"Christian Society": A more influential concept than often understood?

Axel Schoeber

2007

Illumine: Journal of the Centre for Studies in Religion and Society

UVic Libraries ePublishing Services

"Christian Society": A More Influential Concept Than Often Understood?

Axel Schoeber, University of Victoria

Abstract

The rise of monarchies; the rise of cities; the supposedly radical break in the Reformation with the communal emphasis of the Middle Ages—all have been described as signs of early secularization. This paper will dispute those claims. It will examine the concept of "Christian society" and demonstrate that it still had a powerful hold on the minds of early modern Europeans, yielding both constructive attempts to strengthen society and fearful attempts to purge it of the contamination of the Other.

"Christian society" was an aspiration for many people in the Middle Ages. The longing—it was more than a concept—informed choices made in the political realm in the attempt to bring about both social harmony and social righteousness under the umbrella of the Catholic Church. Many believed it possible to construct a just, peaceful, and faithful society with which God would be pleased and upon which He would pour out his blessings. Church and state were the "two heads" of Christendom, which were, in effect, to mediate such a grace to the people. This sacramental view of "Christian society" had a powerful hold on the imagination. Unlike many historians, my contention is that "Christian society" continued to have an influential impact on aspirations and behaviours in the early modern period. I will give evidence for my claim in this paper.

As in many sub-disciplines of history, popular religion in early modern Europe has experienced a paradigm shift. Through much of the last century, the Reformation was understood as creating a radical break with the moribund spirituality of the late Middle Ages. Excessive social control by the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church accounted for this "autumn" of an era.[1] It was widely accepted that this control had to be shaken off, and the Reformers took the first step. However, too much bound by the faith that had enveloped them, they could not move farther. The Enlightenment broke through to a conception of society formed on a basis other than faith. This paradigm was particularly congenial to historians sympathetic to secular liberal democracy. Still, they generally considered the Reformers as heroes who initiated the process of secularization. Recent historiography reveals flaws in this narrative. It is probably accurate to credit the *philosophes* with effecting the transition to a new basis for social organization (though they might have been disappointed that this basis was not Reason, but romanticized nationalism). However, the Reformers were not secularizers, and the break with the medieval period was not as significant as many have postulated.[2]

One approach to this paradigm shift, one suggestive of more fruitful refinements yet to come, is to examine the work on "Christian society" of different scholars. John Bossy tackles the objectivist treatment of "religion" and "society" by Emile Durkheim.[3] Bossy objects on three grounds. First,

1 For the classic expression of a waning culture, see Johan Huizinga, *The Autumn of the Middle Ages*, tr. Rodney J. Payton, Ulrich Mammitzsch (University of Chicago Press, 1996).

2 Some confessional historians—both Protestant and Catholic—have contributed as well to the impression of a major rupture between them.

3 John Bossy, "Some Elementary Forms of Durkheim," in *Past and Present* 95 (May 1982), 3–18. Durkheim's book, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*,

there was in the late medieval/early modern period no such thing as religion as a *system*. In no way was it something outside of oneself that could be examined in a detached fashion. Religion was, in fact, the expression of one's Christian piety. The objective manner of speaking was very rarely used. Second, relying on Raymond Williams' work, Bossy suggests two/three meanings for the word "society." It could mean simply "companionship" or "fellowship." The more objective meaning could indicate either "the body of institutions or relationships of a group" or, more abstractly, it could mean "the condition in which the institutions and relationships are formed."[4] In the early modern period, only the first meaning (the relational and non-objective) applies: "So society for Catholics was practically of the order of the sacred. It was a saving fraternity, the outward face of charity."[5] Yet Bossy diverges from the traditional paradigm: Protestants saw society in the same relational fashion, though probably with less intensity. Third, Bossy makes an important distinction. Durkheim could affirm the statement, "A country needs to have unity of religion to have unity of society." It appears to have great explanatory power: here is the reason unity of religion was so important in the early modern period. Bossy revises it slightly, but crucially: "A country needs to have unity of religion to have society." This revision, especially when applied to both Protestants and Catholics, deepens the enmeshment of society and religion. It explains, positively, the profound impact of religion on social order, and, negatively, the great fear that was unleashed when religious change or difference appeared to threaten the major overlap between religion and order. Thus, conflicts over disunity in religion do not reflect two stubborn groups battling, each unwilling to yield. Instead they reflect fear: fear for the well-being of all that might be dear—family, friends, village, monarch. The rise of Protestantism did not secularize (or objectivize) the notion of society, nor did it lessen this fear. "Christian society" was both a powerful heritage and a deep longing for both Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth century.

