

“Intellectuals, Marxism, and Nationalism: Reflections on Romanian Civil Society.”

by

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ABSTRACT

How can one explain Romanian “civil society”, as it is known that Romania, along with Albania, experienced one of the most ferocious “communist” dictatorships under Ceausescu? Hence, where can one locate a noiseless “civil society” within a political context that lacked reform factions (as in Hungary), or a coalition between workers and intellectuals (“Solidarity” in Poland) or a civil rights movement (“Charter 77” in Czechoslovakia)? This study will show that Romanian “civil society” was located within the sphere of “the intellectuals,” in their factional, discursive struggles. Supported by a regime built on ideology and symbolism, the intellectuals’ nationalist discourse won over Marxism. The intellectuals’ competition created both nationalist values and definitions for the regime and “subversive” ideologies as opposition to the same regime. Hence, intellectuals *were* civil society. The discourse of “the Nation” continues to be present in the post-revolutionary Romanian society, defining Romanian identity between East and West.

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“The Six Commandments of a writer in a communist country:

1. Don't think.
2. If you do think, don't talk.
3. If you do talk, don't write it down.
4. If you do write it, don't publish it.
5. If you do publish it, don't sign it.
6. If you do sign it, write a denial.”

(Banc., C. and Dundes, Alan, *“You Call This Living? A Collection of East European Political Jokes”*, Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990 [First published by Fairleigh Dickinson University Press as *“First Prize: Fifteen Years!” An Annotated Collection of Romanian Political Jokes”*, 1986.]

Introductory chapter

Section one. On the style of the thesis

I am a Romanian who witnessed three distinct moments in the life of Romanian society: communism, the 1989 Revolution, and post-communism. Thus, my thesis encompasses different compositional styles, from theory, to descriptive-factual presentations, to interviews, and even my own testimony on my experiences. This is my first observation: my thesis is alive and in it I will try to immortalize and translate sequences of life into the framework of Western concepts and theories.

A second observation regards Western literature on Romania. Apparently, Romania has been melted into the notion of the Soviet bloc - a concept which, undoubtedly, served political interests - in spite of its own characteristics even within the communist ideology and establishment.¹ Generally, the nonacademic literature on the Romanian Revolution pursues only a historical narrative method, listing the sum of events in a chronological “*histoire evenementielle*”, to paraphrase Braudel, with no theoretical conclusion or assumptions. I found only few academic theoretical approaches to Romania, usually anthropological perspectives.² Facing a plenitude of life experience and a disharmony of theoretical knowledge on Romanian realities, I gradually learned to translate the empirical into the (Western) rational, and, as a feedback, I obtained a better understanding of my own starting point and

1 E.g., Merle Fainsod, Richard Pipes, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

2 I specifically refer to the American anthropologist Katherine Verdery and to Trond Gilberg, David A Kideckel.

assumptions.

A third observation is that I start my analysis from Marxism and only secondarily I introduce another type of analysis, on identity (nationalism). I have to explain why. First, a derivative from Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, was the ideological framework of socialist Romania, being its fixed and official ontological background from 1947 until 1989. Thus, the first impulse and act of knowledge acquisition and analysis that a person in my position could do was to start searching for the ideological-cultural foundations of his/her surrounding environment. In this respect, when dealing with communist Romania, I had to start from the RCP's³ ideological position, as centre of power, theoretically generating the whole organization of Romanian society. Second, the main target of my thesis is to prove that in Romania civil society had a certain dynamics of continuity from pre and interwar times of capitalism, during communism - though structurally transformed and relatively atomized - and after the 1989 Revolution. When dealing with this major issue, I employed the conceptual framework of Western Marxism, as another variant of "Marxism". In this context, Western Marxism provides the best explanation of the species of capitalism (both pre-communist and reemerging now in Romania), because it represents its astute critic, as well as a close approach to Socialism, in its humane, Western face, as opposed to the "real socialism" of the Soviet bloc. It is precisely this ambivalent and critical articulation of Western Marxism, first, with regard to capitalism, second, with regard to communism, and third with regard to Western socialism, that constitutes the most favourable terrain for comparatively translating

3 The RCP is the Romanian Communist Party.

and interpreting the state of affairs of communist (and post-communist) Romania. In other words, in order to deconstruct communism and show a continuity of civil society I could not employ only the critics of capitalism, i.e., pro-Marxists, nor only the critics of communism, i.e., “pluralists”. Western Marxism has an ambivalent position between capitalism, communism and Western socialism.

Third, the reemergence of capitalism after 1989 in Eastern Europe is not a matter of a genuine genesis of capitalism, as is the case with the rise of the classical bourgeoisie in Western Europe from feudalism. In Eastern-Europe, capitalism has a double specificity: first, it reemerged within an overdetermined genesis, i.e., by the work of at least two factors, the idiosyncratic evolution of the cultural level (i.e., the dissidence of “civil society”), to which the economic and relatively autonomous level of the state bureaucracy (“bourgeois” nomenclature) was added; second, East-European capitalism reflects specific features of “Orientalism” and traditionalism, making capitalism appear rather shifted in its essential, rational principles.

Finally, I ask how can one explain Romanian “civil society”, as it is known that Romania, besides Albania, lived one of the most ferocious “communist” dictatorships under Ceausescu? Hence, where can one locate a noiseless “civil society” within a political context that lacked reform factions (like in Hungary), or a coalition between workers and intellectuals (the “Solidarity” in Poland) or a civil rights movement (“Charter 77” in Czechoslovakia)? This is the challenge of the thesis which has to find a subtle argument in the conditions where strikingly obvious facts (like in other Soviet bloc countries) are not easily noticeable.

Section 2. The questions to be answered and the claims of the thesis

A) General questions

This study intends to approach and answer the following question: how can one explain “civil society” for the Romanian case? This general, comprehensive question entails the following “sub”-question with regard to “civil society”: is “civil society” a matter of novelty for the post-revolutionary (post 1989) Romanian society, or did it exist previously as well? If “civil society” did exist, what happened to it during communism? If it did not exist, how can one explain post-revolutionary Romania? What societal “typology” do Romanians have?

B) Related claims

Since the presence or absence of “civil society” culturally defines Romanians as “Europeans” or “non-Europeans”, the issue of “civil society” is a matter of “identity”. *How do Romanians and non-Romanians define Romanians?* I found that the key relationship of my study (focussed specifically on Romania) is that between “identity” and “power”.

In this respect my claims are as follows. First, in Romania, a type of “civil society” existed under communism and I found it located within “the intellectuals” sphere. Second, with the failure of Marxist-Leninist economic principles, Ceausescu’s regime moved its basis of authority and legitimacy from (centralized, planned) economic foundations (methods of control) to (coercive) ideology and symbolism. Third, as Romanian communism also alleged a “maverick” position of distance from Moscow, the ideology legitimating the regime became then “national ideology”, centred around the traditional and historical issue of “*the Nation*”,

as a matter of defining and conceptually building the polity from within (Ceausescu developed “national ideology” up to *Nationalism*). Fourth, the fight between the two discourses, Marxism and Nationalism, ended with the victory of the latter. Fifth, intellectuals, as producers of knowledge, being the best allies of a regime built on an ideology requiring their continuous nurturing with suitable definitions of (socialist-nationalist) values, competed among themselves, creating both national(ist) values and definitions for the regime and “subversive” ideologies. Hence, intellectuals *were* civil society and I am interested in the relationship between intellectuals and power. Sixth, producing definitions for the regime, the intellectuals held in their conceptual hands and determined the party bureaucracy and the regime’s line, in general. The power relationship between four levels of interaction - intellectuals, the regime (and bureaucracy), Marxism and Nationalism - was as follows: as the party required national(ist) symbols from the intellectuals in order to legitimate the Romanian “communist-national(ist)” regime, the intellectuals’ factional fights were responsible for “killing” Marxism while promoting and reproducing the official discourse of Nationalism (national ideology). Seventh, the discourse of “the Nation” continues to be present in the post-revolutionary Romanian society, as a matter of defining Romanian identity between East and West, in a world of regionalisation (“North” - “South”, “East” - “West”) within globalization.

C) What issues this study does not answer

Many issues are touched upon in this study, but not all of them will be elaborated as much as the key issues mentioned previously. In this respect, further studies are required with

respect to the following major issues: first, the emergence of capitalism from communism, in contrast to capitalism's genesis from classical Western European feudalism; second, the continuous social stratification happening under communism and the emergency of new "classes"/"fractions". (What can be said about the rising "socialist bourgeoisie", the nomenclature?); third, the dualism of socialist economies: "economy of shortage" - "second economy", as a cause for the collapse of communism; fourth, the phenomenon of the "1989 Romanian Revolution"; fifth, the issue of the "youth" and statistical studies on "pop and Rock culture".⁴

D) The organization of the study; on methodology

This study comprises three chapters, besides this introductory chapter, and the conclusion. There is also the Appendix (besides the bibliography) including interviews completed in Bucharest in the summer of 1996.

The first chapter is entirely theoretical and is concerned with explaining two realities, Marxism and Nationalism. Section one, on Western Marxism, is focused on Ideology, its locus within civil society, and its formative role for social being. This section also shows the way ideology functioned within (Romanian) communist society and it finds loci of counter-hegemony to the (communist) regime. Overall, this section is intended to prove that the *non-existence* of a cultural-ideological segment of civil society was *impossible* under the type of communism existent particularly in Romania. On the other hand, this section also constitutes the first major theoretical framework of the study (on superstructure), besides Section two,

⁴ See also the Conclusion of the thesis.

on Nationalism. Section two (Chapter one) introduces an element that adjusts the previous theoretical analysis on ideology to the particular conditions of (South)Eastern-Europe and Romania. This element is Nationalism, and it is definitional for explaining the way values are constructed in that region of the world and how peoples there conceive their identity and that of others. The methodology is historico-empirical, sometimes subtracting a principle in order to better articulate and organize the complexity presented. This is the place where the previous theoretical assertions get their “local colour”, being integrated within the case history of this study (on Romanian civil society).

Chapter two presents two discourses, Marxism (of a “real socialist” trend) and Romanian Nationalism, which, this study contends, struggled until the latter won over the former. Section one presents the RCP discourse (ideology) from the Romanian manual of “Marxist” philosophy in the late 1980s, with regard to socialist consciousness. This section will let the Romanian manual of “Marxist” philosophy speak for itself. This is, to paraphrase Althusser⁵, “What children learned in Romanian schools, before 1989”. In section two, in a dualist theoretical-empirical method (to which interviews are added), I will present the debate between Marxism and Nationalism, as a matter of struggle among intellectual factions for power (i.e., for catching the authority of defining values required by the regime). The counter-discourse (to Marxism) of Nationalism will underline what is concealed or falsified by the previous official discourse of the RCP (from Section one). Thus, in Section two, this debate (between Marxism and Nationalism) is seen through: first, the relationship of intellectuals with the traditional, historical issue of “the Nation” - which, at least since 1848, had occupied

5 See Chapter one, Section one.

almost all discursive fields within Romanian society - and, second, the ambivalent relationship between intellectuals and “power” (i.e., the regime’s official power, and the intellectuals’ informal “power” *over* the regime’s official power).

Chapter three presents cases and it combines empirical research with some theoretical principles. This chapter actually “shows” civil society “in action” within communist Romania, in the fields of literature and literary criticism, philosophy, youth, and ethnic minorities. The first two cases had theoretically been explained in Chapter two (Section two). The third case, on youth, is much more idiosyncratic and probably unexpected. It is gathered under the principles of a “rebellious youth” and the failure of the new socialist human being and consciousness, and it shows both “the West” and “nationalism” fighting to catch youth’s soul. Also, the method in this third case is comparative, dispersing its attention throughout the whole “Soviet bloc”. This method intends to situate Romania as integral within a wider phenomenon of cultural Western/Eastern colonization, or cultural imperialism. The fourth case, on ethnic minorities, constitutes subtle evidence that the ruling ideology in Romania was not the internationalizing socialist consciousness of the proletariat, but nationalism and its problems of identity dichotomy and struggles.

The Conclusion is intended to show how the post revolutionary Romanian civil society can be characterized in the light of the trends and processes explained in this study. With all its identity problems posed by Nationalism, Marxism, and dictatorship, today Romanian civil society rises like a “Phoenix”, displaying continuity from pre-war times. This is precisely what this study intends to prove.

Chapter One.

The basic theoretical framework: “Ideological State Apparatuses” and Nationalism.

Section I: Althusser’s theory of “Ideological State Apparatuses”, a synthesis of Marx and Gramsci

As specified in the introductory chapter, this section is focused on Ideology, its locus within civil society, and its formative role. The main purpose of this part is to create the theoretical framework for finding the way ideology functioned within (Romanian) communist society, while theoretically “detecting” loci of counter-hegemony to the (communist) regime, particularly in the system of “Ideological State Apparatuses” (ISA). Overall, this section tries to prove that the “quiet” of Romanian “civil society”, in its “superstructural” cultural-ideological segment (which is of concern for this study), did not mean its *non-existence* under the type of communism existent in Romania. Where one can theoretically locate the “noise” of civil society within the “silence” of a communist dictatorship is the main subject of this part.

A. Question: “What do children learn at school?”⁶

In his “*Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*”, Althusser starts from a basic Marxian problem: in order to be able to exist and produce, any social formation must reproduce its conditions of production at the same time as it produces. The conditions of

6 Louis Althusser, “*Essays on Ideology*” (London: Verso, 1994 [NLB, 1971]) p.6.

production that must be reproduced are: the forces of production and the existing relations of production. To come back to the question of “what children learn at school”, we must investigate a special component of the productive forces, apart from the means of production, namely “labour-power” and its reproduction. In traditional Marxism, “wages” appear as the material conditions of labour-power reproduction. In other words, “wages”, as material conditions of labour-power reproduction, “enable the wage-earner to present himself again at the factory gate the next day [...]”⁷. On the other hand, the education that makes the worker skilful and competent in the socio-technical division of labour is not “material”, though being a by-product of the wage. Yet, “what do children learn at school?” Education is that constituent process of labour-power reproduction that gives “know-how”. This means that, besides learning literary and scientific knowledge, children also learn the rules of the “destined job”, i.e., the job’s consciousness within a specific socio-technical division of labour and, moreover, under a specific dominant ideology. In other words, the second, non-material condition for the reproduction of labour-power is the “reproduction of submission to the ruling ideology”⁸. This ideological component produces specific types of morality, civility, and professionalism in particular types of modes of production within a social formation.

Why is this question “What do children learn at school?” relevant for this study? The next chapter (section one, on the Romanian manual of (Marxist) philosophy) will show a case:

7 Althusser, *ibid.*, p.5.

8 Althusser, *ibid.*, p.6.

how, in the late '80s, education was trying to impose the ideology of the regime, Marxism, though in an obsolete, humanist form, compared to the reality of those times and places governed by nationalism (the real discourse, already hegemonic under Ceausescu).

For the concern of this study, the relationship between ideology and education is important since nationalism, as ideology and discourse won over Marxism, education would follow the victorious ideology (i.e., nationalism). As this could not be done overtly (i.e., a manual of philosophy preaching Nationalism instead of Marxism would have actually revealed its Fascism), the discourse of nationalism surrounded and pervaded other levels of the system of ISA, different from the official education and its curriculum (e.g., communication ISA: press, radio, television; cultural ISA: literature, arts, cultural movements, etc.). In the end, the local excessive and patriotic tones of the national ideology diverted the principles and ends of Marxism, transforming it into its paradox and annihilating it. The whole struggle was fought within the system of ISA. In this respect and as a critical elaboration to Althusser, the question "What do children learn at school?" is relevant for showing that the "official" ideology and its discourse (and curriculum) are not necessarily hegemonic. Various circumstances can produce and develop counter-"official", "really" hegemonic discourses (I cannot call them counter-hegemonic, since the "official" discourse, Marxism, though official, was not hegemonic: it had not won popular consent). Such was the case with Romanian Nationalism established as hegemonic both by Ceausescu and by the international fight among imperialisms, which managed to create both local counter-trends to imperialist centralization and identity claims. In this understanding, "hegemony" is not produced solely through the consent of a national polity, but it transcends the state, being overdetermined by

international conjunctures (imperialisms), as well.

B. On the State. Ideological perspectives: Althusser and Gramsci

a) Althusser's theory of the State

Althusser's Marxist position conceives the state as a repressive apparatus, a tool of dominance in the hands of the ruling classes, whose aim is to ensure the existence of this class by means of taking over the surplus-value from the dominated classes. Thus, the state is symbiotic with the existence of classes and their endemic antagonism. Seen through its function - repression - the state is already defined as "the state apparatus", in both senses: in a narrow sense, "the state apparatus" is very specialized and it refers to its legal practices (e.g., police, courts, prisons, etc.); in a broader sense, "the state apparatus" also includes the army, as an additional repressive force (to that of the police), the head of the state, the government, and the state administration. In both understandings, "the state apparatus" *is* the State, whenever the state is defined solely by its repressive function. On the other hand, the state, as a repressive state apparatus, is at the same time a "class state", because the existence of classes and their antagonism determines the very existence of the state, as a repressive organism. Thus, there is a continuum: "classes" - "repression" - "state".

Yet, if this study is to approach and study "civil society" and find its centres of activity within the system of ISA (an Althusserian concept), then even Althusser's theory of the state as a RSA is rigid and incompatible with the aim of identifying the ISA. This is where Gramsci's theory of the "ethical/cultural" state must be integrated, since it empowers and

enlivens the private levels of “civil society”. Althusser himself uses Gramsci to “sweeten” his orthodox Marxist position. Finally, by using the Gramscian theoretical heritage of “civil society” and “the cultural state”, Althusser produces the system (and theory) of ISA which, my study contends, represents the very “seeds” of civil society, the “materialization” of civil society in action between the levels of “private” and “public”.

b) The Gramscian “ethical/cultural”⁹ State

In Gramsci’s image, the state is not reduced to its repressive function, in other words, the state cannot be narrowed to the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA). His concept of the state¹⁰ is broader, including some institutions from “civil society”, such as the school, the church, trade unions, the media, etc. Gramsci is looking for the “ethical” or the “cultural” state¹¹, expressed in its positive function of education (as opposed to the negative function of repression). The state that educates must be able:

“to raise the great masses of the population to a particular cultural and moral level [...] The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive and negative function, are the most important state activities in this sense [...]”¹².

9 Antonio Gramsci, “Selections from the Prison Notebooks”, in Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell, ed., (New York: International Publishers, 1992).

10 Gramsci uses different conceptualizations of the State.

11 Simultaneously, Mussolini’s fascism used the same concept of the “ethical” State.

12 Gramsci, *ibid.*, p.258.

Besides the school (as positive education) and courts (as negative or repressive education), Gramsci recognizes that “a multitude of other so-called private initiatives [...] and activities [...] form the apparatus of the political and cultural hegemony of the ruling classes.”¹³, i.e., ISA (for Althusser). Opposing the definition of the state as “*veilleur de nuit*”, “*gendarme*”, “nightwatchman” (the repressive state), Gramsci emphasizes the “ethical state”. The state defined as “political society + civil society” means, again in Gramscian terms, a state as the sum of both “the ethical state” (education/civil society) + “the gendarme state” (repression/political society).

C) Althusser’s theory of ISA

In the light of the previous theories of the state (Althusser and Gramsci), Althusser elaborates the system of ISA, as a hybrid (i.e., placed between “public” and “private”) network within which civil society functions. Also, by melding his previous theory of the state, solely as a RSA, with Gramsci’s “cultural state”, Althusser manages to produce features and principles of interaction between RSA and ISA, thus showing the dynamic between both “civil society” and “political society” and between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses.

Hence, different from the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) - including the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Justice system - the ISA system includes:

13 Idem.

- “-the religious ISA (the system of different churches),
- the educational ISA (the system of different public and private “schools”),
- the family ISA (besides its production/consumption or reproduction of labour-power functions),
- the legal ISA [the “Law” belongs both to the (Repressive) State Apparatus and to the system of the ISA],
- the political ISA (the political system, including the different parties),
- the trade-union ISA,
- the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.),
- the cultural ISA (Literature, the Arts, sports, etc.)”¹⁴.

The basic distinctions between ISA and the Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) are (as presented by Althusser): first, the RSA is singular, while the ISA is plural; second, the RSA belongs to the “public” realm, while most of ISA belong to the “private”, yet have “public status” (the family, the school, cultural enterprises, the Church, political parties, newspapers, etc.); third and maybe the most important, the RSA functions by means of *violence*, while the ISA functions by means of *ideology*¹⁵. Still, there is no “pure” repressive or ideological apparatus. This means that both RSA and ISA function through violence *and* ideology, but, while the RSA works predominantly by repression (and only secondarily by ideology), the relation is obviously reversed for the ISA. For example, the Police (RSA) works through ideological values in order to ensure its cohesion, while the School or Family (ISA) has

14 Althusser, *ibid.*, p.17.

15 Althusser, *ibid.*, p.18.

specific methods of repression, punishment, or censorship.

The ISA depend on a unifying force, which is the dominant ideology. This dominant ideology belongs to that class, coalition of classes, fractions, etc., that holds state power and, hence, is governing through the RSA. At the same time, this dominant class can also play the most influential role in the ISA, because its ruling ideology can be repressively enforced in the ISA, in the last instance.

“No class can hold state power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over the State Ideological Apparatuses.”¹⁶

For the purposes of this study, we can notice that being a means of achieving the dominant ideology, ISA are both final objectives in revolutionary transformations, as well as loci where seeds of change develop. Thus, ISA are the places where the ideological struggle happens both prior and posterior to a major structural transformation of society. On the other hand, how can the dominant ideology be realized in the ISA, as long as these are the very sites of opposite ideologies? The way in which the ruling ideology is enacted in the ISA is by means of combat within the field of ideological struggle; hegemony is an achievement through contradictions. In fact, there is a dualism in the way the dominant ideology functions in the ISA. If the RSA joins the realization of the dominant ideology in the ISA, in order to resolve the contradictions within the ISA and proclaim victorious the dominant ideology, the result will be exactly the opposite: underground, subversive ideologies would flourish (e.g., this can

16 Althusser, *ibid.*, p.20.

happen in dictatorships, whereas in democracy, the system of ISA is the locus of complex, vanguard, and popular ideologies, because the RSA stands apart from any interference with regard to the way in which the ruling class manages or not to realize its ideology in the ISA).

There are also some other feedback relationships between the RSA and the ISA. First, the RSA ensures by repression the political climate within which ISA can function. Second, as a response, the ISA can work in unity (in face of inner ideological contradictions) with the RSA because both types of apparatuses reflect, in different degrees, the dominant ideology.

As Althusser says, in the feudal mode of production the ISA were in a smaller number and they were dominated by the religious ISA. The Church used to gather some ideological functions, cultural and educational, that would later spring out in autonomous ideological apparatuses. Being the strongest ISA, the Church was the target of anticlerical and antireligious struggles from the sixteen until the eighteenth century. (Even the 1789 French Revolution is sometimes seen as a “religious” revolution, because only in a subsequent set of actions did it organize French society on the basis of a civil and lay, republican constitution of the “bourgeoisie”¹⁷, a terrain gained in a Revolution against both King and Church.) In the capitalist mode of production (Althusser continues), once the Church’s multiple ideological functions have disintegrated, education is transferred to the lay basis of the School, which thus becomes the educational (ideological) state apparatus.

Before entering into the realm of “real socialism” in order to see the structure of ISA,

¹⁷ Alexis de Tocqueville calls the French Revolution “the Religious Revolution”, in his Society in France before the Revolution of 1789 (London: John Murray, 1888).

Poulantzas' critique of Althusser's interpretation of the State and ISA must be linked to this analysis, since it offers new perspectives on this subject.

D. Poulantzas' critique of Althusser

Poulantzas¹⁸ makes the following criticisms of Althusser's theory of ISA. First, Poulantzas denies the fact that the state equals repression plus ideology, because this would mean a sort of "body mortification" of the members of society, as they would be totally étatised through "violence to the body" (repression) and "bodily order" (ideology). The state means much more. Besides manipulating bodies (the negative definition of the state, encompassing repression and ideology), the State has a positive side as well, as a *creative* entity. This means that, in order to exist, the State must adopt positive policies for the masses, even though through an effort of will and under popular pressure and struggle. In other words, the State is the mediator between the dominant classes and the dominated ones. These creative, positive policies or measures can regard issues of unemployment absorption, welfare, health care, etc.

A second criticism refers to the idea that the dualist definition of the State (repression plus ideology) actually designates "fascism". Under fascism, society's consent is expressed either in the form of "fascism deluded the masses" (ideology) or in the form of "love for the Master" (repression)¹⁹. Moreover, fascism may have its "positive" sides the moment it also

18 Nicos Poulantzas, "State, Power, Socialism", (London: Verso, 1980), p.29.

19 Idem.

absorbs unemployment for example, hence attracting the masses.

A third criticism refers to the issue of the “economic instance”. As the State is negatively defined through repression and ideology, nothing is said about the economic level, apparently left free and independent to reproduce and self-regulate. In other words, the State’s *raison d’être* is simply to settle the negative rules of the economic “game” (i.e., what is permitted and what is forbidden), while being unable to have creative, positive economic initiatives. Thus, the State has surrendered in front of the dominant economic class, under the economic doctrine of “*laisser-faire, laisser-passer*”. The “economic state apparatus” is split into and between repressive and ideological state apparatuses, concealing the hegemonic class or fraction which is economically dominant.

