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A Comparative Historiography of the French and German Revolutions of 1848: An Historical Analysis of Ideology

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ABSTRACT

To the majority of German historians of the Nineteenth Century 1848 was a back-drop to unification in 1871. To the French historians, 1848 was but another in the series of revolutions following the major revolution of 1789. To explain why 1848 was viewed differently in France and Germany, one must look not only at the socio-economic structures of the two countries but also at their different ideological superstructures. One must ask how the differing conceptions of nationalism, liberalism, conservatism, and socialism among historians were related to or affected by the historical attributes of the two countries. It is my thesis that, in the Franco-German historiography of 1848, politics has been the dominant and determining element, and that the historiography produced has therefore always been expressive of ideology. Chapter One examines the particular role and presuppositions of the various schools of Franco-German historiography in order to show how historians have been, still are, and perhaps always will be, prone to reproduce the dominant ideology of an existing social order. Chapters Two and Three, on France and Germany respectively, deal with concrete historical examples of historiography: how theoretical presuppositions and political realities manifested themselves in particular historians' explanation of the origins and causes of the 1848 Revolutions. Since this thesis is concerned with the relationship between ideology and history, it will offer an historical account of the

manifested themselves in particular historians' explanation of the origins and causes of the 1848 Revolutions. Since this thesis is conerned with the relationship between ideology and history I will point to the underlying presuppositions and antecedants that have resulted in the present lack of concern for the relationship between ideology, politics, and history in Franco-German historiography. It is argued that this lack of concern is present in French historians' search for the perfect synthesis of social variables (as in the Annales tradition). Since perfection denotes completion, this is actually a search for an end-goal. I claim that such an end-goal can only result in historical abstraction from political reality. Recent Western German historiography on 1848 will be viewed from a perspective of its unsuccessful integration of Marxism into the traditional historical community and the political and ideological problems that have resulted.

Examiners:

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"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past."

(Karl Marx, from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

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DEDICATION

For My Mother and Father

INTRODUCTION

Since the growth of history as a discipline, the major problem facing historians has been how to overcome that obstacle which separates them from their sources, or, how to interpret historical facts objectively. The Nineteenth Century German historian Ranke claimed that generalizations were useless and unhistorical since they reduced the essential historical nature of individuality. He sought to define history on its own terms, as it actually was. To Ranke theory was an unnecessary contrivance since the past spoke directly to the historian through documented sources. Basically, all the historian had to do was thoroughly research these documents and he would achieve objectivity.[1] On the other hand, late Nineteenth Century members of the Prussian Historical School (eg., Sybel, Treitschke) thought that Ranke's interpretation of history was too quietist. Following Savigny, Sybel claimed that all societies evolved in similar ways and that, therefore, similar types or patterns of human experience would be repeated given certain political circumstances. To Sybel, history could only be explained through politics.[2] The members of the Prussian Historical School were National Liberals and they wrote history from a Prussian nationalist point of view. To them, in order for history to be scientific, it had to be subjugated to the realities

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1 Cf. G.G. Iggers, "The New Historiography in Historical Perspective," Australian Journal of Politics and History, No. 1, (April, 1971), pp. 44-55: pp. 45-6.

2 Antoine Guilland, Modern Germany and Her Historians, (1915) (Westport: Greenwood, 1970), pp. 177-8.

of necessary political actions.

French historians of the Third Republic (eg., Lavisse, Hanotaux) tried to emulate both the Rankean concern for sources and the reification of politics in the Prussian School in order to bolster lagging French nationalism following Prussia's victory in the Franco-Prussian War. Like the members of the Prussian School, republican historians placed politics at the center of historical study and thereby formed a platform from which to legitimize their anti-clerical and nationalist beliefs. Due to the more democratic nature of France, this form of political history was immediately visible and historians, mostly on the left, successfully repudiated it.

Early Twentieth Century historiography was developed in response to these kinds of historical interpretation. The relativism of Croce or Beard, the historical generalizations of Weber and Hintze, and the Annalists' "total history" were all reactions against the pseudo-objectivity of Ranke and the nationalist political history of the Prussian and Republican Schools of history. In their worst form these latter Schools were criticized as contributing to the causes of World War I.

Following World War I French historians returned to "social history" to overcome upon the earlier distortions of political history. Though not until much more recently, German historians have nonetheless also made an explicit move towards writing social history. The positivist philosophical tradition aided the French historians' researches into social history because positivism placed politics outside the realm of science. The German idealist-statist philosophical tradition has made the turn to social history much more difficult since that tradition is more concerned with the embodiment of social factors in an idealized conception

of the state rather than with the isolated factors themselves. The recent German approach to social history is therefore all the more important.

The problem with this turn to social history, and the problem which I will focus on in this thesis, is that it obscures the relationship between politics and society, and hence the relationship between politics and historiography. The replacement of the political or ideological dimension in most social histories with structural analysis has led to a strange breed of historiography.[3] Whether this is due to the desire to forget past historical problems in order to maintain nationalist integrity or simply because a more "scientific" history is sincerely being sought, ignorance of the relationship between historiography and political ideology brings forth more problems than it solves: moral and ethical problems dealing with the manipulation of history as a weapon to back political motives, and the problem of obfuscating various historical continuities.[4] Only among Marxist historians has there been a definite attempt to perceive of political ideology and historiography as necessarily related.[5] Since I will be tracing the

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[3] S. Elwitt, in his "Politics and Ideology in the French Labor Movement," in the Journal of Modern History, Vol. 49, #3, (September, 1977), pp. 468-80, states that due to lack of concern for the political ramifications of the historian's work we now find that "'new social historians' have forged an alliance of pseudoscience and genuine ideology," which by over-emphasis on statistical and structural models excludes "decisive ideological and political factors," p. 468.

[4] I give an argument for the importance of ideology in historiography in "Appendix A".

[5] The English Marxist historian E.P. Thompson has stated numerous times, but perhaps never more effectively than in his The Making of the English Working Class, that if you "examine [the] moment--situate yourself for a Marxist historical or cultural analysis... you must commence, not within theory, but within the political world." (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), p. 400. I believe that this point holds true whether one is arguing that politics structures life-experience and that historical accounts must therefore place politics at the centre, or that the writing of history serves political purposes and is ideologically affected.

historical antecedents of modern Franco-German social history, it will be possible to reveal the false scientific basis from which most of it is derived.[6] I argue that a greater concern for ideological and subjective conditions should be articulated, since this would result in a more balanced historical outlook. A regard for the dimension of ideology causes the historian to give a detailed view of his own biases and therefore of the presuppositions of his "empirical" interpretation.[7] It is my contention that this desire to escape ideological bias by tending towards some sort of strict objectivity and/or so-called "scientific history" cannot be realized. This is due to the fact the transformation from one historical formation or paradigm to another also includes an ideological change in how historians perceive history. In France, the Annalist historians have argued for an evolutionary nexus between the social sciences and history. This nexus ignores the changing ideological barrier between the observer and the observed. West German, and to a lesser extent East German historians, have substituted one paradigm of historical methodology for another without fully realizing the ideological content of either. As Marx knew only too well, a philosophy cannot be transcended unless it is realized.

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[6] G.S. Jones, "From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History," in the British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 27 (1976), pp. 295-305, states his reluctance to see sociological theory become the back-bone of historiography. This is because he rightly notes the positivistic strains of theory that predominate in contemporary sociology. G.G. Iggers, in his New Directions in European Historiography, (revised edition), (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1984), pp.175-205, states that the link between social science and history has "intensified" and has resulted in an "international community of historians," but then concludes his book by claiming that no real consensus can be achieved in such a community due to the protean form of objectivity, and admits that ideology cannot be excluded from historical scholarship.

[7] Among those who point to a more subjective and theoretical approach to history, cf. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State, (London: New Left Books, 1974), p. 7.

My own bias for a Marxist historical analysis in this thesis stems from the Marxian concern for the relationship between ideology and history. Also explicit in Marxism is the concern for the dialectical relationship between free-will and determinism, or the attempt to historically situate how the structural basis of society (the "base") reacts with various ideologies (the "superstructure"). In a sense, then, this work is an attempt to historically analyse ideology, and in the critical tradition of Marxism I will criticize those historians who have either ignored or sought to politically manipulate the relationship between history and ideology.[8]

The Franco-German historiography of 1848 permits a very relevant illustration of the above-mentioned problem. As a pan-European phenomenon the "year of revolutions," 1848, witnessed the occurrence of many outbreaks in, among other countries, France, Germany, Poland, Italy and Austria. The historians of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries looked to the origins of these revolutions mainly from political and ideological perspectives. Their own biases were also present in their works, as seen in the desire to look at these revolutions from a perspective of their worth to national unification (Germany) or to the republican movement (France). These perspectives often resulted in a relative lack of concern for the more social and economic aspects of 1848, as well as its international context. The relative absence of such concerns was affected by the particular political persuasion of the historian. I have chosen the French and German 1848 Revolutions in particular not simply because they allow a

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[8] I feel this to be the essence of this work, and even though I have my own Marxist bias, my concern for the constructs of ideology should, for reasons mentioned, yield a more realistic approach to historiography as well as avoid the obvious error of interpreting the actors of 1848 with the ideological blinkers of post-1848 historians.

comparison of historiographical differences in respective democratic and absolutist traditions, but because France borrowed freely from Nineteenth Century German historical methodology and because much of that German historical methodology was formulated by those who were reacting against the French Revolution and Napoleon's occupation of German lands. The French admired the growth of Prussian nationalism which became more focused after the chance was lost for a democratic German constitution following 1848. Thus there is an unusual continuity in the political aspects of Franco-German historiography, and the political position of the respective historians of 1848 has pervaded not only the interpretation of 1848 but also the formulation of important aspects of Franco-German historical methodology. In general, the turn to a social history of 1848 in both France and Germany has obscured this historico-ideological nexus.

This thesis argues that the German historiography of 1848 has changed from its original bias for political history to a concern for social history without politically specifying what such a change would involve for historical methodology, and thus in a very real sense, effecting no change at all. French historians, on the other hand, have always placed the Revolution of 1848 in the shadow of 1789, and since the outcome of that revolution resulted in an eventual concern for the "Social Question" (i.e., a concern for the evolving problem of the new class relations to new productive forces), social history of one type or another has been the bread and butter of the French historical community. Except during the Third Republic French historians have kept to this concern for social factors, hence social history has remained the dominant mode and a hiatus has been produced in understanding the relationship of politics to society due to the

isolation of social from political history.[9]

The various chapters of this thesis attempt to delineate the ideological presuppositions and historical influences of the Franco-German historiography of 1848 in order to show the need for an awareness of ideology in historical writing. In order to show the importance of the rise of history itself as a discipline, and its relevance to historiographical interpretation, Chapter One will begin with the historical ideas produced in the French and German Enlightenment. Then I will turn to my main concern, namely the Franco-German historiography of 1848 from the first contemporary accounts to the recent debates. This will be done in Chapters Two and Three, respectively. In each of the latter chapters I will start with a discussion of the historical background leading up to 1848, which will then be followed by the actual historiography itself, broken up into representatives of the major schools of interpretation. The conclusion will summarize my arguments as well as give some suggestions to aid in a more ideologically balanced interpretation of 1848.

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[9] Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, in their, Fruits of Merchant Capital, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 173-248, make a similar argument.

Chapter I

POLITICS, SOCIETY AND HISTORY IN FRANCE AND GERMANY

This chapter will attempt to show the relationship between historiography, society and politics in France and Germany in historical perspective. The emergence of history as a separate discipline will be examined, and its philosophical bases explored. It is argued that the presuppositions of the French and German historical communities were related to the dominant ideological value of each respective era. Since the rise of history is also partly derived from its philosophical basis, the philosophical tenets of French positivism and German idealism will be shown to play a central role throughout Franco-German historiography.

Pre-Enlightenment historical study was a mere segment of the studia humanitatis, an adjunct to the major discipline of rhetoric, and was used to illustrate examples in moral philosophy.[10] Historians, or more properly, antiquarians had not as yet developed a critical attitude towards their sources. They saw historical fact as existing universally, laid down once and for all by the

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10 Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Historical Study in Western Germany," in Historical Study in the West, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 75. For background information on humanism and history, see Ernst Breisach, Historiography: Ancient, Medieval and Modern, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 162-165; and Denys Hay, Annalists and Historians: Western Historiography from the Eighth to the Eighteenth Centuries, (London: Methuen and Co., 1977), pp. 87-132.

classical historians, such as Livy, Plutarch, and Thucydides. But just as Protestantism forced the Catholic Church into a systematic study of theology in order to defend itself, the Protestant and Catholic interpretations of pagan antiquity also forced a more systematized chronology.[11] With the advent of the Enlightenment, classical Cartesian philosophy was purged of all its metaphysical conjecturing as well as its singular methodological approach to all disciplines, and the desire of historical scholars became to map out the limits of historical knowledge and experience. The study of history was bifurcated by the Enlightenment's expansion of knowledge through this scientific rejection of conjectural metaphysics and the transformation of religious hermeneutics into a philosophy which was both critical and reconstructive. This resulted in the collapse of the previous study of universal history, and a drawing away from the idea of historian as antiquarian. Stemming from the great works of Gibbon and Hume, the concept of historian as a critical researcher of sources was implanted into most educational systems.[12]

The French Enlightenment's promulgation of deism, rationalist individualism, and especially teleological progress, challenged the older marginal or additive basis of historical chronology. The French philosophes worked mainly outside the university system as literati. Their view of history reflected their radical interpretation of the society in which they lived, a society ruled by Bourbons and reinforced by the Roman Catholic church. The philosophes were against the Old

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[11] François Furet, In the Workshop of History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 77-80.

[12] Hay, op. cit., pp. 167-185. Excluding the politically motivated criticisms of Voltaire, an analytico-critical outlook did not develop as quickly in France as it did in Germany or England. Cf. Furet, op. cit., pp. 81-2.

Regime and its monarchical caste and absolutist principles. In opposition to this form of government the philosophes espoused a systematic conception of history that linked the past and present through rationalist progression. To them, history continually showed itself to lead to further rationalization of the individual, the government or state, and religious institutions. This view of history was obviously against the conservative and papal elements of the Bourbon dynasty which demanded obedience to the existing institutions. Yet this teleological view of progress could also serve to applaud even the most minor concessions of the French monarchy and was therefore not as effective as its creators had hoped.[13]

Less well-known is the German Enlightenment (Aufklärung), which chronologically followed the rise of its more western equivalent. Due to German particularism the Aufklärung can not really be considered a unified movement. Rather, it was centered in the newer university towns (i.e., Halle, Göttingen) by those desirous of reforming German politics without destroying the traditional Ständestaat.[14] The Aufklärers were of a bürgerlich mentality, meaning they were not a unified economic class but belonged to a "juridical category that contained many internal distinctions." While the German university system in the Eighteenth Century went through a period of expansion and reform, the opposite was more the case in the west. This academic expansion contributed to the competitive thoroughness (Gründlichkeit) of the Aufklärers in their attempt to combine the undogmatic conviction of Pietism with rationalist Leibnizian philosophy. Leibniz's idea of the "contextual harmony" of all things guided the

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[13] Breisach, op. cit., pp. 199-202.

[14] The Standestaat was a socio-political order with its own bureaucratic state system. Cf. Peter Hans Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 4.

new critical hermeneutics resulting from Pietism's own critique of orthodox religion. For Aufklärer historians this attempt was paralleled through their own desire to harmonize polyhistory's unreasoned reliance on original sources as the path to historical objectivity and philosophical rationalism's insistence, instead, on a "coherent theory of knowledge."[15]

Pragmatic historiography (pragmatische Geschichtsschreibung) was the term employed by the Aufklärer historians to describe their attempt at such a harmonization. As P. Reill has noted:

> "Pragmatic history placed particulate events into a complex system of actions and interacting relations; it did not abstract the singular event and attempt to discern some universally valid truth or moral from that isolated occurrence."[16]

The pragmatic historian J.C. Gatterer (1727-99) claimed that his highest principle was to portray the universal interrelationship of all things. While teaching at Göttingen University Gatterer founded and edited two historical journals committed to just such a task: the Allgemeine historische Bibliothek, (16 vols., 1767-71) and the Historische Journal, (16 vols., 1772-81).[17] Following the earlier lead of J.M. Chladenius (1710-59) and his Allgemeine Geschichtswissenschaft (1752), Gatterer sought to clarify the interrelationship between the observer and the observed, and to educate his students into thinking in terms of interconnections rather than static categories. But although the work of the Aufklärer historians tackled many essential historical problems, their lack of a

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[15] Ibid., pp. 4-5, 39-41.

[16] Ibid., p. 42.

[17] Cf. P.H. Reill, "History and Hermeneutics in the Aufklärung: The Thought of Johann Christoph Gatterer," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, (March, 1973), pp. 24-51: pp. 46-7.

unified and systematic program prevented the widespread reception of many of their ideas. As well, the professorial status of the German Aufklärers led them to place more hope in the state bureaucracy, and they were therefore not as radical as the French philosophes who stressed individualism.

More influential and systematic was the late Aufklärung figure, Immanuel Kant, whose philosophy of history owed much to the earlier Aufklärer historians. Kant, similar to Gatterer fourteen years earlier, sought as his highest goal the completions of "the systematical connection, both in ascending to higher genera, and in descending to lower species."[18] Yet his philosophical framework was not based on the usual Enlightenment progressive conception of history via its over-coming of the obstacles of superstition and passions, which were considered separate from reason. Kant also disagreed with Hume's sceptical empiricism and he desired to give epistemological status to metaphysical historical forces. Though Kant mainly agreed with the French philosophes' view of the emancipation of reason as the moving force of history, the German Aufklärer saw reason as part of the whole human consciousness, which included the emotions.[19] Yet Kant did separate reason and nature, and he saw an unbridgeable gap between categories and sense-perception. This resulted in the ahistorical duality present in his epistemology. Kant's "transcendental" (or "critical") idealism represented material "phenomenal" knowledge as delimited by the "noumenal" realm of that which is unknowable (as god, or soul). This was ahistorical since it posited a noumenal "thing-in-itself" as a transcendental determining factor. Kant viewed

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[18] Quoted from Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781), in M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, (New York: Continuum, 1972), p. 81.

[19] Breisach, op. cit., p. 218.

this "thing-in-itself" as an expression of moral will, as the focal point of his categorically imperative ethical system, which for him had objective reality.[20] Kant did not, therefore, agree with the rationalist individualism of the French Enlightenment thinkers, and instead, implanted a teleological hope for a more rational (and thus more free) world through a universalist understanding of moral-ethical will as the force behind history. But since the guiding hand of this universal history was the "thing-in-itself" which Kant separated from perception, his idea of universal history was in actualilty but an expression of blind teleology.[21] In Germany, this ideal of universal history was to have profound effects, and with his natural philosophy concern to analyze the connection between phenomenal and noumenal realities by aprioristic and mathematical methods, Kant inadvertently increased educational specialization by allotting epistemology and ethics their own privileged position within scholarly study or science (Wissenschaft being the German word for both).[22]

Coexisitng with Kant's early German "critical" idealism and the late Enlightenment's disdain for mythology, irrationality, and spirituality, was an age of both scientific and political revolution, as well as rising modes of capitalism. Although these factors formed a tenuous interrelationship at best, it was projected, as previously stated, as progress towards and the realization of truth and knowledge, and this de-mythologized knowledge was conceived of as liberating

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[20] I. Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, text and critical essays edited by R.P. Wolff, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1969), pp. xvi, 44.

[21] Cf. Kant's "Idea for Universal History," in Kant on History, (ed.) L.W. Beck, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merill, 1963).

[22] For a disscusion of this, see M. Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 40-42.

in function.[23]

In France, because of the outcome of the Great French Revolu simultaneous growth of the aforementioned deterministic conceptions of science and analytic conceptions of truth, the French Academic system experienced the rise of "positivism" as the dominant philosophy. French positivism, as did German idealism though in a different way, grew out of the anti-metaphysical bias of the late European Enlightenment.

Restoration positivism saw science as the saving grace of humanity. In the philosophy of Saint-Simon, the founder of modern positivism, science and true social theory were "positive" in the sense that they viewed facts only as existing within themselves and beyond which, nothing else existed.[24] Although this ontology of facts subsumed even those facts referred to as subjects, positivism in its early stages did have a rather revolutionary content, in a sense carrying on the revolutionary tradition. But following this period of positivism as the basis for a critique of progress and political economy, the French philosopher/sociologist Auguste Comte took positivism to the extreme when he claimed to have discovered a "positive sociology." This was based on "three stages" of historical development (the theological, the philosophical, and the positive), and he hoped it would provide a truly scientific foundation for the study of mankind. But Comte's positivism was actually an apologetic for the system of French government following the July Monarchy of 1830 and its growing disregard for liberal values and subsequent promotion of bourgeois aristocracy. Of course his system was

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[23] Cf.Horkheimer and Adorno, op. cit., pp. 3-42; and Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).

[24] Marcuse, op. cit., pp. 330-40.

progressive, but once the third or "positive stage" was reached (as he considered the time in which he was living), "progress" became possible only within that given system of order, namely, the Bourgeois Monarchy. This was the conservative element in Comte's philosophy, and by its very nature of reducing reality to immediate appearance it placed a barrier on retaliating criticism.[25]

Comte's positivism suggested that mankind could not effect change of the existing society or its institutions by rational will. By showing the "positive" nature of the July Monarchy and reducing reality to immediate appearance, resignation became the order of the day, with the result of checking revolutionary spirit and affirming the prevailing order. Comte could thus offer the appearance of a critique of the <u>Ancien Régime</u> at a time when the middle-classes of France had consolidated their political power and such a critique was meaningless.

Idealism after Kant, in its transition from its critical to objective phases (Kant to Hegel), was developed in part to overcome Absolutism in Germany and yet still maintain theological values. Its foundation was never laid by a successful democratic revolution. The <u>Sturm und Drang</u> movement and the following Romantic period were not breaks with the <u>Aufklärung</u>, rather, they systematized the Leibnizian/<u>Aufklärer</u> synthesis, whereby things were viewed in their contextual totality while still giving emphasis to the role of particular historical structures. In his desire to link organic cycles to historical patterns, the late Eighteenth Century German philosopher G. Herder claimed: "every historic structure has its own intrinsic value and must be regarded as unique."[26] This

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[25] Cf. A. Arato, "The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity," in <u>Telos</u>, No. 21, (Fall, 1974), pp. 108-161.

[26] Quoted in Mommsen, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 78.

counter-measure to enlightenment rationalism was the first explicit expression of German "historicism."[27]

Hegel's incorporation of Herder's "passionate demand for unity and wholeness," into his own philosophy of history is at the root of his so-called "objective" idealism. It was optimistic, since it was based on residual religious faith, but more important, Hegel's conception of history declared that history had a "cunning of reason," which utilized world-historical figures to serve "the work of reason," which therefore posited its own contradictions and logic.[28] Whereas Herder stressed the uniqueness of all national cultures, Hegel saw history as a more unilinear process which led to a greater rationality.

Hegel's concept of the self-positing nature of historical logic, coupled with Herder's historicist notion of men making their own history, served as the intellectual foundation for those German academics concerned with historical methodology. This nascent German historical profession would come into its own via a conservative interpretation of Hegel. It was aided by the nationalistic feeling produced in Prussia after her defeat by Napoleon's forces at Jena in 1806.

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[27] For a discussion of the different meanings of the term "historicism," see Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, (revised edition) (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983), pp. 295- 298. To be pointed out is that the older expression of historicism referred to here meant acknowledging the historical context of all things and yet still believing in a divine will expressed through history. In the conservative interpretation of this type of historicism by Ranke, each age was seen as "immediate to god," and every historical event was viewed in its own terms. Obviously, this interpretation allowed for a very presentist conception of history. For a history of the development of this conception, see Friedrich Meinecke, Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972). The more modern meaning of historicism, as in the work of Karl Popper, adds a mostly unjust connection of this concept to totalitarianism.

[28] Cf. C. Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), for an excellent interpretation of Hegel's philosophy.

German idealism then, although contributing much to German culture and politics, was frustrated in its attempt to produce an individualist tradition that could match that of the French, and German idealists from Kant to Hegel

> "wrote their philosophy largely as a response to the challenge from France to reorganize the state and society on a rational basis, so that social and political institutions might accord with the freedom and interest of the individual."[29]

So whereas France had already accomplished this task on a socio-political level through the Revolution, Germany could only do so philosophically. This was due, in part, to the particular Protestant orientation of German society whereby liberty was conceived of as an "inner value" which stressed misery and poverty as religious blessings, and in part due to the lack of, unlike France, a conscious and educated middle-class which could lead the fight against absolutism. Germany's backwardness, compared to France, was visible in this lack of a social formation or mode of production that could support a middle-class revolution. Yet even in France the ideals of 1789 were to be squashed by Napoleon. By bringing a repressive system back to France Napoleon acted like a leveler of positive differences between the two nations. His consolidation of the economic results of the revolution, and his crude elimination of radicalism helped promote the rise of French industrial capitalism. It is not suprising that the French philosophers of the period equated reason's own realization with that of laissez-faire in industry.

Germany, on the whole, was sorely behind France and Britain in economic development at the turn of the century. The small number of German industrial enterprises that did exist (i.e., Silesian mining/textiles) were still in the confines of the feudal system. Again, it took the shock of defeat at Jena before the

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[29] Marcuse, op. cit., p. 3.