The older paradigm often argued that the rise of absolutist monarchs represented a challenge to the hegemony of the priestly hierarchy and, thus, another aspect of the rise of secularism. Politically, there is truth in this picture. Yet we can doubt the priestly hegemony was quite so complete.[6] More importantly, we note the rise of monarchs did not represent a challenge to Christian society, but an alternative vision for pursuing that goal. Wayne Holt describes the symbolically charged coronation ceremony of the "Most Christian King" of France.[7] His vow included the promise to "preserve at all times true peace for the Church of God."[8] Gallicanism was so important to the French because many believed the King of France was in a better position to preserve and deepen Christian society than was the papacy, with its burdensome taxes and its predilection for luxury. The rise of the monarchy was not incipient secularism.

Further evidence comes from Spain. The king could help to preserve, in light of strictures from the priests, the local religion that was so important socially to the people. William Christian gives a detailed picture in *Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain*.[9]

was published in 1915. Durkheim, considered by many to be the father of sociology, suggested that the organic connections in a society derived from the division of labour it embraced. Religion, he argued, was less "organic" and more ephemeral, more a part of the "mechanics" of the society. Both the organic and mechanical sources of social unity could be examined, he believed, in the detached, objectivist manner prevalent in so much scholarship in that period of overconfident modernity.

4 Bossy refers to Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976).

5 Bossy, "Durkheim," 11.

6 See one example of social resistance, Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error,* tr. Barbara Bray (New York: Vintage Books, 1979; originally published in French, 1975).

7 This exalted self-designation had venerable roots, going back to the coronation of Charlemagne by the Pope in 800, and even earlier to the baptism of the first Frankish (Merovingian) king, Clovis, in 496. In the sixteenth century, it competed for prestige with the more recent designation (by the Pope in 1496) of the Spanish monarchs as "Catholic kings."

8 Mack P. Holt, *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 8–12.

9 William A. Christian, Jr., *Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Princeton University Press, 1981).

When the Spanish Inquisition began to pay attention to Catholics (as opposed to Spaniards of Jewish or Muslim background), people stopped speaking of visions of saints and began to frequent rural shrines. To avoid scrutiny by inquisitors, the people shifted their devotional attention to sites away from the urban centres where the officials lived. These shrines had developed extensively in the eleventh century, and represented a "Christianization of the landscape"[10]: "Local religion was a fusion of sacred with secular, god-in-society or god-in-landscape … Sacred places, outlasting individuals as they do, come to stand not only for the *pueblo* of the moment, but also for the eternal *pueblo*."[11] In the end, an accommodation occurred: though the church was largely unsuccessful in suppressing aspects of popular religion, local religion did graft itself onto church-wide practices to survive.[12] The role of the king, especially Philip II, in this process is illuminating. As a sign of the status of Spain, but also as a means of royal identification with villagers, Philip arranged for the import of relics from many parts of Europe, and for their redistribution to many villages. Both the relics themselves and the royal patronage were sources of local pride. Kings, too, would visit local shrines as they travelled.[13] Loyalty to the dynasty grew stronger, strengthening the monarchy. Yet this strengthening was not an attack on Christian society (even though it was undermining the ecclesiastical hierarchy) but rather a deepening of this society, both in its intensely local particularity and, through the king, in its wider manifestation.