The last criticism considers Althusser’s theory of ISA to be false due to its rigid endeavour of creating clearly delineated categories. In other words, Poulantzas considers that Althusser has failed to take into consideration the situation that during different stages in its development, a social formation’s apparatuses can shift their locus of power, from ideology to repressiveness, and vice-versa, or gain a double nature (e.g., the army, in military dictatorships).

Poulantzas’ last remarks on the theory of ISA recognize that the strict definition of the State, through its repressive and ideological functions, is acceptable only “at a purely descriptive and indicative level”²⁰, and that, nevertheless, it has the merit of including in the State’s realm some hegemonic apparatuses from “civil society”, i.e., Gramsci’s heritage.

²⁰ Idem.

Though being placed on different Marxist positions, both Althusser and Poulantzas are concerned with ISA and the State's function precisely under *capitalism*. Further on, I will present in a symbiotic transformation my theory on the existence and role of ISA in Romania's "*real socialism*", whose foundations lay on a previous "capitalist" organization; moreover some of the pre-communist ISA continued, although structurally changed, to function under communism as well, a sign that the RSA did not absorb the whole of "civil society" (ISA), and that "public" and "private" still had a relative degree of demarcation.

E. "ISA" in Romania's "real socialism", before 1989

The following approach of ISA under Romania's "real socialism" represents my elaboration on Gramsci, Althusser, and Poulantzas in a manner that Derrida²¹ would call "symmetrical but oppositional". This means that I start from Althusser's theory of ISA (which, I revealed previously, represents a theoretical compromise between Althusser's rigid theory of the state as RSA and Gramsci's theory of the "ethical/cultural state"), the way he located them under "capitalist" conditions. Since Romania's communist establishment lay on a previous "capitalist" foundation (whose "private" remnants - ISA - were still to be found under communism; see the next debate on "the Nation"), the analysis gets localized within the Romanian case, as both "symmetrical" (i.e., following Althusser's typology of ISA) and "oppositional" (finding different features and ends to the system of ISA that I elaborate for the conditions of Romania's communist society). For my case study (on Romanian civil

21 Derrida cited in Schor. N., "The Essentialism Which Is Not One: Coming to Grips with Irigaray", in Schor. N. and Weed. E., (Eds.) "The Essential Difference", (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), p.41.

society) I am not particularly interested whether Althusser or Poulantzas are correct in their overall theoretical appreciations and predictions about “capitalist” society. Instead, I use these authors’ structural display of the institutions and dynamics of capitalism as a means enabling me to see what these processes and institutional frameworks look like and how they were structurally changed by Eastern-European communism.

Hence, I hold that in “real socialist” states, the dialectic between RSA and ISA is only apparently different than in “capitalism”. This means first, that contrary to the “Western” belief²² that the communist regimes managed to abolish the distinction between state and society, state and economy, state and religion, etc., hence, creating totalitarian states into which everything was swallowed, the RSA had *only apparently* absorbed the ISA. I will later show my typology (in an Althusserian spirit) of the ISA that I consider existent under communism, as hybrid categories between the RSA and typical ISA (“typical” refers to “capitalism”, as presented previously by Althusser). Also, this whole study on intellectuals, discourses and counter-discourses in communist Romania shows that the ideological and discursive battle was given within the field of ISA (see the cases on literature and literary criticism and on philosophy) which continued challenging in a transactionist manner the RSA of that regime. Some ISA were more “private” than others that were totally or partially submerged within the RSA. The more ISA were left free for the articulation of the private realm (such as in Hungary, Poland, Eastern Germany, or Czechoslovakia), the more “relaxed” (with respect to the interference of the RSA into the ISA) the typology of communism. This

22 In Sovietologist literature (e.g., M. Fainsod, R. Pipes) or Western Marxist literature on the “real socialism” of the “Soviet Union” (e.g., Althusser, Poulantzas).

was not the case of Romania, Bulgaria, or Albania.²³ Second, in “real socialism”, Marxist theory (such as Althusser’s or even more orthodox Marxist positions of a Marxist-Leninist trend) supposes that the ideological conflicts within ISA have disappeared under the weight of the already unique (not “dominant”) ideology. In other words, this implies that the hegemonic institutions of *pre-communist* civil society (School, Church, mass media, trade-unions, Family, etc.) are now functioning only through a unidirectional, non-conflictual ideological movement, namely that of the unique/dominant communist ideology. Moreover, civil society supposedly (i.e., in theory) is merged into the political society and the bourgeois dichotomy of “private” - “public” disappears, thus making the ISA entirely a matter of the communist, unique “public” realm. Yet, ISA never disappeared under communist conditions, though working within a strongly articulated dominant ideology. This means (and these claims will be proved as we go along) first, that within ISA, ideological conflict never ceased. Second, these types of ISA, being centres of power, were the loci (the “seeds”) of pre and post-revolutionary “civil society”. Third, social stratification was not stopped, thus new forms of “classes” and “fractions” emerged and, together with them, divergent or derivative ideologies, elite struggles for the seizure from above of state power. Fourth, I take Poulantzas’ remark regarding “fascism” as indicative of the way in which the state functioned in “real socialism”: that is, as a tool of “repression-ideology”. Fifth, although classical Marxist theory alleges that under communism there is no “economic instance” - the structural levels (“the economic”, “the political”, “the ideological”) supposedly describe only previous modes

²³ See literature on communism in Easter-Europe, e.g., Vladimir Tismăneanu, R.J. Crampton, K. Verdery, S. Tarrow, M. Burawoy.

of production - this study shows that, on the contrary, as the State was not abolished by the proletariat, as the Marxist-Leninist communist economic doctrine failed, and as the socialist consciousness and the new human being were never created, “communism” in its 19th century sense *did not exist in Eastern-Europe*. The Marxist “topographic metaphor” still applied to the Soviet bloc, and thus “capitalism” and “civil society” were there as well. Sixth, I also hold that “the private” as such never disappeared under communism, although it was abusively restricted by the “public political”. The realm where “the private” could make its voice heard, explicitly or implicitly, with a higher or a lower voice, was precisely the system of ISA. Actually, the distinction between “public” and “private” was transformed into “political public” and an alleged “political private” (i.e., even Family, as an ISA, had to perform socialist educative functions). Under “real socialism”, ISA benefited from plenty of money allocated from the state budget, in order to transmit the ruling/unique ideology from the “political public” into the “political private”. The terrain was thus well sustained, fertile (i.e., well sustained financially) for the development of “cultural” forms of ideological conflicts within the ISA (i.e., resistance, dissidence, complicity, subversive philosophies/ideologies). Seventh, differently from the Western Marxist theory (presented previously) I hold that (and this study will show) there is no such *one* system of ISA within *a* state; on the contrary, there are a multiplicity of different ideological state apparatuses belonging to different ideological strands, coexisting in a cultural-ideological struggle of “imperialisms” (i.e., ISA of a Marxist-Soviet strand and ISA of a “capitalist” strand). Finally, I also hold that Marxist theory (from Marxism-Leninism to Western “socialism”) proves to be rigid for not taking into account local determinations (for the Romanian case, see the next section on the four coordinates of

South-Eastern Europe: religion, ethnicity, the surrounding Empires, and the cleavage between elites and masses) that can structurally change a pre-determined analysis and its categories and ends.

Let us enumerate the ISA under Romanian “real socialism” (following Althusser’s previous typology):

1. the Family ISA, with a strong and active ideological function in the formation of the new socialist consciousness and the new type of the communist human being;
2. the Educational ISA: the system of public schools, Universities, popular Universities²⁴; the factory, with regard to its educational-ideological formative role, etc. The factory’s major role was to crystallize socialist consciousness based on the symbiotic relationship between mental work (study) and physical work (labour);
3. the Trade-union ISA: each factory had a trade-union that benefited from relative independence of state possessions and finances; the trade-union would thus organize the leisure time and holidays of the workers; it also functioned hand in hand with the RCP cell from the factory, putting into effect the political meetings of the RCP, where the party’s policies/ideology would “actively”, “positively”, and “constructively” be debated, and where the workers or the factory as a whole would be praised for their labour results (even though they were faked);
4. the Communication ISA: press, radio and Television;
5. the Cultural ISA: Arts, Literature, sports. Together with the “Communication ISA”, this

24 On popular Universities, see Chapter three, the interview with professor *Mircea Malitza* and Gramsci, *ibid.*, 1992[1971] and Gramsci, “Selections from Cultural Writings”, in David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991[1985]).

was the locus of the most interesting forms of resistance to the regime.²⁵

What is it missing and what is being transformed (compared to Althusser's previous typology of ISA under "capitalism")? First, there was no "legal" ISA, as the "legal" became a totally constitutive part of the RSA. Second, there was no "political" ISA, for the system recognized only one party, the RCP, which was a part of the RSA. Third, the "trade-union" ISA had a different role than in "capitalist" societies (where it represents a real opposition) because in communism it was contiguous to the RCP. In "real socialism", the trade-union ISA can be considered as both a "political" ISA, enforcing the RCP policies and ideology (hence, belonging partly to the RSA), as well as a "cultural" ISA, organizer of the workers' free time. Finally, and here is the sensitive point, the system of ISA were not bound together by the "muscle" of the ruling/unique ideology of the RCP (Marxism), but some of them - and even within them, some structural levels - were pervaded by the RCP "official" Marxist ideology, while others (or other levels of them) were responding to unofficial, subversive, but hegemonic ideologies, such as Nationalism and its contrary discourse, Cosmopolitanism and Westernism.²⁶ The "religious" ISA stood suspended between two ideological positions²⁷: that of the RCP, fighting to destroy any sign of mysticism and idealism and that of the Romanian State and its official tolerance. The latter regarded proletarian democracy as an encompassing "coat", within which all workers - atheists and believers - would contribute to the cause of

25 See Chapter three, on cases.

26 In Chapter three, on cases, such a situation will be revealed by confronting curricula of three manuals: philosophy, history, and literature.

27 See also Chapter two - section one, on the manual of Romanian (Marxist) philosophy.

socialism and communism. In this respect, religion's position was more than curious: it was an ISA, but not recognized as such by the RCP's dominant ideology (Marxism), which actually fought against it. Then what was it? It was an *ISA-residue* of previous modes of production, tolerated by the state only because of deep rooted, national "existential" traditions²⁸.

In the light of the system of ISA presented above, the next section, on the rise of the issue of "the Nation", shows how Ideology became the only "protector" of the Romanian socialist society, whose internal structure developed a path that gradually denied the communist socio-economic and political organization. There, ideology *per se* became an "institution", an autonomous mentally-repressive ISA, enforced by its earthly twin, the RSA of Socialist Romania. Hence, the coming section will show the mechanism that made ideology foundational for "communist" Romania, in its variant of "*national (nationalist) ideology*" and how the regime's emphasis on national ideology made possible an active "subversive" life in the ISA, understood as "civil society".

28 In a generic interpretation, in traditional-agrarian societies if the peasant does not fear the RCP, then the peasant fears God!

Section two: Intellectuals and Nationalism in Romania

A. National Ideology and the Politics of Culture.

For a better understanding of the political and cultural space of Romania and South-Eastern Europe in general, the issue of nationalism²⁹, as the main theme around which political and cultural discourses wrap themselves, must be presented in its interdependence with four key symbols: religion (Orthodoxy), ethnicity, the rise and fall of surrounding Empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian), and the irremediable chasm between elites and masses, typical for a traditional-patrimonial society. As will be shown later, this issue is essential for understanding first, the position of “intellectuals” within the historical cultural-political space (and I am especially interested in their role in the 1989 Revolution and the Romanian pre/post-revolutionary civil society) and second, the struggle between two discourses, nationalism and Marxism. This latter issue reveals the following reality in relationship with the previous theory of ISA: the discourse of Romanian national identity and Romanian national essence became central in the politics and culture of communist Romania - which shifted its mode of control from a (failed) economic based authority to an ideological-symbolic coercive method - undermining the values and categories of the internationalizing discourse of Marxism. Such an atmosphere was propitious to the development of

29 “Nationalism” has a “bad” understanding in the current Romanian discourse. Some authors - Katherine Verdery - use the notion “national ideology” instead. Following Benedict Anderson (“Imagined Communities”), I will not avoid the term “nationalism” which, for the Romanian case, has at least two variants as well (besides “diaspora nationalism”): “popular nationalism” (of the masses) and “official (administrative/bureaucratic) nationalism” (of the elites). The latter can easily be translated into “national ideology” whose content matches the intention of my study. In this same approach I deal with the other term “culture”, in the anthropological sense of “high-culture” of the elites and not “popular culture” of the masses. When necessary, correlations between nationalism/culture of the *elites* and nationalism/culture of the *masses* will be made.

“subversive” (to Marxism) discourses within “ISA”, the moment the Party gave a “green light” to the centrality of the national/nationalist speech, against “the colonizers” Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism. As will be shown, the struggle was fought again at the level of elites, comprised of two segments: the intellectuals and the Party bureaucracy. (Sometimes, these two categories overlapped, since some intellectuals acquired bureaucratic positions.) There is also the issue of the production of knowledge/culture within ISA under the hegemony of the national/nationalist discourse. The issue is not simply expressed in the cultural liberalization following the distance that Romania took from Moscow starting with the ‘60s. Instead, there is another cultural-political space contributing to this reality: the intellectuals’ strife as producers of knowledge within ISA under a highly centralized cultural-political apparatus promoting the discourse of national ideology. Their bitter competition (from ISA) for the authority of defining values within the “RSA” (gathered under the central key-value, the Nation) made them faithful reproducers and developers of the same hegemonic national discourse, adding nationalist (and sometimes chauvinist) shades to the Party’s general discourse of “the Romanian Nation” directed against Moscow. In other words, gaining the authority of defining Romanianness became the main target in the fight of intellectuals among *themselves* (not with the Party). In this sense, Romanian intellectuals were not mere “tools” in the hands of the Party. No. They reproduced the Party’s (national) discourse, thus preserving and multiplying their field as producers of knowledge/culture.

Interesting counter-discourses to Marxism, promoting the Romanian Nation and “essence”, emerged from the struggles of the intellectuals’ factions. Since *nationalism won over Marxism*, the 1989 Romanian Revolution’s aftermath displays the same national-

nationalistic discourse, as the main method for defining Romanian identity between “East” and “West” in a post-cold war era.

Historical arguments about Romanian Nationalism and Romanian cultural elites are relevant in order to consider the relationship between the power spaces of *culture* and *politics* in a communist (totalitarian) regime and the consequences for both cultural-political discourse and for intellectuals.

B. General values of South-Eastern Europe.

In this part I detach myself from the previous theory of ISA, as I add to my elaboration of “communist” ISA (hence, to Althusser’s previous Marxist analysis of “capitalist” ISA) the local historico-geographical characteristics of South-Eastern Europe of which Romania is a part. These local factors overdetermine the dynamics of the ideological processes occurring between ISA and RSA (as they were explained previously). In other words, this part will show the work of “cultural” factors on “Marxism” and their result, “national(ist) communism”. As stated previously, this part shows that there is no absolutely valid analysis and that particularism can be decisive for altering the claims of a metatheory (e.g., Marxism). Hence, there are two analytical levels for the Romanian (communist) case: first, the system of ISA, as a “symmetrical-oppositional” elaboration of Althusser’s ISA, hence ISA under “*real socialism*”; second, the Romanian “national ideology” which pervaded as an alternative, hegemonic ideology the system of ISA, due to the “colour” (or particularism) of some typically Romanian factors conducive to Nationalism.

As specified previously, there are four coordinates determining the peoples’ “political

culture” and the states’ life in South-Eastern Europe³⁰: religion, ethnicity, the rise and decline of surrounding Empires, and the cleavage between elites and masses.

This region faced competing religious faiths. Because of its status as official religion of the Roman Empire (in 323 AD.), Christianity reached the spiritual life of the peoples living in South-Eastern Europe, later being supported there by the Byzantine Empire. The Islamic Ottomans gave Islam the role of major religion within the Ottoman Empire which conquered Constantinople in 1453. Still, the Ottomans were very tolerant of local religions, their religious relaxation making the Empire and its zones of influence a mosaic of faiths. Religion also became “political”, since South-Eastern Europe was under the influence of surrounding Empires: the Habsburg fought to defend Catholicism in the region, the Romanovs protected their Orthodoxy, while the Ottomans, faithful to Islam, responded bloodily to other Empires’ trespassing their territories.

In an interview, Professor *Răzvan Theodorescu*³¹ (an expert in the history of art and South-Eastern civilization), understood to explain the specificity of Romanian society through the (Weberian) dichotomy between Christian-Orthodox and Catholic/ Protestant worlds:

“Since Romania belongs to a space of Orthodox mental structure, *forma mentis*, the Anglo-Saxon pre-modern and modern concepts such as *societas civilis* and democracy pervaded only the elite levels, always through the channel of foreign dynasties, German, from Greece to Bulgaria, and to Romania. This was not the case with the masses who continued

³⁰ See also Trond Gilberg, “Nationalism and Communism in Romania. The Rise and Fall of Ceausescu’s Personal Dictatorship” (Oxford: Westview Press, 1990).

³¹ Interview (Bucharest, July 10, 1996).

to experience a peasant, agrarian, folkloric, collectivist, and traditional form of “democracy” (not in the sense of “civil society”). There is a cleavage between pro-Western elites, completely Westernized through their education [philo-French and philo-German] and the Oriental peasant mass structure. Byzantine Orthodoxy, by subordinating the Church to the State, hence, creating “the State Church”, is mentally incompatible with rational bureaucracies of a Catholic/Protestant nature from the Western world.”

On the other hand, at a more intimate level, religion is very important in this region especially as religion has a cohesive character, creating collective selves and consciousness of such peoples living in both traditional, agrarian societies and under continuous plunder from migratory tribes and wars between neighbouring super-powers. In this hypothesis, religion became a matter of preserving ethnic identity until the advent of 18th and 19th century nationalism. Hence, religion both preceded ethnicity in this region and, by creating inward collective units, helped the maintenance of specific group values; religion was co-terminus with the formation of political units.

Theoretically, ethnicity entails first, a relationship where there is a “genetically” transmitted link; and, second, a “cultural” tie, expressed in sharing the same language and the same myths, values, and dispositions. Hence, ethnicity is both “given” and “learned”, having the same exclusionary power as religion has, while cutting across any other divisive lines, such as: class, education, profession. Again, as religion did, ethnicity protected its members through its “imagined community”, in times of plunder, wars, and foreign administrations and imposed religions.³²

32 In this region, the foreign rulers constantly were: the Turkish-Ottomans - with their Phanariot-Greek administrators - Hungarians, Austrians, Russians, Poles.

The relationship between religious identity and ethnic identity is inescapable since sometimes these two forms of identity can coincide, while at other times they can be at odds. For the matter here, ethnicity and religion were inseparable, nourishing each other. This is why, in the case of South-Eastern Europe, one talks about “ethno-nationalism”, where the ethnic element already includes religion (In Transylvania, Romanians are Orthodox Christians, whereas Hungarians and Germans are Catholic or Protestant. In former Yugoslavia, Serbs are Orthodox or Muslim, Slovenes are Catholic, the majority of Croatians are Catholic, etc.)

Only in the 18th century did “cultural” nationalism (comprising both ethnic and religious identities) became “political”, eager to create political units, like everywhere else in (Western) Europe. With nationalism, a third level of particularism was added to the previous two: religion and ethnicity. Together, these three elements got a “political coat”, creating different subcultures living in political competition and conflict among themselves. The masses were divided between a variety of combinations of ethnicity - religion - political representation (nationalism) preferences. This differential split of the masses along peculiar combinations of the above mentioned triad of values created, on another, vertical scale, specific relationships between the masses and the leaders of their subcultures. In this sense, the legitimacy of authority was not only mediated by (non-rational) ethno-religious preferences, but it also stood at the mercy of nationalist leaders who, in a traditional, Weberian understanding, saw themselves as mythical, divine liberators, thus ultimately as “Sultans”.

There is yet another particularity of South-Eastern Europe. As a region of both ethno-religious minorities and peasants, the contradiction between city and countryside was doubly

acute, since the city was the residence of “corrupt” foreign administrators and merchants whose practices were alien to the peasant; whereas the countryside comprised the dominant ethno-religious groups who were indeed peasants. Under foreign administrations, the ethno-religious competition among subcultures was intensified by socio-economic discrimination. This double conflict precluded the formation of nations, and even after the relationship between citizenship and nationality (i.e., ethno-religious identity, in this case) often demonstrated acute, unappeased tensions.

Finally, there are some cultural features important for defining the political values and dispositions of South-Eastern Europe, expressed in the relationship between the individual and politics. Gilberg’s claim of: “*Widespread Parochialism, Apathy, and Cynicism About Politics*”³³ in South-Eastern Europe matches to my own understanding of Romanian realities. This means that during centuries of predatory foreign administrators, the natives developed both a sense of cynicism about politics and its residence, the city, and a strong survival sense of parochialism, concentrating their lives and loyalty on fellow villagers and village values, occasionally constituting or supporting bands of local brigands in their “challenge” to political authority. These features of political cynicism and survival parochialism entail political apathy among peoples for whom self-government is a matter almost unexperienced.

On the other hand, the elite dispositions and leadership style were autocratic, since those political leaders who brought national independence would always think of ruling over masses of people recognizing their leaders as divinities. Not only did these leaders not try to

33 Under the title “*Political Values and Attitude Formation: The Case of the Detached Individual*”, Gilberg, *ibid.*, p.9.

reach the masses, crossing over socio-economic cleavages, they did not even think of it or want it, since such a step would have meant a weak and unprepared ruler, someone the peasant masses would not equate in their fear and respect with the heavenly God. Hence, another feature is the need for the “strong ruler”, the autocrat, which means that legitimating authority resides on charisma, symbolism, and ideology. The political apathy of the masses calls for the horseback hero who, surrounded by mystical populism, links the peasant to the land and God, in a primitive form of nationalism oriented against both other ethnic-religious minorities and foreign enemies. Professor *Răzvan Theodoreescu* also said that:

“For Romania, “monoleadership” is typical. The first constitutional monarchy of the German King Carol I [1881], who introduced democratic political practices, such as governmental rotations, crashed against the old traditions of a “boyarie” [big and middle landowners], politically reactionary [to forms of democratization], who required only the clear dominance of the unique leader. The “boyarie” needed to politically dramatize and make theatrical the image of the leader. In this understanding, Romania has lived under continuous dictatorship since 1938, not only from 1945: King Carol II’s dictatorship (1938); the fascist dictatorship of the “Iron Guard” (1940); the military dictatorship of the Marshall Ion Antonescu (1941) [ally of Nazi Germany]; the communist dictatorship (1947-1989).”

Another feature regards the work ethic which in “traditional” societies is almost non-existent, thanks to the rule of the “baksheesh”³⁴. The performance scale is otherwise “gerontocratic”, not “meritocratic”.

Following a Weberian approach, since in such traditional-organic structures, elements

34 The “bribe”, brought as a practice by the Ottomans and Phanariots, and institutionalized ever since.

of rational bureaucratic administration were completely absent, the formation of a civil society of the masses and an extensive middle class were hampered (with the big exception of the urban element, its bourgeoisie and intellectuals' salons).

C. Counter elites and ethno-religious nationalism

Counter elites are the representatives of subcultures, their dynamic political force; a counter elite defends and promotes a subculture's interests by initiating a discourse and negotiating with ruling elites. Hence, a counter elite is "the voice" of a subculture, it is a sort of "lawyer" in an established world of foreign ruling elites and dominant "voices" and discourses. This theory of elites and counter elites defines Romanianness as a culture subjected to the position of subculture within neighbouring Empires. Usually, counter elites are a phenomenon of "stratified" and "specialized" social structures. This was not the case with the Romanians. Remaining a traditional agro-pastoral population due to centuries of plundering migrators, Romanians developed a pattern of counter elites leaning on a substitute to stratification and specialization, namely religion. The importance of the Romanian village priest is paramount even today.³⁵ He is responsible for creating secular counter elites in the village, by inspiring daring youngsters with the passion of speaking for their group in front of foreign ruling elites. Thus, under the catalyst of both religious (Romanian Orthodox priests) and such secular counter elites, the voice of ethnic nationalism was set, at times against the Ottomans, at other times against the Austro-Hungarians, and at other times

³⁵ There four important characters in the life of the village: the priest, the doctor, the mayor, and the teacher. Sometimes, a person can fulfil two social functions, rarely three.

against the Poles or the Russians.

Since the political leadership emerged from an ethno-religious process of counter elite formation, it would therefore speak in the name of the group and God³⁶. This first nationalism, ethno-religious nationalism, was doubled by politico-military structures in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia. Being separate until the 19th century, these two principalities started developing an “*integrative nationalism*” oriented first toward independence and then toward the unification of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania within “Greater Romania”³⁷, the Romanian national-state.

The year 1848 produced a lot of confusion and change throughout Europe. The tactics and actions of the great powers in the Balkans gave the Romanian nationalist leaders from the Principalities the opportunity for coalition, uniting Wallachia and Moldavia into a unique political unit (in 1859), though still subjected to the influence of the Ottoman Empire. Once the unification was complete, integrative nationalism strove for the independence that would soon come in 1877, in the Romanian-Russo-Turkish War. The later Kingdom of Romania (1881), as well as the first unification of 1859 were the masterpiece of the large and smaller nobility, to which a level of developing bourgeoisie, including a fraction of intellectuals, was added. Thus, we are talking again about political actions of elites.

