

THE INUVIALUIT FINAL AGREEMENT: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN THE WESTERN ARCTIC
BEAUFORT REGION, NORTHWEST TERRITORIES

by
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

i	Title Page
ii - iii	Table of Contents
iv - v	Abstract
vi - vii	Illustrations I and II
viii	Acknowledgements
ix - x	Preface
1 - 21	Introduction
22 - 54	Chapter I: Federal Intervention and Development in the Western Arctic, NWT
	1.1 Arctic Exploration and Federal Interventionism : 1900-1950
	1.2 Federal Intervention and Arctic Industry : 1950-1965
	1.3 Arctic Non-Renewable Resource Development/Berger Commission : 1965-1975
	1.4 Northern Land Claims/ Regional Development : 1975.....
55 - 95	Chapter II: Northern Land Claims and NWT Constitutional Reform
	2.1 Constitutional Alliance and Government Reform, NWT
	2.2 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement/ Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
	2.3 Western Arctic Claim/ Inuvialuit Final Agreement, NWT
	2.4 Inuvialuit Self-Government, Beaufort Region, NWT
96 - 139	Chapter III: Political-Economic Development in the Beaufort Region, NWT
	3.1 Inuvialuit Political-Economic Development: -- Western Arctic Regional Municipality

-- Western Arctic Regional Government

-- Prime Public Authority

3.2 NWT Regional and Tribal Councils

3.3 Shared-Governance

3.4 The Scone Report: A *Dual-Strategy* of
Development

3.5 Intercircumpolar Relations: Culture,
Politics and Trade

140 - 145 Conclusion

146 - 163 Footnotes

164 - 168 References

169 Appendix

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
ABSTRACT

In the Beaufort Region, Western Arctic, Northwest Territories, a new era of constitutional development has dawned with Inuvialuit communities at the forefront of political-economic reform and cultural renewal inspired by their 1984 land claim. The Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) created the basis for new land jurisdictions and institutions governed by Inuvialuit communities themselves. Unlike previous state-led strategies for development in the Western NWT, the current IFA regional (corporate) governing body derives its authority to implement political-economic policy decisions and to represent Inuvialuit in the NWT Legislative Assembly from the communities. The communities decide the powers of their regional corporation, and the latter has become a strong force in the Legislative Assembly in determining the direction of regional government in the Western Arctic. The current IFA corporate network represents a constitutional change of major significance, of which the federal and territorial governments and other land claimants have taken much notice. Inuvialuit proposals to establish regional self-government, advanced since the beginning of their land claim in 1977, now appear an imminent reality. While there remain other competing levels of government begun by previous federal administrations, Inuvialuit communities are the primary governing institutions in the Beaufort region. Clearly, it is the IFA regional/community corporate bodies that are emerging as

the enduring feature of Beaufort government as it exists today. Previous governing regimes in the Western Arctic have proven unreliable and transitory, a passing whim inspired by what suited the economies of the south. A downturn in the national economy and in the global oil industry has proven a blessing in disguise for Inuvialuit, and Beaufort communities have taken over the development challenge -- building a political-economy that centers on traditional wilderness activities and modern services, and that offers opportunities for future Inuvialuit.



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INUVIALUIT SETTLEMENT REGION





ILLUSTRATION I



COMPREHENSIVE NATIVE CLAIMS IN CANADA LEGEND

Apart from the James Bay "Territory" and the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, the areas indicated on this map represent only approximate boundaries of the areas in which the various native associations have claimed an interest. The precise delineation of these areas for each claimant group will be determined as negotiations proceed on the separate claims settlements.

- (1) Council for Yukon Indians (CY)
- (2a) Inuvialuit Settlement Region
- (2b) * Land areas selected by Inuvialuit pursuant to the Inuvialuit Final Agreement
- (3) Dene Nation
- (4) Metis Association of the Northwest Territories (MANWT)
- (5) Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN)
- (6) Labrador Inuit Association (LIA)
- (7) Naskapi-Montagnais Innu Association (NMIA)
- (8a) James Bay "Territory" — James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and North-eastern Quebec Agreement (Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec & the Northern Quebec Inuit Association; Naskapis of Schefferville)
- (8b) * Land areas selected by the Crees, Inuit of Quebec and Naskapis of Schefferville pursuant to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement

- (9) Conseil Attikamek-Montagnais (CAM)
- (10) Offshore Islands
- * Approximate Representation

COMPREHENSIVE NATIVE CLAIMS IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

- (1) Nishga Tribal Council
- (2) Kitwancool Band
- (3) Gitksan-Wet'suwet'en Tribal Council
- (4) Haisla Nation (Kitamaat Village)
- (5) Association of United Tahitans
- (6) Nuu-Chah-Nulth Tribal Council
- (7) Council of Haida Nation
- (8) Heiltsuk Nation (Bella Bella)
- (9) Nuxalk Nation (Bella Coola)
- (10) Nazko-Kluskus Tribal Council
- (11) Kaska-Dena Council
- (12) Carrier-Sekani Tribal Council
- (13) Alkali Lake Band
- (14) Atlin Band (Taku Tlingit)

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interest in this project, and
-- to Noah,

QUYANAQ

Preface

As an introductory research project on current political-economic development in the Beaufort region, western Northwest Territories (NWT) this Thesis examines the 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement/Western Arctic Claim (IFA) and subsequent Inuvialuit community and regional institutional arrangements that embody activities of government. The research draws upon various academic studies and historical accounts focused on the north, government documents and special publications, the IFA and IFA workshops, local media sources (Tusaayaksat, the Inuvialuit regional newspaper, and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Inuvik verbatim files), the National Energy Board hearings, Inuvik sessions (April 1989), and the Special Committee on the Northern Economy, Inuvik sessions (January 1989) and "just talk from people on the street." ¹

Primary experiences -- IFA workshops, interviews with key Inuvialuit regional representatives and participant observation -- gave me a fuller sense of the Inuvialuit land claim process and the ensuing Beaufort government reforms. I resided in Inuvik, between December 1988 and August 1989, and worked full-time as a nurse in the Inuvik Regional Hospital and on medivac teams responding to medical emergencies in the surrounding communities. I was too busy at that time to do much formal interviewing, aside from a couple of sessions with former representatives of

the Western Arctic land claim who now function in various capacities under the IFA. Thus, only a few personal references to key individuals appear in my footnotes. The greater value of my time in the Beaufort region was derived from daily encounters with local residents, both Inuvialuit and non-Inuvialuit, as I listened to their ideas on political-economic development in the region. For purposes of the project at hand, living near Inuvialuit culture and experiencing the distinctly personal realm and flavor of ordinary daily events simply provided me with a deeper awareness of the *unconscious stuff* of NWT development referred to in some scholarly works. There was one thing of which I became keenly aware, and which remained central to my subsequent thought. With respect to the rigors of Arctic living, ongoing processes of community development and of discovery directly affect governance in the Beaufort region. To abstract from these processes, and thus to marginalize commonplace circumstances related to local development, is to lose sight of much of what is important in constitutional development. I hope I have succeeded in avoiding such abstraction here: if so, this is due to the many kind people I worked and lived with in Inuvik.

INTRODUCTION

You should see Aklavik. Its beautiful.
The foothills, the river...You can see
the caribou nearby. If you come to visit
I'd take you on the dogsled...They should
build a road to Aklavik.

-- An Aklavik Elder

During my visit to the Northwest Territories, Beaufort Region, an Inuvialuit spokesperson asked quizzically: *What is government?* ² This is a question commonly posed in an introductory political science class, but it is pregnant with meaning in the context of a people's struggle to establish new institutions of self-government. What can "government" -- particularly, *self-government* -- mean for Inuvialuit and their traditional land-based culture -- now concentrated mainly in six widely scattered settlements, with outsiders mingled among them -- living in the High Arctic under the sovereignty of the Canadian state? Can meaningful self-government be achieved under these circumstances?


The Inuvialuit's own answer to that question seems to be embodied in the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) with the Canadian federal government, which was ratified on June 5th, 1984. ³ That agreement not only settled the Inuvialuit's outstanding claim, but it established new political and economic institutions, which, in the eyes of Inuvialuit leaders, would provide the framework for an ongoing process of development. Inuvialuit learned from the experiences of Inupiat in Alaska and of Inuit/Cree in northern Quebec, and in turn provided an example to other 'claimant' groups, especially in the Western Arctic. As such, their experience is of broad significance. The purpose here is not to offer a definitive evaluation, but

instead to examine the Inuvialuit Final Agreement in its cultural and historical context, and to explore the implications of the new processes of government that have been set in motion. The thesis is that these processes cannot be understood in abstraction from the Inuvialuit culture of survival. The southern tendency to ignore or devalue the strength of that culture has led various commentators to underestimate Inuvialuit communities, and to diminish their political achievements. Much of the analysis that follows here is intended to highlight and contextualize what has been achieved, and thus to draw attention to what must be regarded as a constitutional development of major significance.

As a comprehensive land settlement, the IFA granted Inuvialuit approximately one-half of the traditional land base they had claimed, a total of approximately 35,000 square miles of land in the Western Arctic. This was in exchange for the extinguishment of all outstanding claims to traditional land rights. Of the total land area provided through settlement legislation, 4200 square miles were granted in fee-simple absolute terms, selected in 700 square mile blocks near the six Inuvialuit communities of Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Sachs Harbour, Paulatuk and Holman. ⁴ Inuvialuit property rights extend to all lakes, rivers and other navigable waterways within the settlement region. ⁵ Canada granted property rights to Inuvialuit

that included control over public access and development of their land. However, this was more than an abstract right. Under the Agreement, a network of new regional institutions for land administration and economic development -- in effect, for *self-government* -- was created. Thus, the IFA also established the elements of a new political constitution for Inuvialuit.

The central agency or 'government' in this network is the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC). Under the IFA the IRC is regulated by the six Inuvialuit Community Corporations (ICCs) which together form a co-operative regional governing network. Ancillary corporate structures, the Inuvialuit Development Corporation (IDC), Inuvialuit Investment Corporation (IIC) and Inuvialuit Land Administration (ILA) exist to manage land development and corporate investments made on behalf of Inuvialuit beneficiaries. An Inuvialuit Trust and Social Development Fund (ISDF) are established for the purposes of equally distributing shares, profits and social benefits to all eligible persons. 6



The hope is that these land claim institutions will establish new forms of government and directions for economic and social development in the Beaufort Region.

The topic of Beaufort development and regional government frequently creates heated controversy in Inuvialuit, Indian and other circles in the western NWT. A former Chief Negotiator of the Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE), which was organized in 1976 to represent all Inuvialuit communities involved in negotiations with the Federal government for the Western Arctic Claim, explained that the term 'development' has tended to denote a particular philosophy not compatible with the political-economic potential and reality of the region. Inuvialuit residing in Beaufort communities have "preserved unique talents and a way of life" -- that is, subsistence practices -- which do not easily fit with imported models of government and business development. ⁷

Early federal administrations nonetheless promoted development similar to that in other parts of the country, with respect to trade and industry, law and order, education, health and welfare programs, settlements and roads. For a long time building roads in the Western Arctic meant development. Some Beaufort residents who recall the early days of heavy road construction may still be heard mimicking the belief that a road built to their home community would generate local jobs and business.

Yet, the continuing question of development weighing most heavily upon communities and government in the region remains "what are people going to do?"⁸ Building a road -- or a school -- does not provide an adequate answer to that question.

The apparent lack of future opportunities in NWT communities, as it relates to employment in the public and private sectors, has prompted a panicky search by the Territorial government for a solution. In 1989 the Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) organized The Special Committee on the Northern Economy with a mandate to study community social and economic conditions and to recommend a government strategy to improve trade and employment opportunities in the various regions of the NWT. The Scone Report, outlining the Special Committee's findings and final recommendations, contains a proposal for a long-term dual-strategy based upon two contrasting but, as later explained, correlated aspects of sustainable development in the NWT: the first, a stable transfer economy and, the second, economic growth through a renewed spirit of northern entrepreneurship. A worst-case social-economic scenario appears in the Scone Report with reference to a recent gloomy future prediction that northern communities might deteriorate into "arctic ghettos" formed by earlier federal policies.⁹ Employing a less extreme interpretation of NWT community development,

the Special Committee concedes that there may be declining opportunities, but it retains hope that such trends are reversible. It is this hopefulness that can be found among Inuvialuit and other reformers currently promoting northern institutions for northern people.