Cities, as locations of more famous shrines, still had an important function in Christian society in Spain.[14] The rise of European cities generally from the eleventh century has often been portrayed as another movement toward secularism; I argue that ambitious local government was not a secularizing trend. Cities did, with increasing wealth from trade, lead the way in challenging feudal structures.[15] Bernd Moeller's groundbreaking book describes how these cities successfully overthrew lay or ecclesiastical overlords, and established an internal governing mechanism that emphasized great solidarity among the local citizens. The magistrates on council and the citizens at large shared a common goal: the city should pursue both material and spiritual well-being. They understood solidarity to mean that the sins of one citizen could potentially bring divine judgment on the city. Piety was, therefore, encouraged by almost all.[16] When the town sought to usurp control of ecclesiastical elements, it was not done to lessen the influence of Christianity but rather to ensure its continued and effective local representation. Townspeople did not wish bishops with wider jurisdictions to overlook the city's needs. Towns, then, were viewed as Christian commonwealths, exemplars of Christian society. A subtle shift had taken place by the 1520s. Towns were no longer seen as connected to eternal salvation, yet they still held out the promise of guaranteeing peace on earth, a goal stemming from the pursuit of Christian society.[17] So, ambitious local government was not a secularizing innovation, but an aspect of Christian faithfulness within the urban commonwealth.

Moeller seems to endorse the secularizing impact of the Reformation when he asserts that Reformation preaching, especially that of Zwingli and Bucer, dissolved the medieval conception of sacred society where one is saved by belonging to a holy community.[18] Yet he actually points to flexibility in the concept of Christian society: the Reformed stream of Reformation teaching—Bucer and Zwingli are two

10 Christian, *Local Religion,* 91.

11 Christian, *Local Religion,* 158. Christian uses "secular" to refer to the mundane, the daily, the tangible. I have used it as a synonym for the "non-religious." *Pueblo* means "village."

12 Christian, *Local Religion,* 161–77.

13 Christian, *Local Religion,* 134–37, 153–58.

14 Christian, *Local Religion,* 152.

15 The cities of the Holy Roman Empire provide a helpful illustration: Bernd Moeller, *Imperial Cities and the Reformation, Three Essays*, tr., ed. by H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), 41–53; Robert Alan Schneider, *Public Life in Toulouse, 1463–1789: From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), paints a similar picture from southwest France.

16 Moeller, *Imperial Cities,* 62–63: it was often the populace that pressured the magistrates to adopt the Reformation as part of this search for communal piety.

17 Moeller, *Imperial Cities,* 53.

18 Moeller, *Imperial Cities,* 90.

prominent representatives—became dominant in the imperial cities of western and southern Germany precisely because it engaged "the particularly vital communal spirit" there.[19] Christian society was differently conceived in many places influenced by Reformation preaching, but its powerful hold on the heart remained.

The rise of monarchies, the rise of cities, the supposedly radical break in the Reformation with the communal emphasis of the Middle Ages—all have been described as signs of early secularization. Instead, we should see them as efforts to deepen or purify Christian society in reaction to disappointment with a compromised church hierarchy.[20] The flexibility of the notion of Christian society demonstrates its deep influence on the Christian imagination. If Christendom as a whole could not live up to its calling, then perhaps a smaller unit—the city, the kingdom—could. If an overtly sacramental conception of society seemed disappointing, then Reformers could reconceive this society as one united under the preaching of the gospel. The concept could mutate, but it was not abandoned.[21]

This passion for Christian society could bear a dark side. Examples are not hard to find. Robert Scribner, probably the most influential of English-speaking historians of popular religion in this period, published widely. In a book of his essays collected posthumously,[22] one important piece stands out. "Elements of Popular Belief" demonstrates the continuity of popular beliefs from pre-Reformation Catholic times to the post-Reformation. Despite the best efforts of Protestant preachers, the populace continued to have a "weakly sacramentalized" view of the world, one in which the supernatural inhabited the material realm in ways both orthodox and less orthodox. This continuity reminds us of the persistence of local religion in Spain, and certainly undermines the argument for a radical break with late medieval spirituality in the Reformation. Scribner's study of efforts to use the woodcut to widen the reach of the Reformation, *For the Sake of Simple Folk,* was a new departure for historians. Since many people were illiterate, the woodcut functioned as a form of mass Protestant propaganda. Scribner contends that it was weak as a teaching tool,[23] and he is unsure how successful it was as propaganda.[24] Still, it is not unreasonable to assume a significant impact from a widely used medium. Its merger of anticlerical themes with Reformation claims, its use of the notion of carnival[25] with its predominant theme of "the world turned upside down" as a framework for criticizing the Catholics, its reliance on both biblical themes of judgment and the practices of astrology and of the study of heavenly portents to serve as a warning of a society under threat, the identification of the pope with the Antichrist—all these themes showed a desire to regain momentum in the movement toward Christian society, a momentum many felt had been lost under

