

**Family Values and the One-Child Policy: Attitudes of Affluent Urban  
China Daughters**

by

Gigi Nga Chi Lee  
B.A., University of Victoria, 2003

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirement for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department of Pacific and Asian Studies

© Gigi Nga Chi Lee, 2007  
University of Victoria

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy  
or other means, without the permission of the author.

**Family Values and the One-Child Policy: Attitudes of Affluent Urban  
China Daughters**

by

Gigi Nga Chi Lee  
B.A., University of Victoria, 2003

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Yuen-fong Woon, (Department of Pacific and Asian Studies)

---

Supervisor

Dr. Leslie Butt, (Department of Pacific and Asian Studies)

---

Departmental Member

Dr. Lily Li-chu Dyson, (Department of Psychological Foundations in Education)

---

Outside Member

## **Supervisory Committee**

Dr. Yuen-fong Woon, (Department of Pacific and Asian Studies)

---

Supervisor

Dr. Leslie Butt, (Department of Pacific and Asian Studies)

---

Departmental Member

Dr. Lily Li-chu Dyson, (Department of Psychological Foundations in Education)

---

Outside Member

### **ABSTRACT**

This study explores the one-child policy as viewed by the present generation of single daughters who grew up in urban China, and the extent to which this policy has affected their family values. Through snowball sampling methods, semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 12 unmarried only-child daughters from urban China now studying in Victoria and Vancouver. For purposes of comparison, 11 unmarried only-child daughters of the same generation were also interviewed in Hong Kong during the same time period. The findings revealed that some only-child daughters from urban China experienced low dissemination and enforcement of the one-child policy and expressed noncompliance and dissatisfaction towards the policy. A comparison between the China and Hong Kong samples indicates that the one-child policy has limited effect on the family values of the only-child daughters in urban China. By exploring the concept of governmentality, the demographic transition theory, and the concept of resistance, this thesis aims to address the dynamics between action of state power and the reaction of only-child daughters from urban China born under the one-child policy.

## Table of Contents

Title Page .....	i
Supervisory Committee .....	ii
Abstract .....	iii
Table of Contents .....	iv
List of Tables .....	vii
List of Figures .....	viii
Acknowledgments .....	ix
Dedication .....	x
<b>CHAPTER ONE</b>	
<b>Young Women and the One-Child Policy in China: Resistance and Compliance ..</b>	<b>1</b>
Research Background .....	3
Theoretical Framework .....	3
Governmentality .....	4
Demographic Transition Theory .....	8
Resistance .....	9
Purpose and Concepts .....	14
Organization of this Thesis .....	16
<b>CHAPTER TWO</b>	
<b>Review of Existing Literature on the One-Child Policy and Family Values .....</b>	<b>18</b>
The Origin and Development of the One-Child Policy .....	18
Noncompliance: People's Response to the One-Child Policy .....	24
"Confrontation" Resistance .....	25
"Evasion" Resistance .....	25
"Accommodation" Resistance .....	26
Family Values in China .....	28
Family Power Structure .....	28
Mate Choice .....	29

Post-marital Residence Pattern .....	29
Gender Preference .....	30
Conclusion .....	31

### **CHAPTER THREE**

<b>Research Design</b> .....	34
Guiding Questions .....	34
Qualitative Approach .....	35
Sampling Frame and Comparative Method .....	37
Research Locations .....	39
Questionnaires .....	40
Interview Procedure .....	41
Participant Responses .....	42
Conclusion .....	45

### **CHAPTER FOUR**

<b>Results: The One-Child Policy as Viewed by China Daughters</b> .....	46
Demographic Characteristics of Participants .....	47
Parents' Background .....	50
China Daughters' Experience on Dissemination and Enforcement of the One-Child Policy .....	52
China Daughters' Views on the One-Child Policy .....	56
Personal Strategies towards the One-Child Policy .....	58
Family Size Preferences after Marriage .....	59
Preference for Siblings .....	62
Inconsistency on Reactions towards the One-Child Policy .....	64
Case Study #1 Xiao Yan: "An Inevitable Policy" .....	64
Case Study #2 A Bao: "A Good Policy" .....	65
Conclusion .....	67

**CHAPTER FIVE**

<b>Results: Family Values of China Daughters under the One-Child Policy .....</b>	<b>69</b>
Family Power Structure .....	69
Mate Choice Decision, Parental Pressure, and the One-Child Policy .....	70
Plans for Post-marital Residence, Parental Pressure, and the One-Child Policy .....	78
Gender Preference, Parental Pressure, and the One-Child Policy .....	83
Summary and Conclusion .....	89

**CHAPTER SIX**

<b>Discussion on Alternate Explanations: Governmentality, Demographic Transition Theory, and Resistance.....</b>	<b>92</b>
Impact of the One-Child Policy .....	92
Governmentality: Internalization and Self-regulation .....	94
Demographic Transition Theory .....	96
Resistance .....	98
Summary .....	99

**CHAPTER SEVEN**

<b>Conclusion .....</b>	<b>102</b>
Research Contribution .....	102
Limitations of Research .....	103
Suggestions for Future Research .....	104
Conclusion .....	106
Bibliography .....	108
Appendix 1: Interview Questions (English and Simplified Chinese) .....	120
Appendix 2: Post-Interview Questionnaire (English and Simplified Chinese) .....	123
Appendix 3: Photos on State Propaganda .....	133

## List of Tables

Table 4.1	Participants' Age Profile .....	47
Table 4.2	China Daughters' Duration of Time in Canada .....	47
Table 4.3	China Daughters' Place of Birth .....	48
Table 4.4	Participants' Level of Education and Occupation Status .....	49
Table 4.5	Participants' Parents' Education Levels .....	50
Table 4.6	Participants' Father's Income Levels .....	51
Table 4.7	China Daughters' Intended Family Size .....	59
Table 4.8	Hong Kong Daughters' Intended Family Size .....	61
Table 4.9	China Daughters' Preferences for Siblings .....	62
Table 5.1	Participants' Marriage Advisors and Preferred Marriage Discussants .....	70
Table 5.2	Participants' Preferences for Prospective Spouse's Place of Origin and Citizenship .....	73
Table 5.3	Participants' Preferences for Prospective Spouse's Family Type .....	76
Table 5.4	Participants' Plan for Post-marital Residence .....	78
Table 5.5	Participants' Preference for Children's Post-marital Residence .....	81
Table 5.6	Parents' Son Bias as Perceived by Participants .....	83
Table 5.7	Participants' Preference for the Sex of their Children .....	86

**List of Figures**

Figure 1	Big Character Posters on Family Planning .....	133
Figure 2	Billboard on Family Planning .....	134
Figure 3	Billboard on Family Planning 2 .....	134

## Acknowledgments

The completion of my thesis came with many challenges, and I could not have succeeded without the support of many people. First, much of my accomplishment is owed to the tremendous help given by my supervisor, Dr. Yuen-fong Woon, and my committee members, Dr. Leslie Butt and Dr. Lily Dyson, who spent countless hours on editing and commenting my thesis on a very tight schedule. I would also like to thank my external examiner, Dr. Feng Xu, who extended her expertise and valuable time to critiquing my thesis. I cannot emphasize enough my deepest gratitude for their patience, guidance, inspirations and support over the completion of this degree.

I am grateful to have received encouragement and support from my department, especially Alice, Joanne, Professor K. Tang, Dr. T. Iles, Dr. H. Noro, Professor K. Mika, Dr. M. Bodden, Dr. C. Morgan, Dr. D. Rudnyckyj and all my fellow grad students. A debt of gratitude is extended to Yuko, Kefen, Dr. J. Keefer, Roberto and his family for their generous assistance. Also, special thanks to Pam, Sound and Charles who spent their precious time editing my thesis.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to my relatives for their generous support when I was in Hong Kong. I wish to acknowledge my grandmother, who no matter how late at night I came back from the interviews would wait up for me to make sure I had arrived home safely. Most importantly, I would like to thank my family for their unconditional love, patience, and strong support at all times.

Lastly, I am grateful to receive many scholarships and research grants during the course of my degree. They include the University of Victoria Fellowship for two consecutive years, the Po Ting Ip & Wai Tsuen Lee Ip Scholarship in Pacific and Asian Studies (2003, 2005), the Philip K. H. Wong Scholarship (2004), and the Victoria Chinatown Lioness Club Graduate Scholarship (2004), the University of Victoria - Michael Smith Foundation for Health Research Grant (2004) and the Graduate Student Travel Grant (2005 and 2006).

I am grateful to have received the financial assistance mentioned above and I deeply appreciate the valuable support from everyone. All made my dream to conduct research overseas possible!

**Dedication**

To my beloved parents

*Raymond and Ada Lee,*

*who raised me to be proud of who I am, son or daughter*

## Chapter One

### Young Women and the One-Child Policy in China: Resistance and Compliance

*Population issue has always been an issue concerning the overall coordinated sustainable development in China and a key factor influencing its socioeconomic development. It is the inevitable choice for the realization of scientific development and the due obligation for China to consistently follow the road for the comprehensive solution of its population issues with Chinese characteristics.*

—— Vice Minister Wang Peian<sup>1</sup>

For more than two decades, China's insistence on slowing the rate of population growth has been strong.<sup>2</sup> In response to the fear that the country's population growth would impede its modernization and economic development, a one-child policy, which sought to limit married couple to one child, was introduced in 1979.<sup>3</sup> Twenty-eight years later, this policy continues to restrict individuals and couples' familial and parental planning. On September 1<sup>st</sup>, 2002, the state further consolidated the one-child policy for the current generation of only-child daughters, by making it a national law.<sup>4</sup>

---

1. Wang Peian is the Vice Minister of the National Population and Family Planning Commission of China. Wang, "Speech by Vice Minister Wang," <http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/en2007-03/news20070310-2.htm>.

2. Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, 1-3.

3. "Decision of the Central Committee and the State Council," <http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/en2007-01/news20070124.htm>; and Milwertz, *Accepting Population Control*, 1.

4. For details on national law, see *Zhongguo Fazhi Chubanshe* 中国法制出版社 [China Law Press], *Banan yiju congshu: Banli renkou yu jihua shengyu anjian falu yiju* 办案依据丛书：办理人口与计划生育案件法律依据 [Guidebook for Case Application: Legal Reference for Cases on Population and Family Planning Applications], 2002; "Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa" 中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [People's Republic of China's population and family planning law], [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326\\_27023.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326_27023.htm); and Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, 2005.

This thesis examines the reactions of the current generation of only-child daughters of reproductive age from urban China to the one-child policy. I will refer to them as “China daughters” throughout the thesis. I will compare their responses with the current generation of only-child daughters from Hong Kong who are also of reproductive age, otherwise referred to as “Hong Kong daughters”.

Some publications suggest that the state has succeeded in gaining acceptance and voluntary compliance from citizens for its population control efforts.<sup>5</sup> Others suggest there is a strong disparity between individual preferences and state’s one-child policy.<sup>6</sup> Research on China itself shows that the state had met with strong resistance, ranging from female infanticide, illegal removal of intrauterine devices, to outright cover up unplanned births. Recent news from Hong Kong reported that many pregnant Chinese women had given birth in Hong Kong. Speculated reasons for such occurrences include getting better hospital services, obtaining Hong Kong citizenship and avoiding fines for unplanned births.<sup>7</sup> Given the diversity and the conflicting nature of the existing publications, if we wish to understand the response to this policy, we must look more closely at the actual

---

5. Anagnost, “A Surfeit of Bodies”, 22-41; Milwertz, *Accepting Population Control*, 1997; Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China’s Population*, 2005; and Nie and Wyman. “The One-Child Policy in Shanghai,” 313-336.

6. Croll, Davin and Kane, *China’s One-Child Family Policy*, 1985; Aird, *Slaughter of the Innocents*, 1990; Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 2003; White, *China’s Longest Campaign*, 2006; “*Neidi yunfu jiutie yuetai chan zi*” 內地孕婦九鐵月台產子 [Mainland Pregnant Women Laboured on the Kowloon-Canton Railway Platform], <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/060924/60/1tkdn.html>; and “*Neidifu bianjing jisu chanzi*” 內地婦邊境極速產子 [Pregnant Mainland Women Gave Birth Swiftly at the Custom Border], <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/060924/60/1tkdn.htm>.

7. “*Jiafei nanzu laigang chanzi chao*” 加費恐難阻來港產子潮 [Fee Increase May Not Deter a Wave of Pregnant Mainland Women from coming to Hong Kong to Give Birth], <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/061221/60/1yqe6.html>.

perceptions and plans of China daughters with responds to the state's imposition on birth quota.

### **Research Background**

Past studies of this policy centered mainly around the attitudes and practices of members of older generations: those who had not been raised under the one-child policy, but were forced to comply with it upon reaching reproductive age.<sup>8</sup> Now a new generation has grown up under the one-child law and is coming of marriageable age. Research on the group (of people born between 1978 and 1986) is critical for understanding current views towards state policy and the family values of those reared under the one-child norm.

Under the one-child policy, women in China are the objects of intense state control. Their experiences are considerably different from those of men because they are the ones who bear the responsibility for contraception and reproduction. They are also the most vulnerable to the physical and psychological risks that accompany these responsibilities.<sup>9</sup> An analysis focusing on women will generate important data on the response of current young urban Chinese to state-imposed policies.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study examines the reactions of China daughters to the one-child policy in two areas: degree of compliance with the state policy and the degree to which the one-

---

8. Banister, *China's Changing Population*, 1987; Milwertz, *Accepting Population Control*, 1997; and Doherty and Norton. "China's One-Child Policy," 745-761.

9. Gal and Kligman, *Reproducing Gender*, 2000; Kligman, *The Politics of Duplicity*, 1998; and Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 2003.

child policy has affected their family values. The study is primarily motivated by the following question: *To what extent have China daughters internalized the state policy of the one-child norm?*

### **Governmentality**

Broadly speaking three different approaches have been used to tackle this question. The first approach is that of “governmentality”, a notion originally introduced by the French philosopher Michel Foucault in order to understand the workings of modern state power in the West. “Governmentality” refers to both a process of and the results of an exercise of a very complex form of power, through which the apparatuses of government administer or control the population.<sup>10</sup> For Foucault, the modern state need not extend its power over society by means of suppressive, coercive, rigid and direct forms of control. He believes that the state can tactically employ non-violent, uncoercive, and indirect techniques and institutions by which to shape and manipulate the thoughts, wants, needs, and behaviour of people as they pursue their own goals.<sup>11</sup> To devise justification for state intervention, the state tactically “create[s] a shared sense of problematization, or modes of problem formation...within shared rationalities or styles of thinking, so that the population not only understands a problem in a particular way but also solves it in a particular way.”<sup>12</sup> The rationalities not only “re-present” the governing social reality, but they also appear as though they are derived from pure and neutral

---

10. Foucault, “Governmentality,” 100, Rose, Malley and Valverde, “Governmentality,” 88; and Dean, “Michel Foucault,” 324-325.

11. Valverde, “Genealogies of European States,” 170.

12. Rose, Malley and Valverde, “Governmentality,” 88.

knowledge.<sup>13</sup> In order to set conditions under which the people would follow their own self-interest and act upon themselves in ways wished by the state, the state rationalities must reflect a concern for “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its conditions, the increase of its wealth, longevity, [and] health etc.”<sup>14</sup>

In contrast to sovereignty or pre-modern state power, Foucault sees that modern state manages its population not only through direct techniques, of which the population and individuals are aware, but also through indirect techniques, by which the state power is exercised without the full awareness of people.<sup>15</sup> Even though the government attempt to shape people’s thoughts and actions by calculated means, the question of consent does not arise because power is operated at a distance.<sup>16</sup>

Overall, the reach of governmentality or state power seems to be all-encompassing or omnipotent. Although Foucault claims that governmentality creates political struggle and contestation which also makes governmentality possible, he does not elaborate on what grounds people might or do in fact engage in a political struggle and contestation against the exercise of governmentality. For him, there seems to be no way of escaping the power of governmentality because all political struggle and contestation against it only strengthens and extends it, but do not over turn it.<sup>17</sup>

In the context of China, the notion of “governmentality” suggests the state could create a shared sense of crisis over overpopulation that could be based on scientifically

---

13. Lemke, “The Birth of Bio-politics,” 191.

14. Foucault, “Governmentality,” 100.

15. Ibid.

16. Li, *The Will to Improve*, 5.

17. Foucault, “Governmentality,” 103.

“neutral” knowledge. With masked rationalities what is to count as the ‘real’ interests of the Chinese people, the state could justify its intervention of the one-child policy on grounds that the policy makes possible an improvement of people’s quality of life and economic modernization.

The speech by Vice Minister Wang Peian at the beginning of this chapter could be said to vividly reflect this tactic of governmentality. In the speech, the state leads the Chinese population to continue to believe in the existence of a scientifically defined population problem, and that the state must tackle that problem by means of the one-child policy. This provided the Chinese population with both a representation of a problem and a strategy and technique for intervention with uniquely “Chinese Characteristics”. It appeals to its citizens a sense of obligation toward China of the past, present, and perhaps in the future.

A recent application of the Foucauldian notion of governmentality to China was taken up by Greenhalgh and Winckler in their book *Governing China’s Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics*. Their argument affirms Foucault’s sense of the importance of population as a central object of power, policy formulation, implementation in China. By mapping the historical development of the population control policy from Mao Zedong era to the present Hu Jintao era, the authors argue that China’s political ideologies and modes of governance are being transformed in a way that resemble Foucault’s governmentality approach. The Chinese state has increasingly taken a softer approach to population control enforcement by resorting to a range of strategies and tactics that are less coercive in nature, such as provisions of social welfare, and more

rewards for compliance in order to make the one-child policy more appealing to its population.<sup>18</sup>

The state also tries to rationalize its population control policy through diffused and “neutral” institutions such as education, law, and promotion of quality children programs. By these means, it hopes that the citizens will perceive the policy as advantageous to the country at large, as well as themselves, and decide to actively internalize the one-child norm.<sup>19</sup> While Greenhalgh and Winckler recognize that there has been societal resistance to the one-child policy, they are positive that public attitudes have shifted greatly, and are still shifting in accordance with the state’s program of population control.<sup>20</sup> They believe that through the use of non-coercive strategies the state can achieve its long-term goal of voluntary compliance from its people.

Like Foucault, Greenhalgh and Winkler assumes that the state has an all-inclusive power that is so effective in its manipulative tactics that the people are unlikely to take up further political struggle and contestation toward the one-child policy, and they will internalize the government policy and regulate themselves in accordance with that policy and governments desires.<sup>21</sup> In short, they will practice self-regulation because of internalization. This is one way to view the actions of the Chinese state and the Chinese people’s reaction to the one-child policy.

---

18. Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China’s Population*, 2005.

19. Ibid.

20. Merli, Book Review, 164-165.

21. Li, *The Will to Improve*, 25.

## Demographic Transition Theory

The second approach that has been used to view the impact of the one-child policy on the present generation of single-daughters in China is that of demographic transition theory. According to the demographer John C. Caldwell, this theory can be traced back to a paper written by Frank Notestein in 1945, which explained the decline of fertility in Western countries in this way:

“Fertility in premodern countries had been kept if not artificially high, then high only by maintenance of a whole series of props: ‘religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, community customs, marriage habits and family organizations...all focused towards maintaining high fertility.’ High fertility was necessary for survival because otherwise the very high mortality rate would have led to population decline and extinctions. But eventually in country after country mortality began to decline, and the props were no longer needed or were not needed at their original strength.”<sup>22</sup>

Notestein argues that the process of modernization was bringing the birth rates down and undermining the need for traditional social props. The growth of large, mobile city populations tended to foster individualism and dissolve the large corporate family structures, along with the traditional family based way of life.<sup>23</sup>

In addition to growing secularization, growing awareness of the world, improved modern education, modern technology (including technologies of birth control), and an increased appreciation of status of women in society are also important factors explaining the decline in fertility rate in the West.<sup>24</sup>

---

22. Caldwell, “Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory,” 323; Notestein was not the first to state the essentials of the demographic transition theory, but his work was conventionally accepted as the classic elaboration of this theory. See Kirk, “Demographic Transition Theory,” 363.

23. Caldwell, “Toward A Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory,” 323-324.

24. *Ibid.*, 324.

In essence, this theory suggests that a country's demographic profile goes through three developmental stages: no growth, high growth, then a return to a low or no growth in population.<sup>25</sup> The first stage is characterized by high death rate and high infantile and childhood mortality rate. The second stage is characterized by high birth rates, and low death rates which come about as a result of improvement in quality of life due to advancement in medical technology, food production, and food distribution. The final stage is characterized by a smaller family size and longer birth intervals due to the rise in the standard of living and advancement in birth control technology.

This theory implies that the Chinese population profile has nothing to do with the notion of governmentality. Even without the one-child policy, family size in China will decrease because economic growth increases the cost of children and reduces their economic contribution and value to the families.<sup>26</sup> China daughters' birth planning strategies is a reaction to their career aspirations and individual comforts of life rather than as a result of direct or indirect manipulation by the Central State.

## **Resistance**

The third approach to examine the reactions of China daughters to the one-child policy is the concept of resistance. It is a general concept that often appears in various ways in the existing literature that examines people's responses to some form of

---

25. Oppenheimer, "Social Demography," 14271.

26. Ibid.

dominant establishment (eg. power, and norm). Resistance is a mode of agency in people's reactions to power relations.<sup>27</sup>

According to the widely influential Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, ruling-class interests are “never a permanent state of affairs and never uncontested” because power could trigger conscious reactions such as resistance, accommodation, or consent.<sup>28</sup> In the field of media studies, Stuart Hall was inspired by Gramsci and focuses on how the media operates to further their mental domination and how the audiences react to media texts. He points out the mass media tend to produce messages and images that serve the interests of the dominant force, while appearing to be autonomous and neutral. In its presentation, the media intricately and skillfully combines some elements of recognition and identification so that the audience can find within the dominant ideologies some shared feelings and perceptions and respond positively.<sup>29</sup>

In describing the reactions to this constant manipulation, Hall rejects the notion of passive audience. He argues that the audience has the ability to produce its own readings of and give its own meanings to cultural texts. He emphasizes that neither the “preferred reading” nor the “preferred” ideologies are automatically adopted by the audience.<sup>30</sup> Some people might favour the dominant messages because these bring an element that they can share. Other people might have oppositional readings that put them into direct conflict with the preferred reading because they do not share any elements with the dominant ideologies. In other words, Hall regards all members of the audience as active

---

27. Meyers, “Agency,” 372.

28. Joseph, *Social Theory*, 36; and Hall, “Cultural Studies,” 97.

29. Hall, “Notes on Deconstructing ‘The Popular’,” 233.

30. Kellner, “Cultural Studies and Social Theory,” 396.

agents in processing the dominant or “preferred” ideas that are presented to them.<sup>31</sup>

According to him, there is a constant and continued struggle between the dominant force and dominated group in the media:

“There are points of resistance; there are also moments of supersession. This is the dialectic of cultural struggle... in the complex lines of resistance and acceptance refusal and capitulation, which make the field of culture a sort of constant battlefield. A battlefield where no once-for-all victories are obtained but where there are always strategic positions to be won and lost.”<sup>32</sup>

I think Hall’s concept of active resistance is one of the more appropriate approaches to my study of the reaction of China daughters to the one-child policy. In order to apply his approach, I will substitute the word people for audience, and policy or power of the state for the power of the mass media. Using this substitution, I can re-state Hall’s concept in the following way. The state has the power to constantly rework, reshape, and impose dominant ideologies on its citizens, but the state does not have the all-inclusive power to occupy and rework the interior life, or remove the contradictions in feelings and perceptions of those who are exposed to the ideologies.<sup>33</sup> People could internalize the state ideologies if they share the rationalities presented by the state and they could resist these messages if they do not share the states’ goals. There is a limit to people’s internalization of the dominant ideology because there are certain aspects of people’s life that are simply too private and too personal to intruded upon.<sup>34</sup>

---

31. Hall, “Notes on Deconstructing ‘The Popular,’” 232-233.

32. Ibid., 233-235.

33. Ibid., 232-233.

34. Kellner, “Cultural Studies and Social Theory,” 396.

More specifically, in terms of reaction to China's one-child policy, the Chinese state can be viewed as wanting its citizens to internalize its one-child norm. It would succeed in doing so only when people share the "scientific" rationalities behind the one-child policy. Yet, it can never succeed completely because fertility for some is too intimate an issue to be subjected to the total intrusions of the state.