Regional government, either in the sense of authority devolved from the Territorial government or in the sense of power exercised from below by Inuit and Indian claimants, is not new to the NWT. However, political-economic reforms inspired by the land claim process are creating distinct patterns of government. Prior to the late 1960s, the Federal government provided public services directly to Inuit and Indian communities, which were mostly isolated and remote one from the other. Gradually, following the 1966 transfer of federal powers to the Territorial government in Yellowknife, regional districts originally named after the early explorers Mackenzie (western NWT), Franklin (eastern NWT) and the Keewatin (central NWT) were divided into smaller geographic areas for administrative purposes. ¹⁰ In the Western NWT, the Mackenzie District was divided into the Inuvik (northeast of the Alaska/Yukon border), Kitikmeot (central-west) and Fort Smith (south-west) regions. The major factors determining these administrative boundaries were the number of communities to be served, their population size, and the communication and transportation routes. ¹¹ These government districts have

been developing a new political face within the milieu of NWT land claims. The main three land claims have been those of the Eastern Arctic Inuit (Nunavut) and, in the Western Arctic, the Dene (Denendeh) and Inuvialuit (IFA), of which the latter was the first to be settled. (See Map, Illustration II). The Inuvialuit communities are situated within, or in close proximity to, the Inuvik region. 12

Thus, there is a possible tension between the bottom-up institutions fostered by the IFA and the forms of regional administration established by the Territorial Government. As we shall see, there have been ongoing debates about the next stage of political development at this level.

However, throughout these debates, principles of 'partnership' or 'shared governance' -- which reflect the cultural experiences of Inuit and Indian peoples -- have been advanced as means of overcoming difficulties.

To set the current debates on the IFA and Inuvialuit proposals for regional government in context, Chapter One, Federal Intervention and Development in the Western Arctic, NWT, reviews the history of federal intervention in the NWT, beginning with the organization of a North-West Territorial branch in Ottawa (1921). Attention is directed to contemporary literary accounts of Inuvialuit society, which give a sense of southern perceptions of the society that was to be governed. Vernon Quinn's characterization of NWT regions, largely based upon a conjectural knowledge

of arctic history may be typical. It stems from the twentieth century epoch of North American exploration and culminates in a fantastical image of 'the North': "Let us probe the silent places... Let us journey to a lonely land...the wild is calling, calling..."¹³ Quinn's literary portrayal of "Eskimos", their "great gathering grounds...men, women, children and especially dogs... bartering...seal or whale fishing", curiously avoids any reference to Inuit occupation of land and situates Inuvialuit in a mere "strip along the arctic coast."¹⁴ Inuvialuit and other indigenous societies named in Quinn's chapter, 'The Lure of the North', disappear into the arctic landscape, in some remote, lonely corner of a region, icebound, and isolated unto themselves. Such marginalization was to be reflected in governmental arrangements that treated Inuvialuit territory as an empty space to be filled by southern activities. As the modern economy and the modern state expanded into arctic regions, the institutions of southern society were replicated there, but with unfortunate results.

More recent accounts of the initial phases of NWT development confirm the story of arctic exploration and state expansion appearing in early narratives. Quinn had expressed the popular notion of northern progress and wrote that the North was "full of promise for the future...rich in mineral, silver, gold, copper, iron, coal...fur supply

is almost unlimited; great and quick fortunes could be made..."¹⁵ The idea of *the North* as a panacea for the wanderlust adventurer and prospector resurfaces in a recent study by Jack C. Stabler and Eric C. Howe who begin by tracing the origin of current NWT economic and social trends prior to the state's active role in northern development. Stabler and Howe argue that existing patterns of development are the direct result of early European influences and ensuing federal pressures to industrialize the north, which in turn led to a downward-spiral in many indigenous communities. Early federal administrations forced the transformation of traditional subsistence economies at a time when Inuit and Indian populations were not prepared for the new dominant social order; the apparent problems now confronting NWT communities are continued high unemployment and social disturbances, compounded by economic uncertainty because of cutbacks in federal transfer payments and subsidies for local programs and services. Transfer payments created a "social safety-net" as well as disincentives for families to provide for themselves: "In many cases the hunter's wife or parents were suddenly drawing incomes that provided more support for the family than his own efforts."¹⁶

The irony of federal interventions to develop NWT communities appears both in the resulting social disintegration and in the lack of political control evident

within the regions. Notably, in the 1950s, the Federal government approved the construction of whole towns and the installation of modern services meant to improve the material circumstances of Inuit and Indian families. Frances Abele explains that once Inuit and Indian communities had received the full range of welfare services, Ottawa began to judge 'native disadvantage' as stemming from a lack of democratic participation, and, by the 1960s, organized regional administrative centers and small village municipalities (led by a Northern Services Officer) to support a fledgling democratic system completely operated by federal appointees and manpower. These attempts to stimulate participation by Inuit and Indian communities in municipal government resulted in stark failure. Federal strategies to improve Inuit and Indian participation in local government and ameliorate economic and social problems, in Abele's final estimation, were replete with ethnocentric and national myths that rendered them incompatible with the particular realities of northern communities. These overall attempts at social and democratic improvement accomplished the reverse, imposing barriers to Inuit and Indian participation in local affairs and exacting heavy hardships which peeled away at the very core of traditional societal values. 17

Federal programs and services implemented in the regions, and the role of federal appointees in municipal

councils, represented the needs of Ottawa more than those of Inuit and Indian communities. Long-term negative effects upon traditional Inuit and Indian lifestyles, which resulted from federal policies to 'democratize' government and raise community living standards according to norms in southern Canada, became more apparent with the onset of land claims. Abele writes that "when Native peoples' experiences of the policies is taken into account...the new life in the settlements brought social problems"; old patterns of hunting/trapping, sharing family resources and authority based upon valued socio-cultural practices and respect for elders became strained under Ottawa's top-down enforcement of its new northern agenda. ¹⁸ Cumulative social disturbances arising from a profound lack of community input into government policies continued unheard until the early 1970s when the well-publicized Berger Commission (investigating the proposed construction of an oil pipeline through the western arctic Mackenzie Valley) and new NWT land claim proceedings heightened public awareness of Inuit and Indian concerns for cultural and environmental preservation. ¹⁹

In Chapter Two, NWT Land Claims and Constitutional Reform, we look at GNWT and Inuit/Indian land claim negotiations since the early 1970s and at subsequent debates in the Legislative Assembly relevant to Inuvialuit land issues and agendas for government reform in the

western NWT. A brief overview of two other northern land settlements in James Bay (Quebec) and Alaska provides a contrast to the IFA, revealing how terms and conditions that appear in the IFA provide a unique basis for Beaufort regional government. In the last half of the chapter, the focus is on issues of regional government raised by COPE (the committee representing Inuvialuit communities in their land claim) during negotiations with the Federal/Territorial government. This highlights the hidden utility of the land claim process for governmental reform. As Peter Clancy notes, in relation to wildlife concerns:

The aboriginal claims arena provides yet another opportunity for addressing the process of local empowerment. At every claims table, negotiations over wildlife have assumed central importance. Whether by defining harvesting rights or guaranteed claimant participation in public decision-making bodies, the settlement packages transform the basis of wildlife management in profound ways. ²⁰

This is illustrated by the community Hunters and Trappers Committees (HTCs), formally instituted under the IFA in 1984 to monitor and advise on important issues related to Inuvialuit wildlife harvesting. These bodies have gained political prominence and recognition by GNWT ministries responsible for the regulation of harvesting practices in the Beaufort region. An outstanding feature of NWT government reform since the advent of land claims is the rapidity with which GNWT responsibilities have devolved to

the regions from Yellowknife (NWT capital city). In the main, Chapter Two underlines the fact that centralized bureaucracies controlling regional field operations have been consistently challenged and reformed by IFA communities with their new institutions of self-government.

Chapter Three, Political-Economic Development in the Beaufort Region, NWT, identifies recent NWT reforms instigated by Inuit and Indian claimant groups that expands upon the existing non-partisan consensual or public style of government practised in the Legislative Assembly. Particular Inuvialuit proposals for Beaufort regional government, which correspond to the consociational model of *shared-governance* and partnership evolving in the Territorial system, are considered in context of the present milieu of NWT land claims and public government. In contrast to the Provincial and Yukon governments, which follow the Westminster model of responsible government, NWT executive and ministerial bodies function cooperatively in their respective roles and are accountable and subordinate to the general consensus of the Legislative Assembly. As Peter Clancy points out, the evolution of consensus rule in the NWT Assembly coupled with the emergence of land claims has "cleared room for creative developments not only on the claims front but for traditional devolution" in terms of the types of political institutions being established in the regions. 21

Ongoing Inuvialuit efforts since the IFA to establish self-governance, in the form of a Western Arctic Regional Municipality (WARM)/Western Arctic Regional Government (WARG) and Prime-Public Authority, ²² are fundamental to the explanation of current Beaufort governing trends appearing in the final sections of this Thesis. All three proposals respond to the huge gap that has historically existed between government and people in NWT communities. Northern specialists generally concur that former federal strategies for political and economic development did not improve the circumstances of communities as expected. Abele notes that "Many Inuit found it more effective to write directly to Ottawa, in syllabics, with specific requests" than to depend upon civil servants posted in their regions to administer public programs and services.²³ The remoteness and ineffectiveness of federal/territorial agencies dealing with specific community issues is a main factor underlying recent Inuvialuit policy reforms and proposals for regional government. Inuvialuit responding to the need for more meaningful community representation and opportunities in the Beaufort political-economy have begun to steer government in new directions through their land settlement.

The official Inuvialuit position on Beaufort regional government is based upon principles of power-sharing or being a 'partner' in the Canadian political system. In the

shared-governance paradigm, the democratic political process of majority rule and guaranteed representation of cultural communities, jointly instituted to ensure the protection of rights and authority vested in regional land claim structures, is assumed. ²⁴ Intermediate objectives of shared-governance contained in Inuvialuit proposals for Beaufort regional and NWT government reform are premised on the decision-making authority and mobilization of Inuit and Indian communities at both levels. Thus, GNWT policy-decisions pertaining to the regulation of regional programs and services are now drafted by Inuvialuit and other claimants directly employed by various GNWT departments. Notably, the Aboriginal Rights and Constitutional Development Secretariat, which operates under the NWT Executive Council, and the Constitutional Alliance, representing Eastern and Western Arctic claimant groups in the Legislative Assembly, are mandated to assist in the resolution of land overlap and boundary issues arising through settlement legislation. ²⁵ Overall, the increased role of Inuit and Indian claimants in GNWT responsibilities is fulfilling political requirements with regard to community representation, accelerating the devolution of GNWT powers to regional bodies and, therefore, effecting more general government reform in the NWT.

There now exists significant potential for community public programs and services presently controlled by the

GNWT to devolve to regional regulatory bodies because of land claims and ensuing local reforms which aim to curtail the unnecessary duplication by government of services being provided more efficiently by claimant corporations. In the Beaufort region, government-sponsored social development and employment programs are in fact becoming controlled by sectors of the IFA corporate network capable of enforcing the preferential training and hiring of Inuvialuit in regional ventures. ²⁶ Additionally, a broad range of administrative functions related to Beaufort health care, education, law enforcement, the judicial system and other areas have the potential of becoming fully controlled by IFA corporate branches presently sharing local governing responsibilities with corresponding GNWT ministerial departments. As is more fully explained in Chapter Three, the ramifications of the IFA for the entire exercise of NWT public governance and constitutional reform and to the development of regional government in the Western Arctic are immense.

A general sense of disappointment with and alienation from government has been borne by Inuvialuit until recent reforms came about through the Western Arctic land claim. Final sections in Chapter Three evaluate the wide-ranging political-economic processes and development trends of IFA communities and their importance to NWT constitutional reform as a whole. In the Scone Report sweeping

generalizations of NWT communities are made; situated in the grander national and global context, they are tagged as "fragile" and "easily damaged" by things happening in distant places. ²⁷ This perspective frames the Special Committee's final analysis of NWT regional economies which denotes a state of weakness and dependency. If this is true, the question which naturally follows is: do Inuvialuit governing strategies (post-IFA) merely represent a forced choice between conventional or popularized notions of 'advantage' and 'disadvantage' or 'development' and 'underdevelopment'? In Section 3.4 the assertion is made that criteria for regional development outlined in the Scone Report omit significant aspects of the traditional and market sectors that have gained preeminence as a result of land claims. Hence, Section 3.5 puts forward an alternative perspective on regional (Beaufort) development and further explains political-economic innovation in terms of existing *possibilities* for reform inspired and harnessed through the IFA.

