able to bring psychoanalysis back to the attention of scholars of colonialism he has still not been able to trigger a more substantial examination of its importance for colonial studies. Nevertheless, given the interest in Bhabha's work, the persistence of psychoanalytic explanations in colonial historiography, and the cultural presence of the theory itself in western knowledge and practice, it seems urgent to overcome the ambivalent silence colonial studies keeps with respect to psychoanalysis. What can colonial studies do with or about psychoanalysis?

Bhabha does not provide his readers with the answer to this question, even if his work makes the questioning possible. His critique, in "The Other Question" in particular, relies on an orthodox version of psychoanalysis, a version which passes over psychoanalysis' sexist, homophobic and racist logic. Young and Moore-Gilbert both observe that psychoanalysis seems to have the status of truth in Bhabha's text. This uncritical use of psychoanalytic theory seems to lend credibility to the anti-psychoanalysis critics who argue that psychoanalysis is too implicated in normative structures to be useful to colonial studies. But this too misses the point. Psychoanalysis is implicated in these structures but this does not give the critic leave to dismiss it as racist. Indeed, it is hardly productive to do so. The colonial critique, as the Foucauldian Bhabha urges his readers, should not aim at these types of judgements: "in order to understand the productivity of colonial power it is crucial to construct its regime of truth, not to subject its representations to a normalizing judgement" (Question 67). For Bhabha, psychoanalysis does not figure as a representation of colonial power and so he fails to construct its regime of truth even as he constructs the truth-regime of the stereotype. However, I have tried to show that this is exactly what colonial studies must do if it is to escape the problem of either ignoring psychoanalysis, or using it unreflexively.

Feminist and gay and lesbian scholars, more so than scholars of race and colonialism, have already intervened in the truth-regime of psychoanalysis. They have taken issue with Freud's representations of women and his account of homosexuality as pathological. Increasingly these same scholars have addressed the question of race, and critics like Pellegrini and McClintock argue that racial difference has an equally significant place in psychoanalysis as sexual difference has always had. Moreover, they suggest that psychoanalysis must finally face up to its failures to relate its theory to the various "practices and institutions that distribute wealth, work, capacities, knowledge and power unequally" (Brenkman 3) among women and men, people of colour and 'white' people, and homosexuals and heterosexuals. The solutions Pellegrini, McClintock and Brenkman offer are adjustments to the theory itself. They call for identifications that include racial images, fetishism that recognises more than just phallic difference, and Oedipal complex resolutions that do not conform to the rule of compulsory heterosexuality. These are all useful interventions, especially for clinical practice of psychoanalysis. But they do not help colonial studies "understand the productivity of colonial power," in its psychoanalytic form, any better than Bhabha did. These studies recognise and attempt to adjust for the sexist, homophobic and racist tendencies of psychoanalysis, but they do not account for the ways psychoanalysis itself produces and distributes racialized and sexualized knowledge and practices.

In this paper I have tried to show that contemporary openings in historical research and research agendas provide grounds for understanding the productivity of psychoanalysis as a form of colonial knowledge. The convergences and resonances of metropolitan and colonial practices and the interdependence of racial and sexual discourses demonstrate that psychoanalysis may be much more than a scrupulously bourgeois account of sexuality. Instead, it may have something to tell colonial studies about race as well as sex, and cultural formations and practices abroad as well as at home. Here I have suggested some questions that might help unearth what psychoanalysis has to tell us about how racial and colonial discourses work. However, it remains for future historians and critics of colonialism to decide just which questions we should be asking ourselves and to carry out the research that can answer those questions.

Foucault repeatedly reminds his readers that what is important about critique is not that it leads us to a better future; there is no better or worse future. Instead, what is important is that critique can enable us to understand what we are now, why we think what we think, how it has come to be truth for us and what effects this truth has on us. This is the type of critique that I have tried to encourage here because it seems to me that, as we continue to live in a racist, sexist, homophobic and class-stratified world one of the most politically useful things we can do is to ask ourselves how this type of world has come to seem truthful to us, whatever our own particular subject positions. Once we have understood what our truths make us, we can begin to refuse their power.

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