Inspired by Gramsci and Hall, various anthropologists focus on women's resistance to public and private patriarchy. As Holly Wardlow shows in *Wayward Women: Sexuality and Agency in a New Guinea Society*, this means that under an asymmetrical relationship of power, women have "negative agency" or can engage in acts of resistance.<sup>35</sup> Instead of exerting agency that would subordinate their desire to the needs of their families or clans (eg. accept arranged marriages or sex as a force of reproduction or in my study, the government needs), the women have the agency to refuse the dominant force (eg. refuse to marry designated partners or exchange sex for money and refuse to go along with the government wishes). The refusal to cooperate, Wardlow argues, is an important means available to women in influencing the social field and to taking charge of their own lives. She claims that the women have their own individual goals which can differ from or oppose those of dominant force (eg. husband, brothers, family, clan and the government).<sup>36</sup> Similarly, the various articles in *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*, edited by Margaret Lock and Patricia A. Kaufert, provide strong evidence that women are not passive recipients of technological innovations on the issues of reproduction, and by implications of government plans, techniques and

---

35. Wardlow, *Wayward Women*, 13.

36. *Ibid.*, 14.

strategies. Women's reaction to the process of medicalization may range from acceptance to rejection or indifference of government aims and practices, depending on whether its use of technology and the techniques fits with their own priorities and values.<sup>37</sup> Lock and Kaufert point out that few women in the various studies are passive to situations of domination even though they are constrained in their choice and the ways they can resist.<sup>38</sup> In one of these articles, “*The Consequences of Modernity for Women in China*,” Lisa Handwerker demonstrates how some childless Chinese women embrace the dominant ideology of normative womanhood, while others challenge it. Some consciously choose to remain childless out of personal desires which others consciously rebel against the government and the possibility of childlessness.<sup>39</sup>

Overall, resistance constitutes a main theme in the existing literature regardless in many fields of study.<sup>40</sup> In the case of Chinese Studies, several scholars specifically focus on resistance to the one-child policy. For example, in *Birth Control 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development*, Thomas Scharping states that “propaganda in favour of one-child families has not succeeded in changing the basic contradiction between numbers and sex of children desired in private life and in state policies.” Citing actual examples, he contends that resistance and strategies of non-compliance still remain a major problem for the government.<sup>41</sup> Tyrene Whites’ study also points out that there are struggles between the state and the people over the dominion

---

37. Lock and Kaufert, *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*, 2.

38. *Ibid.*, 2, 5.

39. Handwerker, “The Consequence of Modernity for Women in China,” 200.

40. For example, see Goldstein, *Laughter Out of Place*, 2003; and Li, *The Will to Improve*, 2007.

41. Scharping, *Birth Control in China*, 224.

of childbearing. According to her, there is a “simultaneous existence of massive evidence in state’s capacity to engineer childbearing, and massive evidence of resistance, including successful resistance”. She classifies resistance to the one-child policy into three general categories: direct confrontation, evasion of enforcement, and accommodation and notes that these forms reflect the “voice” of the Chinese people.<sup>42</sup>

Given all the evidence in the existing literature, I think Hall’s concept of resistance can provide an alternate theory to that of governmentality and demographic transition in analyzing the relationship between China daughter and the state with regards to the one-child policy.

### **Purpose and Concepts**

The purpose of this study is to examine the reactions of China daughters to the one-child policy and the extent to which this policy has affected their family values. I intend to seek answers to three guiding questions: (1) Do China daughters feel that the PRC government consistently and widely disseminates and strictly enforces the one-child policy?<sup>43</sup> (2) Do they intend to comply with the one-child policy? (3) Does the one-child policy have a major impact on their family values? I also intend to put these answers in the context of the three theoretical frameworks outlined above: governmentality, demographic transition and resistance.

Key concepts used in this study include “family values”, “Confucianism”, and “individualism”. By “family value,” I mean people’s ideas about family that organize

---

42. The three forms of resistance will be discussed in details in Chapter Two. See Tyrene White, “Domination, Resistance and Accommodation,” 102.

43. “PRC” is the short form for People’s Republic of China.

and guide their behaviour and planning in the private sphere.<sup>44</sup> “Confucianism” is a complicated concept to define. In the context of my study, I shall narrow it down to filial piety, deference, respect and support for elders, obedience to parents’ decisions, preference for sons over daughters and for patrilocal residence pattern after marriage. It also implies placing the family’s collective interest ahead of individual interest or happiness, particularly when it comes to mate choice.<sup>45</sup>

In striking contrast to the Confucian family values is the concept of individualism, with its strong sense of independence non-conformity and gender equality. An individualist often places his or her interests and happiness ahead of the family collective. Instead of focusing on the needs of elders, he or she is more interested in self-development and making his or her own mate choice and setting up his or her own independent household. An individualist also places stronger emphasis on internal experiences and emotions in making judgments and decisions, and greater emphasis on maximizing individual well being and happiness.<sup>46</sup>

In this thesis, I will examine the family values of China daughters along the continuum of individualism and Confucianism. In order to study the impact of the one-child policy on this continuum, I use a comparison group of Hong Kong daughters of the same generation, who were not reared under the one-child policy. More specifically, I conducted interviews with 12 China daughters who are studying in Canada and compare their responses with those given by 11 single-child daughters brought up in Hong Kong.

---

44. Feldman, Mont-Reynaud and Rosenthal, “When East Moves West,” 142.

45. Pochagina, “Chinese Youth,” 137; and Leung, *Perspectives on Hong Kong Society*, 50.

46. Schimmack, Oishi and Diener, “Individualism,” 26; and Wang Yan, “Value Changes,” 234; and Chirkov et al., “Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence,” 98.

My assumption is that if the data for both groups show similarities, then the one-child policy may not be the most influential factors in accounting for the current family values of China daughters. This comparative method also allows me to explore the extent to which China daughters have internalized the state policy and enables me to place my data in the context of three theoretical frameworks: the notions of “governmentality”, demographic transition, and resistance.

### **Organization of this Thesis**

Chapter Two will provide an overview of the history of China’s one-child policy and review the existing literature on the degree of compliance with the one-child policy in the past two decades and the reaction of the people. I will also review existing literature on the family values of contemporary Chinese people. Chapter Three will provide details on the research method used, the sampling frame, the questionnaire design, the interviewing procedure, and the reception of the participants.

Chapter Four will begin with the general demographic characteristics of China and Hong Kong daughters of this study. I will also present data on China daughters’ experience on the dissemination and enforcement of the one-child policy, and the range of their intention to comply with the one-child policy. This chapter will end with an exploration of their degree of satisfaction with the one-child policy. Chapter Five will focus on the family values of China daughters in terms of marriage, childbearing, old age support, mate choice and gender preference of children, and compare them with those of Hong Kong daughters. The purpose is to analyze whether the one-child policy is the most plausible explanation for the family values of China daughters.

Chapter Six will place the findings of my interviews in the context of three theoretical approaches on China daughters' degree of compliance to the state policy: "governmentality", the demographic transition theory, and the concept of "resistance". Chapter Seven will present a self-evaluation of the contributions, limitations of my research findings. I will also make some suggestions for future research.

## Chapter Two

### **Review of Existing Literature on the One-Child Policy and Family Values**

In this chapter, I will provide an overview of the one-child policy from its initial stage of advocacy, to a period in which the state utilizes draconian birth control measures, followed by a period in which the state shifts towards indirect control measures to induce compliance by individuals. I will also review the literature which indicates that in the 1980s, Chinese citizens responded to this state-imposed policy with great resistance and noncompliance. Then I will move onto literature which explores the relationship between the one-child policy and family values. The review of these topics will provide a basis for my study on the dynamics between the action of the state and the reaction of China daughters towards the one-child policy.

#### **The Origin and Development of the One-Child Policy**

China's population policy actually appeared long before the introduction of the one-child policy in 1979. According to Greenhalgh and Winckler, it can be divided into four eras which roughly coincide with the four successive national leaders: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao. Mao's era (roughly mid 1950s to mid 1970s) was mainly characterized by "soft birth control" in which the state merely advocated that the population to practice birth planning.<sup>47</sup> This was because Mao believed that a huge population in China "is a very good thing" and that "revolution plus production can solve the problem of feeding the population." He dismissed Malthus's view that unless there is family planning, food production cannot keep pace with

---

47. Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, 47-201.

population growth.<sup>48</sup> However, the first population census in 1953 alarmed scholars and government officials as it indicated that China had a huge population of 602 million, which was 30% larger than they had assumed. This had led to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s support for planned fertility and academic discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of China's huge population.

Unfortunately, the Anti-Rightist political movement in 1957 and the Great Leap Forward in 1958 silenced the discussion of birth regulation. One notable example was the persecution of Professor Ma Yinchu (the President of Beijing University at the time). He disagreed with Marxist's view that the population problem does not appear in socialist society and believed that a planned population reproduction was the appropriate action for China's socialist planned economy to pursue. Ma was then labeled a political rightist with bourgeoisie Malthusian thoughts and was fired from his position. Between 1959 to 1961, the drastic decline in birth rate and increase in death rate in the wake of economic calamity and natural disasters stalled any actions to tightly control population growth.<sup>49</sup>

In 1962, with the resumption of economic stability, there was a rush to resume marriage and childbirth. This created a baby boom, which alarmed officials again. It led to a more active stance on birth control policy. All levels of officials were directed to promote birth control, and the health departments and hospitals were instructed to conduct medical research on birth control devices, train new health workers, and offer free contraceptive services to the public.<sup>50</sup>

---

48. Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 29.

49. Liang and Lee, "Fertility and Population Policy," 9-10.

50. *Ibid.*, 11-13.

However, these efforts were interrupted again in 1966 by the Cultural Revolution, during which Red Guards were encouraged to attack Party organizations and leaders.<sup>51</sup> It was only when the Cultural Revolution officially ended in 1969 and Zhou Enlai became the Premier, that there was a renewed concern about population size. In the 1970s, there were slogans such as “late, sparse, few” (晚、希、小), which encouraged the masses to marry late, have their first birth at a later age, and have no more than three children with a birth interval of four to five years between each birth.<sup>52</sup> Slogans such as “one is not too few, two will do and three is too many for you” show the policy was increasingly defined in numerical terms and that the state strongly promoted a two-child norm.<sup>53</sup> In general, during Mao’s era, the state’s effort to plan population growth and promote birth control was often interrupted. Only at the latest stage was there a birth control program.

Deng’s era (roughly late 1970s to early 1990s) was characterized by “hard birth control” policy which set much stricter limits, and put in place a system of enforcement. This vigorous approach was accompanied by Deng’s economic reform and open policy which began in 1979. It was part of the attempt to achieve a new economic goal for China, including a “comfortable standard of living” and a four-fold increase in the gross national product to \$ 1,000 USD per capita by 2000.<sup>54</sup> Given the dense population and

---

51. Brugger and Reglar, *Politics, Economy and Society*, 40-44.

52. “晚、希、小” in pinyin is *wan, xi, xiao*; the encouraged ages for late marriage were 25 and 27 respectively for women and men in the cities, and 23 and 25 in the countryside. See Croll, “Introduction,” 20; For the period between 1949 and 1967, the average age of women at first marriage fluctuated around 19.2 to 22.6 in the cities and 18.4 to 19.9 respectively in the rural areas; There is a slight increase in these numbers for the period of 1970 to 1982. The numbers fluctuated between 24.1 and 25.4 in the cities, and 21.1 and 22.6 in the rural area. No parallel data is reported on men. Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 242.

53. Croll, “Introduction,” 20.

54. Liang and Lee, “Fertility and Population Policy,” 15; and Greenhalgh, “Planned Births, Unplanned Persons,” 202-203; and Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 34.

the high birthrate, under the Mao regime, the Reform leaders feared that whatever surplus generated by economic modernization would be consumed by its huge population.<sup>55</sup> This accounts for Deng's inauguration of the one-child policy in 1979.

State slogans in the early 1980s first introduced the concept of “quality children” and encouraged people to have: “late marriage, late birth, few[er] births, [and] quality births” (晚婚、晚育、少生、优生).<sup>56</sup> Tight state control in cities included compulsory monthly gynaecological examinations for child-bearing age women, issuing of marriage and birth permits by work units, and setting up neighbourhood birth control units. Given the Confucian preferences for sons in rural areas, this “hard birth control” policy led to violence against peasant women and the practice of female infanticide, both of which attracted condemnation from feminist groups and human rights groups around the world.<sup>57</sup> This condemnation in turn led to a policy adjustment from 1984 to 1987. It allowed more exceptions to the one-child rule, such as letting only-girl families in rural areas to have a second child, four years following the birth of the first. However, in 1987 there was a retightening of birth control campaign because of the higher birth rate during the relaxation period. Although the rule of allowing only-daughter households to have a second child remained in effect, policy enforcement was tightened by using crash campaigns, such as forced abortion of all unplanned pregnancies, and sterilization of one member of couples who had reached their childbearing limit. Cadres in various units

---

55. China is one of the most populous nations in the world with one-fifth of the global population. According to its fifth national census in the year 2000, the PRC had a population of 1.29 billion. See Liang and Lee, “Fertility and Population Policy,”<sup>8</sup> and “Zhongguo renhou” 中国人口 [China's Population], [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkgk/zgrk2/t20050920\\_31760.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkgk/zgrk2/t20050920_31760.htm).

56. “晚婚、晚育、少生、优生” in pinyin is *wan hun, wan yu, shao sheng, you sheng*.

57. Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, 2005.

were held personally responsible for enforcing the one-child policy and had to regularly submit reports on birth control objectives and performances.

The Jiang Zemin era (roughly mid 1990s to early 2000s) was characterized by increasing softening of Deng's "hard birth control" approach and phasing out crash campaigns. There was more emphasis on raising "quality children", while maintaining low fertility at the same time. The state focused on correcting previous program maladministration, such as cracking down on corruptions of birth control officials; professionalizing birth work; diverting money to hire and train specialized personnel; providing continuous quality services; and improving the incentives system for citizen compliance. A national law was also enacted on December 29, 2001 and became effective on September 1, 2002 in order with the aim to provide legal basis for enforcing birth control.<sup>58</sup>

In the present (Hu Jintao) era, the one-child policy continues with the "low tide" phase.<sup>59</sup> Increasingly there is less coercion, and less reliance on penalties, such as charging a "social fostering fee" (社会抚养费), terminating of health, education, employment, and childcare benefits. Instead, more rewards are now given to induce compliance, such as paid holidays, merit payments, various discounts on fees, and

---

58. Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, 131-165.

59. The term "low tide" phase or "soft" approach are used in the sense that the state increasingly shifts away from utilizing forceful restrictive administrative methods for averting births, towards relying on legal obligation of people. The law entitles citizens to practice the one-child law, but also allows certain legal provisions for those who qualify to have a second child legally. Those who do not qualify, but are capable of paying a fee and can cope with the punishments mentioned earlier, can still legally permit to have a second child. Those who did not pay the fines are to be referred to the courts accordingly to the law. The law also contained punishments for maladministration and provision for citizens to appeal decisions or sue administrators. In this sense, people remain to be governed, but are subject to a more "soft" or subtle form of power instead of an overt, obvious and coercive form of power as in during the "high tide" phase of "hard birth control". See Ibid., 158; and "Zhongguo renhou" 中国人口 [China's Population], [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkgk/zgrk2/t20050920\\_31760.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkgk/zgrk2/t20050920_31760.htm).

priorities in housing allocations, old age benefits, job training, and child subsidies.<sup>60</sup>

There is also greater emphasis on social policies to guarantee old age security so as to reduce the anxiety level of those who comply with the policy.<sup>61</sup> For people, especially those living in the poor rural areas, the state uses the slogan, “fewer births, faster prosperity” (少生快富) to encourage them to think of the personal benefits of limiting births.<sup>62</sup>

Hu’s approach to population planning is a response to the emergence of social problems associated with the rigid enforcement of the one-child policy in the past two decades, such as the distorted sex ratio due to sex-selected abortion and the abandonment of females babies, and problems associated with the inverse population pyramid in which there are more people of retirement than working age. The state now realizes that without sufficient provision for social security, it would be difficult to persuade the masses, especially those in the poor and rural regions, to forgo their aspirations to have more male children for practical purposes such as an increase in labor power and old age support. To induce voluntary compliance with the one-child policy, Hu’s regime is working on a series of social policy initiatives to improve public health delivery, to reduce poverty and to provide more social security.<sup>63</sup>

---

60. Ibid; “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa*” 中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [People’s Republic of China’s population and family planning law], [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326\\_27023.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326_27023.htm); and 社会抚养费 in pinyin is *shehui fuyang fei*.

61. Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China’s Population*, 2005.

62. Ibid; and 少生快富 in pinyin is *shaosheng, kuai fu*.

63. Ibid., 173.

From the above account of the origin and development of the birth control policy, one can see that although China daughters in my study were raised under Deng's "high tide" period of direct coercive state control on births, they are currently experiencing Hu's increasingly indirect, "soft" approach characteristic of the "low tide" period. This might be one factor which significantly affected their response to the one-child policy during my interview sessions.

### **Noncompliance: People's Response to the One-Child Policy**

To study the reaction of the current generation of China daughters to the one-child policy, it is necessary to first understand the popular fertility preferences for China in general and to review existing literature on people's response to this policy in the 1980s.

Studies on fertility preferences and trends since the promulgation of the one-child policy indicate that the whole of China seems to have moved toward smaller family sizes. Preferences for four children or more is negligible. Although preference for childlessness has been increasing in major Chinese cities,<sup>64</sup> the most ideal fertility preference is a two-child family consisting of one son and one daughter, which is still more than the state sanctioned number.<sup>65</sup> With the popular fertility preference at odd with the state sanctioned one-child norm, it is not surprising that substantial scholarships has shown societal resistance as a response to the one-child policy.

---

64. Feeney and Yuan. "Below Replacement Fertility in China?," 381-394; Lee and Wang, "Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities," 33-65; Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 2003; and *Yangzi wanbao* [Yangzi Evening News]. "Childless Families," 27.

65. Freedman, "Do Family Planning Programs affect Fertility Preferences?," 1-13; Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 2003; and White, "Domination, Resistance and Accommodation," 187.

This section will use Tyrene White's terms to categorize the various forms of resistance: (1) "confrontation" resistance, (2) "evasion" resistance, and (3) "accommodation" resistance.<sup>66</sup>

### **"Confrontation" Resistance**

Following White's categories, "confrontation" resistance is defined as an overt resistance to the one-child policy. This includes threats and violence against birth planning cadres, and against doctors who perform forced abortions, sterilizations, intrauterine insertions, and who reported unplanned pregnancies to officials. The forms of violence include physical assault which may result in deaths, and the vandalization of cadres' properties in retaliation to the latter's seizure and destruction of the properties of those who had violated the one-child policy.<sup>67</sup>

### **"Evasion" Resistance**

According to White's categories, "evasion" resistance is a method used to cover up unplanned pregnancy until the baby is delivered. Strategies include careful timing for a spring pregnancy so that the womb could be hidden under winter clothes when the baby is almost due, giving birth in a relative or acquaintance's home outside of the village, or temporarily migrating to the cities for this specific purpose. Those who took these risks figured that they would not be penalized, since births given outside of their own locality were not the responsibilities of local cadres. Other "evasion" resistance tactics include

---

66. Tyrene White uses these terms specifically to categorize patterns of resistance of citizens towards the One-Child Policy in China. White, "Domination, Resistance and Accommodation," 187.

67. *Ibid.*, 188-189.

giving bribes to local cadres and hospital staff to facilitate illegal removal of intrauterine devices, to file fake gynaecological examination reports, to hand out false certification on sterilization, or to issue second child exemption permits and to falsify first child's physical or mental disabilities. Yet other strategies include cohabiting without registering marriages, since birth planning cadres only concentrate on the birth control practices of married couples.

Local cadres usually refrain from exposing these evasion strategies because they themselves will be punished if unplanned births occur within their units. Thus, they help cover up false reports by families, and give false statistics to inspection teams sent from the upper echelons. Being a local inhabitant, birth planning cadre sometimes even refuses to punish heads of only-daughter households for violating the one-child policy because they want to avoid confrontations with the masses.<sup>68</sup>

### **“Accommodation” Resistance**

“Accommodation” resistance is an approach that uses drastic self-inflicted measures to accommodate the state's birth policy without agreeing with its rationale. A typical example is the practice of female infanticide<sup>69</sup> in order to reserve the birth quota

---

68. Ibid., 189-193.

69. Wasserstrom, “Resistance to the One-Child Family,” 345-374.

for a male child. Other strategies include abandonment<sup>70</sup>, adoption<sup>71</sup>, and selective abortion of female fetuses<sup>72</sup> on the basis of illegal ultrasound prescreening.<sup>73</sup>

According to scholars in the field, “confrontation”, “evasion” and “accommodation” resistance to the one-child policy occurred mostly among families in rural China during the period of “hard birth control” in the 1980s<sup>74</sup>. Such resistance strategies and measures show that the state had met with various degree of non-compliance and that its power to internalize its people with the one-child norm was limited. However, existing literature has no up-to-date data on city responses, especially by the women of the current generation. Having noted strong resistance in the past among the older generations in rural areas, this study will explore the reactions of the current generation of urban China daughters to the one-child policy and to examine whether they plan to use various forms of non-compliance during the present “low tide” period. The aim is to illuminate the extent to which they have internalized the one-child policy.

---

70. See also Johnson, “Chinese Orphanages,” 61-87; Johnson, “Revival of Infant Abandonment,” 77-98; and Johnson, Huang and Wang, “Infant Abandonment and Adoption,” 469-510.

71. Riley, “American Adoptions of Chinese Girls,” 87-102.

72. Chu, “Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-selective Abortion,” 259-282; Tien, “Abortion in China,” 441-468; Ping and Smith, “Induced Abortion and Policy Implications,” 278-286; and Wang, C. et al, “Pregnancy and Induced Abortion Rates,” 646-648.

73. White, “Domination, Resistance and Accommodation,” 188-189. See also Plafker, “Sex Selection,” 1233; and Chan et al., “Gender Selection in China,” 426-430.

74. Aird, *Slaughter of the Innocents*, 1990; Aird, “Coercion in Family Planning,” 184-221; Cooney and Li, “Sterilization and Financial Penalties,” 67-78; and Davin, “The Single-child Family Policy,” 37-82.

## **Family Values in China**

Another way to examine people's reactions to the one-child policy is to explore the impact of this policy on their family values. For the purpose of analysis, I will narrow down the concept of family values to the following aspects: (1) family power structure, (2) mate choice, (3) residence pattern, and (4) gender preferences, and place each aspect along the individualism-Confucianism continuum.

### **Family Power Structure**

As mentioned in Chapter one, under the Confucian principles the father holds absolute authority and the children show absolute obedience to their parents. By contrast under Western-inspired individualism, the children do not show such deference to their elders.<sup>75</sup> Existing literature indicates that in today's China, authority and power structure within families have been somewhat redistributed among its members.<sup>76</sup> Specifically, after the one-child policy came into effect in 1979, children have become more cherished and heavily indulged by their parents and grandparents. These only-children are often spoiled by being offered fancy clothing, toys, special snacks, and extracurricular activities. Their wishes are often fulfilled because their parents feel that they only have one child.<sup>77</sup> In some cases, such parental overprotectiveness and indulgence encourage negative personality development such as selfishness. In addition, families have become more democratic in structure, with the child being given greater freedom and greater

---

75. Huang, "Planned Fertility of One-couple/One-child Policy," 775-784.

76. Kane, *The Second Billion*, 1987; and Yan, "Courtship, Love and Premarital Sex," 29-53.

77. Crowell and Hsieh. "Little Emperors," 44-50; Fong, *Only Hope*, 2004; and Lu, "China's Only Children," 27-19.

“say” in decision-making.<sup>78</sup> What the existing literature does not show us is whether these single-children in their adult years welcome parental participation in major decision-making.

