ANALOGUES AND SOURCES FOR THE NON-HUMAN CHARACTERS IN C. S. LEWIS'S PLANETARY ROMANCES AND NARNIA CHRONICLES

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines C. S. Lewis's use of selected analogues and sources in creating the non-human characters in his planetary romances and Narnia Chronicles in terms of his critical and religious perspectives on the natures of originality, realism and the Christian author's role. The thesis suggests that Lewis's fiction to some extent illustrates these features of his religious and critical position. The thesis first identifies some of Lewis's philosophical sources and mythological analogues for the numinous creatures found primarily in the planetary romances and shows how his combination of selected details from a broad base of analogues results in characters that are original in whole even though derivative in their discrete elements. It then examines how Lewis's adaptation of archetypal, mythic and legendary creatures, found primarily in The Chronicles of Narnia, makes these sometimes incompatible creatures consistent within the secondary world of Narnia. Next, the thesis turns to the real and realistic animals in the planetary romances and the Narnia Chronicles in order to examine Lewis's adoption and combination of literary techniques typical of usually distinct sub-genres such as science-fiction and children's adventure stories or illustrated in specific works such as The Canterbury Tales, The Faerie Queene and Paradise Lost. Finally, the thesis demonstrates that the Talking Animals of Narnia are particularly vibrant and memorable because they combine elements from specific analogues, structural devices and techniques of char-

acterization generally derived from popular or at least accessible sources, especially various types of animal fantasy.

In each case, the examination of Lewis's adaptation or combination of limited elements from a plethora of individual and generic analogues demonstrates how Lewis employed his admiration for the medieval approach to originality, or how he practised the critical values he expounded regarding realism, or how his fiction embodies the values he suggested as appropriate for art produced by a Christian. The thesis concludes by arguing that Lewis has used his broad literary background as source material for his non-human characters in much the same way that another author may use real world experiences as raw material for his characters, that Lewis's combination of elements from his analogues allows him to use disparate materials within consistent secondary worlds, and that, at least for the non-human characters of the planetary romances and the Narnia Chronicles, the broader the range of analogues and sources for a specific or for a type of character, the more complete and hence the more believable and memorable the character.

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Technical Notes

Use of Italics for "Old Solar" words

Lewis has invented a prelapsarian language which he calls "Old Solar" still current on unfallen worlds and in space. Some words from Old Solar occur frequently in this thesis, especially in Chapter Two. In each case, an Old Solar word is italicized on its first appearance, to indicate that it is a foreign word, but not thereafter (except in some direct quotations) to prevent an overabundance of underlining.

Abbreviations.

OOW	Of Other Worlds
SJ	Surprised By Joy
	The Narnia Chronicles
LWW	The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe
PC	Prince Caspian
VDT	The Voyage of the Dawn Treader
SC	The Silver Chair
HHB	The Horse and His Boy
MN	The Magician's Nephew
LB	The Last Battle
	The Ransom Trilogy
OSP	Out of the Silent Planet
Per.	Perelandra (Voyage to Venus)
THS	That Hideous Strength

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Chapter One: Introduction

William Empson, according to James Como, considered Lewis "the best-read man of his generation, one who read everything and remembered everything he read."[1] Lewis's studies of medieval and renaissance literature[2] reveal his detailed knowledge, astonishing in both depth and extent, while his analyses of fantasy and children's stories[3] demonstrate the eclecticism of his literary background. The scope of his reading is almost as apparent in his fiction as in his critical work. Lewis, as Roger Lancelyn Green and Walter Hooper put it, "ransacked all myth for his _dramatis personae_, taking what he needed wherever he found it throughout literature."[4] The frequency and variety of analogues and sources are apparent on even a casual reading of Lewis's fictional and critical works, and become progressively more obvious as one listens for literary echoes. Do the analogues matter, though? One response is that sources are usually more or less irrelevant; another is that extensive background material does no more than enrich the reading experience of the already well-read; a third is that prevalence of a wide range of analogues makes a work derivative or even a pastiche. Each of these responses can be found in criticism on Lewis's fiction, but they all fail to consider Lewis's stated and implied attitude to the nature of originality in creative writing. This thesis will demonstrate his frequent and varied use of analogues and show how this results from his view,

stated and implied, on the nature of originality and the Christian writer's role. Lewis's fiction can be seen almost as the practical model of his critical perspective concerning originality versus authority and the author's role as a "sub-creator".

Clearly, examining all Lewis's analogues for all his fiction would be a life-time occupation, requiring the critic to be as well-read as Lewis himself. Moreover, such an extensive examination would prove little more about Lewis's application of his critical perspective than a more restricted one. All that is necessary in order to establish the purpose and effect of Lewis's techniques in using analogues is to examine the specific and generic counterparts he uses within a segment of his fiction that permits a reasonable number and diversity of analogues. The non-human characters in The Chronicles of Narnia and in the planetary novels form such a segment. From this group, the non-human rational aliens may be excluded as not especially dependent upon analogues different from those informing the human characters.

To some extent, the choice of both non-human characters and the Narnia tales and planetary novels is an arbitrary personal preference. Lewis's opinion on the value of "auctoritees" could no doubt be revealed as well by examining settings in The Pilgrim's Regress. However, the non-human characters are perhaps the most likely group to be "original", so their creator's debt to previous literature is the more striking. Since the most purely narrative fictions (the Narnia Chronicles, the planetary romances and Till We Have Faces) are the most clearly art, we can be reasonably certain that a frequent

feature will reveal something about Lewis's artistic rather than his directly didactic technique.[5] Of the three narrative units, Till We Have Faces has too few non-human characters to be included.

Since no definitive or critical editions are as yet available, the texts were chosen on individual merit. The best editions of The Chronicles of Narnia seem to be the Macmillan (New York) hard-cover series.[6] None of the variants between these and the British editions affect the non-human characters. The planetary novels, less popular than the Narnia tales, exist in fewer editions. The Pan editions[7] are the most readily available and reliable enough for the purposes of this thesis.

The thesis will examine three orders of non-human characters appearing in Narnia and in the planetary romances. The first, consisting of mythical and legendary[8] creatures and derivatives thereof, may be sub-divided into two categories: flesh-and-blood creatures and spirit creatures. Flesh-and-blood creatures, whether supernatural or natural, mythic or legendary, have bodies analogous to ordinary, physical creatures of this world. Spirit creatures may well have bodies, but ones made of light, or air, or some unknown substance. For example, when a dryad dies (because her tree has been cut down), her body, which remains for a few seconds and then vanishes, is clearly different in kind from those of humans, animals or insects. The second order consists of realistic animals, whether drawn from the natural world (directly or via literature) or from Lewis's imagination. The third order consists of Talking Beasts--animals realistic except for their power of speech.

In identifying analogues for these characters, no attempt has been made to compile an exhaustive list, either of individuals or of characters within a group. The method has been to identify enough specific or generic counterparts for each order of non-human characters to reveal both Lewis's technique for incorporating analogues in general and his variations on that technique for each order of non-human characters. The sources identified have for the most part been restricted to medieval and renaissance literature and philosophy; classical literature and philosophy as they appear within the cultural and literary tradition, Lewis's personal experience, philosophy and critical opinion; fantasy, consisting of animal fantasies, science fiction or stories by other Inklings; and children's literature (animal stories and adventure stories). In some cases, specific links between a character or characters in Lewis's fiction and in the source fiction or philosophy have been suggested, but in most cases, connections have been generic: the focus has been on <u>kinds</u> of applications, on approaches or techniques illustrated in a particular work or typical of a genre or sub-genre.

The purpose behind identifying these specific and generic analogues has not been to demonstrate the extent of Lewis's debt to earlier literature, but to prove the nature--general and specific--of that debt. Critical examinations of the analogues in Lewis's fiction, generally concentrating on the Narnia tales, have tended to emphasize the extensive medieval and biblical sources with the result that Narnia appears to be either a medieval pastiche or a Christian allegory. Critical examinations of discrete elements within Lewis's

fiction, however, demonstrate in passing that Lewis's analogues include members of virtually every category of narrative literature and of a wide range of poetry and philosophy. In other words, the range of Lewis's debt to earlier literature and philosophy has long been acknowledged, but examinations of his analogues have been limited to two branches thereof.

There have been more general responses to the peculiarly extensive debt Lewis owes to previous literature. One is that of J. R. R. Tolkien, who objected to the eclecticism and unabashed adoption of Lewis's background material. Tolkien saw the role of author as that of a "sub-creator", who may include earlier literature as part of the raw material, but will create a consistent imaginary world distinct from its derivative elements.[9] When Tolkien read The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe, his response was "it really won't do, you know! I mean to say: "Nymphs and their Ways, The Love Life of a Faun". Doesn't he know what he's talking about?" (Biography, p. 241). Humphrey Carpenter identifies as one of the elements bothering Tolkien the fact that

> the story borrowed so indiscriminately from other mythologies and narratives (fauns, nymphs, Father Christmas, talking animals, anything that seemed useful for the plot) that for Tolkien the suspension of disbelief, the entering into a secondary world, was simply impossible.[10]

The other response is that Lewis, like any successful author, so reworks borrowed elements that he makes them his own; thus their derivativeness becomes irrelevant: Hooper, in his "Narnia: The Author, the Critics and the Tale", says that "it is inevitable that a man so

widely read as Lewis should have known all these things--but they, neither collectively nor individually, are what his story is about" (p. 112). This response, by far the most common, assumes that the sources of Lewis's material are more or less irrelevant.

> Again and again one can find echoes from legend and literature, ancient and modern--and those of us who have 'read the right books' will find more than those who have not. But such echoes are of little importance, save to suggest what books Lewis had read or to make us marvel at his wide reading and retentive memory (Biography, p. 250).

Proponents of this response seem particularly worried that a wide range of analogues might be confused with lack of originality, the practice of pastiche, or even plagiarism.[11]

The assumption that sources are more or less irrelevant has some validity. Hooper, considering whether or not "there is any good to be had from source-hunting", identifies the problem of a false sense of having "solved a 'puzzle' by discovering that Narnia is the name of a place in Italy [or] that Arslan (which Lewis altered to Aslan) is the Turkish word for lion" ("Narnia: The Author, The Critics and the Tale," p. 112). However, Hooper implies that this one problem in source-hunting invalidates the entire process.[12] Of course, there are other problems beyond a false sense of puzzle-solving, all causing superficial critical responses: first, in trying to see a connection between an element in the primary text and its counterpart, a reader may be distracted from the story; second, the reader may even misinterpret a story on the basis of an analogue; third, identifying a source may not convey any information, making source-hunting simply a waste of time. We see the first problem in Hooper's

example of identifying the source of the name "Aslan": there is nothing Turkish about Aslan besides his name. The second problem occurs if a critic places too much weight on a casual allusion such as the similarity between the chapter title "The Parliament of Owls" (SC, p. 39) and the title of Chaucer's The Parliament of Fowls. One might be tempted to interpret The Silver Chair as a dream-vision or a story of courtly love on the basis of what is really nothing more than a word-play: some evidence can be found for both interpretations if one ignores the story as a whole. The third problem occurs in identifying real life counterparts, such as Lewis's gardener, Paxford, as the model for Puddleglum or his tutor Kirkpatrick as the model for MacPhee (Biography, p. 254). Since the reader cannot know these individuals personally, he is no farther ahead in understanding Puddleglum or MacPhee than he would be without knowing the fictitious characters' actual analogues. And even in those cases in which a source is both accessible to the reader and relevant to the character or event, the author's personal experience--his own concerns, interests and associations--that made him use that analogue for that character still fall beyond the ken of even the most erudite reader. Source-hunting, it must be admitted, can be useless or misleading or, at least, limited.

All the above criticisms, however, depend on a reader's trying to interpret a specific element in terms of a specific analogue. Source-hunting in order to answer the question "what does he mean" is quite probably futile. Source-hunting in order to answer the question "what did he do with his sources?" is more promising. An analysis of

sources as elements of an author's artistry or stylistic technique is a potentially profitable line of inquiry.

In Lewis's case, such an inquiry certainly is worthwhile because it contributes to an understanding of how Lewis's critical attack on unexamined or unsubstantiated modernist biases informs his fiction. Lewis condemned as one such bias the emphasis on originality as a criterion for good literature. In The Discarded Image, Lewis discusses the difference between the modern and the medieval approach to writing fiction. Lewis stresses the "bookish or clerkly character of medieval culture" (p. 5) and points out that "every writer, if he possibly can, bases himself on an earlier writer, follows an auctour· preferably a Latin one" (p. 5). Moreover, the medieval writer would include any number of auctours, regardless of inconsistencies or even outright contradictions (p. 11). Lewis describes the "tranquil, indefatigable, exultant energy of passionately systematic minds bringing huge masses of heterogeneous material into unity" and identifies as "the perfect examples" Aquinas's Summa and Dante's Divine Comedy because they are "as unified and ordered as the Parthenon or the Oedipus Rex, as crowded and varied as a London terminus on a bank holiday" (p. 10).

More importantly, Lewis discusses the medieval attitude toward originality. Lewis says that he "doubt[s] if they [the medieval writers] would have understood our demand for originality or valued those works in their own age which were original any the more on that account" (The Discarded Image, p. 211). He imagines Chaucer or Layamon replying to a suggestion of making up an original story with

"Surely we are not yet reduced to that?" (p. 211). So far, Lewis's observations are primarily of historical interest, but he goes on to explain that the literary effect of this conscious avoidance of originality in the modern sense leads to a different sort of originality. He says

> And the paradox is that it is just this abdication of originality which brings out the originality they really possess. The more devout and concentrated Chaucer's gaze on the Filostrato becomes, or Malory's on the 'French Book', the more real the scenes and people become to them. That reality forces them presently to see and hear, hence to set down, at first a little more, and then a good deal more, than their book has actually told them (pp. 211-12).

In "The Genesis of a Medieval Book", Lewis examines the technique by which medieval writers combined and adapted earlier versions of a story. He demonstrates that the typical medieval practice was to retell a story, modifying or expanding the earlier version at will, and concludes that

> we might equally well call our medieval authors the most unoriginal or the most original of men. They are so unoriginal that they hardly ever attempt to write anything unless someone has written it before. They are so rebelliously and insistently original that they can hardly reproduce a page of any older work without transforming it by their own intensely visual and emotional imagination, turning the abstract into the concrete, quickening the static into turbulent movement, flooding whatever was colourless with scarlet and gold.[13]

Now, Lewis is examining medieval literature, not the abstract nature of literature (if that be possible), but evidently he considers the value placed on orginality as a literary "taste", and he argues in An Experiment in Criticism that since literary tastes

change, they are not a valid basis for criticism (pp. 104-06). In Lewis's opinion, then, combining or re-working "auctorities", even inconsistent and contradictory ones if the author can bring them into a unified whole, is just as valid, even just as original, as imagining a new story. His intention seems to be to justify the medieval perspective, not just the medieval practice.

Connected with this obviously favourable analysis of the medieval treatment of originality is Lewis's opinion on the proper role of the Christian writer. In his 1939 essay "Christianity and Literature", he argues that the emphasis in much modern criticism conflicts with portions of the New Testament and implies that a Christian writer should, therefore, basically ignore the values of modern criticism.[14] Lewis establishes what those values are when he asks "What are the key-words of modern criticism? Creative, with its opposite derivative; spontaneity, with its opposite convention, freedom, contrasted with rules" (p. 186). He then argues that the New Testament perspective, as he understands it, implies that human "creation" is not original at all because it, at best, imitates God's creation. Lewis concludes that

> applying this principle to literature, we should get as the basis of all critical theory the maxim that an author should never conceive himself as bringing into existence beauty or wisdom which did not exist before, but simply and solely as trying to embody in terms of his own art some reflection of eternal Beauty and Wisdom (p. 192).

The maxim does not, of course, imply that an author will necessarily re-work earlier reflections of beauty and wisdom--Lewis specifically rejects that interpretation of his argument (p. 195)--but in denying

the possibility of truly original creation on an author's part, Lewis also rejects the attitude that such re-working is inferior art.

What we see, then, is an author who, as a Christian, perceives the authorial role as a necessarily derivative function and who, as a critic, values the "originality" of combining and re-working other, especially much earlier, writers. In this light, Lewis's debt to a wide range of analogues becomes, if not the condicio sine qua non of his technique, at least an essential element thereof. As a result, though identifying analogues and examining Lewis's use of them will not, perhaps, enhance one's understanding of the story,[15] it will increase one's understanding of his novelistic style and one's appreciation of his literary achievement.

Chapter Two: Neither Human Nor Animal

The role of analogues in creating a distinctive style in Lewis's fiction is perhaps clearest in the diverse characters that are neither human nor animal. These characters may be divided into two broad groups: numinous[1] or spirit creatures and flesh-and-blood creatures of myth and legend. Creatures of the numinous include the eldila, the macrobes and the nature spirits; flesh-and-blood creatures of myth and legend include bogies and monsters common to the legends of many periods and cultures, non-classical creatures such as dwarfs, and classical creatures such as fauns and centaurs. All these creatures illustrate three especially significant elements in Lewis's approach to writing fiction: the detail in his adaptation of analogues, their range, and, most importantly, their combinations. For most of the non-human, non-animal characters, Lewis has combined analogues and approaches in order to convey specific literary or theological points. These non-human, non-animal characters most clearly convey the critical theory behind Lewis's fiction, which values control of analogues over originality, or, rather, which redefines originality as the ability to create new literature from the author's literary heritage. In order to appreciate fully Lewis's literary achievement, one must identify the elements which Lewis renewed, reworked or combined.

Lewis early developed an interest in the numinous that is reflected in some characters in the science-fiction trilogy and The Chronicles of Narnia. These beings are neither human nor animal nor even properly supernatural, for their participation in the numinous depends on the presence of an individual spirit in an entity we perceive as inanimate or not a body at all. In Lewis's fiction, these spirit creatures appear in three forms. embodied spirits (various eldila), biologically based spirits (macrobes) and nature-spirits (dryads, naiads, etc.). The eldila are the most purely spiritual, the nature-spirits are the most distinctly earth-bound; and the macrobes form an intermediate class. All give form to the numinous.

The eldila, macrobes and nature spirits allude to, yet rework earlier versions of the beings outside the visible, physical world of our perception, so as to suggest that the elements of nature (both on earth and in the universe as a whole) possess, if not reason, at least a rudimentary consciousness. Lewis explores the numinous and destroys limited or simplistic understandings of numinous creatures. He does both by blending a wide range (from twelfth century Platonists to Jungian archetypal psychology) of theories on various spirit creatures and by alluding to analogues drawn from a broad cultural base.