19 Moeller, *Imperial Cities,* 103.

20 See Peter A. Dykema and Heiko A. Oberman, eds., *Anticlericalism in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 1994). Anticlericalism was widespread and represented the cynicism of the populace for the many in the church hierarchy who obviously loved luxury and had little spiritual "sensitivity"; only rarely was it a rejection of Christianity.

21 Even after the French Wars of Religion, Christian society was not abandoned. The focus fell on strengthening the absolutism of the Bourbon Kings. I suggest that secular tendencies actually began in reaction to the carnage of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648) on the continent, and the Civil War/Commonwealth period (1642–1660) in England. In both these conflicts, what I will call the "dark side" of the conception of Christian society was a clear factor. Consequently, we see a drift—a notably slow drift—toward either rational religion or Enlightenment skepticism.

22 R. W. Scribner, *Religion and Culture in Germany (1400–1800),* ed. Lyndal Roper (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

23 R. W. Scribner, *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation* (Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapter 7. Scribner believes that the woodcuts could transmit the "campaign slogans" of the Protestants very well; they were too simple a medium, however, to teach the subtleties of Protestant doctrine.

24 Scribner, *Simple Folk,* 9–10.

25 Carnival preceded Lent. Lent was a lengthy period of spiritual discipline prior to the commemoration of Christ's death and resurrection on Good Friday and Easter Sunday. Carnival was a riotous time in which both the social hierarchy and the church's moral teachings were widely disregarded.

episcopal leadership.[26] Though some Catholics shared Protestant anticlerical concerns, Scribner's detailed analysis of numerous woodcuts makes it easy to understand how, when many Catholics responded with similar vehemence in favour of their version of Christian society, the dark side of religious violence was near—as I will now show.

Inga Clendinnen tells a heart-rending story of a murderous rampage, carried out under an aura of legality with the support of the Spanish authorities in the Yucatan, to try forcibly to Christianize the Maya Indians. Their conversion had become suspect because of compromises between their old way of life and the pattern of the Christian faith they had supposedly converted to—at least, as this pattern was understood by their erstwhile protectors, the Franciscan monks. Protectors became agents of severe punishment. Ideology, including a commitment to Christian society, triumphed over the ideals of sacrificial service ingrained in the order.[27]

Barbara Diefendorf produced a masterful work in her study of the rise of violent tendencies among the Catholics in Paris, tendencies that produced the St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre in 1572.[28] First, fear developed as a result of the blockade of food to the capital by Huguenot armies. Then, aspects of a Catholic commitment to Christian society sought to draw the Protestants back into the Catholic fold: military-style processions with familiar relics were tried first. Polemical preaching followed. The preaching did not reconvert the Protestants, but it did stir up militia groups. They became increasingly ready to do violence "in the name of keeping the peace"—a concept very much tied in with notions of Christian society. The rising hostility around them made Parisian Huguenots a tightly knit social grouping. Their isolation increased their vulnerability. The truly violent were a small percentage of the Catholic population. The weakness of the Crown made the militia groups bolder. They ignored any attempts by the court to tolerate the presence of the "heretics." Then, fateful words were uttered by the duc de Guise upon leaving the lodgings of the assassinated Huguenot leader Admiral Coligny: "It is the king's command." Some in the confused night took these words not to describe the limited mission to eliminate one leader whom Charles IX found too strong, but to permit killing all Huguenots.[29] "The militia stood at the ready to carry out an order that it wanted to hear."[30] They were "sharing in a vital effort to rid their polis of the corruption of heresy and return it to a pristine state."[31] They could not accept the abandonment of their perception of "society." The massacres (including the echoes in a dozen provincial cities) killed thousands because the Catholic majority, even if many abhorred the murderous rampage, shared the same conception of Christian society.