### **Mate Choice**

Under Confucian principles, marriage was primarily intended to serve the family’s purpose and not the individual’s desires, but the reverse is true under the principle of individualism. Since 1949, Chinese people have been moving towards the individualism side of the continuum. With Mao’s new marriage law and political campaigns that denounced arranged marriage, mate choice has become the younger generations’ realm of decision making.<sup>79</sup> In the 1980s, with the infiltration of Western imagery of romantic love in films, novels and mass media, mate choice has come to be regarded by the younger generation as a personal matter outside the purview of parents or the Party-State.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, at least one study by Fan and Lee shows that marriage may not be based on romantic love, but could be used by an individual or a household to attain certain material goals.<sup>81</sup>

### **Post-marital Residence Pattern**

Under Confucian principles, adult children are expected to live together with their parents and to provide the latter with financial aid and care when they are sick. There are

---

78. Rosenberg and Jing, “A Revolution in Family Life,” 51-69.

79. Wang and Yang, “Age at Marriage and the First Birth Interval,” 299-320.

80. Liu, “Holding Up the Sky,” 199; and Tan, “Marriage and Family in China,” 31.

81. Fan and Li, “Marriage and Migration in Transitional China,” 619-638.

no such expectations under the individualist ethos.<sup>82</sup> Existing literature is somewhat ambiguous on this aspect of family values in present day China. A recent study finds that the one-child generation may still possess a general sense of filial respect; however, more educated only-children are less willing to abandon their career or reduce their job load to care for their parents. In addition, only-children are also less willing than those from multiple-child families to co-reside with elderly parents. For their part, few elderly parents expect their adult children to co-reside with them or sacrifice career opportunities to take care of them.<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, some studies show that the one-child policy has little impact on patrilineal co-residence pattern even in large Chinese cities. Following Confucian patrilocal principles, husband living with the wife's parents is an uncommon pattern, although this might become more popular in the future.<sup>84</sup>

### **Gender Preference**

Confucian family values have a built-in bias against having female children because only the male child could continue with the family line, whereas individualism stresses gender equality.<sup>85</sup> In this regard, some studies show that the one-child policy did exacerbate Confucian attitude of son preference because people are only allowed to have one child.<sup>86</sup> It is this attitude which led to the three kinds of resistance strategies in rural

---

82. Blieszner and Mancini. "Enduring Ties," 176-180.

83. Zhan, "Socialization or Social Structure," 106; and Zhan, "Willingness and Expectations," 75-200.

84. Pimentel and Liu, "Nonnormative Coresidence in Urban China," 821-836.

85. Allison and McCurry, "Gender Crisis," A16; and Bogg, "Family Planning in China," 649-651.

86. Chan et al., "Gender Selection in China," 426-430; Smith "Nonreporting of Births or Nonreporting of Pregnancies?" 481-486; and Short et al., "One-Child Policy and Care of Children," 913-943.

China to the one-child policy in the 1980s as outlined earlier in this chapter. Other studies, however, show that the whole of China seems to have an ideal preference of two-child family with one son and one daughter and have given up the Confucian ideal of a large extended household.<sup>87</sup> One-child family preference is higher in the urban areas and major cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai. A majority of urban inhabitants even indicate no sex preference for the first child.<sup>88</sup>

Increasing demand for modern life-style and individual leisure time rather than strict compliance with the one-child policy seems to be the explanation for the current preference for small family sizes. For example, an article by *Yangzi wanbao* suggests that the childless families appear to be spreading in major Chinese cities. People choose this option because of the difficulty of balancing career and childrearing. Like Western individualists, they want to pursue career goals with more time and energy, enjoy life without children, and maintain a high standard of living. However, this behavior has not yet become a norm in the PRC. Just like true Confucianists, some people viewed childless women as deviants incapable of giving birth or not fulfilling their roles to reproduce for their husbands' families.<sup>89</sup>

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of the history of birth control from its initial phase to its “high tide” phase, and to its current “low tide” phase, which is

---

87. Freedman, “Do Family Planning Programs affect Fertility Preferences?,” 1-13; and Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 214.

88. Sharping, *Birth Control in China*, 213-223.

89. *Yangzi wanbao* [Yangzi Evening News], “Childless Families,” 27; and Handwerker, “The Consequences of Modernity for Childless Women,” 109-200.

characterized by a gradual replacement of coercive birth control measures with indirect ones. Existing literature in the 1980s on China shows great resistance and noncompliance among rural inhabitants towards the one-child policy. However, it offers no clear way to place family values along the individualism-Confucianism continuum. It seems to indicate that the one-child policy reinforces Western-style individualism in terms of family power structure, mate choice and, residential patterns and yet strengthens Confucian gender bias towards sons. On closer look, such literature suffers from three drawbacks: (1) It centers mostly around the attitudes and practices of the older generations and parents of the first single-child generation who themselves were not raised under the one-child policy; (2) Insofar as scholars focus on the current situation, they tend to draw on samples of the only-child generation who were at a younger age, such as elementary school aged students;<sup>90</sup> (3) Existing literature does not analyze whether the family values of contemporary urban China daughters is a direct result of the one-child policy, the retention of Confucian values, or the infiltration of Western-style individualism.

My study focuses on the current generation of single female children in the cities of China, as they reach marriageable age. I interview them on their experiences and perception of family hierarchy, mate choice, residential pattern, and gender preference. I ask them about their existing family situation and their future plans, and I compare their answers with a sample of Hong Kong daughters. My purpose is to examine their response to the one-child policy at its “low tide” phase and the impact of the one-child

---

90. For example, Merli and Smith. “Changing Fertility Preferences,” 557-572; Choe and Tsuya, “Why Do Chinese women Practice Contraception?” 39-51; Fong, *Only Hope*, 2004; and Short et al. “One-Child Policy and Care of Children,” 913-943.

policy on their family values. I then place my interview findings in the context of three conceptual approaches: governmentality, demographic transition theory, and resistance.

## **Chapter Three**

### **Research Design**

#### **Guiding Questions**

In the last chapter, I discussed the origin and evolution of the one-child policy including the ascendance of the “soft” approach on enforcement. My literature reviews displayed evidence of societal resistance to the one-child policy in the 1980s, particularly in rural China. I also reviewed the literature on some key aspects of family values that I assumed might be affected by the one-child policy. In general, the present family shows a less hierarchical structure, less insistence on multi-generation patrilocal residential patterns, and more freedom of mate choice for the younger generation, but retains the strong gender bias of the Confucian period.

However, the extent to which the one-child policy has led to the internalization of China daughters of the one-child norm is still an open question as is its impact on China daughters’ family values. In light of the “low tide” phase of enforcement at present, this study explores the following questions:

- (1) Do China daughters feel that the PRC government consistently and widely disseminates and strictly enforces the one-child policy?
- (2) Do they intend to comply with the one-child policy?
- (3) Does the one-child policy have a major impact on their family values?

The third guiding question is rather broad, so I cater my interview questions to exploring the following sub-questions: (a) Do China daughters perceive parents to be displaying dissatisfaction with their gender? (b) Do they wish they had a sibling? (c) Do

they feel obliged to discuss choice of marriage partners with their parent? (d) Do they feel obligated to live with and to provide old age support to parents? (e) Do they prefer to give birth to a son? (f) Do they express hope for support from their only-child when they in turn grow old?

In order to explore these questions, I draw samples of China daughters born from 1978 to 1986, and compare their responses with an equivalent group of Hong Kong daughters. The rationale for my approach, the selection of the two samples and the interview procedures are listed in this chapter.

### **Qualitative Approach**

The methodological approach for this study is qualitative.<sup>91</sup> It is geared towards soliciting firsthand information and direct experience of participants being studied. I use in-depth interviews because it is the most appropriate way of researching a relatively new and unstudied subject matter, in which data collection needs to be expanded as much as possible. In going through the existing literature, I find that research is limited on China daughters who are among the first generation of only-children raised under the one-child policy. Little study has been done on their family values, marriage, childbirth, and old age plans. This justified the use of the qualitative method.

I used the semi-structured interview format rather than unstructured interview because it was more suitable for my research conditions.<sup>92</sup> This approach was a more

---

91. Qualitative research refers to “using concepts, classifications, and attempts to interpret human behaviour reflecting not only the analyst’s view but the views of the people whose behaviours being described. The emphasis is on verbal descriptions” rather than with numbers. See Jackson, *Methods Doing Social Research*, 570.

92. For an analysis of the drawbacks and benefits of the qualitative method, see Singleton and Straits, *Approaches to Social Research*, 212, 306-309; Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology*, 3rd ed., 205;

efficient use of time since my project was intended to be short-term and I believed I only had one chance to interview the participants. Just as in unstructured interview, I had the participants express themselves in their own terms and allowed both of us to venture freely into new topics of interest which may have been overlooked. Yet, I still exercised full control over participants' responses by guiding them with a list of topics that I planned to cover.

By doing qualitative research and semi-structured interviews, I can provide fair, honest, and balanced accounts of social life from the viewpoints of those who live it everyday. In conducting this research, I tried to adhere to the following core principles: (1) provide an environment and format that allow the participants to fully express themselves, (2) present and interpret findings that are true to the original data, (3) and acknowledge bias in the sampling frame.

The process of gathering data has been very labour intensive as I was the only interviewer and transcriber of this study. Because of this, my study could only involve a limited number of participants from a limited number of locations. The data collected is not a precise representation of the whole female single-child population in urban China or urban Hong Kong, but only suggests what the result of a more extensive study might be. This approach may complement large-scale survey by adding depth and meaning to data as well as providing suggestive leads for further explanatory research.

---

Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology*, 4th ed., 212; Neuman, *Social Research Methods*, 171; Ritchie and Lewis, *Qualitative Research Practice*, 273; and Babbie and Benaquisto, *Fundamentals of Social Research*, 78.

### **Sampling Frame and Comparative Method**

I interviewed 12 China daughters and compared their family values with 11 Hong Kong daughters with similar characteristics. More specifically, the China daughters sample was drawn from foreign students in Canada. These are unmarried female non-migrant Han Chinese aged between 19 and 27 inclusive, who have no siblings and are urban citizens of the People's Republics of China. The Hong Kong daughters sample was made up of unmarried female Han Chinese aged between 23 and 27 inclusive, who have no siblings and are currently living in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. I asked these two groups identical questions about their experiences, their perceptions of their present family situation and their plans for the future. Topics included family power structure, mate choice, plans for post-marital residential pattern, and gender preference.

There are two reasons for choosing to compare the China and Hong Kong daughters. The first reason is that the China daughters were brought up under the one-child policy, but not the Hong Kong daughters. Even though Hong Kong was returned to China as a Special Administrative Region of PRC in 1997, its citizens enjoy a different legal system which does not require them to practice of birth control like their present day counterparts in China.<sup>93</sup>

---

93. For full text of the Basic Law, see The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, "*Basic Law Full Text*," [http://www.info.gov.hk/basic\\_law/facts/index.htm](http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/facts/index.htm); for detailed discussions of the "one country, two systems" concept see Wong, "*One Country, Two Systems*" in *Crisis*, 2004; Postiglione and Tang, *Hong Kong's Reunion with China*, 1997; and Wang and Wong, *Hong Kong in China*, 1999.

The second reason is that they are both ethnic Chinese women growing up in societies that retain some Confucian values,<sup>94</sup> but are increasingly affluent and open to influence from Western lifestyle and ideas of individualism.<sup>95</sup> In choosing the Hong Kong daughters as a comparison group, I obtained a better understanding of the impact of the one-child policy on the family values of China daughters.<sup>96</sup>

I focused on the 19-27 age group for both the China and Hong Kong samples because they fall into a stage of life at which they would think about marriage, ideal

---

94. By “ethnic Chinese” I mean Han Chinese (Hanzu 漢族). They are an ethnic group which according to the PRC census in the year 2000 accounted for 91.59% of the total population. For Hong Kong, Han Chinese accounted for 95% of the total population in 2006. See Census and Statistics Department, “Table,” [http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong\\_kong\\_statistics/statistical\\_tables/index.jsp?htmlTableID=139&excelID=&chartID=&tableID=139&ID=&subjectID=1](http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistical_tables/index.jsp?htmlTableID=139&excelID=&chartID=&tableID=139&ID=&subjectID=1)

95. The launching of economic reforms and open-door policy since the 1980s opened China’s domestic economy to unprecedented global investment, but also brought in Western cultural influence. Global mass media, such as films and TV, exposes China to elements of Western lifestyle and the ideas of individualism and romantic love. See Chan, “China’s Growth Pattern,” 273-309; Wang and Chiu, “China’s Open-Door Policy,” 133-152; Tam, “Modernization from a Grassroots Perspective,” 372-402; Yeh, “Foreign Investment and Urban Development,” 35-64; Siu, “Is Development the Best Contraceptive,” 391-402; Croll, *Changing Identities of Chinese Women*, 176-179; Compared to those in the PRC, Hong Kong people experienced Western cultural influence at an earlier period. Under British rule since 1942, Hong Kong has transformed from an entrepot economy to financial and service centre in the 1970s. After its reversion to Mainland China in 1997, it is still one of the world’s most prosperous and cosmopolitan cities in the world. However, it still retains some traditional Chinese ethos. See Estes and Hong Kong Council of Social Service, *Social Development in Hong Kong*, 1-26, 109; Stuart-Fox, *Short History*, 117; Leung, *Perspectives on Hong Kong Society*, 1-12; Wang and Wong, *Hong Kong in China*, 5-8; Ku, “Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong,” 343-362; Evans and Tam, *Hong Kong*, 4; White, “Chinese Globalism in Hong Kong,” viii; and Tung, “Building Hong Kong,” 109.

96. Another factor that distinguishes between the Hong Kong daughters and the China daughters is that China daughters and their parents grew up in a region that have undergone 30 years of Maoist Socialism, and more than two decades of Market Socialism or “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Instead of experiencing the laissez-faire development model under the British colonial government, people in China have been subjected to the state-directed mobilization approach of the PRC’s socialist government. The difference in the historical background of China and Hong Kong might explain the difference, if any, in the comparative data of the two groups of participants. However, as can be seen in Chapter Four and Five, data on Hong Kong and China daughters are marked by similarities rather than differences. It seems safe to conclude that Western-style individualism and Confucian ethics are major determinants of family values of Hong Kong and China daughters. For details about Maoist Socialism and Market Socialism, please see Cheng, *China in the Post-Deng Era*, 1998; Dreyer, *China’s Political System*, 4th ed., 2004; and Selden, *The Political Economy of Chinese Development*, 1993.

family size and composition, and family values.<sup>97</sup> I included non-migrant China daughters in my sample because migrants in China are not fully supervised by family-planning units in urban areas and therefore might have a different attitude towards reproductive practices. Migrant workers who moved to the cities are often still holders of rural household registration (“户口” *hukou*). They are immune from the system of rewards and punishments associated with the one-child policy, such as housing, retirement benefits and welfare benefits, which are given to urban *hukou* residents.<sup>98</sup> For similar reasons, I did not include ethnic minorities (“少数民族” *shaoshu minzu*) in the PRC in this study since they are recipients of a more lenient population policy than the majority Han Chinese. *Shaoshu minzu* were exempted from the family planning policies in March 1955 and the one-child policy in 1979. The central government allows various provinces and autonomous regions inhabited by *shaoshu minzu* to set their own birth quotas according to their unique circumstances, although the maximum number of children allowed for special cases would be three.<sup>99</sup>

### **Research Locations**

I had initially planned to interview China daughters in Guangzhou, China. I had spent more than two months of correspondence with the Liaison Department at the

---

97. In 2001, 40.3% of the total national population of first marriage women in the PRC were between the age 19-22, and 58.99% were aged 23 or over. A field study of Gaozhou and western Guangdong on marriage and migration in 1999 shows that the average age of women at the time of marriage was 22.1 and the age of marriage ranged from 16 to 32. The age range of China and Hong Kong daughters of this study falls reasonably within the age of first marriage. Please see Social, Science and Technology Statistics National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, *China Population Statistics Yearbook 2001*, 256-257; and Fan and Li, “Marriage and Migration,” 619-638.

98. Froissart, “Party's Thumb,” 197-218; Goldstein, White and Goldstein, “Migration, Fertility, and State Policy,” 481-491; and Wang Chunguang, “Migrant Workers,” 185-196.

99. Shen and Wang, “Population Distribution and Growth,” 222-237.

Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (廣東省僑務辦對外聯絡處), which had initially expressed their support and submitted its own internal application for my research. Unfortunately, the application was turned down by the Foreign Affairs Office of Guangdong Province (廣東省人民外事辦公室) at the last minute.

As a result, I had to follow a backup plan: to interview China daughters from among foreign students residing in Canada, who are likely to return home to start their own family. From a practical point of view, it was more feasible for me to find China daughters at locations where I currently live and study, as this reduced the cost and duration of research. I interviewed those who had lived in Canada for less than three years, as I presume they are not strongly influenced by Canadian culture, and therefore their responses should reflect the values of China daughters living in China.

### **Questionnaires**

I designed two questionnaires for this study: an interview questionnaire and a post-interview questionnaire.<sup>100</sup> The interview questionnaire was used as a guide to conduct my semi-structured interviews; the post-interview questionnaire was used to collect basic demographic information at the end of the session. In my interview questionnaire, I devised 23 framing questions and grouped them according to their conceptual similarities with each other. The titles of the first four parts are: (1) Growing Up as a Single-child, (2) Marriage Plan, (3) Childbearing Plan, and (4) Old Age Plan. These are specifically designed to gather data on the second and third guiding question listed at the beginning of this chapter: Do China daughters intend to comply with the

---

100. See Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 for the full texts of interview and post-interview questionnaire respectively.

one-child policy? and Does the one-child policy have a major impact on their family values? I hoped to be able to compare China and Hong Kong daughters' life experience, self-image, feelings, preferences, values, attitudes, ideals, future plans and expectations in order to draw inferences about the impact of the one-child policy on China daughters.

Part Five (General Questions) and Part Six (Closing Questions) of the interview questionnaire were included so as to allow room for remaining thoughts and general comments the participants might have about my study. The post-interview questionnaire was used at the end of the session to collect basic demographic information from China and Hong Kong daughters. Its purpose was to provide the context in which their answers to the interview questionnaire can be evaluated.

### **Interview Procedure**

The majority of China and Hong Kong daughters were selected through a snowball sampling method.<sup>101</sup> I asked participants and referrers to suggest someone I should interviewed next. All participants were asked to take part in a face-to-face, semi-structured interview that lasted for approximately one and a half hours. My interview procedure follows guidelines laid down by the University of Victoria's Human Research Ethics Board. I first provided a recruitment script to the referrers who invited potential China and Hong Kong daughters to take part in my study. I then met with China and Hong Kong daughters one by one and described the procedure and methods of this research. I had each participant sign a consent form before the interview began. The

---

101. Snowball sampling method involves locating one or more key individuals and asking them to name others who would be likely candidates for the research. See Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology*, 3rd ed., 185-186.

interview was conducted solely by me. I only recorded the interviews of those who gave me permission to do so.

As the study progressed, I discovered that my interviews could not be limited to the exact wording on the list of interview questions. I started to probe China and Hong Kong daughters by adding new questions on the spot. Probing is an interview technique that aims to elicit information from the participants to further elaborate, continue, clarify, and affirm their responses following their first responses to a question and I used this in my fieldwork.<sup>102</sup> For instance, Question 9 asked: “After marriage, do you plan to live with your own parents, or your husband’s parents? Or do you plan to live apart from either side of the family? Why do you have these plans?” When China and Hong Kong daughters responded that they do not plan to live with either side of the family after marriage, I followed up by asking how close they would like to live to their parents and how frequently do they plan to visit their parents. In this way, I was able to induce further information about the degree of their filial devotion to parents.

The interview of China daughters in Canada ran from May 10<sup>th</sup> to June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2005. The interview of Hong Kong daughters took place between July 1<sup>st</sup> and October 3<sup>rd</sup> in the same year. I then completed my transcription, translation, data analysis, and final write-up in Canada.

### **Participant Responses**

There were a total of 13 interviews conducted with China daughters and 12 with Hong Kong daughters, but I could only analyze data from 12 China daughters and 11

---

102. Liamputtong and Ezzy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 63-64; and Bernard, *Research Methods in Anthropology*, 4th ed., 217.

Hong Kong daughters. This discrepancy in numbers is due to the fact that the interview data from one China daughter was lost because of technical difficulties with the recording devices and the other interview data from one Hong Kong daughter was incomplete due to insufficient interview time.

All participants appeared happy to answer my interview questions. They commented that the questions on each stage of their life were very encompassing and allowed them a chance to reflect upon their past as well as on their present and future plans. In my opinion, the presence of the microphone did not deter anyone from freely expressing herself. Some were even so very generous as to hold my microphone for the whole duration of the interview in order to cut down on the interference from high noise levels at the interview site.

No China daughters refused to answer follow-up questions on the level of dissemination of the one-child policy or turned down my request to comment on its impacts. Most Hong Kong daughters were also eager to be involved in academic research. Several reasons I believe have contributed to the enthusiastic response of all participants. First, interviews were conducted in participants' native Chinese dialects: Mandarin for China daughters, and Cantonese for Hong Kong daughters. I was therefore able to create a stronger rapport even on sensitive topics. Second, being a female interviewer enabled me to solicit in-depth answers from female participants. Same-sex talks seem to produce bonding that eases discussions on personal questions, such as childhood experience, family values and marriage plans. Third, being in the same age

group as the participants has helped me generate peer-to-peer talk environment that facilitated in-depth communications.<sup>103</sup>

Fourth, some techniques were used to facilitate the interview process. I often suggested to participants to relocate to a different place after we met up at a chosen landmark in town. During the short walk or ride, I always took the initiative to provide some details about myself. This was a good ice-breaker in which participants were given information about the interviewer prior to their being interviewed. The ice-breaker conversation allowed participants to feel more comfortable in conversing with me when the interview process began.

I usually had the participants settle at a corner table in a coffee shop or food court. I found it the best way to reduce distraction from people walking down the aisles beside our table and lower the extra background noises that was tracked by my recorder. During the whole interview, I maintained constant eye contact with the participants, nodded frequently and smiled to show my focus and interests in their answers. This demeanour encouraged enthusiastic participation and allowed them to reflect upon their own thoughts at their own pace. It put participants at ease, showed them their contributions were valued, and helped establish trust and rapport between them and me, which in turn allowed them to answer candidly and express themselves fully to potentially difficult or sensitive topics.<sup>104</sup>

---

103. Liamputtong and Ezzy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 60, suggest that age can enhance or deter participants' responses; Padfield and Procter, "The Effect of Interviewer's Gender," 355-366, shows that same-sex interviews tend to increase participants' willingness to voluntarily elaborate more on their personal experience; and Manderson, Bennett and Andajani-Sutjahjo, "The Social Dynamics of the Interview," 1320, suggest that commonality on age, gender, and class can reduce the difference between interviewers and participants, and could increase rapport, trust, and communication.