Meanwhile, Romanian nationalism in Transylvania (part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire) was growing stronger and would speak through the voices of powerful religious

36 The great Romanian hero-leaders Stephen the Great or Michael the Brave fought against the Turks and Tartars, uniting the population in the name of Romanian ethnicity and Christian God.

37 In Romanian, “*România Mare*”.

counter elites, the Romanian Orthodox priests, such as the Archbishop *Andreiu Şaguna*. In Transylvania, Romanians were politically subject to the Hungarians and Habsburgs; after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian “*Ausgleich*” settlement³⁸, Transylvania became Hungarian. Overall, Romanian nationalism was fruitless until 1918, when Transylvania was reunited with the Kingdom of Romania (after being under the governance of the Habsburg Empire since 1699), a unification sanctioned by the treaty-system of Versailles (1919/1920).

Meanwhile, in “Greater Romania” ethno-religious nationalism got new, secular reinforcement when, in 1859, the Cyrillic alphabet was officially replaced with the Latin one. This was the consequence of pro-Western, pro-European political statements, of a desire for modernization and restating the Romanian identity as Latin, European, and Westernized. Yet, there was the former, conservative, ethno-religious nationalism, invoking an inflamed patriotism and the uniqueness of the Romanian “essence”; it was anti-European, anti-Western, anti-modernizing, making paramount the village’s perennial values. Once the state was built from without (1859), the need to gain a European audience diminished. Hence, after 1859, the emphasis fell on the Dacian element of the Romanian essence (when, until then, the stress was on the Latin origins), as the country started building itself from within. Dacianism meant independence in politics, the certainty of continuity on the territory; the intention of unifying Transylvania with Romania. On the other hand, talking about “Romanian national essence” meant using the nationalist symbol of the pure Romanian ethnic ego. In this sense, “the origins”, “the Nation”, as historical symbols, became foundational both for a nationalistic

38 R.W. Seton-Watson, “A History of the Roumanians. From Roman Times to the Completion of Unity” (Archon Books, 1963 [Cambridge University Press, 1934]).

politics of “closed doors”, and for its counter-discourse allied to Europe. Romanian Romanticism³⁹ stressed Dacianism and the pure, idyllic, and enlightened “barbarian”. However, the two types of nationalism mentioned constantly fought, their ideologies motivating the two major political parties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries⁴⁰: the Conservative Party merging into the Peasant Party⁴¹, conservative and promoter of the policy of “development with closed doors”, and the Liberal Party⁴², pro-European and promoter of the policy, “let Europe come in”. In their political verbiage, the former accused the latter of being “Francophile”, while the latter labelled the former as “Russophile”. Thus, Romanian identity was always defined as a matter of international alliances, sometimes with the West (Europe), other times with the East (Russia). This is why the Romanian people appear to be “two-dimensional”, with two discourses, two types of alliances, and two identities. On the other hand, the ethno-religious-linguistic nationalism of these opposite parties also had another cleavage: the Peasant Party represented the majority of the big landowners class, while the Liberals stood for a developing bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. In the last decades of the 19th century, the leader of the Conservative party, *Titu Maiorescu*, introduced the theory of “form without substance” in order to ruin the pro-Western liberal claims, advancing

39 E.g., the famous poet *Mihail Eminescu*. Relevant to him is that under communism and its national ideology discourse, *Eminescu* was called “the national poet” due to his exclusionary positions (regarding the West) and praise of national values.

40 Which re-emerged in their historical self-confidence after the 1989 revolution.

41 Today, a Christian-Orthodox party; in Romanian, “*Partidul Țărănesc, Creștin Democrat*”.

42 in Romanian, “*Partidul Liberal*”. Since late 1990 (until the autumn of 1996), the Liberal movement was divided in Romania; in the spring of 1997, the liberal movement reunited its major factional components.

the argument (following Voltaire and Herder) that absorbing foreign (Western) patterns is unsuitable for the Romanian essence, a case of form without substance. But who was to define what exactly the “Romanian essence” was? Although in the beginning the debate occupied the minds of historians, folklorists, and philologists, later it coalesced among philosophers, aestheticians, writers, journalists, musicians, and other producers of culture. Overall, “the Nation” became *the only* knowledge discourse occupying both the political and the cultural space.⁴³

Still, nationalism as ideology, “high-culture”, and political consciousness remains a phenomenon of elites in the Romanian case, totally separate from the great masses of peasants who would live in a distinct, traditional universe of village values, in another temporality. The Romanian countryside remained in opposition to both central authority - usually identified with rapacious foreign (ethno-religiously) or native tax collectors - and the city, the place of trade, a practice threatening their traditional agro-pastoral habits of survival. In this political, negative apathy, the peasants saw the rulers (irrespective of their native origins, since sometimes, Romanian officials and landowners, the “boyars”, had worse habits than foreign governments and administrations) as having the *power*, not the *right* to rule.⁴⁴ Under such a perception, no delegated authority was possible and the concept of democracy and democratic structures was totally absent. In this sense, the most dangerous concept (for a democratic establishment) became a deeply rooted value: the creed that the political job could be enacted

43 *Alexandru Zub*, “A scrie și a face istorie (istoriografia română pașoptistă)” (“Writing and Making History (The 1848 Romanian Historiography)”) (Iași: Ed. Junimea, 1981). See also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

44 Gilberg, *ibid.*, p.30.

without the participation of the masses. The chasm between masses and elites developed a relationship of authoritarian values based on the argument of the nation's interests: the elites' "populism". This conservative and rigid form of nationalism excluded democracy, civility, and pluralism. Before World War II, it developed into a paranoid ethno-religious radicalism, prone to fascism. Under these circumstances, it is easy to see that Marxism was not a phenomenon of nationalist Romania.

Up to World War I, Marxist activity was absent in Romania, since Marxist thought was there a matter of a thin urban stratum (in a country preponderantly rural) who would exchange such "new" ideas as Salon small talk. These intellectuals tried to be "Parisianly" civilized, thus engaging in fashionable "Marxist" conversations. But there was no real basis for Marxism, since the countryside and its separate, non-temporal peasant universe had other value concerns and besides distrusted the "corrupt" ideas coming from the city and its "pagan" ethno-religious minorities, such as Jews, Armenians, Greeks, Hungarians, and Germans. Also, the "proletariat" *per se* was a hybrid stratum, since it represented a rural element brought into the city, which would nevertheless retain its peasant characteristics and countryside primary residence. With an intact "peasant" psychology and village natural values, there was no real "proletariat" within Romanian urban conditions, but "peasant-workers". Thus, I must return to that form of radicalism typical of Romania (since there was no room for Marxism there, until the aftermath of World War II) and its ethno-religious nationalism. The first form of Romanian leftist radicalism, between independence from the Ottomans (1877) and World War II, was *Populism*⁴⁵. Populism emphasized "the interests of the people"

45 The Populist movement was founded by the Bessarabian (Moldavian) C. Stere between 1893-95.

in building socio-economic and political policies and tactics. Populism justified both liberal, pro-European integration, and reactionary, anti-modernizing, patriotic ideologies. With the latter being preponderant, Romanian populism was egalitarian, religious, anti-progressive and anti-intellectual, emphasizing village-agrarian values such as “the good, moral life”, and an identity that should not be stained by Western secular values.⁴⁶

By the early 20th century, Romanian *Fascism* had developed, both in the city and the countryside, stressing ethnicity and race, God and land, the romantic idea of “the peasant pure soul”, and “the pure” individual labouring on the soil. Ethnicity, religion, and village values got fundamentalist and mystic foundations. Opposing the corrupt city and its non-egalitarian practices, anti-Semitism especially became Fascism’s weapon to destroy the enemies of “the pure peasant soul”. Romanian Fascism had institutionalized forms⁴⁷, such as: “the League of the Archangel Michael”(“*Liga Arhanghelului Mihail*”), the later the “Iron Guard” (“*Garda de Fier*”).⁴⁸

The RCP took the power with the help of the Soviets, after World War II, in 1947, when King Michael was forced to abdicate.⁴⁹ With the advent of the communist era in Romania, a new form of nationalism developed: *Communist* nationalism. (The way the

46 This “obscurantist” nationalism represents today, in post-communist Romania, the voice of nationalist-chauvinists who, until the 1996 elections, were a strong component of the governmental coalition (e.g., *C.V. Tudor* and his party “Greater Romania”).

47 After the 1989 revolution, an anaemic form of fascism resurrected in the life of the Romanian society; however, until now there is no political will to employ and thus develop the occult force of Romanian fascism.

48 See also Gilberg, *ibid.* and K.Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

49 In the last days of the War already, King Michael included the communist *Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu* as deputy-minister in his government, while he suddenly allied with the victorious Soviets.

discourse of Nationalism combined and fought Marxism represents the general topic of this study and will be presented in the following chapters.)

As a conclusion, this section intended to show how “the Nation”, an issue co-terminus with “the origins” became hegemonic, as ideology and discourse, within a system of ISA particular to a pre-communist Romania, where elements of urban capitalism were laid on the foundation of a peasant-traditional society. By depicting the four overdeterminant factors (religion, ethnicity, the surrounding Empires, and the chasm between elites and the masses), this section showed the following: first, that for the case of Romania any type of ideology has a component which is the mythology of the Nation and Nationalism; second, that the meta-discourse of the Nation was a claim of identity imperatively necessary in the conditions of the rise and decline of offensive surrounding Empires; third, that due to the cleavage between elites and masses, the high-culture discourse of “the Nation” occupied only the minds of elites, of which intellectuals were a part; fourth, due to the same cleavage (elites - people) the system of ISA (the cultural segment of “civil society”) was again a level of elites and intellectuals only, with the lack of an extensive “middle class” (though the traditional-peasant universe had (and has) other types of solidarity and cultural interactions which, however, cannot be translated as “civil society”); fifth, and as a recapitulation of previous ideas, within the level of elites, the intellectuals’ segment developed through the system of ISA the discourse of “the Nation” as a counter-discourse and claim of identity in face of the hegemonic imperialist discourses (and elites) of surrounding Empires. Hence, “the Nation” was the hegemonic meta-discourse of Romania (since 1848) *within* which secondary, quasi-hegemonic discourses would develop (e.g., liberal, peasant-conservative, fascist, and, in the

last instance, communist).

Having this in mind, the heritage of Nationalism (“the Nation”) becomes relevant for the way communist ideology developed in Romania and for the way ISA functioned in “real socialism”, swaying between the (ruling) communist ideology (of various strands, from classical Marxism to Marxism-Leninism and Stalinism) and the meta-ideology and discourse of the undefeated Nationalism.

In this light, the ideological struggle between Marxism and Nationalism (occurring within ISA and carried out by intellectuals) can be understood.

Chapter two: Two discourses: Nationalism vs. Marxism. On Romanian Intellectuals.

This chapter is intended to show the struggle between the Marxist discourse which, in the totalitarian conditions of communist Romania, lost even its status of humanist utopia and the Nationalist discourse, victorious and hegemonic especially under Ceausescu, as the ideological-foundational variant to an obsolete Marxism, within a regime built exclusively on symbolism.

There are some remarks that must be made at the beginning of the first section, concerned with the presentation of the Romanian (Marxist) manual of philosophy. First, in this section I will let the manual speak its lessons without any personal interference. In this way, I hope to make clear “What Romanians learned in schools” and show what the official discourse (Marxism) of the RCP looked like at a very basic educational level (i.e., in school texts). The presentation of this manual has another aim as well, that of showing that simply employing Marxist concepts did not necessarily make for a “Marxist” regime. In this respect the manual will be revealed as a fraud, not because of the ideas advanced - which, as it will be seen, have clear similitudes with Althusser, Poulantzas, and Gramsci - but because of the very fact of *using* these ideas when analysing the Romanian case which was of a totally different nature (i.e., nationalist, not Marxist); moreover, under Ceausescu, Romanian “communism” had features of Fascism. In other words, there was no sense - and here resides the lie in the manual - in using a Marxist analysis to describe a Romanian “real socialism” which actually made a masquerade of Marxist concepts only in order to hide and cosmeticise the real (nationalist) intents of the RCP and the sad, dysfunctional reality of (particularly Ceausescu’s) Romania. Moreover, there was no sense in comparing Romanian “real

socialism” with “capitalist societies” (as the manual does), since “real socialism” and “Marxism” were not the ideology of “communist” Romania which was in fact a Sultanist dictatorship of a nationalist brand. In this respect (and chapter two, on Nationalism will show this), in “communist” Romania the dominant ideology was not the universal consciousness identified by Marx with the revolutionary proletariat (and compared with the bourgeois dominant ideology of capitalist societies), but Nationalism combined with the dictatorship of one person, Ceausescu. This means that Romania never was a “social formation” of the type Marx had thought of. On the contrary, it continued to be class-divided, having a dominant class, the party (RCP) nomenclature, with a large mass of impoverished peasants; its proletariat was of peasant origins and mental structure; its sophisticated ethno-religious identity (especially in Transylvania) was the product of rival imperialisms; and its economy was backward and disturbed by non-coordination and false reports.

It is true, the line approached in the manual sometimes resembles Western Marxism (Althusser, Poulantzas, Gramsci), such as with respect to the theory of the State and the role of the dominant ideology, the class character of the dominant ideology, and the role of cultural institutions within society - what Althusser calls “ISA”, Gramsci calls “civil society”, and the manual calls “elements of the superstructure”, i.e., “school, children and youth organizations, other mass and public organizations, the press, radio and television, other means of mass cultural communication, professional associations and societies, etc.”⁵⁰; etc.

Nevertheless, as I stated previously, the manual falsely uses Marxist concepts “applied” to Romanian realities, since the regime was totalitarian-nationalist. Romanian life

⁵⁰ See the manual of philosophy.

continued its ancestral path within a universe different from Marxism. Here, I actually restate one of my criticisms of Marxist theory, since it fails to take into consideration “particularisms” (i.e., historico-geographical features of localism) which are not simply secondary and temporary traits but enduring foundational meta-realities. For the Romanian case, any Marxist analysis fails in face of some coordinates shaping the “consciousness” which was “national” not “socialist”; as specified previously these features are ethnicity, religion, the surrounding imperialisms (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian), and the chasm between elites and masses. (This last feature can be approached in a Marxist perspective on “dominating” vs. “dominated” ones.) . This proves that, in the end, it is not always the consciousness of the proletariat that wins, but other possible ideologies (Nationalism, for the Romanian case), and that “the economic instance/level” is not always “determinant in-the-last-instance” in face of locally determinant, foundational realities (if these foundational realities are not economically determined).

In my opinion, the reasons why the manual teaches Marxism may be (such a subject will be again referred to at the end of the case on literature and literary criticism from Chapter three): first, no matter how idiosyncratic, Romania was still a part of the Soviet bloc and its “umbrella” Marxist ideology; and second, Marxist State (“public”) ownership over the means of production was propitious for one person (Ceausescu), who could appropriate overnight for himself the whole country, with all living souls in it.

Finally, I want to explain that this manual of philosophy contains solely the RCP’s Marxist discourse of the late ‘80s. This should clarify this manual’s status with regard to the counter-discourse of Nationalism which pervaded both some levels of ISA (see the case on

literature) and some of the state (as the RSA) policies (see the case on ethnic minorities).

Section I. The discourse of the “dominant” ideology: The late 1980s RCP discourse and ideological position with regard to “socialist consciousness”

A. The specificity of “real socialist” consciousness

“It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.”⁵¹

The RCP ideological discourse of the late ‘80s considers socialist consciousness as “a superior historical step in the development of social consciousness”⁵². Stating that some temporal discrepancies can occur within the ideational content of a form of social consciousness (as they can lag behind social transformations, i.e., “social existence”), this discourse finds some elements of the socialist consciousness in the previous (pre-communist), bourgeois society conditions. Such elements are concentrated in the revolutionary ideology of the working class. Still, the RCP discourse continues, it is only in the complex process of socialist revolution and society building that the specific wholeness of the socialist consciousness can be achieved. This is possible, due to a dialectical determination of the

51 K. Marx and Fr. Engels, “*Ideologia germană*”, în Marx - Engels, “*Opere*”, vol. 3, (“*German Ideology*”, in Marx - Engels “*Operas*”) Bucharest: The Political Publishing House, 1957, pp. 26-27, ed., in the manual of philosophy, p. 140.

52 Romanian Manual of Philosophy.

socialist consciousness by the emergence and fortification of the socialist existence.

The socialist consciousness has a lay character - the RCP discourse continues - and it totally excludes the mystico-religious conceptions and feelings, although, the discourse admits, such conceptions and feelings continue to be manifest, in a way or another, in socialist societies, as well. In this respect, the RCP's ideology has the task to continuously fight against the old order of things and its "unscientific" conceptions, elements recognized to persist in the new, socialist order. Through its cognitive-axiological dimensions, the socialist consciousness must absorb all "authentic" national and "universal" values of culture, science and technology, on the basis of the party's (RCP) philosophical conception (ideology) about life and world.

Finally, the RCP discourse reinforces the relationship between the socialist consciousness and the socialist *superstructure*, urging the elements of the superstructure (school, children and youth organizations, other mass and public organizations, the press, radio and television, other means of mass cultural communication, professional associations and societies, etc.)⁵³ to engage in the formative process of socialist consciousness (under the leadership of the party).

B. The forms of *socialist* consciousness

(In the following part, the manual intends to prove that the socialist consciousness of the proletariat has already been achieved in communist Romania as the

⁵³ A *superstructure* that, with a Gramscian flavour, might be called "civil society". Also, see the previous section on ISA.

dominant (Marxist) ideology. In this sense, the manual proceeds to a comparison with capitalist societies where, under the rule of the dominant ideology belonging to the bourgeoisie, “all is lost”. However, the manual falsely alleges the Marxist analysis to describe Romanian realities as “socialist”, when in fact these realities were under the control of their traditional historico-geographical meta-ideology of Nationalism. Moreover, nationalism was intensified once Ceausescu added his tones of dictatorship to it, which makes the analysis of the manual a more grotesque and false story. Once again, it is not the Marxist ideas (sometimes drawn from or similar to Western Marxist concepts) that embarrass the truth of what happened in Romania (hence constituting the falsity), but the fact that the regime hid behind them in its personal interests.)

As the Marxist manual continues, social (and socialist) consciousness contains the following forms: political, juridical, moral, artistic, scientific, religious, and philosophical.

1) Political consciousness. Marxist theory (from the manual) defines the political consciousness as the ensemble of ideas, conceptions, theories, feelings, and attitudes regarding: the political organization of society, classes and social categories; their interests and the way of satisfying them. (Romanian Marxism manuals used to call “capitalist” society: “society divided into classes” or “society with antagonist classes”.) The RCP discourse regarded the social consciousness of those “societies divided into antagonist classes” as having a strong class character because it appreciated “social existence” from the point of view of the dominant classes’ interests and ideals. In such a (capitalist) society, the dominant class imposes its political ideology as a way of justifying both its exercise of the state power,

and its norms and principles of political life.

ii) *Juridical consciousness*. Due to its content, the *juridical* consciousness has a pronounced ideological character and function, and a strong interaction with the *political* consciousness. However - the RCP discourse stresses - the character and function of the juridical consciousness are different in "the society divided into classes" because, depending on the position, interests, and aspirations of the social classes, each of them crystallizes its own juridical consciousness within a Law system that is unique and is instituted by the dominant class, according to its own interest.

iii) *Moral consciousness*. (a) Moral consciousness is defined by the same RCP discourse as the ensemble of conceptions, theories, convictions, feelings, and habits regarding the norms and rules regulating the relationships between individuals, between individuals and different structural groups to which they belong, on the basis of moral values, such as: good/bad, honest/dishonest, sincere/false, etc. In socialist societies - the RCP discourse says - the social control over the way in which moral values and norms are being respected is expected to be fulfilled through conviction and subjective adhesion of the masses. On the contrary, in "societies divided in antagonist classes", morals have no unitary character, as they reflect, on a spiritual plane, the profound contradictions of their economic and social system.

Morals have a historical character, because, while passing from one stage to another, a social formation encounters profound transformations within the moral system promoted by classes and social categories. Good and bad, as fundamental values of moral life, have different understandings in slave, feudal, capitalist modes of production, from what they have in "real socialism". Thus, there is no eternal, immutable, and universal moral-spiritual life,

although, having a certain degree of independence compared to the material conditions of existence, the spiritual world of morals can contain some elements of extensive longevity.

(b) The RCP's conception regarding "the formation of the moral profile of the new human being". In socialist societies, the RCP discourse says, the value content of moral consciousness arises from considering the creation of new human behaviour correspondent to the new type of socialist existence. The moral profile of the new, communist human being must reflect the following principles of socialist moral consciousness (among others): devotion to socialism; socialist patriotism and international solidarity; a very developed attitude toward labour and socialist property; collectivist spirit; responsibility and respect for the human dignity, etc. (These principles were gathered under the normative framework of "The Communist Code of Principles and Norms of Work and Life"⁵⁴, whose aim was to define the values of the new, socialist ethos.)

iv) Artistic consciousness. (a) The RCP discourse says that artistic consciousness expresses specific ways of receiving, living, and aesthetically appreciating existence, by means of categories such as beautiful/ugly, sublime/grotesque, tragic/comic, solemn/casual, etc. Although artistic consciousness is a component of social consciousness, it nevertheless retains a certain degree of relative independence, due to its complex interferences with other forms of social consciousness. The main function of artistic consciousness is to produce expression. The RCP discourse continues by saying that in socialist societies, artistic consciousness and arts must have an ideological character, because they have always expressed in an elaborate

54 In the manual of philosophy.

and refined message the interests and aspirations of classes, groups, and human communities. Making a parallel with "societies divided into classes", the RCP discourse considers that progressive social classes always promote "realism" (as an ideological and aesthetic option) together with "humanism" (as a feature of the message contained in an artistic creation), whereas "backward" classes support anti-realist artistic practices, incorrect aesthetic conceptions based on the thesis of "pure aestheticism", irresponsibility for the artistic message, total liberty of creation, abstractedness and evasiveness.

(b) The role of art in socialism. Due to its profound expressive function that can mold human convictions and attitudes, the RCP discourse sees in arts a fundamental educational role. In this respect, the discourse considers that true, militant art cannot be conceived as "apolitical". In socialist society, artistic consciousness must project "the heroic", "the beautiful", and "the sublime" of the historical action of the masses, in particular its revolutionary pathos. In this respect, the socialist art has a profound realist character, expressing the interests and aspirations of the working people. Also, the RCP discourse allows a degree of liberty of creation, but only as a matter of "antidogmatism"⁵⁵. In other words, the spiritual sphere of arts must be in strong relationship with the creator's responsibility for the work of art and its (socialist) politico-educational message.

Recognizing the profound educational role of art in creating the new (communist) human being, the RCP stresses (in a Marxist tradition) that socialism can combine productive and technical-scientific activities with the artistic dimension of human action. In this respect,

⁵⁵ See section two, "On Dogmatism".

the national, cultural, and mass movement "Song of Romania"⁵⁶ is to bring all working people into the artistic process of creation.

v) *Scientific consciousness*⁵⁷. The RCP claims that science by itself has no class character, being a non-ideological form of social consciousness.⁵⁸ Yet, through its interpretative components (especially with regard to social sciences), science actively interferes with ideology. This means that science's results by themselves or through their interpretations, more or less directly or indirectly touch upon groups' or class's interests. The RCP discourse considers that in "societies divided in classes", the dialectical relationship between science and social practice deviates from its role in the progress and well-being of humankind, to the dangerous zones of military arsenals and new forms of human exploitation.

"The Program for scientific research, technologic development, and introduction of technical progress for the period 1986-1990", approved by the Congress of Science and Education (Nov., 1986), stresses the following relationships between science, progress, and social practice:

"[...]education must be organically integrated with scientific research and productive activity; [...] increasing the role of science in the organization and management of society on the basis of the unique national plan of economic and social development; deepening the contribution

⁵⁶ In Romanian "*Cîntarea României*". This mass movement gathered artistic groups composed of workers from factories and institutions within a "district" (in Romanian, "*județ*", Romania having around 40 such districts). This way, the movement circled around the country for couple of years, under the guidance of the poet *Adrian Păunescu*, promoting socialist culture with a nationalist (instead of Marxist) flavour, as the culture of the masses. On *Adrian Păunescu* see also Chapter three ("Cases", the "'70s").

⁵⁷ See Chapter three, on Cases: the interview with Prof. *Mircea Malitza*.