An amalgamation of differing theories about the heavenly hosts (that they are angels, gods, personified astrological bodies, etc.) is Lewis's guiding principle in creating the eldila and the similar non-human characters in the Narnia tales: the stars in Voyage of the Dawn Treader and in The Last Battle, Father Christmas in The Lion,

The Witch and the Wardrobe and Father Time in _The Silver Chair_ and in _The Last Battle_. These spirit characters are drawn from classical, medieval and biblical analogues with occasional suggestions of Norse myth, and of Tolkien's Middle-earth. The blend is in itself medieval. In _The Discarded Image_, Lewis points out that the medieval assumption regarding differing authorities was that they were all true: two explanations might _seem_ to contradict one another, but some larger system would, presumably, accommodate both.

Two primary analogues informing all these characters are the "systems" of angelology, mutually inconsistent yet concurrent in medieval thought. In _The Discarded Image_, Lewis describes major influences on medieval perspectives. On the one hand are portions of Plato, especially the _Symposium_ as discussed by Apuleius and the _Timaeus_ as translated and commented on by Chalcidius. The system divides the heavenly hosts into "planetary intelligences" and rank-and-file daemons. On the other hand is the hierarchy of nine angelic choirs which Pseudo-Dionysius (Dionysius the Areopagite) described in his _Celestial Hierarchies_. Of these, only the lowest three directly impinge upon humans and only the highest three have direct contact with God. The hierarchical system best suited the medieval temperament, which, as Lewis emphasises, "prefers the longest possible chain of intermediaries" since "devolution or delegation, a finely graded descent of power and goodness, is the universal principle" (p. 73). This medieval insistence on hierarchies, reinforced by Dante's well-known illustration of the system in the _Paradiso_, contributed to the later emphasis on the Neoplatonic

system rather than the Platonic, and ultimately led to "the purely consolatory, hence waterishly feminine, angels of nineteenth-century art" (The Discarded Image, p. 75).

Lewis's heavenly host, however, owes more to the Platonic system. Lewis presents some of his eldila in Out of the Silent Planet, in Perelandra and, even more, in That Hideous Strength as planetary intelligences. Although his presentation is consistent with the nine-choir system, Lewis does not emphasize it. Lewis tells an enquirer that

> . . . I was very definitely trying to smash the 19th century female angel. I believe no angel ever appears in Scripture without exciting terror: they always have to begin by saying 'Fear not'. . . . By the way, none of my Eldila will be anything like so high up the scale as Cherubim and Seraphim. Those orders are engaged wholly in contemplation, not with ruling the lower creatures.[2]

Clearly, Lewis intended to work within a hierarchical system while trying to restore the angels' status as vibrant, powerful, complicated and masculine. Even within his fiction he mentions the hierarchical principle: in That Hideous Strength, he speaks of "the stair . . . of created beings" (p. 237). The principle, as he points out in The Discarded Image, derives ultimately from Plato, as does the pseudo-physics that Lewis develops to provide the cosmic framework of the planetary romances.[3]

Lewis makes clear his primary source for the eldila near the end of Out of the Silent Planet when the narrator Lewis quotes "the relevant paragraph" of a letter from Dr. Ransom (p. 178). Ransom is enquiring about a difficult word encountered in his work on the

twelfth century Platonists, specifically in the writing of Bernardus Silvestris. In The Discarded Image, Lewis discusses at length various Platonists, Bernardus among them, and the similarities suggest that the materials presented academically in the later work formed the imaginative base for the earlier work.[4]

We find that Out of the Silent Planet illustrates the medieval "Principle of Plenitude", as Lewis called it when he explained reason's demand that "the universe must be fully exploited" (Discarded Image, p. 44). Chalcidius, commenting on Plato's Timaeus, affirms the existence of creatures inhabiting the aether and the air "lest any region be left void", "lest the perfection of the universe should anywhere go limping" (Lewis's translation in The Discarded Image, p. 56). In Out of the Silent Planet, we see empty space recast as "Deep Heaven", teeming with life. This life, in one sense, fits the modern conception of angels: the creatures are entirely obedient to the will of God as imparted to them by higher ranking eldila. But the sense is not a careful gradation of hierarchies. One can see the Oyéresu as archangels and the other eldila as angels, as John Willis does in "The Eldila in the Space Trilogy" when he says that Lewis "implicitly" follows the nine-choir system.[5] This approach also seems implicit in Lewis's mention of the "stair even of created beings" extending above the greatest of the Oyarsa. However, the planetary intelligences, the Oyéresu, apparently derive their authority directly from God, from Maleldil, and directly contact not only lesser eldila, but also humans and the alien equivalent to humans. The Oyarsa of Malacandra refers to mortals and eldila alike

as "my people" (OSP, p. 148), and the hrossa identify the eldila as "a kind of hnau"(p. 88), in other words as rational animals: humans, hrossa and seroni (the plural of "sorn") are also hnau. Moreover, Ransom suspects that "there are also irrational animals with the eldil type of body" and reminds the narrator Lewis of "Chaucer's 'airish beasts'" (OSP, p. 184). Finally, when Tor and Tinidril, the inhabitants of Perelandra, avoid the Fall from grace, Tor is called Tor-Oyarsa (Per., p. 191) suggesting that his status is now similar to that of the planetary intelligences. Lewis's system recalls the medieval idea that "the planets are, as Plato would have agreed, ζῶα --celestial animals, animate bodies or incarnate minds" (The Discarded Image, p. 115). The hrossa explain that Maleldil the Young made Malacandra, and still rules it (p. 78), and Augray the sorn explains that the Oyarsa is thus in some sense the "soul" of the planet Malacandra.

Lewis, like Milton before him, addresses the question of angel bodies, but takes care to avoid Milton's gaffe of the blushing angel. Lewis primarily uses Platonist theory as expanded by Henry More[6] for the theory of the eldil body, and Old Testament visions for some particular descriptions.

Hrossa, seroni, the narrator Lewis, and Ransom all explain that the eldila have some sort of body; they are not, in other words, pure intellect or pure spirit as angels were thought of in Elizabethan times,[7] but, instead, physical creatures. Lewis has Augray the Sorn give a pseudo-physics lesson explaining the nature of eldil bodies:

> Body is movement. If it is at one speed, you smell something; if at another, you hear a sound; if at another, you see a sight; if at another, you neither see nor hear nor smell nor know the body in any way. . . . The swiftest thing that touches our senses is light. We do not truly see light, we only see slower things lit by it, so that for us light is on the edge--the last thing we know before things become too swift for us. But the body of an eldil is a movement swift as light; you may say its body is made of light, but not of that which is light for the eldil. (OSP, pp. 108-109)

The narrator Lewis describes the eldil body as "some kind of material vehicle whose presence could (in principle) be scientifically verified" (Per., p. 7), as "obviously not organic" and as a "homogeneous cylinder of light" (Per., p. 14). The comments of both the sorn and the narrator Lewis recall Henry More's comment quoted in The Preface to Paradise Lost:

> 'I was always disposed to agree with the Platonists, the ancient Fathers, and almost all the magicians, in recognizing that all souls and genii, whether good or evil, are plainly corporeal, and accordingly have sense experience in the strict sense; i.e. by the mediation of a body.'[8]

Lewis summarizes the various theories on which Milton based his angels in Paradise Lost: "all authorities seem to agree in giving the airy body incredible swiftness and almost unlimited powers of transformation, contraction, and dilation" (Preface to Paradise Lost, p. 111). The only feature in Lewis's description of eldil bodies apparently drawn from some other source is the emphasis on light (rather than air) as the element forming the body. Lewis may have had in mind Einstein's theory of relativity,[9] but more probably the pillar of fire that led the Israelites at night (Exodus 13:21) and light as emblematic of divine guidance (e.g. Ps. 119:105). Lewis

also seems to have had Ezekiel 1:15-21 in mind in his detailed descriptions of Malacandra and Perelandra as huge revolving wheels.

Plato identified the stars as gods, animate creatures (see The Discarded Image, pp. 41-42), a theory which seems to underlie Lewis's personified stars in Voyage of the Dawn Treader and in The Last Battle. Ramandu's distinction between what stars are and what they are made of (VDT, p. 175), suggests that the element of personality in the stars again approximates a soul. In fact, according to Ficino in his Theologia Platonica, the stars are souls who, like ourselves, have visible bodies.[10] We also see in Ramandu's discussion an idea mentioned by Isidore, Bishop of Seville (600-636 A.D.) in his Etymologiae and by Dante in his Convivio (II, xiii, 15) that the stars derive their light from the sun (cited in The Discarded Image, p. 111). Ramandu is a "retired" star, but receives a "fire-berry from the valleys in the Sun, and each fire-berry takes away a little of [his] age" so that eventually he will "once more tread the great dance" (VDT, p. 175). The concept of the stars involved in a dance[11] occurs in both Chalcidius and Isidore (see The Discarded Image, p. 58; see also E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, pp. 101-103). In both Narnia tales concerned, the personified stars have, as Lewis insists, quasi-human bodies (e.g. Ramandu's daughter marries, bears a son and dies), conforming with the medieval view of stars as physical creatures.

It is possible to see the Neoplatonic system in this treatment: the fixed stars in the primum mobile, the sphere closest to God, inevitably suggest the fiery Seraphs, Cherubs and Thrones dancing

with their faces turned to God and in turn associate this highest echelon of angels with the personified stars. A second connection between the two systems of angelology is also possible. According to E. M. W. Tillyard, the medieval understanding of the Neoplatonic hierarchical system was that each angelic order regulated one of the spheres (p. 42), a theory reflected in the Oyarsa's reluctance to exceed his authority by killing "someone else's hnau" (OSP, p. 142). Lewis, of course, is not proposing any specific union of the two systems, especially since the personified stars do not appear in the planetary romances nor the various eldila (with two possible exceptions[12]) in the Narnia tales.

The connection between Lewis's eldila and personified stars and their counterparts in various theological treatises is general since Lewis does not provide a sufficient range of these non-human characters to match any of his analogues completely. He does, however, describe his planetary intelligences in some detail. The existence of a special class of eldila having a one-to-one relationship with planets is established in Out of the Silent Planet, but the detailed descriptions of the planetary intelligences begin near the end of Perelandra and are completed in That Hideous Strength.

Although classical and medieval authors treat the sun as a planet rather than a star, Lewis does not include it as one of the gods or Intelligences that appear at St. Anne's. However, his emphasis that space is full of light and life from the sun is medieval. His treatment of the sun as the physical source of planets ("I [the Oyarsa of Perelandra] rounded this ball [Venus] when it first arose from Arbol

[the sun]" [Per., p. 181]) accords with early twentieth century rather than medieval astronomy.

Despite favourable treatment among classical mythologies and among romantics of all periods, the moon, Sulva, does not fare well in Lewis's hands. Lewis transforms the chastity associated with Artemis into a "model . . . of malignant sterility"[13] and may well, as Nancy-Lou Patterson suggests, have been influenced by his childhood association of the moon with terror. Lewis says in Surprised by Joy that he "feared for [his] soul; especially on certain blazing moon-lit nights in that curtainless dormitory" (p. 33). In That Hideous Strength, Ransom, under Merlin's ritual questioning, describes the "cold marriages" of Sulva, explaining that since the "rim of the world" cuts through the moon, the half that faces the earth shares earth's curse (p. 273). Although in the medieval system the moon should have or be an Intelligence, Lewis nowhere suggests this.

The most important Oyéresu are those of Mars and Venus; next in importance is that of Mercury, while the Intelligences of Jupiter and Saturn are relatively unimportant. Among the planets of minor importance in Lewis's scheme, Saturn, "whose name in the heavens is Lurga", derives from a complicated blend of analogues and influences. In The Discarded Image, Lewis lists some of the unpleasant effects, such as disasters, sickness and old age, which Saturn caused, according to the lore of medieval influence, referring the reader to Chaucer's The Knight's Tale. In That Hideous Strength, Lewis alludes generally to these attributes in the sense of foreboding and depression when Saturn arrives. The images he uses to convey this general

sense recall, according to Patterson, those in the opening of Keat's Eve of St. Agnes, while the choice of stiff grass and hen-roosts are, she argues, derived from the Roman view of Saturn as, among other things, a god of agriculture, and from his Babylonian equivalent, a god of fields and canals (p. 24).

Far more important, however, is the connection between Saturn and the Greek god Cronos, especially in the account given in Hesiod's Theogony. Cronos in this account is the father of the gods, which explains the otherwise inexplicable comment that "matched against the lead-like [Saturn's influence on the earth was to produce lead[14]] burden of his antiquity the other gods themselves perhaps felt young and ephemeral" (THS, p. 326). Hesiod devotes part of his account to Saturn's imprisonment under the earth, which partially explains the sense of weight felt as Saturn arrives (though Lewis is no doubt alluding as well to the science-fiction tradition of the gravity of the real planet) and directly connects this Oyarsa to Father Time[15] in The Silver Chair and in The Last Battle. Lewis mentions in The Discarded Image that "our traditional picture of Father Time with the scythe is derived from earlier pictures of Saturn" (p. 105). The sleeping giant is described by the Warden of the Underworld as having been, at one time, a king in the Overworld (SC, p. 124). The reference to an ex-king called Father Time now imprisoned under the earth inescapably recalls the myth of Cronos. Lewis connects the Greek myth to Christianity, however, by giving Father Time the role of sounding the trumpet that begins the end of Narnia (LB, p. 142; cf. I Cor. 15:52), recalling the general outline of the beginning of the

end described in Revelation and associating Father Time with the seven angels sounding the trumpets. It is also possible to connect Father Christmas with Saturn since, as Patterson points out, Saturn is the patron of the Roman festival of the Winter Solstice from which many of our Christmas traditions derive.[16]

The Oyarsa of Jupiter, Glund-Oyarsa, quite simply personifies the medieval description of Jupiter's character, with perhaps a hint of the classical roles of Jupiter/Jove in the description "King of Kings". A less obvious association is that between Jupiter and Father Christmas in The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe. The description of the solemnity combined with joviality plus the war-like nature of the gifts (Lucy receives a dagger along with the healing cordial[17]) suggest that Lewis had in mind the medieval character of Jupiter when he described Father Christmas.

We now come to a considerably more important figure: "the angel that spins nearest the sun. Viritrilbia, whom men call Mercury and Thoth" (THS, p. 322). Here we see the medieval theory of influences enhanced by classical and Egyptian mythology. The medieval system, as Lewis described it in The Discarded Image, attributed to Mercury the influence of "bright alacrity" (p. 108), and we see this effect of "quick agitation . . . a kind of boiling and bubbling in mind and heart" (THS, p. 321) on the inhabitants of St. Anne's. A messenger and herald of the gods, Mercury properly arrives first, but his association with language is more explicitly realized in his Egyptian equivalent, Thoth, the god of wisdom and science, credited with the invention of speech and letters. Hence we see the inhabitants of St.

Anne's glorying in language in such a way that "a stranger coming into the kitchen would have thought they were drunk, not soddenly but gaily drunk" (p. 321), an obvious reference to Pentecost (Acts 2:13). As Patterson says, since the downfall of Belbury is primarily achieved through the destruction of communication, the enhanced command of language at St. Anne's is a significant prefiguring of the "coming triumph of the planetary rulers over the macrobes who have been infesting the earth" (p. 26).

Finally, the two most prominent of the Intelligences are Mars and Venus, Malacandra and Perelandra. They are important largely because they are (rather than "have") the only two genders that humans can understand (Lewis mentions in passing that each of the Planets is a different gender). It is important to realise that Lewis is suggesting not just that gender transcends sex, but that gender exists as a concept without reference to sex at all.[18] Lewis may well have had in mind Plato's ideal plane in that gender appears to be the ideal and sex the incomplete and imperfect version which appears on the physical plane. Lewis mentions that Mars and Venus, though obviously masculine and feminine, are "free from any sexual characteristics, either primary or secondary" (Per., p. 185). Lewis is here baptising the lusty classical gods and also justifying the ways of Milton to modern readers by removing the questions that made Raphael blush to a plane on which they would no longer make sense. Mars and Venus are treated as archetypal genders.

For this reason, following to some extent the Jungian idea that the human psyche contains both male (libido) and female (anima), Mars

intensifies the masculine, but Lewis does not show the men being collectively more influenced by Mars than the women. Denniston seems to take the idea of a fight seriously, but he points out that Logres would be outnumbered in a fight; Dimble says he no longer feels "afraid of being killed and hurt" and Mother Dimble says only that, given companionship, "it might be a nice way to die". MacPhee and Camilia, in contrast, are both excited by the thought of battle, win or lose. Camilia, later described as being "like a Valkyrie" (THS, p. 362) immediately understands MacPhee's allusion to battle (as Dimble does not) and seems excited by the idea (her "eyes flashed towards him. 'Go on!' she said, 'Go on!'"), associating battle with horses, saying she "doesn't mind anything once [she is] on a horse" (p. 324). (Horses, particularly in symbolic functions, are most often associated in literature with men.) Mars, of course, is more than personified battle. He is courage in both active and passive forms. courage to fight against the odds, but also courage to suffer or die. The mythology associated with Malacandra includes in the name "Mars" the Roman values of strength and war-like courage, in the older form of the name, "Mavors", the antiquity of the god and planet, and perhaps his role as a scapegoat (see Fraser's The Golden Bough, pp. 208-210); and in the Norse myth of Tyr, the god of battle (who alone among the gods had the courage to put his hand in the mouth of the wolf Fenrir), the value of self-sacrifice for the greater good.