Prussian Junker class would turn to more industrial methods. Although both idealism and positivism initially had a "negative" aspect in their philosophy (i.e., a critique of the state and political economy), in Germany this was because culture itself was idealistic. The educated were isolated from normal affairs and impotent to change things. In fact, if German opponents of the existing regime were to have ever been critical of absolutism, with the foundation of the University of Berlin in 1810, the exact opposite was to come true. The rise of nationalism after Jena, together with the view that external politics were governed by their own logic, not only prevented the new historical school at Berlin from lapsing into relativity or scepticism, but also inclined them to subordinate history to politics in a way that was to become indicative of German history. Although the school's main intellectual currents were Hegel and Herder, in the Historical School of Jurisprudence at Berlin, Herder's conception of history was more popular due to its emphasis on national culture. Similar to the older Göttingen University historical tradition, Berlin historians were critical of the lack of serious research and the recourse instead to theoretical studies prevalent in their contemporary French counter-parts. Like their earlier Göttingen compatriots they desired to write

> "descriptive treatises, often merely compendia of data; this was an enterprise referred to as Statistik --the description of the state--and from it the endeavor of statistics branched off when numerical data became more and more highly regarded."[30]

But more than this, they included other factors on the history of the state and sought to balance an account of theory on the state with its actual historical practice. This was the beginning of Nineteenth Century Staatengeschichte.

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30 Breisach, op. cit., p. 219.

Those history students gathered around Leopold von Ranke at the University of Berlin for the purpose of concentrating the intellectual energies of a defeated Prussia were to influence all of Europe and beyond. From Ranke's Berlin seminars came almost all the great historians of Nineteenth Century Germany. Armed with Herder's historicist conception of men making their own history, a conservative interpretation of Hegel's conception of the state (whereby the state, and not philosophy or art as Hegel said, was seen as the ultimate expression of civil society), a Kantian concern for universal history based on "scientific" study, and constant recourse to sources, they produced a profound legitimation for conservative monarchism. These factors produced histories with a typically Prussian conception of nationalism as an expression of the primacy of foreign policy. The Prussian state was seen as the institutionalized manifestation of moral spirit granted by god to the Prussian people. The state was something eternal. Ranke's dictum to write history "as it actually was" did improve upon the simple chronicling methods of the Göttingen school, but it was also open to general interpretation, and this, in the case of Ranke, let his monarchist presuppositions shine through.[31]

During the Restoration, then, the Prussian Historical school was nationalist in intention, concentrating on the primacy of foreign policy and thereby legitimizing and strengthening the absolutist order. The French historians on the other hand, as in Jules Michelet's (1798-1874) pléiade or group, were inward looking,

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[31] L. Krieger, "Elements of Early Historicism: Experience, Theory, and History in Ranke," in History and Theory, Vol. 14, Beiheft (1975), pp. 1-14; H. Meyerhoff, The Philosophy of History in Our Time, (New York: Anchor, 1959), p. 13. Also see the Foucauldian discussion of the relevance of Ranke's dictum in Stephen Bann, The Clothing of Clio, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 8-14.

concerned with the internal social and economic problems (the so-called "Social Question") of France.[32] This was done from the perspective of a fusion of revolutionary romanticism with post-Bonapartist nationalism. The pléiade around Michelet, was formed by Guizot in 1833. Along with the Société de l'Histoire de France, also founded by Guizot, Michelet advanced historical research in the area of archives.[33] Guizot had hoped to copy the German style of erudite documentation. In 1827 Michelet published his first work: an abridged edition of Vico's Scienza Nuova, and Vico's particular blend of historicism and "providence" was to greatly affect him.[34] The progressive consolidation of the middle-class and concentration of new schools of historical study in Paris in the 1820's and 1830's were factors which yielded a "new history."[35] This bridged the older, mainly positivist approach which had been combined with Voltarian stylistics to produce a simple "additive" or "marginal" history senza organizational theory (as in bibliography), and the more recent romanticized notion of history stemming not from German romanticism but from English romantic novelists like Sir Walter Scott.[36]

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[32] Michelet's pléiade should not be connected to the much earlier La pléiade French literary movement.

[33] Donald R. Kelley, Historians and the Law in Post-Revolutionary France, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 20.

[34] Cf. James W. Thompson, A History of Historical Writing, Vol. II, (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 23-42.

[35] For a history of Nineteenth Century French historical education, cf. Paul Fredericq, "The Study of History in Germany and France," in the series Studies in Historical and Political Science, No. 8, (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1890), pp. 55-118. On the "new history" of the Restoration see the chapter by the same name in Kelley, op. cit., pp. 13-27.

[36] G.G. Iggers, "Introduction: The Transformation of Historical Study in Historical Perspective," in International Handbook of Historical Studies:

Within the seemingly strong context of nationalism brought on following the Revolution of 1789, and again following the defeat of Napoleon, French historical study began to be examined for its own sake. Napoleon himself, with his utilitarian admiration of history, had suggested that the national Université was void of any "ideology" (he was the first to give a negative connotation to this term). François Guizot (1787-1874), typical of many French historians from 1830-1848, was both an historian and a politician. His French edition of Gibbon's monumental work on Rome was published in 1812, and he had since grown to be quite respected in the French Restoration, so much so that he was appointed Minister of Education under the Bourgeois Monarchy in 1830. He helped to finally blend the critical and the antiquarian historical traditions. Yet after 1848, Guizot was to become a reactionary apologist for constitutional monarchy. He wanted to bring out a monarchical genealogy and he saw history as the medium to do so.[37] Although most of these historians were concerned with halting the sensationalist and ahistorical writings on the Revolution, it must still be remembered that writings on the French Revolution were ideologically divisive. In fact,

> "Liberals, Ultras, Theocrats, Ideologues, Doctrinaires, Independents, Eclectics, Bubouvists, Saint-Simonians, Carbonari, and hosts of fellow-travelers rested and defended their programs on particular views or visions of history, and above all on the proper meanings of 'revolution' and 'restoration.'"[38]

Contemporary Research and Theory, (ed.) G.G. Iggers and H.T. Parker, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), p. 2; Furet, op. cit., pp. 77ff. For details on Scott, see S. Bann, op. cit. Chapt. 5. Michelet, and especially August Thierry (1795-1856), were greatly influenced by the romantic and conservative writings of Scott. Also see, Hedra Ben-Israel, English Historians on the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pp. 119-26, for a discussion of Scott's conception of romanticism.

37 Furet, op. cit., pp. 88-9; Kelley, op. cit., pp. 16-20.

38 Kelley, Ibid., p. 31.

One's ideological stand on the Revolution was a living problem and related to one's view of contemporary society. But in academic historical circles, these ideologies were also disguised by numerous romanticized ideals.

Those historians who were popular in France during and after the Three Glorious Days, men like Lamartine, Michelet, and Guizot, were not that far removed from the Eighteenth Century belles-lettres and litterateurs. Michelet in essence was an archivist-poet and had to overcome his romanticist poetic emotion in his "universal" (i.e., nationalist) historical writings. Lamartine, another politician-cum-historian, was even more a poet than Michelet, and also had to try and surmount a highly biased form of historical writing. One critic of Lamartine's Histoire des Girondins, filled 113 pages with errors from that text. Alexis de Tocqueville, yet another, was of a much higher standard, yet his conservative perspective tended to subtract from his ability to understand the common masses. On the whole, the writings of these historians were counter-revolutionary, and no doubt meant to be. None of these men could be, by today's standards, called a professional historian. They merely continued the new history's emphasis on romantic literature, documented legal history, and German-Italian historicism (in the Rankean positivist manner). They constantly struggled between their love of the French Revolution and a romanticized conception of their importance in the Restoration. This dichotomy in their writings was "the most obvious impediment to the transformation of history into a scholarly profession in France."[39]

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[39] William R. Keylor, Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 29. The same point is made by Kelley, op. cit., pp. 8-10, but he used the terms "internalist" and "externalist", borrowed from the history of science, to explain the dichotomy.

The writings on the 1848 Revolution in France were minor compared to the historiography of 1789. But the 1848 German Revolution, though also a failure for the working-class, did stabilize the middle-class conception of nation, and Germany became rife with nationalist sentiment. This was a politicization of history that was much admired by the French.[40] As history became a separate discipline in France, the German example of historiography became the example. This was especially true of their appropriation of German research techniques and legal history. It was most telling in the French acceptance of the German historians' critique of Napoleon's legislative policies. But the romanticized French revolutionary and counter-revolutionary historiography, together with a positivist philosophical basis, did not immediately result in a distinct historical methodology. To become a separate discipline within the centralized French educational system, historians not only had to prove the politically "pedagogical utility" of German historicism, they had to demonstrate history's own "distinct epistemology."[41] This was partially accomplished by dismissing literature and philosophy

> "as obsolete remnants of a bygone age when men and society were studied by ill-equipped amateurs, trained in the inappropriate arts of metaphysics."[42]

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40 Heinz-Otto Sieburg, in his Deutschland und Frankreich in der Geschichtsschreibung des 19. Jahrhunderts, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1945, 1958) (2 Vols.), notes the French Germanophilism until the 1848 Revolution and lesser so after, due to Ranke's conservative views. But even though after 1848 ideological differences grew, A. Mitchell, extends the French Germanophilism until even after 1870; see his "German History in France in 1870," Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 2, No. 3, (July, 1967), pp. 81-100.

41 Kelley, op. cit., pp. 72-84. Keylor, op. cit., p. 6.

42 Keylor, Ibid., pp. 6-7.

History as "the empirical science par excellence" could, this way, be liberated from metaphysics and literature. French positivism, of course, made this transformation fairly easy. Yet although the new history of the Restoration had turned to a more scientific vein after the July Monarchy, it took defeat by way of the Franco-Prussian War for the majority of French historians to accept Ranke as their main theoretical core; and this still was a distorted acceptance, as were most uses of Nineteenth Century German historicism.

French historiography after the events of 1871 was to witness a re-politicization of French society along nationalist lines. France now looked outward to national problems as Germany had done after Jena. In the historical academy, the most important event was the founding of the Revue Historique in 1876, following Victor Duruy's (1811-94) reorganization of the French educational system as Minister of Public Instruction. As an historian Duruy also sought to introduce German teaching methods in France, especially the type of seminar used in the Prussian Historical school, with its meting out of theory and practice. He also appointed historians trained in those seminars, like Monod and Brèal, to the new École des Hautes Etudes. French historians were, therefore, to promulgate a patriotic nationalism as Ranke and his followers had done. But this nationalism, due to its recent appearance, was much more transparent than its German counterpart.

The attempt to make history a science in France at the turn of the Twentieth Century was offset, not only by reoccurring problems of politics and society, but by both philosophy and sociology. Sociologists complained that history had a narrow scientific methodology, while vitalist philosopher's like Emile Boutroux

claimed that history forgot the present. Historians like those associated with Henri Berr and his Revue de Synthèse Historique (founded 1900) raised misgivings about over-specialization and the over-reliance on factual documents. Berr and others like Lavisse thought it their task to produce a synthesis of all the numerous and scattered monologues.[43] As well, the Dreyfus Affair constituted the first serious challenge to the Third Republic, and historians were put to the task of restoring the republican consensus, and for the most part, publicizing a moderate republican ideology.

After the Revolution of 1848 German historians and philosophers had become "positivized" in their writings along the lines of the emergence of a neo-Kantian philosophy that paralleled Germany's consolidating middle-class. Indeed, perhaps the willing acceptance of German historical methods by French historians at this time was indicative of France's own strongly positivist roots. The first really permanent German historical seminars were begun in the 1850's, and in 1859 Heinrich von Sybel founded the Historische Zeitschrift. As the German middle-class became more influential so did liberalism. But it was a liberalism mixed with a strong nationalist element. The "Casino" faction of the Frankfurt Parliament was comprised of mostly liberal professors, but their separation from working-class ideas after 1849 caused a change from an idealist liberalism to a more conservative variant.[44] German liberals, however, were to feel the real

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43 Keylor, Ibid. chapter 8, pp. 125-140; Thompson, op. cit., pp. 278-9. William Bruneau has shown in his "Logic and Pragmatism: The Foundations of French Historical Training and Research, 1880-1914," in the Western Society for History: Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for French History,(1980), pp. 307-16, that scientific and practical history was in existence as far back as 1880, in university manuals and in the texts of well-known historians such as Louis Liard, Elie Rabier, and Abel Rey.

44 It must be remembered, however, that North German liberalism was much

crisis in the 1860's, after the New Era. Previously, liberals were against Bismarck's efforts to enforce autocratic rule over the budget and military. But after the iron chancellor's successes in foreign policy (eg. Defeat of Denmark), the liberals acquiesced to more nationalist demands and voted for an indemnity bill which absolved Bismarck from charges of misuse of public funds. In 1867 the National Liberal Party formed. It was comprised of those who had made their peace with Bismarck after 1866, and this included liberals of many different leanings who saw unification as the most important political problem. The National Liberals expressed a different attitude towards the state than previous liberals. National Liberal historians like Heinrich von Sybel, Heinrich von Treitschke, and Theodor Mommsen now looked at the German state not as an institutionalized expression of moral forces, but as an ethical concept, an almost living entity endowed with the world-historical destiny of the German people. It was in light of this that they supported Bismarck's colonial policy and other imperialist actions.

With the unification of Germany following the Franco-Prussian War, it seemed as though there would be less need for German historians to dedicate themselves to nationalistic writings, but this was not to be the case. Many historians felt that Germany's unification had not been completed, and there were still those, like Treitschke, who continued nationalist history along virulent lines. If French historians now propagated a patriotic nationalism, German historians began an aggressive nationalism.[45] This nationalism was expressed through the

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more slow to develop than its Southern counterpart, and its idealist qualities stemmed from a mostly cultural liberalism expressed more through a concern for individual rights than any economic policy.

[45] Roberto Vivarelli, "1870 in European History and Historiography," in the

middle-class historians and Bismarck. Bismarck's own blend of positivism and social Darwinism resulted in his power politics, or Realpolitik. He had used Germany's sympathies towards the Franco-Prussian War to bring about unification. As a result of their acceptance of Realpolitik, middle-class German liberal historians attached positive values to an illiberal state. This was the basis to their sell-out to Prussian Absolutism. And in the tradition of German "illiberalism," a strong state was desired rather than a free state.[46] It was after 1870 when,

> "the categories of positivist origin gained their broadest acceptance and that popular philosophy, literature, and politics illicitly borrowed from the natural sciences concepts and parallels originally applied to the natural world, transforming them arbitrarily."[47]

Germany's aggressive nationalism broke with the idea of a European community and led German historians to view Germany as one country against the rest of Europe. French nationalism was more internal in nature by comparison, and it resulted in its historians looking at France regionally and in the context of the European community.[48]

In the face of this, German historical scholars mirrored the conservative nature of the Bismarckian state, and these middle-class intellectuals or "mandarins" set the stage for the first third of the Twentieth Century by

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Journal of Modern History, Vol. 53, #2 (June, 1981), pp. 167-88, p. 181; James Sheehan, "What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography," in the Journal of Modern History, Vol. 53, #1, (March, 1981), pp. 1-23. For France, see Eugen Weber's Peasants into Frenchmen, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), p. 242.

[46] Vivarelli, op. cit., p. 178. Cf. Konrad H. Jarausch's "Illiberalism and Beyond: German History in Search of a Paradigm," in the Journal of Modern History, Vol. 55, #2 (June, 1983), pp. 268-284, for a highly informative discussion of these terms within a Kuhnian conception of historical change.

[47] Vivarelli, op. cit., p. 188.

[48] Sheehan, op. cit., p. 21.

ideologically and coercively mobilizing forces to restrict upward mobility. They sought to stop democracy, the growth of the working-class, and urban civilization as a whole.[49]

Early Twentieth Century Eurocentric "scientific" history was given a severe blow not only by the outcome of World War I, but also by the new American historical methods, a la Beard and Becker (the "new history" school and relativism). Also, Nietzsche had claimed that history could not be a science because of its inherent bias, and that too much history debilitated a nation. From these attacks Franco-Germanic historiography developed many new approaches to the study of history, though these were mostly ineffective in causing any change in German historiography. In France it was realized that political history was easily usurped by the dominant ideology of a given period, and French historians looked to new interests in psychology and other disciplines. The Annales d'Histoire Économique et Sociale journal, as founded by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in 1929 (with much owing to their mentor Berr),

> "undermined the positivist definition of historical fact, destroyed the taboo on unwritten evidence, imposed a dialogue with the sister disciplines, discredited the history of events, rejected the primacy of political history by insisting on its interaction with economic and cultural history, repudiated traditional biography which isolated the individual, and succeeded, finally, in making 'sensibility' or modes of feeling the object of historical research."[50]

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49 Cf. Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community,1890-1933, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969).

50 Jean Glenisen's "France," in the International Handbook of Historical Studies,, op. cit., p. 176. The Annales school, went through many changes in their choice of journal titles, the Annales d'Histoire Économique et Sociale (1929-41), Annales d'Histoire Sociale (1939-41), and under German occupation, the Melanges d'Histoire Sociale (1942-5). This was followed by a return to the original, with the addition of "civilizations" to it. Cf. Maurice Aymard, "The Annales and French Historiography (1929-72)," in the Journal of European

Along with the evolution of the Annales school came a concern for "total" history, from economic history to the history of mental structures and geographical demographics. From Fernand Braudel to the American Annalist Immanuel Wallerstein, the desire to overcome l'histoire événementielle, has been the cause of a continual search for "structures" of a determining nature in a specific "conjuncture" of cycle and trend.[51] The structure and the conjuncture could be measured in economic, social, and/or psychological terms. The Annales school also tried to incorporate Marxism into their methodology, but this was not very successful.[52] After World War II, the Annalists moved to the prestigious Sixth Section of the École Pratique Annales des Hauts Etudes. The school now increasingly tried to incorporate all sciences into history, including linguistics, semiotics, and even structural anthropology.[53] Yet the Annalists were "brought up on the idea that political history was obsolete and out of date,"[54] and criticisms against them have stemmed mainly from here. Recently, American historians mostly on the left have begun to question the values of the Annales tradition. They point to the economic determinism inherent in the structuralism of that school, the lack of a political model, and the overt eclecticism of the

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Economic History, Vol. 1, (1972), pp. 491-511.

51 Against the event-oriented history written by those like C. Seignobos. But the Annalists were not very concerned with methodology; Aymard, ibid., p. 493; Iggers, op. cit., p. 56.

52 Of course Marxism has always played a role in French historiography, but the school was split over its use.

53 Aymard, ibid., p. 502.

54 Jacques Le Goff, "Is Politics Still the Backbone of History?", Daedalus, Vol. 100, No. 1, (Winter, 1971), pp. 1-19: p. 1.

synthesis of mental and physical structures.[55]

Following a brief critique of the tenets of the conservative historicist school during the Weimar period by historians of democratic leanings, and thus disconnected from the academic community (i.e., Eckart Kehr, Arthur Rosenberg), Germany went through a complete sublimation of history into politics under Hitler. The lessons of "history as a weapon" of ideology have no where else been so acutely perceived. But the outcome of World War II led to a re-examination of German history by a new generation of historians. As well the Federal Republic's integration into the North Atlantic Alliance ended the notions of Germany as the great world power, and the Republic became even more democratic than the earlier Weimar Republic.[56]

The last quarter century has witnessed several revisionist attempts in German historiography. In the 1960's, Fritz Fischer re-opened the question of Germany's World War I guilt. Fischer used conventional documentation techniques, but with a twist that would choke nationalist conservative historians like Gerhard Ritter.

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[55] Cf. Fox-Genovese and Genovese, op. cit., pp. 173ff. I. Wallerstein has attempted to extend the Annales paradigm and has fallen into similar criticisms by the left; see his The Capitalist World-Economy, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and among numerous critiques, see the following: T. Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, (1977), esp. p. 1089; H.J. Kaye, "Totality: Its Application to Historical and Social Analysis by Wallerstein and Genovese," Historical Reflections, Vol. 6, (1979), pp. 406-19; and C.A. Lockard, "Global History, Modernization and the World System Approach: A Critique," The History Teacher, Vol. 14, (1981), pp. 489-515.

[56] G.G. Iggers, "The Tragic Course of German Historiography: The Political Function of Historical Scholarship in Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," German Life and Letters, Vol. 34, (1980-81), pp. 223-233: pp. 230-2. On the evolving "internationalism" of West Germany, see V.R. Berghahn, "West German Historiography Between Continuity and Change: Some Cross-Cultural Comparisons," German Life and Letters, Vol. 34, (1980-1), pp. 248-259.

Fischer argued there was a continuity of German imperialism from pre-World War I to World War II. Not only did his revisionism state that even moderates in the German civilian government prior to 1917 had annexationist aims, but that these aims were a result of economic pursuits and not national security.[57] The immediate effects, and even perhaps the long term effects, of the Fischer controversy were not that radical, but certain Marxist and Weberian views hitherto claimed "unhistorical" were given a new look.[58]

The Fischer controversy sparked a partial turn in German historiography from a concern for foreign politics to one for domestic politics. With the re-discovery of the Weimar works of Eckart Kehr to reinforce this latter concern, younger German historians have turned to "social history," and the study of the particular German paradigm.[59] Even East German historians have concerned themselves with a slightly less dogmatic Marxist social interpretation.[60]

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57 Cf. F. Fischer Germany's Aims in the First World War, (London:1967) (original German edition, 1961). For commentary, see J.A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion, (London: George Prior, 1975); A.J.P. Taylor, "Fritz Fischer and His School," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, (1975), pp. 120-4; G.G. Iggers, New Directions... op.cit., Chapt. 3.

58 Cf. G.G. Iggers' "Preface" to Three Lectures in Modern German History, (Buffalo: N.Y. State University at Buffalo, 1976), pp. 2-3.

59 Cf. James J. Sheehan, "The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Eckart Kehr's Essays on Modern Germay History," Central European History, Vol. 1, #2, (June, 1968), pp. 166-74.

60 Among numerous articles by Andreas Dorpalen, see "History and Politics: An East German Assessment," Central European History, Vol. 12, #1 (March, 1979), pp. 83-90; "Weimar Republic and the Nazi Era in East German Perspective," Central European History, Vol. 11, #3 (September, 1978), pp. 211-30. Also see, Jürgen Kocka, "Theoretical Approaches to Social and Economic History of Modern Germany: Some Recent Trends, Concepts and Problems in Western and Eastern Germany, " Journal of Modern History, Vol. 47, (1975), pp. 101-119, esp. p. 103.

The new "critical" school of Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Jürgen Kocka, et al., looks to a broad number of historical aspects in their research and is in some respects reminiscent of the early Annales school.[61] But the "critical" school and its voice, the journal Geschichte und Gesellschaft (founded 1975), have not been without criticism. From the Right they have been criticized as too Marxist, from the Left as being too Weberian.[62] This confusion over the Marxist content of the "critical" school is mirrored in West German leftist politics. One may see the same situation in the SPD, namely, the loss of "any organic, scientific and political relation to Marx's thought."[63] Those more to the Right, like Thomas Nipperdy, desire a return to historicist relativism, minus the traditional conservative idealist statism. Thus in present German historiography there is no unified field of thought.

In conclusion, contemporary French historiography has kept to its insistance on social history and has thereby attempted to isolate and socialize political history in a way that precariously de-politicizes the historical community. This is problematic considering the present political situation of that country. Recent

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61 Cf. Hans-Ulrich Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in Observations on 'The Spiritual Situation of the Age', edited by Jürgen Habermas, (Cambridge: MIT, 1984) (original German edition, 1979), pp. 221-259.

62 Cf. Berghahn, op. cit., pp. 255-6, for a discussion of the controversy. The British Marxist Geoff Eley also is critical of the type of theoretical eclecticism in the work of the "Kehrites" (as he calls the "critical" school). Among his critiques that charge the school with an indifference to methodology (though Eley's overall view seems to have changed recently), see, "Memories of Under-Development: Social History in Germany," Social History, Vol. 1, #6, (1977), pp. 785-92; "Defining Social Imperialism: Use and Abuse of an Idea," Social History, Vol. 1, #3, (1976); and for his criticism of the concept of German exceptionalism (Sonderweg), see, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Pecularities of German History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 39-155.

63 G.E. Rusconi, "Marxism in West Germany," Telos, No. 25, (Fall, 1975).

German historiography, on the other hand, has not been able to overcome the continuity, both ideological and actual, that separates the German historical academies from the population at large, despite the change in emphasis from political to social history. In part, this reflects the tensions between left and right, and East and West. The ideological fragmentation of the left reveals the dominance of the conservative view-point. This writer believes that Hans Mommsen's pronouncement of 1971, that German history is still political history, remains true.[64] The Franco-German historiography of 1848 must be understood as contributing to and affected by these events. France never experienced the popularity of a metaphysical and speculative style of history, and this has led to her increasing concerns for scientific history. Even though questions as to whether history can utilize social theory are discussed in both France and Germany today, what is important is not only the relationship between sociology and history, but that between society, politics and history in historical perspective. This chapter has shown the ideological connections of this interrelationship as relevant to Franco-German historiography. It has also shown that this historiography has been, in one form or another, an expression of the dominant ideology of the respective generation. We may now turn to the question of how the specific historiography of 1848 was affected by these general developments.