⁵⁸ As will be seen later, in the interview with Prof. *Malitza*, such an approach to science was achieved only in the '70s.

of science to the formation and active affirmation of socialist consciousness and to the scientific-materialist and humanist-revolutionary education of the masses [...].”⁵⁹

Finally, in socialism, science is based on the trust that the human being has the total capacity of knowing the surrounding world and on the fundamental thesis of historical and dialectical materialist philosophy regarding "cognizance".

vi) Religious consciousness. (a) Religious consciousness is defined by the RCP discourse as a form of social consciousness which, based on the belief in the supernatural, represents a fantastic and deformed reflection of reality. Religious consciousness is completely different from other forms of social consciousness, because it operates with judgements and images about an unreal, supernatural world, replacing knowledge with belief, and liberty of action with obedience to immaterial forces. The materialist conception of history - the RCP discourse continues - offers a scientific explanation of the genesis of religious consciousness: religion, as a social phenomenon, has a determined historical character. Religion represents and promotes the interests of the dominant classes, thus gaining over time an institutional framework. It is the dominant class which, having supported religion in its own interests, encourages the enforcement of an idealist and mystico-religious ideological vision of reality and society, justifying the idea that the social order of exploitation is sacred and untouchable. Thus, religion has deep social origins in the division of society into antagonist classes and in the transformation of beliefs into a spiritual instrument for subordinating the masses with the help of both religious institutions and state apparatuses expressing the interests of dominant

⁵⁹ From the RCP discourse in the manual of philosophy, p.134.

classes. Yet, the RCP discourse recognizes that the process of secularization (started in late medieval Europe) managed to limit the social and spiritual authority of religion and religious institutions. Today - the same discourse continues - in "societies divided into antagonist classes", religion is seen as a phenomenon resulting from deep contradictions. This process led to a theoretical reformulation of theology in the shape of "contemporary fideism"⁶⁰, an orientation trying to put religion on the same footing with science. "Between the materialist-dialectical and historical philosophical conception and religious consciousness there is a radical, fundamental opposition [...] There can be no compromise."⁶¹ In the RCP discourse, socialism is seen as a total break with religion, due to its completely scientific, lay premises of societal reorganization, independent of mystico-religious phenomena. Still, the same RCP discourse recognizes that religious ideas and feelings can survive over some periods of time, even under socialist conditions, due to the following causes: the relative independence of the evolution of social consciousness, compared to the dynamics of social existence - such a dialectic makes some elements of the social consciousness lag behind the evolution of social existence; the existence of the capitalist world and its ideological influence; a low level of culture and of socialist consciousness of some members of (socialist) society; the existence of the representatives of the Church who entertain mystico-spiritual habits closely linked with special moments in the life of the people (birth, marriage, death).⁶²

60 Ibid., p.136.

61 Ibid., p.137.

62 Idem.

(b) Two positions toward religion: (α) the RCP and religion; (β) the Romanian State and religion. (α)The *RCP*'s position toward religion is an annihilating one. It is based on the irreducible opposition between the principles of historical and dialectical materialism and religious ideologies. On the other hand, this intransigence does not imply a political opposition between believers and lay people. At the basis of this idea stands the fundamental prescription that in the socialist society, all members - atheists and believers - are working people who equally contribute to the achievement of the party's program through their activities. At the same time, as an expression of the working people's democracy, the (β) socialist *State* ensures to all its citizens equal rights and freedoms, irrespective of their religious or confessional distinctions. This is why, the Romanian politico-theoretical discourse stresses, the liberty of conscience and of exercising religious cults recognized by law, is inscribed and guaranteed by the Constitution⁶³. The fact that the position of the RCP toward religion is totally different from that of the State is seen (by the same discourse) as an expression of the dialectical relationship between these two components (i.e., the RCP and the State) of the political superstructure, and not as a contradiction. Yet - the discourse continues - in order to solve this relationship, the RCP's task is to continuously fight against idealistic and mystico-religious conceptions, reinforcing faith in the powers of the human being, because "existence" has primacy over "consciousness".

As a conclusion, the previous section, on the RCP's discourse in the Romanian manual of (Marxist) philosophy, was intended to show unprocessed excerpts from the discourse of

63 The former Constitution of Romania, from 1965.

the official ideology, Marxism. Its character as a fraud must be understood in relationship with Chapter one (section two) on Nationalism, where the particularity of Romania (i.e., the factors conducive to nationalism) proved impossible the Marxist theory and practice as foundational for the Romanian reality.

One of the general claims of this thesis is, as stated in the introductory chapter, that civil society is not a matter of novelty for post-communist Romania and that it had its particular type of life within some cultural institutions (i.e., ISA, for Althusser or “civil society”, for Gramsci). In this respect, the counter-discourse, nationalism, centred on the identity issue of “the origins” and “the Nation” within an Eastern-Europe of traditional offensive imperialisms, manages to throw a light on what was going on at the level of Romanian reality, “unofficial” under the Marxist parade discourse of the RCP. In other words, the coming section (on intellectuals and nationalism) becomes a necessary conclusion and implication of the previous section on the manual of philosophy which was not describing something “Romanian”. This coming section will show that Romanian consciousness was national, not socialist (as alleged by the manual); that the meta-ideology of “the Nation” once more claimed its foundational character for the Romanian case (hence, the ruling ideology was not Marxism, as the manual proclaimed); that in a class-divided society (supposedly communist and “one class”, as the manual proclaimed) social stratification continued and the chasm between elites and masses was maintained, with its consequence: an intellectuality following the pre-communist high-culture issue of “the Nation” which, under Ceausescu’s dictatorship and “maverick” position within the Soviet bloc found its best match.

Finally, having in mind: first, my elaboration on Althusser’s ISA under “real socialism”

(Chapter one - section one); second, the issue of the nationalist meta-ideology typical for Romania (Chapter one - section two); and third, the mystifying “voice” of the Marxist manual of philosophy containing the RCP “official” discourse (Chapter two - section one) - proved to be a fraud in relationship to the foundational ideology of Romania, nationalism - we can enter into the realm of ideological struggles (within ISA/civil society) happening at the level of intellectuals and counterposing two ideologies and two correspondent discourses (and discourse languages): Marxism - “official”, false, but “necessary” within the ideological imperialist framework of the Soviet bloc Vs. Nationalism - non-official, though already hegemonic in the ‘80s, produced by and depicting “true” Romanian realities, and “necessary” for building the Romanian polity from within (again in the conditions of the international imperialist context of the Soviet bloc (within which, however, Romania assumed a “maverick” position) and in the specific circumstances of Ceausescu’s personality). The specific dynamics occurring between intellectuals and power, while juggling between Marxism, Nationalism, and Nationalism’s counter-phenomenon (and counter-discourse), Westernism, represents the subject of the following section.

Section II. The Counter-discourse: On the meta-ideology of “the Nation”. Intellectuals, Nationalism, Marxism, and Power.

A. Intellectuals and “the Nation”⁶⁴

As we have already noted, nationalism in Romania was fostered by counter elites: especially the “1848 generation” of men trained in France, intellectuals who, becoming politicians, emerged as spokesmen for the Nation, using the political argument of Romanian identity. This was “the age of Nationalism” (the middle of the 19th century), when cultural nationalism became political. Once unity and independence were accomplished, nationalism turned inward producing “indigenist Dacianism” and a more general effort to identify “the national essence”. This way, in the early 20th century, indigenism started its fight against the previous, late 19th century Westernism.⁶⁵

In the first decades of the 20th century and especially in the 1920s, Romania experienced German economic colonization. Still, the problem of the foreign debt (World War I reparations) brought a different light to “the national essence” issue. How to increase domestic capital, with or without industrialization (reform from above) and foreign capital? Would “the national essence” be preserved under such circumstances? Thus, images of identity around “the Nation” again started influencing politics and economy.

⁶⁴ I owe my approach to the influence of Katherine Verdery’s Foucauldian study in her “National Ideology Under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania” (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

⁶⁵ I will not repeat here the whole history of Romanian nationalism, which was summarized in Chapter one - section two, but I will stress the cultural-political nationalism of the 20th century and its ideological consequences.

On the other hand, with the 1918 territorial changes (the unification of Transylvania to “Greater Romania”) new problems of administrative incorporation and new minorities (Hungarian and Germans mainly) were posited. The minority struggles for national liberation were supported by the Communist International (between 1922 and 1928). With the unification of Transylvania with Romania, the latter was perceived as oppressing its newly acquired ethnic minorities. Overall, this unification and the outside general image of Romania strengthened the anti-communist and anti-Bolshevik feelings of the Romanians.

As a result of a rebellion in 1907, the Romanian Parliament granted the peasants extended male universal suffrage, thus introducing them in the political arena as voters. The Parliament also enacted a land reform that - by promoting a small-holder type economy, advocated as such through political programs - eliminated the large landowners’ Conservative Party, while levelling the way for the Liberals. (Only in the late 1920s would the large landowners’ party, the Peasant (former Conservative) party be resurrected by means of political coalition.) With these reforms, “the peasant” officially became the central symbol for Romanian identity. As other national minorities were highly urbanized (especially Jews and Hungarians), “the peasant” came to represent the ethnic hallmark for Romanianness, a character rurally defined.

Being employed later in the works and speeches of intellectuals, “the Nation” reached an increasingly hegemonic position in the interwar years. Both intellectuals and politicians worked for defining “the Nation”. By then, the elites of intellectuals and politicians already owed their division to the late 19th and early 20th centuries issue of “national essence” which covered in its search for “Western” - “Eastern” definitions not only the space of politics but

also that of philosophy, sociology, psychology, ethnography, art, and literature. The camps supported three ideas: “the Indigenists” defined the Romanian national essence as being devoid of any alien influence (especially Western); “the Westernizers” linked the fate of Romania to that of “Europe”; and “the Orthodoxists”, pro-Orientals, saw the Romanian national essence coming from Byzantium and the Slavs. Cross-cutting this division there was the issue of an “industrial” vs. an “agrarian” state. Indigenists and pro-Orientals allied under an “agrarian state” formula (of stability), whereas Westernizers supported industrialization and European values (hence, change). With indigenists and Orthodoxists (the latter associated with emergent fascist movements) covering most of the political space, “the peasant”, who defined Romanian essence, came to be characterized as “a contemplative, who disdained material concerns and was therefore unsuited to industrial work, and whose soul was formed by adherence to the Orthodox faith.”⁶⁶ Generally, Orthodoxists would also include the great interwar figures in philosophy, usually associated with fascism, *Nae Ionescu*, *Mircea Eliade*, *Constantin Noica*⁶⁷. Other indigenist trends (the philosopher and psychologist *Constantin Rădulescu-Motru*) considered a non-isolationist position for the Romanian culture, hence the idea of an autonomous Romanian cultural community integrated in Europe, but from a Romanian sovereign approach. The Westernizers were either moderate (the literary critic from Moldavia, *Garabet Ibrăileanu*), or populist (the Moldavian-Bessarabian *Constantin Stere*, stressing the priority of Romanian values in a broader context of Western influences

⁶⁶ *Nichifor Crainic*, professor of mysticism at the Bucharest Faculty of Theology, in the magazine “Thought” (“*Gândirea*”) edited by him, in K. Verdery, *ibid.*, p.48.

⁶⁷ *Constantin Noica* represents one of my “cases” of alternative discourses to Marxism. See Chapter three.

as catalysts). The genuine Westernizers were the Liberals who openly fought the Othodoxist slogan “*ex Oriente lux*”⁶⁸ with “*ex Occidente lux*”⁶⁹:

“Under the banner of Orthodoxy and tradition some persons flourish the ideal - static and immobilized in hieratic Byzantine-Muscovite forms - of a primitive [Romanian] culture without development or prospects. *Our* cultural ideal [in contrast] is dynamic, eager for growth, renewal and fructification... We mean to propagate a sense of culture that is European. Our light comes from the West. [...] We have faith that soap, comfort and urbanism, the telegraph and civil law in no way threaten the purity of our race...”⁷⁰

The great literary critic, *Eugen Lovinescu*, a Westernizer and author of the “synchronism” theory (on which I will elaborate below) denied the origins of the Romanian national essence from the Romanian-Byzantine-Slavic-Turkish-Phanariot root. Perceiving the West as a “liberator”, the Westernizers stressed industrialization, urbanism, and “the bourgeois”, seeing no “true” Romanian essence in the peasant who- in their terms - was as heterogeneous as the bourgeoisie, having no purity, due to successive assimilations of foreign components (i.e., migrants). *Lovinescu* announced this in his theory of “synchronism”.⁷¹ There, he stressed the interdependence of European modern societies, whose spiritual, “modular” life made them “uniform”, while reaching European “semi/peripheric” societies that

68 “The light comes from the East, the Orient”.

69 “The light comes from the West, the Occident”.

70 *Eugen Filloți*, “*Gândul nostru*” (“Our Thought”), in “*Cuvântul Liber*” (“The Free Word”), II:1, pp.2-4, in *K.Verdery*, *ibid.*, 1991, p.51.

71 *Eugen Lovinescu*, “*Istoria civilizației Române Moderne*” (“History of Modern Romanian Civilization”) (Bucharest: Ed. Științifică, 1972 [1924-26]).

would thus imitate those from the “core” of the “Enlightenment”.⁷² Such a principle of imitation would pervade all life structures - technical, literary, artistic, socio-political - in a general trend of progress. *Lovinescu’s* pro-Western discourse was still centred on the “Romanian soul”, but in his understanding of this “soul” was developing with its own particularities, under the impact of Western influences. However, *Lovinescu* was seeking for a non-dogmatized Romanian national essence, that is keeping straight the divorce of aestheticism from political-ideological interferences. He thus opposed the parallel Orthodoxist-fascist trend which covered its political indigenism with ethnicity, race, God, land, and the “the peasant pure soul”.

The way communism and Romanian “socialism” (the latter being founded in the 19th century by *C. Dobrogeanu-Gherea*) defined national essence is also a multi-faceted issue. Some socialists were moderate Westernizers; others were overt Westernizers, seeing the capitalist establishment being propitious for reaching socialism; still, others devoted to the “masses”, thought of the “national essence” as a bourgeois tool against the people, hence denied the concept of “*the Nation*” as both a “charismatic utopia” and a bourgeois instrument against “the proletarians” who were *internationally* (not *nationally*) oriented. However, in 1946, *Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu*⁷³, the first communist to have entered a governmental coalition under *King Michael* (in the last days of World War II), thought of ideologically uniting in a successful manner the two discourses, Marxism and “the Nation”. He managed to do so by

⁷² The modern terminology “core - semi/periphery” belongs to my “translation” of *Lovinescu’s* ideas, from a Wallerstein world-systems approach.

⁷³ *Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu*, “The Position of the Romanian Communist Party Toward Intellectuals” (“*Poziția Partidului Comunist Român față de intelectuali*”) (Bucharest: Editura P.C.R., 1946).

theoretically displacing the concept of “the Romanian national essence” from “the peasant” - an idea defining the rural Romanian ethnicity and serving chauvinist and antisemitic interests of the nationalist-reactionary “right” (fascists) - to “the masses”, that is” the proletariat” (though, for the Romanian case, its origins and structure were still peasant-based). In this understanding of “national essence of the masses, the proletariat”, the national issue became *convergent* to the “democratism” of Marxism (as opposed to the use of the national idea by fascists, the “right”) and the two (i.e., the national idea and Marxism) created the concept of the *national-socialist consciousness of the masses, the proletariat*.

The way the national/nationalist discourse defeated the Marxist discourse under communism, and more precisely under Ceausescu, has its origins and can be explained by the relationship between intellectuals and power. (Also, part C., on Intellectuals, Stalinization, liberalization, and neo-social realism, will show the dynamics of the relationship between intellectuals and power, i.e., the transaction pattern developed between the communist regime and intellectuals, along four decades of communism, from 1947 until 1989.)

B. Intellectuals and Power

a) The relationship between the foreign policy of communist Romania and Nationalism

As is already known, since the Romanian socialist economy was dysfunctional, imposing a low standard of living, the means of centralized control shifted from socio-economic principles (implying an efficient economy) to ideology, symbolism, and charisma.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ References on the Romanian communist economy can be found in e.g., K. Verdery, D. Kideckel, T. Gilberg, V. Tismăneanu.

Hence came the need for national/nationalist ideology and the total abandonment of the main Marxist (economic and socio-political) principles. Thus, first, in 1967, Ceausescu settled the “Commission on Ideology”, as an organ of the Central Committee, preparing the rechannelling of the regime towards more patriotic, national(ist) futures. Then in 1971, he announced his “July theses”; this “cultural revolution” was concerned with the increase of ideological activity for the purpose of raising *socialist* consciousness (paradoxically) around *national/nationalist* values. The allies of this national discourse became the intellectuals and, gradually, the national values totally supplanted communist values, especially internationalism. This happened starting in 1964, when Romania “declared its independence” from Moscow, refusing to become together with Bulgaria the “hinterland” (the food producer) of Comecon. That year, Marx’s “Notes on the Romanians” (defending Romania’s sovereignty in face of Russia’s expansionist tendencies) were published in Romania. Then, Romania announced its refusal to obey a superimposed entity, choosing to independently decide over its economic principles. From this step onwards, Romania entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1971); the International Monetary Fund (1972) and World Bank (1972). In 1973, the European Community granted “maverick” Romania trade privileges and in 1975, the US gave Romania the Most-Favoured-Nations Status. *However, independence from without (Moscow) meant creating a national polity from within under the flag of national ideology.* The path toward national ideology was moreover strengthened by the elimination of any alternative reformist/technocratic Party factions which would have brought decentralization⁷⁵. That is,

⁷⁵ Such a thing happened in Hungary, in 1968, with the New Economic Mechanism that oriented the country toward “market socialism”; see also K. Verdery, *op.cit.*, 1991.

immediately after *Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej*'s death, power was taken by Ceausescu who, being attracted in the '70s by the Oriental type of personality cult, started developing close relationships with North Korea and North Vietnam (besides China), closing the early "liberalization" of the '60s into national slogans and a resurrected social realism. Should Ceausescu have remained in control by means of material, efficient economic principles, his variant of socialism would have meant decentralization, reform and technocratic elites, a sort of "socialist enlightened despotism". Yet, in his desire for absolute power and in the particular circumstances of traditionalist Romania, he chose an autocratic centralization, a mode of coercive control based on ideology and symbols (as the economy failed), a "one Party, one discourse" communication, all legitimated by and legitimating national(ist) values. This is why, among all countries from the Soviet bloc, Romania has the particularity of having lived a pure type of Sultanistic neo-patrimonial dictatorship under the autocrat Ceausescu (Albania, though having experienced its specific "communism", lived a similar situation under its tyrant, Enver Hoxa). These were the restrained conditions for the intellectuals' production of knowledge/culture, a production which, nevertheless became the foundation of the regime, making the intellectuals a very precious ally. From their alliance and conflict, both national/nationalist values and alternative, "subversive" ideologies would emerge.

b) Intellectuals and Power

In such an environment, the production of culture (by intellectuals) created a specific relationship between culture and power whose product was an official Romanian *national(ist)* identity, hence not a Marxist identity in the sense of "*class*" identity. On the other hand, the

relationship between intellectuals and Party bureaucracy (composed of workers, peasants, and some intellectuals) was ambivalent. There is also an important feature of communist economies that must be explained in order to better understand the relationship between intellectuals and power. *In a system of centralized, planned market, the author (the intellectual) gains his or her prestige from the bureaucrat's appreciation and not from the public* (although sometimes an author supported previously by the Party bureaucracy can create his/her segments of audience, hence informally and unwillingly joining Western principles of market profitability). Still, the Party support is essential, for any great author can be banished at any time. In this sense, the Party bureaucracy saw the intellectuals as having a fixing function, that of indoctrination, while the intellectuals saw the Party bureaucracy as the stake of their competition (a competition for catching the authority of defining socialist values), since they would get their subsidies from the state budget (as will be seen later, the only way of financing culture and arts until late '70s), an allocation decided upon by this very bureaucracy. As one can notice, three realities were created simultaneously by this relationship between intellectuals and power: first, a "language" of the "official discourse" (Marxism) which became a tool of ideological production⁷⁶, narrowing an entire "permitted" vocabulary, while (allegedly) being "institutionalized" in the minds of the people; second, by the sharp competition among intellectuals for Party bureaucracy recognition and support, the definition of values was constantly centralized in the Party apparatus, which actually "owned" values; third, those discourses that were left aside, being rejected by the officials, became

76 E.g., people were to eliminate the formal address "Sir", "Madam", and use only "comrade". The national-Marxist newly created paradigms are known as "the wooden language", in the sense of a new, strict, formalist, simple, perceived as false, and narrow language expressing the official discourse.

alternative, “subversive” ways (philosophies, ideologies) of thinking, speaking, and defining values in general, and socialist values in particular.

In this sense, I wish to restate the idea (governing this entire study) that the struggle was not occurring between intellectuals (as exponents of “civil society”) and the Party bureaucracy (as “the power”), but among intellectual factions, creating vivid debates within all levels of ISA, thus “injecting” with alternative reflections that level of the cultural-political (Gramscian) superstructure which, after 1989, was to be called officially “civil society”.⁷⁷

C. Intellectuals, Stalinization, liberalization, and neo-social realism

In an interview, Professor *Ion Scurtu* (historian and director of the General Direction of the State Archives⁷⁸) attempted to periodise Romanian foreign policy and its impact over Romanian society. Prof. *Scurtu* offered the following account:

- “1. 1944-47. This was the regime of the Armistice conventions, when Romania was considered an enemy of the United Nations, until the peace treaty of February 10, 1947.
2. 1947-58. This is the period of Soviet occupation, Sovietization, when Romania’s foreign policy followed entirely the directive lines of Moscow. In 1958, Soviet troops retreated from Romania, the only communist country to experience this reality, since from Czechoslovakia they retreated only in 1992, hence after 1989!
3. 1958-64. In 1964, with the April Declaration, Romania was considered, even by international opinion, to have initiated its independence from Moscow, being free to follow

⁷⁷ In this sense, see Chapter three, on the cases of ideological struggles within the fields of literature, literary criticism, and philosophy.

⁷⁸ Interview (Bucharest, July 19, 1996).

an autonomous foreign policy, as well. Especially in 1968, when Czechoslovakia was invaded by Soviet troops, Romania not only refused to participate, but it [Ceausescu] also condemned the Soviet aggression toward “a friendly country”.

4. In 1985 - although other historians situate the date in 1971, with Ceausescu's visit to China and the following Romanian “cultural revolution” - came the narrowing of Romania's foreign policy, due to Gorbachev's arrival in power. Gorbachev entered into a direct dialogue with Western leaders who did not require Ceausescu's position any longer as a “maverick” intermediary between the West and the Sovietized world.

5. 1985-89. This period meant the total restriction of Romanian foreign policy, since Ceausescu saw Gorbachev as an enemy of Marxist and socialist doctrines.

Until 1958, Romanian society was obliged to believe only in Soviet values (*ex Orientes lux*), after that, new relationships with the West were reestablished (they had existed until 1940): books were translated; foreign magazines and newspapers appeared; students were sent to study in the West; centres for Romanian language and civilization were opened abroad [e.g., in Rome and Paris]; foreign professors from France, Germany, and Great Britain were invited to lecture in Romanian Universities. After 1985, the link with the West was closed: Romanian professors were not given a Romanian visa to leave the country; Western professors were not allowed any more; Western literature and press were severely restricted. In 1989, Romanian society was very closed and, in these circumstances, the Revolution came on the foundation of big transformations in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.”

Hence, from 1948 to 1953, Stalinization was in full process, with the destruction of all previous “bourgeois” intellectual sites: the Romanian Academy was abolished in 1948 and the new one had only Party members; university professors suspected of bourgeois origins or cultural preferences were purged (especially at the University of Bucharest - Faculty of Philosophy). Romanian orthography became “Slavic”, with the replacement of “â”, typical for

Latin people, with “î”, to create an impression of Slavic origins.⁷⁹ History was rewritten on materialist principles and with references to the role of the masses; mass-media became a direct tool of Party indoctrination; literature and school manuals left aside all Western, classical (“bourgeois”) authors. Then, the late ‘50s saw a “liberalization” which made dozens of intellectuals join the Party, while forgotten or banished “bourgeois” authors were re-printed, the general trend being to find alternatives to Marxist-Leninist, Stalinist dogmatism. That sort of dogmatism⁸⁰ would mean by those times imposition of foreign (Soviet) values and principles over national ones and the Stalinist “method” of solving social problems. Later, the ‘60s increased liberalization once Romania created a cultural-political distance from Moscow. New masses of intellectuals joined the Party and its bureaucracy. Publishing and membership in the Romanian Writers’ Union and Academy became free from the Party’s interference. Ceausescu’s accession to power in 1965 originally brought a deeper liberalization and, under this wave of “freedom”, intellectuals claimed even more cultural liberty (especially the dissociation of culture and aesthetics from social issues), decentralization and democratization of literary institutions. They attacked the “dogmatic” bureaucrats for joining culture with politics. In the end, these claims were fatal to them from Ceausescu’s point of view, in his need to legitimate his authority - both inside the country and from Moscow - on centralized ideological-symbolic foundations, around the cultural-political key-symbol of “the Nation”. Hence, the early ‘70s (with Ceausescu’s “July theses” of 1971) saw the first restriction to a culture previously freed of politics; the previous 1965

79 E.g., “România” became “Romînia”.

80 See Section “D”: “On Dogmatism”.

liberalization became anathematized; and the list of prohibited authors and books was an evident gesture of subordinating “liberal” intellectuals. Gradually, all major sites of cultural production received deadly blows: the Romanian Writers’ Union was obliged to restrict its activity and the Romanian Academy became strongly politicized⁸¹; sociology disappeared, merging with philosophy departments, while psychology was belittled; history instead became central and thus suffered a dramatic restriction of alternative approaches besides the materialist one focussed on the role of the “masses”; censorship became tighter, while PhD’s were to be pursued only with a prior approval of the Party (from the ‘80s onwards, only Party members could enter doctoral programs). In 1982, an interesting phenomenon, “Transcendental Meditation” became a scandalous affair among intellectuals, for, although Ceausescu had approved its initial activity for improving “concentration” in the productive field, he later feared that this nucleus of intellectuals wanted to throw him out of power; thus, he pushed the movement’s members away, constraining them to lower, non-intellectual professions. Mass-media increasingly became monological, while, after 1981, the Writers’ Union (the locus of previous intellectuals liberalism) was banned from having meetings.