In this context, we consider Denis Crouzet. Crouzet's *La genèse de la Réforme français* followed up on his earlier ground-breaking *Les Guerriers de Dieu*. These works could be typified as glorious successes and glorious failures. He de-emphasizes socio-economic and socio-cultural factors in explaining the rise of Calvinism and its rivalry with Catholicism, and convincingly argues that religious motivations played a key role.[32]

26 Scribner, *Simple Folk*, chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. Euan Cameron, *The European Reformation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 56–61, says that anticlerical measures were not a sign of incipient secularism but an "ownership" of the church by the laity, who genuinely believed Christian society would be better served by their measures. For a wealth of detailed local studies, see Dykema and Oberman, *Anticlericalism*.

27 Inga Clendinnen, *Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517–1570* (Cambridge University Press, 1987). See, too, her earlier article "Disciplining the Indians: Franciscan Ideology and Missionary Violence in Sixteenth-Century Yucatan," in *Past and Present* (February 1982), pp. 27–48. It is fascinating to note that the Mayans abandoned their own gods—whom they deemed defeated by the Franciscans' show of force—and adopted Christianity. Yet, like the local religions in Spain at the same time, they did so "on their own terms" with resistance to the forms dictated by religious authorities.

28 Barbara B. Diefendorf, *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (Oxford University Press, 1991).

29 Diefendorf, *Beneath*, chapter 6.

30 Orest Ranum, reviewer, *Beneath the Cross* in *The Journal of Modern History* 66 (June 1994), 383.

31 Diefendorf, *Beneath*, 171–72.

32 Denis Crouzet, *La genèse de la Réforme français, 1520–1560* (Paris: Sèdes, 1996), 477–591; Denis Crouzet,

Unfortunately, Crouzet frequently overstates his case. He often makes his case more "sinister" than the evidence allows for. For example, he refers to an incident in Toulouse in 1532, where forty-one warrants were issued for the arrest of suspected Lutherans, both students and professors, in the respected law faculty at the university.[33] One professor, Jean de Caturce, was executed. Crouzet's narration focuses on only a half dozen participants who are cast as conspirators. He minimizes the university connection. He treats Jean de Boysonné, a popular professor of Roman law who was forced to abjure publicly, as a committed Lutheran, and the group as millenarian in emphasis. These claims create a false impression. Caturce was a Lutheran, but Boysonné was a Catholic humanist. Instead of treating the group as millenarian conspirators, it is more appropriate to see group members as temporarily losing an academic battle with the scholastics when the local *Parlement* took the side of the latter.[34] While we prefer Diefendorf's careful handling of her sources to Crouzet's excessive psychologizing, generally their depictions agree. It is the concern to maintain (for Catholics) or renew (for Huguenots) Christian society that allowed both to participate in acts of violence.[35]

Philip Benedict, relying on both social and cultural historical methods, deepens our understanding of Huguenots in the seventeenth century. His erudite collection of essays, *The Faith and Fortunes of France's Huguenots*,[36] weighs in against Crouzet's psychologizing as well. The decline of religious violence did not result from Catholic guilt, but from a shift in local balances of power: one party or the other became numerically so much stronger that the minority party did not risk an open challenge. Commitment to their respective views of Christian society had not abated. In the same vein, Benedict demonstrates that Huguenot theorists embraced notions of freedom of conscience only when it became clear their dream of reforming the entire Gallican church could not be achieved.[37] Most helpfully, he deals with the popular recent approach to this period called "confessionalization." Benedict rejects the stronger form of this theory as inapplicable to France, at least. This theoretical view links the formation of religious group identity with wider forms of social disciplining and the building of modern states. He does accept a weaker view of confessionalization as the formation of religious group identity as a defensive measure in light of the existence of rival alternatives.[38] Yet this movement represented another shift in the conception of Christian society, more inward- than outward-looking, at first still embracing the political unit over which the particular confession was dominant, but also preparing the way for the ultimate rise of denominationalism in the more secularized states that slowly emerged, beginning in the latter half of the seventeenth century.