The essence of Perelandra is conveyed through two earthly representatives, one supernatural and one human. Lewis describes an

earthly and earthy version of Venus, "Perelandra's wraith" (p. 317), who resembles Mother Dimble "with something left out" (p. 304, 314). Lewis does not specify exactly what that something is, but he stresses that Mother Dimble is "a Christian wife" and that as such she has "baptised" nature (p. 314). She thus becomes a Christian version of the pagan symbol of Mother Nature: Mother Dimble represents the nurturing instinct, and her actual barrenness throws into relief her symbolic matriarchal role. In her robes, she is "a kind of priestess or sybil, the servant of some pre-historic goddess of fertility" (THS, p. 363). Patterson associates Venus with Ishtar / Astarte, a fertility goddess (I, p. 26). By using both the fiery, vibrant and inhuman vision and Mother Dimble as Venus's representatives, Lewis separates the essential attributes of Venus from their classical illustrations. Hence the characteristic associated with Venus is not called love, but charity. Lewis certainly intends to remind the reader of "faith, hope and charity" (I Cor. 13:13), the last of which appears in some translations as "love", and perhaps intends to allude to the semantic tangle of associated words which he discusses in The Four Loves.[19] He certainly suggests that clichés of sweetness and tenderness do not adequately convey the concept "love":

> It was fiery, sharp, bright and ruthless, ready to kill, ready to die, outspeeding light. It was Charity, not as mortals imagine it, not even as it has been humanized for them since the Incarnation of the Word, but the translunary virtue, fallen upon them direct from the Third Heaven, unmitigated. They were blinded, scorched, deafened. They thought it would burn their bones. They could not bear that it should continue. They could not bear that it should cease (THS, p. 323).

Perhaps Lewis is imagining what the phrase "God is love" might mean in terms of the images of God as fire and whirlwind. In the description of the essence of Venus, Lewis, more clearly than for any of the other Intelligences, defines an absolute virtue (in the sense of a property: "the virtues of the medicine") which is therefore part of the Absolute, part of God.

Lewis has described his eldila, then, not by adding imaginative details of his own, but by imaginatively applying details of various analogues. The blend seems original because Lewis employs such a variety of analogues, many of them relatively obscure, and the effect is original, Lewis would argue, because, though the details are derivative, the blend is unique. The result provides the modern reader with an "idea of the holy", and with a broad outline what is included in the numinous.

Intermediate between the empyrean and the entirely terrestrial spirits are the Macrobes. These creatures first appear by this name in That Hideous Strength, where Lewis implies a scientific basis, but gradually, as their theological significance becomes apparent in that novel, the reader connects them with the Dark Eldil and his forces as described in the two earlier planetary novels. When Lewis describes the Dark Eldil associated with earth, he is clearly referring to Milton's description in Paradise Lost of the battle in which Satan was thrown from heaven, as well as to the biblical references to Satan falling from heaven (Luke 10:18 and Rev. 9:1). Lewis, however, unlike Milton, does not make Satan into a character. Instead, when any of the Bent Eldila enter the action, they do so either through

psychological temptation of the sort Lewis so vividly conveys in The Screwtape Letters (e.g. the temptation en route to Ransom's home) or through demonic possession of humans (e.g. that of Weston on Perelandra and of Wither).

In the name "Macrobes", however, Lewis adds a perspective different from the association of these creatures with the demonic forces Milton describes. He still has a "bent" form of eldil in mind (as is clear from the comparable associations of Weston and Ransom with their "Masters"), but Lewis is using the modern "microbe" (the word first appeared in 1881) as a basis for a quasi-medieval construct. A modern version of the great chain of being would begin the chain of living creatures not with shell-fish, as the medieval system did, but with virus, bacteria and/or microbes. Microbes, of course, could only be discovered with the development of scientific knowledge and equipment. Will further developments reveal something equal and opposite to microbes, something at the biological top of the chain of being? If so, it would logically be called a "macrobe". Lewis thus conveys a sense of the medieval system in modern terms, including some impression of how plentiful macrobes actually are, and of the essential nature of macrobes: they are anti-life, reversing the role of microbes (which are, of course, essential to life); they are also inhuman in every sense except reason. Modern comics demonstrate that even shellfish can be anthropomorphized, but microbes, and hence the parallel macrobes, are as inhuman as a carbon-based life-form can be.

The only "macrobe" in the Narnia tales is Tash, the bird-god of the Calormenes. Since Tash is an anti-Christ (or at least an anti-

Aslan), he may be assumed to be modelled to some extent on the fallen angel who takes that role in Revelation. In appearance, however, with his form "roughly the shape of a man but [with] . . . the head of a bird" (LB, p. 77), he resembles the animal-headed deities of Egypt. Patterson connects Tash with "the metamorphic entities of Mesopotamia" (p. 14).

Similar to the eldila in the sense of being spirit creatures, but as earth-bound as the macrobes, are the various nature spirits mentioned in That Hideous Strength and employed in several books of The Chronicles of Narnia. These beings are apparently created when Aslan says "Be walking trees. . . . Be divine waters" (MN, p. 103). In The Magician's Nephew, we see an unspecified group of "gods and goddesses of the woods" and "the river god with his Naiad daughters" (p. 104). These creatures are sufficiently human to inter-marry with the sons and daughters of King Frank and Queen Helen (MN, p. 165). In Prince Caspian, the river god appears again (p. 165) and well-women, presumably naiads, are mentioned in The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe, The Magician's Nephew and Prince Caspian.

The gods and goddesses of the woods seem to fall into three categories: dryads, hamadryads and ambulatory trees. The first two kinds derive from classical sources and the last is comparable to Tolkien's trees in The Lord of the Rings.[20] The dryads are simply wood nymphs and are mentioned fairly frequently with few details. The hamadryads, nymphs whose lives are so bound up with their trees that the nymph dies if the tree is cut down, seem to be the nature spirits Lewis has in mind with his descriptions even when he calls the nymphs

dryads. In classical mythology, the dryads are distinctly people and are often indistinguishable from human people. Lewis's silvans, however, when described at all, are clearly trees in some sense. For example, the "delightful person" who looks after Jill in The Silver Chair is physically willow-like: she is not only willowy in form, but her hair seems to have moss in it (p. 35). The nymph of a beech-tree in The Last Battle is certainly a hamadryad: she suffers and dies when her tree is cut down (pp. 16-17). Even though Lewis seems to suggest that, as in classical mythology, dryads and hamadryads are in some way distinct (he mentions hamadryads in a list which includes dryads [PC, p. 158]), he does not distinguish between them in imaginative use. Most of the time, moreover, he does not distinguish clearly between the tree spirits and the trees themselves. It is often hard to tell whether Lewis means a quasi-human but also tree-like nymph or a rational, ambulatory tree. In Prince Caspian, the trees themselves dance, but they also take on some elements of human appearance (PC, p. 114), and in The Last Battle, a Dryad dies when her Talking Tree, is felled (pp. 16-17). Whatever he calls them, the wood gods and goddesses are the embodied souls of the trees in much the same way that the stars are "incarnate minds".

Trees with the power to move and speak are not of classical origin. Lewis most probably has in mind the trees in Tolkien's Lord of the Rings, specifically those at Helms Deep (cp. the woods that arise to rout the Telemarines in Prince Caspian) and those in the Old Forest in The Fellowship of the Ring. In both cases, actual trees have the power and will to move on their own. Lewis's trees, however,

have quite distinct "personalities" rather like Tolkien's Treebeard (apparently modeled on Lewis[21]). Most of the details of Lewis's trees, however, do not seem to have analogues: details of trees breaking off hair and/or fingers to provide a bonfire and the description of the various types of earth forming a feast for the trees (PC, pp. 176-78) seem to have come directly from Lewis's imagination.

The spirit creatures, then, are extrapolations of analogues ranging from Mesopotamian myths to modern mythopoeia and of theories ranging from twelfth century Platonists to twentieth century physicists and psychologists. The effect is not only richness, but also credibility: Lewis's spirit creatures seem too well-rooted in literature, in philosophy and even, by implication, in science not to be real.

In many ways resembling the various silvans are the creatures of classical legend who physically combine human and animal elements. The Chronicles of Narnia abound with such creatures (some are merely named in passing). The more important creatures are centaurs, fauns, satyrs, mer-people and minotaurs, as well as some derivatives such as the man-headed bull. Notably, whatever the classical associations of these creatures, they are good in Narnia if their animal element is subordinate to their human element. For example, the centaurs and the man-headed bull (a classical construct though not a classical creature) are on Aslan's side; in contrast, the minotaurs, bull-headed men, are all part of the Witch's forces.

Two types of creatures from classical legend are particularly important in The Chronicles of Narnia: the fauns (and, by association,

the satyrs) and the centaurs. The fauns in classical legend are semi-deities associated with the rural deity Faunus, a Roman equivalent, more or less, of Pan, and the god of flocks and shepherds. The satyrs are, similarly, gods of woods and fields. Both groups are goat-like in appearance, and by extension in tastes and habits, associated with wild revels and especially with lust and lechery. They seem unlikely creatures for children's books, but a faun is a pivotal character in the first of the Narnia tales. Lewis, however, has interpreted Faunus, in the character of Tumnus the Faun, as a homely (in the British sense) and rural deity, following the tradition of English literature rather than that of classical legend. It is well known that the Narnian tales grew out of Lewis's mental picture of a faun carrying parcels and an umbrella through a snowy wood (Biography, p. 237). Tumnus combines implications of northern civilization (through snow, umbrella and parcels) with the abundance implied in a rural deity. Tumnus's library suggests the highly sexual nature of classical fauns--Nymphs and Their Ways, The Love Life of a Faun--but it mainly helps convey the homely atmosphere of the cave which, combined with the detailed description of the food, inevitably recalls the home of Bilbo Baggins, the Hobbit (see The Hobbit, pp. 15-24). The satyrs are not discussed in any detail, but they are also associated with eating and hospitality.

The centaurs are entirely noble in Narnia with no elements of the churlish centaurs at the marriage feast of Pirithous and Hippodamia. They surely are derived primarily from Chiron, the centaur who studied under Apollo and Diana and in turn instructed various human

heroes. Chiron was "renowned for his skill in hunting, medicine, music, and the art of prophecy"(Bulfinch's Mythology, p. 132). The centaurs in the Narnian tales are "solemn, majestic people, full of ancient wisdom which they learn from the stars, not easily made either merry or angry; but their anger is terrible as a tidal wave when it comes" (SC, p. 198); as Trufflehunter observes, "no-one laughs at a centaur" (PC, p. 149). Of the three named Centaurs, Glenstorm and Roonwit prophesy by reading the stars, and Cloudbirth is a famous healer. The two unnamed Centaurs who take Eustace and Jill back to Cair Paravel are natural teachers: they discourse on "the properties of herbs and roots, the influences of the planets, the nine names of Aslan with their meanings, and things of that sort" (SC, p. 200).

As opposed to the generally good characters derived from classical legend, many of the characters drawn from non-classical legend[22] are evil. In The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe, Lewis mentions a range of minor monsters: "Cruels and Hags and Incubuses, Wraiths, Horrors, Efreets, Sprites, Orknies, Wooses, and Ettins" (LWW, p. 122) and in Prince Caspian, a Hag and a Werewolf appear (pp. 137-143). Cruels, Horrors, Wooses and Orknies are Lewis's inventions. Cruels and Horrors convey, by their names, the sense of all the creatures named. Wooses are similar to Tolkien's Woses, both may be derived from the Woodwose or Wild man of the Woods of East Anglia (mentioned in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight and in later literature).[23] Orknies suggest the orcheas mentioned in Beowulf (line 112) and Tolkien's orcs (Ford, p. 306). The other minor monsters all

appear in studies of legendary creatures.[24] Wraiths and Sprites are both types of phantoms or ghosts, the word "wraith" being Scottish and the term "sprite", to mean "ghost", Middle English. Incubuses are in one sense personifications of nightmare and in another sense demons who descend on sleeping persons. The term "ettin" and variant "eten" are archaic words meaning giant. An Efreet, (usually "afreet" or "afrit") is "one of a class of evil genii, ghouls or demons" found in Arabian legend and common in Islamic mythology.[25] In his lists of monsters, Lewis has combined archaic words with evocative names and creatures of different cultures to create a sense that these monsters are both widespread and ancient.

The werewolf, although specifically associated with central Europe, is just one instance of the shape-changing class common in European medieval mythology. Most of the denizens of Faerie can change shape and although not all shape-changers are evil (consider Beorn in Tolkien's The Hobbit), the werewolf usually is, partially because the wolf is assumed to be evil (for reasons we shall see when we examine the Talking Animals), but more importantly because the animal element is dominant. When the werewolf is changing from man to wolf, the head changes to wolf form first (see PC, p. 144).

The term "hag" is used generally to mean "witch" and specifically to denote a minor witch; hence, the hag in Prince Caspian is clearly far less powerful than the White Witch. For one thing, she needs assistance to call up the White Lady, as she among others of her ilk refer to the Witch. We also see four hags in the service of the White

Witch. In his witches, Lewis clearly has in mind supernatural creatures: they are not mortal women in the Devil's service but are themselves non-human and evil beings. In fact, Lewis stresses that his major witches are not human: the White Witch's claim of being human is refuted in detail, and the Green Witch is a shape-changing serpent.

As a class, the witches are archetypal: as Lewis says, "we are born knowing the witch, aren't we?"[26], and he identifies Circe as the archetypal witch. Lewis certainly has Circe in mind in twice referring metaphorically to the victim of the Green Witch's enchantment, Prince Rilian, as a pig, but he does not otherwise specifically connect his witches with Circe. He makes far more use of the other archetypal witch, Lilith. Lilith, as Glen GoodKnight points out in "Lilith in Narnia", "is one of the oldest mythological figures which continues to inspire modern writers." GoodKnight identifies "Lilith type figures" in the folklore and mythology of a wide range of cultures, mentioning that "at least from a Western view, the Lilith myth reached its fullest development within Medieval Judaism."[27] The two prominent witches in The Chronicles of Narnia are clearly connected with Lilith.

The White Witch is connected to Lilith both in her own right and as Jadis in The Magician's Nephew. (Although the events of The Magician's Nephew take place long before those of the other Narnian tales, Lewis did not have it in mind when he wrote The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe. There are, therefore, inconsistencies, the Jadis/White Witch character being one of them.) The White Witch in

The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe is given the geneology of giants, Jinns (shape-changing spirits in Moslem demonology, with a supernatural influence over humans) and, specifically, Lilith.[28] Jadis, on the other hand, is simply an inhabitant of another world, Charn, and is therefore not a Daughter of Eve (i.e. not human), but she also resembles Lilith, both visually and in her speaking an all-powerful word for selfish purposes. Visually, as GoodKnight says, Jadis is a "sultry, bare armed Amazon", a characterization giving her "a strong Babylonian flavor, which fits the traditional image of Lilith." Her use of The Deplorable Word compares to Lilith's speaking The Ineffable Word ("Lilith in Narnia," p.18).

Connections between the Green Witch and Lilith have also been suggested, most of them based on the argument that since the Green Witch is thought to be "one of the same crew as the White Witch" (SC, p. 90), the same analogues apply. GoodKnight does not go beyond this argument ("Lilith in Narnia," p. 18), however, Patterson in her study of the Green Witch,[29] and John Cox in his "Epistemological Release in The Silver Chair"[30] both see specific connections between the Green Witch and Lilith. Patterson argues that both the witch and Lilith convey the "point of view which finds the mysteries of feminine fertility a source of danger to masculine power" (p. 42). Cox points out that George MacDonald's Lilith "also changes into a snake and goes about seeking males whom she may devour" (p. 161, see also Lilith, pp. 103-112).

In addition to Circe and her predecessor Lilith, the witches in Narnia seem to have innumerable analogues. For example, the White

Witch, in her ability to turn living creatures to stone, clearly derives from Medusa, and of the Green Witch Cox says that "elucidation of her mythical and folkloric origins would no doubt tax the erudition of Sir James Frazer" though he goes on to "identify the literary contexts where Lewis met her" (p. 161). In addition to Lilith, Cox compares the Green Witch in her serpent form to Error in Spenser's The Faerie Queene (I, i, 18-19). Aside from the similarity in details, metaphorical and physical, between the Red Crosse Knight's battle with Error and Prince Rilian's battle with the Green Witch, such elements as the silver chair itself suggest that Lewis used The Faerie Queene as a primary analogue for the penultimate Narnia tale. Patterson[31] and Ann Swinfen[32] independently suggest that the White Witch recalls Hans Anderson's "The Snow Queen". Other possible analogues are Proserpina (Cox, p. 163), Duessa in The Faerie Queene,[33] Astarte ("Halfe Like a Serpente," p. 43) and Hel, the northern witch-figure, Loki's daughter ("Halfe Like a Serpente," p. 44).

The final category of non-human, non-animal characters consists of those who appear human except for size and/or habitat: the giants, gnomes and dwarfs. Because these characters do seem to be just very large or very small humans, Lewis is especially careful to remind the reader that they are not human. As Mr. Beaver says, "there's no two views about things that look like Humans and aren't. . . . [I]n general . . . when you meet anything that's going to be Human and isn't yet, or used to be Human once and isn't now, or ought to be Human and isn't, you keep your eyes on it and feel for your hatchet"

(LWW, p. 66). And in response to his wife's objection that she has known good dwarfs, Mr. Beaver observes that they are "precious few, and they were the ones least like men" (LWW, p. 66). In fact, most of the dwarfs in Narnia are good, but dwarfs as a group are guilty of more treachery than any other group. Similarly, most of the giants we see are good, but good giants are so much in the minority that Lewis must explain the presence of giants in the Narnian forces: "For there are good giants in Narnia" (HHB, p. 149). Apparently, the giants at Harfang are much more typical of giants than Rumblebuffin in The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe or the six giants that fight against the invading Calormenes in The Horse and His Boy. In contrast, the gnomes as a group seem good once freed from enchantment, and the Dufflepuds lack the wit to be evil, but both are far less like men than are dwarfs.

One might expect giants and dwarfs to have the same analogues since both are defined by their size. However, Lewis's giants have widely varied counterparts whereas his dwarfs are, originally, almost exclusively Norse.

Giants commonly appear in mythologies as an older race, either older than the gods (as in Greek and Norse myth) or older than man (as in Hebrew myth). Greek and Norse myths also contain giants smaller than those opposed to the gods, who appear in myths involving humans. In any case, giants are usually hostile to smaller, younger races. Hostility against the gods expresses itself in battle, but giants seem to view people as a type of cattle. In myths of later times and in children's literature, giants have a taste for human

flesh: Cyclops, the giant at the top of the beanstalk, and the giant in George MacDonald's "The Giant's Heart" all eat humans. We are not surprised to learn, therefore, that the "Gentle Giants" of Harfang eat people (as well as Talking Animals). These man-eating giants seem most similar to those in "The Giant's Heart" since both are in domestic surroundings and the giantesses have some sympathy for the humans that are soon to be eaten. However, the giants live north of Narnia and King Peter's wars against them (mentioned in The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe [p. 149]) recall, through the northern locale and through the element of war, the frost giants against which the Norse gods fight at intervals. The giant predecessors of the gods seem to be categorically different, not just in power, but in size, for in Norse mythology the earth is the body of the slain giant Ymir.[34]

The dwarfs derive from very limited analogues. They originate in Norse mythology in which they are described as having developed as maggots from Ymir's body, an origin rather gruesomely reflected in Lewis's name for dwarfs: Sons of Earth. However, given the close association of Lewis and Tolkien and their mutual interest in Norse mythology, it is impossible to say just what Lewis derived directly from Norse myth and what he took via Tolkien. Obviously, the two authors influenced each other. For example, dwarfs traditionally turn to stone when exposed to sun-light. Tolkien applies this legend to his trolls, but not to his dwarfs, and Lewis omits it entirely. Two sub-categories of dwarfs, the gnomes and the Duffers, seem influenced by other analogues. The gnomes physically resemble the goblins in George MacDonald's The Princess and the Goblin, and the Duffers, in

their monopod form may, according to Paul Ford, be derived from Pliny's Natural History (Book VII, ii, 23) or from St. Augustine's City of God (Book XVI, Chapter 8) (p. 153).