In 1978, the policy of “self-financing” brought desperation to a culture bureaucratically sustained. In Ceausescu’s endeavour to redirect the central budget to paying off the external debt, all cultural organizations became financially autonomous⁸², having to

81 The final destruction of the Romanian Academy came with the arrival of Elena Ceausescu (alleged Ph.D in chemistry) as a member, in 1974, later the head of this institution. However, the general opinion is that she did not know even the carbon dioxide chemical formula, a situation that stirred a lot of political jokes on her account. Elena Ceausescu had only three grades of elementary education, being expelled from the fourth; her transcripts were published in the Romanian post-revolutionary newspapers.

82 E.g., I remember when the Romanian Opera of Bucharest had organized a section where hired worker collectives would fabricate slippers and coffins; the money went to the Opera budget, being divided between

follow “free market” principles, paradoxically spreading values corresponding to the Party’s national axiology, not to the audience’s tastes!

In the RCP’s shrewd effort to combine national ideology with Marxism, the early ‘80s saw the rise of the “*aestheticism of the masses*” against “*elitist (pure) aestheticism*”, hence intellectuals were not only supposed to produce definitions of *national* values, but these values had to be placed within the *masses*. The national values of the masses inspired cultural movements encouraging popular culture over elitist national forms. The folk festival “Song of Romania”⁸³ (“*Cântarea României*”) and the youth circle-forum “The Flame” (“*Flacăra*”) started circulating all over the country, inflaming especially the youth with popular, nationalist, and populist values⁸⁴.

Yet, there were interesting processes happening at the level of bureaucracy-intellectuals who helped, though unwillingly, the site of cultural diversity and protection of “high culture”. First, all previous cultural liberalizations of the ‘50s and ‘60s managed to introduce “enlightened” intellectuals into key institutional/bureaucratic positions of culture, such as editors of magazines, directors of publishing houses, directors of theatres, etc. Second, some intellectuals entered the Party bureaucracy *per se* from where they could shrewdly manipulate directives, permitting a certain space of cultural freedom by allocating necessary funds. In an interview, *Viorel Sălăgean*⁸⁵ (journalist and MP) talked about how two

cultural purposes and the wage of those workers.

83 Though a better translation would be “Praising Romania”.

84 See chapter three, on “Youth and Rock culture”, the “‘70s”. On “The Flame” and “Song of Romania”. See also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

85 Interview (Bucharest, July 10, 1996).

of his books escaped censorship, and how liberalism persisted in some strongly politicized publishing houses under “enlightened” intellectuals-bureaucrats:

VS: “I wrote two books [among others], one about Germany, “Guttenberg on Computer” and one about the US, “The Mississippi Meridian”, where anyone could see that I was simply praising the realities of the capitalist economy. During Ceausescu, the book on the US was published in 265,000 copies and that about Germany had 140,000 copies.”

Q.: “How was it possible for them to appear? What about censorship?”

VS: “They appeared at two publishing houses: “Sport, Tourism” publishing house (*Editura “Sport, Turism”*) and “The Political Publishing House” (*“Editura Politica”*). *Walter Roman*, the father of *Petre Roman* [the first post-revolutionary prime minister, today the President of the Romanian Senat], directed the latter. These publishing houses hit some big “jack-pots”. “Sport, Tourism” could publish all sort of things under that name. On the other hand, *Walter Roman* did a lot for the Romanian intellectuals in a period when Romania had closed its doors to the West. He opened for us the channel of information, especially in the field of political and socio-political literature. During one of our conversations, he told me: “Your book [on Germany] should not appear normally, but I will fight for it and I am asking you to write some things, only from “politeness”, such as that in a country like Germany, one can also find prostitutes” - of course that I wrote about this, since a feature report on the world of prostitutes was exactly one of the book’s attractions - “that unemployment exists as well.” - but when I wrote how much an unemployed earned in a welfare, social state [like Germany], any Romanian could see that there an unemployed had a better life than any of our factory directors. The “Sport, Tourism” publishing house, which usually made tourist leaflets, also published “touristic” books, even if my book was not “touristic” at all, but a “political feature report”. Another journalist and writer, *Carol Roman*, could also publish in the late ‘70s his interviews with the laureates of the Nobel Prize and with famous personalities, such as Agatha Christie, George Gallup, Art Buchwald, Indira Gandhi, Yehudi Menuhin, etc., under the same protectionist policy of such publishing houses.”

In another interview, Professor *Mircea Malitza*⁸⁶ (mathematician and diplomat) mentions again *Walter Roman*, in relation to publishing the series “Contemporary Ideas” (*“Idei contemporane”*) at “The Political Publishing House” that he directed:

“The justification for this series at this particular publishing house was that “the people had to be armed with the scientific socialist philosophy in order to resist to the temptations of Western trends.” [In the books published in this series] the dogmatic-ideologic Orthodoxy was consumed in the Preface or Introduction, but in the rest of the book the people could read for example Heidegger, Marcuse, etc., in an astonishing flux. The Romanian intellectual was connected to the present West. All studies of “the Club of Rome” [of which *Mircea Malitza* is co-founder member], the problems of “contemporary globalism”, the “technico-scientific revolution and its implications” - which actually undermined the Marxist utopia - were published in this collection, under the banner: “if we miss out from the international perspective, nobody will believe that socialism is a credible variant”.”

In also another interview, Professor *Mihai Coman*⁸⁷ (Dean of the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Sciences from Bucharest) revealed that the same “enlightened” intellectuals-bureaucrats:

“made possible, from the ‘80s onwards, the translation of the historians’ group from the “Annales” (Fernand Braudel, Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, etc.) and Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-systems theory.”

86 Interview (Bucharest, July 16, 1996).

87 Interview (Bucharest, July 12, 1996).

Q.: “How was it possible?”

MC: “The regime either did not notice it or the motivation was that these authors had Marxist roots.”

Coming back to the level of bureaucracy, there is yet a third level of interaction between it and intellectuals, as even some members of the Party leadership acquired a taste for “high culture” and its inherent prestige, as “appendices” to their status. Entire networks of remote local publications were able to avoid the eye of central censorship, becoming the locus for publishing “undesirable” works or authors.⁸⁸ In all, there was “a structure in the structure” that led an incredible autonomous life, of course, within a narrow space of intellectual autonomy affordable under the support of some segments of the Party bureaucracy. In an interview, *Lucia Humeniuc*⁸⁹ (external relations fund raising officer of the NGO, “The Romanian Independent Society for Human Rights”- *SIRDO*), recalled that:

“while working at the “Cinematographic Studio - Animafilm”, the hall where the personnel would usually watch the cartoons created would sometimes function with closed, barricaded doors, as Western movies, values of the international cinematography, award winners of great international festivals [Cannes, Oscar], could be seen, after being brought with big sacrifices from abroad. The people were in direct contact with the West, without the West knowing it...”⁹⁰

88 Katherine Verdery, herself an American anthropologist, confesses that even she was able to publish one of her articles in a local magazine, while working at the “*Alexandru Ioan Cuza*” University from Iași. *Ibid.*, 1991.

89 Interview (Bucharest, July 10, 1996).

90 I myself recall that during the early ‘80s I saw at the “Spark House” (“*Casa Scînteii*”) from Bucharest - the centre of the press and publishing houses - in some special rooms, with closed doors, the latest James Bonds and even American “heavy” cinematography, such as Orson Welles’ “*Citizen Kane*” and Graham

Still, from the interaction and “commerce” between intellectuals and bureaucracy, overall, the major effect was that the centralization of symbols in the Party apparatus under national ideology created cultural warrior camps among humanist intellectuals (as opposed to technical intelligentsia), pushed to compete for defining values after the Party’s states. For example, if in the late ‘40s and early ‘50s Philosophy meant Marxism-Leninism, later, in liberalization periods, it became “Western thought”; then, under national ideology and Ceausescu’s nationalist Marxism of the masses, Philosophy became “the wisdom of the anonymous old Romanian wiseman, exponent of the masses”.

The nationalist discourse relied on history as a central source for redefining values under materialist and socialist imperatives. In other words, history was essential because “the Nation” had thus been brought back in the political discourse through the non-temporal panoply of national hero-leaders, at the end of whom stood Ceausescu. Since history became political, its symbols structurally changed two other fields that were supporting both the Party’s discourse and the struggle for definitions among competing intellectuals: literature and literary criticism and philosophy.⁹¹

Supplanting the “working class” with the “socialist nation”, Ceausescu created the junction between the Nation, the State, and the RCP, where the RCP represented the exponent not of the proletariat, but of the (Romanian) Nation. Shifting the representativeness of the Party from the proletariat to the Nation, the national(ist) discourse suddenly became historical (“the Nation” was a historical issue along with “the origins”) and hybrid, getting

Green’s “Travels with My Aunt”.

91 See Chapter three.

along with Marxism. What is essential here is that once the Party needed to ideologically and symbolically legitimate itself with respect to the historical “Nation”, the competition for definitions was put in effect among intellectuals who, at their turn developed the debate to such an extent that they dragged into it Marxism, inverting its meanings and, finally, as a feedback, imposing on the Party their discourse. This discourse was “the Nation” and it had previously “swallowed” Marxism.⁹² This is a restatement of the fact that intellectuals were not mere instruments of the Party and the regime; through their workings they structurally switched the ideological symbolism of the regime, while nurturing the Party with their definitions. That is, in my account, *the Party was in the conceptual hands of the intellectuals* who could easily master the traditional, historical discourse of “the Nation”, “national essence”, and “national identity”. Hence, the ‘70s and the ‘80s saw the politicization of culture with the key symbol of “the Nation”, again dividing intellectuals between “indigenists” and “Westernizers” (the latter being possible due to the “maverick” position of Romania within the Soviet bloc). The debate was extremely evident in the schoolbooks⁹³ for, depending on the persons composing the boards and their orientations, such books would contain or exclude Western classics. The exclusionary trend became toughest in the late ‘70s, though, even before, Plato’s idealism had been banished from the study of Philosophy. That is, gradually, with the imposition of an economic policy of autarky, isolationism entered culture and art, and thus the “indigenist” intellectual faction gained momentum. On the other hand, the ‘80s autarkic discourse of the Nation managed to resurrect those authors who, in the

92 This will be shown in Chapter three, in relation to the cases of literature, literary criticism, and philosophy.

93 See Chapter three, on literature and literary criticism.

interwar debates over national essence, were in the indigenist-fascist camp.⁹⁴ In this understanding, the “reading” of cultural personalities associated with fascism and antisemitism, *Nae Ionescu*, *Mircea Eliade*, *Lucian Blaga* was changed and this is proved by the mere fact that they started being published again in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, when, until then, they had been banished as philo-fascists or anti-communists. On the contrary, *Lovinescu* and his theory of synchronism lost momentum and, together with it, the whole theory of European cultural integration and heritage was belittled. *Thus, the ‘80s definitively saw nationalism winning over Marxism.* On the other hand, ideology won as a foundation of the regime, since the continuous struggle among intellectual factions for defining values multiplied the field of ideology with an increasing speed; moreover, the Marxist socio-economic basis of the “economy of shortage” was inefficient, hence, the regime created and, in this sense, was helped by the intellectuals to produce and reproduce an artificial basis of a “mystical-religious” nature, ideology, and more specifically, national ideology.

In this light, one must seek answers to the character of the post-revolutionary society in Romania and its persistent discourse of “the Nation” still and substantially undermining the Westernizer discourse on “civil society” and “Europe”.⁹⁵

A short comparison⁹⁶ with other Soviet bloc countries shows that in Hungary, the 1956 defeat shifted that country’s policy toward decentralization and reform, diminishing the

94 See Chapter three, on the cases of literature and literary criticism and philosophy.

95 See the Conclusion.

96 See also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991 and her “What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?” (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

symbolism of nationalism. After 1968, Czechoslovakia used centralization and coercion to impose reform, hence not an ideological-symbolist control. East Germany, though highly centralized, rejected the symbolism of nationalism since there, the German Communist Party was defined as antifascist, a guarantor against German nationalism. Poland, again a centralized economy, chose reform through imports, while Bulgaria, though experiencing ideologization in the '80s, was defined by a new wave of Marxist-Leninist ideologization and not a national(ist) one, as Romania was. Meanwhile, Romania was becoming more isolated and centralized, with no possible reform factions under the strong muscle of Ceausescu and with an entire regime which, defying any type of economic principles, relied on the symbolism of the meta-ideology of "the Nation", in the despair and hunger of its population.

D. On Dogmatism

"Dogmatism" is a very important concept in the national(ist)-Marxist discourse of Romania, for, during those years, it was employed to anathematize the minority/oppositional intellectual faction. In this sense, dogmatism would sometimes mean intellectual preference for Marxist-Leninism (Stalinist social realism), while at other times it stood for cultural support of Western, capitalist values. "Dogmatism" was related to other discursive weapons, such as the accusations of "elitism", "fascism", and "proletcultism"⁹⁷. Still, what is important here is that "dogmatism" was a comprehensive concept including all five shades mentioned above; in this sense, everyone could be accused of dogmatism by an opposite dogmatic...

Hence, a "*dogmatic elitist*" would mean either an author whose style defied the

97 See also K.Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

masses, in the name of “pure aestheticism” and high culture; or, on the contrary, an author who (usually emerging from the masses) would employ a genuine “popular” style, addressing the masses with traditional idioms, while praising their millennial wisdom. The former, “*dogmatic elitism*”, the dogmatism of the elites, was perceived as bourgeois, pro-Western (hence cosmopolitan), against the masses, thus non-patriotic. In this position, their adversaries, the “*dogmatics of the masses*”, argued that their (the elitists’) approach to national essence was not appropriate for representing Romanian identity, as they were unable to equate the Romanian *Nation* with the Romanian *masses*, as the current official trend of Marxist nationalism required. “Dogmatism” was closely linked to “proletcultism” or “neo-proletcultism”. A “*proletcultist dogmatic*” was a person whose cultural-political orientations remained faithful to the Stalinizing social realism of the late ’40s and early ’50s. Such an accusation could be made only from more advanced positions of liberalization of the ’60s and ’70s. Generally, “dogmatism” meant faith in *alien* values, be they Soviet or Western. In this understanding, the “(neo)proletcultist dogmatism” was leaning toward Stalinism and the Soviet Union, having a secondary meaning as well: intertwining politics with culture, while banishing cultural autonomy and “pure aestheticism”.

When Ceausescu started basing his regime on ideology and symbolism, needing the discourse of the Nation-masses, and on isolationist policies, “dogmatism” started to be applied for accusing some factions of intellectuals of being supportive of international values over national ones. It did not matter that the factions accused of “dogmatism” were in opposite discourses, some of them being “*Westernizer dogmatics*” of the cultural liberalization periods of the ’50s and ’60s, others being “*(neo)proletcultist dogmatics*” of a

Soviet, Stalinist dedication. In all, in the '80s, Ceausescu became a "masses dogmatic", rejecting any form of elitism and international influence (Western or Soviet). Yet, there is a difference even between "*proletcultism*" and "*neo-proletcultism*", where the former means a dogmatic, "bad" Marxism of a Stalinist trend (of the late '40s and early '50s) and the latter means the vulgarization of art with international (usually Western, especially in the '80s, or Soviet, rarely) political values, under Ceausescu's opposite imperative of socio-economic, cultural and political autarky. Hence, the two could be at odds, serving different intellectual factions in their fight to define national values from their different standpoints (West - East). In this sense, Marxism became a matter of a double reality, on one side the "evil" Stalinist Marxism (of a proletcultist/neo-proletcultist dogmatism) and, on the other side, the "correct" one of a national, Romanian nature. With the latter becoming hegemonic, especially with Ceausescu's support, the national discourse became genuinely nationalistic and its overt post-revolutionary chauvinist tones are explicable in this lineage. It is easy to see that accusations of various types of "dogmatism" would serve those prosecuting (any intellectual faction), in their desire to clear the knowledge production field of their enemies and, hence, win the Party bureaucracy's financial support and prestige.

Another accusation, this time from the "elitists" and "Westernizers" side, labelled the nationalist opponents as "fascists". The late '40s and early '50s, that is Romanian early communism, defined itself as antifascist. In the '70s and '80s, "fascist" meant an intellectual who tried to justify the Romanian national essence in a lineage to pre-war debates between Orthodoxists/indigenists and Westernizers/modernizers. As Orthodoxists had been associated with fascism, which stressed the pure spirit of the peasant soul, those intellectuals who, in the

'70s and '80s, would define national values and identity from an Orthodoxist-fascist perspective (which was acceptable in the Party's eyes, since both Orthodoxism and fascism emphasized national values over international influences), would be accused by Westernizers of being "fascists".

"Elitism", "fascism", "proletcultism", "dogmatism" in general, prove that the field of discursive struggles was extremely active and that intellectuals, at their elite levels, ceaselessly held in action a "cultural civil society" (the system of ISA), while producing knowledge/definitions for the legitimacy of the regime.

This section had the following purposes: first, to show that for more than one hundred years (since 1848) the meta-ideology of "the Nation" was foundational and that all other ideological strands (from Conservative-Peasantist, liberal, monarchist, to fascist and communist) were, willingly or not, integrated within the national issue. Second, the section wanted to illustrate the dynamics of this meta-ideology which, while being hegemonic in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (in the debate between Westernizers, Indigenists, and pro-Orientals), was obliged to become a counter-hegemonic discourse (still foundational) in times when the ideological hegemony belonged either to fascist (Nazi) movements (late 1930s and early 1940s) or to the Sovietization of the late 1940s until late 1950s.⁹⁸ The ideology and discourse of "the Nation" gradually resurrected in the 1960s, once Romania alleged economic and ideological independence from Moscow, and finally regained its hegemonic authority

98 As one can notice, the last two ideologies mentioned ((Nazi) fascism and Sovietization) were a matter of imperialisms, opposing and thus exacerbating the discourse of Nationalism.

from the 1970s until the 1989 Revolution, under Ceausescu's discourse of "national pride". This is why, and as this study is mainly concerned with the struggle between Marxism and Nationalism (within ISA, for justifying the existence of a "cultural" civil society before 1989), the most important moments presented as such in this section refer to the resurrected hegemony of the issue of "the Nation" in the 1970s and 1980s, under Ceausescu (as the rise of the issue of "the Nation", late 19th and early 20th centuries, has constituted the subject of Chapter one - section two, on Nationalism). Third, this section also wanted to show that, in relation to the theory of ISA (from Chapter one - section one), the ideological struggle within this cultural level of "civil society" was extremely active especially due to the continuous existence within it of the meta-ideology of "the Nation", which increased its power toward future hegemony especially under Sovietization (i.e., an imperialism). Fourth, in relation with the manual of philosophy (Chapter two - section one), this section showed how difficult it would have been for a genuine Marxist discourse to become hegemonic in the Romanian conditions; in this context, this section implicitly underlined the fraudulent character of the manual in relationship to the Romanian realities which were totally subdued to the national(ist) meta-ideology. As stated previously, Marxism, though "official", has never been genuinely hegemonic in Romania, not even under the strong muscle of Sovietization, let alone under the "Marxist" Ceausescu. Such a situation is entirely dependent on the particularism of Romania, and hence is indicative of a flaw in Marxism (of all trend): namely Marxist theory's simplistic and neglectful treatment of foundational local determinants. However, Western Marxist theory (from Chapter one - section one) on ISA and "civil society" is consistent with this (last) section's intent of illustrating the dialogue and struggle of ideologies

and discourses within the intellectuals' sphere, the cultural segment of "civil society" in Romania. However (as I also stated my criticism on ISA), the cultural-ideological network of competing ideologies transcended national borders, once offensive imperialisms and their ideologies (from Nazi fascism, to Sovietization, and later to "capitalist" culture) were to be found within the system of ISA of the late Romanian state. In other words, without the ideological challenge from without (various imperialisms), the meta-ideology of "the Nation" (i.e., identity from within) would have never survived and become so strong during more than one hundred years of Romanian (ethno-religious) identity claims.

As in 1848, 1900, interwar period, etc., the whole ideological debate along four decades of (various trends of) communism in Romania was fought by intellectuals, as representatives of civil society.

*Chapter three: Cases*⁹⁹

A. Literature and literary criticism. "Protochronism"¹⁰⁰

I will discuss here the discursive struggle in the field of literature and literary criticism that shaped the production of culture, the lives of intellectuals, the centralization of values in the apparatus, and the subtle dissidence within Romanian "civil society". I focus on the '70s and '80s, as these were the most significant years of a clear form of Ceausescu's national(ist) politics and of the intellectuals' dissidence (and expression of "civil society") that would reappear in the same format after 1989.

In 1974, the literary critic *Edgar Papu* published in the series "Twentieth Century" (*"Secolul XX"*) an article on "Romanian Protochronism"¹⁰¹ stressing two ideas: first, that the cultural heritage of the Romanians was "indigenist", hence without Oriental/Western influence; and second, that Western cultural values had often been created under the priority (not influence) of Romanian original values and authors (e.g., the "surrealism" of the absurd theatre of *Eugen Ionesco*, or the "dadaism" of the poet and painter *Tristan Tzara*), hence, the latter alleging for themselves priority in time (*qui prior tempore potior jure*¹⁰²), "protochronism". This temporal priority had a very important political message since it was

99 Though constituting separate sections, I preferred to label the cases "A", "B", etc., since each of them represents a distinct case study in its own.

100 The following account on "protochronism" is extensively drawn from my own experience in Romania, as reader of many of the articles constituting this debate and as witness to some of its cultural forms, from Television programs and Radio broadcasts to the shows of "Song of Romania" and "The Flame".

101 See also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991. "Protochronism" comes from the Greek "protos", (the) first and "chronos", time.

102 The Roman juridical adage, "the first in time, the strongest in right" supporting such a conception. (Under the French cultural influence, Romania is country of the "civil law".)

not oriented toward a Western *audience*, but intended *to improve Romanians' own image of themselves*, in the sense that their prophetic role would raise their self-esteem, from peripheral to core cultural positions. Evidently, a political by-product of “protochronism” was an increased cultural distance from Moscow. Being a perfect match to Ceausescu’s 1971 “cultural revolution” and resurrection of a local social realism within national and autarkic policies, the thesis of “protochronism” synthesized interwar and early post-War debates on “traditionalism”/“indigenism”/“Orthodoxism” vs. “modernizers”/“Westernizers”, laying its blueprint for the coming struggles among intellectual factions leading up to the 1989 Revolutions and post-revolutionary politics. Nationalist intellectuals embraced the thesis in cultural weeklies, such as “*Luceafărul*” (“The Morning Star”), “*Flacăra*” (“The Flame”), “*Săptămâna*” (“The Week”). “The Flame” was led by the poet *Adrian Păunescu*, a charismatic figure who would also run the nation-wide festival “Song of Romania” and the youth circle-forum “The Flame”, inflaming its audience with national(ist) values. “The Week” was led by *Eugen Barbu* and his friend *Corneliu Vadim Tudor*, chauvinists and anti-Semites; today, *C.V.Tudor* leads the extremist nationalist-chauvinist party “Greater Romania”, a name taken from the newspaper continuing the “The Week” after the Revolution. The Westernizers who, in this account became “anti-protochronists”, drew attention to the consequences of such an inflammatory discourse: one such was the literary critic *Nicolae Manolescu*, today the leader of the Civic Alliance Party, a constituent of the pro-Western governmental coalition emerging from the 1996 general elections.

The essence of “protochronism” was hatred toward Western values especially which, it was argued, in their conceited superiority, had created a psychological complex for the

“Romanian Nation” regarding its self-image. In short, Romanians conceived themselves as being culturally inferior and split between East and West. Dismissing *Lovinescu’s* theory of “synchronism”, protochronists generally preferred the lineage from “indigenists” and “Orthodoxists”, even if the latter were associated with interwar fascism.¹⁰³ If for humanist intellectuals the debate was concentrated against Western values, for Ceausescu, protochronism served as a political tool: as an anti-Soviet, anti-colonial discourse. The match became perfect in the ‘80s and it meant declaring first, cultural “war” on the West and, second, economic sovereignty from the Soviet Union, that is *cultural* protochronism (intellectuals) came hand in hand with *economic* autarkic policies (the Party and Ceausescu). As will be seen when studying the debates on “Philosophy” (next section), the protochronist - anti-protochronist struggles engaged deeper and subtler approaches, posing issues such as national (particular) - global (universal) in relationship with the production and integration of Romanian cultural products (particular) within the international circulation of values (universal), as a consequence of various definitions of “Romanian essence/soul”. Protochronists supported the pristine character of Romanian values, while anti-protochronists saw the Romanian axiology being created under the “Enlightenment” of Western civilization.