The relevance of the Scone Report, as a full-scale analysis of the NWT economy, is that it reveals the marked diversity of the communities and potentials for development in the regions. In the final analysis, however, the Scone Report obscures the complex variables of regional development with a crude dichotomy between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' communities. The Special Committee's

final recommendations for a development strategy assume that people who rely upon traditional subsistence economies (in small undeveloped communities) will readily embrace the market value system (in the developed regional centers) to meet their basic needs. What is overlooked is the fact that most people engaged in wilderness subsistence pursuits, as Michael S. Whittington explains, are simply unwilling to give up hunting and trapping completely for steady job or business incomes and to depend upon imported market products. ²⁸ It then follows that an investigation of social-economic trends at the *regional* level, as opposed to a broad territorial-wide analysis, would allow for a more authentic explanation of the specific realities and possibilities for development in the communities themselves. Along this same vein Whittington argues that it is essential to "recognize the causal links between the patterns of economic development and northern political culture"; an important aspect of northern political culture is that the people are diverse and so are their views of the north as home.²⁹ Elaborating on Whittington, I point to political-economic trends in the western NWT that flow out of the diversity of community histories and lifestyles and which affect how government operates in a particular region, especially within the realm of a land settlement.

The creativity of the IFA is in its capacity to

incorporate ongoing possibilities for Beaufort development so that each particular community is allowed equal opportunity to participate or co-operate in government relations and economic ventures. A general description of IFA regional and ancillary corporate bodies, and the six Inuvialuit communities which control them, appears relatively early on in the Thesis. Under the IFA, the communities determine the nature and function of government in the Beaufort region. Even the IFA itself, which outlines and defines specific corporate structures, may be amended by a majority of Inuvialuit exercising their voting rights to decide regional policy directions.³⁰ Finally, new possibilities for Beaufort governance are raised. Inuvialuit co-operation and relations with other Beaufort area and Inuit communities, such as those developing through the Inuit Circumpolar Conference that include Russian, Scandinavian and U.S. circumpolar regions, form the basis for improved support and strategies generating even greater levels of IFA community participation in regional governance.³¹ It is suggested that ingenious use of evolving intergovernmental exchanges both at the Territorial and Federal levels and even internationally by Inuvialuit will lead to an increasing political-economic presence and resource in the Beaufort region that advances Inuvialuit objectives for self-governance in northern Canada.

I

FEDERAL INTERVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT
IN THE WESTERN ARCTIC, NWT

- | | | | |
|-----|---|---|-----------|
| 1.1 | Arctic Exploration and Federal Interventionism | : | 1900-1950 |
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| 1.3 | Arctic Non-Renewable Resource Development/Berger Commission | : | 1965-1975 |
| 1.4 | Northern Land Claims/Regional Development | : | 1975..... |

I was born around 1886 at a place called Niglik, which is far above the mountains. There are times I remember and times I don't since I was small but what you read will be the truth...There were also other families living at Niglik with us...I remember after the big flu epidemic, the people who were still alive had a big feast and drum dance...I remember that many old people and women died from starvation. I remember my dad was a very good provider and we somehow managed to survive...He could get caribou and we would live on caribou meat...During summer we would head down river and meet with traders from Utkeavik (Point Barrow, Alaska)...My dad would trade his furs for supplies that we would need for the winter. This was the way they always traded and I remember it as a small boy. The Utkeavik people traded their food supplies and ammunition for our foxes, wolves, caribou skins and sinew...I remember as children we would have a lot of fun and I don't ever remember going hungry...When the traders finally arrived, it was a great day for us children because we would have a lot of bannock (bread) and tea...Sometimes white people would come and camp alongside us. The women would ignore the white men who were camped beside us. In fact, they wouldn't even invite the white men for a meal, but my mother was different. She was willing to share what she had cooked with any white man who would come visit us. My father always told her, "Share what you have with others, for it is not ours but a gift. In return when we start trapping, we will be given gifts such as fur in my traps." Maybe this was why my dad was always a good provider and trapper...

'The Life and Times of Archie Erigaktoak'
Tusaayaksat, Aug. 3, 1990

In this chapter and throughout the remainder of the Thesis the explanation of Beaufort governance owes its formulation to a reading of early historical and recent events found not so much in scholarly interpretations and futuristic predictions of NWT regional development as in the practical experiences of those people who live there. Some understanding of current Beaufort political-economic trends arises through recalling the region's history or learning first-hand from Inuvialuit elders, such as Archie Erigaktoak, who *tell the story* of commonplace occurrences and the changing order of traditional Inuvialuit life. The effects of European exploration, industrialization and Federal intervention upon the arctic wilderness and Inuvialuit, who now under the IFA legally possess traditional rights to land occupancy and use in the Beaufort region, are dealt with in the following sections from a variety of perspectives. When considering the varying socio-cultural conditions and realities of regionalism recalled by those either studying or living in the Western Arctic, one truism about the facts of the Inuvialuit land claim and the future outlook for the region emerges -- that much depends upon interpretation and how one chooses to approach the challenge of history as well as issues of unsettled sovereignty in Canada's Territories. Certainly, the Inuvialuit quest for self-governance derives from the legal reality of their land claim as well as the

current territorial-wide devolution trend; however, a major part of the Inuvialuit approach to develop regional government draws upon cultural values and a connectedness to the land that, as explained in the next section, date back a long time before the arrival of the Canadian state.

1.1 Arctic Exploration and Federal Interventionism : 1900-1950

Inuvialuit, known as 'cousins' to Inuit in Alaska, are said to have migrated east and established seasonal migration patterns in the general vicinity of the Mackenzie Delta and Beaufort Sea, Western Arctic. ³² Other migrant northerners residing in the region have queried, *Who are Inuvialuit?* After over a century of intermingling with European travelers and settlers, how are Inuvialuit any different from other northerners residing in Beaufort communities? Inuvialuit elders who *tell the story* have provided an anthology of vivid family recollections and life images that explain their culture:

As spring came along, we always made
camps along the coast. This is what
Inuvialuit always did;
...always hunted seals during the spring
when they were out on the ice sunning;
...used to make puugs out of them. A
puug is a sealskin container...used as
food containers for meat, blubber, dry
fish, anything edible...;
...In the fall, we'd go hunting inland with
pack dogs...This is a long walk;
...We used to live in sort of a house in the
winter...we made them as we went along... ³³

Europeans arriving in the north, traders, missionaries and eventually functionaries of the welfare state, gradually contributed to "a different kind of life";³⁴ even so, the story of Inuvialuit/European contact brings to mind an old adage, *the more things change the more they stay the same.*

In the genre of explorer biographies, Peter Freuchen, a famous Danish explorer, displays the typical ambivalence of those who encountered Inuit communities prior to northern industrialization and categorized their social existence within a historical spectrum of evolution and progress. Freuchen writes of premodern Inuit society:

One thing is certain; the people who thus give valuable material to the archaeologists met a tragic end...I have come across such ruins in the extreme north of Canada...³⁵

On the other hand,

I have read countless stories of explorers running out of matches. But that never bothered them as long as the natives were there to help them. In a short while the natives...would provide a roaring fire...³⁶

Writing close to the same time period as Freuchen, Quinn informs us that following first-contact Inuit inhabiting mainland and island communities maintained traditional wilderness skills and seasonal patterns of providing for their physical and material needs, including those of their European visitors.³⁷

Contemporary scholars, adding to the earlier biographical and historical accounts of cultural

development, have provided an impressive body of literature, ranging from a strict chronology of events to an interpretive analysis of social trends. Relevant historical data contained in chronological accounts convey local trends based upon population, health, migration and subsistence patterns and so forth. In short, social changes occurring during the early 1900s are explained in the literature as part of a process of acculturation whereby Inuit began to lose their cultural traditions and survival skills to become modern consumers. In Morris Zaslow's account it would have been the generation of Archie Erigaktoak's grandparents who made the transformation to trading furs and other wildlife products for imported goods from Europe. By the time of Erigaktoak's birth, Zaslow claims that "most of the native inhabitants of the NWT were ceasing to be completely self-sufficient, self-reliant hunters and becoming integrated into the modern economy as specialized producers of commodities derived from the wildlife of their homelands." 38

In the northern literature we learn that the presence of European whaling fleets, trading and missionary outposts led to a rapid diminution of Inuit cultural practices, permanently changing Inuit subsistence and migration patterns on the land. By 1912 the whaling industry declined and established trading outposts became centers for church missions and in some instances a small police

force. ³⁹ Stabler and Howe explain that the development of village townships in sites around old trading outposts ushered in "the virtual collapse of the delicately balanced traditional economy and aboriginal way of life." ⁴⁰

Interestingly, events Stabler and Howe identify as leading up to a critical juncture in Inuit society Erigaktoak recollects with immense candor, backed by numerous colorful stories about traditional family and successful hunting episodes, as a "very great life to lead." ⁴¹

In contrast to much of what is found in the northern literature, Inuvialuit elders inform us that changes associated with European contact and industry did not necessarily mean the end of traditional pursuits. Quite the opposite, often modern conveniences have accentuated customary travels, hunting and trapping. Peter Usher, in an economic survey of Sachs Harbour, confirmed that Inuvialuit continue springtime trips to familiar hunting grounds, traveling by riverway on motorboats to family campsites and storing a winter's supply of wild game with greater ease and efficiency than done solely by dogteam.⁴² Elders' stories relay not the cessation, but, rather, the endurance of seasonal travels and subsistence activities because of the basic necessity of tending to family campsites and harvesting enough wildlife to prevent starvation during the harsh winter months. The addition of modern conveniences to traditional life has simply meant

that people do not have to suffer to the extent they did before in order to survive.

An important part of Inuit culture and subsistence which remains until today is the whale hunt. It was during the whaling season in the early 1900s when inhabitants throughout the Beaufort region were devastated by what Inuvialuit refer to as 'the big flu'. Inuvialuit became exposed to diseases to which they had no resistance and which led to the demise of countless families and relatives. Erigaktoak recalls:

This was a dreadful sight. I remember it though I was small. All along the beach at Kittigazuit and the tents up on the hill. People dying everywhere -- everywhere you looked people died. I remember...so many people dying that they quit bothering to make graves... Most of the older people died off and the middle-aged. We also heard that in the other whaling camps people were dying off too. 43

Outbreaks of influenza continued into the mid-1930s, and while Inuvialuit populations were already disturbingly reduced tuberculosis came onto the scene leading to many more fatalities and family losses. 44

European-borne diseases threatened the very existence of small arctic communities struggling to survive the rigors of hunting in frozen conditions. Personal accounts of Inuvialuit who survived convey that people were already engaged in the serious task of putting their lives back together when federal intervention to provide aid and

improve living standards began. Government funding for food, buildings and other community services brought much needed relief from the dismal circumstances of illness and starvation, but did not necessarily mean the discontinuation of traditional subsistence. In fact, federal assistance to construct and maintain schools and hospitals did not begin until 1945 and frequently left remaining costs that were supplemented by families contributing a portion of their food, material goods and time to assist in operational needs and the conservation of donations. ⁴⁵ A strong connection and dependency to the land and wildlife remained fundamental to peoples' daily lives during the early phases of federal intervention, and, while the northern literature predominantly focuses on social setbacks and problems experienced by Inuit, the other version of the story reveals ongoing family support of government efforts to recover disease-ravaged communities and improve living conditions.

Shortly after the arrival of European settlers and government in the Western Arctic we learn that Inuvialuit adapted to survive many difficult challenges to their traditional way of life. Survival is integral to Inuit culture, and Inuvialuit elders tell us that to suffer disheartening losses and be out the next day searching the land is part of the usual course of events. The near annihilation of families during "the big flu" was followed

by a "big feast and drum dance" attended by all those who survived it. ⁴⁶ Erigaktoak recollects that families regrouped and, as anticipated, embarked on long hunting journeys during which more "old people and women died from starvation" until the warmth of late spring when they returned to camp along the rivers. ⁴⁷ The traditional order of cohesive family groups and seasonal wilderness pursuits was not swallowed up by European diseases, culture or government (as further explained in the following sections) but, rather, the new frustrations as well as welcomed conveniences led to even more effective ways for Inuvialuit to survive the dark side of change and remain strong.

Precious few written accounts of Inuvialuit social order and political institutions prior to European contact exist that are provided by Inuvialuit themselves. General facts about traditional Inuit societies may be extracted from archaeological or other historical accounts of the impacts of modern European culture upon the land-based * existence of the Arctic's indigenous inhabitants. Outside

* The term 'land-based' here is a general reference to the wilderness existence of Inuit in a terrain of frozen countryside, ocean, lakes- and riverbeds. Inuit seasonal subsistence depends upon land and sea mammals for which, most of the year, they must hunt on the ice.

the archaeological investigations of Inuit migration and subsistence, identifying hunting artifacts and seasonal campsites belonging to small kin groups recognized as the primary (self-governing) institution of Inuit society, ⁴⁸ the reports of the elders rank second to none as valid testimony of the continuing central importance of community and a fundamental respect by younger members for their elders whose exemplary role and wilderness skills were esteemed to lead to future prosperity.