The flesh-and-blood creatures of myth and legend, then, demonstrate Lewis's attitude towards his analogues. Since the analogues for these creatures are remarkably varied, and generally better known than those for the creatures of the numinous, Lewis often alludes rather than explains; he is careful, however, to include enough information for a reader who misses the allusion to understand the characterization. He works within the limits of the analogues, but selects details to create a consistent synthesis in his creatures (e.g. Lewis's selection of creatures and characteristics to make human-dominant hybrids good and animal-dominant hybrids bad). When Lewis's use of the analogues for the numinous creatures is considered with his use of those for the flesh-and-blood creatures of myth and legend, we see that Lewis grounds his characters in "auctoritee" as firmly as did any medieval writer, yet by selective use and combination of details manages to avoid any sense of being simply derivative or of practising pastiche. Lewis's non-human, non-animal characters seem credible new creations even though the materials from which Lewis fashioned them are almost exclusively drawn from the literary heritage.

Chapter Three: Real and Realistic Animals

The "realistic animals" in C. S. Lewis's fiction are an unpromising field for an analysis of sources and analogues: possible analogues are simply too numerous, and often too nebulous, to permit specific identification. The analogue Lewis _might_ have had in mind for, say, a London cab-horse could have been one of a thousand horses described anywhere from _The Iliad_ to _The Lord of the Rings_, or an actual horse, or a composite. Moreover, Lewis may well not have had in mind any individual, or even any composite analogue. Largely because animals are such common figures in literature, readers may not perceive them as discrete elements: animal figures function so often as imagery, as part of setting, as part of the mechanics (food, transportation, etc.) and as actual, allegorical and symbolic characters, that they seem to blend into a vague literary background. However, generic analogues can be identified: even if we can never verify a particular analogue for one of Lewis's animal figures, we can say that his treatment of that figure derives from one type of literary application, and we can sometimes trace a modification or departure from a common use to Lewis's literary or philosophical theory or to an actual animal analogue. What such identification should reveal is how Lewis's critical theory, Christian perspective and generic preferences, as opposed to his use of specific analogues, inform his fiction.

The initial problem in discussing the analogues for Lewis's realistic animal figures arises in defining "animal" and "realistic". Can Lewis's Talking Beasts, creatures similar to Toad and Rat in Wind in the Willows, combining the physical attributes of animals with the verbal and intellectual abilities of humans, be considered animals? Can the small dragon-like creature in Perelandra that acts like a pet dog be considered either realistic or an animal? Obviously, neither type is a scientifically verifiable animal, but Lewis describes both as if they actually exist. Of course, the genres Lewis employs (fantasy, allegory, myth, science-fiction) presuppose some departure from the observable world.

Not surprisingly, then, we find few animal figures which can be considered realistic in the sense of being mimetic representations of actual animals, and those that are realistic in this sense often are so only briefly or only within the givens of a story. For example, the cab horse, Strawberry, is solidly realistic in London.[1] But once in Narnia, Strawberry becomes a Talking Horse and sprouts wings; he does not long remain a literary representation of the observable world. Similarly, the mice who chew through the ropes binding Aslan are mice-like in appearance and activity, but can only be considered realistic insofar as Aslan is divine, with an inherent relationship to all created beings. Mice may well be inspired to serve and worship their creator in a suitably mouse-like manner, but we can observe neither their inspiration nor their worship (and real mice are unlikely to chew ropes off a dead lion). Finally, the animals who trample and rend the people at the N.I.C.E. banquet act as one

imagines real animals would in that situation, but the situation itself is mythic: the animals are the physically destructive element in the divine retribution against the N.I.C.E. people because they have rejected their humanity.

Contrasted with this conditional realism of the few animal figures directly drawn from analogues in the actual world is the unlikely behavior of some of these figures (notably the animals at St. Anne's in That Hideous Strength), and the unexpected sense of realism conveyed by the imaginary animals on Malacandra and Perelandra (for example, the giraffe-like "pale furry creatures" suit the low-gravity of Mars and the multi-coloured flying frogs are exactly right for a watery, edenic Venus). Lewis's imaginary animals, though unrealistic by definition, are quite believable; in contrast, the cat, bear and jackdaw at St. Anne's would not, in the real world, live peaceably together: a sense of realism in Lewis's animal figures clearly does not depend solely upon conformity to actual analogues.

The matter is especially complicated by the detailed animal attributes Lewis provides for the Talking Beasts of Narnia. In fact, Lewis even makes speech, which might be considered the strongest evidence that a character is not an animal, convey an element of animality; as Deborah Rogers mentions, Lewis "gives the animals manners and characters suitable to the kind of animal they are" including occasional onomatopoeia in their speech (e.g., the owls in The Silver Chair and the dogs in The Last Battle).[2] In fact, any of Lewis's Talking Beasts is more convincing as an animal than, say, the dog mentioned in passing in Out of the Silent Planet.

The proper questions, then, concern not whether Lewis drew his realistic animal-figures from life, such mimesis being alien to him,[3] but the senses in which his figures may be regarded as either "real" or "animal", and their counterparts in Lewis's reading. If we were to assume that observations of the physical world form the sole logical criterion, then we would have to conclude that Lewis uses virtually no "real animals," and that all the non-human characters save those of myth and legend are to some extent realistic animals. The approach is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, no useful division of the non-human figures results, and second, the approach ignores Lewis's published opinion on actual animals and on the nature(s) of reality in fiction. The criteria for defining Lewis's realistic animals must be ones Lewis would accept.

The first step in identifying these criteria is to consider the relationship between man and animal included in Lewis's view of the unfallen, and hence proper, role of man. In The Problem of Pain, Lewis outlines a modernized version of creation, suggesting that "for long centuries, God perfected the animal form which was to become the vehicle of humanity and the image of Himself" and that "in the fullness of time, God caused to descend upon this organism, both on its psychology and physiology, a new kind of consciousness which could say 'I' and 'me', which knew God" and which had the capacity to judge and to perceive time (p. 65). One result of this "new kind of consciousness" was that man "commanded all lower lives with which he came into contact" (p. 66). Lewis also describes unfallen man as "the priest and even, in one sense, the Christ, of the animals" (p.

66). Lewis directly maintains the implications of this version of the creation myth in his fiction. In the words of Augray, the sorn, "beasts must be ruled by hnau" (OSP., p. 119); in The Magician's Nephew Aslan gives the Talking Beasts dominion over the Dumb Beasts with instructions to "treat them gently and cherish them" (p. 105), in That Hideous Strength, abuse of man's dominion over animals is a sure sign of evil.

Now, Lewis's description of creation in The Problem of Pain, though not inconsistent with that in Genesis, owes more to medieval and more still to renaissance concepts of the interrelations among created beings and between created and creator. The theory of hierarchy in the created world based on properties or types of souls, in which each level of created being has the souls of the lower levels, plus one type of soul which the lower levels lack, seems what Lewis has in mind in a "new kind of consciousness".[4] In E.M.W. Tillyard's The Elizabethan World Picture, we find "a shortened version of the Natural Theology of Raymond de Sebonde" in which the "inanimate class" is described as having existence only, "the vegetative class" as having existence and life, the "sensitive class" as having existence, life, and feeling (further subdivided into three groups based on the properties of touch, hearing, movement and memory) and man as having existence, life, feeling and understanding (pp. 27-28). The "understanding" property of man is essentially linguistic. The difference is between souls and spirit: the human "soul" is qualitatively different from other souls because it is the divine element in man. the image of God in which man is created is a spiritual image so

that the human "soul", the spirit, is the image of God in man.[5] Since God creates through speech (Gen. 1:3-30 repeats "And God said") and since God in His creative role is The Word (John 1:1-4), the divine element in man is essentially linguistic (cp. "In him [i.e. Christ] was life; and the life was the light of men" [John 1·4]). The basic distinction, then, between man and the higher animals was the ability to reason, manifested in speech. Lewis implies this distinction in the creation scene in The Magician's Nephew and briefly mentions this understanding of man's nature in Perelandra when he describes Tor and Tinidril at their coronation: "Animal rationale--an animal, yet also a reasonable soul: such, he remembered, was the old definition of Man" (p. 192).

This essential difference seems the most useful criterion for defining the primary boundary of the animal world: any creature revealing reason through an ability to speak is more than an animal. The Talking Beasts, then, cannot be considered realistic animals, no matter how life-like the "animal" components of their characterization. What remains after excluding the Talking Beasts is to define these animal components to determine which of the non-human characters belong in the "real animal" category. To be consistent, the distinction of a soul-based hierarchy should apply: a figure that gives evidence of existence, life, and feeling, but not understanding, should be considered as an animal regardless of whether it has an analogue in the actual world, one only in the literary world (a sea-serpent for example), or none at all (i.e. an animal contrived in Lewis's imagination). ("Understanding" is a necessarily ambiguous

term, but we may here apply the distinction between a human consciousness, as Lewis defines it in The Problem of Pain, and one which feels but is not self-aware.) "Real" then refers to "essential nature" rather than to practical zoology: a Talking Cat is not a real animal; a rainbow-coloured flying frog is.

Once we have limited the definition of "animal", we must identify the criteria for defining "realism" as it applies to Lewis's fiction and especially as it applies to the imaginary animals in the planetary novels and the unlikely menagerie at St. Anne's. First, Lewis rejected the idea that literary realism is necessarily desirable. Elements of this opinion appear as early as 1917 when Lewis, commenting on the mud in the trenches during his training, facetiously writes "You know how I have always disapproved of realism in art" (Biography, p. 52). In Lewis's "A Reply to Professor Haldane" (1946), the question of the relevance of reality in fiction is behind both Dr. Haldane's original criticism of Lewis's planetary novels[6] and Lewis's response. By 1961, the opinion had developed into a literary theory. in An Experiment in Criticism Lewis explains his disapproval not exactly of "realism in art" but of the assumption that such realism is necessarily a good thing. His argument turns on the distinction between "realism of presentation" and "realism of content" (pp. 57-73). Lewis identifies realism of content as probable or "true to life" material in a work of fiction (p. 59), and realism of presentation as descriptive detail, including minor characters (pp. 57-59).

Lewis does not object to either form of realism in itself, he objects to what he considers an entirely modernist assumption, that

realism of content is inherently valuable and that literature which is unrealistic in content is not "good fiction" (pp. 60-63). Lewis goes on to divide content realism into "fictions of which we can say without reservation 'Life is like this'" (p. 63), and fictions containing "hypothetical probability--what would be probable if the initial situation occurred" (p. 65). He suggests that treating the latter version as a brand of realism is the modernist's attempt to explain the lasting success of stories pivoted about distinctly unlikely events (such as Pip's unmerited good fortune in Great Expectations). Lewis has two main objections to the emphasis on realism of content in both literary criticism and popular opinion. His first is that the assumption stating that realism of content is essential to good literature is "entirely artificial" (p. 64) and distracts criticism from considering the craftsmanship of literary art. Lewis says that

> the effort to force such stories [e.g. Lear and The Miller's Tale] into a radically realistic theory of literature seems to me perverse. They are not, in any sense that matters, representations of life as we know it, and were never valued for being so (p. 66).

Lewis's second objection is that the assumption implies that stories without such realism "'give a false picture of life'--in other words, deceive their readers" (p. 67). He argues further that literature presenting realism of content is more likely to deceive an unperceptive reader than that which is "admitted fantasy": "the unblushingly romantic has far less power to deceive than the apparently realistic" (p. 67).

From this attack on literature which ostensibly provides a "true picture of life," and the more sustained attack on the exaltation of such literature as an ideal, we may derive a criterion for defining Lewis's realism as it applies to animals. Clearly, Lewis does not value a literary portrait of the observable world simply for its connection with reality; he does seem to value descriptions that convey a sense of close observation even if the portrait is of something (like a dragon or a unicorn) that the author could not possibly have observed. Lewis's ideal in this matter is medieval literature: Lewis says that "the Middle Ages favoured a brilliant and exuberant devlopment of presentational realism, because men were at that time inhibited neither by a sense of period . . . nor by a sense of decorum" (Experiment in Criticism, p. 58). Accordingly, realism, in Lewis's fiction, depends on descriptive detail, the more "brilliant and exuberant" the better: a dragon or a hnakra that we can picture is far more realistic than a dog or a cat about which we are told nothing. We may also assume, on the basis of Lewis's concern to rescue from the toils of the "radically realistic theory of literature" works which employ a "hypothetical probability," that Lewis himself is more likely to be concerned with believable developments than with objects or events which are in themselves true to life. Just as Aslan, as Narnia's creator, must obey the laws he establishes (VDT, p. 132), so Lewis as author can postulate any situation, but must then work within the givens of that situation.

However, despite Lewis's theoretical acceptance of any initial set of "givens" in a work of fiction, and his theoretical rejection

of the requirement that fiction should be true to life, Lewis usually provides some connections to the observable world--even the allegorical The Great Divorce employs a mundane bus to provide transportation between hell and heaven.

The initial situations, of course, contain inherent disjunctions with the actual world since most of Lewis's fiction belongs firmly and unashamedly to various genres of fantasy, the Ransom trilogy as science-fiction and The Chronicles of Narnia as fairy-tales. Lewis makes it clear that the departures from the actual world in fairy-tales is a significant advantage over the content realism in genres providing "slice-of-life" descriptions. When Lewis gives his reasons for choosing the fairy-tale as the form for the Narnia stories in his article "Sometimes Fairy Stories May Say Best What's to be Said", he argues that the "Fantastic or Mythical" is able "to generalize while remaining concrete, to present in palpable form . . . whole classes of experience" and that "at its best . . . it can give us experiences we have never had and thus, instead of 'commenting on life', can add to it" (OOW, p. 38). Part of Lewis's point here seems to be that the very fantasy element in fairy-tales may contain, or at least employ, the essence of reality. Lewis's classes of experience suggest that mythic reality involves types of events and of people: in a biblical sense, events prefigure later events and every element of nature reveals something about God (see Rom. 1:20), in a psychological sense, mythic reality describes or employs basic human elements (what Jung called archetypes). In these terms, it is possible to place the Narnia Chronicles in a Christian psychological perspective as Carol

Ann Brown does in "Once Upon a Narnia", arguing that "fairy tales are the key to the wisdom of the submerged [i.e. some form of the unconscious], both pagan and Christian, for thousands of years" and that Narnia has such wide appeal because it conveys this wisdom.[7]

Even from the mechanical perspective of a structural analysis, we find bits and pieces of representations of the actual world in the fairy-tale mode. For example, scattered through Vladimir Propp's analysis of the morphology of the folktale[8] is an unexpected synthesis of ordinary events with the fantastic. In Function XXIII the hero, extraordinary by definition, takes a perfectly ordinary role as a stablehand or an apprentice (p. 60). The effect in the elements Propp identifies seems to be a tenuous but constant connection between the fabulous world in which heroes slay dragons and the ordinary world in which even heroes may have to clean stables. Given Lewis's own identification of The Chronicles of Narnia as fairy-tales, it seems valid to apply Propp's analysis, as Kath Filmer does when she identifies the normal children and normal events opening the Narnia Chronicles as belonging to the commonplace "initial situation" which Vladimir Propp lists as a morphological element of the folk-tale.[9] Although Filmer does not mention animals, they seem to function as "the normal" in much the same way as do the characters and events she identifies.

In Lewis's fiction, then, the realistic animals can be seen as structural elements typical in fairy-tales as practical and psychological connections between fantastic and ordinary worlds. (For example, even the imaginary animals on Malacandra and Perelandra, as

"lower animals," reflect an earth ecology, especially when the imaginary animals either act or look like actual animals.) The "real animals" in Narnia, however, because they contrast not only "real people" but also Talking Animals, go beyond providing a connection with the ordinary world; they also establish a parallel: Narnia is not a world where animals talk; it is a world like ours containing some self-aware, rational beings and some non-rational beings. On Propp's assumptions, the dumb animals in Narnia belong to the common stock of folk-tales. But they also make a philosophical connection between Narnia and the actual world.

Lewis's own analysis of detailed physical settings as part of presentational realism implies a further application for realistic animals. To some extent, the animal figures are simply part of the background, part of the setting: a rabbit watching a train (THS, p. 50) and "the occasional seagull" (PC, p. 5) are simply details that anyone riding in a train or walking on a beach might notice. Such an application is especially relevant to the non-rational beings on Malacandra and Perelandra; these figures are imaginary but sufficiently detailed to be considered real, and they are certainly believable within the science-fiction genre. In fact, Lewis's imaginary animals are typical of devices used in science-fiction to establish a sense of realism for an extra-terrestrial setting. Many of the science-fiction stories employing any natural setting use imaginary animals as vehicles to establish the extra-terrestrial locale, especially if the rational aliens are either not sufficiently alien or not sufficiently significant in the plot to maintain the fiction that

the action is taking place on another world or in another dimension.