On the other hand, many intellectuals and artists were drawn into protochronism by an opportunistic reaction. This was determined by a complex of circumstances. The previous liberalization had accustomed the audience to Western values (Hollywood productions, European classical TV serials, etc.). Then, the late ‘70s self-financing of cultural institutions threw the artists and intellectuals onto the market which required nurturing the public

103 See the next section on “Philosophy” and the philosopher *Constantin Noica*.

according to their already Westernized tastes, yet under the national(ist) “hammer” of the Party line.¹⁰⁴ Under such strained conditions, Romanian artists and some intellectuals demanded protection under the banner of protochronism.

Protochronism, a constituent of national ideology, was linked to the Party; to markets (“who should publish and what”); to interwar “indigenism” (of an “Orthodox-fascist” strand); to Ceausescu’s isolationist foreign policy and defiance of Moscow and the West; and, last but not least, to its own counter-phenomenon, “anti-protochronism”, understood as intellectual dissidence and resistance to the regime, especially in the late ‘70s and the ‘80s, a decade defined by official hegemonic extremist protochronist positions.

The camps were¹⁰⁵: “protochronists” *Eugen Barbu*, chief editor of the weekly “The Week”; *Nicolae Dragoș*, poet and chief-editor of the Party’s newspaper “The Spark” (“*Scînteia*”); *Ion Lăncrănjan*, writer; *Corneliu Vadim Tudor*; *Paul Anghel*, poet and mathematician; *Adrian Păunescu*, the “court poet” and chief-editor of “the Flame”(although his attitude toward protochronism was sometimes ambivalent); *Ioan Alexandru*, *Ilie Purcaru*, *Mihai Ungheanu*, etc. Another protochronist publication for literary debates was “The Morning Star”. The “anti-protochronist” camp included cultural personalities such as *Nicolae Manolescu*, *Ovid Chrohmălniceanu*, *Alexandru Paleologu* (a former adherent to the “Transcendental Meditation”), the philosopher *Andrei Pleșu*, *Eugen Simion*, etc. Anti-protochronist publications were “Literary Romania” (“*România Literară*”), “Twentieth

104 One can imagine the shrewd games these institutions had to play, since the Party bureaucracy required values that were national and protochronist, while the audience stood at the opposite axiological pole.

105 See also K.Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991, en.3 and 6, pp.342-43.

Century” (“*Secolul XX*”), “Romanian Life” (“*Viața Românească*”). Yet, some intellectuals had ambivalent positions, such as the great mathematician *Solomon Marcus*.

There are two issues linked to this debate¹⁰⁶: the match between cultural positions and “right” and “left” in politics, and outside support to both camps. The first issue is very ambiguous since “protochronists”, as nationalists and sometimes chauvinists, (of an “Orthodoxist-fascist” vein) usually would call themselves “the right”. Yet, defending “the Nation” as the *masses* within a hybrid Marxist discourse, they also claimed “leftist” positions: that is, they were “Marxists”, although (paradoxically) promoting “rightist” nationalist (chauvinist) attitudes against the “Westernizers”, “elitists”, “modernizers”. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to use the “right” - “left” terminology, once hybrid values constitute one or the other camp (not “wing”). Second, anti-protochronists, as supporters of “Europe”, were usually helped by the discourse of a certain part of the Romanian Diaspora in the foreign broadcast of “Radio Free Europe” (“*Radio Europa Liberă*”), transmitting from Munich, where a strong cultural collective composed, among others, of *Monica Lovinescu* (the daughter of *Eugen Lovinescu*, settled in Paris) and the historian *Vlad Georgescu*, would bring the Romanians an anti-protochronist imagery on Romanian realities¹⁰⁷ and “The Voice of America” (“*Vocea Americii*”). For their part, protochronists were supported by the emigré *Iosif Constantin Drăgan* who had settled in Italy¹⁰⁸ and would occasionally publish books and

106 See also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

107 As far as I know, the majority of Romanian intellectuals, in both camps, would secretly listen to this radio station, usually around 6:00 A.M., every day.

108 He had been a former legionary in the “Iron Guard” and had supposedly come in the possession of their treasury, once the legionaries were purged in 1941. However, in Italy he became the student of the philosopher Giorgio del Vecchio and there are references that he discovered “butane” gas. Today he

articles supporting protochronists in their debates over “the national question”, while mobilizing a wider network of Romanian ex-legionaries¹⁰⁹ escaped abroad, in the Romanian Diaspora.

The dialectic between the two camps was very interesting and it defines the struggle of dissidence to the regime. Hence, under the official national ideology of Ceausescu, protochronists could afford being on the offense, setting the rules and values of the game. On the other hand, though on the defence, anti-protochronists would start dominating the institutions of subversive discourse (especially the Romanian Writers’ Union) the more the official protochronist pressure would increase.¹¹⁰ *Viorel Sălăgean* recalled his experience at the Romanian Writers’ Union, where he lived “moments of an absolute liberalism”:

“During the Party meetings at the daily journals “*Scînteia*” (“The Spark”, the party’s newspaper), “*România Liberă*” (“Free Romania”), and at the “Romanian Writers’ Union”, I heard totally “unorthodox” commentaries on the Party documents and measures. I was also present at that Party meeting when *Mircea Dinescu*¹¹¹ gave his opinion on the grave violations of democracy by Ceausescu’s regime. He said exactly like this, that “Ceausescu defies culture, defies the Romanian village [it was the epoch of village exterminations], defies tradition” and he was talking with an air of justice, as if addressing to Ceausescu “how do people around you, comrade Ceausescu, allow themselves to pull down churches, destroy villages, attack

financially supports the nationalist segments in the Romanian political life.

109 On the Iron Guard, see e.g., Ghiță Ionescu, V. Frunză, S. Brucan, R.J.Crampton, T.Gilberg.

110 For a theoretical approach to the dialectic between “dominant ideology” and “subversive/counter ideologies” see the section on Althusser’s “ISA”, in Chapter one.

111 The dissident poet who was the first to announce the rebellion against Ceausescu, on the afternoon of December 22, 1989, on Romanian Television.

intellectuals?”.”

Thus, the bigger the oppressive force, the stronger the position of intellectual dissidence within cultural institutions, although they were continuously vulnerable to attacks from a politicized, protochronist culture supported by a regime solely legitimated on ideology and symbols.

For the purposes of this study linking ISA with nationalism and Marxism, there is a major consequence with regard to the question “What do children learn at school?” School manuals contained definitions of values depending on the proto/anti-protochronist orientations of their authors, following social realism vs. liberalization periods and debates. With respect to the manual of philosophy (presented in Chapter two - section one), the following can be said (in relationship with another manual, of literature, which had a “liberal” curriculum - see below). First, because the manual of philosophy presented a genuine Marxist discourse, it means that either the board of professors deciding on it were from the classical Marxist, anti-protochronist (anti-nationalist) side (and were probably helped by an anti-protochronist camp of the party bureaucracy who would financially decide on the enforcement, i.e., publishing, of this manual), or that the whole structure of the manual was well known to the RCP and its leaders and that they only demagogically approved it in order to maintain the appearances of a Marxist regime that was politically correct (in terms of Marxism) and to hide the nationalist trend which pervaded society by means of propaganda and some levels of ISA (e.g., a part of the press, cultural ISA such as “The Flame”, “ Song of Romania”). Second, the manual of philosophy, though Marxist, (i.e., anti-protochronist)

was not true in relationship with the actual existing regime which, as explained previously, lived under the hegemony of the nationalist discourse, in spite of some intellectuals' (anti-protchronists) endeavour to theoretically rechannel the regime (toward "real" Marxism) or to cosmeticise it. (Other manuals were pervaded by other ideological positions, such as the manual of history which was hibridly protchronist (nationalist), but also written in a Marxist vein, stressing the Dacianist "pure origins" and the historical role of the masses and the proletariat; the manual of literature instead was "liberal" (in the late 1980s), including Western authors and civilization as well, probably because literature and literary criticism remained the hallmark of intellectual (and bureaucratic) opposition to the regime, the "anti-protchronists" - see below). Finally, from this ideological variety pervading curricula and manuals results: the eclectic and equivocal character of the "socialist" education in Romania; the ideological confusion of a masquerade regime; the obsolete and unrealistic character of Marxist ideology, since some manuals could afford other types of discourses, from genuinely "protchronist" (nationalist), e.g., history, to "liberal" (Westernizer), e.g., literature; and the strong character of ideological struggles within ISA which reverberated first and foremost in the education ISA and its question "What do children learn at school?" Though history and philosophy had been rewritten in a materialist/ nationalist vein, projecting a forceful discourse of Dacianism and reinterpreting World War II in favour of "victorious", "anti-fascist", and "anti-imperialist" Romania, in the '80s, college manuals of literature afforded (especially under the guidance of anti-protchronist university professor and literary critic *Nicolae Manolescu*, a member in the boards approving the college curriculum of literature) a position favourable to "liberal" Romanian authors, making parallels and junctions with Western and world wide culture and

civilizations. For example, there were connections made, among others, from the Vedic and Greek cosmogony to the Greek and Roman classical Antiquity and to Chinese “Dao De Jing” or the Persian “Zend - Avesta”; from Beowulf, the Nibelungen, the “El Cid” to “knight novels”, minstrels and Dante Alighieri; from Renaissance’s Leonardo da Vinci, Fr. Petrarca, N. Machiavelli, Th. Morus, M. Cervantes to Classicism’s Newton, Leibnitz, Bach, Mozart, Boileau, Corneille, Racine, J.Milton, J.de la Bruyère; from Enlightenment’s Descartes, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Diderot, Lessing to Pre-Romanticism’s Goethe, Schiller, J.J. Rousseau, Chateaubriand, M-me de Staël; from Romanticism’s Fourier, Darwin, Pasteur, Delacroix Heine, Shelley, de Lamartine, de Musset, Ed.A. Poe to Symbolism’s Monet, Degas, Renoir, Baudelaire, Verlaine, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Yeats; from Realism’s Einstein, Curie, Corot, Utrillo, Stendhal, Balzac, Flaubert, Dostoievski, Tolstoy, Dickens, Thackeray, Brontë sisters, Eliot, Ibsen, Twain to Neorealism’s Hemingway, Steinbeck, to the “Beat generation” and the Existentialism of Kafka, Camus, Sartre, S.de Beauvoir.¹¹²

Also, Popular Universities existed beside the network of state schools, colleges and Universities. In every city, town, or major village, there were “Culture Houses” (“*Casa de Cultură*”), financed from the state budget in order to improve the cultural horizon of the working people. These “Culture Houses” had one hall for shows and entertainment and another one for conferences. In the latter, some courses were organized, as I said, in order to extend “the culture of the masses”, under the name of “Popular Universities”, financed from the same source, the state budget. There, people irrespective of their age could study

¹¹² From “*Manual of Romanian Language and Literature*” (“*Manual de Limba și Literatură Română*”), eleventh grade, Bucharest: Ed. Didactica și Pedagogica, 1983.(Romanian colleges end with the twelfth grade.)

foreign languages¹¹³ and civilizations, could acquire new skills, could gather to listen to conferences on various topics. *Mircea Malitza* talks about them in his interview:

“Besides the Marxist program of popularization of the ideas of scientific socialism [e.g., “Song of Romania”], under the title of “Popular Universities”, university professors, writers, and artists, etc. talked about their experiences, their contacts with the West, and what was going on in the world. The audience was extremely interested. Under this title of Popular Universities, lecturers from cities could permanently spread all over the country new ideas, under a climate of liberty greater than that from the halls of state Universities. The public was enthusiastic to find out what was going on abroad. With only two, three phrases in the beginning and in the end of the discourse, praising the authority of the regime, the content was left free.”

Finally, another issue regarded the use of science, particularly computers¹¹⁴. *Mircea Malitza* again explains how the regime was “convinced” to introduce cybernetics in the University curricula and as profession, since in the beginning the regime looked upon the computer as a “capitalist gadget”, “enemy of the human brain”¹¹⁵:

“A number of persons [to whom *Malitza* belongs], conscious of the international environment, wished to determine in Romania an adequate movement, but without giving the impression of wanting to disestablish the “socialist order”. Initially, Marxist theory and the Soviet encyclopaedia rejected cybernetics, as a “bourgeois-imperialist” movement. Still, when

113 When I was fourteen, I started studying “Esperanto” at such a “Popular University” from Bucharest.

114 In Latin languages the equivalent for “computer science” is “cybernetics”.

115 See also Chapter two - section one, on the manual of philosophy, the section on “scientific consciousness”.

a particular thesis of British Marxism was accepted by the philosophers from the socialist camp, the situation changed. This thesis supported that “science” should not be classified among phenomena of “superstructure”, but together with the means of production [“infrastructure”]. If science belongs to the former, it enters the family of ideology whose values it must support. In this sense, science can be socialist because it can also be capitalist. But if science becomes like the railways, mills, concrete or cement factories, equipments [infrastructure], devoid of ideological colour, a matter of world wide production, application, and assimilation, then science becomes autonomous, being freed from the control of philosophers and ideologues. This shift happened in Romania after the ‘60s, but the regime did not realize the danger for socialism, since all scientific polytechnics, institutes, and academies were to get out from the regime’s ideological implication. The technical intelligentsia started belonging to a new, solidary stratum surrounding the whole world, that of the people of the same profession, detached from ideology and social sciences. [...] Under the name of “instrument for long term planning”, we managed to introduce the computer in Romania, even if it represents a means for searching for alternative types of knowledge and futures.”

This part, on literature and literary criticism, is co-terminus especially with Chapter two - section two, on intellectuals, Marxism, nationalism, and power, which explains the rise of the struggle between intellectual factions for power. Hence, this part illustrated the actual camps and the ideological fights and dissidence to the regime (within cultural, communication, and education ISA) which, for the Romanian case, were strongest at the level of humanist intellectuals, especially writers and journalists. This part also tried to throw a new light on the manual of philosophy, integrating it within the ideological dichotomies (reflected especially in various manuals) of communist Romania.

The next part, on Philosophy, will deepen the level of analysis into the subtle argument

of a rising philosophical alternative to the “official” Marxism, a new metaphysics (Noica).

B. Philosophy. The “Noica” group¹¹⁶

Constantin Noica (1909-1987) was more than a philosopher. He became associated with the creation of an intellectual group which, in the ‘80s, managed to disperse among intellectuals a dissident discourse, dethroning (from another angle, besides “typical nationalism) Marxist materialist philosophy and introducing (a degree of) freedom in the philosophical field, understood as “metaphysics” and not as the Party’s political discourse.

Noica was born in Teleorman district (South-East of Romania). He obtained his Philosophy degree in 1931, at the Faculty of Letters and Philosophy of Bucharest, after which he pursued advanced studies in France and Germany, getting his doctorate in 1940, at University of Bucharest, with the thesis “Sketch for the history of how something new is possible” (“*Schiță pentru istoria lui cum e cu puțință ceva nou*”). During World War II he worked in Berlin, as research fellow in philosophy at the Romanian-German Institute (he, as other great figures in Romanian philosophy, *Nae Ionescu*, *Micea Eliade*, *Emil Cioran*, was associated with the fascist movement from Romania, especially due to a philo-Germanic cultural formation; he was also a member of the “League of the Archangel Michael”). From 1949 until 1964 the regime forced him into restricted residence¹¹⁷, then he was incarcerated for “political reasons”. In 1965 he was released and, until 1975, he was a researcher at the Centre for Logic of the Romanian Academy. In 1988, he received (post-mortem) the Herder

116 The following account represents my own experience as reader of the books and of some of the articles constituting the debate and as a witness in Romania of various discussions happening among many of these intellectuals (especially during post-revolutionary TV programs). On *Noica*, see also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

117 This means that he was obliged to live in a designated apartment, with minimal living standard, under strict surveillance, and with few human contacts.

Prize, becoming, from 1990, a post-mortem member of the Romanian Academy. He published a lot, among which “Mathesis or simple joys” (“*Mathesis sau bucuriile simple*”) (1934), “The Romanian Philosophical Utterance” (“*Rostirea filozofică românească*”) (1970), “Becoming toward Being” (“*Devenirea întru ființă*”) (1981), “De Dignitate Europae” (1988) are notable. He also translated from Plato, Kant, Descartes, Hegel. His last years were spent at *Păltiniș*, a village on a mountain, where he lived the ascetic life of a hermit. There, he had a circle of followers, “liberating philosophy” while walking those valleys, like Aristotle’s peripatheticians. Some people were closer to him: *Gabriel Liiceanu*, philosopher and university professor, *Noica*’s most important follower; *Andrei Pleșu*, philosopher¹¹⁸; *Sorin Vieru*. Others, in close relationship to the small group of disciples, were *Alexandru Paleologu*, *Vasile Dem Zamfirescu*, *Victor Stoichița*. People connected to the groups were *Ștefan Augustin Doinaș*, *Andrei Pippidi* and anti-protochronists such as *Nicolae Manolescu*, *Mircea Iorgulescu*.¹¹⁹ *Noica*’s metaphysical approach to the Romanian soul attracted protochronists as well, although they delimited themselves from the disciples and the anti-protochronist group; such protochronists were *Eugen Barbu*, *Ion Coja*, *Paul Anghel*, *Dan Zamfirescu*.

Noica became known and obtained the status of a “phenomenon” in the ‘80s, with the publication of “Journal from Păltiniș” (“*Jurnalul de la Păltiniș*”) and “Letters” (“*Epistolar*”) by *Gabriel Liiceanu*. The first book is *Liiceanu*’s journal between March 1977 and July 1981, where he describes his conversations with *Noica* at Păltiniș, on the top of the mountain. The

118 Both *Liiceanu* and *Pleșu* were trained in Romania and in the West.

119 See also K. Verdery, *ibid.*, 1991.

second one, “Letters”, contained responses and afterthoughts from *Noica*’s disciples, their friends, and other intellectuals, reactions stirred by the publication of the “Journal”.

Why is *Noica* so important for the intellectuals’ dissidence? First, though searching for a place for philosophy/metaphysics in the context of Romanian culture, the discourse transcended the group of philosophers, crossing the Party’s discourse of cultural politics through its particular definitions of values. When the party had incorporated Marxist-Leninist materialist philosophy, it had banished other alternative philosophies, especially when these were understood as metaphysics. Yet, once the socio-economic system failed and Marxism could no longer legitimate control and domination, Ceausescu shifted his basis of authority from Marxism to a national ideology loosely connected to disassembled Marxist concepts devoid of their structural framework and, consequently, of a coherent content. The major effect of this movement was that once philosophy ceased to be the major concern, since the failure of Marxism, the Party, reorganized around the symbolism of national ideology, paid no attention to the fact that at the periphery of philosophy new discourses would arise. In other words, once *philosophy* (i.e., Marxism) lost its political momentum, *philosophy* (i.e., metaphysics) gained first, the cultural stage, later becoming a subtle political dissidence.

Noica was interested in finding an alternative philosophy (metaphysics) capable of changing the modern world and its “harmful” rationality. Criticizing modern reason, he sought a spiritual (not an earthly, revolutionary) salvation, hence, his introduction of religion as a matter of necessity in the philosophical discourse. He challenged the institutionalized (communist) power from at least two points of view: first, he saw the antidote to modern reason (what communism would call “capitalism”) not in Marxism and socialism/communism,

but in a “spiritual change”; second, this “spiritual change” was placed in “salvation”, hence the transformative, positive, and “secular” role of religion¹²⁰ upon “human souls”. In other words, the change and salvation from scientific, modern rationality was not an outward socio-economic or political revolution, but a inward, spiritual, metaphysical one.

Criticizing Western civilization for an alienating rationality, *Noica* found the place of Romanian culture within the context of Hegel’s categories of “general” and “particular”. Defining “the general” as “the truth of the particular” and “the particular” as “the exactitude of the general”, *Noica* placed Romanian culture in an ubiquitous position regarding both itself and the great civilizations. This means that “the particular” (Romanian culture) participated both in “the general” (great cultures) and in its own particularity, back from “the general”. Hence, both “particular” and “general” reciprocally contain each other’s structures for, simply put, “the particular” is “a general in small”.

Having located Romanian culture this way, *Noica*’s philosophy was approached both by protochronists and anti-protochronists. Romanian culture’s “particular” character was embraced by protochronists who saw *Noica* as defining a prominent Romanian “ethnic consciousness”¹²¹ in the agrarian-pastoral tradition practising individual meditation on an ethical-religious foundation. By contrast, anti-protochronists saw *Noica* as pro-European due to the reciprocal integration between “the particular” (Romanian culture”) and “the general” (Western culture). However, *Noica* himself had ambiguous positions since he did not react

120 An institution theoretically forbidden by the Party.

121 Especially in his “Pages on the Romanian Soul” (“*Pagini despre sufletul românesc*”) (Bucharest: Ed. Humanitas, 1991 [1940]).

to overstated nationalist-patriotic readings of his work (the protochronists), nor would he or his disciples create a clear distinction from his fascist youth experiences.

Initially, the Party saw no threat from a “cultural” alternative discourse that had simply “freed thought”, i.e., *Noica*’s metaphysics. Soon, the fact that many philosophical concepts started to be differently defined, in an alternative philosophical lineage (i.e., *Noica* saw “the spiritual salvation” against modern reason in the solutions suggested by the works of Plato and Heidegger), and so started undermining the cultural politics of the Party. The latter thus began watching closely the *Noica* group.

Noica’s program (the way it appears in the “Journal”) also contained a “paideic model”, as an accessory to freeing metaphysics, meaning “cultural reproduction” or how to find a way to train and transmit culture to coming generations. In this sense, *Noica* not only liberated philosophy, but he also employed a special language in his discourse, a language accessible to the uninitiated audience, while creating new metaphorical contents to casual words. These “words” became key philosophical words signifying a whole metaphorical reality (e.g., “*petrecere*” usually means “passing”; in *Noica*’s context it means a certain voyage of the “being” into deeper levels of its self.)¹²²

The “Letters” also discussed the general cultural climate and what to be an intellectual meant. Establishing thus a discourse where disagreement (not a “politically correct” consensus) became the meta-norm, a Platonic dialectic in search for the truth, *Noica* and *Liiceanu* publishing *Noica* became a locus of cultural opposition, especially as they (and

¹²² After all, philosophy has a plenty of “new” words, from “*daimon*”, to “*noumen*”, and to “*geist*”, etc. All philosophers exist within the context of their own created conceptual and terminological frameworks.

generally the Noica group) were supported by the Romanian Diaspora's broadcastings at "Radio Free Europe".

Noica also stressed that unless Romanians wanted to perish, they had to continuously produce culture in that vein that he used when characterizing Romanian soul and the relationship between "particular" (Romanian culture) and "general" (universal culture). In this respect, *Noica* translated and edited, besides Plato and Kant, works by Plotinus, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger. This effort was linked both to the liberation of philosophy after years of Stalinist dogmatism and to his "paideic" accessible educational model.

What is important for this study is that the philosophers' community around *Noica* and the anti-protocronists from literature and literary criticism, history, etc. constituted a platform of cultural dissidence to the regime, gradually making their democratizing discourse hegemonic among intellectuals, in spite of various protocronist excesses. Before the 1989 Revolution, Romanian intellectuals, producers of definitions, were overwhelmingly tied by this liberating spirit which simply clashed with the official political discourse (where it created anguish and, as a consequence, tightened the reins on intellectuals). No matter how many of such intellectuals were persecuted, the stream of philosophico-cultural dissidence remained undisturbed. In other words, the regime definitively lost its validity once its own producers of definitions and values, the intellectuals, became attached one way or another to the platform of opposition around *Noica* and the anti-protocronists.

Immediately after the 1989 Revolution, until the first general elections of May 1990 which saw a restoration of the old regime, the first emerging political elite contained the

previous cultural dissidence - anti-protocronists and the *Noica* group: *Andrei Pleșu* became Minister of Culture; *Mihai Șora*, dissident philosopher, took the Ministry of Education; *Alexandru Paleologu*, a *Noica* group member and literary critic, became Romanian ambassador in France; *Mircea Dinescu*, dissident poet who started the first hours of the Romanian Revolution at the Television, became the president of the Romanian Writers' Union; *Gabriel Liiceanu* took the editorship of the former Political Publishing House, newly renamed "Humanitas"; *Nicolae Manolescu* became the director of the cultural magazine "Literary Romania"; *Răzvan Theodorescu*, art critic and expert in South-Eastern civilization, became the director of the Romanian Television. Generally, other dissident or opposition intellectuals took the leadership or board membership in parties or NGOs promoting democracy, civil society, and integration into Europe (e.g., "*Partidul Alianței Civice*" ["The Party of the Civic Alliance"], headed by *Nicolae Manolescu* or the NGO "*Grupul pentru Dialog Social*" [The Group for Social Dialogue"], coalescing important cultural personalities).

The fact that Romania could not create a noisy opposition such as Solidarity in Poland, a reform faction like that in Hungary, or a civil rights movement like Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 group, does not exclude a form of intellectual opposition and "civil society" under the peculiar conditions of Romania. These realities presented above demonstrate that such an oppositional intellectuality existed and that its dissident discourse had reached its climax in the dawn of the Revolution. These intellectuals (both protocronists and anti-protocronists) were Romania's cultural "civil society", of a "petty bourgeois"¹²³,

123 The Party usually attacked intellectuals with this label.

elitist, and “Salon”-type character: individualistic and disconnected from “the masses”, in spite of some “dogmatics of the masses”, intellectuals in the “ivory tower”.