An Inuvialuit elder, Alice French, writes that prior to the tuberculosis epidemic "our people were still nomads" and family groups organized social responsibilities and ceremonies as seasonal conditions and circumstances permitted. ⁴⁹ Inuvialuit family activities and community life revolved around the successes of hunting and trapping. For this reason the birth of a male child in a community was good reason for celebration and a large feast, whereas "for the birth of a girl a meal was enough." ⁵⁰ Except during times of childbirth, French recounts that men and women worked tirelessly to provide the necessary food, clothing and household materials required for wilderness survival. When times were good and food plentiful "games and feasting, visiting back and forth" became common preoccupations. ⁵¹ French's description of life within Inuvialuit community rings true to the accounts of other elders. It was a life with many hardships but a happy

one, where family relationships and the land always remained integral to one's existence and sense of self-worth.

A person's standing in the community as a hunter and generous provider for family and community needs constituted the basis for kin members recognizing that individual as chief or leader. Other distinctions were made as in the case of French's grandmother, Susie, who assumed "the position of head of the house" because of her strong temperament and role as a healer. Susie's husband, Amos, became revered for his "quiet and soft-spoken" consideration for others. He often acted as a buffer between the strong personality of his wife and others within the community. ⁵² In French's and other personal accounts, a person emerged as leader or highly esteemed member endowed with authority by the larger community in proportion to the degree of hunting success, display of valuable knowledge, and acts of kindness shown. The Inuit kin-based system of wilderness survival and self-governance as explained in the next several sections met severe challenges as a result of federal interventions imposing social and political reforms in arctic regions. Federal efforts to transpose democratic institutions in southern Canada upon Inuit communities brought about difficult changes for families. This seemed to close the door on their past, but in fact the opposite occurred.

1.2 Federal Intervention and Arctic Industry : 1950-1965

Inuit and Indian proposals for self-governance raised at government/claimant negotiation tables assume a particularly high degree of credibility when considered in light of previous federal policies for NWT development. Specifically, federal consent for U.S. and Canadian oil companies to embark upon a program of non-renewable resource exploration haunts the memories of those with personal experience of how economic development unchecked by local social and cultural considerations with regard to quality of life can unfold. The peak exploration of northern oil reserves and of corporate aggrandizement dates back to the 1950s, with unconstrained federal policies controlling land and natural resources in effect well before then. Unilateral political and economic policy-decisions initiated by Ottawa in response to global energy demands and competition in the international market certainly form a dynamic link to the whole NWT treaty/land claim process. However, the general nature of Ottawa's monolithic jurisdiction over NWT development is only partially traced to a continental interest in the presence of arctic minerals and oil. Crown developers practised a tradition of predicating all northern programs upon southern Canadian interests even before the race to energy self-sufficiency and profitability began.

Federal land treaty negotiations (early 1900s) with NWT Inuit receded almost as soon as they began due to the costly and formidable realities of extracting and transporting valuable non-renewable resources from the arctic to southern markets. The Federal government backed away from its policy of negotiating land treaties, as it had with Indians in the south, opting instead to leave Inuit in a 'state of nature'. This turn in policy reinforced a long-standing federal stance to negotiate treaties with "Native societies only where open conflict threatened between migrants and indigenous peoples." ⁵³ On a more psychological, introspective level Franklyn Griffith writes:

...the southern mind with the image of unspoiled and truly awesome natural greatness, the thought of the Arctic at once lifts up the human spirit and appalls with its harsh and overpowering immensity... the Arctic evokes a dual political response in Canadians: it both attracts and repels. It brings forth deep-seated attitudes of possessiveness on the one hand and fear and passivity on the other. ⁵⁴

The above description encapsulates a pervasive dominating force that presents itself in the attitudes and actions of most government decision-makers promoting industry and progress in NWT regions. In contrast to other federally administered regions of Canada the 1867 Indian Act protecting treaty lands and status never did extend to include Inuit territory. ⁵⁵ Consequently, Inuit lands did

not develop on a par with the Indian reserve system organized in the south but remained wide open to national objectives for future development.

In the northern literature we find that urban culture in southern Canada undisputably formed the basis for federal policy-decisions to develop the arctic in the years that followed World War Two. Unlike Yukon and the provinces, which in their early phases of development were rapidly infiltrated by migrant prospectors who eventually settled and promoted a culture of entrepreneurialism, the NWT developed as a vast region of Canada where isolated areas of explored wealth could be expropriated for shipment south to expanding markets. Zaslow writes that a series of post-war federal projects, road/air terminal construction, modern communication systems, housing and public services, occurred one after the other and transformed the NWT into a "northern offshoot of Canada's industrial society." ⁵⁶ In the 1950s military mega-projects, the Defense Early Warning System (DEW Line) linking radar stations across the arctic to detect enemy aircraft, and non-renewable resource exploration led to a gradual, steady influx of southern-based prospectors; a more technical, bureaucratic northern infrastructure eventually emerged and the regions became "centres for extensive surveying and mapping activities, of all manner of scientific investigations, and of elaborate, very costly exploratory and test-drilling operations by the

oil industry." 57

Even in the northern-most parts of Canada's arctic, existing regional infrastructures and public services essentially symbolize the boom-and-bust spawned by Ottawa. Northern scholars generally explain that post-war federal policies to encourage industrial growth primarily focused on building stable regional support structures for military operations and the exploration of a non-renewable resource base for market purposes. Unfortunately, however, federal policies and programs designed to serve the pressing interests of national security and modern industry proved deficient in addressing the needs of NWT communities. Inuit and Indian populaces lived in a constant state of flux as federal schemes for northern development changed according to economic reverberations felt in the post-war industrialized world. A general consensus also appearing in the scholarly literature is that government acted hastily and unrealistically, lavishly spending to construct new townsites and relocate Inuit and Indian families away from land-based activities while few employment opportunities were available to them. 58

Recent GNWT policies and programs, following after several Royal Commissions and government-funded studies on northern development, are largely a response to failed federal political-economic agendas and the resulting demand for reform within the regions. By the mid 1950s piecemeal

democratic initiatives introduced by Ottawa began the gradual inclusion of disenfranchised Inuit and Indian residents into a voting membership of the District of Mackenzie and Eastern Arctic (later named Nunatsiaq). The right to vote was extended to Western Arctic Inuit and Indian residents in 1950 just after white Yellowknife voters received the federal franchise in 1947. In 1951 voting residents of the Mackenzie District elected three individuals to the eight member NWT Council of which the five remaining were appointed by Ottawa; and, by 1956 the Council consisted of elected members representative of all NWT regions.⁵⁹ Not until after the Territorial Council went north, from Ottawa to Yellowknife, in 1974 did it come to consist entirely of elected members with the right to choose its own executive and ministerial departments controlling matters of government.⁶⁰

The changes in NWT Council organization and composition during the 1950s and early 60s laid the foundation for regional constituencies to enlarge their voice as never before in Council forums deciding directions for territorial-wide development. Soon after a proposal was introduced in Parliament to divide the NWT into a self-governing Mackenzie Territory and federally administered Eastern Territory. In 1965 the Federal government appointed the Carrothers Royal Commission, which one year later recommended against division and for the

devolution of federal powers to a Territorial government located in Yellowknife. This recommendation, adopted by Ottawa, reflected the fact that the Council had to a greater extent become representative of all outlying regions (with a majority of seven elected members, four from the Mackenzie District and three from the remaining Territories, to five federal appointees) and was well on its way to developing into a fully accountable, democratically elected government. ⁶¹ Rising regional pressures for new jurisdictional boundaries and more representative government grew as a result of land claims and led to the new Territorial administration committing itself to work even harder to expand its civil service and to function as a responsible government with an Executive Council and Legislative Assembly.

Although the people concerned were granted the right to vote, effective Inuit and Indian representation in the government of their particular communities remained to come at the advent of land claims in the 1970s. Several northern scholars comment that federal interventions during the 1950s and 60s meant to link NWT communities to the mainstream of Canadian democratic society effectively omitted Inuit and Indian strategies for northern development, creating a one-way dialogue informed by policy-makers in Ottawa unqualified to represent specific northern issues. Abele adds that federal interpretations

of Inuit and Indian disadvantage and its solution were based more upon myth than reality, and that federal efforts to force the transformation of the traditional kin- and land-based system (explained in Section 1.1) toward political-economic norms in southern Canada often resulted in devastating policy failures. Parallel to Griffith's depiction of federal interventions to establish national sovereignty over arctic lands and waterways, Abele focuses on the conventional political imagery invoked by Ottawa and makes the claim that inherent contradictions and compromises in the Canadian federal tradition ultimately nurtured new hybrid forms of northern governing practices. Ironically, familiar national sentiments became juxtaposed by NWT claimants with the issue of land rights during the late 1960s and 70s to communicate "their own interpretation of northern reality and their plans for the North's future..." 62

The dominance of southern institutions in arctic regions, as found in Abele's analysis, paved the way for Inuit and Indian claimants who later applied the legal language of property rights, sovereignty and constitution-building to effectively challenge conventional national beliefs and compete with federal strategies for northern development. A new model of intergovernmental co-operation and accountability actively pursued by NWT claimant groups, such as COPE, has become part of a long-range plan to bring

government closer to those it is meant to represent. Appearing in several COPE proposals and drafts for regional government, the prevailing idea is that the inherent right of Inuit and Indian communities to participate or cooperate in future governing processes within their particular regions and in Yellowknife will produce truly northern democratic and economic strategies for development. As explained in the following chapters, the reality in the Western Arctic is that Inuvialuit participation in Beaufort governance has unloosed regional contributions to the Territorial political-economy other than the land and non-renewable resources frequently divested from Inuvialuit communities by government/industry as valuable market commodities.

1.3 Arctic Non-Renewable Resource Development/ The Berger Commission : 1965-1975

A striking fact about the NWT non-renewable resource base is that as much as fifty percent of the earth's undiscovered oil reserves are north of the sixtieth parallel. ⁶³ This attracted both Canadian and United States interests, and encouraged an energy rush in the Beaufort Sea and high arctic islands. Oran R. Young argues that economic pressures applied by both Canadian and U.S. commercial interests to hurry energy independence and development of an arctic petroleum export industry became a powerful force dominating federal policies. During the

1960s military operations declined and commercial activities surrounding the extraction of subsurface hydrocarbons and transfer of crude oil from the NWT to southern markets replaced the DEW Line as a large-scale economic project. ⁶⁴ Ensuing federal economic policy-decisions eventually culminated in the notorious Mackenzie Valley pipeline debate, prompting Inuit and Indian claimants and the general public at large to question government's role in arctic development.

Did Ottawa possess the right to unilaterally determine economic policy and directions for arctic regions? What are the responsibilities of the national government to NWT communities affected by international agreements and legislation controlling development? The proposed pipeline, which was to originate in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska and run south through northern Yukon and Mackenzie Valley regions, ⁶⁵ incurred considerable opposition from Inuit and Indian leaders who accused the Federal government of trespassing on traditional land rights and of violating government's legal obligation to function as guardian of their rights and of the arctic environment. Inuit and Indian claimant groups also took the position that federal policies for northern development subverted the NWT land claim process and community reforms aimed at enlarging democratization, social opportunities and cultural preservation. Notably, the 1969 White Paper on Indian

policy, submitted by Ottawa primarily in response to Indian claims to land and special status in Canada, was designed to eliminate treaty lands through the "equal participation" of Indian people in the "cultural, social, economic and political life of Canada." ⁶⁶ Federal policy outlined in the White Paper closely corresponded with official statements by Prime Minister Trudeau who likened the national importance of northern oil to the development and industrialization of nineteenth century western Canada. ⁶⁷

Plans to construct a pipeline through the Mackenzie Delta, linking southern Canada with Alaskan and future Canadian oil, generated a backlash from Inuit and Indian claimants who strongly insisted that the land and wildlife belonged to them and to future generations. NWT claimants protested the right of the Federal government to proceed with oil development solely on the basis of 'national interest' because the expected outcome sorely lacked in terms of its bearing, socially and economically, upon their communities. Abele writes that "The prospect of oil and gas development in the North raised for Ottawa a complex web of intersecting sovereignty, environmental and economic considerations"; ⁶⁸ ultimately, federal policy in the 1960s became instrumental in forcing government to return to the negotiation tables and search out solutions to Inuit and Indian land claims.