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64 Hans Mommsen, "Historical Scholarship in Transition," Daedalus, Vol. 100, #2, (Spring, 1971), PP. 485-508: p. 507

Chapter II

FRENCH HISTORIOGRAPHY AND 1848

Being closer to the concept of a bourgeois revolution, the 1848 Revolution in France was witness to more change than its counter-part in Germany. It brought universal (male) suffrage to France, the first appearance of it in Europe. It also brought shorter working hours, a minimum wage, and pension funds. But though 1848 has been widely researched it has not really had its great historians. This is due to the fact that 1848 is usually overshadowed by 1789. Only during periods of the popularity of the left has 1848 received a deserved amount of attention.

The early historiography of 1848 is considered by most historians of France to be divided into three schools: the monarchists, the republicans, and the socialists. Due to the many alterations in the political basis of French history the lines that separate these schools have become blurred. The monarchist or conservative monarchist interpretation of 1848 is mostly restricted to the Nineteenth Century, while the republican and socialist interpretations, in varying forms, have been the ones to survive. The republican interpretation has, at different times, been both rightist and leftist, but it too has lost much of its impact due to events in the Twentieth Century. The socialist interpretation of 1848 does not date back only to Marx. There were strong working-class organizations in France before 1848. French socialism is a blend of positivism, utopian socialism, and Marxism. Following the French Revolution and the growing concerns for the "Social

Question," the first two aspects of French socialism united with a nascent working-class. It was not until much later, and under different circumstances, that Marxism began to affect this type of socialism. One finds, therefore, that French socialism, due to its middle-class origins, often had much more in common with what, in the West, would be considered a liberal tradition. As an expression of this tradition, social history in France, as a whole, has developed along centrist and often non-political lines.

This chapter seeks to show the results of this development through the historiography of 1848. It is argued that the ideological premises of French historiography on 1848 have been gradually won over to a false concern for science. This "scientific history," due to its lack of an explicit political concern, has tended to promulgate the status quo. It will be shown that this depoliticization of history into a scientific social history rather than political social history has been accompanied by the use of the determinist theories of structuralism, as in the work the Annales School. Finally, it is argued that crises in the French socio-economic basis also contributed to the false scientific nature of French historiography. :I shall begin with a general discussion of the historico-ideological background leading up to the 1848 Revolution. This discussion will conclude with a critique of several factors which, as will be shown, have been ideologically manipulated by various historians of 1848. By incorporating my criticisms of such factors, many of the ideological elements in the historiography of 1848 should become clear.

2.1 France in 1848

As the feudal basis of France disintegrated in favour of a capitalist system, so did the ideological superstructure. The growth of the industrial capitalist mode of production in France, however, was very slow. This was due to several factors. First, the majority of a possible labour market lived in rural areas, and the agricultural prosperity of those areas weakened industrial competition. The outcome of the French Revolution had an eventual damaging result on industrialization, and the Napoleonic codes had a stabilizing, even rigidifying effect upon the peasantry.[65] The main thing that survived the Great Revolution was private property, and the peasants' inherent ideological belief was their right to work the land. Also to hurt industrialization was the shortage of fuel and mineral resources until after 1850 when new metallurgical techniques were developed.

But all of this is not to say that, in this largely pre-industrial society, industrialization did not make any headway. Steam-engines were replacing canal boats by the thousands, and railroad production, though slow at first, was nevertheless replacing the more traditional forms of transportation. Telegraph systems helped to give the early entrepreneurial capitalists a competitive edge. In 1848, there were some 400,000 factory workers in France, most of whom were in the textile trade. Even though Paris still remained mostly a city of small artisans and their workshops, the workers in those workshops were not as tied to the master artisans as they had been before.[66] The Jacobin ideology of the

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65 Claude Fohlen, "France 1700-1914," in The Fontana Economic History of Europe, (ed.) Carlo M. Cipolla, (Glasgow: Fontana, 1973), pp. 7-75: pp. 12, 25-31.

66 Peter Jones, The 1848 Revolutions, (Essex: Longman, 1981), p. 6; G. Rudé,

French Revolution continued in the Secret Societies as the older guilds were outlawed. In such societies, the Jacobin principle of revolutionary determinism fused with elements of the newer middle-class utopian socialism to produce the first "proletarians." As the traditional guilds lessened, societies like Blanqui's "Rights of Man" indoctrinated workers into a "socialist" orientation. This form of socialism incorporated the writings of middle-class ideologues as interpreted by the leaders of the societies, and the result was a liberal socialist ideology which stressed both individualism and collectivity. Etienne Cabet's communist utopian vision, Fourier's planned societies, and Blanc's concerns for organized labour, were all, in themselves, devoid of political action, and this accounted for the strange blend of ideologies. This mixture is also explained by the fact that these middle-class liberal republicans wrote with a totalistic vision, they included the new proletarians in their writings.[67] The growing working-class was not, before 1848, a class-for-itself, but it did exhibit uniform rebellion in certain cases. The beginnings of an organized working-class reaction can be seen in the Lyons insurrection of 1834.

Louis Philippe's regime was not directly repressive. What existed was a tolerated repression in the form of unreasonable working-hours, food crises, and unemployment. As well, the working-class had an inherent belief in a "just price" to be paid for bread.[68] When the tolerated amount of repression was exceeded,

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Ideology and Popular Protest, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), pp. 118-9.

67 Rudé, Ibid., pp. 123-4.

68 Here I am applying the argument of E.P. Thompson in his, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd of the Eighteenth Century," in Past and Present, No. 50, (May, 1971), pp. 76-136.

food riots and other forms of Luddism resulted (i.e., the Lille and Mulhouse bread riots of 1847). In light of these factors, when the economic crisis hit in 1846-7, and Louis Philippe and Guizot would still not make any concessions, a "crisis psychology" situation arose.[69] This situation affected all classes: the ruling-classes who were deathly afraid of the "Spectre of Communism" and its assertion that property was theft, the middle-classes who found that industrialization was forcing many of them out of traditional businesses, the working-classes who now found it difficult to survive, and the peasants who were being chased from their land.

Now that the background to 1848 has been generally related to certain ideological and objective factors, we can make several points that are relevant to the French historiography of 1848. First, for an historian to place the reason for the movement to the right during the 1848 Revolution on the fear of the violence of the radicals is, not in itself, meaningful. For to say one fears the violence of the radicals is also to say that one approves of the intolerable living and working conditions in pre-1848 France. The demoralized state of the military forces of the ruling-classes, and their reluctance to act upon the orders of their superiors, attests to the nature of a violence that was part of Louis Philippe's regime. This does not mean that fear of Jacobinism was unwarranted. Its potential for dictatorial contempt of the majority indeed made it something to be feared. But to renounce the whole radicality of the working-classes and petty-bourgeoisie as Jacobin is extremist to say the least. Second, the writings of the utopian socialists contained a belief in the Enlightenment's stress on "human

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69 Eric Hobsbawm and R.F. Leslie, "The Revolutions of 1848," in Nineteenth Century Europe, (London: Sussex Books, 1976), pp. 43-64: p. 53.

perfectability." This teleological conception ignored the existing socio-economic conditions. It was a conception which placed hope in a perfect future society but which did not consider a political change necessary. Only when this middle-class ideal came up against Jacobin ideology, or the writings of Marx, was there anything produced which was of use to the working-classes. The idea of progress is thus a false one unless it is part of a larger idea for political action, and its teleological representation in utopian socialism must be denied whenever it occurs. Another type of teleological concept present in the historiography of 1848 is that which sees 1848 as a rebirth of 1789. To be sure, the two revolutions did have aspects in common, but to try and relive the past through the present only results in grotesque imitation and, as Marx noted in the opening of his Eighteenth Brumaire, tragedy. Thirdly, one must criticize those interpretations of 1848 which point to nationalist rather than world-historical concerns. The year 1848 witnessed the discovery of the importance of the working-class everywhere. Since the new working-class developed out of the breakdown of feudalism (also of world-historical importance), it must be considered more relevant to 1848 than any overidealization of the French people. As well, 1848 was a pan-European phenomenon, thus any historical interpretation which stressed the Revolution as due to internal French developments must be made suspect. Fourthly, one must criticize those historical interpretations which are a product of bourgeois apologetics. The Revolution of 1848 in France occurred after the "heroic period" of the bourgeoisie, and as it rose in power its previous radical-democratic values turned against it. As its gods fell, the bourgeoisie's political ideology turned into apologetics, it decayed from romantic anti-capitalism into capitalist

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[70] For an excellent discussion of this critique of Marx's, cf. G. Lukács, "Marx

philistinism.[70] Guizot, who brought a critical study of history to France, after 1848 pathetically looked to the July Monarchy as an historical necessity. Finally, one must be critical of those who try to offer a "total" or a "scientific history" of 1848. This type of interpretation, though claiming to steer free of ideological waters, can be manipulated into a reproduction of the status quo as easily as the above interpretations. In conclusion, the above criticisms should be kept in mind when we turn next to the historiography of 1848, since the different usage of these interpretations has yield the platform for many of the debates on 1848 in French historiography.

2.2 Monarchists and Republicans

At the center of Nineteenth Century French historiography on 1848, between the socialism of Marx and the conservatism of Tocqueville, lies the republican position. As shall be shown, this position was prone to change over time. Just as the liberals of 1830 had become the conservatives of 1848, the republican position of 1848 was eventually to yield to Bonapartism. It is first necessary, however, to give an account of the political position of François Guizot (1787-1874), since he was one of the most criticized members of Louis Philippe's government.

Guizot played the leading role in Louis Philippe's government from 1840-48. The economic crisis of 1846-7, however, resulted in scathing criticisms of Guizot. Tocqueville criticized him from the right, and Lamartine from the left. An opposition banquet campaign at the end of 1847, though, had still not caused Guizot or the king to consider any reform. But Guizot's banning of the February

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and the Problem of Ideological Decay," in his Essays on Realism, edited by R. Livingstone and translated by D. Fernbach, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), PP. 114-66.

22nd banquet campaign of the National Guard of the 12th arrondissement led to a general demonstration by numerous students and workers on the streets of Paris. In his account of the Revolution written in 1879 Guizot blamed the outbreak of revolution on the secret societies and on the weakness of the opposition leaders.[71] To explicate his interpretation one must look at Guizot's political position.

To Guizot, the doctrinaire, and constitutional monarchist, any revolution against the enlightened Orleanist order was evil. He saw the secret societies (i.e., those of Blanqui and Barbès) as producers of radical and dangerous ideas which they then spread amongst the public. This view can be explained by the fact that Guizot believed that government was separate from society. His juste milieu between anarchy and absolutism suggested that a strong government was the only way to combat either, and thus government was his first principle, not representation. Society, then, was seen as something sick and government was needed to hold it together. This conservative ideological viewpoint was typical of the repressive nature of the July Monarchy, and as such it was one of the barriers to the growth of French political consciousness in the Nineteenth Century.[72] As well, his conception of the role of the party in government led him to view "opposition as either revolutionary or personal." This was because he desired only one party, with its basis in constitutionalism. That is, within a constitution that upheld the franchise for the property- owning pays légal. Since the Revolution of 1789 consolidated private property, Guizot could claim that that Revolution was legal, and since the Revolution of 1830 did not change the status of private

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[71] M. Guizot and Madame Guizot, France, Vol. 8, (1879) (New York: Collier, 1902), pp. 374-5.

[72] Cf. Douglas Johnson, Guizot, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 51-60.

property, it too was considered as legal and national.[73] But since 1848 exhibited socialist tendencies against private property, a desire for a new constitution based on universal suffrage, and a change in party representation, up to his death Guizot thought it illegal. Guizot did not attribute the events of February to an economic crisis, though, and this was not because of ignorance on his part. He was aware that much of the economic crisis of 1848 occurred after February 1848, during the seven weeks of social revolution.[74] Thus Guizot seemed to be aware of at least one of the issues facing the masses, but he attributed this economic crisis mostly to the Revolution itself. Guizot's complex personality, including strong Calvinist beliefs, probably also contributed to the rigidity of his anti-reformism.

Alphonse de Lamartine (1790-1869) and Louis Blanc (1811-1882), were both members of the Provisional Government formed February 24 from lists supplied by the two Republican newspapers, Le National (moderate republican), and La Réforme (left republican). This government was basically divided into two factions as well, reflecting the differences between the two newspapers. Lamartine, as Foreign Minister, being a typically moderate republican, and Blanc, with his more oppositional views, a left republican.

Lamartine, who had won the respect of the masses through his criticism of Guizot, was himself of aristocratic heritage. After 1830, he had been a member of the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. In 1848 he became the leading member of the Provisional Government. Outside of the possible influence of his

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73 Ibid., pp. 69-75.

74 Ibid., pp. 230-2. As Roger Price has shown, "in the months after the Revolution unemployment in Paris reached 56 per cent of the total number of employed workers, varying between 20 and 75 per cent according to industry;" Revolution and Reaction, edited and introduced by Roger Price, London: Croom Helm, 1975: p. 23.

own, widely read, History of the Girondists (1847), Lamartine was convinced that the growing dissatisfaction with Louis Philippe's reign was expressed by the numerous banquet campaigns at the end of 1847.[75] He noted that the demonstrators on the streets during the third week of February were of two different "classes":

> "two classes of groups exhibited characteristic differences of air and costume. The one was composed of young men belonging to the rich and refined mercantile classes, to the school, to trade, to the national guard, to literature, and more particularly to the periodical press... the other class was composed of the lower orders, summoned within the last two days, from their shops, by the sound of firing; clad in their working dresses, with their blue shirts open, and their hands still blackened with the smoke of the forge."[76]

This was not, however, a class analysis but merely a poetic depiction. Lamartine, like Blanc saw February 1848 through rose-tinted glasses. Yet Lamartine's lofty and romanticized speeches were exactly what the people wanted to hear, and on April 23, Lamartine was elected by universal (male) suffrage into the Constituent National Assembly with an astounding 259,800 votes. The representatives of the working-classes, Blanc and Albert, obtained far fewer votes. This broad difference in popularity points to the growing influence of the conservative and right republican factions and to the origins of the failure of the attempt to produce a "Social Republic."[77] The Montagnards (named after the

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[75] Alphonse de Lamartine, History of the French Revolution of 1848, (London: Bell, 1888), pp. 25-6. Leo Gershoy, in his "Three French Historians and the Revolution of 1848," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 12, (1951), pp. 131-46: pp. 139, 146, states that Lamartine's History of the Girondists cannot really be considered a sufficient cause of the revolution, but also states that Lamartine's, Blanc's, and Michelet's pre-1848 histories "heightened existing discontent..."

[76] History of the French Revolution of 1848, p. 51.

[77] Of the 851 deputies elected, only 285 were Républicains de la veille, and by far the majority being Républicains du lendemain. This distinction between

"Mountain" in the Assembly of the Great Revolution), had become more of a mole-hill.

Whereas Marx saw the coming betrayal of the working-classes by the bourgeoisie of the National Assembly in the results of the April election, Lamartine was ecstatic with hope for a new constitution for the Republic. The journée of May 15, further revealed Lamartine's lack of interest in the working-classes. On that day, he led the National Guard against the demonstrators who were protesting the 45 centime increase in the land tax. Lamartine did not realize, that with this act his popularity was on the wane. Following the dissolution of the National Workshops came the start of the June Days on the 22nd of that month. Lamartine's middle-class moderate republican position was obvious. He claimed

> "It was a plebian and not a popular movement, a conspiracy of subalterns and not of chiefs, an outbreak of servile and not of civil war."[78]

Crushed by General Cavaignac and the forces of reaction, by June 28 the insurrection was over.

As a good friend of the British Ambassador Lord Normanby, Lamartine, like Normanby, aproved of liberty but feared its leading to licence. This was one of the dichotomies facing both the moderate and the left Republicans. May 15th had destroyed the revolutionary Republicanism of Blanqui and Barbès just as the June Days were to destroy the left and moderate Republicanism of Blanc and

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the Republicans of yesterday and those of tomorrow, respectively, was commonly used to express the difference between those who had held Republican sentiments for a long time and those who adopted them recently, in opportunist fashion. On this, cf. Anthony Denholm, France in Revolution: 1848, (Sydney: John Wiley, 1972), p. 34.

[78] Lamartine, op. cit., p. 554.

Lamartine.

Blanc's Historical Revelations, though written in 1858, was his most detailed work on 1848.[79] Blanc thought that French society under the Bourgeois Monarchy had grown corrupt, that "when fruit is rotten, it needs only a breath of wind to shake it from the tree."[80] He saw February 22, 1848, as a result of the growing bourgeois individualism and laissez-faire economic policies since 1830. Blanc polarized history as a struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie, in which the bourgeoisie was the enemy. This was a typical républicain de veille position. In his Historical Revelations, as well as earlier influential books, Blanc constantly referred to the 1793 victory of the bourgeoisie over proletarian fraternity. This over-simplification of class struggle appeared in his account of 1830 as well, the bourgeoisie again being the enemy halting the movement to socialism. Because of his popularity with the working-classes the Provisional Government appointed Blanc head of the Luxembourg Commission on March 1, 1848. He was requested by the Provisional Government to give a solution to the problems of unemployment in Paris. But the Commission never really exerted much influence, nor did the Government intend it to. Even Blanc's idea for "socialist workshops," which explicitly put forward a plan for state-backed businesses, was diluted by the more rightist faction of the government into national workshops. He accurately perceived the latter as unproductive organizations of workers, many of

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79 Louis Blanc's 1848: Historical Revelations, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), was first published in London by Chapman and Hall in 1858, while Blanc was in exile. It was written as a critical response to Lord Normanby's A Year of Revolution in Paris. The British Ambassador's account placed Lamartine into the key historical role in the Provisional Government and the Assembly. Blanc, quite accurately, corrected many of Normanby's "blunders and misrepresentations..."

80 Ibid., p. 4.

whom did no labour at all, while still collecting a dole.[81]

Blanc's hopes for a "social" Republic were crushed by the *journée* of May 15th and the civil war in June. He foresaw the dangers of the 45 centime tax increase which was levied to help with state expenditures, and had, instead, argued for the creation of a state bank along socialist lines. But this plan was also denied, and his resentment is apparent in the following line:

> "In a word the tax of 45 centimes, though levied for the profit of succeeding governments and by them, was disastrous only to us and the Republic."[82]

Blanc's proposal for a Ministry of Labour and Progress was to be rejected on May 10, by the then more reactionary National Assembly. Along with this rejection came the postponement of a hearing on Poland. Support for Polish freedom was, at that time, a major issue among the Parisian Clubs. It was bitterly clear to Blanc that these events resulted in the insurrection of May 15, just as it was clear to him that the following closing of the National Workshops led to the June Days. Blanc was to be later convicted *in abstentia*, along with Barbès and Blanqui, for complicity in the insurrection of May.

In the main, Blanc's fusion of utopian socialism and republicanism yielded him a gradualist picture of bourgeois individualism eventually giving way to socialism.[83] Marx had thought that this idea was a farce. Blanc's fusion of middle-class utopian socialism with the republican values of revolutionary democracy resulted in the stultification of any activist principles. Blanc was really a pacifist in nature and his rosy picture of the fraternity of February 24, of

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[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 197-8.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

[83] Gershoy, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

the poor guarding the houses of the rich, actually betrayed the real social tensions at the start of the Revolution.[84] Now that we have viewed the historiography of some of the major participants in the 1848 Revolution we can turn to the first real analyses of that Revolution. The views of Marx and Tocqueville are two such analyses and they help in putting the conservative and the socialist positions in perspective.

2.3 Marx and Tocqueville

Marx's The Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte are histories of the first magnitude.[85] They masterfully move back and forth between an analysis of socio-economic structures and political power. In them one finds a class analysis, but not just a two-class analysis. Marx utilized a multi-class framework as well as a precise analysis of class itself in these historical writings:

> "Under Louis Philippe it was not the French bourgeoisie as a whole which ruled but only one fraction of it--bankers, stock-exchange barons, railway barons, owners of coal and iron mines and forests--the so-called financial aristocracy."[86]

This particularly repressive faction of French society was the main target of all the other class factions, which momentarily came together in popular protest, on February 22, 1848. As Marx noted, it was not repression alone which caused

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[84] R.B. Rose, "Louis Blanc: the Collapse of a Hero," in Kamenka and Smith (eds.), Intellectuals and Revolution, op. cit., pp. 31-41: pp. 37-9, comes to the same conclusion.

[85] I have consulted Marx's The Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte in Karl Marx, Surveys from Exile, edited and introduced by David Fernbach (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 35-142, and pp. 143-249, respectively.

[86] Class Struggles, p. 36.

the revolution. There were two external events of "world importance" as well: the potato blight and crop failure, and the collapse of the European monetary system, starting in England. There was also another factor, the centralization of political power in Paris, the city which also had the highest concentration of the French working-class. The demands of the barricaded Parisian working-classes for a republic, are therefore decisive for Marx's interpretation of that revolution's origins and results.[87] They demanded not only a republic, but one based on universal (male) suffrage, and this in turn resulted in the re-entry of the classes of previous political domination--the financial aristocracy and landlords. But there was also a new entry, and one of great importance to the history of France, namely, the peasantry.[88] Demographically, their dispersal throughout France caused the lack of impetus which resulted in the downfall of the Second Republic. Since, for Marx, the rise of the working-class was to follow the rise of the bourgeoisie, the unorganized content of the existing Parisian working-class only mirrored the dislocations of class power throughout France. With the desire for securing the financial stability of the republic, the working-class's ensuing isolation from the bourgeoisie became apparent:

> "Thus, in the approaching fray between bourgeoisie and proletariat, all the advantages, all decisive positions, all the middle strata of society were in the hands of the bourgeoisie..."[89]

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[87] Ibid., pp. 40-2.

[88] Numerous works have examined the importance of the peasants in Nineteenth Century French Society. Cf. the review of recent studies by Eugen Weber, "The Second Republic, Politics, and the Peasant," in French Historical Studies, (Fall, 1980), pp. 521-550.

[89] Class Struggles, p. 54.

This melee of growing tension and skirmishes led to the June Days of 1848. On June 22, when forced into an insurrection by starvation, thousands of working-class prisoners were massacred in the "fight for the preservation or destruction of the bourgeois order."[90] The resulting preservation of the bourgeoisie led to the terror of the bourgeoisie, and its final reliance on the financial aristocracy. As well, the petty-bourgeois debtors were sacrificed to the bourgeois creditors, further acknowledging the turn to the right of the bourgeois republicans who were drafting a new constitution.[91] The ironic contradiction was that the new constitution gave power to neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat. The Constituent Assembly could not give complete power to the moderate bourgeoisie without betraying the February Revolution, and it would not grant power to the "party of anarchy" (i.e., the left republicans and socialists). The solution, if one could call it that, was a constitution which really gave ultimate authority to the executive, namely, the President Louis Bonaparte, with only lip service paid to the "rights of man."[92] From this contradiction came the last ditch effort, from the "pure republicans," to hold on to the republic by whatever means necessary, an effort which more and more saw the defeat of the goals of republicanism.

Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire is his analysis of this defeat. Marx deplored any attempt to view history as that caused by the role of "great men."[93] In his Class

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[90] Ibid., p. 59.

[91] Ibid., p. 67. The petty-bourgeois included shopkeepers, craftsmen, and small traders who had gone in debt during the weeks of revolution.

[92] Eighteenth Brumaire, pp. 158-66.

[93] His reference here is to the writings of Louis Napoleon. See the section on Bonapartism, infra. pp. 65-9.

Struggles, Marx had already answered the question of why the peasants voted for Louis Napoleon on Dec. 10, 1848, by looking at what Napoleon meant to the peasants and not at Napoleon's character, which Marx constantly belittled. The heavy tax burden imposed by the republic caused the peasants to look at an election as a way out of their predicament, and in this way, "Napoleon was not a person but a programme" to the peasants. If "the republic had announced itself to the peasants with the tax collector; they announced themselves to the republic with the emperor."[94]

In a similar style, the Eighteenth Brumaire is an analysis of the process of Louis Bonaparte's proto-fascist domination, or what Marx and others called Bonapartism.[95] In the Bonapartist state, the number of internal contradictions between the power structure and the social structure were amazing. The imposition of the wine tax, growing mortgage debts, and the use of military coercion were all aspects of Bonapartism.[96] In May 1849, the tensions between the Constituent Assembly and the Party of Order (supporters of Bonaparte's government) came to a head, the result being the dissolution of the republican Assembly in favour of an Assembly comprised mostly of monarchists. This signified the bourgeoisie's growing realization that they no longer had any hopes of attaining a unified political power, and that they would have to settle for

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94 Ibid., p. 72. Also see P. Abrams, Historical Sociology, (Somerset: Open Books, 1982), pp. 57ff., for his remarks.

95 Cf. August Thalheimer, "On Fascism," Telos, No. 40, (Summer, 1979), pp. 109-22, and the introduction to it by Frank Adler, "Thalheimer, Bonapartism and Fascism," pp. 95-108, who is rather critical of Thalheimer. For a more favourable view, cf. Martin Kitchen, "August Thalheimer's Theory of Fascism," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 34, #1, (Jan.-March, 1973), pp. 67-78.