104. See Liamputtong and Ezzy, *Qualitative Research Methods*, 219, for interview techniques.

## **Conclusion**

The data I collected through interviewing these 23 participants yield significant and interesting findings. With rigorous care about interview procedures, the qualitative data obtained in this study have high degree of validity and it is very likely that a similar pattern would result in similar studies. The comparative method has provided me with good insight on the extent to which the one-child policy has affected China daughters today. The fact that their answers to questions on family values are remarkably similar enabled me to meaningfully evaluate the impact of this policy on the China daughters. The next chapter will use my findings to explore the first two guiding questions sketched at the beginning of this chapter, which deal with the dissemination and enforcement of the one-child policy and the degree to which China daughters intend to comply with it.

## Chapter Four

### **Results: The One-Child Policy as Viewed by China Daughters**

In my last chapter, I described my research design and listed three main guiding questions on the relationship between the one-child policy and the family values of China daughters. In this chapter, I shall use my field data to explore the first two guiding questions:

- (1) Do China daughters feel that the PRC government consistently and widely disseminates, and strictly enforces the one-child policy?
- (2) Do they intend to comply with the one-child policy?

I shall present data on China daughters' experience on dissemination and enforcement of the one-child policy. I shall also present data on the extent to which they intend to comply with this in the future. This will be followed by an exploration of their degree of satisfaction with being reared as a single-child by parents who were forced to comply with the one-child policy. The purpose is to evaluate the extent to which the China daughters have internalized the state's goals for fertility reduction.

Before exploring the two guiding questions mentioned above, I shall first describe the demographic characteristics of China and Hong Kong daughters from the information I gathered from the post-interview questionnaire, as these characteristics will provide the context for evaluating their answers on family value issues.

### Demographic Characteristics of Participants

In terms of age, the China daughters ranged from 19 to 27 with a mean of 22.3, and Hong Kong daughters ranged from 23 to 27 with a mean of 22.9. Although the age range between the two groups seems to be slightly different, the actual age median was about the same. Their aggregate demographic profile is presented in Table 4.1.

**Table 4.1**  
**Participants' Age Profile**

<b>Date of Birth</b>	<b>Age in 2005</b> (in years)	<b>China Daughters</b> (n = 12) <sup>a</sup>		<b>Hong Kong Daughters</b> (n = 11)	
		n	%	n	%
1978-80	25-27	1	8.3	9	81.8
1981-83	22-24	7	58.3	2	18.2
1984-86	19-21	4	33.3	0	0.0

<sup>a</sup> The total number of participants is referred to as “n” for the rest of the tables in this thesis.

**Table 4.2**  
**China Daughters' Duration of Time in Canada**

<b>Duration of Time in Months</b> <b>in Canada</b>	<b>China Daughters</b> (n = 12)	
	n	%
< 3	8	66.7
4-6	1	8.3
> 6	3	25.0

As Table 4.2 indicates, most China daughters had spent less than three months in Canada. The rest lived in Canada for two to three years. I deliberately choose these new

arrivals among foreign students because it is my assumption that their responses best reflect the family values of their cohort in China itself.

**Table 4.3**  
**China Daughters' Place of Birth**

City	Province/Region	China Daughters (n = 12)	
		n	%
Unknown	Heilongjiang (黑龍江)	1	8.3
Yingkou (營口)	Liaoning (遼寧)	1	8.3
Beijing (北京)	Not applicable	2	16.7
Tianjin (天津)	Not applicable	1	8.3
Yantai (煙臺)	Shandong (山東)	1	8.3
Xian (西安)	Shaanxi (陝西)	1	8.3
Nanjing (南京)	Jiangsu (江蘇)	1	8.3
Hangzhou (杭州)	Zhejiang (浙江)	1	8.3
Guangzhou (廣州)	Guangdong (廣東)	1	8.3
Liuzhou (柳州)	Guangxi (廣西)	1	8.3
Changzhou (常州)	Jiangsu (江蘇)	1	8.3

In terms of place of origin, Table 4.3 indicates that China daughters came from cities in different parts of the PRC. In contrast, all but two Hong Kong daughters were born in Hong Kong.<sup>105</sup>

105. One Hong Kong daughter was born in Beijing and the other one was born in Qingdao, China.

**Table 4.4**  
**Participants' Level of Education and Occupation Status**

Education level	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Senior high	4	33.3	5	45.5
College	1	8.3	2	18.2
Bachelor's degree	5	41.7	3	27.3
Master's degree	1	8.3	1	9.1
<b>Present occupation status</b>				
Full-time student	12	100.0	0	0.0
Full-time employee	0	0.0	10	90.9
Unemployed	0	0.0	1	9.1

As Table 4.4 shows, the education level of China daughters ranged from senior high school to Master's Degree students. Nine out of 12 China daughters were enrolled in English language and culture programs at post-secondary institutions in Canada. The rest were university students studying in Canada.

Although Hong Kong daughters' education attainment was similar to the China daughters, their education aspirations were lower. While all China daughters planned to continue with further education, even the college graduates amongst the Hong Kong daughters did not intend to do so. They entered the work force directly upon graduation.

## Parents' Background

**Table 4.5**  
**Participants' Parents' Education Levels**

Father's education level	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
High school or below	1	8.3	3	27.3
College	2	16.7	1	9.1
Bachelor's degree or above	7	41.7	3	27.3
Unknown	2	16.7	3	27.3
<hr/>				
Mother's education level				
High school or below	2	16.7	6	54.5
College	2	16.7	1	9.1
Bachelor's degree or above	6	50.0	1	9.1
Unknown	2	16.7	3	27.3

As Table 4.5 shows, parents of China daughters' have higher education levels than parents of Hong Kong daughters. Most parents of China daughters have a Bachelor's degree, but this is not true of the Hong Kong sample. The education level of fathers of Hong Kong daughters ranged from elementary to Medical Doctor level, and most mothers of Hong Kong daughters have junior high levels.

**Table 4.6**  
**Participants' Father's Income Levels**

<b>China Daughters</b>		
<b>(n = 12)</b>		
<b>Father's income (RMB)<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
15,001 and over	2	16.7
10,001 to 15,000	0	0.0
4,001 to 10,000	2	16.7
4,000 or below	2	16.7
Retired	2	16.7
Unknown	4	33.3

  

<b>Hong Kong Daughters</b>		
<b>(n = 11)</b>		
<b>Father's income (HKD)<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>n</b>	<b>%</b>
15,001 and over	3	27.3
10,001 to 15,000	2	18.2
4,001 to 10,000	1	9.1
4,000 or below	0	0.0
Retired	3	27.3
Unknown	2	18.2

<sup>a</sup>RMB stands for Reminbi or Chinese yuan.

<sup>b</sup>HKD stands for Hong Kong Dollars. (1 HKD  $\approx$  1 RMB)

In terms of father's income, the range is listed in Table 4.6 above. It is difficult to place the family income levels of China daughters within the national context or to meaningfully compare these with the Hong Kong daughters within the Hong Kong context. However, one can safely assume that China daughters' family income might be higher than that of their cohorts currently living in China. Supporting a daughter to study in Canada is more expensive than if she were to study in her home country. In addition, foreign students in Canada usually pay three times more in tuition than Canadian citizens. For example, the tuition fees for studying in an English Language and Cultural Program

at a Canadian university in British Columbia range from \$1400 for a four week program to \$4200 for a twelve week program.<sup>106</sup> The undergraduate tuition fee for studying at the University of Victoria is \$1427.4 per 1.5 unit course.<sup>107</sup> This is almost equivalent to two years of tuition fees in an urban China university.<sup>108</sup> As can be seen in this and the next Chapter, the affluent family background of the China daughters might throw light on their views towards the one-child policy and their family values.

These differences between the background of China daughters and Hong Kong daughters will be further explored in the next chapter which deals with family values. The rest of this Chapter will focus on the dissemination and enforcement of the one-child policy and the reactions of the China daughters to this policy.

### **China Daughters' Experience on Dissemination and Enforcement of the One-Child Policy**

To explore the degree of dissemination and enforcement of the one-child policy experienced by China daughters, I asked them how they learned of the policy and whether the topic was brought up at home, school or community. All of them noted that it was “common knowledge” or “common sense” and therefore the government does not need to promote it vigorously. Here is a typical response:

---

106. “Dates and Tuition Fees,” <http://www.sfu.ca/elc/dates.html>.

107. According to the University of Victoria brochure (effective of May 1, 2006), a domestic undergraduate student pays \$294.10 per fee unit, while an International undergraduate student pays \$951.60 per fee unit. See “Tuition and Fee Schedule,” <http://www.finance.uvic.ca/tuition/fees.shtml>.

108. In China, undergraduate tuition fees are only around 5000 yuan (or \$759.00 Canadian dollars with an exchange rate of 0.1518) per academic year for urban universities in Guangdong, Beijing and Shanghai. *Shenyang jinbao* [Shenyang Today’s News], “*Suan hao feiyong tian zhiyuan*,” [Calculate your cost before filling out applications] [http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-06/10/content\\_4674599.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-06/10/content_4674599.htm).

“We do not often talk about this policy. It had been in place for so long and nobody would specifically talk about it or raise this issue. It is just like any other policy.”

Most commented that they were never forced to attend, or had voluntarily attended any lectures on the one-child policy at school or in their work units. To the best of their knowledge, there were no public lectures on that policy that were mandatory or even voluntary while they were growing up. Only one China daughter recalled that she was among several students selected by her class representative to attend a lecture given by the local birth control unit. Even so, the lecture was geared towards promoting a delay in sexual activities until after graduation:

“It was not mandatory... we attended the lecture as a genuine gesture to *meet the demand from the top*... he didn't talk very deeply... he just said as students we must place education first...” [Italics added].

“To meet the demand from the top” seems to suggest she is aware of some form of state pressure. She attended this lecture to facilitate her unit's obedience to the government.

Except for the case above, none of the China daughters remembered any efforts by representatives of All-China Women's Federation (ACWF)<sup>109</sup> or the National Population and Family Planning Commission of China (NPFPC)<sup>110</sup> to promote or enforce the one-child policy with its related family planning measures. Only one China daughter

---

109. ACWF was established in April 3, 1949. As stated in Article 7 of the Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China, its function is to carry out the one-child policy with other public organizations such as the Family Planning Associations. See “Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China,” <http://www.women.org.cn/english/english/laws/05.htm>.

110. NPFPC is the main government unit in China to propose guidelines and policies for the national family planning programs. For full mission statement see “The Missions of the National Population and Family Planning Commission,” <http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/fpcn05-en.htm>.

ever heard of the NPFPC, and like the rest of the participants, she was not familiar with the work of ACWF at all:

“I do not know the function of ACWF. I only know they have a big building in Beijing. I have never met any NPFPC personnel either, so I am not sure what they do, but I did hear they gave out condoms on the street.”<sup>111</sup>

Similarly, none of the China daughters encountered any school texts that explicitly reminded them of the one-child policy, except for a brief mention of the Marriage Law in their Political Science textbooks in junior high school. One China daughter recalled that the textbook mentioned legal marriage ages, recommending later marriage and later birth, but it did not talk about birth planning in any detail.

When I asked about the one-child policy propaganda in the media, all China daughters commented that they did not see any strong propaganda slogans from television advertisements, bulletin boards, magazines or street posters. Even if they noticed any such advertisement on the streets, they did not feel it was significant enough to pay any attention, since they had already known about the policy. Here is a typical response:

“I did not see any such advertisement for the past two years. Everyone is having only one child now, so there is no need to talk about it.”

Although this participant did not see any advertisement herself, official advertisements did exist in urban China. In my trips to various South China cities in

---

111. Although ACWF has duties to carry out the one-child policy, it is uncertain whether the organization does actively hand-out condoms on the street.

2005 and 2006, I did notice a few billboards and red banners on the one-child policy.<sup>112</sup>

The fact that China daughters did not see any birth control propaganda seems to reflect their selective perceptions of what is worth noticing and that the one-child policy posters are not among them.

From the answers of the China daughters described above, there does not seem to be a strong institutional promotion or dissemination of the one-child policy. The same is true of its enforcement. All China daughters did not seem to feel heavily pressured or restricted by the policy. Some felt that the policy had lost its function since many young Mainland couples already preferred small family sizes. Here are two China daughters' responses:

“I have no particular feeling towards this policy. It feels very natural to accept this policy, and everybody is used to it. I don't feel restricted because I don't care in the first place.”

“Not many people would want to give birth to two children. Many young Mainland couples don't even want to have children nowadays. The government even wants to encourage people to have children.”<sup>113</sup>

Likewise, other China daughters felt the policy was not restrictive at all and that they had a choice to have more children by paying fines:

“...the policy is loosening up, very free. If you want to give birth to another child you can do so, the law does not say you cannot. It is only a policy. You just need to pay fines, just like a penalty for smoking. It's your choice. You can do it if you want to.”

---

112. See my photographs in Appendix 3.

113. State's encouragement might be related to their concern about the inverse population pyramid because an ageing population would become a drag on China's social service expenditures. See Greenhalgh and Winckler, *Governing China's Population*, 173.

In summary, China daughters did not feel there were strong propaganda messages on family planning in schools, work units, or the public media, or that governmental agencies or birth control organizations widely disseminated information on the one-child policy. Similarly, they did not feel that the policy was highly restrictive or strongly enforced. This confirms existing literature which describes the present period as the “low tide” of the one-child policy enforcement.

### **China Daughters' Views on the One-Child Policy**

I now turn to the second guiding question: Do China daughters intend to comply with the one-child policy? I shall start with their general views and then move on to their specific strategies and experiences. My interviews of the 12 China daughters show a lack of unanimity in their views on the one-child policy. Their answers can be divided into three general categories: (a) supportive of the one-child policy, (b) indifferent, or (c) unsupportive.

Among the four China daughters in the first category, their support for the policy came from the conviction that national development should override personal desires.

Below are two typical responses:

“Of course it is a very good policy. China has so many people nowadays. If there were no such policy, there would be even more people.”

“Of course it would be nice not to have the one-child policy, but one has to think about the whole country. From the standpoint of the nation, China is overpopulated. If everyone gives birth, there will be too many people, so we need to control it. To me, it doesn't matter. Having one, two or even no children at all is not a big concern. Although the policy does restrict my choices, I think it is an appropriate policy because it is an

inevitable decision for our country's development. *Even if force is used, it is still a national policy.* Since you live in this country, I think you should consider the situation, the larger the population the more resources are needed. China still has a large poor population, and so one cannot be too selfish, one has to think outside the circle" [Italics added].

The phrase, "*Even if force is used, it is still a national policy*", demonstrates how strongly this China daughter felt about the collective aim of the national birth control policy.

Among the six China daughters who fall into the second category (indifference), there was a general feeling that the policy was already in place whether they like it or not. They were already used to it, and it coincided with their personal plans. Here are two typical responses of China daughters who were indifferent:

"It all depends on your living condition if you can afford to have a child. Even if you want to give birth, you might not have time to raise a child because of work."

"I do not feel good or bad about this policy. Like my cohorts, I have not experienced what it is like not to be the only-child. So, although the policy makes us into only-children, I feel very natural and normal to be one... Whether the one-child policy is in place or not, it does not affect me much."

Among the two China daughters who fall into the third category (unsupportive), there is a general feeling that the policy deprived them of personal choices and that they were the first generation to suffer from this policy. Here is an example of strong dislike:

"It is a violation of human nature to be allowed to have only one child.<sup>114</sup> I feel that this generation is being sacrificed and we are being experimented on. We are the first generation, but probably the last

---

114. This is a translation from the phrase *Zhi sheng yige shi weibei renxing ba* ("只生一個是違背人性吧").

generation. Only our generation is the single-child generation, I do not know how this is going to affect us in the future, no one knows...”

### **Personal Strategies towards the One-Child Policy**

Despite the range of views China daughters have on the one-child policy, this policy continues to exist in China. It was reconfirmed as a law on September 1, 2002.<sup>115</sup>

The fact that the policy is currently at the “low-tide” phase of dissemination and enforcement does not mean that China daughters do not have to come to terms with it. The following quotes show that the one-child policy did have an impact on the China daughters’ childbearing plans even though many said it did not. They have actually thought of various strategies to overcome the restriction of the policy.

“The one-child policy would not affect me. I will find ways within the restricted circumstances to do what I felt I should do. I will either not give birth, or pay a fine to have more than one child. I will go with the flow. If the government will not allow us to have more children but everyone is having two children, I too will give birth to two because I want to follow the rest of the population. I do not want to be different.”

“I personally don’t really care about the policy. But if I really want to have two children, and the policy will not allow me to do so, I would ask my husband to move to some other place to live where there is no such restriction. There are actually a lot more places in the world without this policy, so it will work out alright.”

“The policy will not affect me. If I need to have more children, I will just pay the fines. It’s only several ten thousand yuan. It’s only money. Lot of people have the ability to pay fines. If money can solve it, the problem is not a problem anymore. If you can’t even pay several ten thousand, then don’t have more children!”

---

115. See “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa*” 中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 [People’s Republic of China’s population and family planning law], [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326\\_27023.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326_27023.htm).

It is clear from the quotes above that the China daughters intended to pay fines or leave the country in order to have more children. It is only when the policy conformed with their own childbearing preference that they felt there was no need to devise any marriage or childbearing strategies to accommodate their preference. This intention to resist the policy in turn gives rise to two further questions: What is their preferred family size? Does the preferred size reflect their own upbringing as a single-child?

### **Family Size Preferences after Marriage**

In this section, I am specifically focusing on their intended family size to find see if it was different from the state-sanctioned number.

**Table 4.7**  
**China Daughters' Intended Family Size**

Number of children wanted	China Daughters (n = 12)	
	n	%
0	0	0.0
1	1	8.3
1 to 2	2	16.7
2	5	41.7
2 to 4	3	25.0
4 or more	0	0.0
Other <sup>a</sup>	1	8.3

<sup>a</sup>A preference of three children or no children at all.

As can be seen from Table 4.7 above, while no one intended to have a large family with four or more children, many China daughters planned to have more than one child. Here are two typical responses:

“I want two children because they can keep one another company. If I cannot not take care of them, they can take care of each other.”

“I do not plan to have just one child because a single-child is too lonely. It is the same to me whether I raise one or more children, so of course I would like to have at least two.”

From the above answers, one senses the almost unanimous desire to have more children, and it seems that it is mostly for the sake of the children themselves. Even the only participant who preferred to raise one child said that she would consider having more children if her husband so prefers and if her work and financial situation permits it.

“I think one child is good enough, but if my husband wants to have more children and we are financially capable and my work environment allows, then I will have two children.”

Finally, the only China daughter under the “other category” who felt giving birth was optional would like to have a maximum of three children if she were to have any children at all. Here is her response:

“I do not want that many children. Perhaps I will not even give birth. I do not have the traditional idea that I must have children. I make no plans. I will let whatever happens, happen. But I will have a maximum of two to three children regardless of sex because raising children is an enormous responsibility. If I were to raise one, I would raise more.”

From the responses above, it seems most China daughters do not intend to follow the state imposed policy to have just one child. However, it is not clear what causes their preference. Does this have to do with Confucian preference for large families? Or is it because they focus on individual happiness like Western individualists? Since Hong

Kong daughters are equally affected by Confucian principles and exposed to Western-style individualism as the China daughters, a comparison with Hong Kong daughters' response is instructive.

**Table 4.8**  
**Hong Kong Daughters' Intended Family Size**

Number of children wanted	Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%
0	2	18.2
1	2	18.2
1 to 2	3	27.3
2	2	18.2
2 to 4	2	18.2
4 or more	0	0.0

As can be seen from Table 4.8, Hong Kong daughters' responses are similar to that of the China daughters in the sense that nine out of 11 of them said they planned to have more than one child.

It seems safe to conclude that the one-child policy does not have a major impact on preferred number of children among the China daughters. Then the question becomes: Why do the China daughters prefer more than one child? To explore this question, I now turn to the feelings of China daughters about their own upbringing. Do they enjoy being the single child? Do they wish they had a sibling?

## Preference for Siblings

**Table 4.9**  
**China Daughters' Preferences for Siblings**

Number of siblings preferred	China Daughters (n = 12)	
	n	%
0	3	25.0
1	5	41.7
1 to 2	1	8.3
Other <sup>a</sup>	3	25.0
<hr/>		
Sex of siblings preferred		
Brother	4	33.3
Sister	0	0.0
No preference	5	41.7
Not applicable	3	25.0
<hr/>		
Birth order of siblings preferred		
Elder sibling	4	33.3
Younger sibling	1	8.3
No preference	4	33.3
Not applicable	3	25.0

<sup>a</sup>Other: Preference for siblings, but no specific preference on the number of siblings wanted.

As can be seen from Table 4.9, nine of the 12 China daughters indicate dissatisfaction with being the single-child. They would like to have had one or two siblings, particularly an elder brother. As my participants explained:

“An elder brother can teach me a lot of things and no one would dare to bully me when I go out. I would feel very secure and proud to have an elder brother. He could understand me better too since he would be closer to my age.”

“I am the only-child in the family. I will be very busy with my own life and work in the future, which would not allow me to put 100 percent of time and effort into taking care of my parents. If for some reason I am not in China, my parents would not feel good without me around. If I had siblings, they would be able to help take care of my parents.”

“My parents felt the lack of choice [under the one-child policy]. They wanted to have more children because they worry that when they are old, there will be no one to take care of them. They would feel much safer if there had been two children. Just like now, I study overseas and cannot take care of them, but if there is another child, he or she would be able to take care of my parents.”

While those who prefer to have siblings tend to idealize the situation, those who did not want any sibling were not shy to admit they were selfish. Here are two examples:

“I want to be an only-child. As an only-child, I could receive all my parents’ love and do not have to share things given to me by other people. Only I could possess all of them. Perhaps being an only-child makes me more selfish. If I have siblings, I would probably fight with them, or my parents would love the other siblings more if my performance is not that good at home or at school. Perhaps we would be compared and I won’t be the one who gets to study overseas!”

“I do not really want to have siblings. Maybe being an only-child is more selfish. If I have siblings, I will have to share my stuff with them and would not be happy if my parents liked my siblings more and me less.”

As indicated above, most China daughters in this study preferred to have a sibling instead of being a single-child. This suggests that they were dissatisfied with the state-imposed policy. Some believed that being the single child will breed selfishness, while others believed having another sibling would provide companionship for themselves and more comforts for their senior parents.

### **Inconsistency on Reactions towards the One-Child Policy**

If most China daughters resent being the single-child, and plan to have more than one child in future, why is it that some still verbally support the one-child policy? Why are there major discrepancies between China daughters' attitude to state policy in general and their own family planning and strategies, which aim to avoid the one-child policy? Here are two case studies to highlight this discrepancy.

#### **Case Study #1 Xiao Yan: "An Inevitable Policy"**

Xiao Yan was born in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, China in 1982.<sup>116</sup> She is a third year undergraduate student at a Canadian university and has been in Canada for three years. She comes from an affluent family. Her father has a managerial position at a state-owned-enterprise in the field of transportation, while her mother has a managerial position at a private company in the field of international business. Xiao Yan is slender, had short hair, and is about 168 centimeters in height. She seems to be a quiet person, but she is firm in her responses. When Xiao Yan is asked about the one-child policy, she said the policy is good and necessary for national development. In order to cure China's overpopulation problem, she feels that every citizen should put aside personal desire of having more children:

"If everyone gives birth, there will be too many people, so we need to control it. I think it is an appropriate policy because it is an inevitable decision for our country's development."

---

116. Name used here and the rest of this thesis are pseudonyms.

Although she claims to support the one-child policy in general, her responses to more personal questions contradict to this claim. Xiao Yan would prefer to have one elder brother:

“I would like to have a sibling older than me, not younger because I could ask him about everything and he can take care of me. I want an elder brother.”

Xiao Yan also explains why she does not feel obliged to follow the one-child policy:

“No, I don’t feel there’s pressure on me. You don’t have to have two children, but if you do, then you will get fined. You will be punished financially. There are restrictions, but it does not affect me too much. It really depends whether I want to have two children. If I really want to, then I would not mind paying fines.”

and

“I can give birth outside of China. One boy and one girl is more ideal. I will choose to go to other places to give birth.”