John Bossy calls this latter development "Migrations of the Holy."[39] Having painted a portrait of an intensely social religion in the late medieval period, Bossy believes Europeans by 1700 sought to replace a lost sense of social solidarity by other means. As I mentioned above,[40] absolutist monarchy was one such avenue. He sees the discipline of music as an intimation of the holy that ultimately drifted away from the church. Words, too, became more objective and less descriptive of solidarity. While Bossy can blame Protestants for this loss,[41] he can also agree[42] with my suggestion in this paper that, in a somewhat different form, Protestants were so committed to Christian society that they took enormous risks in seeking to do

Les Guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525 - vers 1610), 2 *tomes* (Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1990).

33 Crouzet, *Le genèse,* 212–14.

34 See Schneider, *Toulouse,* 47–49.

35 The Huguenots participated in many acts of iconoclasm, a small number of murders of Catholic leaders, the attempted abduction of kings, and war.

36 Philip Benedict, *The Faith and Fortunes of France's Huguenots, 1600–85* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2001), 302.

37 Benedict, *Faith and Fortunes,* 308.

38 Benedict, *Faith and Fortunes,* 313–16.

39 John Bossy, *Christianity in the West, 1400–1700* (Oxford University Press, 1985), chap. 8.

40 See n. 21.

41 See his discussion of the interiorizing effect of Protestant celebrations of the Eucharist and its lessening of the social bond: *Christianity in the West,* 141–43.

42 See above.

better than they felt the Catholic hierarchy had done.

Protestantism was not a conscious secularizing movement. Christian society was a powerful assumption of almost all Christians in the late medieval *and* early modern period. Scholars certainly are aware of its importance at one level. Yet many seem to miss the immense power behind its continued pursuit by both Protestants and Catholics. This paper has pointed the way toward further reassessment of its place. It was the dark side of this longing, the fear-filled insistence on only one manifestation of Christian society and the resulting carnage, that, by 1648, turned Europeans (slowly!) in another direction to seek to constitute society on a less "comprehensive" basis, one more able to accept social and religious diversity.

Bibliography

Benedict, Philip. 2001. *The Faith and Fortunes of France's Huguenots, 1600–85.* Aldershot, England: Ashgate.

Bossy, John. 1985. *Christianity in the West, 1400–1700.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. 1982. "Some Elementary Forms of Durkheim." *Past and Present* 95: 3–18.

Cameron, Euan. 1991. *The European Reformation.* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Christian, Jr., William A. 1981. *Local Religion in Sixteenth-Century Spain.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Clendinnen, Inga. 1987. *Ambivalent Conquests: Maya and Spaniard in Yucatan, 1517–1570.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—. 1982. "Disciplining the Indians: Franciscan Ideology and Missionary Violence in Sixteenth-Century Yucatan." *Past and Present* 94 (1) : 27–48.

Crouzet, Denis. 1996. *La genèse de la Réforme français, 1520-1560.* Paris: Sèdes.

—. 1990. *Les Guerriers de Dieu: La violence au temps des troubles de religion (vers 1525 – vers 1610).* 2 *tomes.* Seyssel: Champ Vallon.

Diefendorf, Barbara B. 1991. *Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth-Century Paris.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dykema, Peter A., and Heiko A. Oberman, eds. 1994. *Anticlericalism in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe.* Leiden: Brill.

Holt, Mack P. 1995. *The French Wars of Religion, 1562–1629.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Huizinga, Johan. 1996. *The Autumn of the Middle Ages.* Tr. Rodney J. Payton and Ulrich Mammitzsch. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Le Roy Ladurie, Emmanuel. 1979 [1975, in French]. *Montaillou: The Promised Land of Error*. Tr. Barbara Bray. New York: Vintage Books.

Moeller, Bernd. 1972. *Imperial Cities and the Reformation, Three Essays.* Tr. H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr., eds. Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Schneider, Robert Alan. 1989. *Public Life in Toulouse, 1463–1789: From Municipal Republic to Cosmopolitan City.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Scribner, R. W. 1981. *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—. 2001. *Religion and Culture in Germany (1400–1800).* Ed. Lyndal Roper. Leiden: Brill, 2001.

Ranum, Orest. 1994. Review: *Beneath the Cross. The Journal of Modern History* 66: 382–84.