96 The Eighteenth Brumaire, pp. 187-9.

maintaining their social status by turning to Napoleon. Bonapartism became the obvious way to reconcile peasants and bourgeoisie, as well as the tensions between the president and the Assembly. In this way Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of Dec. 1851 was preordained since February 1848.[97] Throughout Marx's Eighteenth Brumaire one reads of the bourgeoisie's false sense of reality (their "false consciousness"), whereby they believed that history could repeat itself; the memory of the French Revolution being the reference.[98]

Though at times Marx may resort to unnecessarily long and harsh characterizations of the republican and conservative leaders of 1848, if one accepts his ideological position these cannot be deemed inaccurate. At most, perhaps, Marx's arguments may seem somewhat idealist and after the fact, since, clearly, the socialism he propounded was not to be the victor of 1848. But then, so much the worse for the facts.

The historical writings on 1848 by Alex de Tocqueville stresses an opposing ideological perspective to that of Karl Marx.[99] Tocqueville was a liberal conservative and a staunch believer in private property. He, as did Marx, had

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97 Victor M. Perez-Diaz, State, Bureaucracy, and Civil Society: A Critical Discussion of the Political Theory of Karl Marx, (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 42.

98 Leonard C. Groopman, "A Rereading of Marx's 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon'," Journal of European Studies, Vol. 2, Part II, #46, (June, 1982), pp. 113-129: p. 119-121.

99 For biographical background on Tocqueville I have consulted the following: the "Introduction," in Alexis de Tocqueville, On Democracy, Revolution, and Society, edited and introduced by John Stone and Stephen Mennell, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 1-46; Irving M. Zeitlin, Liberty, Equality and Revolution in Alexis de Tocqueville, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); the Open University Press's "Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville," in the Volume France: 1848-1851, (Open University: 1976), pp. 97-126; and Irene C. Brown, "Tocqueville, Democracy and Revolution," in History Today, Vol. 31, (September, 1981), pp. 27-31.

first-hand experience of the 1848 Revolution. Yet whereas Marx's political pamphlets were purposely written as revolutionary journalism, Tocqueville's account of 1848 was written as a memoir, and was thus more detached.[100] Despite their ideological differences, however, their analyses appear quite similar, and this begs closer examination.

Both writers looked at 1848 from a class perspective. Tocqueville knew that the struggle between Orleanists (represented by the "bourgeois king" Louis Philippe) and the Legitimists (the landed nobility) was a class struggle and not dynastic in nature.[101] As a member of the Chamber of Deputies Tocqueville had often warned his fellow members against isolating the Ministry from the working-classes. He knew that a reaction to this isolation would eventually happen.[102] Although he saw the July Monarchy as middle-class in nature, he thought that

> "the Revolution of February, on the contrary, seemed to be made entirely outside the bourgeoisie and against it."[103]

This conflicts with Marx's view, who agreed with Tocqueville on the middle-class nature of the July Monarchy (though noting that it was only one specific faction of the middle-class, namely, the financial aristocracy) but saw the outcome of the February Revolution resulting in "bourgeois republic." The difference of analysis,

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[100] Alexis de Tocqueville's Souvenirs, which contain his memoirs of the French Revolution of 1848 and end prior to the coup d'état of Louis Napoleon, were written between July 1850 and September 1851. Marx had already completed his Class Struggles by November 1850.

[101] Tocqueville was also aware that the Republicans under Ledru-Rollin (1802-74) and the Bonapartists were even more dangerous to Louis Philippe.

[102] George Rudé, "Introduction" to Georges Duveau 1848: The Making of a Revolution, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) (reprint of the 1967 edition), pp. ix-xxxi: P. xi.

[103] Quoted in, Zeitlin, op. cit., p. 101.

here, stems from their respective ideological perspective. To Tocqueville the defender of private property (being the only privilege that had survived 1789), the 1848 Revolution was something to be regretted.[104] He thought that the best way to achieve liberty was through the existing government, and since socialists desired to change it, Tocqueville claimed that "socialism will always remain the essential characteristic and most redoubtable remembrance of the February Revolution."[105] Socialist theories were, in Tocqueville's conservative opinion, responsible for kindling the dynamic of the Revolution.

Marx, on the other hand, revealed the false conception which Tocqueville was under by showing that the dominant classes called anything they feared socialist:

> "Even bourgeois liberalism was declared socialist, as well as bourgeois enlightenment and bourgeois financial reform."[106]

This, to Marx, revealed the obvious implicit plea of the bourgeoisie for

> "deliverance from the peril of its own self-government... that its political power must be broken in order to preserve its social power intact..."[107]

This could easily be done, as noted, by its siding with Louis Napoleon's coup rather than with the working-classes.

Although each author analyzed many factors as the causes of 1848: the industrial revolution, the economic status of the classes, centralization of power in Paris, class conflict, and the instability of the various governments, Marx's theory of history was an example of that very type of writing which Tocqueville

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[104] Tocqueville, op. cit., p. 13.

[105] Ibid., p. 271.

[106] Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire, p. 189.

[107] Ibid., p. 190; Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 101-3; Thalheimer, op. cit., pp. 110ff.

labeled "mad" socialism. For Tocqueville, Marx's type of historiography provoked in the masses "the democratic disease of envy."[108] This most profoundly brings out the different ideological analyses of the two men. For even though they agreed on certain events, this only belied their tremendous political differences over the processes involved.

In all probability, Tocqueville's contempt for the 1848 socialists stemmed from his ignorance of the oppressive socio-economic conditions which the socialists sought to relieve.[109] Whereas Marx initially saw 1848 as one of the stages towards "pure" communism, Tocqueville saw it as another step backwards, brought about by the destructive power of the masses who senselessly rebelled against past injustices. These histories were written from different sides of the barricades. Marx saw the 1848 revolutionaries as a potential force, Tocqueville as but the most "stupid" of men. As regards the causes of 1848, Marx stressed the economic hardships, while Tocqueville made light of them and stressed, rather, the influence of "subversive" ideas. And while Tocqueville wanted the masses to stay in "their place," Marx wanted them to take their rightful place. Finally, Tocqueville must be seen as actually taking part in the destruction of his prized republic, due to his willingness to place restrictions on liberty, and thereby furthering the problem of the lack of responsible government which was to plague

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[108] Tocqueville, op. cit., pp. 262-7. Cf. Melvin Richter's "Tocqueville's Contributions to the Theory of Revolution," in Nomos, Vol. VIII, Revolution, ed. by C.J. Friedrich (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 82, for a critique. In his The Old Regime and the French Revolution, (1856) (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1955), p. 176, Tocqueville states that it is not economic misery that causes "popular discontent," but rather, economic prosperity. It is also considered by some, that this book is really a "commentary" on his experiences of 1848-51; cf. "Karl Marx and Alexis de Tocqueville," op. cit., p. 104.

[109] Richter, op. cit., p. 79.

Nineteenth Century France. Their respective positions delineate many of the socialist and conservative tenets that constantly appear in much of the later historiography.[110]

2.4 Bonapartism and the Second Empire

As Marx had shown in his The Eighteenth Brumaire, the bourgeoisie under Louis Napoleon became its own worst enemy. Though middle-class business did not really suffer a severe blow, the bourgeoisie's political basis was continually undermined. The bourgeosie eroded its own political foundation by passing repressive legislation which de-legitimized the principles of 1848. This process, in which previous parliamentary coalitions dissolved into moderate, then rightist, then royalist factions, in turn, provided the basis for the dictatorial executive power of Louis Bonaparte. Factionalism was also promoted by withdrawing universal suffrage and restoring the franchise, re-legitimizing the regime through integration with the church (the Falloux Law of 1850), and industrialization.

Although historiography suffered under Napoleon III, his own view of history should be briefly surveyed since it dominated the proto-fascistic Second Empire. Louis Napoleon did not write much on 1848. His earlier political pamphlets, the Political Reflections (1832), the Napoleonic Ideas (1839), and the Extinction of Pauperism (1844) set out his ideas on history and his place in it. These works claimed that "great men" made history, and that history was progressive due to the efforts of such great men who intervened in order to restore tranquility to chaotic periods. Just as Napoleon I was the hero of the 1789 Revolution with his Brumaire, Napoleon III was the hero of the 1848 Revolution. He criticized liberal

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110 Zeitlin, op. cit., pp. 104-118.

parliamentarianism, suggesting that neither universal suffrage nor the franchise could be efficacious in the long run. The former would lead to factional division, the latter to far too many restrictions on liberty. Again, only a great man could govern the people, with the people themselves passing laws via plebiscites. In actuality, to Bonaparte this only meant having dictatorial powers given to him through which he could choose universal suffrage or franchise. And of course, his dictatorial use of the plebiscite is well known.

The segregation of French society following the May 1850 limitation of the franchise gave the legend of Napoleon a chance to ferment in the minds of the repressed lower classes. Bonaparte played upon this segregation, and at the height of divisive tensions sprang his December 1851 coup d'état, dissolved the Chamber, arrested Cavaignac and other officials, and drew up a plebiscite to approve his constitution of January 1852. By restoring universal suffrage Bonaparte's support by the working-class and peasants was guaranteed, and so was the Second Empire.

The Second Empire was characterized by an alliance of the bureaucratic administration with the regime.[111] But republican sentiments were not dead. Republicans now knew that they had to capture the peasant vote to beat Napoleon III, and this was a lesson which they learned well. Napoleon's subjugation of history to his political theories was not admired by the republican historians of the Second Empire and this was placed against him. It should be remembered, however, that the marriage of Saint-Simonism and Bonapartism performed by the Saint-Simonian on horseback gave him the economic lever he needed for dictatorship. Napoleon had made better use of the popular social theories of the

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111 S. Campbell, The Second Empire Revisited, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978), pp. 1-26.

1840's than the republicans, and his crude synthesis of such theories included an attempt to deal with both industrialization and democratization, something which the Orleanist July Monarchy had not done. Since the Saint-Simonians refused to be involved with politics, Bonaparte could utilize their expansive economic ideas for industrialization, bank financing, and railway construction, and implement his own apolitical productivism. The Cobden-Chevalier Treaty of 1860 broke the protectionist nature of the backward French industrialists, the result being that French businessmen entered into international competition, and they were aided with more liberal reform during the 1860's. But just as the Second Republic was unable to incorporate liberalism and democracy, the alliance of democratic liberals and republicans under Napoleon III threatened to destroy his dictatorship. Republican historians like Edgar Quinet lost faith in the democratic spirit of le peuple. In his La Révolution (1865), Quinet claimed that the failure of 1848 began in 1789, the latter being seen as unable to produce a real foundation for freedom and liberty. The violence of the Jacobin terror was ultimately to reappear under Napoleon III. Quinet also pointed to the continuity of archaic Catholic values as a factor causing the downfall of 1848. But it was almost impossible to effectively criticize the Empire while living in it, due to press restrictions and the dictatorial powers of Napoleon III. Thus Quinet, like Blanc and many others, had to write their histories from outside their home country.[112]

Under this repressive regime the "social romanticism" of the moderate republicans was to take a turn to the left. The French Academy of liberal conservatives, the unemployed opposition, criticized the Empire and Emperor through indirect attacks. Victor Hugo, in a more republican spirit, wrote scathing

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112 Ibid., pp. 7, 22-3, 37-8, 158, 199.

criticisms of Napoleon III. But he did not really understand the nature of Bonapartism, and as such, his appeal to the people "took the form of an abstract humanitarianism which was nothing but the ideology par excellence of the bourgeoisie." His lack of concern for class barriers outweighed his moral indignation.[113] Yet Hugo was correct in stating that the Empire could not last, though it did last longer than he thought it would. The contradictions of of the Empire were too great, and with Napoleon's defeat in the Sedan there arose a new Republic and new historiographical concerns.

2.5 Republicans and Socialists

In the "Republic without republicans," the conservative interpretation of 1848, though it eventually gave way to that of the orthodox republican interpretation, was not in spirit greatly changed. With rising working-class movements and concerns, the historiographical focus shifted from that between monarchist and republican to that between liberal-republican and socialist. The majority of conservatives still wrote on the 1789 Revolution, seeing the "new regime" as but a manifestation of the dangerous socialist ideas that were hatched in that Revolution. In light of this, the conservative historiography on 1848 was minor.[114]

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113 Cf. Victor Hugo, History of a Crime, (New York, London: Co-operative Publication Society, n.d.). J. Mehlman, Revolution and Repetition: Marx/Hugo/Balzac, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 50-1. Campbell, op. cit., pp. 32-42.

114 G. Rudé, Debate on Europe: 1815-1850, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 213. P. Farmer, France Reviews its Revolutionary Origins, (originally published, 1944) (reprinted, New York: Octagon Books, 1963), pp. 110-1.

Similar to H.A. Taine's writings which attacked 1789 following the Paris Commune, the conservative monarchist Victor Pierre, in his Histoire de la République (1873-8), judged 1848 as but another failure of bourgeois Republicanism against both Bonapartism and socialism. His Orleanist sympathies led him to criticize the Third Republic since he saw no chance of a revolutionary tradition yielding a stable government. His conservatism evoked the conspiratorial interpretation of the origins of 1848. The main agent of the Revolution was the "conspiracy" started by the republican newspapers La Réforme and Le National.[115] He viewed the Parisian working-class as a passive "rabble" duped by the conspirators.

Following the Monarchist President Marshal MacMahon's abortive 1877 coup (seize-mai), and the almost Bonapartist efforts of General Georges Boulanger, republicanism, though of a conservative nature, began to gain in popularity. Pierre de la Gorce (1846-1934), wrote one of the last influential monarchist histories on 1848. Though written almost ten years after Pierre's Histoire, Gorce's Histoire de la Second République Français (1887) in two volumes, still incorporated the same basic analysis. Gorce criticized the republicans of 1848 for overthrowing Louis Philippe's constitution for Louis Napoleon's dictatorship and thereby destroying all previous attempts at constitutionalism. A Catholic royalist, Gorce became an historian in his later life as was fairly common then. As a boy he had read Walter Scott's works, and this influence showed in his histories, which were romanticized and non-methodological.[116] Gorce did,

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115 Rudé, ibid., pp. 213, 217-8. P. Farmer, "Some Frenchmen Review 1848," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 20, #4, (December, 1948), pp. 320-5.

116 Farmer, France Reviews..., p. 25; "Some Frenchmen...," pp. 320-1. For biographical details, see Campbell, op. cit., pp. 57-71.

however, see problems with the July Monarchy, and in light of these he viewed the leaders of 1848 as ineffective men of good will. He was actually more of a moderate conservative, since he also criticized counter-revolutionary action.

During the Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906), monarchist-clerical enemies of the republic received a severe blow, and a republican-socialist coalition was formed under Rene Waldeck-Rousseau from 1899-1902. Moderate republicans took over the political arena which the conservatives had vacated. But as mentioned, these dramatic changes in France's political arena did not yield a great advance in republican historiography. The moderate republicans now in power lost a great deal of previous support by not acting on reforms such as those in England. The republican-socialist coalition also fragmented as the disillusioned working-class attached itself more to trade unions after 1906 and became seen as an independent political reality, expressed through the growing importance of socialism. As well, the new academic schools of French historiography were now synthesizing Rankean methods along with French positivism, since they saw the Prussian victory of the 1870 war as due, in part, to the nationalist concerns of Prussian historiography. History became the domain of professional historians, and along with professionalization came the desire to write objective and/or scientific history. The older general histories were criticized for their lack of research into documents, and for unprofessional prejudices. Specialization was the result.[117] This concern for objectivity, though, was offset by a strong nationalism, and the late Nineteenth century European phenomenon of nationalist liberalism became the dominant political position. In the orthodox republican interpretation of the Third Republic, 1848 did not receive a position as important

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117 Campbell, op.cit., pp. 91-3.

as 1789. But then again, the orthodox republican politicians were not themselves really successful in solving the growing tensions between republicans and socialists.[118] The republican educational programme of Jules Ferry drew the loyalty of the professors to the regime, and in the wake of the defeat in the Sedan, historians expressed strong nationalist sentiments in their works. Ferry's 1880 pro-laic legislation, like that of Guizot's in 1830, manipulated education in favour of the land-owning elites. Between 1879-1886, with the repeal of the Falloux Law of 1850, textbooks based more in "civic morality" replaced the older more theological texts. This major achievement was basically due to the republican and socialist anti-clericalism, with education growing at the expense of the church. Yet the educational reforms were mainly opportunist,

> "designed to weaken the clergy, to appease genuine worker and peasant demands, yet also to preserve the substance of an elitist education structure which perpetuated bourgeois class domination.[119]

The republican interpretation of 1848, reflecting many of the problems in the Third Republic itself, tended to ignore the social tensions at the center of the Revolution and present it, instead, as a natural occurrence arising out of the need for reform. The 1789 Revolution was also viewed in this way.[120] Histories by those such as Ernest Lavisse and Gabriel Hanotaux stressed that 1848 was a poor imitation of 1789, and though they recognized the quarante-huitards as their ideological ancestors, they did not honour them. They focused more on the problems of Louis Philippe's regime which was seen as causing both the 1848

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118 "Some Frenchmen Review 1848," p. 321.

119 R. Magraw, France 1815-1914: The Bourgeois Century, (Oxford: Fontana, 1983), pp. 217-9.

120 France Reviews its Revolutionary Origins, p. 112; Rudé, op. cit., p. 214.

Revolution and the coup of Louis Napoleon. Ernest Lavisse, who had studied historical methodology in Germany before becoming a professor of history, "advocated the adoption of Ranke's system of historical research," since he "was willing always to take the best of Germany for the good of France."[121] Gabriel Hanotaux also saw France as defeated by German scientific techniques and wanted to better them, and like Lavisse, nationalism was at the center of all his work.[122]

Republican, or nationalist liberal historians, revitalized positivism and its emphasis on progress and science to back their anti-clerical and legitimizing concerns. Legitimist Catholics, on the other hand, incorporated "integrism" (i.e., the desire for an "integral" Catholicism which rejected contemporary culture) as a counterrevolutionary force. The stalemate republic of the "two Frances," split between right and left following the Dreyfus Affair, each developed their own ideological stance. Anti-Dreyfusard leagues were organized by the rightists, and they blamed the Jews for revolutionary outbreaks of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Freemasons sided with the anti-clericals, and by 1900, practically every radical republican deputy was a Freemason. The counterrevolutionary forces developed the idea of a "Judeo-Masonic conspiracy" as the source of all of France's evils, while the republicans, radicals, and socialists placed "renewed faith" in the 1789 Revolution and its ties to the Third

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[121] Donald F. Lach, "Ernest Lavisse (1842-1922)," in Essays in Modern European Historiography, edited and introduced by S.W. Halperin, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 143-59: p. 148.

[122] V.S. Vetter, "Gabriel Hanotaux (1853-1944)," in Halperin, ibid., pp. 91-118.

[123] E.R. Tannenbaum goes so far as to say that the republican and counterrevolutionary forces each developed their own respective "myths;" see his "The Myth of Counterrevolution 1870-1914," in Ideas in History,

Republic.[123] Since the nationalism of the anti-Dreyfusards contained an explicit attack on the institutions of the Third Republic, radicals, socialists, and republicans became the main defenders of the Republic up to 1905.

After 1905, further polarization of French society occurred. The Action Française gathered together monarchists, Catholics, and reactionary nationalists. On the opposite end of the spectrum, syndicalism, developed out of the anti-parliamentary ideas of Proudhon, rejected the "parliamentarianism" of the socialists as well as the emphasis on politics by Marxists like Jules Guesde. Direct action was seen as much more effective than intellectual Marxism. France's peculiar brand of Marxism can be explained by the fact that working-class movements and socialist programmes were already in existence when Marxism began to permeate the political arena. Jaurès, whose socialism reflected this pre-Marxism, claimed that French socialism owed as much to Michelet as to Marx.

In Jaurès's series on the socialist interpretation of France, Georges Renard was to write the standard account of 1848. His La Rèpublique de 1848 (1907), was a typical socialist interpretation of the time. Similar to the republican interpretation, he defended the Second Republic by attacking both Louis Philippe and Louis Napoleon; but his socialism also led him to praise the working-classes behind the barricades. He also praised the Provisional Government for the creation of "public pawnshops" through which loans could be obtained through collatoral, and thought that this "democratized credit." He claimed that many of the reforms of the Second Republic kept alive if not the letter, then the spirit of

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edited by R. Herr and H.T. Parker, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1965), pp. 265-87. Also see, Rudé, op. cit., pp. 204-5, for his discussion of works pertaining to the "Judeo-Masonic conspiracy" interpretation of 1848.

the National Workshops.[124] It has been pointed out that Renard was essentially alone it stating that there were not two but three competing viewpoints in 1848, namely, those of socialists (those in the Provisional Government), the "pure conservatives" (most of the Legislative Assembly of 1849-51), and the "interventionists" (who dominated the National Assembly).[125] The interventionist viewpoint was characteristic not only of the moderate republicans but it also circulated in the Legitimist and Catholic factions of the July Monarchy. Interventionists considered the state as the main source of reform, were critical of both laissez-faire and socialist ideologies, and proposed reforms which would alleviate social problems but not alter capitalist society. This middle, reformist road between left and right, perhaps marked Renard's own viewpoint of the Third Repubic as well. Renard's Marxism was, like Jaurès's, more pacifistic that activist in nature, and he tended to have a moralistic attitude towards society. This can be detected in his book on 1848, but it is especially obvious in an essay of his on Cabet, where Renard, though not wanting to steer away from Marxist principles, regretted the lack of a utopian socialist spirit in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. He claimed that Cabet's Voyage en Icarie deserved attention "because of the great...plan...developed by the author" for the "total recasting of human society."[126] Renard also showed an appreciation for Saint-Simonian positivism, and this together with his concern for utopian socialism no doubt

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[124] G. Renard, La République de 1848 (1848-1852), in the "Histoire socialiste (1789-1900)," series edited by Jean Jaurès, Vol. 9, (Paris: 1907), pp. 318, 337; quoted and discussed in Frederick A. de Luna, The French Republic Under Cavaignac: 1848, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), pp. 279-315.

[125] de Luna, ibid., pp.248-9.

[126] G. Renard, "Cabet et les Precurseurs de la Révolution de 1848," La Révolution de 1848, Vol. 28, (1931-2), pp. 181-92: pp. 183, 192.

resulted in his moralistic Marxism.

In 1904, Renard had founded the periodical, La Révolution de 1848, as the voice of the Bureau de la Société d'Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, of which he was also founder and chief editor from 1904-1930.[127] The pacifistic nature of the Marxism of the United Socialist Party under Jaurès could not assuage the fear of the French people over the growing tensions between France and Germany leading up to World War I. The socialist party split over the German question, leaving the door open for the conservative Raymond Poincare to enter as president.

2.6 Science over Politics

The aftermath of World War I left an indelible imprint on French society. Economic catastrophe followed by emigration did not prove a suitable environment for political debate. During the next two decades, political parties were further plagued by civil war, the depression, and the rise of German Nazism. The Third Republic was torn between communism and fascism. A militant working-class consciousness sought the communist party as its representative, and following revolution in Russia, communism grew in appeal to the working-classes. The traditional socialist left dropped its admiration of pacifism and built itself up on a platform of anti-fascism. The right, now faced with the complete separation of church and state, turned to anti-Marxism as its new bête noire. Technocratic

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127 The journal went through many changes of title, keeping the above-mentioned until 1940, and entitled both 1848: Revue des Révolutions du XIXe Siecle and 1848: Revue des Révolutions Contemporaines up to 1951. After this date an annual collection of research was published entitled Etudes, up to the 1960's. In the 1960's, its concerns were taken over by the Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, with its greater emphasis on the 1789 Revolution. For a complete list of articles published up to 1956, see the "Tables Analytiques," in the Bibliothèque de la Révolution de 1848, Vol. 17, (Paris: 1957).

managerial experts guided France through a period of dirigisme. Reminiscent of Napoleon III's integration of Saint-Simonism and Bonapartism, even Blum's socialist Popular Front experimented with technocratic planning.[128] The outbreak of World War II and the resulting split of Resistance and National Revolution proved to be the collapse of the Third Republic.

The changes in French society between the wars were also reflected in its historiography. The depression caused a concern for economic history. Histoire événementielle, with its narrative and political structure was criticized as restricting man to a political arena, as ignoring his creative aspects. Historians like Lucien Febvre also attempted to incorporate Marxism into an alternative to the older forms of history. The traditional republican political system of the Third Republic was faulted for leading the country to war, and this further separated politics from history as witnessed in the writings of historians from both the left and the right.[129] Henri Berr criticized the specialization of study, and offered a synthetic approach, and Albert Mathiez's work on the Great Revolution oriented the left to similar Marxian studies. But the Marxism used in most of such studies was of a passive, intellectualized nature. Due to the peculiarity of French Marxism, as discussed above, these "Marxist" works included positivist, utopian, and apolitical attributes. With the desire to escape the polarization confronting the Third Republic, historiography offering apolitical interpretations was bound to be more popular. Social history became the dominant form of historiography because it was seen as more scientific. But considering the apolitical nature of this social history, it harkened back to the social romanticism of the Nineteenth

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[128] Campbell, op. cit., pp. 141-7.

[129] Ibid., pp. 148-9.

Century.

During the Fourth Republic this trend of historiography was further enhanced and entrenched into the academic system. But under the Fourth Republic the educational system was not as important as it had been. Productivity and dirigisme continued to be the center concerns of the government, especially in the light of the damage inflicted by World War II. With the victory of the Resistance over fascism the political locus of the Republic experienced a move to the left. Socialists of the Third Republic had become the center party of the Fourth, communists having displaced the socialists for a position on the left. In the centenary year of the 1848 Revolution, dozens of historical monographs were produced.[130] Not totally suprising, considering the political dimensions of socialism in 1848, most of these works had a, typically French, socialist flavour. The majority of authors saw 1848 as a betrayed moment in the movement towards a "social republic," the Parisian working-class was viewed as the Revolution's "tragic hero," and the moderate republicans were mostly flailed with invectives.[131] The orthodox republican interpretation of the Third Republic found few friends amongst these historians.