C. Youth and Rock Culture¹²⁴

a) Intellectuals, youth and rock culture

The fact that four decades of communism (from the late '40s to the end of the '80s) did not manage to banish “the West” and its Rock, Coca-Cola, and blue-jeans representatives from the quarters of the Sovietized fortress is more or less known. Four generations of youngsters sang in public the hymn of communism and socialism, while secretly listening to Western music, covering the walls of their rooms with big posters of Hollywood artists and rock singers, and imitating the relaxed, hippy behaviour of their Western counterparts. The liturgy of Marxism-Leninism foundered with each generation of young Eastern-Europeans listening to “Radio Free Europe”, “The Voice of America”, and “Radio Luxemburg”; with each radio cassette being secretly introduced from the West; and finally, with people generally watching Western European and American cinematography in years of liberalization along with video cassettes of the latest movies and concerts, prudently brought in despite the official “belt” that was tightened.

This is the story of four generations of young Eastern-Europeans who “conquered” communism by a Westernized social consciousness, supported by capitalism’s consumer goods, a consciousness called by neo-Marxists “cultural imperialism” and by pluralists “media

124 The following account represents either my own experience as a youth in Romania (from the late '70s onwards) on “pop and Rock culture” or it is the result of discussions and recollections with friends (sometimes older), or they represent memories of sequences from programs broadcasted on the Romanian Radio and Television (both before and after the Revolution). I have been to many Romanian pop and Rock concerts before the Revolution and read commentaries on them in various newspapers from those times. Generally, I partook in my generation and its “liberal” spirit and innocent interests. From the '70s onwards, the story of my generation refers to my experience as well. A very well documented account on these realities can also be found in Timothy W. Ryback, “Rock around the bloc. A history of Rock music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union” (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

imperialism".¹²⁵ This is the story of how "Mickey Mouse", chewing gum, blue-jeans, "Dallas", "The Beatles", and "the Rolling Stones" created "imagined communities" in the minds of youth whom communist regimes were unable to subject to their authority. Maybe it is not without importance for the demise of communism that the "father" of "perestroika" and "glasnost", Gorbachev, was a "Beatles" fan. Yet, for the Romanian case the story has a certain hybrid character once Western cultural archetypes collided into the particularity of Romanian national(ist) ideological patterns. That is, besides embracing Western cultural values, Romanian young people sometimes filled such forms with a national content, induced by the proto/anti-protocronist intellectuals and bureaucracy. Hence, the ideological debate among factions of intellectuals (some of whom were members of the party bureaucracy) had direct influences on youth, not only in terms of "What do children learn at school?", but also "What music, what movies, what clothes, what behaviour should youngsters have in order to become new socialist beings?" There was a special dialectic at work in the relationship between intellectuals (sometimes the bureaucracy included) and youth. Intellectuals, as producers of value definitions and legitimating a regime built on ideology and symbolism, had "power", that is both official and informal authority. Through their debate over Romanianness, protochronists and anti-protocronists not only reproduced their discursive field, centralized values in the Party apparatus, and promoted a regime constructed on ideology, they also set the agenda for engineering the human soul. The youth, on the other hand, were not protochronists; did not attain a socialist consciousness, as they were at the age

125 Pluralists claim that "media imperialism" does not entail a relation of economic domination, besides the cultural one, as the neo-Marxists' definition of "cultural imperialism" does. See also John Tomlinson, "Cultural Imperialism" (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991).

of rebelliousness; and were not concerned with the great political ideals of communism (which, in their opinion, belonged to previous generations), but only to be part of their age, to be young, happy, and “on the edge”. They were the audience for the values promoted by the intellectuals. In this understanding, they held a “passive” position. Yet, whenever the youth felt unsatisfied, they would turn their heads and listen to the West, an “author” of strong competition. Then, *the youth took power over the intellectuals* who were obliged either to liberalize more (anti-protocronists) or strengthen both Marxist-Leninist and nationalist values (protocronists). This game created two important trends within the Romanian youth: one part became dedicated to genuine Western values; the other considered filling Western forms with national flavours (e.g., Romanian rock), sometimes inflamed with nationalist-patriotic values (e.g., the cultural circle-forum “The Flame”, conducted by the charismatic *Adrian Păunescu*)¹²⁶. Then, for the youth case, the common denominator remains “the West”, even in countries ruled by Stalinist or Ceausescuist models.

Still, there are some very significant remarks to be made. Usually, the youth from the cities were more Westernized than those from the country, who had less means available for reaching modern Western cultural products. Hence, the country was more prone to national(ist) values than the city which looked upon Western values. In her interview, *Lucia Humeniuc* gave an interesting insight into the rural world, since she comes from Fălticeni, Northern Moldavia:

“In the province, the people saved themselves through a “petty bourgeois” life dedicated to

126 See later “The ‘70s, “Pepsi-Cola”, “Dallas”, and “The Flame””.

tradition, family, and national-classical culture. The problems of administration, totalitarianism, and the communist leaders were issues that, they understood, simply had to function and to continue functioning. Today, the province still relates itself to traditional-classical national values. See, for example, in the Republic of Moldavia [Bessarabia, a territory from Moldavia which belonged to Romania up to World War II, when Stalin incorporated it within the Soviet Union], “civil society” is anachronistic, still living in the 1848 and its “Nation” problems!”

Second, the young people who formed bands or became singers promoting the latest fashion came from families of intellectuals or Party bureaucracy elite. Third, the whole show-business had a different configuration than in the West, for culture, as a whole, depended on the financial support and approval from the part of the bureaucracy.¹²⁷

Finally, this coming section will be referred to in a comparative method, the Sovietized world of Eastern-Europe, since ideational complexes such as music, fashion, and behaviour pervaded the Soviet bloc in a quick and rather uniform way, transcending national borders. The reactions of each communist country differed, but not the flow of ideas destined for youth “use”. In this sense, Romania has striking particularities only in the ‘70s and ‘80s (with the rise of an idiosyncratic, autarkic nationalism) and they will gradually be presented as such.

b) “The ‘50s, Jazz, James Dean, and Rock’n Roll

In the ‘50s, Romanians lived the Stalinization period which, for the cultural field, meant respecting the “iron rules” of *Andrei A. Zhdanov*, Stalin’s “engineer” of the new

¹²⁷ I already stated previously that appreciating communist values depended on bureaucratic approval (hence, financing) and not on audience tastes.

socialist personality, for whom artists were instrumental in raising the socialist consciousness of the masses. Although Zhdanov had declared American cultural influences as the “poison” of the masses’ consciousness, youth still imitated James Dean, listened and danced to American jazz rhythms, and fashioned their behaviour accordingly, while changing from daily simple, egalitarian cloths to tight-fitting costumes.¹²⁸ By then, “the West”’s representatives of consumer goods on the “second market”, giving Eastern European youth the flavour of the “American way of life”, were jazz recordings, Marlboro or Kent cigarettes, nylon stockings, sweaters, neckties, and Italian shoes.

The officials’ indignation with Americanism grew stronger when jazz music made the youth “swing” or “boogie-woogie” and when “Chattanooga Choo-Choo” made the climax of weekly evening gatherings. An immediate official reaction followed from Moscow, forbidding jazz and Dixieland altogether, while too “personalized” or “sophisticated” manners of dancing were to be observed and punished by communist youth organizations. The counter-reaction in the “youth civil society” was the emergency of “subversive” jazz bands having two types of repertoires, an official, “correct” one and another jazzistic one, consisting of songs of the most famous Western personalities of those days (among others, Miles Davis and Dizzy Gillespie). In 1956, Khrushchev undertook the policy of de-Stalinization, hence jazz, swing, and boogie-woogie were liberated, being reconsidered as a matter of “youth necessity” in building the new socialist being.

Still, the mid ‘50s saw the rise of Rock’n roll, a far more dangerous “child of the

¹²⁸ Apparently, “make-up” was seen as “bourgeois”, hence it became a generalized rule for women -Party activists - to renounce to it. However, this was not the case for young girls.

West” than jazz had been. If for the Party bureaucracy jazz proved to have had some harmonic tonalities, Rock was perceived as “bestial music”, perverting youth and making them prone to riots, crime, and mass disobedience in the streets. The albums with the latest hits were usually introduced through the “second economy” or by relatives from abroad or even by parents with official status for travelling abroad. In these circumstances, Rock’n roll became the youth’s “high culture”, different from the situation in the US where it was not particularly “high-culture”.

In 1955, the Romanian newspaper “*Contemporanul*” (“The Contemporary”), from July 15, put a nervous finger on to the “evils” of the West, as the meetings of youngsters ended “with so-called modern dances, in which barbarism is pitched to the height of hysteria”, and the dancing music stirred “animal instincts”, “cruelty, contempt, and their destructive urges”, hence “the dances and their savage music are a hidden inducement to the growth of war psychosis and to the perversion and animalisation of the youth.”¹²⁹ “Comrades” were not allowed to “dance apart”, but only in a “politically correct” smooth “waltz” style. Only in 1960, when an East-German communist leader was photographed dancing the twist apart from his partner, would dancing styles become freer.¹³⁰

Then, 1958 saw Elvis Presley becoming the counter-phantom of Stalin all over the Soviet bloc and new-borns were given the name “Elvis”, though the Romanian offices for civil status registration were instructed to refuse inscribing Western given names.

129 Ryback, *ibid.*, p.26.

130 Ryback, *ibid.*, pp.29-30.

c) *The '60s, The Beatles, and blue-jeans*

The Beatles were more than music for Eastern Europeans. They were a new way of life, they meant breaking taboos, they were hippy and, as such, became the symbol of the fact that “life is possible under communism”. The Beatles and the hippy look became widespread in Romanian cities, besides Bucharest, especially in Transylvania (in *Cluj, Sibiu, Oradea, Timisoara*), where the latest cultural fashions came from Hungary and its extremely Westernized youth.¹³¹

The Beatles generation in Eastern Europe was officially called the generation of “hooligans”, as youth mass civil disobedience was stirred by the Beatles rhythms and lyrics dedicated to euphoric imagination, something that the leadership considered subversive to communist materialist convictions. It all started in November 1963, in Poland, when five “hooligans” were sentenced to death for lynching a Polish militiaman in front of a Warsaw movie house.¹³² Still, with all the Party rigour, the youth assimilated the “Beatles look”, with its haircut, large trousers, tight skirts, medallions of peace, and buttons. The “Beatles look” also became representative for Eastern European rock musicians who, from then onwards, would change their ‘40s and ‘50s jazz style suit with the simple, “negligent”, hippy outfit.

Gradually, the Beatles grew into Beatle mania in Eastern Europe and the headmaster of a Prague school complained that it was “really not so easy to face a fifteen year old wearing a checked jacket and a big red badge inscribed THE BEATLES and talk to him about

131 That Hungary was a “Western heaven” for the youth is indicated by the fact that in 1979 I saw in Budapest Milos Forman’s and Andrew Lloyd Weber’s celebrated movie “Hair” and Andrew Lloyd Weber’s modern Rock opera “Jesus Christ Superstar”.

132 Ryback, *ibid.*, p.55.

Communist ethics.”¹³³ No parent, no teacher, no party bureaucrat was able to put a lid on the Beatles inside the youth’s souls. Therefore, the Beatles sustained the young socialist soul; from cultural phenomenon, the Beatles became political. With them, “the West” became an “institution” in the heart of communism until its demise.

By the mid ‘60s, the first generation of hippies appeared in Czechoslovakia, as a result of Rock culture import. In Bratislava, the “James Bond Club”, consisting of university dropouts had scruffy, long-haired looks, secretly listening to beat music from Radio Free Europe, London, and Luxemburg Radio stations. The bureaucracy’s reaction was first to label those long hair hippies “little Marys”, a pejorative reference to homosexuality¹³⁴, while engaging in a furious struggle to eradicate them. Hence, on the basis of the ID, required by law to be carried by all citizens every day, the “correct” (i.e., short hair) ID photo was for its guilty (i.e., hippy) bearer the proof of his rebelliousness. These hippies were then taken to the police station where they had their hair cut off. In Romania, the practice of the officials was even more horrible. They constituted groups of “dedicated party line followers” who would wander the streets of big cities, catching hippy youngsters and cutting their hair on the spot or, in the happy cases, delivering them to the nearest parlour where they surveyed their heads being shaved.

The closer to the West, the stronger and tougher the hippy behaviour. Western Rock culture’s by-product was drug abuse. Although Western drugs, such as LSD, morphine, and cocaine were not unknown in Czechoslovakia, the most widespread was “Fenmetrazin”, a

133 Ryback, *ibid.*, p.59.

134 Indicted under communist law and ethics.

fortifier which, taken in excess, was hallucinatory and addictive.¹³⁵ All over Eastern Europe, youth were seeking to live “with desperation”.

With the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the strategy of Sovietologist *Zbigniew Brzezinski* (trained at Harvard) was put into effect. This meant “dismantling the Iron Curtain”, “effacing socialism, and reuniting Europe as a single community.”¹³⁶ As a consequence, a “war” of ideas, of foreign Radio stations, of music was unleashed. The most prominent was Radio Free Europe which, besides news, had an entire hour of Western music, Rock and pop. Dozens of letters from Eastern Europe were sent to Radio Free Europe, BBC, and Radio Luxemburg showing that youth on both sides of the Iron Curtain had the same tastes and idols.

d) The '70s, “Pepsi-Cola”, “Dallas”, and “The Flame”

By the end of the '60s and early '70s, Romania finished restoring its Black Sea resorts, with a policy of inviting tourists and hard-currency in. The Romanian resorts being attractive and inexpensive, dozens of German, Scandinavian, and British tourists started coming season after season to the Black Sea coast (until the early '80s). Romania strove a good deal to make the Westerners come to its Black Sea shores, since Romanian sea side resorts (*Olimp, Neptun, Jupiter, Venus, Saturn, Mamaia, Mangalia*) were in competition with Bulgaria's resorts, “The Golden Sands”.

The arrival of Western tourists forced the authorities to introduce “Coca-Cola” (in

135 Ryback, *ibid.*, p.72.

136 Ryback, *ibid.*, p.85.

Bulgaria, in 1965) and “Pepsi-Cola (in Romania, in 1967):

“A Pepsi-Cola advertisement in June 2, 1967, issue of *Contemporanul* showed three athletes in the heat of a soccer match. To the right, in classic socialist monumentality, towered a giant bottle of Pepsi-Cola. A banner headline proclaimed: *Pepsi - avînt și energie* (“Pepsi - upsurge and energy”).”¹³⁷

Dozens of Western tourists would cover every year the beaches of the Black Sea, while the authorities would initiate a network of “shops”- stores where goods were purchased only with hard-currency and where only foreigners, after presenting their passport had access - in spite of a growing frustration of the Romanians for whom the next door store had empty shelves. With the arrival of these tourists, the Western influences (from fashion to behaviour) became even more pervasive among young Romanians. A small trade of blue-jeans, chocolate, records, and chewing-gum developed between the Western tourists and the Romanian youth who would increasingly come to the seaside resorts, to find such encounters.

Romanian authorities called pop and Rock music “light music” (“*muzica ușoară*”), an “unsuccessful offspring of the West”, a “superficial taste”, compared to “real”, classical music. However, “light music” would be listened to in student clubs such as the “Pop Club” at the Academy of Economics and “Club A” at the Institute of Architecture “Ion Mincu”, in Bucharest, where discotheques and live concerts would occasionally be held by young Romanian rockers. “Pop Club” published a weekly “Top 30” with polls of Romanian students on British and American hit-songs. In 1970, “Club A” organized the first Romanian National

¹³⁷ Ryback, *ibid.*, p115.

Festival of Pop Music, as the '60s and early '70s Beatle mania had produced dozens of Romanian rock bands, among the most famous ones "Phoenix" from Timișoara and its award winning composition (of 1968) "Beat 68". As rock fans became more and more impulsive, sometimes destroying the benches of outdoor stadiums, or shouting "USA" and displaying peace signs (e.g., during the tour of the American band "Blood, Sweet, and Tears" in 1970)¹³⁸, the authorities' response was to narrow the previous artistic and cultural liberalism around Ceausescu's "1971, July theses". As if competing with Western rock stars, Ceausescu initiated his cult of personality.

In 1973, the poet and editor of the cultural weekly "*Flacăra*" ("The Flame"), *Adrian Păunescu*, started travelling around the country accompanied by a circle, a forum called "The Flame" as well. This national youth movement was extremely ambivalent in its methodology and nature, for, on the one hand, it brought together previous fans of the West and Romanian rock bands and, on the other hand, the texts and lyrics spread through electric-electronic sounds from the height of the stage would praise historical and dialectical materialism, Ceausescu, and the national(ist) discourse of the "forefathers". An awkward mixture of Westernism (music) and nationalism (lyrics, hence message) would shrewdly penetrate the Romanian youth, enabling the eccentric manifestation of their youthful-ness through Western rhythms and accords and the realization of the Party (Ceausescu) line. Apparently, *Păunescu* understood that in order to conquer the youth in face of the strong Western competitor, Westernism *per se* had to be employed in the service of national ideology and nationalism. For years, *Păunescu* wandered all over the country and the youth was in frenzy (as the tough

138 Ryback, *ibid.*, p.124.

years of “cultural Ceausescuism” were in force) at his six hour forums, where they could dance, drink, and scream, occasionally breaking chairs, and creating mass commotion, hysteria, and fights. When *Păunescu*’s charismatic personality started competing with Ceausescu, he lost and his movement was officially considered expendable in the mid ‘80s. *Păunescu*’s forum was a door toward Westernism through the nationalist gate, especially for youth from a rural environment. Meanwhile, the cities would continue a hidden youth life of a genuine Western look, as it did before with the help of foreign broadcast and the “second market”.

e) The ‘80s, the “long, black night” and VCR culture

Starting with the ‘80s, the VCR brought into the house of increasing numbers of intellectuals and Party bureaucrats the latest American movies. “Dallas” left an inimitable imprint all over the country, with new-borns named after the Texan characters.

In the early ‘80s, while the latest “punk culture” was flourishing in Hungary, Romanian youth would find again its imagined path toward the West while watching movies smuggled into country on video-cassettes, especially as Romania, like other communist countries, did not recognize “copyright”¹³⁹. Later, the VCR became a “must” for any city family and even the countryside and its local, rural nomenclature, bureaucracy, and intelligentsia would honour the place of the VCR in their houses.¹⁴⁰

139 The law for “copyright” was introduced in Romania only in the fall of 1996, although a national protection on “intellectual property” existed prior to 1989, but with no effective international consequences.

140 In the ‘80s and until the 1989 Revolution, the VCR became the “hottest” item on the “second market”, though its price was the equivalent of half a year wages or half the price of a Romanian car.

However, by the turning of the '70s into the '80s, an impressive show called "The poetry of the young music" ("*Poezia muzicii tinere*"), created by the charismatic actor *Florian Pittiș*, almost took the size of a movement (for which reason it was banished within couple of years, in the first half of the '80s). This show, although performing with several interdictions, managed to keep alive the spirit of some city youth, especially in Bucharest, where it performed at the "*Lucia Sturdza Bulandra*" theatre. There, *Pittiș* would explain to the youth of the '80s who the Beatles, Jimi Hendrix, Pink Floyd, Led Zeppelin, Janis Joplin (i.e., the Beat generation), etc. had been and let the theatre's megaphones sing with loud decibels excerpts from these superstars' hits.¹⁴¹ Even today, *Pittiș*, in his fifties, has a hippy look and the young remember him more for opening the doors to Western rock culture than as an actor.

Sometimes, the anti-protocronist bureaucracy would let go on the TV channel some European TV serials (such as, among others, the British "The Onedin Line", whose main actor, Peter Gilmore, was invited to Romania in the late '70s, as the audience's most favoured actor; the French film on Balzac's "The Human Comedy"; the Italian biography of Verdi, etc.), explaining to their superiors that such creations would show the "evils" of the West. There is no doubt that they knew that such productions would have a reverse effect on the majority of the viewer population, especially as a consequence of comparing them with the sad reality of a failed economic system and a narrow cultural environment. The same would happen to foreign cinema movies smuggled and broadcast under different names, in order to

141 I have been to one of *Pittiș*' shows and I recall being surrounded by an enthusiastic young audience who, between excerpts of songs, would scream slogans against the regime and Ceausescu. *Pittiș* was embarrassed and frightened and invited us to slow down, otherwise he would stop the show.

avoid the anger of their Western creators.

In such an atmosphere the 1989 year approached, with a youth oriented toward the West, although in some of its segments - especially the rural environment - Western influences were perceived through nationalist messages ("The Flame"). Being obliged to develop its cultural life in an entirely subversive manner, youth was more radically Westernized and pro-Western even than the anti-protocronist intellectuality and bureaucracy. This was the youth who occupied the centres of Timișoara and Bucharest in December 1989. In a metaphorical way, they shouted for liberty, democracy, the "Beatles", and Rock. Unfortunately, there was a parallel reality happening at the official level, among the Party bureaucracy elite, who by coup d'état stole the Revolution from the Romanian youth.

D. On Ethnic Minorities

In the summer of 1996, I interviewed representatives of two ethnic minorities, in order to find out how they characterized the current situation of their minority groups in comparison with Ceausescu's times, and hence, for the purpose of this study, to reveal the nationalist character of the previous regime and its present consequences.

a) The Jewish minority

In the interview with professor *Nicolae Cajal* (doctor in medicine and President of the Federation of Jewish Communities from Romania¹⁴²) he recalled that before 1989, although the Constitution of Romania (from 1965) alleged equality among Romanian citizens, irrespective, among others, of their ethnic origins, anti-Semitic discrimination was mostly felt at the level of appointments in academic, intellectual, and leadership positions:

“ Until 1989, I was the only Jewish member of the Romanian Academy. Today, there are eight or nine full and correspondent members. The [communist] officials were anti-Semitic. But today, I consider that there is no anti-Semitism at the people's level. The Romanian people are not anti-Semitic. This is only a matter of some elites, intellectuals, press. We [the Jewish Federation] did not answer to the [present] anti-Semitism from the press, but with regard to the resurrection of the legionnaire movement [the former fascist “Iron Guard”], which is otherwise illegal and unconstitutional [under the new, post-revolutionary Constitution of 1991, forbidding extremist parties], we reacted, since this is also damaging for Romanians and Romanian democracy. Hence, we recalled the purges from Romania, the deportations - the “death train” from Iași, the victims of the Holocaust.

142 Interview (Bucharest, July 24, 1996).

On the other hand, I introduced the concept of “real Semitism”, as a tool to fight anti-Semitism. This means to continuously present the world in general and the Romanians in particular with the contribution of the Jewish people to international and Romanian science, culture, press, painting, music, architecture, medicine, and social life. This way, we hope that those who are uninformed or biased will come to terms with our existence, especially that we consider ourselves Romanians, Romanian Jews, integrated and loyal to the country where we live .”

That the situation of the Jewish minority was very special is given by the fact that “Jewishness” [ethnicity] is religiously defined¹⁴³, whereas Romanian or Hungarian ethnics for example, can be either Orthodox, Catholics, or Protestants, etc. There is no doubt that other forms of anti-Semitism existed during the Ceausescu period - even the notorious “selling of Romanian Jews” to the state of Israel, with which Ceausescu kept diplomatic relations after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war at least for such financial considerations¹⁴⁴ (Ceausescu also “sold” German ethnics from Transylvania to Germany) - but what is important here is, as prof. *Cajal* says, the distinction between masses and elites (intellectuals, officials, bureaucrats), where the latter include, besides democrats, the nationalist-chauvinists, expressing their views in (their) press and political discourses (such as *C.V.Tudor*). In other words, anti-Semitism is today, as it was - Professor *Cajal* suggests - a matter of some elite segments and individual intellectuals. However, it is my opinion that anti-Semitism is (and was) pervasive from the elite level “downwards” in the large masses, and such a chauvinistic attitude can be illustrated

143 Religion was a theoretically forbidden institution.

144 Other opinions deny this “human trade” and consider that Ceausescu was given by the Soviet bloc (which did not have diplomatic relations with the state of Israel) the “task” of maintaining such diplomatic relations.

by the example of another ethnic minority: the Magyars (the Hungarians).

b) the Hungarian minority

Anton Niculescu (Cabinet head of the President of the “Democratic Union of the Magyars of Romania” (“UDMR”) - in the summer of 1996, in Opposition, today (1997), in the governmental coalition) talks in an interview¹⁴⁵ about social and political cleavages between Hungarians and Romanians before and after the Revolution:

“From the 1980s onwards, the situation of the Hungarians from Romania got worse, especially with the restriction of the use of the native language, Hungarian, in schools and as names for localities or geographic objectives. Such policy had social repercussions, although, I consider that at the level of the daily interaction, there were no conflicts among the Hungarian and Romanian population, as they do not exist at this level today. Following statistics, today, the Romanian negative attitude toward Hungarians exists much more in zones with no Hungarians. In Harghita, Covasna districts, and in Transylvania in general [where the majority of Hungarians reside] the average of anti-Hungarian feelings is of only 24%, whereas in Dobrogea and Wallachia [South-Eastern regions with no Hungarian ethnics] the average is of more than 50%. This brings me to the conclusion that anti-Magyarism is an induced attitude. I am from Târgu-Mureş and my relatives there are good friends with their [Romanian] neighbours. During the events from 1990 in Târgu-Mureş [the internationally mediated fight between Romanians and Hungarians], it was not the people from Târgu-Mureş who fought among themselves. People from the province, around 80 km. from Târgu-Mureş were brought in to fight (the same as happened with the miners in Bucharest [in 1990 and 1991]). The neighbours cannot be manipulated to simply attack each other. Yet, because of the political cleavage, the problem got more complex reaching the levels of the ordinary

145 Interview (Bucharest, July 24, 1996).

people. Here I am referring to the access to public or hierarchical (professional or cultural) functions which, during Ceausescu as they are today, wear an ethnic connotation. For example, today in Târgu-Mureș, no state factory has a Magyar manager, although around 50% of the population is Magyar (I am not referring to the private sector which is left free for private initiative). On the other hand, in Odorheiul Secuiesc, though the majority of the inhabitants are Magyar [besides another ethnic minority, the Germans], they elected a Romanian manager, at the same time as when, in Bucharest, the press was talking of a terrible anti-Romanianness of the Magyars. But, as a rule, after the Revolution, all appointed functions are occupied by Romanians (in Justice, police, army, diplomacy). Another example regards the FPS [The State Property Funds represent 70% of the former state property, the great industry, that is in the process of privatization], in whose board from Târgu-Mureș, where 43-45% are Hungarians, there are less than 2% appointed Hungarian members. Obviously, this creates a tension at the level of the population. However, this climate was exponentially higher during Ceausescu because, for example, in a village where all inhabitants were Hungarian, the policeman was Romanian [ethnic] and was sent there to be anti-Hungarian. Then, the Hungarian villager identified the policeman with the Romanian nation, officialities, “the Majority” and acquired nationalist, anti-Romanian attitudes. This is why, during the Revolution, in this region there were grave atrocities against policemen, both Romanian and Hungarian. On the other hand, Ceausescu promoted a policy of homogenization, bringing especially Moldavians to Transylvania. In the last thirty years, Târgu-Mureș, from a population where only 18% were Romanians, today has more than 50% Romanians. Moreover, those brought in came from a rural environment, with no ideas of multiculturalism and this created tensions with the Hungarians who were used to living within urban patterns.”