The Berger Commission

During the 1974-75 Berger Commission NWT Inuit and Indian claimants mobilized to present their views on land development. Thomas Berger, a new Justice of the Supreme Court of British Columbia and a former lawyer representing the Nisga'a land claim in southern British Columbia, was appointed by Ottawa to preside as Commissioner over a Federal Inquiry into the proposed northern pipeline project. The Inquiry was mandated to investigate the effect of a pipeline corridor on the surrounding social and natural environment and to submit a final recommendation to Ottawa for or against pending pipeline proposals submitted by Canadian and U.S. oil companies. ⁶⁹ The Commissioner and his team of professionals traveled to various localities in the western NWT and held hearings attended by community residents who testified to the impact a pipeline would have upon their lives. Abele explains that the Inquiry achieved a number of desirable outcomes in the early phases of the land claim process; importantly,

...it became the forum for a cathartic national debate about the assumptions underlying economic growth; and, participation in the inquiry provided Native people in the Mackenzie Valley with a unique opportunity for political participation and consolidation, while northern Native organizations in general gained new national recognition. ⁷⁰

The Berger Commission recognized Inuit and Indian rights, but, more explicitly, it focused on economics and the

idea that land claims are crucial because they move valuable resources into the communities.

The active involvement of Inuit and Indian claimants throughout the entire Inquiry, in Abele's estimation, had a direct impact on the public nature of the struggle over non-renewable resources and led to an expansion of "the official analytical framework regarding northern development." ⁷¹ National attention during publicized hearings of the Inquiry was no longer on native poverty or disadvantage but on rights, opening up a Pandora's box of local conditions surrounding the pipeline project and demands for government policy reform. Federal conceptions of 'native disadvantage' and, in particular, efforts to reroute Inuit from land-based activities into the job market were challenged by Inuvialuit spokespeople:

We do not think of our jobs as a substitute for living off the land, jobs are another way to help us live. We still want to hunt and trap and eat the food from our land. ⁷²

The general Inuvialuit position was that Ottawa acted illegally by not consulting with their communities on issues related to land development and that they, as a collective group, represented the majority of high arctic interests. Inuvialuit participating during scheduled community hearings emphasized to the Berger Commission that both the use and occupancy of their traditional land base existed independently and even regardless of unilateral

federal policies for development.

Traditional use and occupancy of land in the Western Arctic had been previously studied in a survey performed by Peter Usher just one year prior to the Berger Commission.⁷³ Current and relevant data appearing in Usher's survey revealed that in all six Inuvialuit communities land use patterns of hunting and fishing comprised an essential part of local economies, even in those communities where urbanization was most apparent. In the town of Inuvik, a modernized regional center, the majority of residents maintained wage employment, but, as one Inuvialuk (individual) testified in the Inuvik hearing:

[We] are not like...the people that come from South and have government jobs; they go down South and have a rest on their holiday, whereas the Eskimos -- they use a holiday to hunt as much food as they can so that they don't have to buy from the store, and that will help them to live through the winter. Even though they have a job, they need to get their food in order to keep up with themselves. ⁷⁴

The Usher survey confirmed Inuvialuit testimony on land use, adding the observation that the introduction of modern technology into seasonal hunting and trapping pursuits actually boosted the traditional economy by easing the physical burden of wilderness travel and camping. ⁷⁵

Inuvialuit participants to the hearings convincingly explained to Berger and members of the Commission that home-rule in the Beaufort region did in fact exist,

representing Inuvialuit customs, aspirations and viable local incentives for development that had substantial economic implications for southern commercial interests and the entire Western Arctic.

During the Berger Commission hearings Inuvialuit leadership came forward to emphasize the importance of a land settlement prior to construction of a pipeline corridor in the Beaufort region. Negative political and economic pressures imposed by such an immense project upon their land claim raised obvious concerns for COPE (organized in 1970 by Inuvialuit in response to the oil exploration already underway in Tuktoyaktuk) ⁷⁶ who presented both the testimony of elders and maps of traditional Inuvialuit land occupancy and use in the Western Arctic to Inquiry members. COPE negotiators demanded a land settlement and adequate time to implement Inuvialuit governing structures designed to protect their land interests prior to any further outside development in the settlement region. The Western Arctic Claim became a pivotal factor in Berger's final recommendation for a ten year moratorium on Beaufort oil development, with Berger stating "We must settle native claims before we build a Mackenzie pipeline." ⁷⁷ In the end, the issue of land claims emerged during Inquiry hearings as central to all other environmental, social, political and economic issues surrounding development in terms of how those issues affect

Inuit and Indian communities and, ultimately, how development in the Western Arctic would proceed. By mid 1977 COPE presented their Agreement-in-Principle to the Federal government requesting not only land title and financial compensation in return for traditional lands ceded, but also recognition of the right of Inuvialuit communities to organize their own style of regional government in the Western Arctic. 78

Following the Berger Commission the GNWT was suddenly thrust into a Constitutional crisis as widespread Inuit and Indian claimant demands for government accountability and responsiveness to their varying local circumstances grew. The blockage of oil development paled in significance when compared to the difficult business of governing the Territories because it became increasingly apparent that the future of governance would be enormously affected by the outcome of land claims. By the mid 1970s legislative and administrative powers of the federally-appointed NWT Commissioner were lessened to allow elected Territorial Council members full law-making authority and to represent regional constituencies in Yellowknife. 79 In the Western Arctic the gradual empowerment of community hamlets or councils (notably, those in the regional center of Inuvik and port town of Tuktoyaktuk) to act autonomously and in a high degree of consultation with elected Council members was a turning-point in NWT governance and an unstoppable

expansion of the terms of devolution initiated by the earlier 1966 Royal Commission. In 1974 the Council comprised a total of fifteen elected members who selected their own Executive body and were heads of various GNWT departments controlling government finances and services in the regions. Zaslow describes these administrative changes as pivotal to the emergence of a "second NWT" because of unavoidable "constitutional clashes" between elected federal/territorial departments and those on the land claims front competing for positions of power within government. 80

Certainly, the simultaneous development of a democratically-styled NWT Executive Council and Legislative Assembly and of land claims has resulted in a struggle between the main political contenders for a base from which to function in their respective roles and as parties to a new NWT constitution. In the Western Arctic COPE presented their proposal for a municipal style of regional government and Dene communities, in preparation for their land settlement, for a self-governing region, Denendeh. Moreover, Inuit in the East had previously come forward to propose Nunavut, which included their own form of government to oversee the large land area and numerous remote communities represented in their land claim. 81

Berger's final recommendation to the Federal government, which went beyond the Inquiry's mandate to answer whether a

pipeline should or should not be built, included the recommendation that Canada recognize the inherent right of Inuit and Indian claimants to engage in the development of new political institutions. While the ten year moratorium on oil development was meant to allow time for the settlement of NWT land claims, it also cleared the way for claimants to establish local structures and programs which, Berger predicted, would "form the basis for native self-determination." 82

1.4 Northern Land Claims/Regional Development : 1975....

A sharp reduction in job and business opportunities during the 1970s, resulting from a slump in the oil industry, opened the way for alternative Inuit and Indian claimant strategies for regional development, and Ottawa prudently backed down from a long-standing policy position to disallow the topic of government reform to enter into land negotiations. 83 During the ten year moratorium on all new commercial oil activities COPE and the Government of Canada signed the IFA and went to the drawing boards to begin the process of planning possible directions for Beaufort development. Comparing Ottawa's tradition of ad hoc political-economic experimentation to more recent examples of government reform implemented under other northern comprehensive claims, COPE embarked on a series of Beaufort government reforms and proposals to the

Legislative Assembly that rejected both the boom-and-bust cycle of resource exploitation experienced under previous federal administrations as well as other regional models devised elsewhere. By the mid 1980s COPE had refined and drafted principles of regional government that reflected traditional Inuvialuit institutions and community pursuits.

Prior to settlement legislation the Inuvialuit position on regional government was two-fold: 1) a regional government must be granted power to control government expenditures thereby allowing for more realistic policies appropriating government revenues for public services and programs; and, 2) future government regimes in the Western Arctic must be ensured the flexibility and complete right to negotiate new political boundaries, constitutional terms and commercial agreements with other regional governments. ⁸⁴ From the IFA's earliest inception Inuvialuit leadership recognized that the mere granting of fee-simple title did not offer a complete guarantee of IFA terms and future Inuvialuit objectives for development, and that nothing short of Inuvialuit self-governance or home-rule would adequately protect against the possibility of Federal or Territorial government actions to amend existing IFA co-operative agreements and community support measures in the settlement region.

The implication of Inuit and Indian land claims and home-rule for NWT regionalism has become highly scrutinized

in the northern literature. Essentially, the focus appears divided between issues of economy and political autonomy. In a recent analysis of the IFA and Beaufort energy issues, Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale argue that "the real test of the implications of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement for non-renewable resources is in the kind of arrangements that can actually be reached between the native land owners and non-native developers." ⁸⁵ Cassidy and Dale envision a type of economic compromise and co-existence between IFA claimants and industry, specifically the petroleum companies, that include concession agreements (explained in Chapter Two) designed to minimize the negative effects of industry upon the traditional economy and vice versa. IFA concession agreements include Inuvialuit preferential hiring strategies, consultation and shared-management in land projects and compensation by petroleum companies for existing and future wildlife harvests lost to Inuvialuit.⁸⁶

From a more purely political perspective NWT governance in the 1980s and 90s has introduced more questions into negotiations surrounding issues of Beaufort home-rule than final resolutions. Soon after settlement legislation Inuvialuit leadership launched an aggressive campaign in the Legislative Assembly to create new regional boundaries and government structures to protect IFA corporate resolutions for political-economic and social development. One of the first steps in the long process of

establishing Beaufort regional government was for Inuvialuit to become active participants in the Assembly. By the mid-1980s both Inuit and Indian representatives assumed an unprecedented number of ministerial posts and made up nearly half of the Executive Council in Yellowknife. ⁸⁷ In the Assembly an Eastern and Western Arctic caucus emerged with high profile members agreeing to work cooperatively on issues arising from land claims and within a responsible public government built upon semi-autonomous regions. ⁸⁸ NWT public government gained momentum and strength largely as a result of Inuit and Indian claimant proposals for home-rule, and elected Assembly members now boast of a government in Yellowknife which accommodates unique regional interests and particular community lifestyles in the Territorial political-economy.

Northerners as a whole have voiced their own objectives for development of a valuable renewable and non-renewable resource base, political-economic reform and a constitutional package guaranteeing community/regional representation in Yellowknife. To keep abreast of the rapidly evolving reality of land claims and increasing Inuit and Indian claimant participation in regional policy affairs the GNWT has changed in composition and function and, as explained in the next Chapter, is now commonly referred to as a 'public government' working in cooperation

with claimant objectives for development within settlement lands. The Federal and Territorial governments are officially committed to an expansion of the democratic framework within which government operates; and, to regional programs meant to improve local opportunities through traditional wilderness pursuits, the enhancement of Inuit and Indian cultures/languages and community co-operation in regional governance, all of which are strongly part of northern life.

II

NORTHERN LAND CLAIMS
AND
NWT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

- 2.1 Constitutional Alliance and Government Reform, NWT
- 2.2 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement/
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
- 2.3 Western Arctic Claim/Inuvialuit Final Agreement, NWT
- 2.4 Inuvialuit Self-Government, Beaufort Region, NWT

I will tell a story about Easter holidays long ago at kitiraaryuit...Before the Easter holidays everyone would be very busy preparing food and sewing new clothing...People would arrive all day long and into the night before Good Friday. We used to do a lot of work preparing food, hauling ice and wood, we also got food ready for our dogs. The women were busy sewing new parkas, parka covers and fancy shoes... When Good Friday was over, and after much feasting, we would then begin our games and dances. We played a lot of indoor traditional games and drum dances. Young people were always a part of all our activities and dances. The elders would take turns story telling, which lasted into the night. I would fall asleep listening and would wake up during the night, and they would still be telling stories... The people who came to spend time with us often stayed for a week or so. Our homes were small, but sometimes three families stayed together in our house. Everyone shared what they owned with one another, that is the way we all got along well. Our life back then may not have been easy, but we worked together as one -- and that is how we survived.