In brief, Xiao Yan’s case shows that one can express verbal support for the state policy in general, but feel no compunction to follow it in specific behaviour unless the state’s policy coincides with one’s wishes.

### **Case Study #2 A Bao: “A Good Policy”**

A Bao was born in Heilongjiang, China in 1981. She has completed a Bachelor of Arts degree in China and is studying at an English Language and Culture Program at a Canadian university. She has been in Canada for three months. Like Xiao Yan, she comes from an affluent family. Her father has a managerial position at a state-owned-

enterprise in the field of drugs and medicine with a monthly income range of 1,5001 yuan and over. Her mother has a staff position at a bank with a monthly income range of 2,001 to 4,000 yuan. A Bao has an average frame, long hair, and is about 168 centimeters in height. She seems to be up-to-date with Chinese trendy clothes, top brand name cell phone, and is not shy during the interview. Similar to Xiao Yan, A Bao claims to support the one-child policy in general:

“Birth planning is a good policy. China had so many people today. We will have more people if we do not have this policy.”

However, she becomes more critical when it comes to her own personal situation:

“China’s population is aging because there are many only-children. The pressure is great for one person to take care of four elders. I feel great psychological pressure if my parents are sick because I alone will have to take care of them and I alone will have to handle their deaths.”

Not only does she wish she had an elder brother but also has no intention to follow the dictates of the state in her own future family planning:

“I definitely do not want to have just one child. I either have no children at all, or give birth to two or more.”

A Bao’s ambivalent response shows she is inconsistent with her claim of supporting the one-child policy. When it comes to her own situation, she criticized the negative impact of the state policy on the resources of the family. She expressed dissatisfaction with being an only-child and planned not to follow the one child norm imposed by the government.

The cases of Xiao Yan and A Bao perhaps reflect the fact that in an authoritarian state such as the PRC, the dominated finds it prudent to echo the state's party line, however unpopular, while figuring out strategies to subvert it.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter, I utilized my data to answer the first two guiding questions: Do China daughters feel that the PRC government consistently and widely disseminates the one-child policy, or strictly enforces it? Do they intend to comply with this policy?

With regards to the first guiding question, their answers support the existing literature that the one-child policy has entered its "low phase". The PRC has not widely disseminated or strictly enforced the policy. Even though the state had re-confirmed it by making it into law on 2002, China daughters feel that the policy is not so strict that they cannot evade it. With regards to the second guiding question, my data shows that while some China daughters verbally support the policy in general, many have no intention to comply with it fully. Most China daughters resent the fact that they are single-children because the state forced the policy on their parents during its "high tide" phrase. They wanted to have an elder brother to protect them and share the burden of taking care of senior parents. Furthermore, they themselves planned to have more than one child of their own, and are actively pursuing strategies to achieve this goal.

As can be seen from my description, China daughters have indicated they would pay fines or migrate overseas to have more children if they decided to do so. These strategies are slightly different from the categories used by Tyrene White to describe peasants' resistance against the one-child policy, described in Chapter Two. For example,

China daughters do not use “confrontation” strategy since they do not plan to overtly resist the state. Nor do they plan to use “accommodation” resistance by means of abortion. Finally, they do not plan to use “evasion” resistance. There is no intention to cover up any unplanned pregnancy until the baby is delivered. Unlike peasants of the 1980s, China daughters would rather use non-confrontational and legal means to have more than one child. Certainly, they are affluent and educated enough to achieve their goal by paying fines or immigrating to a foreign country.

The fact that China daughters’ preference for family size is similar to that of the Hong Kong sample indicates that the one-child policy does not have major impact on family planning of China daughters. Whether this policy has impact on other aspects of family values will be examined in the next chapter, in which I will consistently compare their responses with those of Hong Kong daughters.

## Chapter Five

### **Results: Family Values of China Daughters under the One-Child Policy**

In my last chapter, I used my data to explore the first two guiding questions. In this chapter, I focus on the third guiding question: Does the one-child policy have a major impact on China daughters' family values? Here, I will use the Hong Kong daughters as the comparison group to explore the effects of the one-child policy on the China daughters' plans for marriage and family, and their expectations of their children. The purpose is to place the family values of China daughters along the Individualism-Confucianism continuum and to see if this is a direct result of the one-child policy. I will present data on the following aspects of family values: (1) family power structure, (2) mate choice, (3) post-marital residence pattern, and (4) gender preference.

#### **Family Power Structure**

Under the Confucian system, parents usually dominate the decision of their children. Since the one-child policy limits parents' choices to having one child, it seems logical to expect parents to exert strong pressure on their only-child in important decisions which will affect the parents as they grow old. However, my findings did not support this expectation. As the rest of this chapter shows, very few of the China daughters experienced parental pressure in marriage, childbearing, living arrangement, or old age support. In fact, they mostly make their own decisions.

**Mate Choice Decision, Parental Pressure, and the One-Child Policy**

**Table 5.1**  
**Participants' Marriage Advisors and Preferred Marriage Discussants**

	China Daughters (n =12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n =11)	
	n	%	n	%
Marriage advisors				
Parents	1	8.3	5	45.5
Parents and friends	10	83.3	0	0.0
Parents, friends, and future spouse	1	8.3	0	0.0
Parents, friends, and others <sup>a</sup>	0	0.0	4	36.4
Anyone	0	0.0	1	9.1
No one	0	0.0	1	9.1
Preferred marriage discussants				
Parents	9	75.0	5	45.5
Friends	2	16.7	3	27.3
Husband	1	8.3	0	0.0
Anyone	0	0.0	1	9.1
No one	0	0.0	2	18.2

<sup>a</sup> Others include: cousins, and or experienced people.

As can be seen from Table 5.1, most China daughters welcomed advice from parents and preferred to discuss marriage decisions with them. However, they did not experience any parental pressure, and felt that the final decision in these matters rests solely with them. Here are some typical responses:

“I could choose my own spouse. They would check out my prospective mate, but would not define selection criteria for me. It is my own business, it is my choice. Parents will give advice, and watch out for me. Unless the person is totally unacceptable, my parents would not interfere with my choice.”

“My friends give me advice, but it does not affect my decisions too much. I would accept my parents’ advice because they have more experiences in

life. Although I trust and respect my parents' advice, they would not control my marriage decisions because I am still the one who makes the final decisions about my own marriage plans."

"I will not ask advice from others even if they are my parents because the marriage is only between the two of us."

One China daughter even received parental encouragement to engage in individualistic thinking and decision making:

"I would not ask my parents for advice because my parents have told me that marriage is my own business, and children are my own too. They said it is my problem if I desire to have children and if I have the ability to raise them. It is also my problem if I do not want any children. They said they cannot watch over me for a very long time, so I have only myself to look after my own life. I have to be independent. I have to make my own decisions."

Similar to China daughters, most Hong Kong daughters preferred their parents as their main advisors on mate choice. However, they also feel the power to make their own final decisions regardless of other's opinions, including their parents. Compared to the China daughters, the Hong Kong daughters are slightly less attached to their parents. Two from this group did not even need any advice from others. Below are passages which show the diversity of responses from Hong Kong daughters:

"I would prefer to talk to mom, but I do not need to consult her. I just feel that she could give me good advice because I feel she understands me the most. I would decipher her advice, but I would make my own decisions because I am the only one who knows best if I could get along with the person I am interested in marrying."

"I prefer advice from my friends because they understand me more than my parents. I would first discuss it with my friends, then my mom, but I am the one who makes the final decisions."

“I do not take anybody’s advice to heart. Parents would give me advice, but I do not care. My parents would say it is good to marry someone who has money, is successful in work, dependable, has housing, and has a car. I forget about this advice after I hear it. I mean they can do nothing about my decision, they can not control me. If they put pressure on me, they are making their life harder because I would not listen to them in the first place.”

“I definitely do not let my parents or relatives affect my decision in mate choice. I only take action according to my own needs. I just don’t talk to them about my love relationships, and they don’t have the guts to ask me either. My parents would feel really hurt and helpless if they found out I got hurt. I would just rather let them guess than telling them the truth. I will make my own final decisions.”

From the above, it can be concluded that Hong Kong daughters were slightly more independent than China daughters. However, both groups expressed strong independence when it comes to finalizing their mate choice and parents do not seem to put pressure on them.

If parents’ interests were not the deciding factor for China daughters’ mate choice, what then were the chief criteria? Was their marriage decisions affected by the one-child policy? Did they seek a spouse outside the one-child policy limits, such as marrying someone outside China, or another single-child within China?<sup>117</sup>

---

117. My questionnaire would have been more comprehensive if I had included China’s ethnic minority status as one criterion for mate choice since non-Han Chinese are subject to a more lenient policy. Unfortunately, I did not realize this in time to include it in my questionnaire.

**Table 5.2**  
**Participants' Preferences for Prospective Spouse's**  
**Place of Origin and Citizenship**

Preference for Prospective Spouse	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Place of origin				
PRC	5	41.7	0	0.0
Hong Kong	0	0.0	2	18.2
Macao	0	0.0	0	0.0
Overseas Chinese	0	0.0	1	9.1
Foreign country	0	0.0	1	9.1
No preference	7	58.3	3	27.3
Other <sup>a</sup>	0	0.0	4	36.4
Citizenship				
PRC	0	0.0	0	0.0
Hong Kong	0	0.0	0	0.0
Foreign country	0	0.0	2	18.2
No preference	12	100.0	9	81.8

<sup>a</sup>“Others” is a category reserved for participants who indicate no clear-cut preference.

Table 5.2 shows that almost half of the China daughters preferred to marry somebody from Mainland China while the rest did not have a preference on their future husband's place of origin. Here are two typical responses:

“I do not base my search for husband on his nationality. I do not think it is important where he lives or where he comes from. There are much more important things to consider such as personality and cultural backgrounds. I would prefer someone who is responsible, kind hearted, and tolerant.”

“I place love as the top priority. I would not put nationality or citizenship as the main criteria. I believe love should not have strings attached. You would not marry someone who you did not like in order to have one more child, would you? The most important thing is my husband would place high value on the family and would love to spend time with me and the children.”

The above quotes show that China daughters did not think of selectively marrying someone who is not bound by the one-child policy to maximize their childbirth options. Their marriage decision is grounded in husbands' personal attributes and love. This rise of love as an important element in marriage might have been influenced by China's Marriage Law which banned arranged marriages since 1950, and the rise of individualism as a result of the exposure to Western influence through televisions and multimedia.<sup>118</sup>

Their attitude is similar to that of most Hong Kong daughters. Here are responses from the Hong Kong daughters:

“I think communication is very important. I want to be able to communicate my thoughts with my husband so we can both understand each other. So I would definitely choose Hong Kong men.”

“It does not matter, as long as we can communicate with each other through culture and language. He can understand me. I have no particular preference. His citizenship is not important.”

Two Hong Kong daughters did have a preference for international marriage, yet their preferences on marrying foreigners were related to the imagined personality and culture of foreigners and not the importance of gaining a foreign passport:

“I prefer to marry a foreigner, especially British or European. British are more gentlemen. I worship foreign things all the time. I do not mind about their citizenship, but foreigners are nicer, and are more comfortable to talk with than Hong Kong people. Chinese people are too calculating and too materialistic. I am not sure how foreigners behave, but I have a good impression on them and I like their culture.”

---

118. “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa*” 中华人民共和国婚姻法 [People's Republic of China's Marriage Law], [http://www.gdpc.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/200511/t20051125\\_11976.htm](http://www.gdpc.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/200511/t20051125_11976.htm).

Despite Hong Kong daughters having less orientation towards marrying a husband of the same origin as with China daughters, I can safely conclude that both China and Hong Kong daughters based their marriage on love and free choice. Judging from the similarities of their answers, I also conclude that the one-child policy does not have any influence on marriage strategy of the China daughters. The fact that two Hong Kong daughters did prefer to marry a non-Chinese might be due to the fact that they were living in an international city and were exposed to Western influences longer than China daughters.<sup>119</sup>

When I was conducting the interviews, I asked China daughters if they have heard that the government allows only-child couples in certain cities to have a second child. Here are responses from the China daughters who had heard of the policy, but did not feel that it played a big role or make a big difference:

“I know that only-child marrying an only-child can have two children now, but I would not let that predetermine my choice of husband.”

“I heard of the policy, but it does not affect my choice of spouse.”

“I do not have particular preference to marry an only-child. Most people around my age are only-child already.”

---

119. Ku, “Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong,” 343-362; Estes and Hong Kong Council of Social Service, *Social Development in Hong Kong*, 109; Evans and Tam, *Hong Kong*, 4; White, “Chinese Globalism in Hong Kong,” viii; and Tung, “Building Hong Kong,” 109.

**Table 5.3**  
**Participants' Preferences for Prospective Spouse's Family Type**

Preference for Family Background of Prospective Spouse	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Single-child	1	(8.3%)	0	(0.0%)
Multiple-child	1	(8.3%)	1	(9.1%)
No preference	10	(83.3%)	10	(90.9%)

As Table 5.3 shows, most China daughters did not specifically plan to marry an only-child in order to have two children. Here is a typical response:

“It does not matter to me if I am marrying someone who is an only-child or someone who has siblings. I would not restrict myself to choose only a single-child guy. You would not want to marry someone who you do not have affection for in order to have more children, right?”

Only one China daughter *did* want to marry a single-child, but not because she wants to overcome the constraints of the one-child policy:

“I am worried about maintaining a good relationship with my husband’s siblings. The more relatives he has, the more complicated would be my relationship with my husband’s family. It is just much simpler to marry an only-child.”

Among the 12 China daughters, only one had the one-child policy in mind when considering the question of mate choice. However, it had nothing to do exploring the loop-holes of the policy to have more children. She said:

“It is very tiring for a pair of single-child couples to take care of four elderly parents. If my husband’s side of the family has siblings...then the

pressure for him to take care of his own parent would be less, and he would have more time to take care of my parents.”

The above quotes show that China daughters from this study did not think of selectively marrying someone who is not bound by the one-child policy in order to maximize their childbirth options. During the interviews, it becomes clear that their marriage decision is grounded in husbands’ personal attributes and love. This emphasis on love as an important element in marriage could be the result of China’s Marriage Law which banned arranged marriages since 1950, or the rise of individualism because of the infiltration of Western cultural influence through televisions and multimedia.<sup>120</sup>

Like China daughters, most Hong Kong daughters had no preferences on whether to marry someone who is a single-child:

“I do not care how many people he has in his family, as long as I like him, I would not care if he is an only-child.”

“I would not selectively make my decision according to my husband’s family type. It does not matter if he has siblings or not. Neither him nor I worry about who is going to take care of our parents.”

In summary, both China and Hong Kong daughters based their mate choice on love and personal attributes. They do not focus on the family background of the groom or yield to parental pressure. They are on the individualism side of the individualism-Confucianism continuum when it comes to the question of mate choice. The similarities of their responses indicate that the one-child policy has no explanation power on mate choice of China daughters. They did not use marriage strategy to overcome the

---

120. “*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa*” 中华人民共和国婚姻法 [People’s Republic of China’s Marriage Law], [http://www.gdpc.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/200511/t20051125\\_11976.htm](http://www.gdpc.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/200511/t20051125_11976.htm).

constrains of the one-child policy. As stated in last chapter, they would rather devise other strategies, such as paying fines or moving abroad with their husband to maximize their childbirth opportunities.

### **Plans for Post-marital Residence, Parental Pressure, and the One-Child Policy**

Under the Confucian principle, one or more children are expected to provide old age support, etc. Under the individualism principle, there are no such expectations. In this section, I will present data on the participants' plan for post-marital residence and place this aspect of their family values along the individualism-Confucianism continuum. By comparing answers of both Hong Kong and China daughters, I will explore the extent to which the one-child policy affects the China daughters' plans for post-marital residence.

**Table 5.4**  
**Participants' Plan for Post-marital Residence**

	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Co-reside with parents	2	16.7	0	0.0
Live apart from parents	10	83.3	9	81.8
Depends on situation	0	0.0	2	18.2

Table 5.4 shows that almost every one I interviewed plans to live apart from either side of the family after marriage. Since they are single-daughters, they feel pulled in different directions by their significant others: the husband, their own parents, and the husband's parents. Here are typical responses from China daughters:

“Younger and older people have a hard time living together in peace and [it is] very inconvenient for both sides to live together because each has a different life style. Besides, there are times when my parents and I have conflicts due to different opinions. It would be even more difficult for my parents and my husband to adjust to each other when my husband is not my parents’ biological son and has not lived with them before.”

“In reality, there will be conflicts living with parents or parents-in-law. No matter how good the relationship one has with the older generation, it is very difficult to maintain that in the long run.”

“If my husband and I live with one side of the parents, the other side will feel neglected, so it is better to have our own world. Besides, I am used to being independent. I could enjoy more freedom too.”

Most China daughters report that parents have not expressed any disapproval on their post-marital residence plans. Some did experience parental pressure, but not because their parents wanted to follow the Confucian preference for a patrilocal extended household. Here’s a typical response:

“The older one gets, the more one would prefer a quiet environment. It would not work for two generations to co-reside together. My parents would not prefer to live with us. Even when I am my parents’ biological daughters, there would be times when we have generation gaps. Not to mention that my husband is not their biological son.”

Similar to China daughters, nine out of 11 Hong Kong daughters intended to live apart from both sets of parents:

“I prefer living with my own husband and have our own world. I prefer my parents or in-laws to live in the same district, but not so close that they could wear their flip-flops and walk over to give me a surprise visit. It would be rather bothersome if they could visit us so conveniently. I would like to have my own space, but I really can’t turn them away if they are already at my door. It is better if they need to travel some distance to visit us, so if I happen not to be at home, they can’t do anything about it.”

It can be seen from the above that most participants in my study did not plan to co-reside with parents on either side of the family in the future although they are the only-child. There was a strong aspiration for “couples’ spaces” and a greater desire for maximizing their own psychological well-being and individual happiness. That does not mean they plan to abandon their parents in the latter’s senior years. As can be seen in the last chapter, China daughters wished they had siblings to help take care of parents.

In fact, upon further probing, I find out that both Hong Kong and China daughters prefer to live very close to their parents, or even be a next door neighbour because they find easier and more convenient to take care of their parents. Here’s the response of one China daughter:

“I am willing to live with my parents, but if my husband does not prefer to do that, I would still like to live very close. This way it will be easier for me to take care and I could always go visit them.”

Most participants plan to visit their parents once or twice a week. However, they are not expected to follow the Confucian model of providing. Here is a response from a China daughter:

“My parents do not need any financial assistance from us. They already have pensions. They will have enough to live on. If their health is a problem, the health insurance plan will cover them. My parents would not want my money even if I did send it. Unlike young people who spend a lot of money on fashion, and housing, my parents will not require a lot of money for living since they have all that already. The money I give them will only be saved up and given back to me at the end.”

Thus in general, both China and Hong Kong daughters are individualists when it comes to preference for post-marital residence pattern. They prefer “personal space”

with their own spouse and live in a nuclear family instead of multi-generation households. However, they are “Confucian” enough to plan to live in close proximity with senior parents, to visit regularly, and offer support. The parents, for their part, are also “individualist” in the sense that they wanted their own personal space and did not pressure their daughters to co-reside after marriage or expect their daughters to offer any financial support. Being affluent, by Chinese standard, parents of China daughters feel financially secure enough not to insist on monetary assistance from married daughters

Does this “individualistic thinking” continue in terms of the China and Hong Kong daughters’ own expectations of support from their own descendants?

**Table 5.5**  
**Participants' Preference for Children's Post-marital Residence**

	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Co-reside with married children	1	8.3	1	9.1
Live apart from married children	10	83.3	10	90.9
Depends on children's preference	1	8.3	0	0.0

From the table above, it can be seen that like their parents, most China and Hong Kong daughters preferred to live apart from their married children when they in turn grow old. The following response from a China daughter reflects some typical reasons:

“I would not co-reside with my children because just like me, they will value their independence. They will like to have their own space as much I will value my own space from my parents after my marriage. Even if I want to live with them, they will prefer not to do so. Besides, it is too troublesome to live in a three generation household. Frequent visits will bring more happiness if we live apart from each other.”

Only one China daughter and one Hong Kong daughter considered living with their children. Here is the response from this China daughter:

“I would like my children to be around me when I am old, so I would prefer to live with them, but I will let them decide. I will put myself in their shoes and I will not pressure them.

Here is the response from the Hong Kong daughter:

“Well I hope they would live with me, so the house will be livelier with more people. However, I will not force them to do so.”

Just like their sense of filial devotion to their own parents, almost all China and Hong Kong daughters preferred frequent visits from their children and to live close to them, either in the same city or the same district. Only one China daughter and one Hong Kong daughter felt their modern transportation was very convenient, so they did not need to live close to their children.

In summary, my data shows that both China and Hong Kong daughters have consistent views towards their parents and children: no dependence on co-residence as a form of old age support. They anticipated and planned to live independently from elderly parents and their married children. They too feel financially secure enough not to insist on future monetary assistance from their children, and they respect the children's personal space and self-determination. My findings thus indicate that both China and Hong Kong daughters are as individualistic as their parents. Given the similarity of their response, I can safely conclude that the one-child policy does not explain this aspect of family values. My participants probably affected by the infiltration of Western ideas of individualism.

They subscribe to a watered-down version of Confucianism, and intend to support parents by close physical proximity rather than co-residence.

### **Gender Preference, Parental Pressure, and the One-Child Policy**

Existing literature presented in Chapter Two indicates that the one-child policy did reinforce the Confucian bias for sons among peasants in the 1980s. Because of the desire to have male children, there was widespread resistance in rural areas to this policy. In this section, I shall examine the experience and attitude of young, affluent, urban, educated only-daughters with overseas experience to this aspect of family values. I shall explore whether China daughters personally experienced any son-bias from their parents and if so whether they will carry forward any of this bias when they in turn become parents. I shall also compare their response to this question with those of Hong Kong daughters in order to examine the role of the one-child policy on gender bias.

**Table 5.6**  
**Parents' Son Bias as Perceived by Participants**

Parents' Son Preference	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Yes	4	(33.3%)	1	(9.1%)
No	8	(66.7%)	10	(90.1%)

As can be seen from the above table, a majority of participants did not experience gender bias on the part of their parents. However, there is a certain degree of ambiguity

in the China daughters' perceptions. Here are the responses of two China daughters who did not feel any prejudice from parents:

“My family does not have *zhongnan qingnu*.<sup>121</sup> I am being treated very well. I can get whatever I want if my family can afford it.”

“My parents see sons and daughters equally. They do not discriminate against me because I am a daughter.”

Here are two responses of China daughters who think their parents treated them with love and had a very close relationship with them, but still perceive that their parents showed signs of son preference:

“My parents might have liked me to be a boy. When the hospital mistakenly told them [the screening indicated that] I was a boy, they allowed me to be born. Sometimes I wonder if the screening had showed that I was a girl, would that mean they would not have wanted me? But after I was born as a girl, I did not feel I was not being loved by my parents. My parents did not think of paying fines to have a second child.”<sup>122</sup>

“When I was young, my dad liked to dress me up as a boy and buy me toy cars instead of dolls. He liked my hair short too. One time he said that boy is smarter, so if I were a boy, I would have very good grades. And if I were a boy, I could help lift and move things without a sweat if we move house. My dad had also made jokes to his brother who has a son saying that if my uncle gets sick, his son can easily carry my uncle to the hospital, but if my dad gets sick, he does not know who can do the job. But I feel that my dad loves me very very much. He actually likes me a lot and loves me a lot. My dad had said to me: ‘Because I like you, I like girls.’ My mom does not mind my gender at all, she thinks sons and daughters are the same.”

---

121. *Zhongnan qingnu* (“重男輕女”) means “favoring son over daughters” or, simply, son-bias.