Q: “What was, if any, the solidarity between Romanian and Hungarian dissident intellectuals during Ceausescu?”

AN: “First thing, during communism, all national and international cultural forms, especially literature, were translated into Hungarian. Hungarian intellectuals [from Romania], as well translated Romanian cultural values (the poets *Mihail Eminescu*, *Nichita Stănescu*, etc.),

although the reverse happened only in the interwar period (the poet and deputy-minister *Octavian Goga* translated from Hungarian to Romanian). On the other hand, a member of our community, the poet and writer *Domokoş Geza*, was president of the Romanian Writers' Union. Also, the first post World War II samizdat [underground, subversive literature] was created by six, seven Magyar intellectuals, being supported by Romanians as well; I am talking about the magazine "Counterpoints" ("*Contrapuncte*"). Again, the dissidence of the dramaturge of Hungarian language (even the Hungarian government recognizes him as such), *Sütö András*, is important, for he was openly against Ceausescu. Today, I consider that there are only a few Romanian intellectuals still actively engaged in political life the way Hungarian intellectuals [from Romania] are. Maybe, though I do not particularly like them, *Adrian Păunescu* [with "The Flame"] and *Marin Sorescu* [poet and MP in the Iliescu regime, deceased in the fall of 1996], but in the Magyar community all intellectuals are implicated in politics, since a minority cannot afford wasting its elites. For example, "UDMR" has a consultative body, a sort of Senate, where all political and cultural Magyar personalities (the president of the "UDMR", *Marco Bela*, being himself a poet) are gathered and the honorary president is a reform bishop. Today, at the "Criterion" publishing house, Romanian literature is being translated into Hungarian and we are about to publish an encyclopaedia of Magyar intellectuals from Romania."

This section of the thesis was intended to throw a light on how nationalism functioned and was enforced as the real ideology of the regime, through ISA (education, culture, etc.) and the RSA (police, army, appointed functions, etc.) within ethnic minority groups. This section is important since it produces evidence from another level (that of ethnic minorities) that it was not the internationalizing socialist consciousness that was governing as ruling ideology. On the other hand, the fate of ethnic minorities reflects the (general) subtle reverberation of the fight between Nationalism and "democratism". Had "Marxist

democratism” have ruled in Romania, the national issue (hence, its co-terminus ethnic minority question) would have been resolved within the wider category of the “proletariat”. In my opinion, the issue of national minorities is the most sensitive to showing which type of consciousness - national or socialist - governed Romania. It is true, the interview with A. *Niculescu* revealed the fact that a lot of Romanian and international literature had been translated into Hungarian by the Romanian government but, as with the facade manual of (Marxist) philosophy, this was only a means to pretend respecting other minorities’ rights while pointing at their “absurd” claims.

Finally, after the 1989 Revolution, the issue of “the Nation” - occupying the cultural and political spaces of Romania - brought into light its subsequent problematic, that of ethnic and religious minorities. These two issues (i.e., the discourses of “the Nation” and ethno-religious minorities) counter-balance each other, since diminishing the nationalist voice increases the freedom of action of various minority groups.

Conclusion: Romanian civil society a “Phoenix”

Section one. The political spectrum of Romania between 1989 - 1997. On intellectuals today.

Politically, post-revolutionary Romania passed through three important periods: first, from the Revolution of December 1989 to the general elections of May 1990; second, from May 1990 to the general elections of November 1996 (marked by two important moments, the demise of the prime minister *Petre Roman*, in June 1991, under the street pressure of the miners attacking Bucharest students and intellectuals and the 1992 general elections reconfirming president *Ion Iliescu* and a government of restoration); third, since November 1996, when the elections propelled to power a pro-Western coalition, the former Opposition, including Ceausescu’s dissident intellectuals.

As specified previously, the first period saw the Westernizers (anti-protocronist intellectuals) occupying key cultural and official governmental positions.¹⁴⁶ There were at least two factors that impeded their remaining in such positions after May 1990: first, these solitary intellectuals could not adjust and adapt themselves within a rising government of restoration, pro-indigenist and even with pro-Soviet memories, which, for them, meant everything they had been fighting against; and second, these dissident intellectuals were detached from “the masses”, as explained previously (Prof. *Răzvan Theodorescu* said in his interview that “[Romanian] intellectuals conceive “the people” as a “people of individuals”, not as a “people of the masses”, to whom they do not relate”). Hence, the dissident intelligentsia was too thin a stratum to compete with an old mechanism routinized over forty

¹⁴⁶ See previously the case on “protocronism” and its post-revolutionary aftermath regarding anti-protocronists filling cultural and governmental positions.

years. In other words, if the *political* revolution was achieved, the way it was, in December 1989, the *social* revolution¹⁴⁷ was only to follow, as a long-term process, as an aftermath.

The second period (from May 1990 until November 1996) saw a hybrid government of old forms, swaying between a limited and often privileged privatization, nationalism, corruption, and timid developing relationships with the West. Until June 1991, two leaders, though placed in different constitutional positions, were at odds with each other's political orientations: President *Iliescu*, a supporter of old structures "with a humane face" and the prime minister *Petre Roman*, an overt pro-Westerner, accepting all the commitments to privatization and democracy, and generally pro-intelligentsia (especially the technocratic elite). There is a lot of speculation around the issue of whether *Iliescu* did or did not call the miners ("the masses", "the people") to save his regime from the faction of *Petre Roman* in June 1991 (though, one day later, in an telephone interview at the French TV channel "TV5", *Roman* declared that *Iliescu* stirred a communist rebellion by calling the miners). The fact is that the miners surrounded the government and, after beating students and ordinary people, in a "witch hunt" for "bourgeois", "anti-patriotic" intellectuals (under the slogan "*we work, we don't think*", a reminiscence of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" over the "degraded intellectuals"), pressured *Roman* to present his resignation, although *Roman* claimed the authority to choose the new premier-candidate, *Theodor Stolojan* (who held the office of prime minister until the general elections of May 1992, after which he left for the World Bank to work as financial expert). With *Roman* and his Westernizing faction eliminated, the road

147 Also see theories of revolution by Theda Skocpol, Ivo and Rosalind Feierabend, Chalmers Johnson, Charles Tilly, Barrington-Moore jr., etc.

was cleared for a steady restoration of privileged former officials. The coalition in power was formed by: first, *Iliescu's* Party (other leaders were *Oliviu Gherman*, professor of Physics, and *Adrian Năstase*, professor of International Public Law), called "FDSN" ("The Front of the Social Democracy of Romania") and renamed "PDSR" ("The Party of the Social Democracy of Romania") after the split with *Roman* (first, *Roman's* faction kept the former name, "FSN" ("The National Salvation Front"), as it emerged (together with *Iliescu's* faction) from the Revolution, then changed it into "FSN-PD", adding the formula of "Democratic Party", finally, becoming the "Democrat Party", "PD"); second, by the nationalist party "PUNR" ("The Party of the National Unity of Romania"), with a strong centre and leader, *Gheorghe Funar*, an overt anti-Magyar, in Transylvania (in Cluj-Napoca); third, by the ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, anti-Magyar, anti-Gypsy, and anti-Semitic party "PRM" ("The Party of Greater Romania") - also, a promoter of the reintegration of the territory of Republic of Moldavia (former Bessarabia) within the official borders of Romania - led by the "Jirinovskian" protochronist *Corneliu Vadim Tudor*, a charismatic figure already presented in this study; and finally, by "The Socialist Party of Labour" ("PSM"), led by *Ilie Verdeț*, one of Ceausescu's former "premiers", which, at that date, gathered "dogmatic" Marxist-Leninists, former communist elite members. Although the privatization and the reconstitution of the right of private property (i.e., returning formerly expropriated property back) had already been initiated by the *Roman* government, the 1992-1996 *Nicolae Văcăroiu* government did not manage to relieve strong social contradictions, such as an opening gap between a small fraction of "rich people", usually business persons of Ceausescuist formation and the rest of

the Romanians - except for a 10% growing middle class¹⁴⁸ - who were constrained to live between Western type prices and Eastern type wages (i.e., around \$30-40/month). Also, the whole “second economy” system of traffic of influence, corruption, and bribery erupted at the surface, catching up an already “Phanariot” type bureaucracy. (Still, the kernel of the socio-political chaos remains the economic disaster in which Romania was openly brought in from 1989 onwards.)

As all previous intellectuals retreated, after their May 1990 failure in elections, within the Opposition as “pro-Europeans” and “pro-civil society”, the 1996 general elections, by proclaiming as the winner this very Opposition, propelled them again to power within a Westernizing coalition composed of: first, the “Democratic Convention” (“CD”), a conglomerate of oppositional parties - comprising, among others, *Nicolae Manolescu*’s “Party of Civic Alliance” (“PAC”), “The Liberal Party - the Democratic Convention” (“PL-CD”), a faction of the liberal movement which is split in Romania after 1990 between some five factions, hence five parties¹⁴⁹; second, the “Social-Democrat Union” (member in the “Socialist International”), led by *Petre Roman*¹⁵⁰, a union composed by *Roman*’s “Democratic Party” and *Sergiu Cunescu*’s “Social-Democrat Party”; third, by “PNTCD”, the historic “Peasant Party”, a christian-democrat party, supporting the return of big landowners within a *restitutio in integrum* privatization; fourth, the “Democratic Union Of the Magyars of Romania” (“UDMR”), a party in a forceful opposition to the previous nationalist, anti-Magyar

148 As statistics published in daily newspapers of that period showed.

149 Apparently, in 1997, the liberal movement is getting united, for it never managed to occupy serious numbers of seats in the Parliament, under its divisive, factional struggles.

150 Since 1993, *Petre Roman* also became official reporter for NATO in Eastern Europe.

governmental coalition.

As a conclusion, today in the Romanian “national identity” the *cultural* issue is still a *political* one, continuing to determine after more than one hundred years the alternation of governments and the system of internal and international alliances.

Section two. Conclusion: Romania and “civil society”

This study proves to have touched upon two categories of interrelated issues, one on the validity of meta-theories, the other on the particular case study of finding and explaining Romanian “civil society”, especially under “communist” dictatorship. On the first issue regarding meta-theories, this study counterposed two types of analysis, one drawing from Marxism, the other focused on identity, and hence on nationalism. Various brands of Marxism were invoked: from “classical” Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, representing the “official” ideology of communist Romania between 1947 and 1989 (e.g., the manual of philosophy from Chapter two, section one) to Western Marxism (Chapter one, section one). The latter was employed to prove the continuity of Romanian “civil society” from pre and interwar times to the present. The Althusserian concept of “Ideological State Apparatuses” (ISA) was used to explain a reality that officially did not exist under “real socialism”: namely, the persistence of a hegemonic discourse that had nothing to do with Marxism. This led us to switch our analytic focus to the subject of identity, which was at the heart of the hegemonic nationalist discourse. This analysis revealed not only the phoniness of the official Marxist ideology, but also the limitations of any approach that neglects the particularities of a country’s identity - formative experiences. The analysis of identity/Nationalism built up in two sections of this

study: Chapter one, section two, on the origins and history of Nationalism in Romania, which is essential for explaining Romanianness, and Chapter two, section two, on the dynamic and dialectics of Nationalism both as (already) a meta-ideology in the 20th century and as a theoretical, discursive field swallowing all other “transient” ideologies, temporarily hegemonic or occasionally “official”(of which communism is an example). I want to add here that it was only by elimination that I could find and apply an identity analysis (on Nationalism), since I felt compelled to start from the “official” ideology, Marxism. What was neglected in the official analysis were the four particular determinant factors for Romania: ethnicity, religion, the struggle of imperialisms, and the division between elite and mass (which has persisted through changes in regime) (Chapter one, section two). Since the regime alleged itself to be “Marxist” and “communist”, as indicated in the manual of philosophy (Chapter two, section one), it was useful to apply these categories to the Romanian reality. This enabled us to demystify a regime fabricated from materials other than the ones mentioned in the official ideology: materials to be understood under the rubric of nationalism.

Romania’s official ideology may have been Marxist after 1945, but the regime overthrown in 1989 was a collectivistic-populist, neo-patrimonial autocracy with fascist shades. Its character could not be explained by a “Marxist” theory that disregarded the particular features of the country. The particularities of Romania actually made a mockery of the theory and practice of Marxism.

Linking questions of meta-theory with the particular problem of explaining Romanian Civil society, we saw that Romania’s persistently “European” culture sustained practices associated with liberalism and the Enlightenment. These practices reinforced civil society and

strengthened Romania's understanding of itself as a European country, but (ironically) also opened the discursive field to those who contested this interpretation of Romanian identity in the name of other characterizations of Romanian nationhood. Thus, the particularities have to be understood in terms of the contests over national identity worked out within the framework of a civil society that links Romania with the outside world. Discourses on identity - focused on various brands of Nationalism (populist, peasantist, fascist, national-communist) and their counter-discourses (pro-Orientalism, liberalism, and Westernism/cosmopolitanism) - take place within the cultural levels of "civil society" ("ISA") and bring the whole body of intellectuals into relation with one another. This is the ideological background of post-communist Romania and its reactions to various external and internal (see the case on ethnic minorities) stimuli.

The more specific analysis of Romanian cultural "civil society" under communism, revealed how the economic failure of Marxist-Leninist principles, the arrival to power of Ceausescu, and the context of world globalization and imperialisms, made the Romanian communist regime become (from the inner polity perspective) both a purely ideologico-symbolic realm and the stake of intellectuals' battles. Since the intellectuals were the authors defining the values of the political regime, they were, loosely speaking, "the authors of the regime". On the other hand, as these intellectuals had already been raised in the tradition of the millennial meta-ideology of Nationalism, it is easy to see that, coupled with Ceausescu's personal, nationalist ambitions, the discourse of Nationalism once more gained both hegemony and "officiality" from late '60s onwards. Chapter two, section two, generally speaking of intellectuals and power and the case of "Protochronism", has shown how these

factional fights between intellectuals created the following results and trends. First, the transactionist attitude of the intellectuals managed to nurture the regime with Nationalist values: subversive ideologies also appeared, as alternative definitions of identity (e.g., Westernism; even “classical” Marxism became subversive). Second, producing definitions of values for the regime, the values became centralized in the (repressive) state apparatus, although dissident definitions of values existed at the periphery of the official discourse (in the “ISA”). (Although at the periphery from the Party’s point of view, such alternative definitions, e.g., Westernism, were at the same time at the centre of consent (counter-hegemony) within some cultural institutions of “civil society”, e.g., literature and literary criticism (case A), and philosophy as “metaphysics” (case B), the manual of literature (case A).) Third, reaching the status of producers of cultural-political definitions for the regime, the intellectuals multiplied and refined their ideological and discursive fields, finding subtle arguments for each type of definition, be it supportive or opposing the regime’s tastes. In this sense, intellectuals became more and more subtly refined in their transactionist and ambivalent personality.

“Indigenism”, “pro-Orientalism”, “Orthodoxist-fascism”, “Westernism” and “cosmopolitanism”, “*ex Oriens lux*” or “*ex Occidens lux*”, “synchronism” or “form without substance”, “dogmatism” and “proletcultism”, “protochronism” and “anti-protochronism”: this was the voice of Romanian cultural “civil society” from pre (19th century) and interwar times through communist and post-communist times (Chapter two, section two and Chapter three, cases A and B).

The heritage of the communist regime for post-revolutionary political debates still

remains the issue of “the Nation” with all its consequences for the way in which Romanians imagine their identity, in a national(ist) or European/global integrationist attitude. As was presented, this result was possible due to the shift of the regime’s methods of control, from economic to the coerciveness of ideology (national ideology) and a symbolism centred on the issues of “the Nation”, “national essence”, and “national soul”. Hence, the previous section of the Conclusion (on the political spectrum and intellectuals in post-revolutionary Romania) indicated the following. First, that the dynamics occurring among intellectuals’ factions, struggling between memories of Marxism and the (continuing) meta-ideology of “the Nation” is still going on after the 1989 Revolution. Its tonalities are sharper today than before 1989, under the newly gained democratic right of “the freedom of speech”. In other words, in a world of globalization with clearly delineated regions (“North” - “South”, “East” - “West”), the identity issue of Romanians erupted within a millennial force. On the other hand, after November 1996, the nationalist tendencies within this political elite with roots in the intelligentsia lost a lot of its political space and popular support. Yet, I consider that while diminishing the voice of nationalists something else was left free - under an increasing socio-economic gap between already clearly defined classes, the “economically dominant”, representing around 10-15% of the population (it is not here the place to comment on the nature of this class) and a class of 60-65% “economically dominated”, between which a narrowing “middle class” of 20-25% stands¹⁵¹ - the rechannelling of popular discontent toward an undefined “left”.

151 Summer 1996 statistics on the decreasing of the “middle class” in Romania, after the Revolution (1990) until 1996. Sources: The Sörös Foundation (the Romanian branch) and The National Institute for Statistics (Romania).

It has also been presented how dissident intellectuals made part both of the first (December 1989-May 1990) regime and of the newly elected legislature of November 1996, while the nationalist (protochronists), combining “dogmatic” values of Marxism-Leninism, occupied the political centre from May 1990 to November 1996. Still, what is also important here is that the idea of “the Nation” meant for all parties, groups, and coalitions (after 1989) establishing their limits and relationships with inner national minorities, in policies defining their “taste” for democracy. In other words, after 1989, “the Nation” again became a matter of *defining identity from without*, between East and West, and *defining identity from within*, demarcating Romanianness both from other Eastern-Europeans (especially from the former Soviet bloc) and from inner ethnical minority groups (Chapter three, the case on ethnic minorities). Post-revolutionary, pro-Westernizers (anti-protochronists) alleged the discourse of the values of “democracy” and “civil society” and, in this understanding, the inner, more subtle articulation of such a discourse meant “*multiculturalism*” and “*tolerance*” regarding other ethnic groups, such as Magyars, Jews, Gypsies, etc. The counter-discourse, unfortunately hegemonic between May 1990 - November 1996, was propelled by Indigenists (nationalists) and pro-Orientals (under the category of protochronists), alleging the values of “the Nation” coupled with a “dogmatic” Marxist-Leninist discourse of “total state appropriation” (e.g., the ultra-nationalist *C.V.Tudor*).

Finally, another issue colourfully presented in this study regarded the role of youth (Chapter three, case C). I want to leave open this issue, because, in my opinion, youth along with the intellectuals, all over the Soviet bloc, managed to “conquer” without any compromise or “transaction” a communism of a totalitarian type, through their youthful and

innocent rebelliousness against assimilating socialist consciousness. I think that the Youth and their “pop and Rock culture” under communism deserve a more complex, statistically based study¹⁵² on “colonialism”/“anti-colonialism”, “media”/“cultural imperialism”.

In the end, we can say that: yes, Romania did have a type of cultural “civil society” before 1989 and, within a totalitarian type of regime it was located at the level of intellectuals. The reason why such a subtle, “noiseless” cultural “civil society” could exist is explicable through the persistence of “the Nation”, a meta-ideology and discourse which nourished the ideological struggles within “ISA”, moreover, constituting a perfect match for Ceausescu’s personal, non-Marxist political intentions. Nationalism won over Marxism this study contends, but along with Nationalism its counter-phenomenon, Westernism/cosmopolitanism/Europeanism (the former dissidence), has strongly erupted especially in post-communist Romania. No matter how foundational, the meta-ideology of Romanian Nationalism will always be challenged by its subtle, inner ego: Europeanness.

152 By this I mean statistics (that do not exist yet) studying segments of the youth, what they listen to and how much; what was the influence of such “pop and Rock” subculture (in an anthropological understanding).

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Appendix: Interviews (Bucharest, Romania, 1996)

Nicolae N. Cajal, PhD in Medicine and Surgery at the Medicine Faculty from Bucharest (1946); PhD in Sciences (1958). President of the Federation of Jewish Communities from Romania (from 1994). Professor and Dean of the department of Virusology at the “Institute of Medicine and Pharmacology”, Bucharest; member and vice-president of the Presidium of the Romanian Academy; member and vice-president of the Academy of Medical Sciences; member of the Royal Society for medicine, London; member of the Science Academy from New York. National and international prizes; publisher of manuals, treatise, and researches

(From “*Personalities of Contemporary Romania. The Immortals. Romanian Academicians*”, Bucharest: The National Agency Press “Rompres”, 1994, pp.69).

Mihai Coman, PhD in Literature (University of Bucharest). Professor of Romanian and French literature. Dean of the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Sciences. Visiting professor at the department of Communications from University of Québec, Montreal (Canada). Founder member of the Romanian Society for Cultural Anthropology (1990). Publisher of papers and researches on ethnology (rural sociology), cultural anthropology, Romanian popular mythology, mass-media, culture, society, journalism.

Lucia Humeniuc, external relation fund raising officer at the “Romanian Independent Society for Human Rights” (SIRDO), NGO affiliated to the UN program of the High Commissioner

for Refugees.

Gheorghe Iancu, PhD in Law. Master's degrees in Ottawa (Canada), Italy, Freiburg (Switzerland). Professor of Constitutional Law and Comparative Political Institutions. Head-Secretary of the Constitutional Court of Romania. Publisher of manuals and researches.

Mircea Malitza, PhD. Academic degrees at the Faculty of Mathematics and Faculty of Sciences; PhD with the thesis "Mathematical Models for Negotiations" at the Faculty of Philosophy. Counsellor at the Permanent Mission of Romania at the UN, New York (1956-1961); Foreign Affairs vice deputy-secretary (1962-1970); Deputy-secretary of Education (1970-1972). Romanian Ambassador to the UN, (Geneva) Switzerland (1980-1982); Romanian Ambassador to the US (1982-1984). Member of the Romanian Academy; founder-member of the "Club of Rome". International lecturer and publisher.

(From "*Personalities of Contemporary Romania. The Immortals. Romanian Academicians*", Bucharest: The National Agency Press "Rompres", 1994, pp.185-87.)

Anton Niculescu, Cabinet-head of the president of the "Democratic Union of the Magyars from Romania" (UDMR).

Viorel Sălăgean, PhD. Graduate of the "Faculty of General Economy", and PhD in Economy at the Academy for Economic Studies, Bucharest. Writer and journalist. Presently, director of "The Economic Truth" ("Adevărul Economic") and "Business Journal" magazines,

Bucharest. MP (senator) in the 1992-1996 legislature; president of the Senate committee for privatization. National prize for feature report (1985).

(From "*Personalities of Contemporary Romania. Public Life Protagonists.*", vol.1-3, Bucharest: The National Press Agency "Rompres", 1994.)

Ion Scurtu, PhD. Director of the General Direction of the State Archives. Prime vice-president of the "Society for Historical Sciences from Romania". President of the Council for Historical Sciences from the foundation "Romania of Tomorrow".

Răzvan Theodorescu, PhD in historical sciences (University of Bucharest). Expert in the history of art and civilization, especially the Middle Ages and the early Modern epoch, Byzantine and Balkanic culture. Professor and dean of the department of History and Theory of Art, at the "Fine Arts Institute *Nicolae Grigorescu*" from Bucharest. Correspondent member of the Romanian Academy. General Director of the Romanian Television (1990-1992). Member of the National Council for the Audio-Visual (from June, 1992). Prizes: "Bernier" of the Institute of France (1970), "Bălcescu" of the Romanian Academy (1976), "Herder" of the University of Wien (1993).

(From "*Personalities of Contemporary Romania. The Immortals. Romanian Academicians*", Bucharest: The National Agency Press "Rompres", 1994, pp.324-26.)

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Author



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