Tusaayaksat, April 29, 1992

The Berger Inquiry began the process of settling NWT Inuit and Indian land claims but caution must be taken not to overrate the importance of Berger's final recommendation and the subsequent federal policy to negotiate claims on the eventual outcomes of government reform in the regions. Inuit land use and occupancy issues raised during the Berger Inquiry led to a legal and moral obligation on the part of Ottawa to reverse its aforementioned stance and proceed to negotiate comprehensive land settlements in the Eastern and Western Arctic. Eastern and Western Arctic land settlements are premised upon separate histories and guiding principles that make each different from the other. Although the original mandate of the NWT Constitutional Alliance, a subcommittee of the Legislative Assembly established by the GNWT not long after the Berger Inquiry, was to aid in the settlement of land claims and in determining subsequent boundary divisions, its role expanded to that of a forum in which a new constitution representative of all varying regional interests could be decided. The following sections provide a broad overview of northern land claims and local issues surrounding separate settlements in Alaska, James Bay and the Western Arctic which led to government reforms and new definitions of regionalism in the 1980s and 90s. All three settlements provided for new regional boundaries, local governing structures and approaches to negotiating land overlap and

the management of natural resources. The settlement provisions diverge, however, when it comes to the private and public institutions implemented by the communities represented under each separate claim. The difference lies in the degree of authority vested in community governments to decide the nature and direction of their regional government. As a prelude to the explanation of Beaufort political-economic development in Chapter Three, this chapter as a whole underlines the fact that underneath the general theme of Inuit and Indian land claims and self-government exist many subthemes representing a wide range of local historical and cultural experiences, making even a loose cross-analysis of the claims and related issues difficult.

2.1 Constitutional Alliance and Government Reform, NWT

The Constitutional Alliance, comprised of Western Constitutional Forum (WCF) and Nunavut Constitutional Forum (NCF) members, was organized in 1982 by the GNWT and has developed primarily as a channel through which Inuit and Indian claimant interests in the western (WCF) and eastern (NCF) arctic regions can be represented in the NWT Legislative Assembly. ⁸⁹ Political reforms proposed by WCF and NCF members before the Assembly aimed to establish constitutional protection of Inuit and Indian land claims and priorities for regional governance within the

Territorial system. Ongoing efforts by the Constitutional Alliance to reform the Territorial government have reversed enormous deficiencies with regard to Inuit and Indian representation in the Assembly; however, to date, land claims and particular claimant strategies for political-economic development in the regions remain legally unprotected in future GNWT directives for constitutional development. 90

Inuvialuit spokesperson and current NWT government leader, Nellie Cournoyea, traces the Inuvialuit claim to land, waterways and natural resources in the Beaufort region prior to the existence of Canada; it is a claim, she says, which will continue long after federal and other non-Inuvialuit interests in the Western Arctic wane. 91

For the foreseeable future, a discomfoting concern raised within the WCF is that Inuit and Indian claimants, Inuvialuit in particular, could very conceivably become underrepresented in the practical dealings of government without constitutional entrenchment of their collective rights as an overarching principle of NWT political reform. Current western NWT demographic trends already situate Inuvialuit within a minority of the total population. 92

This fact is an abiding cause of concern for IFA beneficiaries who, under their Agreement, relinquished 'native title' on the understanding that there would be *equal* partnership and representation within the Canadian

federal system. Sections 3(4) and (5) of the IFA clearly state that "Inuvialuit cede, release, surrender and convey all their aboriginal claims, rights, title and interests", retaining ownership of selected lands (Section 7(1)) in the Beaufort region and of specified corporate structures (Sections 6(1) through (6)) on a par with other Canadian corporations. IFA corporate bodies engaged in planning long-term political-economic directions for Inuvialuit communities clearly regard their position in Yellowknife and Ottawa as one of partnership. Nonetheless, concern for some method of guaranteed representation of IFA communities in NWT governance has prompted Inuvialuit WCF members to negotiate new *public government* structures and power-sharing arrangements designed to protect Inuit and Indian claimant interests within all of the regions.

The nature of NWT public government consists of three recognized political processes which briefly paraphrased are:

- 1) *guaranteed representation of cultural groups* within NWT regions;
- 2) *protection of individuals* who reside in NWT regional jurisdictions and are entitled to regional programs or services; and,
- 3) *legitimation of regional governments* within all NWT jurisdictions so that the right of communities to form democratic regional governments in Canada exists unhindered. ⁹³

A broad interpretation of public government in the 1980s and 90s, insofar as NWT communities are empowered to give

expression to regional and territorial policy-decisions, is that it intrinsically places constraints upon federal and GNWT controls exerted over other levels of government in the regions. Public government in the Western Arctic is a grass-roots approach to government decision-making; in the wake of land claims, it is government consistent with legitimate regional *corporative* directives and increasing noninterference by federal administrative departments.

Inuit and Indian claimants elected to the Legislative Assembly and participating in the Territorial political arena have consistently challenged state-led directives for political-economic development. The incorporation of land claim institutions and traditional Inuit and Indian practices of consensus rule into NWT public government has become a historic anomaly of Canadian federalism, and, for not a few northern administrators, a trying concept with which to deal. For many government officials the new northern political institutions are a unique challenge, while in the experience of others they being a disappointing process, "like two big dogs when they first meet, running around in circles..." ⁹⁴ More importantly, the current arena of public government functions to expand opportunities whereby Inuit and Indian communities may participate, co-operate, in meaningful directions for NWT reform, and, no doubt, in WCF and NCF efforts to enhance particular claimant resolutions with a definite purpose to

fortify land claims with strong regional government.

The question of how at once to protect the rights of Inuit and Indian claimants without somehow excluding or frustrating certain rights belonging to an entity referred to in the Canadian Charter of Rights, namely, the individual, remains a pressing part of the NWT constitutional puzzle. It is precisely in such conflictual junctures of the NWT political process that notions of governance and constitution-building begin to take shape, refining and customizing significant aspects of Canadian democratic government in the northern regions in which it serves. The spirit of public government calls for constitutional change based upon the right of community governments to arrive at a consensus on regional issues related to jurisdictional boundary and political reforms. Experience has shown that the attainment of community consensus is an arduous task, requiring a predisposition among negotiating members to expect much time, patience and co-operation to be part of the process. In April 1982, for example, a territorial-wide plebiscite resulted in a majority of communities voting to divide the NWT into two separate eastern and western jurisdictions.⁹⁵ Following the plebiscite the Constitutional Alliance embarked upon a program of preliminary boundary and political solutions, only to back down and leave the question of division and constitutional development until after the settlement of

land claims and a more decisive consensus among member communities. 96

A new set of concerns and options relating to boundary issues grew in the Constitutional Alliance as a result of the IFA, expressed by COPE members in such statements as: "Inuvialuit should be able to choose which territory they want to belong to through a community by community vote..."; "How will guaranteed representation be implemented?"; "We don't like resource revenue sharing. If one territory needs money it should borrow it." 97

While enactment of the IFA considerably heightened the political power-sharing and participation of Inuvialuit communities in regional affairs and government in Yellowknife, IFA land authorities presently enforce local policies protecting Inuvialuit surface/subsurface rights with some real limitations and potential difficulties. Inuvialuit control over Beaufort lands and the natural resource base is exercised through a system of arbitration, participation agreements, and private contracts. Crown or private developer activities and rights of guaranteed access to specific sites on IFA lands require Inuvialuit approval on an IFA joint-management board, and must proceed according to the terms agreed to by Inuvialuit in a participation agreement. If the terms of a development project are not agreed to by all negotiating parties, the proposed project then becomes a matter for arbitration and

a committee is assigned to determine terms and conditions of a final land contract. ⁹⁸ The IFA arbitration process is returned to in the latter part of Chapter Three with regard to circumstances surrounding the abandoned DEW Line and related costs of environmental cleanup imposed by Inuvialuit against Canada's Department of National Defence. The bottom line, however, is that legislative authority to negotiate or determine new jurisdictions in- or outside of the settlement region in accordance with future political-economic ventures or in the event of a land dispute is outside the purview of Inuvialuit powers.

Boundary issues were dealt with but not altogether resolved by the IFA. The current IFA corporate land regime appears to represent an intermediary development on the path to true Inuvialuit self-determination and to be setting the stage for a fully legitimized Beaufort regional government. A leading COPE negotiator, Agnes Semmler, has been quoted as saying: "...What COPE's been working for, that's what I've been working for, our future generations. For these kids, for their kids, for their grandchildren ...So they have something to live for, that they own...will be theirs forever." ⁹⁹ What COPE negotiated for and received under the IFA were private lands and corporate structures owned and governed by Inuvialuit themselves. Although the main IFA regional corporate arm operates according to general laws controlling private corporations

in Canada, Inuvialuit received protection from federal or territorial government rights to levy any tax against their lands. At present, the Constitutional Alliance continues to contend with pressing land claim and boundary issues in the Western Arctic and their effects upon NWT governance as well as the reverse. As one COPE member of the Alliance observed during the 1982 NWT Constitutional debates in Yellowknife, it remains unclear exactly what is meant with reference to 'the Western Arctic people', 'COPE region' and 'Western NWT' or as to what actually constitutes government within those boundaries. 100

What is government in the Beaufort region, western NWT? One might suggest that more power exists in reposing the question than in conceiving a singular answer. On the other hand, in the aftermath of settlement legislation it is clear that Inuvialuit communities are prime movers in NWT Constitutional development through participation in a co-operative, consensus public-style of governance, making it an evolving reality in the Beaufort region. This gradual evolution of regional co-operation and political power-sharing is the strength of public government to Inuvialuit communities and, it would appear, to the future of NWT governance as a whole in the midst of land claims and enormous political-economic transition.

2.2 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement/ Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act

The institution of regional government is not peculiar to the Western Arctic or NWT. Before turning to examine IFA governing structures in the Beaufort region, this section briefly looks at regional arrangements in two other northern settings, James Bay, Quebec and Alaska state, including particular aspects of the land claim processes and ensuing public/private land regimes. The land settlements in northern Quebec and Alaska pose some striking contrasts in their implementations and present-day outcomes to those of the Western Arctic. This is evident in terms of both the regional governing structures and the economic strategies initiated under their respective final settlements. While it is not the intention here to proceed on postulates of how or why outcomes of the land claims in James Bay and Alaska negate or justify IFA developments, for the Thesis it is important to note a significant difference in the IFA to the other northern claims. The IFA clearly establishes private lands and structures and community authority on issues of Beaufort development which radically alter the top-down direction of government policy decisions occurring under previous federal rule (more to follow on this point in Section 2.4).

James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement

A comparative examination of the James Bay and

Northern Quebec Agreement (commonly referred to as the James Bay Agreement) to previous treaties and government compensations for Inuit and Indian land and subsistence rights would be instructive for an understanding of how the Agreement differs from the Western Arctic Claim in terms of the types of land claim structures it established. From a legal standpoint, Wendy Moss points out that federal policy on Inuit and Indian land settlements has historically assumed an obligation by Ottawa to provide compensation for the loss of traditional lands and livelihoods incurred in newly occupied territories. The James Bay Agreement is described as "essentially a modern version of the treaties concluded one hundred years ago...", but one possessing unprecedented legal force because of federal and provincial ratification of specific land claim provisions. 101

Cree Indian and Inuit communities of the James Bay region negotiated Hydro-Quebec's mega-project, a massive electric facility which began construction in 1971, and the cessation of outstanding land interests in return for certain government compensations understood to cover the loss of traditional subsistence and economic potentials.¹⁰² Specific aspects of the Agreement important to Cree and Inuit communities include the right to hunt and fish within traditional land areas and to establish government-funded locally-operated public land management and social service agencies. A key factor influencing final contingencies and

the implementation of local governing structures officially agreed to by all negotiating parties to the Agreement was the hydro-electric facility already in its early stage of construction in Cree and Inuit territory. The imminent marketing of electricity to Quebec, Ontario and several northeastern states spurred on by changes in the international oil industry imposed extreme external pressures and time limitations throughout the entire negotiation process.

Negotiations involved 400,000 square miles of land and featured a complex series of business proposals directed toward securing the future interests of seven parties: the Grand Council of the Cree representing eight separate Indian bands, the Northern Quebec Inuit Association representing fourteen communities, the Quebec and Federal governments and three Quebec Crown corporations (Hydro-Quebec, James Bay Development Corporation and James Bay Energy Corporation).¹⁰³ In short, what emerged from the negotiation process was an Agreement whereby Cree and Inuit communities received the following protections and compensations for relinquishment of their property rights in Quebec: 1) Federal and Provincial government obligations to protect reserved areas for traditional subsistence pursuits; and, 2) government funding to implement regional structures outlined in the Agreement aimed at promoting Cree and Inuit participation in local economic and social

endeavors. ¹⁰⁴ Economic and social development clauses in the Agreement primarily refer to protection of the natural and cultural environment which includes government compensation or remedial action for the loss of land and subsistence activities due to hydro development in James Bay.