122. It is unknown to the participant whether the hospital screening was inaccurate because of technical failure or false reporting from the hospital.

Unlike China daughters, most Hong Kong daughters did not feel any ambiguity in terms of gender bias from their parents. Here are two typical responses from them:

“I have not experienced any bias. I feel very happy as an only-child. My parents treat me very well.”

“My parents love me, they always give me everything first. My relationship with my parents is very very good.”

The only Hong Kong daughter who mistakenly detected some son-bias from her father later contradicted her response upon further probing from me. She actually felt being treated well financially and emotionally and enjoyed her status as an only-daughter in the family:

“My dad seems to treat his siblings’ sons better than me. When my cousins ask him for money, he will give it to them very generously. My dad will not do the same when I asked him for money. However, he would be generous to me when we go shopping together. I could buy anything I want. He treats me very well in everyway. He will sometimes buy stuff that I like. One time he brought home a dog because he knew all along I like dogs.”

From the description above, it seems that there is a bit more son preference from parents of China daughters compared to the Hong Kong sample. This indicates that the one-child policy does seem to have some impact on the gender bias of the parents of China daughters. The reason is obvious. Parents in Hong Kong can choose to have more children, but they prefer to give birth to just one. Parents in Mainland China have no such choice because of the strict enforcement of the one-child policy during its “high tide” phase. As a result, parents with Confucian gender bias tend to resent their daughters. However, many have eventually developed affection for their only-daughters, and did not

put pressure on them to produce grandsons. Here's a typical response from a China daughter:

“My parents do not have any bias towards the sex of my children. If I gave birth to a boy, then they will accept my child as a boy. If I gave birth to a girl, then they will accept my child as a girl. My parents do not have a strong preference for a grandson. Older generations may place heavy emphasis on the traditional values of continuing the family line, but the contemporary generations do not have the same view. Boys and girls are the same.”

What about the daughters themselves? Do they have any Confucian son-bias at all?

If not, why do many plan to take advantage of the government's “soft” approach and evade the one-child policy by paying fines or moving aboard? These are the questions I turn to next.

**Table 5.7**  
**Participants' Preference for the Sex of their Children**

Gender Preference	China Daughters (n = 12)		Hong Kong Daughters (n = 11)	
	n	%	n	%
Son-bias <sup>a</sup>	1	(8.3%)	1	(9.1%)
Daughter-bias	1	(8.3%)	1	(8.3%)
No Bias	10	(83.3%)	8	(72.7%)
Not applicable <sup>b</sup>	0	(0.0%)	2	(18.2%)

<sup>a</sup>Preference for son, but daughter is welcome too.

<sup>b</sup>Preference for being childless.

As Table 5.7 shows, only one of the 12 China daughters indicated a slight “son-bias” when she in turn becomes a parent.

“I want to have a boy to continue the bloodline of my husband's side. A son will have a career, be capable of taking care of me, and give me a

sense of security. However, I would not be upset if my first child is a girl because she is my child too.”

The rest of the China daughters did not show any Confucian thinking in this aspect of family values. They have no preference for the gender of their own children. Here are responses of those who preferred to have a son and a daughter:

“It is best to have a boy and a girl to give the family a balanced sex structure.”

“I think everyone prefers to have a son and a daughter because this gives you different feelings. Having a boy and a girl gives me a very fulfilling feeling because I can have one of each kind. I can experience happiness from different types of persons.”

Here is a response from a China daughter who preferred a daughter. Her preference was based on her imagined personal traits of girls:

“It does not matter to me to have a boy or a girl, but it would be best to have a girl. Girls are cuter and more intimate with the family. Sons are more naughty.”

Below are examples of China daughters who had no sex preferences for children, and did not even consider the issue of male inheritance or continuation of the husband’s family line:

“I have not thought about the sex of my children. It does not matter to me. It’s not my business to care about carrying on the family name. It’s not a big deal in this era. I am not worried about my status in my husbands’ family if I give birth to a daughter. I am not a baby machine.”

“I do not dwell heavily on the sex of my children. I am not that traditional or feudal. I don’t mind at all.”

“I do not care about the sex of my children. I will be equally happy to have sons or daughters. There is no inheritance thinking for this generation. I don’t think of having a son to continue my husband’s family line or support me in my old age.

By and large, the attitudes of most Hong Kong daughters are similar to those of China daughters. Those who planned to have children did not have any sex preference for their children. Two even did not want any children. Only one preferred a son, but would still be happy to have daughters. Here is her response:

“It is best is to have sons, but there is nothing I can do if I give birth to a daughter. I will still treat her very well. I will even put more effort into raising her.”

The rest of the Hong Kong daughters have no particular gender preference for future children. Like China daughters, they do not have a Confucian son bias. None mentions the issue of family line when they give reasons for their preference of their children’s gender. Here are some typical responses:

“I’d like to have one boy and one girl. Isn’t it great to have both a son and a daughter?”

“I don’t have to have boy first. It does not matter to me whether I have a boy or a girl. Even if I give birth to two girls, I do not mind at all.”

“I like sons. Daughters are more troublesome because I would worry about them being cheated in relationships. I am a girl I know. I don’t want my daughters to be cheated upon. I still think that sons do not get cheated that easily. If I give birth to a girl, I will try my best to teach her not to get hurt by men.”

“I am a girl, so I would definitely want a daughter. I just feel that daughters are better because they are closer to parents.”

From the above, it seems that by and large, both China and Hong Kong daughters are similar in that their childbearing plans are not affected by Confucian son-bias. In this sense, the one-child policy does not seem to reinforce Confucian mode of thinking. However, that does not mean that China daughters plan to follow the dictates of the state. As can be seen in Chapter Four, many resented the fact that they are the only-child and wanted to have had a brother. While they do not prefer sons to daughters, they wanted to have more than one child in the future. The participants of this study are a very unique sample group. Coming from affluent families and having an overseas education, they know they can easily take advantage of the “soft” approach of the state by paying fines or relocating overseas.

### **Summary and Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter is to use my data to examine the third guiding question: Does the one-child policy have a major impact on the family values of China daughters? By comparing the response of the Hong Kong daughters, I have come to the conclusion that this policy has minimal influence on the family values of China daughters in this study.

First, the data in this chapter shows that their existence in the family was not resented by their parents. Even though some parents did wish they had a son, they were strictly forbidden to have a second child. Unlike the rural areas, city residents like them could not easily resist the system of rewards and punishments utilized by the state during the “high tide” period of the one-child policy. Unlike rural areas in the 1980s, there was no evidence of confrontation, evasive and accommodation types of resistance among city

folks. With the limited choice in the gender or number of their children, these parents have learnt to accept their daughters as well. They showered these only-daughters with their unconditional love and affection. Contrary to some existing literature, these China daughters are not excessively selfish and heavily spoiled. They still have filial devotion towards their parents. They plan to live close to and take care of parents in their senior years.

Similar to the existing literature outlined in Chapter Two, authority and power are somewhat redistributed among its members and children certainly enjoy greater freedom and “say” in decision-making. As reported by China daughters, they did not experience great pressure from their parents with regards to mate choice, gender of future children, post-marital residence arrangements or old age support. Perhaps this is because the parents themselves are highly educated and are affluent enough not to worry about their future security. This is a select group who could afford to live comfortably and send their only-daughter to study in Canada, so their views may well be very unique.

Given the infiltration of Western ideas since the Open Door Policy in the 1980s and the “low tide” phase in the enforcement of the one-child policy, it should not be surprising that China daughter’s mode of thinking are even further away from Confucian family values. Similar to the existing literature outlined in Chapter Two, China daughters use love and personal attributes to guide their mate choice. They do not devise marriage strategies, such as marrying someone outside of China, or another single-child in order to escape the one-child restriction. They prefer to set up their own nuclear family after marriage, instead of living with parents or parents-in-law. Contrary to some existing literature, these China daughters show no gender bias when it comes to the sex preference

for their own children. The issue of having a son for old age support and to continue with the family line does not enter into their consciousness at all. Just like their parents, they expect their children to live apart from them when they in turn grow old. Thus in all aspects of family values, they are definitely on the individualism side of the individualism-Confucian continuum. However, in terms of caring for seniors, they subscribe to a watered-down version of support by regular visits and living in close proximity.

As the China daughters' own expectations, attitudes, and future planning are similar to those of the Hong Kong daughters, one can safely conclude that the one-child policy does not have much explanatory power for the family values of the current generation of China daughters in this study.

In the next chapter, I will place my findings on the impact of the one-child policy, the fading of Confucian principles and the growing sense of individualism in the context of the larger issues including the perspectives of governmentality, demographic transition theory and resistance.

## Chapter Six

### **Discussion on Alternate Explanations: Governmentality, Demographic Transition Theory, and Resistance**

In the previous two chapters, my interview data show that China daughters displayed noncompliance towards the one-child policy and that this policy does not adequately explain the family values of China daughters. In this chapter, I present three different approaches outlined in Chapter One that might explain the findings of Chapter Four and Five. The three explanatory approaches are: governmentality, the demographic transition theory, and the concept of resistance. I will show by the end of this chapter, all three approaches have some merits in explaining the dynamic between the action of state power and the reaction of China daughters towards it, but the third approach is the most plausible approach to understanding the extent to which China daughters have internalized the one-child policy.

#### **Impact of the One-Child Policy**

Existing literature on the impact of the one-child policy on family values does not present a uniform picture. Some scholars argue that the one-child policy has triggered violence against daughters. Others argue that this policy, which constrains the number of children one may have in a family, have increased the tendency of parents to indulge the wishes of their only-child because they only have one child on which to focus all their attention and love. From my data, the difference between the response of China and Hong Kong daughters on gender preference of their parents suggests that the one-child policy did reinforce the Confucian son-bias for some China parents. The fact that Hong

Kong parents could, but did not choose to have a second child means that their daughters are wanted children. Such right to choose was not open to urban Chinese parents in the 1980s. For Confucian-minded parents, the one-child policy might have intensified their resentment towards their only daughter. However, the difference between parents of Hong Kong and China daughters is slight. Parents of China daughters have eventually learnt to cherish their only-child who happens to be female. Yet, this does not mean that these parents necessarily agreed with the policy. They might have acted in this way only because they are restricted by the law, and they do not intend to break the law to have more than one child. Nevertheless, their increase affection for daughters might have contributed to the further fading of Confucian principles on the part of the daughters and increase in their tendency towards individualism.

It should be said that the contradictory consequences of the one-child policy such as gender abuse, and over indulgence of daughters reported widely in the media, were not part of state intentions. The one-child policy was only motivated by the pursuit of economic goals. It was intended to be a gender neutral policy with limits only on the number and not the sex of the child. It is also true that the findings from my participants cannot be generalized to all urban families in China because of the small sample size and non-random sampling. They might well be a very special group. The parents are highly educated, and have financial resources to both send their daughters overseas for education and to secure their own old age support. The daughters are rich and have high aspirations for future studies abroad. Nonetheless, the fact that both parents and daughters have expressed resentment of the one-child policy and prefer not conform to it suggests that the state has not convinced some members of China's urban families to embrace and

internalize the one-child norm. The following will explore the three plausible explanations that address the dynamic between the action of state power and the reaction of China daughters towards it, and place my data in a wider conceptual context.

### **Governmentality: Internalization and Self-Regulation**

The first conceptual perspective is “governmentality”. Scholars taking this perspectives argue that the PRC government’s increased shift from direct coercive measures to indirect control measures through means such as education, law, propaganda promoting quality children, and increase in social services will eventually result in the citizens’ internalization of the one-child norm. On this perspective, Chinese daughters would self-regulate to follow the policy and act in accordance with state control measures.<sup>123</sup> The findings of this study seem to support this argument in the following ways.

First, as mentioned in Chapter Four, some China daughters verbally support the government population control policy, praising the one-child policy as necessary and beneficial to the nation’s development. Some even confessed they were selfish and preferred not to have any siblings. This sense of selfishness may be an outcome of the one-child policy, which created overindulged China daughters who enjoy their status as the only-child.<sup>124</sup>

---

123. Rose, Malley and Valverde, “Governmentality”, 84-88. Valverde, “Genealogies of European States”, 170.

124. Crowell and Hsieh, “Little Emperors,” 44-50; and Short et al, “China’s One-Child Policy and the Care of Children,” 913-943.

Second, the one-child policy seems to have increased parents affection for daughters. China daughters reported that their parents view them as worthy as sons for their own happiness and future comfort. Despite initial son-bias, parents seem to have eventually come to terms with having an only-daughter and started to pour all their love and financial resources on their only-child. The closer parent-child relationship might have led China daughters to have independent decision-making power within the family and on matters which concern their own personal interests and well-being. Growing up as the indulged single-child might have led to a heightened sense of individualism and independence on the part of China daughters and to view a large number of children as a burden rather than a blessing.

Although the governmentality perspective provides some explanation for my findings, it falls short of explaining China daughter's noncompliance responses to the one-child policy, for two reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter Four, and Five some China daughters show a high degree of noncompliance in action plans even when they verbally claimed to support the policy in general. Others had outright criticism of its restrictive nature. Most preferred to have two children after marriage, which are more than the state ideal of one-child and devise strategies to reach their goals.

Second, my comparative data indicate that China daughters' childbearing plans are similar to those of the Hong Kong daughters. Since Hong Kong daughters are not subject to any government-imposed birth restrictions. I can safely assume that the one-child policy has little explanatory power in the intended family size of China daughters. This is where the governmentality perspective falls short.

### **Demographic Transition Theory**

The second approach that addresses the dynamic between state action and reaction of China daughters towards the one-child policy is the demographic transition theory.<sup>125</sup> This theory argues that a country's demographic profile goes through three developmental stages: no growth, high growth and then resumes to a low or no growth in population. The first stage of no growth is the result of high birth rates and high mortality rates. The next stage is characterized by high population growth due to high birth and low mortality rates. This comes about as a result of improvement in the quality of life, such as advancement in medical technology, food production and distribution. The final stage is similar to the first stage, but for a different reason. The increase in affluence and the availability of reproductive technology have led to low birth rates while death rate remains similar to stage two. People in this stage tended to plan for smaller family sizes and longer birth intervals because economic growth increases the cost of raising children and reduces their economic contribution and values to families.

My data seems to confirm this theory. With the Open Door Policy and the dramatic economic growth in the past decades, it can be argued that China has entered the third stage of demographic transition. None of the China daughters for example wanted four or more children. Some expressed concerns over the cost of raising children, while others were concerned about balancing work and childcare responsibilities. The high level of economic development and the expansion of the private sector has increased

---

125. For a detailed account, see Oppenheimer, "Social Demography," 14271.

highly educated women's employment opportunities and influenced China daughters preference for smaller families for career reasons.<sup>126</sup>

However, my data shows that some of them are willing to spend their earnings to pay fines to have a second child or migrate to another place which does not have the one-child limit even though they know that having another child might delay their career advancement or divert their earnings from personal leisure activities. In this sense, my findings coincided with recent studies which indicate that increase in personal wealth does not necessarily lead to preference for fewer children in China.<sup>127</sup> Instead, higher income permits Chinese people to have the resources to get around the one-child policy.

Likewise, the demographic transition theory may not apply mechanically to the case of Hong Kong daughters. People growing up in Hong Kong are probably far more affluent and materialistic-minded because they enjoy high economic growth for longer periods (since the early 1970s) than people in Chinese cities, which did not open until the late 1980s. My data shows that while some of them did express concerns over the burdens of children and some even preferred raising pets to raising children, others did plan to have more than one child. This suggests that even at the third stage of the demographic transition model, Hong Kong daughters do not mind having a moderate sized family.

---

126. Chan, Liu and Zhang. "End of Women's Emancipation?" 589–616.

127. Siu, "Is Development the Best Contraceptive?" 525-558; Akkerman, and He, "Economic Reforms and Family Planning in China," 39-65; and Zhang, Feng and Zhong, "Changing Patterns of Desired Fertility," 89-109.

## **Resistance**

The third approach examining the dynamics between state action and the reaction of China daughters towards the one-child policy is the concept of resistance provided by Stuart Hall.<sup>128</sup> Hall argues that no matter how the state reworks, reshapes, and imposes its policy, it cannot guarantee compliance of its citizens. This is because the state does not have the power to “occupy and rework the interior contradictions of feeling and perception in the dominated classes.”<sup>129</sup> This argument seems to offer another plausible explanation for the responses of China daughters of my study.

As described at the beginning of Chapter Two, the Chinese state did attempt to reshape and rework its population control policy by gradually shifting from direct coercive measures to indirect control measures. However, as can be seen by my interview data, this does not result in internalizing China daughters’ attitudes to follow the one-child policy. Despite some verbal support for the party-line, China daughters placed their personal preferences above the collective interests of the country in their action plans. Most had a two-child fertility preference instead of one-child as sanctioned by the state. Some also wished they had siblings, indicating dissatisfaction with their parents’ compliance with the one-child policy.

My comparative data shows family values and family plans of China daughters are similar to those of Hong Kong daughters. Both are exposed to the infiltration of Western ideas. Their family values are towards the individualist side of the individualism-Confucianism continuum. Coming from affluent families, having high

---

128. Hall, “Notes on Deconstructing ‘The Popular’,” 227-240.

129. *Ibid.*, 233.

education aspirations and being brought-up by highly educated, financially-secured and well-placed parents who have moved away from Confucian gender bias, China daughters in my sample have developed a heightened sense of individualism. It is this individualism which leads to the tendency to resist the state's attempt to internalize their attitude to support the one-child policy. In fact, many regard the "soft" approach as an opportunity to subvert the state.

Thus, my study supports Hall's concept of resistance. My data indicate that the state, including an authoritarian one such as the PRC, could not totally control the feelings and thoughts of its citizens. Individuals can censor and contest dominant ideologies accordingly to their interior feelings and perception.

### **Summary**

Of the three approaches, governmentality, demographic transition theory, and Hall's concept of resistance, the third approach seems to provide the best means to study the reaction of China daughters to the one-child policy. The governmentality approach offers the best explanation for the actions of the state, but not China daughters' response to these actions. The explanatory power of the demographic transition theory is also limited because of its general and mechanical natures. It does not take into account of cultural factors, family socialization, or individual attitudes. Although the high level of economic development does explain some China daughters' lack of desire for more children, it fails to explain their lack of respect for and readiness to disobey the one-child policy.

To me, all three explanations have some merit inasmuch each explains some aspects of state actions and the reactions of the China daughters to the one-child policy. However, Stuart Hall's concept of resistance offers the most plausible explanation for how China daughters respond to state-imposed policy. His theory takes into consideration China daughters' internal criticisms, opinions and personal preferences. It recognizes that people are not passive recipients of government policy, even in an authoritarian state such as the PRC. Contrary to what Foucault suggests, the China daughters have not been turned into objects of indirect techniques outside their awareness that influence their birth choices. Nor are many China daughters passive responders to market or economic signals or forces which would make them limit the number of children they bear. Rather, some China daughters are agents who have full awareness of the meaning of childbirth in their lives and who are prepared to exercise their power of resistance to make up their own minds in these matters. Hall's account of cultural struggles in society implies that there is a dialectical struggle that goes on continuously between the Chinese state and some Chinese women and that the domain of childbearing has become a constant battlefield where "no once-for-all victories are obtained [by the government or the women] but where there are always strategic positions to be won and lost."<sup>130</sup>

Even though the China daughters I interviewed might have belonged to a special group, it seems safe to conclude that in general the dominated group may not fully internalize state policy or state ideology behind the policy. Inasmuch as policy and ideology do not coincide with individual aspirations and values, subjected people are prepared to evade them and draw on their own resources to determine their own

---

130. Ibid., 233-235.

reproductive behaviors. This is true for urban China daughters of the current generation, as much as it is true for Chinese peasants in the 1980s.

## Chapter Seven

### Conclusion

#### **Research Contribution**

This thesis contributes to the understanding of the extent to which the Chinese government has the power to manipulate and control the thinking of its citizens. My research helped ensure that the voices of those who experienced state control were heard. It also challenges the existing studies that do not fully recognize the internal contradictions in the reactions of the members of the dominated group to state-imposed policies and priorities. Affluence, personal preferences, individual happiness, and the desire for maximizing one's own well-being seem to occupy an important position in people's lives and could potentially supplant the influence and the force of state among the citizens.

Possible noncompliance by China daughters would have serious implications for China's political and socio-economic growth and development in the immediate future. Studies show that resentment towards the state population policy in the 1980s led to "resistance" from individuals in the countryside in order to satisfy their preferences for sons, and that the will of the state was fiercely contested by these people.<sup>131</sup> Judging from my present study, I expect that the central government will have to continue battle against noncompliance from some young urban affluent only-daughters with overseas experience although not because of a Confucian style preference for sons on their part.

---

131. White, "Domination, Resistance and Accommodation," 187.

### **Limitations of Research**

There are a number of limitations in my study. The first is the small sample size, and the non-random sampling method, particularly the snowball sampling method, that resulted in a highly selective group which cannot claim to provide reliability (ie. claim to be a representative sample of all the daughters of China). However, this is not the objective of this qualitative study. This study has a high degree of validity that draws on carefully collected and rigorously analyzed qualitative data. My qualitative in-depth interviews did yield some rich data and it is likely that if others conduct a similar study, the results would be similar patterns of feelings, ambitions, attitude towards the one-child policy, and family values among young affluent overseas Chinese only-daughters of similar socio-economic background.

The second limitation is the use of Hong Kong daughters as the comparison group. This study acknowledges the different historical background of the China and the Hong Kong daughters, such as China daughters and their parents' experience of Maoist Socialism and Market Socialism. Nonetheless, my comparative data which show similarities between the two groups strongly suggest the role played by Western cultural influence on Chinese family values. They offer evidence of the Chinese Party-State's limited role in individual China daughters' future plans for their own lives.

The third weakness of my study is that the interviews with China daughters were conducted outside their place of origin. Being unable to conduct research in China itself because of the perceived sensitivity of the topic by Chinese officials, I had to resort to my back-up plan and conduct interviews with China daughters in Canada. As a result, the participants of this study may be a selective group not typical of urban daughters in China.

However, it also means that they were more likely to speak their minds. I have also made an effort to minimize the problem of generalization by selecting those who have resided in Canada for three years or less. It will be of great interest to compare my findings to those of other researchers who can interview China daughters at their place of origin, who are able to have a larger size sampling, and use a non-random sampling method.

The fourth limitation of this study is the difficulty in translating responses from Mandarin and Cantonese into English, as there are many subtle variations between the original and the translated conversations.<sup>132</sup> However, efforts were made to reduce subtle variations by not using other personnel, such as assistant interviewers, transcribers, or translators, which might have produced even more variations in each stage of data collection and processing.

Since the findings from this study are subject to the limitations listed above, it is important to recognize these problems and interpret the findings accordingly.

### **Suggestions for Future Research**

This study has generated valuable qualitative data on some young, affluent, urban, educated only-daughters from China that have been exposed to overseas ways of life. To be sure, more study is needed to further examine if China daughters' action plans will actually be carried out at a future date. In terms of research methodology, I would recommend a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches. It would be beneficial to conduct a questionnaire survey that makes use of larger sample size and random sampling method. This can provide statistical data that would quantify the

---

132. This is true for any social research that requires translating participants' responses from one language to another for publication purposes. See Jackson, *Methods Doing Social Research*, 163.

attitudes of Chinese young women of the current generation to the one-child policy and their family values and future marriage and family plans. It could provide a better summary of major patterns, and complement the qualitative interview data that focused on depth, detail and meaning.<sup>133</sup>

Regarding educations and policymaking in China, this study raises questions about the effectiveness of the one-child policy and its restrictions on the fertility planning of the young, affluent, urban, educated only-daughters with overseas experience. For this unique group, the state's positive incentive package such as bonus, allowances, or paid holidays are not great enough to induce them to conform, and the penalties of paying fines are not significant enough to deter them from having more children. Yet, policy makers should not take this as a reason to drastically increase rewards or penalty because those who are strongly determined to have more than one child turn to such strategies as "evasive", "confrontation" and "accommodation" resistance described in Chapter Two. These type of resistance can damage the state's effort in building a strong and accountable legal framework, increase tension between the government and citizens, and possibly put the health of the mothers and children at risks.