It must be noted, however, that the science-fiction story which Lewis identified as "the real father of [his] planet books" (Letters, p. 205), David Lindsay's Voyage to Arcturus,[10] includes few non-rational aliens. Fish are eaten twice (p. 87 and pp. 160-62), two telepathic flying reptiles are killed and a third is used as transportation (pp. 92-100), a trained, dog-like animal is used to catch fish (p. 160-61), and insects, "plant-animals," and "pure animals" come into existence as a result of a creative life-force (pp. 190, 194). In all but the last instance, the animals supply practical details for the plot (see below, pp. 59-60) rather than an extra-terrestrial setting. Lewis mentions two other science-fiction authors he enjoyed reading: Wells ("I had grown up on Wells' stories of that kind [i.e. science-fiction]" Letters, p. 164) and, later, Ray Bradbury (see Biography, p. 178). Neither of these authors emphasizes (though neither excludes) non-rational life-forms in their works. Moreover, Lewis praises Lindsay as "the first writer to discover what 'other planets' are really good for in fiction" and explains that employing the spiritual dimension, rather than "merely physical strangeness or merely spatial distance" is the only really successful method for conveying the "idea of otherness" essential to science-fiction (OOW, p. 12). Given this theoretical stance, Lewis is unlikely to depend entirely on any sort of "physical strangeness" including unusual animals, to establish "otherness."

However, in individual cases, Lewis's animals in the first two novels of the science-fiction trilogy do contribute to a sense of the

alien even though, at the same time, the divergence of species on Perelandra reminds us of earth.[11] Here, Lewis is following such fantasies as those of Edward Bulmer-Lytton, (e.g., The Coming Race) and George MacDonald (e.g., Lilith and Phantastes) in which the animals are not exactly ordinary, but certainly have close parallels among various ordinary animals. In contrast, writers such as Lindsay often concentrate on a single genus, often reptilian, perhaps for the symbolic purpose of suggesting fauna archetypically hostile to man.

It could be argued, of course, that Lewis intended symbolism (or at least didactic commentary) with animals such as his pet-dog version of a dragon in Perelandra. Both Malacandra and Perelandra are unfallen worlds: Lewis is at some pains to make both worlds attractive, even ideal, and so largely avoids descriptions which might repel a reader, at least until after the reader has accepted the alien world as an attractive ideal. Lewis presents Malacandra as a sinless world and, as Sister Pauline argues, "in a subtle way shows it as the norm, with our world being the odd one. . . ."[12] Significantly, Ransom's initial assumptions about aliens belong in the "sci-fi monster" category in that they emphasize insect and reptile physiologies: Ransom has "read his H. G. Wells and others. His universe was peopled with horrors. . . . He saw in imagination various incompatible monstrosities" (SP, p. 39). When he does first see an alien, a sorn, he is horrified, but the first alien animals, aside from a "small red creature" (p. 52), which he encounters are impossible to fear: "pale furry creatures more like giraffes than anything else he could think of" with "big liquid eyes" and a voracious

appetite for tree-top leaves (p. 58). This animal is apparently the milk-producer later described in response to Ransom's question about the "substance which revealed itself to nose, eye and palate, in defiance of all probability, as cheese" (p. 107); there must be close biological parallels between Thulcandra (Earth) and Malacandra. The only other contact Ransom describes with animals is the hnakra-hunt which, though dangerous, is treated primarily as an opportunity for adventure.

When Ransom travels to Perelandra, his Wellsian assumptions have already been destroyed, but Lewis, perhaps for the sake of any reader who has not read Out of the Silent Planet, details a variety of attractive or loveable creatures: we see a quantity of "preternaturally airy and graceful frogs" with "the colour of dragon-flies" (p. 33); we see "big pigeon-coloured birds and flame-coloured birds" (p. 47), "beaver-like creatures . . . heraldic-looking fish" (p. 48) and "a gazelle-like creature" (p. 49) all of which sport around the Green Lady "like our own dogs" (p. 48). The "playful, fearless animals," according to Sister Pauline, contribute to the "exotic, fantastic or at least alien" world of Perelandra ("Secondary Worlds," p. 3). The fantastic element of Perelandra appears in the second animal Ransom sees: "a small dragon covered with scales of red gold. He recognised the garden of the Hesperides at once" (Per., p. 39). Despite the animal's association with a fearful mythic guardian and despite its reptilian physiognomy, it rapidly becomes not just friendly, but even, as Ransom affectionately tells the creature, a pest. The creature dogs Ransom's steps, sleeps across his knees and

licks him when he tickles it in a soft chink in the scales (pp. 40-42). In appearance, the creature is a horror typical of B-grade science-fiction: reptilian, with bat-like wings, scales, and a "long metallic-looking snout" (p. 40); but in behaviour it is an affectionate puppy. Characterizing a traditionally dangerous monster as, at worst, "a considerable nuisance" (p. 42) graphically demonstrates Perelandra's edenic nature. Lewis is here employing animals for two sorts of setting: an extra-terrestrial physical setting stressing beautiful colours (the "dragon-fly" colours of the flying frogs and the red-gold scales and bluish gold wings of the dragon), and a psychological setting of a safe, even homely environment. His technique is consistent with the "physical strangeness" of alien animals, despite the dragon's classical analogue, but its effect is the reverse of that of many science-fiction animals. Lewis's creatures convey a wonderful, not a horrific strangeness.

Not all the "real animals" on Perelandra can be traced to the science-fiction genre. For example, the dragon coiled around the base of a "strange heraldically coloured tree loaded with yellow fruits and silver leaves", a scene which Lewis identifies as the Garden of the Hesperides for any reader lacking a classical background, illustrates Lewis's suggestion that myth on earth might be reality elsewhere (Per., p. 39; see also pp. 131 and 187). Lewis intentionally blurs the distinction between real and mythic, sometimes using the same approaches as appear in the medieval bestiaries. As he points out in The Discarded Image, despite the first-hand knowledge about many animals which most people in the medieval

period must have had, "the written zoology of their period is mainly a mass of cock-and-bull stories about creatures the authors had never seen, and often about creatures that never existed" (p. 147).

The zoology of Lewis's fiction seems to have a similar minimal relationship to the actual world and at times Lewis seems to have had the medieval bestiary in mind as a model for style and approach. For example, the description of the Singing Beast, according to Deborah Rogers, would be entirely appropriate in a medieval bestiary (p. 156). Lewis goes beyond presentational realism when he provides detail on the Singing Beast's symbiotic relationship with another animal:

> The beasts of that kind have no milk and always what they bring forth is suckled by the she-beast of another kind. She is great and beautiful and dumb, and till the young singing beast is weaned it is among her whelps and is subject to her. But when it is grown it becomes the most delicate and glorious of all beasts and goes from her. And she wonders at its song (Per., p. 182).

Rogers says that this passage

> as Lewis the medievalist obviously intended, cries aloud for medieval treatment. Bestiaries of the Middle Ages habitually allegorized, showing a higher significance in the animals they described. For the objects of visible creation are but the letters of a message to rational beings from and about the Creator (p. 156-7).

Rogers imagines the rest of the entry for the Singing Beast making clear that the Singing Beast "is a type of Christ" (p. 157). The allegorical significance of most of the imaginary animals on Perelandra is more obscure than that of the Singing Beast, but Lewis repeatedly suggests "a higher significance" by using the adverb

"heraldically" to modify colour and shape: as in "heraldically fantastic shapes" (p. 91). Here, Lewis seems to have pictorial, rather than literary, analogues in mind, but in either case the influence is distinctly medieval and, if Rogers is right, Lewis gives even originally classical analogues a medieval treatment.

The dumb animals in Narnia also establish setting, combining medieval and renaissance animal references with the devices common in boys' adventure stories such as those of Rider Haggard, one of Lewis's boyhood favorites. First, as in King Solomon's Mines[13] Haggard uses animals to establish the African locale, so Lewis uses animals to contribute to the sense that Narnia is like medieval England. The realistic animals of Narnia, along with most of the Talking Beasts, belong almost exclusively to Britain and northern Europe, but to those regions as portrayed in literary texts of the Middle Ages and Renaissance upon which Lewis lectured. For example, lions are common in The Faerie Queene and there the "Satyres sonne" yokes a variety of "Wyld beasts": "The spotted Panther, and the tusked Bore, / The Pardale swift, and the Tigre cruell; / The Antelope, and Wolfe both fierce and fell" (Book I, Canto VI, 21-26).

Similarly, Northern Europe, if the hunt scene preceeding Siegfried's death in The Nibelungenlied is to be believed, was home to panthers, boars, bears and European bison.[14] Many of the animals in Narnia--rabbits, hedgehogs, squirrels--could belong to Britain in any period, but the bears and especially the leopards and panthers exist only in a prehistoric or a literary Britain. However, although the application of the limited range of species reflects the

adventure story technique, the major work Lewis probably had in mind when creating the animals in Narnia was Paradise Lost: the "bears, tigers, ounces, pards" and "th'unwieldy elephant" frisk around Adam and Eve (IV, 343-47). The inclusion of the elephant among predominantly northern animals in Narnia and the comedy concerning noses (in Paradise Lost, the elephant "wreathed / His lithe proboscis" to entertain Adam and Eve [IV, 347]) suggest the Paradise Lost passage as one direct analogue for the creation scene in The Magician's Nephew.[15]

A second function of animals in the boys' adventure stories is to supply the practical details supporting the main action: in Rider Haggard's stories, again, details about hunting animals for food and using animals for transportion are a primary form of what Lewis calls realism of presentation. Most dumb animals in Narnia are similarly used for transportation or food: the small, white reindeer pulling the White Witch's sled (LWW, pp. 23-24, pp. 92-96), the larger brown reindeer pulling Father Christmas's sled (LWW, p. 86), the dumb horses ridden in A Horse and His Boy (passim), the bear killed and eaten in Prince Caspian (pp. 100, 112-13), the "nice plump bat" the Owl recommends (p. 42) and the eels and birds eaten in The Silver Chair (passim), the rabbit (p. 55) and pigeons (pp. 73-74) eaten in The Last Battle, and the venison, beef and assorted birds and fish (including the pavender, which Hooper and Green suggest is derived from "a perhaps inaccurate recollection of Warham St. Leger's humorous poem 'A False Gallop of Analogies'" [Biography, p. 254]) mentioned in the descriptions of feasts. The real animals that are

not food or transportation are still, with two exceptions, defined in terms of their usefulness to man: the guinea pig which Uncle Andrew uses in his experiments (MN, pp. 11, 19, 28-29) and the polar bear whose hide the Dwarf wears while driving the Witch's sled (LWW, p. 24). The two exceptions are the birds whose singing is heard at intervals--clearly part of setting--and the mice who chew off Aslan's ropes and who subsequently become Talking Beasts. Except for the pavender, all the real animals with a functional role are indigenous to England, actual or fictional.

The other practical purpose of animal figures in Lewis's fiction, one with frequent literary parallels, is to reveal character. Analogues in which a character's nature and attitudes are revealed through relationship with or treatment of animals range from Hunter Quatermain in King Solomon's Mines to the Prioress in Chaucer's Canterbury Tales. Hunter Quatermain is, as a hunter, necessarily defined by his relationship with animals and the illustration of that relationship (e.g. the elephant-hunting scene) is used to establish Quatermain's knowledge, hunting skills and perhaps even his masculinity. A more complex use of animals for characterization appears in the case of Chaucer's Prioress. Chaucer selects animals to prove that the Prioress is "so charitable and so pitous" and that she "al was conscience and tendre herte":

> She wolde wepe, if that she saugh a mous
> Kaught in a trappe, if it were deed or bledde.
> Of smale houndes hadded she that she fedde
> With rosted flessh, or milk and wastel-breed.
> But soore wepte she if oon of hem were deed,
> Or if men smoot it with a yerde smerte.[16]

The characterization achieved through these examples of the prioress's attitude toward animals is quite complex. The praise concerning her charity, pity and so forth is undercut by her sentimentality about animals: one might prefer to see her feed the poor, and keeping pets is against monastic rules.[17]

In fact, literary interactions between people and animals generally contribute to characterization; this tendency falls within the "minor character" category in Lewis's discussion of techniques for establishing realism of presentation. In Lewis's fiction most of this sort of characterization reveals unpleasant traits: one of the first intimations we have that Weston[18] is a villain is the information that he has killed his dog, Tartar, in an experiment (somehow the dog having a name makes using him for an experiment reprehensible). The most vivid proof we have that Weston, as the Un-man, is entirely diabolical is his casual vivisection of the pretty flying frogs on Perelandra for entertainment. Lewis also uses attitudes to animals for more complex characterization. In a letter to his brother, Lewis says that the children who stayed at the Kiln during the war were "fond of animals, which is a good thing" (Biography, p. 238). Lewis uses such attitudes about the merits of liking animals in a complex way reminiscent of the characterization of Chaucer's Prioress. For example, one of the first things we learn about Eustace in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader is that he "liked animals, especially beetles, if they were dead and pinned on a card" (p. 1); this preference, of course, reveals not the spontaneous animal-liking of a good child but clinical interest comparable to Weston's. Furthermore, Lewis's own

dislike of insects, the result of childhood nightmares (SJ, pp. 15-16) is the obvious source for the implication that liking beetles reveals an unpleasant personality.[19]

Perhaps the most detailed use of real animals to establish characterization concerns Uncle Andrew in The Magician's Nephew. Lewis clearly relates the magician's selfishness and cowardice, as they affect the children, to his attitude towards his experimental guinea-pigs. Clearly, Uncle Andrew feels, experimenting on guinea-pigs, even if they are killed, is quite acceptable, and just as clearly, in Uncle Andrew's egocentric philosophy, there is nothing wrong with using children in experiments: they are merely "subjects" (p. 20). Lewis also explains Uncle Andrew's fear of animals as resulting from his unfeeling treatment of them: "He had never liked animals at the best of times, being usually rather afraid of them; and of course years of doing cruel experiments on animals had made him hate and fear them far more" (p. 114).

Lewis rarely uses animals to establish favourable characteristics. Occasionally he suggests one character's goodness by his responses to another character's misuse of an animal. Ransom is appalled by (and unfortunately tries to remedy) the Un-man's cruelty to the frogs; Digory calls Uncle Andrew's experiments using the guinea-pigs "a jolly cruel thing to do" (p. 19). Sometimes good qualities are suggested in discussion, but not shown. For example, the London cabby, Frank (who becomes King Frank of Narnia), is, like Quatermain, largely defined by his occupational relationship to animals. The cabby appears kind and considerate as he describes how

he cared for Strawberry, but he seems selfish and inconsiderate when we hear the horse's version. The only undeniably favourable characteristic directly established through response to an animal concerns the sea-serpent: in battling the monster, Eustace demonstrates a newfound courage, and Reepicheep, by abandoning futile heroics in favour of more practical action, redeems his usual pugnaciousness from the possibility of bravado. This use of a sea-serpent as a tool for characterization is consistent with a multitude of classical and medieval analogues; in fact, one might argue that sea-serpents exist to prove the courage of our heroes.

Lewis, finally, employs realistic animals derived from the medieval and renaissance texts on which he lectured to symbolize religious or philosophical concepts. His technique of deriving animal symbols from biblical stories is similar to that in The Faerie Queene where we see, for example, a white ass (I, i. 4) as a symbol of humility drawn from the account of Christ riding into Jerusalem on an ass and the Garden of Adonis described in distinctly edenic terms (III, vi, 30-42). Lewis's technique also recalls that of Paradise Lost in which the behavior of animals illustrates the nature of an unfallen world. Following these models, Lewis uses animals in two of the planetary romances, Perelandra and That Hideous Strength, to convey the proper (i.e. unfallen) relationship between man and beast and seems to combine Spenser's Garden of Adonis with Eden in Paradise Lost (IV), especially as modified by Lewis's own version of creation. Lewis may also have had in mind the explanation that Eve was "used / To such disport before her through the field / From every

beast, more duteous at her call / Than at Circean call the herd disguised" (PL, IX, 519-522). The mating scene in That Hideous Strength clearly recalls the Garden of Adonis[20] in which "Franckly each paramour his leman knowes, / Each bird his mate, ne any does enuie / Their goodly meriment, and gay felicitie" (III, vi, 42). Indirectly, almost any theologically-based representation of man/animal relationships is arguably an analogue for Lewis's application.

One specific use of animals as symbols of the proper relationship between man and beast is Lewis's treatment of horses and of riding horses. Possible analogues are legion, but one cannot help noticing the imagery involving horses in the Bible,[21] especially as images of power and strength serving man (e.g. Job 39:19-25). The most obvious example of this image in Lewis's fiction is in The Great Divorce where the chattering red lizard of lust becomes a white stallion of desire which seems to be a perfectly acceptable heavenly companion for the young man. Throughout his fiction, Lewis uses the horse, as Paul Ford points out, as "a complex symbol, the personification of all that is best in our natural desires" (p. 234). Lewis exclusively treats real horses in relation to man specifically using "horsemanship, the harmonic interaction of horse and rider" as "symbolic of the ultimate reconciliation of our spiritual and physical natures" (Ford, p. 235). We see something of this approach when Shasta's apparent ability to ride is treated as evidence of noble birth (HHB, p. 131), although this association of horsemanship with nobility is medieval. The symbolic treatment of horsemanship is perhaps most evident when we see Merlin, possessed by the eldila Mercury

(the essence of language), making "a whinnying noise . . . apparently talking to a horse" (THS, p. 365). Merlin/Mercury is suddenly on the horse's back and cantering away almost exactly as does the young man in heaven. In every case, the emphasis is on horsemanship as companionship: the essence of the proper man/animal relationship.

In both the menagerie at St. Anne's and the assembly of animals attending the Green Lady on Perelandra we see a wide variety of animals in peaceful co-existence clearly in a subservient but loving relationship with people (for the moment treating the Green Lady as a person). In Perelandra, most of the animals are, in themselves, irrelevant; their importance is in their relationship to Tor and Tinidril as a demonstration of an edenic state. In That Hideous Strength, the same is true of most of the animals at St. Anne's, but Mr. Bultitude, the bear, becomes a character in his own right. He is, of course, primarily proof that Ransom has "brought back with him from Venus some shadow of man's lost prerogative to ennoble beasts" (p. 307). Ivy Maggs comments that "that's the way he has with animals. There isn't a creature in the place that would go for another or for us once he's had his little talk with them" (p. 164), but if the reader saw only ordinary animals, he would have no reason to suppose that Ransom's "way with animals" was extraordinary. Apart from this application in characterization and in establishing a supernatural element, Mr. Bultitude derives from a real life analogue, a bear Lewis saw in a zoo, but also illustrates some of Lewis's opinions in The Problem of Pain. The event behind the initial situation, having a pet bear, is the trip Lewis made to

Whipsnade Zoo in 1931. Lewis's brother, Warnie, describes a "delightful brown plethoric one [bear] which sat up and saluted for buns. Jack is full of the dream of adding a pet bear to our private menagerie, which he intends to christen 'Bultitude'" (Biography, p. 116). Lewis uses this animal to illustrate the difference he postulates in The Problem of Pain between the thought processes of humans and the sense perceptions of higher animals. On two occasions (pp. 306-308 and pp. 350-351), narration shifts to the bear's perspective, Lewis taking great care to avoid anthropomorphism. At these points, Lewis's descriptions of the bear's perception of experience parallel his arguments about how animals perceive pain, especially his distinction between sentience and consciousness (pp. 119-121).