Compensation included land reforms that divided the James Bay region into three separate categories: 1) lands designated for Cree or Inuit village municipalities or land-holding corporations, 2) public lands, governed by the James Bay Regional Zone Council, where Cree people are granted exclusive rights to pursue traditional livelihoods and economic ventures, and 3) lands in which Cree hunting and trapping activities are subject to property rights retained by the Quebec government and other authorized individuals for development purposes. ¹⁰⁵ Public land and service agencies, particularly in the first two land categories, organized for the purpose of planning and implementing economic and social reforms in Cree and Inuit village municipalities come under jurisdiction of both the Provincial and Federal governments. The problem here is that land claim agencies depending upon two levels of central government for support have experienced serious setbacks due to costly delays in the implementation of their respective departmental mandates. ¹⁰⁶

Problems associated with land and local government

reforms initiated under the Agreement are traced back to the general nature of the land claim negotiation process itself when Cree and Inuit groups began to bargain for certain compensations.

...problems were recognized by the Cree negotiators at the time the Agreement was drafted. The decision was taken, nevertheless, to settle for a general description of obligations with numerous qualifications of an ambiguous nature and to continue the fight to delineate the obligations more precisely after the Agreement had been signed. ¹⁰⁷

Jurisdictional stalemates arising between provincial and federal negotiators about which government would be responsible to fund specific public programs and services carried into the Agreement's implementation.

Intergovernmental disputes and a resulting lack of government accountability seriously jeopardized the performance of newly created land claim bodies relying upon government support to implement community economic and social programs in James Bay. ¹⁰⁸ These frustrations arose from the fact that no single government body was held responsible at the outset to ensure the full exercise of regional programs and services agreed to in the final settlement package.

In the James Bay region the existing land regime functions under two relatively recent laws, the 1971 James Bay Region Development Act and the 1975 James Bay Agreement. ¹⁰⁹ The Agreement provides for Cree and Inuit

land and subsistence rights whereas the 1971 Act establishes regional land agencies that enforce laws of general application in Quebec municipal districts. In the area of mineral rights, for example, Cree and Inuit rights to soapstone (material used to carve traditional art objects) have been deemed subordinate to the rights of Quebec and Crown energy corporations to develop certain lands in James Bay. Moreover, traditional Cree and Inuit subsistence rights subordinated to Quebec Provincial and Hydro development are threatened because of dams affecting the region's water system and wildlife. ¹¹⁰ The far-reaching consequences of regional policies approved by James Bay municipal authorities with power under the 1971 Act to make inappropriate decisions abrogating Cree and Inuit land rights, and potentially damaging the surrounding environment upon which their subsistence depends, undermines the function of public agencies operating in accordance with the Agreement.

One possible recourse to problems identified in the Agreement's implementation and for meaningful reform exists through opportunities for upward mobility available to Cree and Inuit claimants working inside both provincial and land claim administrative agencies. ¹¹¹ Major regional public programs and services, in such areas as health, education and social development, provided by the Quebec Government and the Agreement, are coming under greater supervision by

employed Cree and Inuit public servants who generally hold themselves directly accountable to the communities for annual policy decisions and expenditures made on their behalf. James Bay municipal councils and land claim compensation boards also exist to monitor the delivery of public programs and services and to enhance traditional economic and social opportunities centered on hunting and fishing. ¹¹² Cree and Inuit claimants occupationally concentrated in various areas of the public sector appear to have better chance for advancement and to ensure standards of living and economic advantages sought through compensation clauses in the Agreement.

The James Bay Agreement provides for regional government structures that support traditional Cree and Inuit community life, but the essential advantage of various land claim boards or municipal councils to claimants has been diminished due to provincial and federal constraints upon the Agreement's implementation. Failure of government officials to initially observe necessary jurisdictional boundaries in the context of a land settlement and to fund public agencies mandated to promote Cree and Inuit culture and opportunities for self-development forced claimants, as Moss described, "into a continual state of [*crisis management*]"; and, she cites compensation earnings (@ \$30,000,000.00 up to 1981/82) intended for social-economic development that were "spent

to remedy some of the conditions brought about by years of government neglect and government non-performance of contractual and statutory obligations." 113 The political challenge ahead for Cree and Inuit reformers in James Bay appears to be to counteract the deleterious consequences of restrictive provincial legislation and confusing jurisdictional squabbling by introducing and maintaining greater number of claimants into the public service and land claim bodies that decide on issues of importance to the region.

Alaska Native Claims Settlement

Analyses of the 1971 Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act (ANCSA) and subsequent borough government reforms throughout the North Slope of Alaska underline key political and economic events in northern communities which, like the situation in James Bay, tended to isolate claimant communities from government processes affecting local development. The organization of borough-style government in Alaska followed the 1959 Statehood Act that officially joined Alaska to the United States. 114 This form of regional government, primarily based upon the unique demographic and geographic conditions of municipalities within the new state, provided an efficient system whereby large districts remote one from the other could be regulated and serviced. 115 Borough government

and its associated strategies of development became the basis for Aleut, Indian and Inuit claims to land and to Alaska's natural resources.

Federal ownership and control over large tracts of land in Alaska continued after the Statehood Act since the state apparently lacked sufficient fiscal and technical resources to develop valuable oil and mineral reserves. 116 Alaskan officials anticipated a transformed economy through a generous share in federal oil revenues as well as increasing business development within the private sector. State proponents of economic development supported several major proposals, including construction of an Alaskan oil pipeline from the North Slope to Valdez. Other proposals involved extensive excavation of important hunting and fishing grounds for the purposes of building new transportation links, harbors, hydro-electric and other related infrastructure projects. 117 All of these new development schemes generated yet another wave of political-economic activity, of Alaska land claims and the establishment of ANCSA village and regional corporations.

The North Slope Borough, located north of the rest of Alaska, was organized in 1972 by ANCSA tribal leaders wanting to establish a home-rule borough with political autonomy and power to legislate. 118 One year prior the ANCSA granted claimants a total of one billion dollars and unrestricted title to forty million acres of land in return

for the extinguishment of all outstanding claims to land and compensation arising from the loss of treaty status and traditional pursuits. The established ANCSA land regime included twelve regional profit corporations, two hundred village corporations and a Joint Federal-State Land Use Planning Commission comprised of central government and tribal representatives; non-profit corporations were also organized to ease the prevalent social and economic problems experienced within many villages. ¹¹⁹ ANCSA regional and village profit/non-profit corporations, which basically form a network of centralized bodies functioning to plan and coordinate community entrepreneurial and social development, are meant to be integrated into the Alaskan Constitution of borough government.

ANCSA regional corporations retain advisory powers only in matters of North Slope Borough government. Final drafting of the Act ensured strong limitations placed by the state upon any intention on the part of ANCSA corporations to alter the existing political power structure in favor of regional home-rule. In accordance with the Alaskan Constitution a unified system of borough government is protected and the state guaranteed a firm role in political and economic development in the North Slope region. What the Statehood Act and subsequent ANCSA initially invited for North Slope claimants was a growing orbit of opposition waged by state officials and private

industries refusing to yield to specific claimant reforms establishing greater self-determination and home-rule. Private industries and businesses viewed claimant proposals for government reform in the region as a threat to business development and, fearing taxation of their profits, bitterly disputed the merits of home-rule. ¹²⁰ Village tribal leaders responded by flexing their political muscles and gradually expanded the definition of regionalism in Alaska through a more accurate vernacular of North Slope Borough government.

A home-rule charter was eventually drafted in the 1970s that enhanced ANCSA village authority to collectively retain control over the presence of state and private industries in settlement lands. ¹²¹ The centralization of ANCSA village powers in North Slope Borough government created the largest semi-autonomous region within the entire Alaska state, and, Aleut, Indian and Inuit claimants attained a more dominant role in matters of regional governance. Gerald A. McBeath and Thomas A. Morehouse, in their analysis of ANCSA regional corporations representing Inupiat (Inuit) villages, explain that Inupiat participate in borough government "through membership in the borough assembly and interlocking relationships with borough administration." ¹²² Inupiat participation in borough government is explained as one of *partnership* which at once embraces the non-tribal government system and the

struggle for Inupiat self-determination. In a later publication, Morehouse describes Inupiat self-governance in Alaska in terms of a 'concurrent model' that attempts to incorporate the dynamics of mainstream non-tribal and tribal elements of political culture into a system of mutually beneficial cooperation and governing relationships. 123

The Morehouse model of North Slope borough government in Alaska warrants some critical questioning with regard to unresolved areas of political contention remaining within Inupiat villages where the struggle by tribal leaders to establish home-rule constitutes a strong force in borough reform. How do political reforms launched by Inupiat and other tribal leaders alter mainstream interpretation of the ANCSA and regional governance in Alaska? Might socio-economic issues arising in ANCSA localities become a countervailing force transforming state policies that endorse particular mainstream approaches for development? Morehouse tends to overlook the brimming potential of tribal leaders to challenge and reform political-economic boundaries and structures as new circumstances and strategies for development unfold. On the other hand, the concurrent model offers yet another vision of northern governance that identifies the need for cooperation between government, business and ANCSA claimant parties in regional development, and, no doubt, will likely require later

revision as ongoing changing issues occur that pertain to village authority and home-rule in the North Slope region.

2.3 Western Arctic Claim/Inuvialuit Final Agreement, NWT

The above section provides a general overview of the underlying impetuses to the land claims in James Bay and Alaska and the political-economic outcomes incurred by each. With large industries moving into traditional Inuit and Indian territories, land claims presented a forceful momentum and, for better or worse, resulted in settlements that changed the way government operates in both regions. What initially resulted in James Bay and Alaska was a new mode of assimilation whereby Inuit and Indian claimants found themselves confined to the predominant or 'mainstream' political and economic systems. The encroachment of the Quebec and Alaskan governments upon Inuit and Indian community priorities for development ultimately became part of the land claim process in those regions, forcing the implementation phase of their respective land claim structures, as was obviously the case in James Bay, into one of grave difficulty and attached to serious loss of time and fiscal stability.

In the Beaufort region, where close to ninety percent of the total population are Inuvialuit, from the outset COPE negotiated for structures of local government that would strengthen land claim institutions and community

priorities for political-economic development. 124 The situations in James Bay and Alaska had to some degree influenced the principles of regional government endorsed by COPE in their 1977 Agreement-in-Principle. Problems experienced more specifically by northern Quebec Inuit influenced COPE to develop theoretical models of government other than one principally based upon public institutions as a sole vehicle for generating economic transformation and political reform. As observed by some, the public institutions established in James Bay provided the opportunity for the Government of Quebec to "extend its administration, its laws, its services, its governmental structures through the entirety of Quebec." 125 COPE also stressed more than the enhancement of Inuvialuit culture and self-government through a new synthesis of community values and corporate entrepreneurialism as seen in the older North Slope Borough paradigm. Although one could argue the case that the IFA corporate network represents a hybrid-form of both James Bay and ANCSA sub-government structures, it has proven to be more than that.

Inuvialuit claimants negotiated their rights to traditional land occupancy and use with the Government of Canada, conveying to the Federal government that Canada's future certainly was locked into the north by means of untold northern contributions. Perhaps more so than anywhere else in Canada, in the western NWT a consensual

style of representative government fully recognized and endorsed by the communities creates the basis for land claim structures appearing after the Berger Inquiry. In the Beaufort region COPE rigorously worked to integrate the traditional consensual basis of Inuvialuit family and social organization into their land agreement, refusing to simply copy solutions to political-economic problems entertained by government and claimants elsewhere. By so doing, COPE aimed to increase Inuvialuit community co-operation and participation in processes of regional governance and preparedness for the forthcoming necessary administrative responsibilities implemented under the IFA.

The IFA establishes future possibilities for political and economic reform that emanate from a long-standing Inuvialuit tradition of community co-operation, or *power-sharing*, as a standard upon which all regional land authorities controlling development are based. The goal appears not so much to wrestle with federal and territorial authority over regional affairs as it seems to free up local expertise, existing in a large abundance, to compete for dominance in the management of Beaufort lands and natural resources. Inuvialuit Nunangat, the Agreement-in-Principle submitted in 1977 by COPE to the Federal government identified general community objectives underlying COPE proposals for Beaufort regional government:

- 1) regional control over matters of interest vital to

people within the region, but of relatively no concern to people outside the region; 2) regional control over and efficient management of government services in the communities; and, 3) the effective participation and self-development of Inuvialuit in regional governance. 126

Inuvialuit alienation from land and local development through a series of ad hoc federal policy-decisions and grants issued on behalf of large (oil and mineral) industries in the south was an ongoing concern of COPE throughout the entire negotiation process. Although the alienation of Inuvialuit land had occurred in the past without Inuvialuit consent, COPE did not demand that the alienated property rights be returned but, rather, that specific compensations and Inuvialuit control over future renewable and non-renewable resource development be part of a final settlement.