For the poor rural areas, the state could induce birth limitations by providing free and adequate social and health services and an equitable pension system that provides a decent standard of living for seniors. For the group of financially capable and individualistically minded China daughters, trying to officially enforce the one-child policy might be an exercise in futility. Looking at the population trend in Japan and the West, I think the affluent Chinese will voluntarily limit birth once they reach a certain

---

133. Milwertz, *Accepting Population Control*, 204-205.

standard of living. The demographic transition theory, despite its limitations and contradictions, seems to have a certain degree of truth to it, at least in the long run.

In sum, any form of government intervention should be implemented non-intrusively. The Chinese state should move away from coercion. Voluntary actions from citizens are more sustainable in the long run and serve to minimize confrontation and tension between the government and its citizens.

### **Conclusion**

The analysis undertaken in this study indicates that the China daughters constitute a unique sample group with unique backgrounds. They are young, affluent, urban, educated only-daughters from China that have been exposed to overseas ways of life. They also have highly educated, financially-comfortable and well-placed parents who have moved away from Confucian family values. It is therefore not surprising that they are on the individualistic side of the individualism-Confucian continuum of family values.

The fading of Confucian principles and the growing sense of individualism seems to apply to both China and Hong Kong daughters of similar backgrounds. The similarities of thoughts, experiences and future plans found between these two groups suggests the one-child policy is not the most plausible explanation of family values among contemporary young urban affluent Chinese women. The notion of governmentality, demographic transition, and resistance offer various approaches to understand the dynamics of state action and the various reactions of China daughters to the one-child policy. Although this study suggests Hall's notion of "resistance" provides the best approach to understanding the extent to which China daughters have internalized

the one-child policy, all three approaches are by no mean conclusive or exhaustive theories. Given the small and non-random sample and the circumstances under which the data is collected, this thesis does not aim to provide an ultimate theory of explanation, but to give voice to the group of contemporary Chinese daughters who are members of the first generation raised under the one-child policy of the 1980s.

## Bibliography

- Aird, John Shields. "Coercion in Family Planning: Causes, Methods, and Consequences." In *China's Economy Looks toward the Year 2000*. Vol. 1 of *The Four Modernizations*, edited by US Joint Economic Committee, 184-221. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
- . *Slaughter of the Innocents: Coercive Birth Control in China*. Washington D.C.: AEI Press 1990.
- Akkerman, Abraham, and Jiaosheng He. "Economic Reforms and Family Planning in China: The One-Child Policy in Rural Guangdong, 1979-1990." *Canadian Studies in Population* 26, no.1 (1999): 39-65.
- Allison, Rebecca, and Justin McCurry. "Favouring Boys Leaves China Facing Gender Crisis: One-Child Policy and Cultural Preference for Males Creates Big Shortage of Women." *The Globe and Mail*, March 10, 2004, A16.
- Anagnost, Ann. "A Surfeit of Bodies: Population and the Rationality of the State in Post-Mao China." In *Conceiving the New World Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction*, edited by Faye D. Ginsburg, and Rayana Rapp, 22-41. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
- Babbie, Earl, and Lucia Benaquisto. *Fundamentals of Social Research*. 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian ed. Nelson: Thomason Canada Limited, 2002.
- Banister, Judith. *China's Changing Population*. California: Stanford University Press, 1987.
- Bernard, H. Russell. *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. 3rd ed. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2002.
- . *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. 4th ed. Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2006.
- Blieszner, Rosemary, and Jay A. Mancini. "Enduring Ties: Older Adults' Parental Role and Responsibilities." *Family Relations* 36, no. 2 (1987): 176-180.
- Bogg, Lennart. "Family Planning in China: Out of Control?" *American Journal of Public Health* 88, no. 4 (1998): 649-651.
- Brugger, Bill, and Stephen Reglar. *Politics, Economy, and Society in Contemporary China*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.

- Caldwell, John C. "Toward a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory." *Population and Development Review* 2, no. 3/4 (1976): 321-366.
- Census and Statistics Department. "Table: Population by Ethnicity, 2001 and 2006." Statistical Tables, February 22, 2007. [http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong\\_kong\\_statistics/statistical\\_tables/index.jsp?htmlTableID=139&excelID=&chartID=&tableID=139&ID=&subjectID=1](http://www.censtatd.gov.hk/hong_kong_statistics/statistical_tables/index.jsp?htmlTableID=139&excelID=&chartID=&tableID=139&ID=&subjectID=1).
- Chan, Cecilia L.W., Paul S. F. Yip, Ernest H. Y. Ng, P. C. Ho, Celia H. Y. Chan, and Jade S. K. Au. "Gender Selection in China: Its Meanings and Implications" *Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics* 19, no.9 (2002): 426-430.
- Chan, Cecilia Lai-wan, Liu Meng, and Zhang Yulian. "End of Women's Emancipation?" In *China in the Post-Deng Era*, edited by Joseph Y.S. Cheng, 589-616. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Chan, Thomas M. H. "Changes in China's Growth Pattern since the Reform." In *China in the Post-Deng Era*, edited by Joseph Y.S. Cheng, 273-309. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Cheng, Joseph Y.S., edited. *China in the Post-Deng Era*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Chirkov, Valery, Richard M. Ryan, Youngmee Kim, and Ulas Kaplan. "Differentiating Autonomy from Individualism and Independence: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective on Internalization of Cultural Orientations and Well-Being." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 84, no.1 (2003): 97-110.
- Choe, Minja Kim, and Noriko O. Tsuya. "Why Do Chinese Women Practice Contraception? The Case of Rural Jilin Province." *Studies in Family Planning* 22, no.1 (1991): 39-51.
- Chu, Junhong. "Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-selective Abortion in Rural Central China." *Population and Development Review* 27, no.2 (2001): 259-282.
- Coale, Ansley. "Excess Female Mortality and the Balance of the Sexes in the Population: An Estimate of the Number of 'Missing Females'." *Population and Development Review* 17, no.3 (1991): 517-523.
- Cooney, Rosemary Santana, and Li Jiali. "Sterilization and Financial Penalties Imposed on Registered Peasant Couples, Hebei Province, China." *Studies in Family Planning* 32, no.1 (2001): 67-78.
- Croll, Elisabeth. *Changing Identities of Chinese Women: Rhetoric, Experience and Self-Perception in Twentieth-Century China*. Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995.

- . “Introduction: Fertility Norms and Family Size in China.” In *China's One-Child Family Policy*, edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia Davin, and Penny Kane, 1-36. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985.
- Croll, Elisabeth, Delia Davin, and Penny Kane, edited. *China's One-Child Family Policy*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985.
- Crowell, Todd, and David Hsieh. “Little Emperors: Is China's One-Child Policy Creating a Society of Brats?” *Asiaweek*, December 1, 1995, 44-50.
- “Dates and Tuition Fees.” *Programs*, by English Language and Culture Program Continuing Studies, Simon Fraser University. <http://www.sfu.ca/elc/dates.html>.
- Davin, Delia. “The Single-Child Family Policy in the Countryside.” In *China's One-Child Family Policy*, edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia Davin, and Penny Kane, 37-82. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985.
- Dean, Mitchell. “Michel Foucault: ‘A Man in Danger’.” In *Handbook of Social Theory*, edited by George Ritzer, and Barry Smart, 324-338. London: Sage, 2001.
- “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Fully Enhancing Population and Family Planning Programme and Comprehensively Addressing Population Issues (Unofficial translation).” *National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, Chinapop*. Edited by Song Qixia, Jan. 22, 2007. <http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/en2007-01/news20070124.htm>.
- Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics National Bureau of Statistics of the People's Republic of China, compiled. *China Population Statistics Yearbook 2001*. Beijing: China Statistic Press, 2001.
- Doherty, Jim P., and Edward C. Norton. “China's One-Child Policy: The Economic Choices and Consequences Faced by Pregnant Women.” *Social Science and Medicine* 52, no.5 (2001): 745-761.
- Dreyer, June Teufel. *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*. 4th ed. New York: Pearson Education, 2004.
- Estes, Richard J., and Executive Consultant, Hong Kong Council of Social Service. *Social Development in Hong Kong: The Unfinished Agenda*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Evans, Grant, and Maria Tam. *Hong Kong: The Anthropology of a Chinese Metropolis*. Hong Kong: Curzon Press, 1997.

- Fan, C. Cindy, and Li Ling. "Marriage and Migration in Transitional China: A Field Study of Gaoshou, Western Guangdong." *Environment and Planning* 34, no.4 (2002): 619-638.
- Feeney, Griffith, and Yuan Jianhua. "Below Replacement Fertility in China? A Close Look at Recent Evidence." *Population Studies* 48, no.3 (1994): 381-394.
- Feldman, S. Shirley, Randy Mont-Reynaud, and Doreen A. Rosenthal. "When East Moves West: The Acculturation of Values of Chinese Adolescents in the U.S. and Australia." *Journal of Research on Adolescence* 2, no.2 (1992): 147-173.
- Fong, Vanessa L. "China's One-Child Policy and the Empowerment of Urban Daughters." *American Anthropologist* 104, no.4 (2002): 1098-1109.
- . *Only Hope: Coming of Age under China's One-Child Policy*. California: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- Foucault, Michel. "Governmentality." In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 87-104. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Freedman, Ronald. "Do Family Planning Programs affect Fertility Preferences? A Literature Review." *Studies in Family Planning* 28, no.1 (1997): 1-13.
- Froissart, Chloé. "Escaping from under the Party's Thumb: A Few Examples of Migrant Workers' Strivings for Autonomy." *Social Research* 73, no.1 (2006): 197-218.
- Gal, Susan, and Gail Kligman, ed. *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Goldstein, Alice, Michael White, and Sidney Goldstein. "Migration, Fertility, and State Policy in Hubei Province, China." *Demography* 34, no.4 (1997): 481-491.
- Goldstein, Donna M. *Laughter Out of Place: Race, Class, Violence, and Sexuality in a Rio Shantytown*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China. "Basic Law Full Text." *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China* [http://www.info.gov.hk/basic\\_law/facts/index.htm](http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/facts/index.htm).
- Greenhalgh, Susan. "Planned Births, Unplanned Persons: "Population" in the Making of Chinese Modernity." *American Ethnologist* 30, no. 2 (2003): 196-215.

- Greenhalgh, Susan, and Edwin A. Winckler. *Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics*. California: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- Hall, Stuart. "Notes on Deconstructing 'The Popular'." In *People's History: An Socialist Theory*, edited by Raphael Samuel, 227-240. Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.
- . "Cultural Studies." In *The New Social Theory Reader: Contemporary Debates*, edited by Seidman, Steven, and Jeffrey C. Alexander, 88-100. London; New York: Routledge, 2001.
- Handwerker, Lisa. "The Consequences of Modernity for Childless Women in China: Medicalization and Resistance." In *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*, edited by Margaret Lock, and Patricia A. Kaufert, 178-205. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Huang, Lucy Jen. "Planned Fertility of One-couple/One-child Policy in the People's Republic of China." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 44, no.3 (1982): 775-784.
- Jackson, Winston. *Methods Doing Social Research*. 2nd ed., Ontario: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1999.
- "*Jiafei nanzu laigang chanzi chao*" 加費恐難阻來港產子潮 [Fee Increase May Not Deter a Wave of Pregnant Mainland Women from coming to Hong Kong to Give Birth]. *Yahoo! Hong Kong News*, Dec 22, 2006. <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/061221/60/1yqe6.html>.
- Johnson, Kay. "Chinese Orphanages: Saving China's Abandoned Girls." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 30 (1993): 61-87.
- . "The Politics of the Revival of Infant Abandonment in China, with Special Reference to Hunan." *Population and Development Review* 22, no.1 (1996): 77-98.
- Johnson, Kay, Huang Banghan, and Wang Liyao. "Infant Abandonment and Adoption in China." *Population and Development Review* 24, no.3 (1998): 469-510.
- Joseph, Jonathan. *Social Theory: Conflict, Cohesion and Consent*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003.
- Kane, Penny. *The Second Billion: Population and Family Planning in China*. Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1987.

- Kellner, Douglas. "Cultural Studies and Social Theory: A Critical Intervention." In *Handbook of Social Theory*, edited by George Ritzer, and Barry Smart, 395-409. London: Sage, 2001.
- Kirk, Dudley. "Demographic Transition Theory." *Population Studies* 50, no.3 (1996): 361-387.
- Kligman, Gail. *The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceausescu's Romania*. California: University of California Press, 1998.
- Ku, Agnes S. "Postcolonial Cultural Trends in Hong Kong: Imagining the Local, the National, and the Global." In *Crisis and Transformation in China's Hong Kong*, edited by Ming K. Chan and Alvin Y. So, foreword by Lynn T. White, 343-362. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.
- Lee, James, and Wang Feng. "Malthusian Models and Chinese Realities: The Chinese Demographic System 1700-2000." *Population and Development Review* 25, no.1 (1999): 33-65.
- Lemke, Thomas. "'The Birth of Bio-politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the College de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality." *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2 (2001): 190-207.
- Leung, Benjamin K. P. *Perspectives on Hong Kong Society*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Li, Tania Murray. *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2007.
- Liamputtong, Pranee, and Douglas Ezzy. *Qualitative Research Methods*. 2nd ed. Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Liang, Qiusheng, and Che-Fu Lee. "Fertility and Population Policy: An Overview." In *Fertility, Family Planning, and Population Policy in China*, edited by Dudley L. Poston, Jr, Che-Fu Lee, Chiung-Fang Chang, Sherry L. McKibben, and Carol S. Walther, 8-19. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Liu, Jieyu. "Holding Up the Sky? Reflections on Marriage in Contemporary China." *Feminism and Psychology* 14, no. 1 (2004): 195-202.
- Lock, Margaret and Patricia A. Kaufert, ed. *Pragmatic Women and Body Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Luo, Zhongyun. "The Graying Population." *Beijing Review*. 45, no.28 (2002): 19-20.

- Manderson, Lenore, Elizabeth Bennett, and Sari Andajani-Sutjahjo. "The Social Dynamics of the Interview: Age, Class, and Gender." *Qualitative Health Research* 16, no.10 (2006), 1317-1334.
- Merli, Giovanna M. "Book Reviews: Governing China's Population: From Leninist to Neoliberal Biopolitics." *Contemporary Sociology* 36, no. 2 (2007): 164-165.
- Merli, Giovanna, and Herbert Smith. "Has the Chinese Family Planning Policy Been Successful in Changing Fertility Preferences?" *Demography* 39, no.3 (2002): 557-572.
- Meyers, Diana Tietjens. "Agency." In *A Companion to Feminist Philosophy*, edited by Alison M. Jaggar, and Iris Marion Young, 372-382. Malden, Massachusetts; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998.
- Milwertz, Cecilia Nathansen. *Accepting Population Control: Urban Chinese Women and the One-Child Policy*. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1997.
- "The Missions of the National Population and Family Planning Commission." *National Population and Family Planning Commission of China*, September 7, 2005. <http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/fpcn05-en.htm>.
- "*Neidi yunfu jiu tie yuetai chan zi*" 內地孕婦九鐵月台產子 [Mainland Pregnant Women Laboured on the Kowloon-Canton Railway Platform]. *Yahoo! Hong Kong News*, September 25, 2006. <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/060924/60/1tkdn.html>.
- "*Neidifu bianjing jisu chanzi*" 內地婦邊境極速產子 [Pregnant Mainland Women Gave Birth Swiftly at the Custom Border]. *Yahoo! Hong Kong News*, Dec 13, 2006. <http://hk.news.yahoo.com/060924/60/1tkdn.html>.
- Neuman, W. Lawrence. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. 4th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2000.
- Nie, Yilin, and Robert J. Wyman. "The One-Child Policy in Shanghai: Acceptance and Internalization." *Population and Development Review* 31, no.2 (2005): 313-336.
- Oppenheimer, V.K. "Social Demography: Role of Inequality and Social Differentiation." *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science and Behavioral Sciences*, edited by Smelser, Neil J., and Paul B. Baltes, 14270-14276. Oxford: Elsevier Science, 2001.
- Padfield, Maureen, and Ian Procter. "The Effect of Interviewer's Gender on the Interviewing Process: A Comparative Enquiry." *Sociology* 30, no.2 (1996), 355-366.

- Pimentel, Ellen Efron, and Liu Jinyun. "Exploring Nonnormative Coresidence in Urban China: Living with Wives' Parents." *Journal of Marriage and Family* 66, no.3 (2004): 821-836.
- Ping, Tu, and Herbert Smith. "Determinants of Induced Abortion and their Policy Implications in Four Countries in North China." *Studies in Family Planning* 26, no.5 (1995): 278-286.
- Plafker, Ted. "Sex Selection in China Sees 117 Boys Born for Every 100 Girls." *British Medical Journal* 324, no.7348 (2002): 1233.
- Pochagina, Olga. "Chinese Youth: Attitude toward Family and Marriage." *Far Eastern Affairs* 32, no.1 (2004): 133-149.
- "Population and Family Planning Law of the People's Republic of China." *All-China Women's Federation*. <http://www.women.org.cn/english/english/laws/05.htm>.
- Postiglione, Gerard A., and James T. H. Tang, ed. *Hong Kong's Reunion with China: The Global Dimensions*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.
- Riley, Nancy. "American Adoptions of Chinese Girls: The Socio-political Matrices of Individual Decisions." *Women's Studies International Forum* 20, no.1 (1997): 87-102.
- Ritchie, Jane, and Jane Lewis. *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. California: Sage Publications, 2003.
- Rose, Nikolas, Pat O'Malley, and Mariana Valverde. "Governmentality." *Annual Review of Law and Social Science* 2 (2006): 83-104.
- Rosenberg, B.G., and Jing Qicheng. "A Revolution in Family Life: The Political and Social Structural Impact of China's One-Child Policy." *Journal of Social Issues* 52, no.3 (1996): 51-69.
- Schimmack, Ulrich, Shigehiro Oishi, and Ed Diener. "Individualism: A Valid and Important Dimension of Cultural Differences between Nations." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 9, no.1 (2005): 17-31.
- Selden, Mark. *The Political Economy of Chinese Development*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993.
- Sharping, Thomas. *Birth Control in China 1949-2000: Population Policy and Demographic Development*. London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

- Shen, Jianfa, and Wang Guixin. "Population Distribution and Growth." *Developing China's West: A Critical Path to Balanced National Development*, edited by Jianfa Shen, and Y. M. Yeung, 222-237. Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004.
- Shenyang jinbao* 沈阳今报 [Shenyang Today's News], "Suanhao feiyong tian zhiyuan: quanguo gedi gaokao xuefei biao zhun" 算好费用填志愿: 全国各地高校学费标准 [Calculate your cost before filling out applications: Various college tuition fees standard across the nation]. *Xinhua wan* 新华网 [Xinhua net], June 10, 2006. [http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-06/10/content\\_4674599.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2006-06/10/content_4674599.htm).
- Short, Susan E., Zhai Fengying, Xu Siyuan, and Yang Mingliang. "China's One-Child Policy and the Care of Children: An Analysis of Qualitative and Quantitative Data." *Social Forces* 79, no.3 (2001): 913-943.
- Singleton, Royce A., and Jr., Bruce C. Straits. *Approaches to Social Research*. 4th ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Siu, Yat-ming. "The Imbalance of Sexes in China: A Consequence of the "One-Child" Policy?" In *China in the Post-Deng Era*. Edited by Joseph Y.S. Cheng. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 525-558. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- . "Is Development the Best Contraceptive? An Examination of the Relationship between Economic Development and Fertility in Two Counties in Guangdong." In *China's Regions, Polity, and Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-Reform Era*, edited by Si-ming Li, and Wing-shing Tang, 391-402. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Smith, Herbert. "Nonreporting of Births or Nonreporting of Pregnancies? Some Evidence from Four Rural Counties in North China." *Demography* 31, no.3 (1994): 481-486.
- Stuart-Fox, Martin. *A Short History of China and Southeast Asia: Tribute, Trade and Influence*. Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2003.
- Tam, Siumi Maria. "Modernization from a Grassroots Perspective: Women Workers in Shekou Industrial Zone." In *China's Regions, Polity, and Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-Reform Era*, edited by Si-ming Li, and Wing-shing Tang, 372-402. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Tan, Shen. "The Process and Achievements of the Study on Marriage and Family in China." *The Far East* 22, no.1/2 (1996): 31.
- Tien, H. Yuan. "Abortion in China: Incidence and Implications." *Modern China* 13, no.4 (1987): 441-468.

- Tsui, Ming, and Lynne Rich. "The Only Child and Educational Opportunity for Girls in Urban China." *Gender and Society* 16, no. 1 (2002): 74-92.
- "Tuition and Fee Schedule." *Accounting Services, University of Victoria*. <http://www.finance.uvic.ca/tuition/fees.shtml>.
- Tung, Chee Hwa. "Building Hong Kong for a New Era." *Chief Executive's Policy Address*, 109. October 8, 1997. <http://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/pa97/english/patext.htm>.
- Valverde, Mariana. "Genealogies of European States: Foucauldian Reflections." *Economy and Society* 36, no.1 (2007): 159-178.
- Wang, Caroline C., E. Vittinghoff, Lu Shuhua, Wang Haiyun, and Zhou Meirong. "Reducing Pregnancy and Induced Abortion Rates in China: Family Planning with Husband Participation." *American Journal of Public Health* 88, no.4 (1998): 646-648.
- Wang, Chunguang. "The Changing Situation of Migrant Workers." *Social Research* 73, no.1 (2006): 185-196.
- Wang, Feng, and Yang Quanhe, "Age at Marriage and the First Birth Interval: The Emerging Change in Sexual Behavior among Young Couples in China." *Population and Development Review* 22, no. 2, (1996): 299-320.
- Wang, Gungwu, and John Wong. *Hong Kong in China: The Challenges of Transition*. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1999.
- Wang, Peian. "Speech by Vice Minister Wang at the Information Meeting on Population Issues in China." *National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, Chinapop*. Edited by Song Qixia, Mar. 10, 2007. <http://www.npfpc.gov.cn/en/en2007-03/news20070310-2.htm>.
- Wang, Sze-yueh, and Lee-in Chen Chiu. "The Impact of Mainland China's Open-Door Policy on Regional Industrial Development." In *China's Regions, Polity, and Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-Reform Era*, edited by Si-ming Li, and Wing-shing Tang, 133-152. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Wang, Yan. "Value Changes in an Era of Social Transformations: College-Educated Chinese Youth." *Educational Studies* 32, no.2 (2006): 233-240.
- Wardlow, Holly. *Wayward Women: Sexuality and Agency in a New Guinea Society*. California: University of California Press, 2006.