Perhaps the closest to the older tradition was that volume written by Gaston-Martin, La Révolution de 1848.[132] He neither blamed nor praised the Second Republic moderates. Count de Falloux, the leader of the clericals, is depicted as an evil genius, and the author states that:

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[130] Cf. E. Tersen, "Les Révolutions de 1848," Revue Historique, Vol. 201, (1949), pp. 272-89, for an account of the majority of these.

[131] Farmer, "Some Frenchmen Review 1848," p. 324.

[132] Gaston-Martin, La Révolution de 1848, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1948), No. 295 in the "Que sais-je?" series.

> "how, once more, a victory of the people, won in a sudden outburst of heroism, succumbed beneath the triple alliance of the Catholic reaction, the conservative bourgeoisie, and doctrinaire politicians."

Similar to other accounts written on the centenary, Gaston-Martin held that the Revolution "was, in truth, a social revolution which strove toward something quite other than the political conquest of the universal right of suffrage," and was defeated because the leaders "did not understand, or did not wish to admit," that it had a social character. The author was mainly concerned with the months from February to July, and stated that the "democratic and social Republic" was defeated during the June Days,

> "The day that General Eugene Cavaignac handed back to the National Constituent Assembly the dictatorship entrusted to him...the social Revolution was finished and the Republic was already in decline."[133]

Gaston-Martin's interpretation reveals the general tendency to adopt a leftist perspective most clearly, even though his republican- socialist leanings also appear. His work, however, was limited to Paris, and he thus misinterpreted the 1848 Revolution "as a strictly urban and chiefly Parisian phenomenon--in sharp contrast to the revolutionary linkage of city and countryside in 1789."[134]

More to the left were Georges Duveau's writings of the centenary.[135] Even though Duveau was a socialist in his politics, he was only interested in Marxism as far as it concerned the working-classes. As well, he only looked to Marxism

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133 Ibid., pp. 5, 116; quoted in Farmer, "Some Frenchmen Review 1848," p. 322, and Rudé, op. cit., pp. 215-6.

134 Peter Amann, "The Changing Outlines of 1848," American Historical Review, Vol. 68, #4, (1963), pp. 938-58: p. 947.

135 These writings, containing pamphlets on various aspects of 1848, have been collected in Georges Duveau, 1848: The Making of a Revolution, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984) (original French collection 1965), and it is to the book that I will refer.

through Saint-Simon and Proudhon. In fact, "Duveau's primary concern was to find an alternative to Marx."[136] He found this alternative in Durkheim, and was really more concerned with alienation as a disease than as a product of the division of labour, the latter which he considered necessary.

Duveau focused on both the workers of Paris and their political environment. He narrated the events of 1848 through the eyes of three Parisian workers: a hosier of the faubourg Saint-Denis, a cabinet-maker of the faubourg Saint-Antoine, and a mechanic of the more industrialized faubourg of La Chapelle. The hosier, being the most traditionalist, was a moderate, the cabinet-maker more radical, and the mechanic a follower of the secret societies of Blanqui. They all had expressed a desire to be rid of Guizot, and thus were part of the February 22 demonstration. But after that date, these men were to traverse different paths. The hosier, with more traditionalist, anti-communist leanings, was destined to meet the mechanic on opposite sides of the June barricades.

Duveau narrated a dramatic episode in French history, he did not give an analysis of 1848. His sympathies were with the *ouvriers*, and as such he interpreted the leaders of 1848 (i.e., Lamartine, Louis Blanc, Ledru-Rollin) as good-willed men, but impotent to change things.[137] His emphasis on the workers was an important contribution to the historiography of 1848 because he clearly showed their varied loyalties. As a narrative, though, Duveau's book did not stress

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[136] Campbell, *ibid.*, p. 172; Campbell gives biographical background and analyzes some of Duveau's works on pp. 170-85.

[137] Duveau, *op.cit.*, p. 203. Rudé's "Introduction" to this volume analyzes many of the salient points of Duveau's texts, although he does tend to ignore some of the more utopian distinctions of Duveau, such as his analysis of the Provisional Government in terms of Catholics and Freemasons on pp. 182-202, and Duveau's stressing of the originality of utopian socialism over that of Marx's on pp. 203-30.

one event over another. Rather, he portrayed the events of February (i.e., the fired shots in the boulevard des Capucines, the abdication of the king, and the proclaiming of the Republic) as one immense tragedy, ending with a note of finality, in June. Duveau placed leaders (i.e., Lamartine and Louis Blanc) in a favourable light, in fact even Louis Philippe is seen as more of a victim of circumstances. Duveau does state, however, that Louis Philippe showed that he "was no longer in control of events" when he gave way "to public pressure," and dismissed Guizot. To Duveau this proved that the king's government was disintegrating and that the Revolution was about to begin.[138] Even though he sided with the workers, Duveau asked far more questions than he answered. By placing all the events in the perspective of June (in other words, as caused by the imposition of the 45 centime tax, the failure of the National Workshops, and the regional differences of France), Duveau offered very little in the way of a new perspective.

Still further to the left is the interpretation of 1848 by Albert Soboul. His The Revolution of 1848 in France, offered an avowedly Marxist analysis.[139] Soboul explained the February Revolution as ultimately due to "the social and political evolution of the Forties." As well, he did not hesitate to exclude the bourgeoisie from the February days:

> "It was in fact the masses, artisans and labourers, who made the Revolution of February, 1848. The bourgeoisie played no part in it. They let things take their course.[140]

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[138] Ibid., p. 29.

[139] Albert Soboul, The French Revolution of 1848, (London: Fore Publications, 1948).

[140] Ibid., pp. 4, 9.

Soboul also compared 1848 to 1789, but he did not place it in the latter's shadow, rather, he saw them as equals, both expressing the "same force and generosity." The Revolution of 1848 was important because it gave the French people universal suffrage, and "the immense hope of socialism." He blamed the men of the Provisional Government's mixture of deism and romantic idealism for blinding them to the reality of their position, and for giving them a false feeling of hope. Soboul noted that the Provisional Government did very little for the peasants, that with the rise of economic crisis during the first months of the Revolution the peasants were actually seen as a scape-goat.[141] The influence of the revolutionary clubs are played down by Soboul, and he saw them as lacking the political "programme of action" that was an attribute of the clubs of 1789. With the increasing exclusion of working-class interests from the Provisional Government, the June Days were predicted. But Soboul states that they sprang essentially from the decree which excluded those workers between 18 and 25 from the National Workshops and compelled them to join the army.[142] With the massacre of the working-classes the Republic came to an end, for it could not survive without those who gave it its original impulse.

The histories of Gaston-Martin, Duveau, and Soboul were written from different political perspectives, but as mentioned above, one notices the basic similarity of their interpretations. This consensus, however, cannot be construed as permanent. New research was to lead to new debates, and changes in the political structure of France led to new ideological perspectives. Specialized studies in demographics and economics followed the pattern laid down previously

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141 Ibid., pp. 9-18, 35.

142 Ibid., pp. 20, 31.

by the Annales school, and even outside that school historians accepted many of their terms and methods.

Several of these studies deserve mention due to the controversial nature and influence of their conclusions. The French economic historian, C.-E. Labrousse, argued that the economic crisis of 1846-7 did not have as much effect on the outbreak of the February Revolution as did the gradual swing back to stability after prices fell in early 1848. He pointed to the "natural" rather than the anthropomorphic causes of 1848 and suggested that a conjoncture between the economic crisis and the following political crisis intensified popular discontents, resulting in revolution.[143] A.-J. Tudesq wrote that the 1847 crisis struck Paris commerce harder than in other cities, but that it was the "petite bourgeoisie and the working-classes [who] were the most affected." He also noted that the opposition journal, Le Siècle, exaggerated the end of the crisis, due to the failure on their part to prevent it, and therefore suggested that it actually proved "the solidity" of France's "commercial position."[144] Finally, Remi Gossez, an expert on the Parisian workers, claimed that no simple polarization of two classes (i.e., bourgeoisie versus proletariat), could account for the outbreak of the June Days. Both workers and railwaymen were in the National Guard, and the membership of the Mobile Guard was mostly younger workers, some of whom had fought behind

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143 C.-E. Labrousse, "1848-1830-1789. Comment naissent les revolutions," in Actes du Congrès historique du centenaire de la Révolution de 1848, (Paris: 1949), pp. 1-31; translated in (ed.) F. Crouzet, et al., Essays in European Economic History, (London: Edward Arnold, 1969), pp. 1-14. But also see Labrousse's "Panoramas de la Crise," in Aspects De La Crise Et De La Dépression De L'Économie Française, which is Vol. 19 of Etudes (Paris: 1956), pp. iii-xxiv, where he states that the February Revolution itself provoked "an economic paralysis without precedent."

144 A.-J. Tudesq, "La Crise De 1847, Vue Par Les Milieux D'Affaires Parisiens," in Aspects, op. cit., pp. 4-36: p. 22.

the barricades back in February. But Gossez also noted that the "vanguard of the insurrection" was mostly comprised of militant railwaymen and longshoremen. So while there may not have been a fully class conscious working-class, there was a nascent proletariat.[145]

The 1960's witnessed an impassioned attack on several notions concerning history in general and the history of the French Revolution specifically by the English historian Alfred Cobban. Cobban took, what he claimed to be, a very empiricist stance towards the study of the Revolution.[146] He stated that he would not enter into any theoretical discussion but would deal with the social history of the revolution through a strict "empirical examination of the facts."[147] Cobban's anti-theoretical bias was aimed mostly at the Marxist accounts of the French Revolution by those such as Georges Lefebvre. Against the Marxist periodization of capitalism emerging from feudalism in France during the course of the French Revolution, Cobban claimed that the men of 1789 were not capitalists nor were they hostile to feudalism. Furthermore, Cobban argued that the French Revolution was not due to a rising bourgeoisie but to one in decline. Cobban's researches caused a great deal of controversy in France and other countries.

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145 R. Gossez, "Diversité des antagonismes sociaux vers le Milieu du XIXe siècle," Revue Économique, Vol. 1, (1956), pp. 439-58; and "L'Organisation ouvrière a Paris sous la Seconde République," 1848: Revue des Révolutions Contemporaines, Vol. 41, (1949), pp. 31-45. I have followed Rudé's, op. cit., discussion of Gossez here.

146 Cf. his Social Interpretation of the French Revolution, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964). This was mainly an expansion of his 1954 inaugural lecture entitled "The Myth of the French Revolution." For a summary of most of his positions, see his Aspects of the French Revolution, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1968).

147 Ibid., pp. 22-3.

The American historian of the Revolution of 1848, P. Amann, seems to have followed Cobban's lead, and has written numerous works from what he also claims to be a strictly empiricist position. Amann has criticized Marxist studies of 1848 like Jean Dautry's 1848 et la Deuxième République (1957), and Emile Tersen's Quarante-Huit (1958), as simple "glosses" embued with "Marx's rigid class interpretation."[148] He states that the concern to keep a strictly Marxist theoretical framework has stifled Marxist historians from taking "a fresh look at the period." Yet nowhere does Amann give a partial, let alone thorough, analysis of Marx. Nor does he seem to be aware of the fact of the remarkable consensus of the 1948 anniversay writings or their impassioned applause for the basic Marxist interpretation. As such, his critique is one-sided at best. Amann pays only lip-service to Marx's historical works and continues to use the tactical polarization of bourgeoisie and proletariat in Marx and Engels' Communist Manifesto as his understanding of a Marxist history of 1848, which, since this work was written before 1848, is absurd. To further his opinion Amann cites the work of R. Gossez, who has made perhaps the most in-depth study of the Parisian workers. Gossez claimed that since both workers and property-owners were in the National Guard, there was obviously no polarization of two classes in the June Days, and thus there was no totally class conscious proletariat. But Amann fails to make reference to the fact that Gossez also claimed that there was a "vanguard of the insurrection" comprised of mainly militant railwaymen. So even if there was no fully class conscious proletariat, there were representatives of its

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148 See Amann's discussion of these two works in his, "Writings on the Second Republic," in Journal of Modern History, Vol. 34, #4, (1962), pp. 409-29: p. 410.

proletarian ideals.[149]

In another of his articles Amann empirically tries to give a redefinition of the concept of revolution.[150] Correctly pointing out the false "objectivity" of the Rankean style of history, Amann attempts to overcome its problems by using an "empirical" understanding of revolution which he claims is "independent of ideological value judgements." In so doing, he dispenses with the numerous distinctions

> "between a coup d'état and a revolution; the degree of social change necessary before a movement may be called revolutionary; the possibility of a conservative revolution; the uncertain differentiation between wars of independence, civil wars and revolutions."[151]

Amann claims that all the above can be called revolutionary, or what he calls "power blocs," if they cannot be suppressed by police action. To him, a revolution is simply the competition between these various power blocs.[152]

Amann does not seem to appreciate, that no matter how empirical he believes his concepts to be, he is nevertheless systematically working from a preconceived notion of what constitutes his field of study. In other words, by his deciding what were power blocs and what were not, he has selected data that coincide with the nature of his argument. Mark Poster has made a similar point in a discussion of Cobban, and his conclusions are worthy of note:

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149 P. Amann, "The Changing Outlines of 1848," op. cit., pp. 944-6; and Rudé, op. cit., p. 221.

150 P. Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 77, #1, (March, 1962), pp. 36-53.

151 Ibid., pp. 37, 39.

152 Ibid., pp. 42-3.

> "In this field [of study], where the empiricist gathers his data, there are unfortunately no pure facts with appropriate labels clearly marked. There are data, but it is in a state analogous to raw material. The historian must give a value to the raw material and then search for it. He must rework it or process it before it can be circulated among scholars under the title of a fact. In other words, the historian, like any other scientist, has no choice but to conceptualize his field, decide what is in it, what is important, and how it should be evaluated. These are the tasks of theory, and they are done best when the historian acknowledges that he has one."[153]

As well, Amann's denial of ideology as a relevant factor tends to yield a positivist interpretation of the 1848 Revolution as a revolution which can only be understood on its own terms. He ignores how ideological factors helped promote the atmosphere within which that revolution took place, how previous revolutions affected the outcome of 1848, and also how 1848 was measured in the mind's of the actors. In short, he views 1848 as an event rather than a process, and this de-politicizes its nature and its relevance. By trying to avoid what he calls the "monistic" pattern of Marxism, he has created his own monism by dissolving the ideological barriers which separate what politically constitutes a revolution from that which constitutes another form of political action (i.e., war).

In the last decade the Annalist paradigm has tended to dominate French history. The famed leftist journal the Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, has brought into its fold positivist concepts like the Annalist's "conjuncture" and theory of "mentalities," as well as the emphasis on things of long duration over those which are dynamic. French Annalist Historians, as a whole, have almost completely replaced the "diachronic" (narrative conception of history) with the "synchronic" (spatial conception), and the historical process itself with positivist theory.

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153 Mark Poster, "History and Theory: Sartre and Althusser on 1789," in The Eighteenth Century, Vol. 20, #1, (1979), pp. 39-49: p. 40.

The historiography of 1848 has suffered from this injection of liberal theories due to their avoidance of political conflict. A recent special issue of the Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française was entirely devoted to 1848 and reveals the influence of Annalist conceptions replacing some of the Marxist concerns of its founder, Albert Mathiez.[154] P. Vigier speaks of yet another "new history," and echoing the Annales School of the 1930's, the creation of a "complete history" which would nevertheless regard economics as the main determinant.[155] M. Agulhon, though critical of a social history that is devoid of a political side, generally applauds such hopes.[156]

Annalist historians, by perceiving a nexus between history and natural science, have elimanted the role of free-will in history. Humanity is interpreted as in the hands of blind determinism and conscious intervention is not deemed possible. Braudel tended to see politics and ideology as isolated and less informative than social history. Furet, a more recent Annalist historian, has basically followed this approach, and so have all other Annalist or Annalist-influenced historians mentioned here-- from the precursor of the School, Henri Berr, through to Labrousse, up to Furet and even Vigier and Agulhon. In short, the French Annalist historians have not been able to overcome the hiatus between free-will and determinism, or between structure and events. They have, instead, tried to discover a science of "total history" that is logically consistent. The problem is that, by ignoring political ideology, they have become historically illogical.

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154 Annales Historiques de la Révolution Française, No. 222, (Octobre-Decembre, 1975).

155 Ibid., p. 623.

156 Ibid., pp. 499-512, 603-12.

In conclusion, I believe that such a search for total history is a search for a perfect history. This approach to history is meaningless. Social history is not necessarily connected to political history as is often supposed; the connections must be made. It is clear from the analysis of the historians represented in this chapter that the dominant ideological concerns of different generations have greatly affected the respective historians. The "socialist romanticism" of the moderate republicans, since it was but a middle-class ideology could only feign an understanding of the actual social and political tensions that existed in the Second Republic. Similarly, the political vacuum at the center of the early Third Republic no doubt contributed to the evolution of professional history as historians were called to aid the flailing national spirit of France. The revolution of 1848 is an important aspect of French history, but it remains to be seen if its real revolutionary nature will not be forgetten amidst a cascade of "empirical" techniques.

Chapter III

GERMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY AND 1848

The historiography of the German Revolution of 1848 is an important theme for many reasons. First and foremost, that revolution was a focal point for the history of German nationalism, liberalism, and socialism. It occurred at the height of a European depression, yet also at a time when a fledging German middle-class was experiencing new freedoms afforded them in the early stages of Central Europe's industrialization. Alternately, peasants and artisans were struggling with the new problems of laissez-faire capitalism brought on by the dissolution of the old guild system, and the painfully slow, typically Central European transformation from feudalism into capitalism.

Ultimately, this revolution failed to radically change the existing situation, and the conservative order was, for the most part, re-established. Yet even though much of the debate on 1848 concerns its denotation as a success or failure, or whether or not it was a bourgeois revolution, there is another more crucial question concerning its historiography. The question must be answered as to how the political factors seen as dominant by the historicist-minded "mandarin" German historians tended to reflect both the basis and the bias of their historical interpretation of 1848. In other words, one must try to separate the ideological from the methodological factors. Another important question is why these same factors have tended to dominate, to the exclusion of socio-economic aspects, most

of the historiography on 1848, both in Germany and elsewhere. In past chapters I have talked about the growth of history as a discipline in Germany and how other countries took up many of the Nineteenth Century historians' methodologies unchecked. This of course gives a partial answer to the above questions, as does the susceptibility of the middle-class intellectuals to the legitimizing tactics prevalent during the Bismarckian era and the stultification of history and other disciplines under Hitler. But German historians continue to speak of a German Sonderweg (unique path) in which the failed revolution of 1848 figures centrally as the factor retarding the growth of parliamentary democracy and as allowing one to see an historical continuum from Bismarck to Hitler in which the social hierarchy retained its predominance. There was thus also formed a lasting fusion of history with politics through the initial formulations of the Nineteenth Century historians such as Ranke and Sybel.

In toto, these factors have prevented not only the reception of a form of democratic liberalism and/or socialism, but of a creative study of history in all but the last two decades. The main ideological value that has been promulgated has been in the form of a reactionary myth which states that the "ideas of 1848" were of foreign origin and thus not applicable to Germany, hence the failure of that revolution. Other historians, mainly from outside Germany have pointed to socio-economic reasons for failure that deal with the peasant situation in 1848, or with the particular domestic problems in Germany rather than its foreign policy. But it is the contention of this chapter that this change from political to social historiography and from the external to the internal dynamics of 1848, has in a very real sense, thrown out the baby with the bath-water. It has revitalized the

ideological nature of the older political history by applying it to the new social history and the result has been not change but continuity. In other words, the "ideas of the ruling class," have only changed their focus of attention from political to social history. Thus the historiography of the 1848 German Revolution, if incorporated as a tool with which to understand the above process, should help to sort out much of the controversy surrounding the issue of Germany's Sonderweg, which in turn should allow an unmasking of the ideological content in German historiography as a whole. As a way of utilizing this tool, this chapter will examine the views of those historians who best represent the seemingly changed attitudes towards the "ideas of 1848". I have tried to place the methodological issues in the light of the major historical events, since ideological values as well as objective conditions are part and parcel of legitimate historical research. I shall only include the works of historians outside Germany where those works have affected the normative ideological basis of the historiography of 1848. As in the previous chapter I shall begin with an account of the historical background leading up to 1848.

3.1 Germany(Prussia) in 1848

German Absolutism hindered industrialization, and it was not until after 1848, when the bourgeoisie's presence was finally known, that we can point to German industrialization. But then, if prior to 1848 Germany was predominantly agricultural, after 1850 it experienced a "revolution in organization." There occurred simultaneous progress in both manufacturing and the growth of the market economy.[157] Germany's quick industrialization, as compared to France,

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[157] Knut Borchardt, "Germany 1700-1914," in The Fontana Economic History of

was in part due to the combined forces of upper and lower bourgeoisie together with the nobility, against the working-classes and peasants. Advanced metallurgical techniques and an abundance of coal in the Ruhr were also contributing factors.

Germany's 1848 Revolution really did little to change the existing situation. The constitution issued by Friedrich Wilhelm IV did not transform the the feudalized relations of production, nor did it alter the ideological superstructure of the state. Anything similar to a class system was still developing in Germany in 1848, and this explains the ambivalence of different social groups in their political demands to the Frankfurt Parliament. It in part also explains the success of the "monarchical principles" and hereditary basis of the constitution of 1850.[158] The German bourgeoisie grew and was organized within the still absolutist state structure; yet industrialization was taking place in the early Nineteenth Century, and a nascent working-class was evolving. This meant that any working-class ideology that was critical of the nobility was also critical of the bourgeoisie. Just as the French middle-class utopian socialists offered certain critical analyses of the early capitalist system that could be used by leaders of the secret societies, similarly, Germany's last great bourgeois philosophy, Hegelianism, offered the origins of a critical method to Marx. Thus the breakdown of Hegelianism, via Marx, was a key element in the origins of a working-class ideology in Germany. But the bourgeoisie in Germany was not class conscious itself before 1848. It took the "dignified" men of the Frankfurt

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Europe, op. cit., pp. 76-160.

158 H.W. Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany, (Essex: Longman, 1984), pp. 75-80.

Parliament to formulate the first truly liberal German objectives, and thus give expression to the class consciousness of the bourgeoisie. This was why Marx claimed that the proletariat revolution had to follow on the heels of a bourgeois revolution. The German bourgeoisie, just emerging as a political body was shocked to find an organized working-class also making demands.[159] This shock was to have a long-lasting effect on the relationship between the German bourgeoisie and working-class. Whereas France had experienced, before 1848, a social liberal ideology with which the working-class and the bourgeoisie could each partially identify, the simultaneous rise of socialist and liberal factions in Germany only resulted in the further polarization of both.

The criticism of violence as a factor mentioned in the last chapter also applies here. Germany's working and living conditions for the poor classes were horrendous.[160] It was quite typical of conservative historians (eg. Ranke) to completely ignore the condition of the working-classes since Germany had not experienced anything like the French Revolution, which in France, opened up the social question. The violent nature of these living conditions no doubt contributed to the violent actions of March 1848, and the criticism of the violence of the 48'ers, by Ranke and his followers, as due to French revolutionary influences is surely misleading. As regards the teleological factor in German historiography, one can note the appearance of a belief in the primacy of the state and its relation to foreign policy. This was the result of a conservative interpretation of Hegel, and as we shall see later, it was reinforced by the academic historical academy. The supremacy of the German state over that of any other country's

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159 Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, op. cit., pp. 180-3.

160 Jones, op. cit., pp. 76-7.

was considered an accepted fact by German historians. Also resulting from Hegel's concept of the state as an idealization of the people, German historians, during a long indoctrination into nationalist ideology, that was also supported by the persistence of feudal structures, continually viewed the German state as the focal point of history. The ideological ramifications of this position were immense, and they will be brought out later in this chapter. One must also criticize those historians who placed nationalist concerns over world-historical factors. But this criticism must be placed in balance with the fact that Germany was still experiencing national growing pains, and thus there were legitimate problems such as Austro-Prussian dualism, the persistence of particularist traditions, and territorial questions. Finally, as the bourgeoisie came into its own after 1848, it also was also faced with the problem of ideological decay into apologetics similar to France, and this decay also took on the form of pure ideology (false consciousness).

3.2 Marx and Engels

The first comprehensive and systematic analysis of the 1848 Revolution in Germany was that of Marx and Engels.[161] Through their articles in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, and Engels' Revolution and Counter-Revolution, the radical or Marxist historiography of the 1848 Revolution had its start.[162] Though debate

161 T.S. Hamerow, "History and the German Revolution of 1848," American Historical Review, Vol. 60, (1954), pp. 27-44: p. 28, and also see footnote #3, for the reference to "non-Marxian" historians.