In Lewis's real animals, then, we see applications consistent with the fictional forms Lewis uses. What is significant is Lewis's selection and combination of these applications. His ordinary applications exclude any techniques that do not contribute to his synthesis of literature and philosophy. For example, within the science-fiction genre, details of an animal's physiology or habits can contribute to plot--but such a use creates an emphasis unlikely in children's adventure tales. Lewis's applications, then, blend literary techniques accommodating each of the forms and genres informing his fiction, and coalescing into patterns conveying key points of Lewis's philosophy and literary theory. From the perspective of philosophy, all the applications of real animals are consistent with Lewis's position on man's nature, fallen and unfallen, as that nature informs man's relationship to and responsibilities in

this world. From the perspective of literary theory, all the applications of real animals illustrate what Lewis had in mind when he praised "presentational realism" of the sort evident in medieval literature. Individual applications, then, are unremarkable, but the selection and combination of narrative techniques are unique to Lewis. Most importantly, Lewis's blend of generic analogues, which seems on the surface an eclectic hodge-podge, contributes to a consistent philosophical and literary position.

Chapter Four: Talking Beasts

The Talking Beasts of Narnia are probably the best known of Lewis's characters. In fact, for many readers the phrase "non-human characters" means "Talking Beasts"[1] even though talking animals are very much in the minority among the non-human characters, and aside from a few key characters--Aslan throughout and one or two others in each Narnia story--are not especially important to the action. The dwarfs and mythical creatures appear more frequently and contribute more to the action, and the main interest is directed towards human characters. Why, then, do the Talking Beasts figure so largely in the popular conception of Narnia? What about the Talking Beasts so captures the imagination that more common and even more important figures fade in comparison? The answer has four parts: first, the concept of talking animals seems inherently appealing to humans; second, the functions and descriptions of Talking Beasts give them an importance beyond that which the frequency of their appearances would suggest; third, the Talking Beasts contribute to the creation of the secondary world; and fourth, the Talking Beasts are so well grounded in, yet distinct from, earlier animal fantasy that they are at once fresh and comfortably familiar.

An initial explanation of the importance of the Talking Beasts, given Lewis's own emphasis on readers in An Experiment in Criticism, must be in terms of how readers are likely to respond to familiar and

unfamiliar creatures. Quite apart from a reader's literary background, what is his most likely human response? First, the Talking Animals capture the popular imagination more than do the legendary creatures because the ordinary is easier to visualize than the fantastic. No matter how carefully an author describes a faun, for example, or how many times one has met fauns in other literature, the character remains imaginary, whereas a Talking Dog is the animal sleeping at the reader's feet--except for the not immediately apparent gift of speech. The reader may well be less familiar with bears and elephants, but has probably seen them and certainly does not doubt their existence.

Second, animals answer the human longing which Ransom identifies as "an instinct starved in us, which we try to soothe by treating irrational creatures almost as if they were rational" (OSP, p. 182). Lewis here refers to a notion behind much science-fiction that mankind longs for companionship with another rational, mortal species. The idea is that the individual need for companionship, since it demonstrably extends to larger units such as nations needing allies, extends to the species.[2] The connection of animals with this "instinct" is revealed in the folkloric belief that in the prelapsarian world humans and animals could communicate. Ann Swinfen, introducing her chapter on Talking Beasts in In Defense of Fantasy, says that "man's relationship with the rest of the animal kingdom strikes a deep chord of imaginative recognition in the human consciousness" because "since the Fall, some might say, man has been trying . . . to re-establish that mutual understanding and rapport

which he senses must once have existed" (p. 12). Lewis draws on this belief in his explanation of why the hrossa so appealed to Ransom: they seemed animals, yet had reason "as though Paradise had never been lost and earliest dreams were true" (OSP, p. 66). A Talking Animal, then, answers a subconscious human need.

The Talking Beasts seem prominent and ubiquitous because of the conspicuous roles assigned to a few and the merely implied presence of others. For example, even though Voyage of the Dawn Treader contains only one Talking Beast besides Aslan, that character, Reepicheep, is sufficiently important to convey the sense of a continuing presence of Talking Beasts in the Narnia series. In contrast, some Talking Beasts are invoked though they do not appear. For example, almost every time someone kills an animal for food in Narnia, we are told that it was not, of course, a Talking Beast. Again, descriptions of Narnia always mention the Talking Beasts, generally in the emphatic final position: Narnia is "the country of Waking Trees and Visible Naiads, of Fauns and Satyrs, of Dwarfs and Giants, of the gods and the Centaurs, of Talking Beasts" (PC, p. 42). Finally, descriptions of groups of creatures often emphasize the Talking Animals, even though the creatures from the group who then contribute to the action tend to be dwarfs and mythical creatures. We are told, for example, that only "one in five" of the crowd seeing King Caspian off at the beginning of The Silver Chair is human, and the description that follows, though it first mentions various mythical creatures, emphasizes the animals and their obvious intelligence (p. 28). The impression conveyed is that the crowd mainly comprises Talking

Beasts, with a scattering of humans and mythical creatures. After the description, however, the immediately active non-human characters are a dwarf (Trumpkin), a faun, a dumb animal (the donkey) and one talking animal, Glimfeather the Owl. Only one in five may be human, but then only one in five is a Talking Beast. After the Parliament of Owls in Chapter IV, unless Puddleglum be considered a Talking Animal, no Talking Beasts take part in the action until the final two chapters, and even there dwarfs and mythical creatures outweigh the Talking Beasts in both number and importance. In Prince Caspian, the majority of the army does consist of Talking Beasts, but the leaders are one human (later joined by two others), two dwarfs, one half-dwarf, and one Talking Beast.

However, neither their numbers, placement nor appeal to readers will entirely account for the prominence of the Talking Beasts. To explain their role both in Narnia and in readers' imaginations, we must, once again, see Lewis's fiction in relation to its specific and generic analogues. We find that, for the Talking Beasts as for the other non-human characters, significance and freshness result not from "original" creation, but from unusually detailed combinations and applications of previous literary devices, characters and approaches.

First of all, the Talking Beasts are treated as a device for distinguishing between our world and Narnia: the frequent reminders that there are Talking Beasts in Narnia are part of the window dressing that helps establish and maintain the secondary world.[3] The combination of talking animals with a secondary world is in

itself unusual: Swinfen points out that "modern animal fantasy in most instances is set in the primary world and therefore rarely involves the often numinous experience of otherworlds" (p. 13). Consider the settings of, for example, The Wind in the Willows or Watership Down: despite the fantasy, both works emphatically belong to the primary world. Patterson makes a point similar to Swinfen's with the observation that the wolf in Little Red Riding Hood is treated as a wolf, that there is never any suggestion that the story takes place outside our world, and that the wolf's ability to speak is accepted as a given . in fairy tales all animals presumably can talk.[4] Secondary worlds, such as those in George MacDonald's Lilith or Phantastes, with their usual emphasis on magic, need have nothing to do with talking animals. In contrast to animals in fairy tales, only some Narnian animals can talk, in contrast to the usual emphases in secondary worlds, it is the Talking Beasts who most frequently remind us that Narnia is outside our world. for example, Lewis explains that Beavers tend to speak ungrammatically when they are excited; at least they do "in Narnia--in our world they usually don't talk at all" (LWW, p. 86). As a result, every time Talking Animals are mentioned, the reader is reminded that the story is taking place not in medieval England (despite the choice of weapons) nor Ovid's or Homer's mediterranean world (despite the fauns and centaurs) but in a different world. Lewis has, in effect, used a commonplace specific to the fairy-tale, talking animals, to establish a general fantasy commonplace, a secondary world. The unusual connection points up both individually unremarkable elements and makes

the Talking Beasts unusually significant to and in the fantasy world.

In terms of the importance of Talking Beasts in the readers' imaginations, many of Lewis's combinations make them credible both as characters and as talking animals--the latter requiring that the reader perceive a creature as rational and at the same time as an animal. In contrast, Grahame's Badger is a completely credible character--the gruff but kindly English country gentleman--but not at all believable as a talking animal. To some extent, Lewis uses analogues of individuals and of character types to realize some major figures among the Talking Beasts; to a greater extent, Lewis combines different literary approaches to talking animals to develop the concept of Talking Beasts.

To establish individual Talking Beasts, Lewis sometimes draws on identifiable analogues and thereby partially counteracts a reader's possible difficulty in believing in a creature that is out of character as an animal because it acts from human motives and out of character as a human because it is physically an animal. The problem is inherent in the fairy-tale genre. One wonders, for example, why a wolf would bother to disguise himself as Little Red Riding Hood's grandmother. And one goes on wondering: the wolf is not sufficiently established for us to believe in him either as a wolf or as anything else. In contrast, when Lewis's animals do not act as animals, they remain convincing as characters, mainly because of Lewis's use of individual analogues and of literary approaches.

For example, one may well doubt Reepicheep's mousehood, but one certainly accepts him because one recognizes elements of his char-

acter.[5] He can be seen as a Don Quixote: "his mind was full of forlorn hopes, death or glory charges, and last stands" (VDT, p. 55), and his eagerness to fight giants and dragons is surely as absurd as Quixote's to fight windmills perceived as giants. Reepicheep is also a Galahad figure, according to Bruce McMenomy who sees "embodied in Reepicheep many Galahad type virtues" in that both Reepicheep and Galahad embody "almost the entire idea of chivalry" as well as similarities in quests and deaths.[6] We can even catch an echo of King Arthur as Reepicheep hurls his sword into the lily-strewn sea just before his boat takes him into Aslan's land. In terms of character types, Rogers sees in Reepicheep both a companion figure (The Fictitious Characters of Lewis and Tolkien, p. 71)[7] and a miles gloriosus (p. 72). With these analogues contributing to his character, the conflicting element of Reepicheep's physical nature--a two-foot tall mouse--provides a silent comment on different elements of courage, heroism and heroics.

More important than specific analogues, however, are Lewis's applications and combinations of different types of animal fantasy. Here, Lewis's approach is consistent with that of much modern animal fantasy which, according to Swinfen, "is more closely linked to and borrows more heavily from its antecedent literature than most other types of fantasy" (p. 13). The "antecedent literature" Swinfen has in mind exists in five types: folklore, animal fable, animal satire, naturalists' tales and "earlier modern fantasies", primarily those in which the animal figures are "surrogate humans" (pp. 17-18). Lewis draws elements from most types, although by making his Talking

Animals realistic he necessarily departs in some particulars from pre-nineteenth century analogues. As William Magee says, earlier writers "who had used animals in fiction usually had purposes which discouraged or even prevented realistic characterization."[8] Lewis, however, combines, and occasionally undercuts, elements so that the apparent conflicts between the source types are resolved in his characters.

In folklore, animals are often demi-gods of a sort, having magical powers that usually include the ability to speak and/or assume human form. They are hostile only to humans who have insulted or abused animals or mis-used nature. Otherwise, the demi-god animals use their magical powers and superior wisdom to act as guides and companions for deserving individuals or tribes. Gertrude Levy, in The Gate of Horn, describes the wish of early man to be associated with these superior creatures as a desire for "a participation in the splendour of the beasts."[9] She explains how this desire became expressed in dance and art and ultimately developed into the "satyr and half-human ministrants of the mystery Gods of Greece" (p. 227). It can be argued that Lewis employs the broad outline of this tradition. Levy's description of the totemistic understanding of animals sounds similar to Patterson's comment that "these holy animals [i.e. the Talking Beasts] called out and unfallen, visited by a God incarnate in their own beast-flesh, are the inhabitants of Narnia" ("Lord of the Beasts," p. 26). Some evidence can be found for the association of Narnian animals with archetypal animals prominent in the religions of Stone Age cultures. In Prince Caspian, the Tele-

marines try to stamp out the Talking Beasts and the Waking Trees, and the Trees and Beasts reciprocate the hostility. The Telemarine who seeks and reveres them, however, receives both moral support and practical help. We can also see various Talking Beasts as guides and protectors. The Beavers take in the Pevensie children, feed them, teach them and guide them to Aslan (LWW, pp. 53-70, 81-89, 99-101). Bree initiates Shasta's escape, guides him, and teaches him to ride (HHB, pp. 8-19). Fledge not only physically assists Digory and Polly in their quest but stands guard over them and literally takes them under his wings (MN, pp. 136-137). And, of course, Aslan is always a Guide[10] in some sense. Talking Beasts also function as companions. Insofar as Bree is not a guide he is a companion, as is Hwin (also a guide when she counsels against suicide [HHB, pp. 30-31]) and certainly Reepicheep.

However, most of these elements can also be explained without reference to folktales. One need not be an animal demi-god to reciprocate hostility nor to support someone who has mutual enemies. As for the guides and protectors, most are adult animals, guiding and protecting children, or else cognoscente instructing neophytes. Moreover, the roles of guide, protector and companion are certainly not exclusive to animal demi-gods, and the wisdom or powers the Narnian guides demonstrate do not seem to be functions of totemistic animal nature. Lewis need not, therefore, have drawn the motifs from animal folklore.

Lewis more directly refers to but does not consistently employ the second type of animal fantasy, fable. His most important appli-

cation of the fable is in his characterization of the wolf, who in animal fables is always a villain. Lewis generally assumes the association of wolves with evil, but he has in mind, of course, the wolf of Norse myth as well as that of Red Riding Hood. Lewis makes this clear by calling the best developed Talking Wolf Fenris Ulf. In Norse mythology, wolves are descended from an aged giantess (Prose Edda, p. 39). One wolf, Fenrir, the first son of Loki and the giantess Angrbotha, will be responsible for Odin's death and the destruction of this world (Prose Edda, pp. 87-88). The similarity between the names "Fenrir" and "Fenris" suggests their connection, and the giant blood in Jadis, whom Fenris serves, inescapably associates Lewis's chief wolf with the mythical Fenrir. On the other hand, Lewis does not restrict himself to the fable type or the mythical analogue: he implies the goodness of some minor wolves. There are stone wolves in the White Witch's house who presumably fight on Aslan's side when they are restored, and the wolf who fights with the Calormenes against King Tirian in The Last Battle presumably came to Stable Hill to worship Aslan; at the very least he proves that wolves were not among the evil creatures stamped out. The emphasis on evil wolves with the very minor presence of arguably good ones creates some sense of individuality and moral responsibility. Fenris, then, choses to be evil.

Lewis reveals his attitude towards the treatment of animals in fables when he says that non-human humans, such as the anthropomorphic beasts, are "an admirable hieroglyphic which conveys psychology [and] types of character more briefly than novelistic presentation"

(OOW, p. 27). Although Lewis is here discussing not fables but modern animal fantasies, especially Tolkien's, Grahame's and his own, his observation neatly applies to such animals of fable as the fox and suggests a generic similarity between animals of traditional fable and those of modern fantasy. Of course, Lewis does not use his Talking Beasts exclusively as hieroglyphs for characters and states of mind, but many do serve this purpose.

The dragon, for example, is a hieroglyph for avarice in the same way as a fox is traditionally one for cunning. Both dragons and foxes have other characteristics, but the fable equates a single quality with each animal. In focussing on avarice as the essential quality of dragons, Lewis draws on the Norse tale of Fafnir, who turns himself into a dragon in order to protect his hoard (Prose Edda, p. 112), and avoids other associations.[11] Similarly, Lewis focusses on limited elements of biblical imagery in order to make the lamb in The Last Battle a hieroglyph for innocence. In one case, however, Lewis inverts expected qualities: he makes Reepicheep a "representative of dauntless courage" (Glover, p. 148), a most unlikely character type to be conveyed by a mouse, but successful because it is an inversion. Deconstruction theory argues that each side of a binary opposite (light/dark, courage/cowardice) implies its antithetical partner.[12] In other words, if we inherently define light as the absence of darkness, we cannot think of one without the other. Deconstruction in practice identifies an unintentionally implied inversion and attempts to show how that implication makes the text internally inconsistent. In Reepicheep's case, the inversion inher-

ent in our definition of a mouse's timidity is externalized and given form. Given the inversion, the character is completely consistent.

A related use is Lewis's association of the dog with loyalty: every one of the Talking Dogs fights on King Tirian's side in the last battle. In this case, however, the association is popular rather than literary, and the dogs have features completely unconnected with loyalty (see, for example, the bulldog's pugnacious reaction to any slight about his nose in The Magician's Nephew, pp. 117-18) so that they must be said to be associated with rather than be hieroglyphs of loyalty.

As for character types, Lewis uses some fable associations directly, but avoids others and creates new fable-type associations of his own. The deer is associated with speed (HHB, p. 145) and the eagle with keen sight (LB, p. 85), but the foxes are not exactly cunning. The fox in The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe attempts to turn the Witch's anger by proposing a toast to her health but without success (pp. 93-94). The fox in The Last Battle is called "Slinkey" (p. 110) which suggests an unsavory underworld character rather than a relative of Reynard. The Raven is neither stupid nor greedy (both male and female Ravens are part of the council Aslan calls in The Magician's Nephew [p. 106]), but in Prince Caspian (p. 70) he is certainly pompous. The owls are wise (SC, p. 33 and pp. 44-55), as they themselves point out, but perhaps not as wise as they think. At any rate, the dwarf Trumpkin does not especially respect them. Lewis also uses fable-type associations in such phrases as "loyal as a badger" (VDT, p. 16). Here Lewis no doubt has in mind Badger from

Wind in the Willows, but the association of a quality with a particular animal is the essence of the role of animals in fables. Clearly, Lewis is employing the technique of fables, but without reference to particular fable associations.

It is important to note that Lewis does not permit the fable technique of associating a quality with a particular animal to preclude individuality. The only badger of note is loyal, but when two or more of a species appear, they show distinct personalities. Consider the differences between the horses Bree and Hwin or among the good but silly bear who sucks his paws in Prince Caspian, the "stern, hard-bitten bears" who fight in the Narnian army against Prince Rabadash (HHB, p. 149), the "Lapsed Bear of Stormness" (HHB, p. 191), and the confused but staunchly faithful bear in The Last Battle (passim).