- Wasserstrom, Jeffrey. "Resistance to the One-Child Family." *Modern China* 10, no.3 (1984): 345-374.
- White, Lynn T. Foreword to "Chinese Globalism in Hong Kong." *Hong Kong's Reunion with China: The Global Dimensions*, edited by Gerard A. Postiglione, and James T. H. Tang, viii-x. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.
- White, Tyrene. *China's Longest Campaign: Birth Planning in the People's Republic, 1949-2005*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006.
- . "Domination, Resistance and Accommodation in China's One-Child Campaign." In *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance*, edited by Elizabeth J. Perry, and Mark Selten. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2000.
- Wong, Yiu-Chung., edited. *"One Country, Two Systems" in Crisis: Hong Kong's Transformation since the Handover*. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004.
- Yan, Yunxiang. "Courtship, Love and Premarital Sex in a North China Village." *The China Journal* 48, no.2 (2002): 29-53.
- Yangzi wanbao* [Yangzi Evening News]. "Childless Families." *Beijing Review* 18, no.17 (1995): 27.
- Yeh, Anthony Gar-on. "Foreign Investment and Urban Development in China." In *China's Regions, Polity, and Economy: A Study of Spatial Transformation in the Post-Reform Era*, edited by Si-ming Li, and Wing-shing Tang, 35-64. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1998.
- Zhan, Jenny Heying. "Socialization or Social Structure: Investigating Predictors of Attitudes toward Filial Responsibility among Chinese Urban Youth from One- and Multiple-Child Families." *International Journal of Aging and Human Development* 59, no.2 (2004): 105-124.
- . "Willingness and Expectations: Intergenerational Differences in Attitudes toward Filial Responsibility in China." *Marriage & Family Review* 36, no.1/2 (2004): 175-200.
- Zhang Li, Feng Xiaotian, and Zhong Qingsong. "Changing Patterns of Desired Fertility." In *Fertility, Family Planning, and Population Policy in China*, edited by Dudley L. Poston, Jr, Che-Fu Lee, Chiung-Fang Chang, Sherry L. McKibben, and Carol S. Walther, 89-109. New York: Routledge, 2006.

*Zhongguo Fazhi Chubanshe* 中国法制出版社 [China Law Press]. *Banan yiju congshu: Banli renkou yu jihua shengyu anjian falu yiju* 办案依据丛书: 办理人口与计划生育案件法律依据 [Guidebook for Case Application: Legal Reference for Cases on Population and Family Planning Applications]. Beijing: *Zhongguo Fazhi Chubanshe* 中国法制出版社 [China Law Press], 2002.

*Zhongguo renhou* 中国人口 [China's Population]. National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, *Zhongguo renkou wang* 中国人口网 [China Population Website], edited by *Song Qixia* 宋绮霞, September 20, 2005. [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkgk/zgrk2/t20050920\\_31760.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/rkgk/zgrk2/t20050920_31760.htm).

*Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2000* 中国统计年鉴 2000 [China Statistical Yearbook 2000]. Beijing: *Zhongguo tongji chubanshe* 中国统计出版社 [China Statistical Press], 2000.

“*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo renkou yu jihua shengyu fa (2001 nian 12 yue 29 ri di jiu jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di ershiwu ci huiyi tongguo)*” 中华人民共和国人口与计划生育法 (2001 年 12 月 29 日第九届全国人民代表大会第二十五次会议通过) [People's Republic of China's population and family planning law (Passed on December 29, 2001 at the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Ninth National People's Congress)]. National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, *Zhongguo renkou wang* 中国人口网 [China Population Website], edited by *Song Qixia* 宋绮霞, March 26, 2004. [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326\\_27023.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326_27023.htm).

“*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo hunyin fa*” 中华人民共和国婚姻法 [People's Republic of China's Marriage Law]. *Guangdong sheng renkou he jihua shengyu weiyuan hui* 广东省人口和计划生育委员会 [Province of Guangdong's Population and Family Planning Committee], [http://www.gdpic.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/200511/t20051125\\_11976.htm](http://www.gdpic.gov.cn/zcfg/flfg/200511/t20051125_11976.htm).

“*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wuyin baojin fa*” 中华人民共和国母婴保健法 [People's Republic of China's Maternal and Infant Health Care Law]. National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, *Zhongguo renkou wang* 中国人口网 [China Population Website], edited by *Song Qixia* 宋绮霞, March 26, 2004. [http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326\\_27023.htm](http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/flfg/fl/t20040326_27023.htm).

## Appendix 1

### Interview Questions (English and Simplified Chinese)

#### Part I. Growing Up as a Single-child      第一部分 独生女的成长

1. Can you provide me with a brief summary of your life until now?  
您可以简略的叙述一下您的生活经历吗？
2. Do you think your parents or grandparents treat you like “the little emperor” because you are a single-child? In what way? How does this make you feel?  
您觉得您父母或祖父母会因为您是独生女而待您像“小皇帝”吗？在哪一方面呢？这会让您有什么感受呢？
3. If you were to be born again, would you prefer to be a boy or a girl? Why?  
如果人可以再生，您会希望自己是男或是女呢？为什么？
4. Do you prefer to have a lot of siblings? Why?  
您希望有很多兄弟姐妹吗？为什么？

#### Part II. Marriage Plan      第二部分 结婚计划

5. Do you plan to get married? 您将来打算结婚吗？
6. Would you prefer to marry somebody living in China, Hong Kong, Macao, overseas, or a foreigner? Why do you have this preference?  
您比较希望跟国内同胞，港澳同胞，海外华人，或外国人结婚呢？您为何有这样的偏向呢？
7. Would you choose to marry someone who is also a single-child? Why?  
您会选择跟独生子结婚吗？为什么呢？
8. Who would give you advice on marriage? Who would you prefer to discuss this matter with? Why?  
谁会给您婚姻上的意见？您会比较愿意跟谁谈论这种问题呢？为什么呢？

9. After marriage, do you plan to live with your own parents, or your husband's parents? Or do you plan to live apart from either side of the family? Why do you have these plans?  
婚后您计划跟您父母或您丈夫的父母一起同住吗？或是您不打算跟任何一方的家人同住？您为何有这样的计划呢？
10. After marriage, do you plan to provide financial support to your parents or grandparents? About how much of your income? Why do you have these plans?  
婚后，您计划在经济上扶助您父母或祖父母吗？大约占您收入的多少？您为何有这样的计划？
11. How much are your attitudes different from your parents on marriage? Why?  
您父母跟您对婚姻的看法有多大的分别呢？为什么有这样的分别？  
Prompt: 1) Premarital sex 婚前性行为  
2) Pregnant before marriage 未婚怀孕  
3) Choosing husband 挑选对象

### **Part III. Childbearing Plan            第三部分 生育计划**

12. After marriage, do you plan to have children? How many boys and how many girls? Why do you have this plan?  
您婚后打算生育吗？想要几个男孩，几个女孩呢？您为何有这样的计划？
- 12b. What would be your ideal number of children of either sex if it were not for the one child policy? Why do you have such an ideal?  
如果不是一胎化政策的关系，您想要几个男孩和几个女孩呢？您为何有这种想法呢？
13. How heavy do you weigh the sex of your child? Why?  
您对自己孩子的性别看得有多重呢？为什么呢？
14. How different is your attitude towards the sex preference of your child in comparison with that of your parents? Why?  
您跟您父母对于您孩子的性别的看法是否相同呢？为什么呢？
15. How much pressure your parents have on your childbearing plan?  
在生育计划方面，您父母会给您多大的压力呢？在哪一方面？
16. Who would give you advice on childbearing? Who would you prefer to discuss this issue with? Why?  
谁会给您生育方面的指导？您会比较愿意跟谁谈论这种问题呢？为什么呢？

**Part IV. Old Age Plan****第四部分 退休计画**

17. Do you expect your children to live with you when they in turn get married? Why?  
当您的孩子结婚后，您期望他们跟您同住吗？您为何有这样的想法呢？
18. Do you expect them to support you when you are no longer working? Why do you have these expectations?  
当您不再工作时，您期望他们照顾您吗？为什么呢？
19. If you do not expect to get marry or have children, how would you plan for your old age? 如果您不准备结婚或生孩子，您会怎样计划您的退休生活呢？

**Part V. General Questions****第五部分 总结性问题**

20. How much impact do you feel being a single-child has had on you? On your experiences? On your values? On what you do? On your future aspirations? Why would you have such thought? Would it be different from that if you were not a single-child?  
您觉得作为独生女对您有多大的影响呢？在您的经历方面？在您的价值观方面？在您做事方式方面？在您未来抱负方面？您为何会有这些想法呢？如果您不是独生子女，您的想法会有分别吗？

**Closing Questions 其它问题**

21. What did you think about the interview? 您觉得这个访问怎么样？
22. Do you have anything you would like to add? 您还有什么想说的吗？
23. Do you have any questions for me? 您有问题想问我吗？

## Appendix 2

### Post-Interview Questionnaire (English and Simplified Chinese)

#### Part I. Informant's Background Information 被访者的背景资料

##### Age 年龄

1) What year were you born? 您出生于哪个年份?

- |                               |                               |                               |                               |                               |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1978 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1979 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1980 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1981 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1982 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1983 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1984 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1985 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1986 | <input type="checkbox"/> 1987 |

##### Place of Birth 出生地

2) Where were you originated (city/province/country)? 您的出生地在哪里(市/省/国)?

##### Past Occupation 过去职业

3) Have you worked before? 您曾工作过吗?  No 否  Yes 是

[If no, please go to Q.6 or else go to Q.4.

如果答案是【否】的，请往问题〔六〕。否则请往问题〔四〕。]

4) If yes, what was your work unit? 如果答案是【是】的，您曾在那个单位工作?

Period of employment 参加工作时间: \_\_\_\_\_

Please check **all** that apply for all the following:

请把以下所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号:

5a) Type of Occupation 职业类型

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Wage-earner 工薪阶层                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Non Wage-earner 非工薪阶层           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Agricultural 农业                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-agricultural 非农业            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State-owned Enterprise 国有企业            | <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign-owned Enterprise 外商投资企业 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private Enterprise 私营企业                | <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed 个体工商户             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |  |

5b) Employment Status 职业类型

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent employment 固定工               | <input type="checkbox"/> Temporary Employment 临时工 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |   |

5c) Employment Rank 职位

- |   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Management 管理人员                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Staff 一般职员 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |                                     |

**Present Occupation** 现有职业

6) Do you work now? 您现在工作吗?  No 否  Yes 是

[If no, please go to Q.9 or else go to Q.7.

如果答案是【否】的，请往问题〔九〕。否则请往问题〔七〕。]

7) If yes, what is your work unit? 如果答案是【是】的，您现在在那个单位工作？

Period of employment 参加工作时间: \_\_\_\_\_

Please check **all** that apply for all the following:

请把以下所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号:

8a) Type of Occupation 职业类型

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Wage-earner 工薪阶层                 | <input type="checkbox"/> Non Wage-earner 非工薪阶层           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Agricultural 农业                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-agricultural 非农业            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State-owned Enterprise 国有企业      | <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign-owned Enterprise 外商投资企业 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private Enterprise 私营企业          | <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed 个体工商户             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) | _____  |

8b) Employment Status 职业类型

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent employment 固定工         | <input type="checkbox"/> Temporary Employment 临时工 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) | _____   |

8c) Employment Rank 职位

- |   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Management 管理人员                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Staff 一般职员 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) | _____                               |

**Education 教育程度**

- 9) Please check **all** that apply in column A and fill in the rest of column B, C, and D.  
请您在 A 项目里把所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号，并请您填写其余的 B, C, D 项目。

A	B	C	D
<b>Type of School Attended</b> 学校类型	<b>Level Attained</b> (grade/year) 受教育程度 (级别/年份)	<b>Location of School</b> (city/province) 学校地点 (城市/省份)	<b>Public/Private/ International/ Study Aboard/ Others(specify)</b> 公立/私立/国际/海外留学/ 其它(请详列)
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Preschool</b> 学前教育			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Kindergarten</b> 幼儿园			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Elementary School</b> 小学			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Junior High School</b> 初中			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Senior High School</b> 高中			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>College/University</b> 大专/大学			
<b>Name of College/University</b> 大专/大学名称：			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Bachelor's Degree</b> 学士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Master's Degree</b> 硕士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Doctorate (PhD)</b> 博士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Medical Doctor</b> 医生			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Others (Please specify)</b> 其它(请详列)			

**Income Range 收入**

- 10a) What is the range of your monthly income? 您每月的收入是多少？

- Yuan 人民币  Hong Kong dollars 港元  
 Others (please specify) 其它(请详列) \_\_\_\_\_  
 0-200       201-400       401-600       601-800  
 801-1000       1001-2000       2001-4000       4001-6000  
 6001-8000       8001-10,000       10,001-12,000       12,001-15,000  
 15,001 and over 或以上  Others (please specify) 其它(请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

- 10b) What is/are your financial source(s)? 您的经济来源是什么？

- Work 工作       Father 父亲       Mother 母亲  
 Paternal grandfather 祖父       Paternal grandmother 祖母  
 Maternal grandfather 外祖父       Maternal grandmother 外祖母  
 Others (Please specify) 其它(请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

**Part II. Parents' Background Information 父母的背景资料****Age range 年龄**

## 1a) Father 父亲

- Under 34 以下     35-39     40-44     45-49     50-54     55-59  
 60-64     65-69     70-74     75-79     80 and over 或以上

## 1b) Mother 母亲

- Under 34 以下     35-39     40-44     45-49     50-54     55-59  
 60-64     65-69     70-74     75-79     80 and over 或以上

**Place of Birth 出生地**

2a) Where was the birth place of your father? 您父亲的出生地是在哪里？

2b) Where was the birth place of your mother? 您母亲的出生地是在哪里？

**Father's Past Occupation 父亲过去的职业**3) Did your **father** work before? 您父亲曾工作过吗？     No 否     Yes 是

[If no, please go to Q.6 or else go to Q.4.

如果答案是【否】的，请往问题〔六〕。否则请往问题〔四〕。]

4) If yes, what was his work unit? 如果答案是【是】的，他曾在哪个单位工作？

---

 Period of employment 参加工作时间: \_\_\_\_\_
Please check **all** that apply for all the following:

请把以下所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号:

5a) **Type of Occupation 职业类型**

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Wage-earner 工薪阶层                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Non Wage-earner 非工薪阶层           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Agricultural 农业                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-agricultural 非农业            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State-owned Enterprise 国有企业            | <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign-owned Enterprise 外商投资企业 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private Enterprise 私营企业                | <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed 个体工商户             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |  |

5b) **Employment Status 职业类型**

- Permanent employment 固定工     Temporary Employment 临时工  
 Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

5c) Employment Rank 职位 Management 管理人员 Staff 一般职员 Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_**Father's Present Occupation** 父亲现有职业6) Does your **father** work *now*? 您父亲现在工作吗?  No 否  Yes 是

[If no, please go to Q.9 or else go to Q.7.

如果答案是【否】的，请往问题〔九〕。否则请往问题〔七〕。]

7) If yes, what is his work unit? 如果答案是【是】的，他现在在那哪个单位工作？

\_\_\_\_\_  
Period of employment 参加工作时间: \_\_\_\_\_Please check **all** that apply for all the following:

请把以下所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号:

8a) Type of Occupation 职业类型 Wage-earner 工薪阶层 Non Wage-earner 非工薪阶层 Agricultural 农业 Non-agricultural 非农业 State-owned Enterprise 国有企业 Foreign-owned Enterprise 外商投资企业 Private Enterprise 私营企业 Self-employed 个体工商户 Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_8b) Employment Status 职业类型 Permanent employment 固定工 Temporary Employment 临时工 Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_8c) Employment Rank 职位 Management 管理人员 Staff 一般职员 Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_**Mother's Past Occupation** 母亲过去的职业9) Did your **mother** work before? 您母亲曾工作过吗?  No 否  Yes 是

[If no, please go to Q.12 or else go to Q.10.

如果答案是【否】的，请往问题〔十二〕。否则请往问题〔十〕。]

10) If yes, what was her work unit? 如果答案是【是】的，她曾在哪个单位工作？

\_\_\_\_\_  
Period of employment 参加工作时间: \_\_\_\_\_

Please check **all** that apply for all the following:  
请把以下所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号:

11a) Type of Occupation 职业类型

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Wage-earner 工薪阶层                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Non Wage-earner 非工薪阶层           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Agricultural 农业                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-agricultural 非农业            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State-owned Enterprise 国有企业            | <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign-owned Enterprise 外商投资企业 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private Enterprise 私营企业                | <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed 个体工商户             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |  |

11b) Employment Status 职业类型

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent employment 固定工               | <input type="checkbox"/> Temporary Employment 临时工 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |   |

11c) Employment Rank 职位

- |   |                                     |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Management 管理人员                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Staff 一般职员 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |                                     |

**Mother's Present Occupation** 母亲现有职业

- 12) Does your **mother** work *now*? 您母亲现在工作吗?  No 否  Yes 是  
[If no, please go to Q.15 or else go to Q.13.  
如果答案是【否】的, 请往问题〔十五〕。否则请往问题〔十三〕。]

- 13) If yes, what is her work unit? 如果答案是【是】的, 她在哪个单位工作?

\_\_\_\_\_

Period of employment 参加工作时间: \_\_\_\_\_

Please check **all** that apply for all the following:  
请把以下所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号:

14a) Type of Occupation 职业类型

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Wage-earner 工薪阶层                       | <input type="checkbox"/> Non Wage-earner 非工薪阶层           |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Agricultural 农业                        | <input type="checkbox"/> Non-agricultural 非农业            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> State-owned Enterprise 国有企业            | <input type="checkbox"/> Foreign-owned Enterprise 外商投资企业 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Private Enterprise 私营企业                | <input type="checkbox"/> Self-employed 个体工商户             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |  |

14b) Employment Status 职业类型

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Permanent employment 固定工               | <input type="checkbox"/> Temporary Employment 临时工 |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) _____ |   |

14c) **Employment Rank** 职位 Management 管理人员 Staff 一般职员 Others (Please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_**Education** 教育程度15a) What is your **father's** education level? 您父亲的教育程度是什么?Please check **all** that apply in column A and fill in the rest of column B, C, and D.

请您在 A 项目里把所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号，并请您填写其余 B，C，D 项目。

A	B	C	D
<b>Type of School Attended</b> 学校类型	<b>Level Attained (grade/year)</b> 受教育程度 (级别/年份)	<b>Location of School (city/province)</b> 学校地点 (城市/省份)	<b>Public/Private/International/Study Aboard/Others(specify)</b> 公立/私立/国际/海外留学/ 其它 (请详列)
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Preschool</b> 学前教育			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Kindergarten</b> 幼儿园			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Elementary School</b> 小学			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Junior High School</b> 初中			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Senior High School</b> 高中			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>College/University</b> 大专/大学			
<b>Name of College/University</b> 大专/大学名称：			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Bachelor's Degree</b> 学士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Master's Degree</b> 硕士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Doctorate (PhD)</b> 博士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Medical Doctor</b> 医生			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Others (Please specify)</b> 其它 (请详列)			

16) What is your **mother's** education level? 您母亲的教育程度是什么？

Please check **all** that apply in column A and fill in the rest of column B, C, and D.  
请您在 A 项目里把所有符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号，并请您填写其余 B，C，D 项目。

A	B	C	D
<b>Type of School Attended</b> 学校类型	<b>Level Attained (grade/year)</b> 受教育程度 (级别/年份)	<b>Location of School (city/province)</b> 学校地点 (城市/省份)	<b>Public/Private/International/Study Aboard/Others(specify)</b> 公立/私立/国际/海外留学/ 其它 (请详列)
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Preschool</b> 学前教育			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Kindergarten</b> 幼儿园			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Elementary School</b> 小学			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Junior High School</b> 初中			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Senior High School</b> 高中			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>College/University</b> 大专/大学			
<b>Name of College/University</b> 大专/大学名称：			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Bachelor's Degree</b> 学士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Master's Degree</b> 硕士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Doctorate (PhD)</b> 博士			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Medical Doctor</b> 医生			
<input type="checkbox"/> <b>Others (Please specify)</b> 其它 (请详列)			

### Income Range 收入

17a) What is the level of income of your **father**? 您父亲每月的收入是多少？

Yuan 人民币  Hong Kong dollars 港元

Others (please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

0-200       201-400       401-600       601-800  
 801-1000       1001-2000       2001-4000       4001-6000  
 6001-8000       8001-10,000       10,001-12,000       12,001-15,000  
 15,001 and over 或以上       Others (please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

17b) What is the level of income of your **mother**? 您母亲每月的收入是多少？

Yuan 人民币  Hong Kong dollars 港元

Others (please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

0-200       201-400       401-600       601-800  
 801-1000       1001-2000       2001-4000       4001-6000  
 6001-8000       8001-10,000       10,001-12,000       12,001-15,000  
 15,001 and over 或以上       Others (please specify) 其它 (请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

**Type of Household** 户口类型

18a) Does your **father** have siblings? 您的父亲有兄弟姐妹吗?  No 否  Yes 是

If yes, how many siblings does your father have including him?

如果有, 包括您的父亲在内, 他有多少兄弟姐妹? \_\_\_\_\_

What is the order of their birth including your father?

包括您的父亲在内, 他的兄弟姐妹的出生次序是什么? \_\_\_\_\_

18b) Does your **mother** have siblings? 您的母亲有兄弟姐妹吗?  No 否  Yes 是

If yes, how many siblings does your mother have including her?

如果有, 包括您的母亲在内, 她有多少兄弟姐妹? \_\_\_\_\_

What is the order of their birth including your mother?

包括您的母亲在内, 她的兄弟姐妹的出生次序是什么? \_\_\_\_\_

19) Please check **all** that apply in column A and D, and fill in **all** that apply in column B, C, E and F. 请您在 A 和 D 项目里把**所有**符合您的选项打上【✓】的符号, 并请您在 B, C, E, F 项目里填写**所有**符合您的选项。

A	B	C
<b>Shared House with You Before</b> 跟您同居过的	<b>If Yes, Please Specify The Period of Co-residence (year)</b> 如果答案是【是】的, 请您详列同居时间 (年份)	<b>If Not, Please Specify His/Her Location of Residence (city/province)</b> 如果答案是【否】的, 请您详列他/她的居住地点 (城市/省份)
<input type="checkbox"/> Paternal Grandfather 祖父		
<input type="checkbox"/> Paternal Grandmother 祖母		
<input type="checkbox"/> Maternal Grandfather 外祖父		
<input type="checkbox"/> Maternal Grandmother 外祖母		
D	E	F
<b>Share House with You Now</b> 现在跟您同居的	<b>If Yes, Please Specify The Period of Co-residence (year)</b> 如果答案是【是】的, 请您详列同居时间 (年份)	<b>If Not, Please Specify His/Her Location of Residence (city/province)</b> 如果答案是【否】的, 请您详列他/她的居住地点 (城市/省份)
<input type="checkbox"/> Paternal Grandfather 祖父		
<input type="checkbox"/> Paternal Grandmother 祖母		
<input type="checkbox"/> Maternal Grandfather 外祖父		
<input type="checkbox"/> Maternal Grandmother 外祖母		

**\* Please proceed to the following questions only if you are interviewed in Canada.**  
如果您是在加拿大受访的，请您继续填写以下的问题。

**Participants interviewed in Canada** 在加拿大受访的参与者

20) Your status in Canada is...您在加拿大的身份是…

International student 国际留学生

Canadian permanent resident 加拿大永久居民

Canadian citizen 加拿大公民

Others (Please specify) 其它(请详列) \_\_\_\_\_

21) How long have you been living in Canada? 您在加拿大居住了多久？

---

## Appendix 3

### Photos on State Propaganda

During my trips to several cities in Guangdong Province in July and August 2005, and October 2006, I saw several billboards and *da zhi pao* (big character posters) promoting family planning on public walls or on streets. Here are three samples.



*Figure 1: Big Character Posters on Family Planning*

In Figure 1, the wordings are “实行计划生育是我国一...”, which can be translated into “*Implementing family planning is our country...*”. In Figure 2, the wordings are “生男生女一样好，女儿也是传后人”. This can be translated as “*It is just as good to give birth to sons as daughters, daughters are heirs too*”. In Figure 3, the wordings are “实行计划生育是妇女自身解放的需要”, which can be translated into “*Carrying out birth planning is necessary for women’s self liberation*”.



*Figure 2: Billboard on Family Planning*



*Figure 3: Billboard on Family Planning 2*

As evidence that the one-child policy is at its “low tide” period, I notice that these posters did not stand out to catch the public eye. They were small and posted somewhere insignificant. Nonetheless, their very presence confirms the fact the one-child policy continues to exist in urban China although some China daughters do not notice them.