162 The Neue Rheinische Zeitung, (NRZ), was founded by Marx and Engels in Cologne and the first issue is dated June 1, 1848. It continued until Marx's expulsion; its last issue the famed "Red Issue," was printed in red ink and appeared on May 19, 1849. Engels' Revolution and Counter-Revolution, (RCR), was, as a favour to Marx, originally written as a series of articles for

still continues as to what was the influence of Marx and Engels in Germany in 1848, there remains little doubt that whatever the influence, it has continued to grow. This is mostly due to the rise of German socialism and to Marx and Engel' transnational perspective: they always viewed the Revolution as part of the historical problem of the transition from feudalism to capitalism. Marx originally thought that 1848 would witness a bourgeois revolution, but that it would be different from the previous bourgeois revolutions in England and France. This was because of the "uneven" or retarded German development whereby the lack of a strong financial bourgeoisie had nevertheless not impeded the growth of a proletariat. Thus the proletarian revolution in Germany would, Marx thought, follow very quickly behind the bourgeois revolution.[163]

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the New York Daily Tribune from Oct. 25, 1851 to Oct. 23, 1852. These articles were compiled in book form in 1891. For details concerning the NRZ, I have consulted the following: S.K. Padover, Karl Marx: an Intimate Biography, (New York: Mentor Books, 1980), pp. 140-171; RCR, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), p. 146; A. Whitridge, Men In Crisis, (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1949), pp. 220-1; E. Kamenka and F.B. Smith (eds.), Intellectuals and Revolution, (London: Edward Arnold, 1979), pp. 76-93; D. Felix "Heute Deutschland!: Marx as Provincial Politician," Central European History, Vol. 15, #4, (Dec. 1982), pp. 332-350; Marx and Engels, Articles from the NRZ: 1848-49, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972); Marx and Engels, Selected Correspondence, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975).

163 Karl Marx The Revolutions of 1848, edited and introduced by David Fernbach, (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 33-8. T.S. Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, op. cit., pp. 66-7, takes a very negative view of Marx and Engels' influence, as does Felix, op. cit.; whereas W. Abendroth, A Short History of the European Working Class, (London: New Left Books, 1972), pp. 22-6, and Leviova's "Introduction" to Marx and Engels, Articles..., op. cit., take a much more positive view. Also see the "Introduction(s)" to the various editions of Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1975). For a discussion of the French and German "synthesis" of attitudes present in the Communist Manifesto, see G. Lichtheim, Marxism, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 61-2, 65.

Specifically, in the NRZ, through a policy of constant critique, Marx and Engels defined the ideological parameters of the democratic and left factions of the Frankfurt Parliament, as well as various other middle-class state assemblies. The subtitle of the newspaper, "Organ of Democracy," was a tactic enabling Marx to extend his theory of revolution in a democratic fashion. By also being concerned with the nationalist and constitutionalist issues of the middle-class liberals and democratic-left, the editors hoped to win over this larger audience to the concerns of the working-class.[164]

Marx and Engels expressed their utter contempt for the betrayal of revolutionary hope soon to be perpetrated by the bourgeoisie. They characterized the members of the Frankfurt Parliament, and to a somewhat lesser extent the other constituent assemblies, as cowardly "old women" who "lacked enlarged views of revolutionary resolutions" and in the end "betrayed the people, and restored

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164 For the reason why Marx and Engels chose this tactic and their actual differeces with the democrats, cf. "Apendix III," in F. Engels, Germany: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, (New York: International Publishers, 1969), pp. 135-46, and also p. 130. On the various meanings of "democratic," "socialist," and "communist" ideologies to Marx and Engels at this time, cf., "Preface to the English Edition of 1888," of the Manifesto..., pp. 9-15. On the composition of the democratic-left, cf., Lenore O'Boyle, "The Democratic Left in Germany, 1848," in Journal of Modern History, Vol. 33, #4, (1961), pp. 374-83. On the composition of the Communist League, cf., Marx and Engels, Selected, op. cit., p. 378; Whitridge, op. cit., p. 221. In light of this, Felix, op. cit., pp. 336-7, could not be further from the truth in stating that the NRZ belonged to the "bourgeois Democratic Party" mentality and that its articles advocated emancipation of "the middle class while granting modest benefits to the workers and peasants." Marx and Engels always distinguished between the Revolutionary Left, the Radical-Democrats, and the more liberal left-wing faction, and their policies were always critical of the middle-classes. Marx learned from 1848 that the proletariat would have to develop its own hegemony, outside the bourgeoisie. Also see, note #8, in Marx and Engels, Articles.., p. 268, and also, pp. 27-37. Also see, J.H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 243-286, for a discussion of the origins and evolution of the term "communism."

power to the hands of feudal, bureaucratic, and military despotism." The prediction that the bourgeoisie would continue the revolutionary impetus of March and lead the way for a final proletarian victory was, because of this betrayal, not to be realized. Instead, this tragic turn of events was to become the foundation for a conservative reactionary counter-revolution.[165] Marx and Engels' exacting analyses were, of course, not accepted by the existing German historical community, but they eventually were nevertheless recognized as scholarly interpretations.

After the March days, the desire for dramatic change became the raison d'être of both the peasant and the bourgoeis liberal, of both the artisan and the factory-worker. Only at the opposite end of the political spectrum--in the camp of the extreme conservatives--was there any disbelief in the severity of the March events. Leopold von Ranke (1795-1885) was fairly representative of this faction.[166]

3.3 From Rankean to Neo-Rankean Historiography

The evolution from Ranke's writings on 1848 to those of the neo-Rankeans up to World War I reveals a remarkable continuity. Ranke saw the state (i.e., the Prussian state) as being the center of all historical narrative, as being an end unto itself. The state was overseen by God through the king and his bureaucracy, and

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165 Frederick Engels, Germany..., op. cit., pp. 49-53.

166 Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, edited and introduced by G.G. Iggers and K. von Moltke, (New York: Bobbs-Merill, 1973); Kurt Schwerin, The Revolution of 1848 and the German Historians (unpublished PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1955,), Chpt. 2; Leonard Krieger, Ranke: The Meaning of History, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), Chpt. 10; Georg G. Iggers, The German Conception of History, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983) (revised ed.), Chpt. 4.

thus their policies and their international power interests were far more important than domestic or socio-economic interests. The legitimation of the existing order was hence carried out by Ranke's identification of the state with spiritually moral forces. These forces could be observed through their "objective" representation of divine will. Thus to Ranke, objectivity was synonymous with his conservative ideology. This Prussian political bias of Ranke's led him to be concerned with questions of the primacy of the state, and, in a nationalist sense, with the primacy of the nation. The types of questions that he asked about 1848 were therefore very narrow. Documents, once authenticated, were not questioned but taken at their word. This led to sensationalized "great man" history rather than a history of the people since the majority of these documents were about the deeds of famous statesmen. It also led to a bias for the political power of Prussia rather than the rest of Germany, or any other country for that matter. The historiography of 1848 by Ranke and his school was therefore a product of Prussian political convictions, and Ranke's since the Prussian state was considered an a priori entity, socio-economic changes were not inferred as changes in the state. Even in the later Prussian and neo-Rankean schools 1848 was seen as an interruption in the activities of the state, and was therefore viewed negatively.[167]

Ranke was unprepared for the March events mainly because he was contemptuous of domestic politics in the first place, and this kept him distanced from a deeper understanding of the conflicting issues. Only in his eight

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167 G.G. Iggers, The German Conception..., Chapt. 4. By presentism I mean history that is premised in contemporary concerns. Ranke's presentism was developed through his conservative mixture of Hegel and Herder; see supra., pp. 16-7.

"Memoranda," written between 1848 and 1851 for the use of Friedrich Wilhelm IV as a means for his forming an opinion on 1848, do we see Ranke take an overt political position as regards his conservative monarchism. The first two Memoranda were summaries of the February Revolution in France. Oddly enough, Ranke, like Marx, saw the events in France as transnational in character, but unlike Marx he attributed their origins to a few conspiratorial agitators. Ranke showed his awareness of a social problem but not that problem of social change seen as necessary by the radicals and liberals. And in a similar vein, Ranke as well as the King, ascribed the revolution in Germany to the work of a few extremely radical Parisians. This was Ranke's "conspiracy theory." The ideas of these foreign agitators were planted in Germany during the Vormärz, where they supposedly developed as a mimetic function of the French Revolution. For Ranke these ideas were dangerous, because they could not be applied to the German case.[168]

Ranke's empathy for the policies of the King was at the heart of his ultra-conservatism. Even though, as mentioned, he was first of all shocked by the Revolution in March, he eventually incorporated 1848 into his later cosmopolitan outlook. Through a radically presentist approach to historiography, that was brought on because of the growing confidence in the reactionary counter-revolution, the events of March came to be seen by Ranke as a necessary step towards unification and the manifestation of the monarchical constitution. He saw the King and the Prussian army as the two saviours of the Revolution.

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168 Andrew Lees, Revolution and Reflection, (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 89-90; Franzjorg Baumgart, Die verdrangte Revolution, (Dusseldorf: Padagogischer Verlag, Schwann, 1976), pp. 21-24; Schwerin, op. cit., pp. 105-8.

Only after the Prussian humiliation at Olmutz in 1850 did he begin to think of a nationalist alternative to the old German Confederation, and even then, it was still in the dualistic form of a Prussian dominated North German union and an Austrian South (the Kleindeutsch solution). Ranke also applied this presentist technique in his later view of the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, which at the time he had seen as a result of Bismarck's belligerence, but later viewed as necessary for laying the foundation for a strong Prussia which could deal with the growing threat from the French. Here we see an incarnation of Ranke's concern for the primacy of foreign policy which was later to become very controversial.[169] He thought he could write history that was objective, or something given once and for all. But his political affiliation with the king, and his dislike of universal suffrage, reveals his conservative bias and his alteration of Hegel by making God or Geist the vehicle through which he could legitimize monarchism. This is presentism. His positivism stems from his idea that he could write history "as it actually was," or that the historian was separated from his sources.

While the above analysis suggests a strong political leaning in Ranke's writings, this should be put into perspective. Ranke's work, on the whole, expressed a quietist approach to politics. To be sure he did inititate in Germany a historiographical history-politics nexus in which history was to be interpreted through political documents, but his idealistic statism did not allow him to develop

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[169] For a discussion of positivism and presentism in historiography, cf. Adam Schaff History and Truth, (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976), Chpt. 2, where he focuses on Ranke's positivism, as in the latter's preconceived separation of his historical interpretation from his sources, and his claim that history is only thought about history; and Kreiger op. cit., pp. 202-15, who points more towards Ranke's presentism. Schaff tends to downplay the influence of Hegel on Ranke while I tend to see aspects of both presentism and positivism in Ranke.

this nexus, and it remained flexible to the presentist demands of his universalistic theories. In short, Ranke justified the status-quo.

In a very different way the same can be said of Heinrich von Sybel (1817-95), who was to become Ranke's most influential pupil. If Ranke's idée fixe of writing history "wie es eigentlich gewesen ist," was in fact subjected to presentist concerns in his "Memoranda" and therefore cannot be seen as in any way objective, then after 1848 Sybel proudly announced his biases.[170] Sybel was much more politically oriented than Ranke; in fact, he even thought of himself more as a politician than a historian. He was probably the most famous member of the so-called "Prussian school," a school which through all of its members stressed the subjection of history to politics. As a "secession from the Ranke school," it was precisely the objection to Ranke's quietism that was the basis of the school's political leanings.[171]

With the rise of Bismarck's policy of "iron and blood," the growth of nationalistic Prussian spirit after 1866, and the continued subjection of history to politics in the universities, Sybel's histories earned him Acton's criticism as being "the first classic of imperialism." Sybel's was an uncoloured "didactic historiography." Unlike Ranke, Sybel did not give a European context to the Revolution of 1848. As a pro-Hohenzollern and a National Liberal Sybel tended to equate liberty not with individual freedom but with nationalism.[172] Whereas

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170 Lees, op. cit., pp. 43-4; Schwerin, op. cit., Chpt. 3, esp. pp. 120-7; Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 66-8.

171 J.W. Thompson, A History of Historical Writing, (New York: Macmillan, 1942), p. 205, 208-14; C.P. Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, (London: Longmans and Green, 1952) (revised edition), pp. 131-7. Also see George Rudé, Debate on Europe: 1815-1850, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 230 and Hamerow, "History...," op. cit., pp. 30-1.

Ranke approved of the particularism of the German states and the preservation of the monarchy, Sybel thought that particularism led to disintegration and that the need for a strong Prussia had proven Friedrich Wilhelm IV's policies to be weak before and after March. Yet the conservative nature of national liberalism is nevertheless quite evident in Sybel's opposition to universal suffrage, his condemnation of liberal radicalism, and his total rejection of socialism all of which he equated with France. This hatred of things French is captured best in his Geschichte der Revolutionzeit (5 Vols., 1853-71), where he claims that after the defeat of the French in 1870 "the danger of French ideas [was] lessened," and that

> "Our Empire is the result of the principle of nationalities, quite irreconcilable with the false ideas of equality of the French Revolution. These ideas denied any right to individual existence, whether that of a people or that of an individual. The supposed universal liberation of the Girondins, the universal conquests of Napoleon, were nothing but the logical application of that basic principle which, in France itself, stifled the free development of individuals."[173]

The major difference between Ranke and Sybel stemmed from the latter's more critical view of the aristocracy. Ranke was very conservative in desiring a constitution that would restore power to the aristocratic classes. But Sybel was somewhat closer to Hegel than Ranke in seeing the state not as a spiritually legitimate manifestation of political and/or military institutions but as an ethical idea.[174] But Sybel's was still a conservative interpretation of Hegel since he did not place philosophy, religion and poetry above the power of the state as had

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172 Guilland op. cit., p. 183.

173 Quoted in Guilland, pp. 206-7. Lord Acton, "German schools of History," English Historical Review, Vol. 1, (1886), p. 7; Lees, op. cit., p. 44. The Prussian school historians' were not liberal in the Western definition of the word. They wanted a powerful state and they rejected universal suffrage.

174 supra. pp. 25-6.

Hegel. Like other members of the Prussian Historical school (i.e., H. Treitschke, H. Baumgarten), Sybel followed Ranke in the latter's concerns for the centrality of the state and the primacy of foreign policy.[175]

Though his picture of the 1848 Revolution was obviously one-sided, Sybel did not go to the reactionary extreme of blaming the cause of the revolution on a conspiratorial plot like his teacher. He pointed instead to two shots fired accidently by soldiers who guarded the Berlin Palace while facing a large crowd. But this meant that Sybel saw the Revolution as even more accidental and unnecessary than Ranke. Sybel though, as had Ranke, practically ignored social and economic events. His doctrinaire stance was typical of the Rankean and Prussian schools in general. In Sybel's last large work, Die Begründung des deutschen Reich (7 Vols., 1889-96),[176] further blame was put on Friedrich Wilhelm IV for his hesitancy in repulsing the masses. The hero of the book was Bismarck, who, as a man of political action was revered because he was able to sweep away any minor philosophical differences the Prussian historians might have had with him. With the Prussian victory in 1866, Bismarck was to become the central "great man" in most National Liberal (this party formed in the 1860's) histories, and again, reinforcing the link between politics and history.[177]

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175 Iggers, op. cit.,, pp. 90-6, 116-9.

176 Heinrich von Sybel, The Founding of the German Empire By William I, Vol. I, (1890), (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968).

177 Thompson, op. cit., p. 212. Perhaps the best analysis of Sybel's writings is still, C. Varrentrapp's introduction to Sybel's Vorträge und Abhandlungen, (Munich and Leipzig: 1897), pp. 1-156. Also see, George C. Kent, Bismarck and His Times, (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), Chpt. 2, for a discussion of Bismarck's participation in 1848, which Kent mentions made Bismarck aware of his destiny.

Liberalism in the imperial period was to take a turn for the worse. Before the Reichsgründung liberals were the main opposition party, but after 1867, due in part to their being perceived by many Germans as the party in power, and in part to their surrender of earlier "Casino" liberal principles to Bismarck and their separation from the more critical Progressive Party, they had to bear the brunt of the complaints against the existing regime. By the 1880's the popularity of the National Liberal party had faded. This, in turn, allowed other opposition parties, including the SPD, to grow in strength.[178]

By the turn of the century, the historiography of the 1848 Revolution had taken a new turn. Left-liberal and socialist histories gained in popularity, and their resurgence added to the originality of new views.[179] In 1892, Karl Binding, from the University of Leipzig, called for an objective history of 1848. He concentrated his own efforts on the Constitution of 1849, and revealed the complex issues that were involved, and upon which Sybel had only touched. In the works of such diverse historical writers as Wilhelm Blos and Hans Blum, the former a socialist the latter an anti-socialist, we find the first real consideration of the complicated socio-economic factors at work in 1848. Blos' book was the first "entirely sympathetic account of 1848." Hans Blum, son of Robert Blum (a liberal leader in 1848), described the role of his father as one of the precursors of

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178 Iggers, op. cit., p. 93; Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 30-6. The "Casino" (the name of the hotel where they met) liberals were, for the most part, university professors, see supra, p. 25-6, and James J. Sheehan, German Liberalism in the Nineteenth Century, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 123-158.

179 There were of course socialist histories written during Bismarck's era, but his anti-socialist repression, as well as the conservative nature of the German historical community, meant that these histories would not be influential to academic historians.

the National Liberal heritage. Even staunch conservatives such as Erich Marcks and Max Lenz payed small tributes to the idealism of 1848.[180]

The National Liberals Max Lenz (d. 1932), and his two most famous pupils, Felix Rachfahl (d. 1925) and Hermann Oncken (d. 1946), were the center of what has been described as a neo-Rankean renaissance occurring about the time of the Revolution's Fiftieth Anniversary. As the name suggests the neo-Rankeans attempted to revive Ranke's concern for objectivity, his strict adherence to sources, and the universalist aspects of his historiography. In essence, the neo-Rankeans dropped the earlier liberal political assumptions of the Prussian school (i.e., constitutional reforms, Rechtsstaat), and returned to the conservative stance of Ranke whereby the absolutist state became the apotheosis of an obviously ahistorical interpretation. Their overall political position was one of reaction against the lack of political objectivity of the Prussian school. This reveals a contradiction in the development of German historicism. All of these schools desired to be scientific and objective. But if the desired historical objectivity came from conservative politics, state-derived sources, and historicist-nationalist universality, the evolution from Ranke to the neo-Rankeans

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180 Hamerow, "History...", op. cit., p. 31; Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 158ff.;Schwerin, op. cit., Chapt. 4. For a discussion of the philosophical influence on the changes of this period, cf. Iggers, op. cit., Chpt. 6. Karl Binding, Der Versuch der Reichsgründung durch die Paulskirche in den Jahren 1848 und 1849, (Leipzig: Duncfer and Humblot, 1892), pp. 3-4; W. Blos, Die deutsche Revolution: Geschichte der deutschen Bewegung von 1848 und 1849, (Stuttgart: J.H.D. Dietz, 1893), in which he states immediately that his task is to "provide the proof that the popular movement of 1848 had an entirely different goal than that realized by the Bismarckian military-bureaucratic state," (p. 1); Hans Blum, Die deutsche Revolution 1848/9, (Florenz; 1897); Erich Marcks "1848" in Männer und Zeiten, Vol I, (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1911), pp. 281-323; M. Lenz, "1848", in Kleine historische Schriften, Vol. I, (Munich and Berlin: 1910), pp. 343-359. For further discussion on the roles of the above-mentioned historians, cf. Baumgart, op. cit., Chpt. 5, esp. pp. 123-30, 158-167.

suggests continuity not change. The critique of the Prussian School by the neo-Rankeans thus fairs no better than the critique of Ranke by the Prussian School. The neo-Rankeans were firm advocates of the political order before 1914 and upon defeat of Germany and the beginnings of Weimar, they turned to an outdated nationalism as their philosophy and opposed the Republic.[181]

The conservative and apologist nature of the neo-Rankeans as regards the historiography of 1848 can be seen in their focus mainly on the debate about the king and the lack of attention given to socio-economic matters. The controversy over the policies and personality of Frederick William IV inherited from Ranke and Sybel, was re-opened by the neo-Rankeans. In fact, they practically based their entire understanding of the Revolution upon their research on the King.[182] Lenz, Rachfahl, and Oncken all agreed on the basic issues involved. They stressed Ranke's interpretation as being the most correct; especially his universalist view of the Revolution as a "European Event," and his defense of the policies of the King. Also similar to Ranke, Lenz attributed the failure of the Revolution to German particularism and foreign intervention. He added that the King's policies were not weak, but instead, were delimited and shaped by foreign relations. Although Lenz did give some credence to the radicals of 1848 by saying that they were the only real voice of the nation's sovereignty, he nevertheless put this sovereignty in perspective to his glorification of the Kaiserreich.

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181 Schwerin, op. cit., Chpt. 5; H.-H. Krill, Die Rankerenaissance: Max Lenz und Erick Marcks, ein Beitrag zum historisch-politischen Denken in Deutschland: 1880-1935, (Berlin: 1962); Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 129-40. The concept of a Rechtsstaat, is defined by Sheehan as that liberal ideal whereby a political institution could absorb public opinion into its legal foundation. This was a very popular German liberal conception. Sheehan, op. cit., pp. 43-4.

182 This parallels the stress in France for an ideological stance on the French Revolution, supra, p. 20.

Oncken and Rachfahl took very similar positions: Oncken emphasized Frederick William's strong desire for a German Empire as shaping his policies with regard to constitutional reforms, and Rachfahl argued that the King was pinned down by having to make a decision between "the whirlpool of popular sovereignty and constitutional doctrine," and thus "a certain experimenting was in order." In short, all three took highly conservative and apologist positions and they revelled in the most mundane of issues. They saw the Revolution of 1848 only in the light of 1871, and although they half-heartedly disposed of the "conspiracy theory," they substituted something far more simplistic by claiming, as in Lenz's complete understatement, that the March Revolution was simply a "gigantic street riot" which came about after a "misunderstanding." By giving a Rankean interpretation to the events of 1848 even though they were living in a different age, the neo-Rankeans provided a legitimation of German imperialism. Through this ideological decay they propagated false-consciousness.[183]

By trying to utilize Ranke's universalistic historiographical method as an underpinning for Bismarck's imperialistic expansionism, they wrongly incorporated the idealist-romanticist core of Ranke's writings (which were neither imperialist nor actually very nationalist) and tried to displace the extreme nationalism of the Prussian School. But as Krill states, the neo-Rankeans were actually premised in,

> "the intellectual foundation of that same trend of propagandistic political history from which they wished to remove themselves by turning to Ranke's objective historical perspective."[184]

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[183] Quotes in Schwerin, op. cit., pp. 250, 254, 255-6. And though they altered the Rankean and Wilhelmian "conspiracy theory," they still kept the blame for the outbursts as being foreign intervention. Also see, Baumgart, op. cit., pp. 22-4, for a discussion of the tactical use of the "conspiracy theory" by Ranke as a means to discredit the liberals because of their acceptance of non-German ideas. On ideological decay, see supra., pp. 44-5, 103.

In all, they inherited from Ranke a conservative interpretation of Hegelianism, and they kept this form of historicism alive and vibrant by their stress on the world-historical figure being controlled from without by history's List der Vernunft (cunning of reason), and by their opposition to the type of history such as Karl Lamprecht's which attempted to break with German Idealism and, instead, base history on socio-economic and cultural aspects. As well, their opposition was strong due to their control over the historical community.[185]

3.4 Back to Marx

The historiography at the turn of the century, however, was not all conservative in nature. The change in spirit and rise of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) led to new and scholarly Marxist interpretations, which gained a strong foothold. Franz Mehring (d. 1919), as the official historian of the SPD, combined

> "economic forces, social classes and layers, ideological trends, political institutions [and] individual figures"[186]

in his history of 1848. In the 1880's, Mehring had changed from an earlier advocacy of democratic liberalism to social democracy. His reading of Marx and his growing intolerance of Bismarck were central to this change. In his critique of

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184 Krill, op. cit., pp. 4, 256.

185 For a discussion of the Hegelian basis of the Prussian school, cf. Thompson, op. cit., p. 205. Also see, Charles Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 389-93. For a discussion of Lamprecht's nomonological history, cf. Iggers, op. cit., pp. 197-200. Also see, p. 130, where Iggers claims that the neo-Rankeans "provided a theoretical foundation for Weltpolitik and imperialism."

186 Franz Mehring, Absolutism and Revolution in Germany: 1525-1848, (London: New Park, 1975), p. xiv.

Prussian liberalism, Mehring struck out against the Rechtsstaat ideal of the liberal constituency. With his focus on the importance of the working-class, he criticized Bismarck's state-socialism and argued for more self-help programs in the context of a democratic political system.[187]

Actually Mehring wrote many accounts of 1848. In the most comprehensive of these, he took to task the "wearisome debate" as to whether the two shots fired by the guards on March 18 "were discharged accidently" or whether it was the army or the masses which won the following thirteen hours of fighting. He concluded that this type of approach was both "idle" and "completely incidental." The basic fact to Mehring was that during

> "March 18-19, 1848, the old Prussia collapsed helplessly under the weight of its sins brought down on its head by the mighty blow of the revolution."