Also related to hieroglyphic and associative applications of animal figures are the more elaborate but rare symbolic uses. Fenris Ulf has satanic elements, Puzzle is obviously an anti-Christ and Bree is briefly cast as Thomas (cp. HHB, p. 170 with John 20:27).

The only important symbolic use of a Talking Beast is that of Aslan as a Christ figure. Kathryn Lindskoog, in The Lion of Judah in Never-Never Land identifies biblical analogues and images that contribute to the characterization of Aslan,[13] but also compares Aslan to the pan-like Diety in The Wind in the Willows (p. 52) and the "archetypical lion" in Charles Williams' The Place of the Lion (p. 53). An even more detailed study of credal elements and of parallels between Aslan and Christ is Ford's discussion in his Companion to Narnia (pp. 17-56 and pp. 116-119). Both critics demonstrate that the

character Aslan is based on Christ as he appears in Old Testament prophesies, on specific elements of Christ's life as recounted in the New Testament, and even on specific wording of some of Christ's speech. Ford's analysis also identifies the influence of some essentially Anglican interpretive theology. Significantly, the treatment of a lion as a Christ figure has several direct analogues. First, Christ is specifically identified as the "Lion of Judah" in Revelation 5:5 (hence the title of Lindskoog's work); second, the lion is generally associated with power in the Bible--Lindskoog identifies "the use of a lion as a symbol of power [as] a Scriptural device" (p. 50), citing Proverbs 30:30 as an example; and, finally, the lion as a Christ-figure is part of medieval bestiary allegories: Patterson refers to the

> traditional Christian symbolism which uses the Medieval notion that a baby lion is born dead but comes to life after three days when its father breathes upon it, to make the lion a type of the Resurrection and a symbol of 'Christ, the Lord of Life' ("Lord of the Beasts," p. 25).

Aslan, the most vibrant and memorable of Lewis's characters, has also the richest, most distinct and most varied analogues.

We also see in the Talking Beasts elements of animal satire, the third type of animal fantasy, sometimes in the sense of a human element attributed to and attacked in an animal, and sometimes in the sense of an animal characteristic illustrating human failings. The first type of animal satire occurs in the characterization of Bree as vain and, as he himself finally realizes, "rather a fool" (HHB, p. 170). Bree's vanity is undercut by Hwin's quiet practicality, his

miles gloriosus role by the genuine courage of "a child, a mere foal" (p. 127), and his role as sophisticated expounder of the metaphorical nature of Aslan-as-lion by the reality of Aslan's whisker tickling his ear. In each case, Lewis attacks a human, not an equine attitude, and in the last case his attack has a theological perspective consistent with Bree's character yet not especially relevant either to characterization or to plot. Lewis uses the second type of animal satire, for example, when he compares the changeability of humans to the constancy of animals.[14] Trufflehunter says "I'm a beast, I am, and a Badger what's more. We don't change. We hold on" (*PC*, p. 57; see also p. 145). Even the woolly-minded bears remember fine points of rights and duties (*PC*, p. 154).

The two remaining approaches to animal fantasy, naturalists' tales and tales of animals as surrogate humans, are essentially antithetical. On the one hand are tales which emphasize the animal nature of animals: in stories such as those of Sir Charles G. D. Roberts, every attempt is made to convey an accurate "animal psychology" (Magee, p. 225); in *The Ugly Duckling* or in *Black Beauty*, the animals' consciousness is arguably human, but they remain animals in all practical senses. We see them communicating, but not, usually, talking to humans. As Swinfen says,

> human consciousness and speech is accorded to the animals simply in order to present a vivid picture of animal life as animals experience it. Such animals are not surrogate humans, except in so far as it is impossible to give them human consciousness without also giving them something of human emotions (p. 17).

In other tales, by contrast, the animals are indeed surrogate humans. In Wind in the Willows, for example, the "animals" live in houses, drive cars, eat human food, are put in prison and so on. As Lewis points out, we even see Mr. Toad combing leaves out of his hair (OOW, p. 14). Lewis explains that in stories such as Wind in the Willows animal characters free the author from the necessity of accounting for the restrictions placed on children or the responsibilities placed on adults. Lewis says that

> the life of all the characters is that of children for whom everything is provided and who take everything for granted. But in other ways it is the life of adults. They go where they like and do what they please, they arrange their own lives (OOW, p. 14).

In other words, one type of animal fantasy employs animals who are, for the sake of literary convenience, marginally human; the opposed type deals with humans, or at least human types, who are, for the sake of literary convenience, marginally disguised as animals.

Lewis's own juvenilia are entirely in the tradition of Wind in the Willows, even though he did not read that work until his late twenties (OOW, p. 24). Walter Hooper, commenting on a passage from a late example, The Locked Door,[15] wonders how many readers would know without being told that the speakers were animals. He says that his own knowledge of what animals are intended "is partly derived from the pictures Lewis drew to illustrate his Boxen stories" (Past Watchful Dragons, p. 13). And yet, surprisingly enough, the animal tales that Lewis identifies as his favorites, the tales of Beatrix Potter, belong to the naturalist camp. Lewis's other favorite chil-

dren's story author, E. Nesbitt, uses either mythical or fantastic "animals"—such as the Psamead and the Phoenix—or completely natural ones.

It is not surprising, then, that in the Chronicles Lewis combines these two usually opposed approaches to animal fantasy: after all, he combined a taste for both in his childhood. In the Chronicles, some details make the Talking Beasts inescapably animal; other details make them, like the comic strip cat Garfield, "just little people with fur and fangs." To some extent, The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe separates the two approaches: the Beavers are very superficially beavers while the panthers in Aslan's train seem intelligent but do not talk; aside from their intelligence, they have no exclusively human qualities. Even in this first story, however, some Talking Beasts (such as Fenris Ulf) reveal both distinctly human and distinctly animal traits, and the separation of traits in other animals permits an independent examination of Lewis's use of both approaches.[16]

At times, especially in the early Narnia tales, the Talking Beasts would fit nicely into The Wind in the Willows. The Beavers, for example, have built a dam and are physically identifiable as animals (Mr. Beaver slams down his paw [p. 65] and his whiskers tickle the children when he whispers [p. 54]), but are otherwise completely human. Mrs. Beaver owns a sewing machine, Mr. Beaver has various tools for building and fishing, and both of them have entirely human tastes in food: real beavers do not eat even fish, let alone potatoes, beer, butter and marmalade rolls. For that matter,

given a hundred years of winter and no evidence of international trade, the presence of these foodstuffs in Narnia is at least as unlikely as beavers eating them. Other animals have similarly human tastes: Trufflehunter, for example, apparently eats exactly what the humans and dwarfs eat. The point, of course, is not to make the animals seem human, but, as in The Wind in the Willows, to create a mood of homeliness and hospitality. Having the Beavers serve tree-bark to the Pevensie children might create a more realistic sense of rational animals (as opposed to surrogate humans) but at the expense of mood and economy of action (could the children eat tree-bark? would other food have to be found? would they try to eat it and become ill?). In contrast, although Reepicheep's completely human eating habits are part of his strongly anthropomorphic characterization, they are also part of the omnivorous nature of mice. Mice do eat more or less what people eat.

However, we also see animals who belong to the naturalist tradition, and some of them behave as animals on exactly the same points as the Beavers (and others) behave as humans. Trufflehunter specifically rejects tools in the form of weapons and, with one exception, Talking Beasts fight only with their natural weapons. The one exception is, of course, the mouse contingent, but mice, like men, are naturally ill-equipped for fighting. As for food, in both The Magician's Nephew and The Horse and His Boy, the different eating habits of humans and horses are thrown into relief as Fledge and Bree eat grass while their hungry human companions cannot. Both horses have some difficulty in believing that humans cannot eat grass; they

suspect that humans simply think that they will not like grass. Bree says "I suppose, like all humans, you won't eat natural food like grass and oats. . . . Ever tried?" (HHB, p. 17). Fledge suggests that Polly and Digory "try the grass" arguing that they "might like it better than [they] think" (MN, p. 134). A similar treatment of human versus animal food occurs in The Magician's Nephew as different Talking Beasts try to feed Uncle Andrew (pp. 151-152). Although he can eat the nuts and fruit, he does not seem to appreciate the thistles that the donkey gathers, the worms that the birds drop on him, or even the honey (since it comes complete with a few live bees) that the bear throws into his cage. We see another animal assumption that humans eat what animals do in Glimfeather's offer of a "nice plump bat" as a snack for Jill (SC, p. 42).

In most cases, the surrogate-human versus naturalist-animal approaches do not balance each other as do the tool and food elements. In some elements, such as names, noises and physical habits, the animals are quite naturalized; in others, such as values, the animals are entirely humanized.

Lewis achieves a continuous sense that the Talking Beasts are animals by giving them names that suggest their animal natures. One can see this technique as a sophisticated variant on Grahame's practice of using species names--Rat, Mole or Toad--as character names. Lewis's version of the technique has much the same effect without being so obtrusive. Every time we hear of Pattertwig, for instance, we are reminded that he is a squirrel; every time we hear the name "Glimfeather" we recall that the creature is an owl. Other animals

have names that suggest the animal noises a particular creature makes: the mice have squeaking names--Reepicheep and Peepiceek--and one horse has a whinnying name: Breehy-hinny-brinny-hoohy-hah (HHB, p. 14). Hwin's name in full no doubt also mimics the whinny.

Along the same lines, Lewis actually uses parts of the animals' ability to speak to remind the reader that the creatures speaking are animals. For example, the speech of the owls and dogs is at times onomatopoeic: "Who are you two?. . . ."Too true, too true.". . . "But who are you? There's something magic about you two. I saw you arrive: you flew. . ." (SC, pp. 30-31); "We'll help, we'll help, help, help. Show us how to help, show us how, how. How-how-how?" (LB, p. 109). Even more frequently, an animal's speech includes animal noices. The owls often preface and punctuate their remarks with "Tu-whoo, tu-whoo" (SC, pp. 30-53, passim). Lewis tells us that "Talking horses always become more horsey in accent when they are angry" (HHB, p. 10), and when Bree gets excited, he includes whinnying noises: "Narnia and the North! Bra-ha-ha! Broo Hoo!" (HHB, p. 19) as does Jewel the Unicorn (LB, p. 162). Puzzle's speech is part bray (LB, p. 5), and Ginger's speech includes a "mew" (LB, p. 75) and a "miaow" (LB, p. 94). Many animals, including Aslan, growl, and the creatures who chase Uncle Andrew not only speak in words but also "speak" in "roars, barks, grunts, and various noises of cheerful interest" (MN, p. 111). Finally, the animals have animal types of voices: Fledge has a "nosey and snorty kind of voice" (MN, p. 104); Reepicheep has a "shrill and small voice (PC, p. 73) and, when he is in a reflective mood, a "little chirruping voice" (VDT, p. 26); the

bears have a "wooly sort of voice" (PC, p. 59); the hedghog has a "thick and wheezy voice" (HHB, p. 142). These verbal techniques economically maintain the speakers' dual nature: they are rational; they are animals. The union of these ostensibly antithetical natures generates a tension reminiscent of man's own inner conflict between "higher" and "lower" natures which makes the Talking Beasts a paradigm for man's dual nature.

To this end, Lewis also draws our attention to the physical habits of various animals: Bree's concern over whether the rolling he enjoys is acceptable among Talking Horses emphasizes that activity. Dogs depend on their sense of smell in both The Magician's Nephew (p. 116) and in The Last Battle (p. 151). Most frequently, Lewis uses the nocturnal habits of certain creatures as a reminder that they are animals. Glimfeather is sleepy during the day and the owls have their parliament at night (with some criticism of the unnatural habits of men and animals who sleep at night [PC, p. 14]), Glimfeather and Farsight, the Eagle, are both described as putting their heads under their wings to sleep (PC, p. 196; LB, pp. 93-94), and the hedgehog whom Shasta meets in the early morning is just "on [his] way to bed for a good day's sleep" (HHB, p. 144). Of course, Lewis ignores the nocturnal habits of other animals (such as cats), but he uses sleep habits often enough to convince the reader of the animality of many of the minor Talking Beasts.

One might wonder, if the ability of animals to speak is a given in fairy tales, why Lewis needs, or at least chooses to include, so many details to remind us that the Talking Beasts are beasts. After

all, unlike the inhabitants of Boxen, the Talking Beasts of Narnia live in the woods; we do not see them arriving by hansom at tedious evening parties. But then, we do not see the humans in Narnia arriving by hansom at evening parties either. In fact, the animals and the humans in Narnia are equally involved in Narnian entertainment and politics; the animals, like those in Wind in the Willows, are essentially human in interests and activities. More importantly, the animals seem human in values, attitudes and capabilities. They interact with humans on an almost equal footing and are different in kind from the Dumb Beasts. Most of them are not just human but, morally speaking, ideally so. In this sense, the Talking Beasts transcend the surrogate human type of fantasy animal.

The key to this ideally human element in fantasy animals can be found by comparing the creation scene in The Magician's Nephew to Lewis's imagined combination of human evolution and creation in The Problem of Pain (pp. 65-66; see p. 44 above for summary). The similarities suggest that the Talking Beasts of Narnia are not a "Chosen People" as Patterson calls them ("Lord of the Beasts," p. 28) in the sense of being called out from other animals who remain equal but for the ability to speak. They certainly do not represent, as Swinfen complains, "the most bigoted doctrine of predestination" (In Defense of Fantasy, p. 91) unless one can also argue the same bigotry in the distinctions between humans and animals in this world. The gap between the Talking Animals and the Dumb Animals in Narnia is as great, and of course as trivial, as the gap between humans and animals in our world. Humans and animals are immensely different in

spiritual terms (applying the medieval and renaissance view of reason as a type of soul), but otherwise, humans are simply animals and not very successful animals at that. This inherent similarity between animals and humans partially explains the popularity of animals as vehicles for conveying human qualities. For example, as R. M. Lockley wonders, are "rabbits so human" or are "humans so rabbit"?[17] Here, too, we see why Lewis insists on the presence of both Talking and Dumb animals, an unusual combination in animal fantasy, and on the animality of his Talking Beasts: the difference between Talking and Dumb Beasts is (apart from some variation in size) spiritual.

The equivalence of Talking Beasts with humans is an essential element in such didacticism as can be found in the Chronicles. The point can best be made in Ransom's words: "Animal rationale--an animal, yet also a reasonable soul: such, he remembered, was the old definition of Man" (Per., p. 192). The Talking Beasts clearly fit this definition just as well as homo sapiens. By rejecting their moral nature and their relationship to Aslan, however, the Talking Animals can lapse into dumbness and real animality--a possibility also, as Lewis implies, for humans. In Prince Caspian, Lucy says "Wouldn't it be dreadful if some day in our own world, at home, men started going wild inside, like the animals here, and still looked like men, so that you'd never know which were which?" (p. 101). Of course, the implication is that the process has already begun in our own world; sadly enough, the practical Susan, who refuses to be bothered with the question in Prince Caspian, is, in The Last Battle, the most obvious example of a lapsed human. Even without Lucy's

observation and Susan's example, however, the point would be made through the Talking Beasts because they are, _just_ like us, _animalia rationalia_.

As long as an animal fantasy has only surrogate humans, only natural animals, only fable or satirical associations of an animal with a quality or a character type, then the reader is but lightly touched. Lewis's combination of these types results in a whole that is definitely greater than the sum of the parts. The Talking Beasts are not, in other words, merely illustrations of human tendencies, or anthropomorphic animals, or surrogate humans; they are metaphors conveying Lewis's perspective on humans.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

When one thinks of an author employing sources, one generally has in mind two possibilities. The first is that the author has taken the germ of an idea, the outline of a plot, or the life of a character and wrought a wondrous "sea-change / Into something rich and strange." One thinks of Shakespeare's "debt" to Holinshed or perhaps the relationship between Homer's Ulysses and Tennyson's. The second possibility is that the author has simply taken, unchanged, an idea, plot or character, kidnapped someone else's creativity. And here we find the difficulty in thinking about Lewis's use of his background material: neither possibility describes his method.

The analogues and sources discussed for the non-human characters in the planetary romances and the Narnia tales reveal the variety in both specifics and in fields comprising Lewis's background materials. Lewis has included elements from philosophy, psychology, theology and science as well as from literature; and the literature he invokes ranges from Babylonian mythology to boy's adventure stories, from The Faerie Queene to Voyage to Arcturus. Of all the non-human characters, those which are also non-animal show the richest analogues and sources. The numinous creatures in this category are grounded in Neoplatonist and Platonist philosophy but include elements of Greek, Roman, Norse, Egyptian and Babylonian mythologies, Biblical imagery, medieval and modern science and Jungian archetypal

psychology. The flesh-and-blood creatures in this category are primarily drawn from legends of different cultures--Greek, Roman, Norse, Hebrew and Islamic--but include archetypal figures and influences from children's literature and Tolkien's mythopoeic world. The real and realistic animals, in their functional applications --setting, atmosphere, etc.--are indebted to literary genres such as science-fiction and adventure stories, to specific works, including The Faerie Queene and Paradise Lost, and to Lewis's own theories on animals as expressed in The Problem of Pain. The Talking Animals' analogues include some individual literary characters plus structural influences of fantasy and fairy-tales, but show the strongest debt to various methods of characterization specific to sub-genres of animal fantasy. Lewis's analogues and sources include not just specific literary figures but literary techniques and philosophical frameworks.

Lewis's techniques for employing his analogues are also varied. For the non-human, non-animal creatures, Lewis primarily selected and combined details from non-literary and mythic sources. For the real and realistic animals, Lewis blended structural techniques with specific sources, and for the Talking Beasts Lewis blended characterization techniques with specific analogues. The emphases in each case, however, were on using types rather than specifics and on making the disparate elements consistent with a single, essentially Christian, world view.

Lewis's application of his sources and analogues derives from his stated opinion on the role of a Christian writer and from the ele-

ments he seemed most to admire in the approach of medieval writers. Lewis has taken his own advice about ignoring the values of modern criticism that link praise of creativity, spontaneity and freedom with condemnation of their supposed opposites writing that is derivative, conventional or rule-bound. Although Lewis does not follow the medieval practice of re-telling a story (at least, not for the works in question--he certainly does so for Till We Have Faces), his non-human characters are "derivative" in the sense that they are derived from written works, and he employs the "conventions" of earlier works in terms of techniques of setting, mechanics and characterization. As far as the non-human characters are concerned, Lewis is not creative, spontaneous or free in the usual senses of those terms in modern criticism. Moreover, Lewis does not exactly "re-work" his analogues to make them his own. But although most elements in Lewis's non-human characters can be traced to an earlier character, technique, application or philosophy, few can be matched with an analogue or even with several complete analogues. Lewis does not combine one analogue with another--such a practice would indeed be pastiche, instead Lewis takes one element from one analogue, another element from a second and blends them with something drawn from a mind stocked with philosophy, science, psychology and theology.

Lewis has, in fact, drawn and employed his characters from his experience and his acquaintances just as one might argue that Austen or Hemingway did. Lewis's experiences and acquaintances, however, are literary. Ultimately, we find that the quantity and variety of his analgoues and sources do not make his writing a pastiche, nor, in

a pejorative sense, derivative, least of all plagiaristic. If Lewis had used fewer analogues and sources, these charges might have applied, but the richness of the background material instead establishes a literary reality similar to the practical reality found in works that combine and intensify bits and pieces of human experience. As Lewis says, the author does not create Beauty and Wisdom; he just works with their existing forms. Lewis's writing conveys the courage of his critical convictions and proves them correct.

We can conclude, then, that Lewis's techniques demonstrate that literary experience and observation can be as successful as their real life equivalents in conveying presentational reality; that his method of using analogues demonstrates the viability of elements of the medieval attitude to "auctorities"; and that his attitude towards using analogues demonstrates the possibility of being original and creative within the strictures and values he suggests for the Christian writer. The examination of Lewis's applications of analogues and sources illustrates the practical application of his literary and Christian critical perspectives.

Lewis says, justifying his own analysis of background materials for medieval texts, "we may have to go outside it [a medieval poem] in order that we may presently come inside it again, better equipped."[1] In understanding something of the analogues and sources for the non-human characters in Lewis's planetary novels and Narnia Chronicles, the reader is "better equipped", if not to understand the fiction, at least to understand the critical perspective controlling Lewis's fiction and hence to appreciate his literary achievement.

Notes

Chapter One

[1] James T. Como, "Introduction: Within the Realms of Plenitude," C. S. Lewis at the Breakfast Table (New York: Macmillan, 1979), p. xxiii. See also Walter Hooper, "Narnia: The Author, the Critics and the Tale," in The Longing for a Form, ed. Peter J. Schakel (Kent State University Press, 1977), p. 106.

[2] See for example The Discarded Image: An Introduction to Medieval and Renaissance Literature (Cambridge University Press, 1964).

[3] See for example "On Three Ways of Writing for Children," Of Other Worlds: Essays and Stories, ed. Walter Hooper (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1966).

[4] Roger Lancelyn Green and Walter Hooper, C. S. Lewis: A Biography (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974), p. 241. Further references to this work are included in the text of the thesis abbreviated as Biography.

[5] All Lewis's fiction can be seen as didactic and evangelical in that it conveys a particular world view as attractive and portrays other world views as unappealing, dangerous or foolish. However, fiction usually tends to be didactic and evangelical in this sense.

[6] C. S. Lewis, The Lion, The Witch and the Wardrobe (New York: Macmillan, 1950); Prince Caspian (New York: Macmillan, 1951), Voyage of the Dawn Treader (New York: Macmillan, 1952); The Silver Chair (New York: Macmillan, 1953); The Horse and His Boy (New York: Macmillan, 1954); The Magician's Nephew (New York: Macmillan, 1955); The Last Battle (New York: Macmillan, 1956).

[7] C. S. Lewis, Out of the Silent Planet (1938; rpt. London: Pan, 1952); Voyage to Venus (Perelandra) (1943; rpt. London: Pan, 1953); That Hideous Strength (1945; rpt. London: Pan, 1955).

[8] Throughout the thesis, the term "myth" is used in the sense of Lewis's definition in An Experiment in Criticism (Cambridge University Press, 1961). The key points of his chapter "On Myth" are 1. that myth is extra-literary; 2. that it "is felt to be inevitable"; 3. that "human sympathy is at a minimum"; 4. that myth always "deals with impossibles and preter-naturals"; 5. that "the experience . . . is always grave"; and 6. that myth is numinous. See pp. 40-49, and especially pp. 43-44. The term "legend" refers to traditional tales which do not contain the mythic elements Lewis outlines. The story of Cupid and Psyche is a myth; the story of Chiron is a legend.

[9] J. R. R. Tolkien, Tree and Leaf (London: Allen and Unwin, 1964), see especially p. 36.

[10] Humphrey Carpenter, The Inklings: C. S. Lewis, J. R. R. Tolkien, Charles Williams, and their friends (New York: Ballantine, 1978), p. 247.

[11] For example, Green and Hooper conclude their discussion of Lewis's literary echoes by saying "Lewis can never be accused of copying another author, save in trifling instances, which were usually subconscious anyway" (Biography, p. 250). They also say that Lewis "could no more be accused of plagiarism for introducing fauns and centaurs . . . than Homer could" (p. 251-52). One wonders why they feel the need to defend Lewis against this charge. Surely it is obvious that introducing classical creatures does not constitute plagiarism.

[12] Hooper does go into more detail about source-hunting in the corresponding passage in his longer version of the same material in Past Watchful Dragons (London: Collier, Macmillan, 1971) (see pp. 106-109). His point, however, is much the same in both versions.

[13] C. S. Lewis, "The Genesis of a Medieval Book," in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, ed. Walter Hooper (Cambridge University Press, 1966), pp. 37-38.

[14] C. S. Lewis, "Christianity and Literature," Rehabilitations and Other Essays (London, 1939), see p. 195.

[15] The word "story" should be taken in the sense in which Lewis uses it in "On Stories," Of Other Worlds: Essays and Stories, see especially p. 3.

Chapter Two

[1] The term "numinous" to refer to the human sense of the existence or presence of the supernatural was made fashionable by Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, trans. John W. Harvey (1923; rpt. Oxford University Press, 1976). See especially chapter III.

[2] C. S. Lewis, Letters to An American Lady, ed. Clyde S. Kilby (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 12-13.

[3] Lewis, in his Preface to Paradise Lost (1942; rpt. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), summarizes part of Henry More's Immortality of the Soul (III, ix, 6) to shed light on the theory Milton probably drew on in describing angel bodies.

[4] Although the critical work was written twenty-five years after the first of the science-fiction stories, Lewis had been lecturing on the background to medieval literature since the 1920's. The Discarded Image is based on Lewis's lecture series "Prolegema to Medieval Studies".

[5] John Willis, "The Eldila in the Space Trilogy," Bulletin of the New York C. S. Lewis Society, 11, No. 4 (Feb., 1980), p. 3.

[6] More goes into considerable detail about angels taking on quasi-human bodies, primarily for communication and combat.

[7] See E. M. W. Tillyard, The Elizabethan World Picture (New York: Vintage Books, 1943), p. 40.

[8] More's third letter to Descartes, quoted in Preface to Paradise Lost, p. 110.

[9] The summary of Einstein's Theory of Relativity in The Penguin Dictionary of Astronomy (Penguin, 1966) bears a strong resemblance to Augray the Sorn's exposition on physics: "According to the theory [Einstein's not Augray's], classical mechanics [which Ransom outlines] is a special case of a more general mechanics, and is valid only for low velocities [cp. Augray's emphasis on body as movement]. . . . Mass is regarded as a form of energy" (p. 74).

[10] Ficino, Theologia Platonica (IV, i); cited in Lewis, Preface to Paradise Lost, p. 110.

[11] The idea of the stars taking part in a dance occurs at least as early as the sixth century B.C. in the astral religion of the Babylonians, according to Franz Cumont in his Astrology and Religion Among the Greeks and Romans (New York: Dover, 1912), p. 37.

[12] Father Christmas and Father Time seem to be connected with the "planetary intelligence" of Saturn and possibly of Jupiter. See pp. 22-23 following.

[13] Nancy-Lou Patterson, "The Host of Heaven: Astrological and Other Images of Divinity in The Fantasies of C. S. Lewis. Part I," Mythlore, 25 (Aut. 1980), p. 23.

[14] The Discarded Image, p. 105.

[15] Cronos is identified as "Time" in Bulfinch's Mythology. The Age of Fable (New York. Doubleday and Company, 1968), p. 5.

[16] Patterson, p. 18. Patterson also points out that Father Christmas has been connected with Saturn on the rather unconvincing grounds of the image of both as hoary yule figures. See William Sansom, A Book of Christmas (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 104.

[17] The healing cordial is made from "one of the fire-flowers that grow in the mountains of the sun" (LWW, p. 88). Compare the fire-berries, from the valleys of the sun, which restore Ramandu in Voyage of the Dawn Treader.

[18] Lewis's theory of gender includes an absolute superiority of the masculine gender. In Preface to Paradise Lost, Lewis says "whether the male is, or is not, the superior sex, the masculine is certainly the superior gender" (p. 113). Ransom says that the male "exists only on the biological level" but that "above and beyond all things is [something] so masculine that we are all feminine in relation to it" (THS, p. 316). Lewis seems concerned to disassociate the understanding of God as masculine from any understanding of God as male, but he also wants to describe God in unequivocally patriarchal terms. As a result, the claim of seven genders notwithstanding, all the Oysersu except Perelandra seem masculine insofar as they seem divine.

[19] C. S. Lewis, The Four Loves (New York, 1960).

[20] The similarities are no doubt the result of mutual influence since the two authors read and discussed each other's fiction during the writing process.

[21] Paul F. Ford, Companion to Narnia (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 421. Ford refers to Humphrey Carpenter, Tolkien (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), p. 194.

[22] Or at least from legend not exclusively classical. Witches appear in all periods and giants in many.

[23] See Katherine Briggs, An Encyclopedia of Fairies (New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1978); Ford incorrectly attributes the connection to Patterson, Mythlore, 27. However, Mythlore, 27 does not contain an article by Patterson. Patterson's article in Mythlore, 26 mentions various longaevi but does not discuss wooses.

[24] See especially Katherine Briggs, A Dictionary of Fairies: Hobgoblins, Brownies Bogies and other Supernatural Creatures (London. Pengin, 1976). See also Gertrude Jobes, Dictionary of Myth, Folklore and Symbols, 3 vols. (New York: Scarecrow Press, 1961).

[25] Ford, p. 164. See also the Dictionary of Myth, Folkore and Symbols, p. 44.

[26] Quoted by Peter J. Schakel, Reading With the Heart. The Way into Narnia (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1979), p. 9.

[27] Glen GoodKnight, "Lilith in Narnia," Narnia Conference Proceedings (Los Angeles: Mythopoeic Society, 1970), p. 15.

[28] Mr. Beaver emphasizes that this combination includes not a drop of real human blood.

[29] Nancy-Lou Patterson, "Halfe Like a Serpente. The Green Witch in The Silver Chair," Mythlore, 40 (Aut. 1984), p. 42.

[30] John Cox, "Epistemological Release in The Silver Chair," in The Longing for a Form, ed. Peter J. Schakel (Kent State University Press, 1977), p. 161.

[31] Patterson, "The Host of Heaven: Astrological and Other Images of Divinity in The Fantasies of C. S. Lewis, Part II," Mythlore, 26 (Winter, 1981), p. 18.

[32] Ann Swinfen, In Defense of Fantasy: A Study of the Genre in English and American Literature since 1945 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 153.

[33] Donald E. Glover, C. S. Lewis: The Art of Enchantment (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981), p. 166.

[34] The Prose Edda of Snorri Sturluson: Tales from Norse Mythology, trans. Jean I. Young (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954), pp. 35-36.

Chapter Three

[1] The scene contains a number of fantasy elements, but they all concern Jadis. Despite the supernatural method of frightening the horse, Strawberry is simply an ordinary, very frightened horse.

[2] Deborah Rogers, "The Fictitious Characters of C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien in Relation to their Medieval Sources," Dissertation University of Wisconsin 1972, p. 160. See below for a fuller discussion of onomatopoeia in animal speech.

[3] See pp. 47-50 following. Lewis makes it clear that, even in works that do imitate reality, the imitation of reality is not something he admires for itself.

[4] See Lewis's discussion of this principle of hierarchy in "Imagination and Thought in the Middle Ages" in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, Walter Hooper, ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 50. See also Preface to Paradise Lost, Chapter XI.

[5] See Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), I. 1-4.

[6] J. B. S. Haldane, "Auld Hornie, F.R.S.," in Shadows of Imagination: The Fantasies of C. S. Lewis, J. R. R.Tolkien, and Charles Williams, ed. Mark R. Hillegas (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969).

[7] Carol Ann Brown, "Once Upon a Narnia," CSL: The Bulletin of the New York C. S. Lewis Society, 8, No. 8 (June 1977), p. 1.

[8] Vladimir Propp, The Morphology of the Folktale, 1st ed., trans. Laurence Scott; 2nd ed. rev. Louis A. Wagner, American Folklore Society Bibliographical and Special Series (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968), passim.

[9] Kath Filmer, "Speaking in Parables," Mythlore, 40 (Aut. 1984), p. 15. See Propp, p. 25.

[10] David Lindsay, Voyage to Arcturus (1920; rpt. London: Pan, 1965).

[11] According to C. W. Hume in The Status of Animals in the Christian Religion (London: The Universities Federation for Animal Welfare, 1956), the Bible makes extensive use of animals and of animal imagery, especially within its discussions of ideal behaviour (e.g. Job 4.11 demands consideration for animals and Ex. 20.10 includes animals as being exempt from labour on the sabbath). It is not surprising, then, that a Christian writer includes animals in a world that must seem ideal.

[12] Sister Pauline, CSM, "Secondary Worlds: Lewis and Tolkien," CSL, 12, No. 7 (May 1981), p. 3.

[13] Rider Haggard, King Solomon's Mines (1886; rpt. London: Dent, 1963).

[14] The Nibelungenlied, trans. A. T. Hatto (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1965), pp. 124-128.

[15] The actual creation scene in Paradise Lost Book VII (notably lines 449-493) is the other direct analogue (though Milton does include various tropical animals).

[16] Geoffrey Chaucer, "Prologue to the Canterbury Tales," in The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, ed. F. N. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 18, ll. 143-150.

[17] Eileen Power, Medieval People (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1924), pp. 90-91.

[18] Weston is the spokesman for ideas Dr. Haldane had expressed in print, ideas to which Lewis violently objected (see Biography, p. 163; see also Carpenter, p. 72).

[19] We see Lewis's responses, emotional and intellectual, to insects informing part of his battle with the Un-man on Perelandra, but these responses are not part of characterization.

[20] Judith J. Kollman, "C. S. Lewis as Medievalist," CSL, 10, No. 7 (May 1979), p. 3.

[21] For example, horses are an emphasized part of the symbolism in Revelation. Lewis may have had in mind Revelation 6.2, describing the False Christ who rides a white horse, when he chose a white horse for the Green Witch. The symbolism cannot be pushed too far, however; although there are numerous parallels between the functions of the False Christ and those of the Green Witch, the parallels do not hold between the next rider of a white horse in Revelation (the True Christ) and Snowflake's next rider (Jill Pole).

Chapter Four

[1] The most common response to the title of this thesis was "You mean Aslan and all the Talking Animals?" Many of the people asking this question said they had read the Narnia tales several times, and yet even on further discussion did not seem to remember fauns or centaurs or talking trees.

[2] One could here apply Jacques Lacan's version of the archetypal Other: just as an individual defines himself in terms of his perception of those things not-himself, so mankind can only establish an identity in terms of something like but apart from mankind. See "The Subject and the Other: Aphanisis," The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (1973; trans. New York: Norton, 1978), especially p. 214.

[3] A "secondary world" may be defined as one which is entirely a creation of the imagination no matter how closely it is based on the primary world. A story set on Mars is set in the primary world because Mars has a scientifically verifiable existence. Narnia and Middle Earth are secondary worlds. For a discussion of the requirements and effects of secondary worlds in terms of a reader's ability to "suspend disbelief", see Tolkien's Tree and Leaf, p. 36.

[4] Nancy-Lou Patterson, "Lord of the Beasts: Animal Archetypes in C. S. Lewis," Narnia Conference Proceedings, pp. 27-28.

[5] Unfortunately, the most playful application of an analogue, Reepicheep's debt to the medieval questing beast, is not likely to contribute to an ordinary reader's acceptance of this character.

[6] Bruce McMenomy, "Arthurian Themes in the Narnia Books," Narnia Conference Proceedings, p. 9.

[7] See also Lewis's distinction between "companionship" and "friendship" in The Four Loves, pp. 94-96.

[8] William H. Magee, "The Animal Story: A Challenge in Technique," Only Connect: Readings on Children's Literature, eds. Sheila Egoff, G. T. Stubbs, and L. F. Ashley, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 221.

[9] Gertrude R. Levy, The Gate of Horn (London: Faber and Faber, 1948), p. 19.

[10] Rogers distinguishes between a "guide", anyone who physically leads or directs someone else; and a "Guide", who must be in some sense a divine being whose guidance, whatever physical direction it provides, is essentially moral or spiritual. For example, Lady Philosophy is a Guide to Boethius. See pp. 61-62.

[11] I am indebted to Rogers, p. 26 for the association of Lewis's dragon with the Norse Fafnir.

[12] Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 133.

[13] Kathryn Lindskoog, The Lion of Judah in Never-Never Land: The Theology of C.S. Lewis Expressed in His Fantasies for Children (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 1973), pp. 48-84.

[14] It must be noted that Lillian H. Smith ("News from Narnia," Only Connect) sees this element as an indication of "the prehistoric antiquity of animal traits, the unchanging persistent tenacity with which they pursue their own ends" (p. 173). This perspective places animals in the category of primitive folklore rather than that of satire.

[15] Cited in Walter Hooper, Past Watchful Dragons, pp. 4-5.

[16] Carpenter argues that "the Narnia series was rather uneven in quality" and especially criticizes the first two stories as being internally inconsistent and as lacking "that special quality of atmosphere which Lewis himself declared was such a vital ingredient of stories" (Inklings, p. 251). The more completely homogenized blend of different types of animal fantasy in the Talking Beasts of the later Narnia tales can be seen as part of the "quality of atmosphere" missing in the earlier tales.

[17] R. M. Lockley, The Private Life of the Rabbit (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), p. 164.

Chapter Five

1 "'De Audiendis Poetis'," Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Literature, p. 1.

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ANALOGUES AND SOURCES FOR THE NON-HUMAN CHARACTERS IN C. S. LEWIS'S PLANETARY ROMANCES AND NARNIA CHRONICLES

Author [redacted]

ELEANOR MARION SUMPTER

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