His position was very close to that of Marx and Engels. He saw the German Revolution as part of the pan-European class struggle, which was triggered by "a series of bad harvests and the great trade crisis of 1847." Mehring also incorporated Marx and Engels' idea of the betrayal of the bourgeoisie and discussed how the Bürgerwehr (citizen's militia) was conscripted by preferential tactics to become a police force for the bourgeoisie who wanted to end the revolution. In his analysis of the Berlin Assembly he focused on the leaders' lack of revolutionary perspective and showed the faults of "the reactionary calumnies that have for the last fifty years paraded under the radiant guise of 'objective historiography'." Thus Mehring revealed the political purpose of conservative

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187 Cf. Glen R. McDougall, "Franz Mehring and Problems of Liberal Social Reform in Bismarckian Germany, 1884-90: The Origins of Radical Marxism," Central European History, Vol. 16, #3, (September, 1983), pp. 225-255, for a discussion of Mehring's critique of Prussian liberalism.

historiography and its availability to be used as a tactical weapon. Perhaps more important than this, he viewed the 1848 capitulation of the liberals as preparing the way for the liberals' compromise with Bismarck in the 1866-71 period. Mehring's studies, although they were not to have a great influence on the academic community, nonetheless did aid in inducing accounts of 1848 which were more socio-economically and ideologically balanced.[188]

3.5 Historiography Before and After the World Wars

One such account was that written by Frederich Meinecke (d. 1954) just prior to World War I. Meinecke, though still in the tradition of the National Liberals, did look for a reply to Marxism through a broader concern for the masses. In his book, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (1907), Meinecke traced political history via its embodiment in the evolving conception of the German state. The history of this idea was seen by Meinecke as progressing and/or retrogressing within the polarities of spirit and power. He suggested that in order to achieve its unification, Germany had to give up the cosmopolitan ideals which had originated in the earlier Romantic era.[189] The Romantic conception of the nation-state was

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[188] Mehring, op. cit., taken from the above-mentioned English edition of his 1897 Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie, Vol. 1, pp. 186, 190-1, 225. For a discussion of Mehring's conception of the political uses of history, cf. McDougall, ibid., pp. 242-3.

[189] Translated as Cosmopolitanism and the National State, translated by R.B. Kimber and introduced by Felix Gilbert, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970): pp.9-22, 230, 233, 364-74. Gilbert's analysis of Meinecke's "genetic method" is particularly good. He shows how Meinecke developed a method of intellectual history based partly on Dilthey, which did not view ideas in a closed system but related them to the intellectual development of their author. In this development he stressed the link between ideas and politics and thereby gave a new twist to political history by showing the relationship between ideas and their political expression. Cosmopolitanism and the National State was Meinecke's first attempt at this type of

opposed to rationality because of its basis in folklore and traditional customs. But its influence had nevertheless inspired Bismarck's Reich, and thus his unified empire was still a dichotomous creation, and

> "the German nation remained a politically unfinished product...standing as it did midway between unity and regional particularism."

In his biography of Radowitz, Meinecke further developed this theme. Radowitz's opposition to a western, democratic idea of the state at Frankfurt in 1848, was viewed as keeping alive the German Sonderweg (unique path) in its transition from the Romantic age to Bismarck's Reich.[190] This view was due to Meinecke's glorification of the Prussian German state and his opinion that 1848 gave Prussia the chance to develop into a greater Germany, to sacrifice her own "state personality" to become the "leading power in Germany."[191] Meinecke's idealist conception of the state, though considerate of some socio-economic factors, was balanced more in favour of historicist politics, and this was the cause of several debates which were central to the historiography of 1848, and which clarified Meinecke's own view.

Erich Brandenburg, in one such debate, criticized Meinecke's almost Hegelian idealism in seeing national unity emerging from a universal consciousness and suggested, instead, that the movement which ended in national unity was basically the result of the reaction to many years of French intervention. Brandenburg's

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intellectual-political history, and was thus an explict attempt to show the need for political reforms.

190 Carlo Antoni, From History to Sociology: The Transition in German Historical Thinking, (London: Merlin, 1962) (original Italian edition, 1940), p. 99. Also see, Iggers, op. cit., pp. 200-228; and Schwerin, op. cit., Chpt. 7.

191 Meinecke, op. cit., pp. 250-70.

argument was that, regarding general populace,

> "elemental experiences, experiences affecting and disturbing them in their daily, personal lives, are more powerful motives than doctrines and theories which are handed down to them from above."[192]

Meinecke defended his views by attacking Brandenburg's thesis of the origins of the national movement and concluding that it was simplistic. Brandenburg's explanation had not taken into account any similarities between liberalism and democracy.[193] Thus Brandenburg had not completely understood the sudden reaction of the masses in favour of the ideas of the liberal intellectuals, and in fact that it was, in part, those same liberal intellectuals who kept alive the ideas for change after 1848. The differences between Brandenburg and Meinecke reveal the complex issues involved in any conception of German liberalism, but these men did not consider many of these issues. Their main difference was one of emphasis between the materialistic and ideological interpretations of 1848. Considering that this debate arose just before World War I, it should be interpreted as characteristic of the ideological conflict between those who were desirous of expansionist war aims and those concerned with more immediate issues.[194]

The Meinecke-Brandenburg debate was only one involving themes important to 1848. In a debate with Rachfahl, Meinecke took issue with the neo-Rankean's thesis that the policy of Friedrich Wilhelm IV was well-planned but confronted

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192 Quoted in Hamerow, op. cit., p. 42.

193 Erich Brandenburg, Die Reichsgründung, (Bd. I), (Leipzig: Quelle und Meyer, 1916).

194 Cf. Schwerin, op. cit., pp. 340-49; Antoni, op. cit., Chpt. 3, esp. pp. 92-103; Hamerow, op. cit., pp. 41-44.

with an impossible decision between monarchy and liberalism. Meinecke argued that the king never believed that a strong monarchy was compatible with a moderate liberal constitution, and that there was more than one choice which could have been made. Meinecke's pervading right-liberal idealism, which can be seen in all his works, did have its drawbacks however. In his view of the state as a manifestation of an ideal, or universal idea, Meinecke actually legitimized the course of events from 1848 to 1871 as the only possible path which could have led to the German nation-state. This resulted in his admiration of Bismarck, even though seeing limits in the latter's settlement.[195] Even in later life Meinecke kept his typical German national liberal distrust of the "limited understanding of the common herd" in the political process. In an article written on the occasion of the centenary anniversary of 1848, Meinecke placed the blame for the failure of the Revolution on the "totally irresponsible" actions of the left during the meetings at Frankfurt. He barely acknowledged the alienation of the working-classes from the "distinguished" Frankfurt Assembly, dominated as it was by professors, lawyers and businessmen. For Meinecke, the forces of liberalism could have triumphed over absolutism only if the communists and working-classes had not been so unconscious of their actions. He still accepted Ranke's dictum of the primacy of foreign policy, though with "certain qualifications," of which he only mentioned the need to also view Bismarck's Reich as an internal national community as well as an imperialist state. Though Meinecke saw the German 1848 Revolution as being more complex than its French counter-part, due to the former's social as well as national concerns, he nevertheless viewed it as one of several moments in Nineteenth Century German history when militarism

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195 Iggers, op. cit., pp. 203ff.

triumphed over reformist movements. Thus Meinecke's political ideology of national liberalism was always placed in front of his history.[196]

With Germany's loss of World War I, the November Revolution of 1918, and the establishment of the Weimar Republic, there followed a sincere concern for constitutional reforms which would change the many problems of the Imperial constitution, such as Prussian hegemony and unequal representation. From 1918 to 1933 the literature on 1848 greatly expanded. It was natural that the "ideas of 1848" would be seen as relevant to the new liberal perspective of 1919, and this was reflected in much of that literature. There were many similarities, not the least of which was the task of forming a new constitution. But now the constitution would have government consent. If Meinecke's position that the Frankfurt constitution was not a good starting point for a new constitution was typical of the liberal-conservatives, the democratic-liberal viewpoint was just the opposite. In 1923, the Minister of the Interior gave Veit Valentin the task of writing a history of the 1848 Revolution to express the latter viewpoint.

Valentin's Geschichte der deutschen Revolution was the first historical work to achieve a synthesis of practically every aspect of the Revolution.[197] He succeeded in changing the historiographical emphasis of the Revolution from one of political bias to that of a peoples' revolution. He did this by addressing both its social and political bases. This meant an analysis of the proletarianization of the masses, the economic crisis of 1846-7, and the social ideologies of the

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196 F. Meinecke, "The Year 1848 in German History: Reflections on a Centenary," in Review of Politics, Vol. 10, #4, (Oct., 1948), pp. 475ff.

197 Veit Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution, 2 vols. (1930-1) (Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1968). A poorly translated abridgement was published in English as 1848: Chapters of German History, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1940).

middle-class. Thus he concluded that the Frankfurt Parliament was a democratic institution.

The first volume of his work was concerned with the background to 1848. He took issue with the conservative interpretation of 1848 seeing it as part of a reaction to developments in France, and claimed that it was the outdated governmental system of 1848 itself that led to the Revolution. The system of Metternich could not contain the newer forces of socialism, liberalism, and nationalism. The second volume followed the rise of events which contributed to the tragic failure of the Revolution, events such as the Schleswig-Holstein question, the Austrian counter-revolution, and the role of Prussia. He was critical of the Prussian leaders, and thereby offered a refreshing alternative interpretation to that of the nationalistic Prussian historians. As well, he did not concern himself with the "great men" but with the little men and their role in the process of democratization, the latter being what the revolution most signified to Valentin.[198] He saw 1848 as "a supreme turning-point for the German people," one in which the movement may have been defeated but not the idea for a more constitutional Germany. Yet he also stated that it was to take a long time for the German people to recover, and that "revolutions that are nipped off do a people no good."[199]

Perhaps it was the very wealth of issues he dealt with that contributed to the major fault of the work: the lack of inner coherence.[200] As well, Valentin paid

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[198] Richard H. Bauer, "Veit Valentin," in Some Twentieth Century Historians, edited by S.W. Halperin, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 103-41.

[199] V. Valentin, The German People, (New York: A. Knopf, 1946), pp. 416-31.

[200] Hamerow, op. cit., p. 33, says that Valentin lacked "discrimination." Also

little attention to the foreign policy of 1848, choosing instead to portray the inner significance of the Revolution in a purely liberal-democratic light. But this light shines pale due to his attempt to see the liberals of 1848 as dedicated to democratic ideals and thus refute the socialist conception of 1848 as a "bourgeois" revolution. Though he did have some sympathy for the left-democratic faction of Parliament, his main devotion was to the liberals. Yet Valentin's Geschichte was the work which described, more than any other, the ideals of liberal Weimar. His careful and extensive use of sources on 1848 has yet to be equalled.[201]

Just as 1848-9 had its counter-revolution, the Weimar Republic was to eventually experience a reaction to its tenuous form of democracy. Hitler's "National Revolution" was to have a deleterious effect upon the historiography of 1848. The acceptance of older, more traditional historians such as F. Meinecke, E. Marcks, and P. Wentzcke by the Nazi Regime was only in proportion to their willingness to co-operate. Others like Valentin, Hajo Holborn, and Arthur Rosenberg were forced into exile, and still others emigrated rather than comply with the wishes of the Third Reich. But the real ideologues of the Nazi era were the younger and newer generation of historians, such as Klaus Besser and Kurt H. Neumann.[202] Their works recast 1848 in the light of the old conspiracy theory,

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Schwerin, op. cit., criticized the lack of "one powerful theme." Also, Rudé, op. cit., pp. 159-60; Schwerin, ibid., Chpt. 8; John A. Hawgood, "The Frankfurt Parliament of 1848-9," History, Vol. 171, (July, 1932), pp. 147-51, esp. 149-50.

[201] Valentin, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 611-62, and Vol. II. pp. 595-613; pp. 687-709 are analytical bibliographies of the information on 1848 up to 1930, and are still the most extent for this period.

[202] Klaus Besser, Das tölle Jahr: Die Geheimleitung einer Revolution (Munich: 1940); Kurt H. Neumann, Die jüdische Verfalschung des Sozialismus in der Revolution von 1848 (Berlin: 1939).

but now it was seen as a conspiracy

> "of the machinations of world Jewry and the treacheries of world communism, with Jesuitical sophistry and freemasonic guile added for good measure."[203]

This of course was not history by any sense of the word. The Revolution of 1848 was viewed by the Nazi school as the first appearance of such conspiratorial forces. The necessary goal of halting those forces was finally achieved by the elections of 1933.

The racist and ultra-nationalist determination of the Third Reich was, of course, to be criticized in a very hostile manner. The so-called Revisionist school, although non-German, took upon itself the task of revising German history after its defeat in 1945. This school accepted the idea of a German Sonderweg, but their idea of Germany's uniqueness was based on seeing it as a diseased road going back to Frederick the Great, and including everything from "Teutonic tribalism," to Bismarck's Realpolitik. L.B. Namier's 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals (1946), in spite of his insights into often ignored areas, was one such book which heralded the beginnings of non-German revisionism. At first appearance in 1946 Namier's reasons for the cause of 1848 seemed very close to those of Marx and Engels. He was aware of the "economic and social background of the revolution," the pan-European context, the fact that it was the "working classes [who] touched it off..," and the ineptitude of the bourgeoisie at Frankfurt. But there is something quite different in Namier's perspective which emerges

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203 Hamerow, op. cit., p. 35. Also see Felix Gilbert, "German Historiography During the Second World War: A Bibliographical Survey," American Historical Review, Vol. 53, #1, (1947), pp. 50-8, places the historiography of the period in a critical perspective, yet makes the distinction between those who were of the older tradition and those of the Nazi school under Walter Frank.

after only a short reading. Namier not only gives a careful analysis of socio-economic factors, but locates a central group of actors as responsible for the Revolution. In place of the ideology of the working classes, Namier sees the causal factor as being the liberal intellectuals. Their failure was the failure of the revolution. This is something Marx and Engels did not do. Namier saw the 1848 Revolution as the start of the German national movement, and this was to be the germ which would infect all of Europe, since to Namier, national sovereignty was "as unsuited to living organisms as chemically pure water." For Namier, this demented German nationalism was destined to win over the antics of the Frankfurt Parliament, the latter which he viewed as having no more significance than a "playful cow."[204]

Namier's friend and colleague A.J.P. Taylor, was even more virulent in his attacks on 1848 and German nationalism. In his The Course of German History, he put a twist on words that were reminiscent of his teacher, G.M. Trevelyan:

> "For the first time since 1521, the German people stepped on to the centre of the German stage only to miss their cues once more. German history reached its turning point and failed to turn. This was the fateful essence of 1848.[205]

Taylor continued with his emphasis on 1848, concluding that it was "merely a vacuum in which the liberals postured until the vacuum was filled," and in which the counter-revolution following it "was welcomed" by the majority. The

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204 Sir Lewis Namier, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals, (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 4-7, 24, 31, 123-4. Also see Julia Namier, Lewis Namier: A Biography, (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 260-1, for an account of Namier's sudden change from pro-nationalism to anti-nationalism upon the death of his mother in Nazi occupied Lwow. For further discussion, see Rudé, op. cit., pp. 233-4, 262, 264.

205 A.J.P. Taylor, The Course of German History, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1945), p. 68.

Revisionist school had thus a combination of both skilled analyses and biased reaction against the Hitler Regime. The view that one can put the source of the 1848 Revolution within the context of a uniquely German "mentality," is one-sided at best, and contributes very little to the understanding of 1848.[206]

The division of Germany into East and West following 1945 exhausted what remained of critical scholarship. The centenary anniversary of 1948 produced some of the first works to contrast the bourgeois and communist approaches. The West German approach immediately after World War II differed little from that of Valentin. Hans Rothfels suggested that Germany had to preserve the heritage of 1848, namely the liberal ideas of the Paulskirche (where the Frankfurt Assembly met), and imitate the American and French constitutions. In 1948 just as in 1848, Rothfels stressed, Germany had to find its place between the two world powers, and be like a Switzerland. Wilhelm Mommsen, in a similar vein, pointed to the need, parallel to 1848, to strive for a united Germany and to look at unity and freedom as inseparable. The East German perspective on 1848 was different. Werner Meyer said that the failure of 1848/49 showed the "decadent process" of the "degenerated bourgeois liberalism" which ended in the Nazi Regime in 1945. Meyer concluded by saying that the DDR was the only state which legally inherited the revolutionary, humanist tradition of the working class in German history. In toto, these views mirrored old party divisions and added little to the understanding of 1848. As well, the historiographical concerns were still political, with many conservative historians emerging from the Nazi school unchanged in their focus on foreign policy, the centrality of the state, and an anti-sociological

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206 Taylor, ibid., pp. 68-70; Edmond Vermeil, "An Historical Paradox," in The Opening of an Era, edited by F. Fetjö, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1948), p. 223; Hamerow, op. cit., p. 37.

perspective.[207]

3.6 New Concerns

There were, however, a handful of historians who sought a somewhat newer course. Rudolf Stadelmann, in the foreward to his Soziale und politische Geschichte der Revolution von 1848, said that he wished to find the "social and political powers" that caused the failure of the Revolution. He analysed social as well as psychological factors pertinent to 1848 and tried to apply them to the study of revolution in general. Stadelmann argued against the idea that poverty was the major cause of the Revolution, and turned instead to the question of how that poverty was perceived. He took a very idealistic stand-point by stating that the motivating ideas for a revolution were not transmitted by a static social class but by "an uprooted intermediate social stratum," which did "not belong essentially to any class and that intellectually disputes the ruling social order." This class was not the proletariat, in Stadelmann's opinion, but the "socially declining lower-middle class." For Stadelmann, "one will find the best information where the law of large numbers was of no consequence from the beginning." Thus the largest faction of 1848 society was not necessarily the most revolutionary. Stadelmann's typically liberal interpretation of 1848 was evident in his seeing the Revolution as halted by counter-revolutionary forces, which in turn, were frightened of the democratic ideal of early communism. Similarly, he ends his book after "the sad close of the Erfurt union parliament and the wreck of the last hopes of the Liberal Party." He concludes by saying that the inevitable path was

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207 Dieter Langewiesche (ed.), Die deutsche Revolution von 1848/49, (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), pp. 6-11.

thus laid for Bismarck's power politics. Problematic in Stadelmann's account is his separation of social from political factors and the reduction of the former into sociological and psychological generalizations. His interest in the social aspects of 1848 was, in light of this, over-shadowed by a regurgitation of liberal political sentiments.[208]

The "social" histories of 1848 written during the 1950's in the United States were no more social than Stadelmann's. Priscilla Robertson's Revolutions of 1848: A Social History, marred by the period of cold warrior witch-hunting, claimed that no new freedoms were won from the aftermath of 1848, and that, "when the the 48ers failed they were beaten physically by the terrified conservatives, and also beaten intellectually by the theories of Marx." The resulting nihilism thus prepared the way for "totalitarianism." But it does seem quite a leap to blame Marx, the father of the socio-economic interpretation of 1848, as being a cause of Twentieth Century German totalitarianism. Indeed, Marxism itself took a beating by those who wrote the half-hearted "social histories" of the 1950's. Yet the contradictions in this position appeared to be somewhat alleviated by the end of that decade. It is there that one finds syntheses of sources and events of 1848 that seem to adhere to an inner coherency. Such works would be Hamerow's Restoration, Revolution, Reaction and J. Droz's Les Révolutions Allemandes, both written outside of Germany.[209]

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208 Rudolph Stadelmann, Social and Political History of the German 1848 Revolution, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975) (German original, 1948), pp. vii-xvi, 6, 68.

209 Priscilla Robertson, Revolutions of 1848: A Social History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 412-19; Hamerow, Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, op. cit.; J. Droz, Les Révolutions Allemandes de 1848, (Paris: Presses Universitaires De France, 1957).

Hamerow's book took a decidedly socio-economic, but anti-Marxist perspective. He saw the failure of the German liberals in 1848 as causing tremendous repercussions in Europe over the next one-hundred years: "the penalty for the mistakes of 1848 was paid not in 1849, but in 1933 and in 1945." Besides the ideological factors of nationalism and liberalism Hamerow considered "the lower-classes'...struggle against the consequences of industrialization." His conclusion was that

> "There was no German Revolution of 1848. There were rather several simultaneous German revolutions, each with its own ideology and objective..."

Hamerow showed the various meanings of the Revolution to the artisan, the peasant, and the upper- and middle-classes, and suggested that although the middle-class revolution

> "remains the only revolution in the textbook and in the class-room...As far as the masses were concerned, the insurrection was the outcome of tensions generated by the transition from agricultural manorialism to industrial capitalism."

Therefore, even though Hamerow looked upon the Frankfurt Parliament with a liberal eye, he noted that "its fleeting success was made possible only by peasant revolts and artisan riots."[210] Hamerow actually focused more on why the Revolution failed than how it began, and his analysis of the significant roles of the peasant and the artisan added a different dimension useful to future research. This concern for the roles of the peasant and artisan was thought, at the time, to be a corrective to Marx's viewing them as insignificant. But actually nothing could have been further from the truth. It was actually Engels who wrote the majority of articles on the history of 1848 in Germany. Marx's own short articles

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[210] Hamerow, op. cit., pp. vii-ix, 260-8.

on Germany in 1848 analyzed tactical problems, and his analysis of the peasants and artisans in France suggest that such a claim was false.[211]

Jacques Droz's book took a similar theme to Hamerow's. Droz also looked at the reaction to industrialization by various social factions. But like Marx and Engels, Droz blamed the liberals of the Frankfurt Parliament for the failure of the Revolution, and like the former he did not view this failure as entirely due to a particularly diseased form of nationalism. Droz stated that one must not look mainly to such a factor in 1848, but instead to the fact that:

> "It was Germany's misfortune that, because of the retarded economic growth forced upon its territorial division, it was able to produce liberal institutions only at that time when large-scale industry was facing it with the challenge of a militant proletariat. Therefore, Germany was denied the opportunity, necessary for any democratic country, of experiencing a parliamentary form of government."

This view of the backwardness of Germany's political institutions was, similarly, applied to a history of the presuppositions behind those political theories. Droz saw quite clearly that Germany had not "been allowed to take in hand its proper destiny" in 1848 and that this "created a gap in German history which neither the triumphs of 1866 and 1870 nor the ingenious compromise of the Bismarckian era had been able to successfully fill-in." Droz was also critical of those, like the revisionists, who employed a "'psychological' explanation, which lends to each people a certain political temperment." For Droz, this was "a simplistic explanation."[212]

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211 It was not discovered until much later that it was Engels who actually wrote Revolution and Counter-Revolution. As well, critiques of Marx stemmed from the view of his espousing a simple two-class model (bourgeois and proletariat) which was actually only done in the Communist Manifesto, where the polarization between the two was only presented in rarefied form for purposes of tactical effect.

Leonard Krieger's The German Idea of Freedom, looked at the conception of a German Sonderweg in a different light from most previous attempts. Germany's "idea of freedom" developed out of the type of liberality or Libertät, which was peculiar to Germany in the medieval period. Different from Western liberal theories which were based on Lockean natural law models, German Libertät existed as a unified conception of state and individual, in which the German princes were representative of the peoples' rights. Ultimately, in the growth and development of the individual German states,

> "the aristocratic liberty of the newly autonomous principality in the sense of Libertaet was to be a crucial assumption for the peculiar role which individualized freedom...later played in the modern states of the 19th Century Germany."

The failure of the Revolution was therefore due to the fact that the German state could not be changed into its opposite, a purely constitutional state. German liberalism was continually to encounter, and accede to, the "magnetized rock of a liberalized conservatism." The German liberals, in this way, confused freedom of the state with individual freedom. Krieger's thesis did put the failure of liberalism in 1848 in a new perspective, but the book was mostly intellectual history with little concern for social problems.[213]

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212 Droz, op. cit., pp. 639-40.

213 Leonard Krieger, The German Idea of Freedom, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1957), pp. ix-xii, 6, 329-40, 458-70.

3.7 Ideological Continuity in the Change from Political to Social History

The last twenty-five years have witnessed new and important ideas on 1848 and German historiography as a whole. In the 1960's, Fritz Fischer re-opened the revisionary interest in German "war guilt" for World War I by transgressing against the accepted traditional German historical wisdom. He claimed that purely economic goals, implemented by the civil government's actions and decisions, were responsible for World War I. Fischer saw a continuity in German politics and affairs from Bismarck to Hitler. But his revision did not end there. Regarding historical research methods, Fischer also stated that literary documents alone were not enough for accurate historical interpretation. They had to be supplemented with a socio-economic basis. Even more traditional German historians such as W. Conze, although still very much a part of the old idealist historical school, were nonetheless cognizant of problems in that school. It was not surprising, then, that the traditional German interest in the primacy of foreign politics was, in the mid-1960's, to be criticized once more. This criticism can also be related to the growing integration of the Federal Republic into the American sphere. Through a rediscovery of the work of E. Kehr, the Weimar historian, a concern for the "primacy of domestic politics," was taken up by a new generation of German historians educated in the post-1945 years.[214]

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[214] W. Conze's view of 1848 is presented in The Shaping of the German Nation, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979) (German original, 1963), pp. 34-45. The main supporter in the rediscovery of Kehr is Wehler; see his introduction to E. Kehr's Der Primat der Innenpolitik, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965) (English translation with a new introduction by Gordon Craig, 1977). Also see James J. Sheehan, "The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Eckart Kehr's Essays on Modern German History," op. cit.

The concern for the internal problems of German society has, in turn, sparked a growing interest in the "social history" of 1848. Works on the political consciousness of popular movements, political clubs, the media, state/church relations, womens' groups, cultural aspects, etc., have been the center of recent research.[215] The 1970's experienced a decline in the number of traditional historians trained in the Wilhelmine period, and the newer more socially concerned historians became a contending if not dominant force in the historical profession. But much of their work reflects the East-West tensions of the two Germanies. The desire to place 1848 within the contexts of communist or democratic ideology is quite apparent in many of these works. This political use of history is reminiscent, to a certain extent, of the imperial historians. In 1974, the Federal German President Gustav Heinemann gave a speech in which he evoked his earlier plea for East-West unification, and asked for a competition between the two German states which would show who inherited the "ideas of 1848" and the movement towards freedom.[216]

East German historiography on 1848 flourished in the 1970's. Although written from an explicit ideological position (i.e., Marxist-Leninism), these newer works have exhibited a rather rigorous methodology. Klaus Kinner has written numerous articles on 1848 as well as his dissertation on the interpretation of 1848 by the German Communist Party during the years of the Weimar Republic. He shows how the German communists looked to 1848 as part of the world's revolutionary development, which taught them that it was necessary to organize a

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215 Langewiesche, op. cit., pp. 11-18. In English, there is the recent essay by Donald J. Mattheisen, "Recent works on the German Revolution of 1848," American Historical Review, (Winter, 1983), pp. 1219-1237.

216 Langewiesche, ibid., pp. 9-10; Mattheisen, ibid., pp. 1233-4.

communist "world party." Kinner realized that a perspective on revolution itself was necessary for a methodological interpretation of 1848 and he argued that there was an international continuity from 1848, through the Paris Commune of 1871, to the 1905 Revolution in Russia. Kinner claimed that this continuity was important for a methodological perspective, and since the German Social Democrats were not aware of it they had had to base their politics on a very non-international, idealist historiography. Kinner's pespective is interesting in its attempt to go beyond national boundaries and find an internationalist revolutionary momentum, but neither 1871 nor 1905 were as international as he makes them out to be. He needs much more ground-work to substantiate his periodization.[217]

Walter Schmidt is probably the leading East German historian working on 1848. He continues with the idea of the comparative periodization of revolution and has attempted to put 1848 in this context. He has looked at the Marxist-Leninist internationalist view as being shaped in the early 1970's (by those such as Kinner) through "an essential impetus" which includes the comparative outlook, the concern for understanding bourgeois historiography, and also the Fifth and Sixth Historical Congresses of the DDR (1972 and 1977, respectively). Schmidt takes a fairly evenly argued position, especially in his concern for the understanding of the role of the bourgeoisie in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and points out that most important in this transition is not only the ideological characterization of that class's position, but "the basic trend of social

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217 Klaus Kinner, "Die Internationalistische Sicht der Revolution von 1848/49 im Geschichtsbild der KPD in den Jahren der Weimarer Republik," Beitrage zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Vol. 15, #2, (1973), pp. 252-61. Among numerous surveys of East German historiography, cf. Hans Schleier's article in Iggers and Parker, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 217-32.

revolution and the totality of social forces that produce its reorganization." His position does not affix the usual East German axiom of class distinction (and thus the hegemonic superiority of one over the other) as the ultimate determining consideration.[218]

In West Germany, the new "critical" school of history, which primarily originated with the aforementioned rediscovery of Kehr, has also incorporated new elements.[219] Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the foremost proponent of this new school has sought to demolish the statist orientation of traditional German historiography by utilizing Kehr's concern for the "primacy of domestic politics" and Hans Rosenberg's economic orientation, and by placing these both within the confines of a Marxist-Weberian interpretation. As he has stated, he wishes to dismiss the traditional aims of historiography and research, instead, into

> "society and its history, the history of society in the broad sense, understood as the history of social, political, economic sociocultural and intellectual phenomena,"

and how these factors change over time.[220] But this turn to social history has brought with it an uncritical adoption of structurally determinate concepts like "modernization."[221] R. Dahrendorf has argued that modernization theory acts as

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218 Walter Schmidt, "Zu Problemen der europäischen bürgerlichen Revolutionen von 1848/49," Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschft, Vol. 27, #7, (1979), pp. 639-59.

219 See the translation of Wehler's "Historiography in Germany Today," in J. Habermas (ed.) op. cit.

220 Quoted in John A. Moses, "Re-structuring the Paradigm: West German Historians between Historism and Social History," Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 29, (1983), pp. 368-78: p. 371.

221 The term modernization as defined by S.N. Eisenstadt in Modernization:Protest and Change, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1966), refers to that transnational phenomenon which, it is argued, affects all societies which experience industrialization and mechanization. If

"a great leveler, which evens out all, or most, traditional differences within as well as between countries," and that this false premise still unites scholars in East and West..."[222] So although this "new orthodoxy" has surpassed the neo-Rankean paradigm, there is still much controversy.

Criticizing what he sees as the moralistic overtones of Wehler, Heinemann, J. Kocka, et al., Thomas Nipperdey has, in numerous polemics restated the need for the Rankean directive of history as objective science. Nipperdey's revival of traditionalist historiography has been quite influential. He is critical of the attempt by Marxists and "neo-critics" to situate history via the "determining content" of emancipation or democracy. As regards 1848, Nipperdey rejects the Marxian thesis that the liberals betrayed 1848/49 just as the social Democrats did 1918/19. He claims that this is a radical form of presentism, and it results in an "uncritical" and "party ideology" motivated history of the liberals of 1848. In his opinion, one must view the revolution both as "positive" and "negative" in order to achieve scientific objectivity. Nipperdey argues that the liberals were revolutionaries against their own will, and that the only change was the relations between the parties at Frankfurt, not the parties themselves. The liberals, since they were the center, did not have to change their attitudes to be considered more right-wing by the radicals. Objective history, claims Nipperdey, cannot concern itself with the "claims for legitimacy" of one party over another. Thus the

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anything is left of the Enlightenment idea of teleological progress, modernization theory is it, since, as part of its definition it views the rise of education, lessening of class conflict, growth of social services, and other conditions considered favourable, as due to the modernizing progress of a particular society. Modernization theory thus acts as an ideological mask.

222 R. Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967), pp. 42-3.

critical school is criticized for viewing revolution as a "positive" event, and thereby losing the objectivity afforded by a plurality of perspectives. Nipperdey argues that the liberal party had no other choice but to capitulate, eventually, to the right, and that the Revolution cannot therefore be viewed in only a "positive" way. But to prove this point Nipperdey only chooses a handful of historical arguments, and has, himself, far from exhausted the possibilities. He defeats his own argument for pluralism by producing a moralistic argument which states that the majority of the German people in 1848 would not have supported a policy that had been more radical than the liberals' policy. In fact, Nipperdey seems to ignore the either/or dichotomy prevalent in all historical interpretation. His demand for a return to historicist relativism minus the traditional idealist statism is but a demand for the revival of bourgeois historiography. This only succeeds in re-mythologizing 1848. Nipperdey's type of historiography also ignores the element of the history of ideology, since by demanding a relativized objectivity, he forgets that ideologies can be altered over time and that this has an influence on historical interpretation. Thus his conclusion that the liberals did not betray the revolution but were only apathetic towards it, and that they were not "traitors" but merely caught up in the "tragic" German situation, is but a mincing of words.[223]

Finally, the recent efforts of the British Marxist historians Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn have been the source of recent controversy over German exceptionalism. With polemical furor, they have criticized the critical school for promulgating the concept of a German Sonderweg. This concept, as used by

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[223] Thomas Nipperdey, "Kritik oder Objecktivität? Zur Beurteilung der Revolution von 1848," (first published in 1974/76), in D. Langewiesche, op. cit., pp. 163-89: esp., pp. 167-8, 170, 179-86.

Wehler, is related to and defined as Germany's failure in the Nineteenth Century to realize a parliamentary democracy. Due to the failure of the bourgeois Revolution of 1848, a pattern was evolved for "the defence of inherited ruling positions by pre-industrial elites against the onslaught of new forces."[224] During the Kaiserreich, the disjuncture between pre-industrial elites and the socio-economic system undergoing intensified industrialization created an instability which could only be subdued by Bismarck's "social imperialism." Thus an authoritarian political system survived until forcefully halted in 1918 and, after Weimar, again in 1945. Eley claims that the basis for this concept was developed out of an inappropriate understanding, on the part of the critical school, of what constitutes a bourgeois revolution. The critical school, by equating the "aggressive political liberalism" of England to the German case, has committed a double entendre. Not only have they incorrectly viewed the German Revolution of 1848 through English (and French) tinted glasses, they have not seen how their own connection of bourgeois revolution with democracy ignores the German case where that revolution led, instead, to "bourgeois hegemony" under an authoritarian, pre-liberal political structure.[225]

Blackbourn's and Eley's book stirred a great deal of resentment in the German historical community. Although written from a Marxist perspective, neoconservative reviewers of the book received it with more gratitude than the

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224 Wehler, quoted in Richard J. Evans, "The Myth of Germany's Missing Revolution," New Left Review, No. 149, (Jan.-Feb., 1985), pp.67-94: p. 69. For a discussion of various Sondeweg models, see Bernd Faulenbach, Ideologie des deutschen Weges, (Munchen: Verlag C.H. Beck, 1980).

225 David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, Mythen deutscher Geschichtsschreibung: Die gescheiterte bürgerliche Revolution von 1848, (Frankfurt/Berlin/Wien: Ullstein Verlag, 1980), esp., pp. 18, 27, 29.

social-liberal historians of the critical school.[226] The former saw it as giving them ammunition to attack the concept of a German Sonderweg. Since neoconservatives were trying to destroy the idea of there being any continuity in German history, and instead, claiming that Hitler's regime was more of an accident than anything else, Eley and Blackbourn were interpreted as an attempt to bring back the historicist notion of studying each epoch in its own terms.[227] Social-liberal historians, on the other hand, have criticized Eley for his suggestion that the critical school (or Kehrites as he has called them, following W. Mommsen) was the only school of history promulgating the idea of a German Sonderweg. It has been pointed out, in several attacks on Blackbourn and Eley that the critical school is only one of many which incorporate the concept of exceptionalism both inside and outside Germany.[228]

In the recent English edition of their book, Blackbourn and Eley have revised many of their earlier arguments. But Eley still stresses that their main point was to overcome the myth of the bourgeois revolution of 1848, in which that Revolution is seen as an unsuccessful battle of a class conscious bourgeoisie against the aristocracy in which the former heroically introduced a programme of liberal democracy. He argues against this one-sided interpretation, stating that

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[226] Close to Evans here, the term "social-liberal" appears to be be the closest definition of Wehler's political position. See Wehler's closing remarks in Habermas, op. cit., pp. 250-1.

[227] For a good discussion of the controversies around this debate, cf. Richard J. Evans, op. cit.,

[228] One example of an American historian who dislikes the debate on the Sonderweg, though still finds it to be a useful concept, is Robert M. Berdahl, see his "The German Sonderweg: A Valid Historical Thesis?," (unpublished) a paper given at the Western Association of German Studies Conference in Madison, Wisconsin, October 1, 1983.

since the capitalist mode of production became entrenched in the sociopolitical realities of the Kaiserreich, Bismarck's "revolution from above" was, in essence, Germany's bourgeois revolution. He has also tried to broaden his definition of a successful bourgeois revolution, and as well as seeing it as the triumph of the capitalist mode of production, he includes more relevant sociopolitical factors which could alter the occasion or outcome of such a revolution. Eley is also helpful in his critique of Wehler's over-reliance on modernization theory, since as shown previously, such theory results in the telological interpretation characteristic of the Sonderweg thesis. But there is an ulterior motive in Eley's critique of modernization as well, namely his desire to dispense with the "look towards 1933." He claims that one cannot place the blame for 1933 on a German Sonderweg, since even when that concept has been reduced to respective different bourgeois revolutions, the similarities remaining between Germany and the other West European countries still far out-number such differences.

It seems as though Dieter Langewiesche was premature when in 1981 he suggested that there was a decline in the "controversy around the heritage of 1848." His suggestion that the older statist history was being replaced with a new social history concerned with the "living world of the people" does not ring true. It is obvious from the recent controversies that 1848 is a central area for discussions on ideological distortion.[229]

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229 D. Langewiesche, "Die deutsche Revolution von 1848/49 und die vorrevolutionäre Gesellschaft: Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven," Archiv für Sozialgeschichte, Vol. 21, (1981), PP. 458ff.

The importance placed on such debates on 1848 reveals the changing political status of West Germany. Recent political decrees in West Germany (the Radikalenerlass decree against radicals, the Berufsverbot decree of professional proscription, and the Kontaktsperrgesetz restrictions on human rights) show the survival and growth of older, conservative values. As the neoconservatives try to legitimize these values, they usurp the lefts' ability to offer alternatives. Somewhat reminiscent of the Frankfurt liberals of 1848, the contemporary social-liberals are caught in the middle of these political changes, and their actions will be important to Germany's future. Habermas has often spoken of a recent Tendenzwende, or a "shift in ideological currents," toward the right and against the anti-authoritarian movements of the late 1960's and 1970's. The "German Autumn," the name given to the passing of the above-mentioned restrictions in the fall of 1977 as a response to growing terrorism, has been further realized through the antiliberal government of Helmut Kohl. In light of this, Hans Mommsen has noticed the swing back to the "statist-authoritarian mentality that dominated the Weimar Republic."[230] Neoconservative ideologues, in their desire to "affirm societal modernization while challenging cultural and political modernism," are attempting to reinstate uncritical conceptions of historiography, and these, in turn, propagate irrationalist and authoritarian ideologies.[231] Since 1959, the German SPD has lost any relationship to dogmatic Marxism. In fact, West German social democrats have constantly eroded the Marxian heritage of their party in a way that has foreshadowed the rightist shift from Brandt to Schmidt to Kohl. The remaining Marxism of the West German left

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[230] H. Mommsen, "The Burden of the Past," in Habermas (ed.), op. cit., p. 277.

[231] A. Buchwalter's "Translator's Introduction," to Habermas, ibid., p. xix.

is held within the dogmatic grip of East German Marxism, and there appears to be very little desire to create an undogmatic alternative, Habermas being somewhat of an exception. In fact, although the historical community has accepted Marxism as an interpretative tool, the number of practicing Marxist historians represents an "unqualified exception." This has resulted in the overt eclecticism which best characterizes the new social history.[232] The decrees against radicals have not helped to alter this predicament.

In conclusion, it appears that there has been an ideological continuity, broken briefly during the late 1960's and early 1970's, in which the the statist-oriented historiography has kept alternatives at a distance. The year 1848 figures prominently in this, as testified by the growing number of historical writings on it. But for the most part, these histories view Revolution as a spring-board for much stale political debate. On the one hand, the right views 1848 as a prime example of the uselessness of communism, and this is further exacerbated by the present division of Germany. On the other hand, the left tends to view 1848 as failure, but one which was understandable in light of Germany's exceptionalism. Here, the effects of the swing to the right become visible as the lefts' position of fifty years ago is no longer recognizable in the present leftist writings, which tend to avoid class distinctions and opt instead for an eclectic mixture of Weber and Marx. There needs to be a greater participation of undogmatic Marxists in the historical community if the "mandarin" phenomena is not to be repeated. The extremes of too much teleology or too much historicism, are not in themselves important. What is important is the ideological perspective from which they are used.

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232 Wehler, "Historiography in Germany Today," in Habermas, op. cit., pp. 248-9.

Chapter IV

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has shown the problems resulting from the turn to social history and implicit acceptance of a sociological methodology in the French and German historiographical traditions. The German historical community has been viewed as evolving through a combination of "speculative" philosophy with neo-Kantian ethics. In its political historical context, this combination allowed the teleological presentation of an ultra-nationalist German world-view, the equating of history with the dominant ideology of the time, and the segregation of the historical community from the public at large. In recent attempts by historians to place German historiography more in line with critical study, Marxism has received academic attention. The problem here is that the social-liberal nature of those historians utilizing a form of Marxism, together with the recent ideological swing to the right, allows only a partial acceptance of Marxian tenets. As the majority of German historians are still members of the middle-class they cannot accept a critical working-class consciousness without disavowing their own position within society. This factor has also contributed to their reproduction of the existing dominant ideology.

The French historical community, by contrast, was seen as evolving more along the lines of a so-called scientific history. Positivism has had a steadily increasing influence in all aspects of French society. Comte's justification of the

July Monarchy, Louis Bonaparte's apolitical Saint-Simonian economic policies, the Third Republic's opportunist anti-clericalism and working-class Proudhonian anarchism, all contributed to the de-politicization of historiography. This was mirrored in the rise of the Annales School and its displacement of contemporary history with the study of past periods of "long-duration," its emphasis on a fortuitous "conjuncture" of economic and political crises as an explanation of revolution, and its determinate positing of structure over consciousness. Lavisse's et al., adoption of a Rankean methodology to aid the promotion of French nationalism and the last attempts by conservative monarchist historians to implement a conspiratorial theory of 1789 and 1848 contributed to a growing historical abstractionism at the turn of this century. This abstractionism was furthered by the socialist historians of the time (i.e., Jaures and Renard), and their pacifistic interpretation of Marxism. It has been argued that these developments have produced a new breed of historians who tend to play down the importance of the relationship between ideology and history, and who therefore tend to promulgate the status quo.

The Franco-German historiography of the 1848 Revolutions figured prominently in the historical development of these situations, and as such I approached the problem of the relationship between ideology and history through an analysis of that historiography. Because of those revolutions France won universal suffrage and the definite origins of a working-class consciousness, and Germany planted the seed for later socialism. Yet although the respective French and German historiographical traditions have had different historical antecedents, they have been concerned with similar historical methodologies, methodologies which, though at different times, have produced similar political results.

This thesis has shown not only how the events of 1848 influenced its historiography, but how this historiography was used to influence the social and political developments of later events. It is clear that we must place Meinecke's brilliant reinterpretation of intellectual history within the confines of his glorification of the Prussian state. Similarly, we must regard early French socialism as an ideology not of the working-class, but of the middle-class. We have seen how aspects focused upon by the respective historians (i.e., the debate over Friedrich Wilhelm IV, or the debate over the effectiveness of the Second Republic), could provide a legitimizing framework for the status quo. This was true in both the explicit connection between historiography and politics in Germany, and in the tacit acceptance of the dominant ideology through an equating of science with history in France. Historians, clearly, are ideologically prone to reproduce the status quo.

The possibility of overcoming such a problem rests with the historian. Only if the historian's theoretical hypotheses are oriented to the historical antecedents of his or her political beliefs will any form of real history result. This of course points to the basis of my critique of Wehler's use of modernization theory, Amann's empirical approach, and the Annalists' positivist techniques. The devaluation of ideology that is prevalent in all these approaches can only result in history's displacement by an ahistorical, apolitical eclecticism.

Appendix A

THE IMPORTANCE OF IDEOLOGY IN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The amount of research on ideology and its role in historiography has been quite extensive, yet it has usually been played down and made to serve more empirical or "materialist" concerns.[233] What should be remembered here is that the historiographies of liberals, conservatives, and socialists have, themselves, gone through changes in ideological perspective over time. Just as historiography mirrors not only the social conflict of an age but also sets up an "action-orienting" function in the political arena,[234] ideology mirrors, though more directly, the actual nature and purpose of such orientation. What is clear is that ideology and history are very similar, and that both have a protean existence.

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233 I am not criticizing Marxist studies on ideology here. Quite to the contrary, Marxist studies have perhaps been the most fruitful and useful to those who wish to look at ideology as a subject. What I am criticizing here is those who incorporate just that amount of Marxian analysis as is desired, and then tend to ignore its implications for the remainder of their research, or dismiss it altogether in favour of some purportedly more empirical framework. An example of this approach that will be discussed below is N. Abercrombie and Bryan S. Turner, "The Dominant Ideology Thesis," in the British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 29, #2, (June, 1978).

234 Thus as F. Baumgart has noted in his discussion of Habermas and Luhmann, "...the 'reduction' of the past that is acknowledged in the historiography of certain epochs, throws an illuminating light on the structural peculiarities of the society for which that historiography was written." Franzjorg Baumgart, Die verdrängte Revolution: Darstellung und Bewertung der Revolution von 1848 in der deutschen Geschichtsschreibung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, (Düsseldorf: Pädagogischer Verlag, Schwann, 1976), pp. 13-15, 173, footnotes 19 & 20.

Perhaps the best definition of ideology was that given by Marx, who defined it in the German Ideology as "the ideas of the ruling class," which in their political translation restricted the mobility of the dominated classes. But he also went on to say that the proletariat had to step beyond the "false reality" that ideology represented to achieve real "class consciousness."[235] This is not to say that, for Marx, the working-class was duped because of a "false consciousness" into committing unconscious actions. The working-class, in the classical Marxist dialectic of base and superstructure, was excluded from the superstructure from whence ideology was derived.[236] They were confined to the economic base, in fact, they were the major component of it. It was the intellectuals of the ruling-classes (those who produced ideology) who lived under a false conception of reality. Since for Marx, social being determined social consciousness, the subordinate position of the working-class made them "painfully aware of the difference between being and thinking...," while for the intellectuals and capitalists, history happened "behind their backs."[237]

Later Marxists like Gramsci and Lukacs tended to separate false consciousness and ideology to explain the lack of proletarian revolutionary success, where false consciousness was an aspect of perception (even to the working-class) and ideology was the explanation of that confused perception by

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235 For a discussion of this see George Rudé, Ideology and Popular Protest, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1980), pp. 7-11.

236 This, of course, is not to deny the importance of working-class culture, only to show Marx's emphasis on the distance of the working-class from the ruling-class's ideological (i.e., cultural, legal, institutional) apparatus, hence alienation.

237 Quoted from Marx and Engels Collected Works, in Ron Eyerman, "False Consciousness and Ideology in Marxist Theory," in Acta Sociologica, Vol. 24, #1-2, (1981), pp. 43-56: pp. 44-5.

intellectuals who tried to make it seem natural. Thus, they further emphasized the need for class consciousness as a way out of the "impasse of capitalism" (Lukacs). For Gramsci especially, this involved "establishing an alternative proletarian hegemony."[238]

Recently there has been a controversial attempt by N. Abercrombie and B.S. Turner to dispute the value of analysing a "dominant ideology." They claim that Marx and Engels had two conflicting analyses of ideology (one determined by social being, and the other just the ideas of the ruling-class), and that the apparatus for dispersing an ideology (i.e., Eighteenth Century religion, Nineteenth Century education) has never been efficient enough to reach the subordinate classes. They also state that coercion leaves no room for ideology and that if there was any type of dominant ideology it was "dominant moral ideology" used to guarantee the ruling-class family's ownership of property, and that in the main, the dominant ideology is "more pertinent for the dominant classes" than for the subordinate classes (even if one could say a class envelopes an ideology, which they doubt). As much as this is useful for an alternative analysis of religion, education, and family in pre- and early capitalist modes of production, it tends to ignore the changing economic structure of capitalism, and thus of different responses by the working-classes to subsequent ideologies. It is in fact the disbelief in the dominant ideology which causes the existence of a subordinate class as a class-for-itself rather than its being only a class-in-itself.[239] In other

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[238] Martin Carnoy, The State and Political Theory, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 80. I will not enter into a discussion of the numerous differences between these authors since my only concern here is to emphasize the importance of ideology in historiography.

[239] The distinction between a class-for-itself and a class-in-itself being that the former denotes a class that acts as a conscious whole to improve its position

words, the very apparatus which yields the subordinate classes their initial class consciousness is their conscious negation of the dominant ideology. The concept of ideology used by Abercrombie et al. is also limited by its reduction of Marx and Engels' analysis of ideology. As such, Abercrombie and Turner do not mention very much about the use of ideology as a coherent political program representing a class faction, or the ideology of extremist factions. In short, their argument denies that subordinate social classes have any reason for rebellion against dominating classes whatsoever.[240]

As such, an historian should not only be concerned with politically explicit ideology, as in the bias of various historiographies of 1848, but simultaneously with what George Rudé calls the "inherent" (common base ideology), the "derived" (from outside sources affecting the inherent ideology), and other conditional factors which cause an interaction between them all.[241] It is not enough for one

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in society, while the latter merely denotes the existence of a class which has a few common structural elements but does not have a common motivating consciousness.

240 N. Abercrombie and Bryan S. Turner, op. cit., this article has been published in book form as The Dominant Ideology Thesis, with the inclusion of Stephen Hill as another author, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1980). See the "Appendix: The Concept of Ideology," pp. 187-91, for the authors' very empiricist definition of ideology, and their ahistorical attempts to isolate ideology as an observable variable. For a contrasting discussion of ideology which points to the more complex issues involved, cf. Jurgen Ritsert, "On Horkheimer's and Adorno's Concept of Ideology," in Social Classes, Action and Historical Materialism, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982); Also see Poulantzas, one of the propagators of the so-called "dominant ideology thesis," who admits that dominant ideology is mainly concerned with the dominant class but also notes that it "does not simply reflect" that class's "conditions of existence." It appears to this reader that Poulantzas is aware of the complexity of issues involved in an analysis of the dominant ideology; Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, (London: Verso, 1978), p. 203, and see discussion, pp. 201-6.

241 Cf. the "Introduction," to George Rudé, op. cit.

to reveal the conservative ideology of Sybel or the republican ideology of Gorce, one must also show how these respective ideologies were related to the German conservative and French republican historiographical traditions. Ideology cannot be isolated as a singular structure any more than history can be reduced to one correct explanation. Only when it is realized that ideology changes in regard to historical antecedents and that such change has an effect on history can we then perceive the dialectical relationship that exists between ideology and historiography, a relationship that, although deeply embedded in historical structures, is never static.

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