Renewable Resources

"As the sea is laying there, we look at it, we feed from it and we are really part of it."
-- Norah Ruben, Paulatuk 127

Renewable resource development, as generally explained in the IFA, means the harvesting of wildlife, 'wildlife' being "all fauna in a wild state other than reindeer." 128

The IFA further clarifies wildlife species of particular importance to Inuvialuit hunters and trappers for the purpose of traditional subsistence and commercial use.

Lengthy sections of the IFA defining Inuvialuit rights to wildlife in the western NWT and Yukon are premised on the recognition that "the Arctic is crossing the threshold of the industrial economy" which presents "new opportunities and options, as well as problems, to the traditional lifestyle." 129 The central problem of a growing arctic industrial economy to Inuvialuit domestic life is that it has procured long-lasting lamentable harm to important subsistence and valued cultural pursuits. A closer look at the problem reveals a background of inadequate wildlife management often derived from a definitional weakness or mistaken notions of biology and habitat on the part of the scientific establishment conducting research within the Beaufort region.

Does the management of wildlife include the natural and cultural environment or does it merely allocate species to quotas and regulations that conform to government-funded environmental impact studies limited to specific areas of industrial development? The common approach to wildlife research and management has tended to be the latter. Not until following the IFA did the scientific establishment begin a formal process of consultation with Inuvialuit on wildlife management and land development issues. To address the problem of development Inuvialuit Land Administration (ILA) activities and control over renewable resources extend to an area much larger than the Inuvialuit

settlement region, including several overlapping government jurisdictions in the Western Arctic. The IFA accommodates jurisdictional overlap or joint-management of wildlife and subsistence activities on lands upon which Inuvialuit depend. A *community of interests* is supposed in the IFA to mitigate potential difficulties arising from interjurisdictional conflicts over wildlife preservation and productivity. The vital link is the Wildlife Management Advisory Council (WMAC), established by Section 12(46) "In order to provide for joint planning by the native people and the governments in the Yukon North Slope..." (a large land space located between Alaska, Yukon and the NWT).¹³⁰ IFA joint-management bodies, such as the WMAC, act in an advisory capacity to the ILA and corresponding government ministries responsible for environmental screening and protection of renewable resources in the Western Arctic.

Development of the Beaufort renewable resource base is controlled according to stated IFA principles and long-term strategies (subject to review and revision) that aim to preserve the region's natural environment for succeeding Inuvialuit generations.¹³¹ Blocks of land, approximately seven hundred square miles, surrounding the six Inuvialuit communities were granted by Canada to the ILA to manage and develop in the interest of all Inuvialuit. Remaining large land spaces traditionally used for hunting and trapping

pursuits, but not deemed 'Inuvialuit lands', received protection from environmental degradation under the IFA as designated wilderness refuge or national park territory. The Yukon North Slope was provided such special designation or conservation status, under Subsections 12(1) and (2), for the purpose of preserving "wildlife habitat and traditional native use." ¹³² Other lands important to Inuvialuit subsistence and community development that come under the jurisdiction of the Federal or Territorial governments are further specified in the IFA, Section 12. Wilderness refuges and national parks referred to in the IFA represent vast public land holdings that, alongside established ILA requirements and safeguards ensuring Inuvialuit community control over development in their immediate vicinity, yield protection of Inuvialuit land interests throughout the entire Beaufort region.

A good example of IFA land overlap and shared jurisdiction is the Northern Yukon National Park, an area which includes Yukon Indian and Inuvialuit lands and coming under special protection since 1984. Settlement legislation prohibits any development inconsistent with Park objectives to maintain the natural wildlife characteristics of the region. ¹³³ A safeguard clause appears in Section 12(8) of the IFA that requires future changes in Park management be obtained only through Inuvialuit consent. A Yukon Park planning program was due

for final recommendation and approval by the summer of 1992, and, public consultation during the planning process included all interested parties: the Canadian Parks Services, Inuvialuit, Yukon Indians and the Yukon Territorial Government. The parties involved in deciding Park plans aim to incorporate historical, social and geographical factors of the region into the initial program. ¹³⁴ Thus far, the Park has been developed as a wildlife refuge and tourist attraction, although certain areas are being considered for development by the oil industry.

Ivavik, the recent name chosen for the North Yukon National Park, translates from Inuvialuktun (Inuvialuit language) into "where the animals have their young." ¹³⁵ Ivavik is breeding ground for the protected porcupine caribou herds, a current source of contention between parties sharing land and economic interests that cross jurisdictional boundaries in the Western Arctic because wildlife, such as caribou, travel throughout the Beaufort coastal plains irrespective of so called 'private/public' rights to land. In the general sense of the name, *Ivavik* extends into other regions perceived to hold economic opportunities and benefits, specifically, in the field of oil development. Though large land spaces in the Western Arctic are designated as wilderness refuges, oil developers continue to lobby for access to these regions to drill and

establish coastal river or land transport routes. 136

No doubt, ongoing issues of wildlife preservation and Inuvialuit control over the natural resource base will lead to new directions as IFA and other corporate overlapping land interests coalesce in the regulation of environmental and social-economic outcomes caused by development.

Non-Renewable Resource Development

"The North is...a region of limited biological productivity...But through a long history the region has been productive enough for the native people, and...could be made to be more productive in the years to come." -- Thomas Berger 137

As in the case of wildlife, interjurisdictional considerations and land claims adjudicate the extraction and transportation of non-renewable resources along the Western Arctic coast. Inupiat communities in Alaska's North Slope especially have specific environmental concerns about the presence of off-shore oil-tankers traversing ice in the Beaufort Sea region. 138 An acceptable joint-planning process establishing Inupiat/Inuvialuit claimant and government controls over hydrocarbon development in the vicinity of the Beaufort region must no doubt recognize multifarious social and environmental requirements too complex for a complete evaluation in the study at hand. Nonetheless, a general sense of Inuvialuit shared-management strategies initiated with other private and/or government parties involving on- and off-shore oil

production and transportation would be helpful to understand important implications of the IFA to community control over non-renewable resource development.

The IFA determines 'Agreements of Consent' or 'Participation Agreements' that identify ILA criteria for the exercise of petroleum, coal and mineral developer rights within Inuvialuit lands. Section 10(2) of the IFA states:

Except as otherwise agreed by the ILA, before exercising his guaranteed right of access, a developer must have concluded a valid Participation Agreement with the ILA setting out the rights and obligations of the parties respecting the activity for which the access is being granted. 139

Participation Agreements may apply to any number of ILA requirements: the compensation of costs associated with environmental screening or potential losses due to land or wildlife restoration, royalty revenues, preferential hiring of Inuvialuit in management and labor contracts, education and training programs and other terms originating from the nature and scope of any development project. In any Participation Agreement the onus rests with the developer to prove that a proposed project meets with ILA policy and procedure, saving the ILA time and money. 140

Practical implications of the IFA for Beaufort non-renewable resource development are further explained by Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale as an outgrowth of particular land management strategies adopted by Inuvialuit governing

bodies. In their analysis, concessional agreements reached between Inuvialuit and outside developers represent a 'homeland and hinterland' approach to land management that guarantees IFA principles and objectives for Beaufort development. Cassidy and Dale begin by explaining the homeland and hinterland paradigm as one that "envisions a high degree of native autonomy in regulating and undertaking natural resource development within clearly demarcated regions of native ownership and jurisdiction over resources", and, which appears "problematic in the eyes of most industry and government representatives." 141

Large industries working to transform Inuvialuit *homelands* in the Western Arctic into metropolitan *hinterlands* that advance southern-based corporate interests and economies may be interrupted by Inuvialuit actions to preserve the region's natural environment, traditional land rights and to guarantee community economic benefits. Under the IFA Inuvialuit and industry co-management bodies enjoined to regulate land and business ventures are required to operate upon IFA terms and conditions pertaining to any development project. Both parties are legally obligated to conform to general IFA principles (Section 10) that protect community social/cultural, environmental and economic development. If agreement cannot be reached, Cassidy and Dale aptly point out that Inuvialuit land authorities may opt to enforce the 'homeland' facet of the aforementioned model,

exercising IFA community rights to a traditional land base and to slow or scale-down development over any outside developer's 'hinterland' project. 142

A distinguishing feature of the IFA as compared to other land claims is that it provides for Inuvialuit ownership and community control of traditional homelands in the Western Arctic through terms and conditions that protect against any outside encroachment upon Inuvialuit property rights or attempts to bypass IFA requirements for developer access to the region. Depending upon the scale of the development project, the Inuvialuit regional governing body holds the legal right to require land access agreements and compensations from outside developers pertaining to any related environmental, social and political-economic impacts upon the communities. In the Inuvialuit scenario, as pointed out by Cassidy and Dale, claimant/industry parties have thus far succeeded to negotiate workable business agreements thereby allowing existing operations, specifically in the petroleum industry, to proceed with reasonable predictability. The fear nursed by some investors in the non-renewable resource sector that Inuit land claims and self-governance will inevitably produce an unstable and undesirable business atmosphere need not necessarily be true. In fact, existing concessional agreements between Inuvialuit and certain oil companies, such as Dome Petroleum drilling and shipping in

Tuktoyaktuk, support the opposite conclusion. IFA concessional agreements are based upon corporate co-operation and Inuvialuit criteria to build a healthy regional political-economy and future outlook for Beaufort communities. 143

2.4 Inuvialuit Self-Government, Beaufort Region, NWT

In the above section the IFA is presented as forming the basis for a unique model of regional governance in northern Canada, creating opportunities whereby Inuvialuit in Beaufort communities may develop their own particular talents and objectives for political-economic and social progress. An important and controversial aspect about the IFA is that it establishes private lands and corporate structures. 144 Under Section 7(100) of the IFA the Inuvialuit and Canada agree that:

...Inuvialuit lands shall be considered,
accepted and deemed not to be lands reserved
for Indians. 145

The IFA avoids reference to 'native' or 'aboriginal' title to land, whereas in other northern comprehensive claims, such as the James Bay settlement, native title remains a protected item. What does private ownership offer that the Indian Act or legal cases defining the Act do not? The answer seems to lie in a greater sense of community control and security; "What better way [the implication being that private ownership is the best method whereby Inuvialuit

communities may achieve control over external pressures and equality with other levels of government operating in the Beaufort region] than to incorporate the existing interests of Inuvialuit communities?" 146

IFA corporate structures are defined in Section 6 which states that the ILA, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC), Inuvialuit Investment Corporation (IIC) and the Inuvialuit Development Corporation (IDC) are the main bodies responsible to Inuvialuit beneficiaries for compensation and benefits received pursuant to the Agreement. 147 The IRC is described as an umbrella corporation under which the ILA, IDC and IIC each function in their respective roles and which is controlled by the Inuvialuit Community Corporations (ICCs) representing all six IFA communities. An Inuvialuit Trust is established to own 100% of the capital shares and income from which the IRC and all enrolled Inuvialuk (individual persons) receive benefits. 148 The IFA specifies distinct corporate structures that receive either financial compensation or income on behalf of Inuvialuit beneficiaries, but it leaves the determination of corporate powers and responsibilities to the ICCs which represent separate community interests.

Effective community control over land development or any joint venture proposed by the IDC or other interested parties within the settlement region occurs at two levels of IFA administration, the IRC and ICCs, to achieve balance

in the distribution and diversity of economic opportunities to the greatest extent possible. For example, IRC authority to approve IDC decisions affecting transfer of capital shares, funding or the execution of entrepreneurial activities are checked on an ongoing basis through the right of the ICCs to equally participate in economic ventures occurring within the entire Beaufort region. 149

Under the IFA all six ICCs are provided with the same measure of protection and benefits derived from land ownership and any future development project, setting the stage for the ICCs to negotiate substantive political-economic and social reforms. In Sections 16 and 17 the Federal government agrees to Inuvialuit rights to undertake economic programs and social ventures in accordance with rights applying to any private property owner and corporate entity in Canada. Nowhere in the IFA does Canada explicitly agree to ICC/IRC rights and authority to establish Inuvialuit self-government; however, political outcomes of IFA implementation, such as increasing IRC powers to determine land and wildlife policies and to act on behalf of (ICC) voting constituencies, certainly warrant further investigation into new avenues of Inuvialuit self-governance being developed by IFA corporate structures approved by Canada.

In the next chapter we arrive full circle at the central question of how political-economic processes

occurring in IFA communities have produced government reform in the Beaufort region and western NWT. Existing Beaufort community infrastructures, sustained by a balance of traditional activities centered on fishing, hunting and trapping pursuits and modern services, are firmly in place because of ICC co-operation and a growing number of joint ventures and participation agreements between government, industry and IFA corporate bodies. The Beaufort education system, for example, incorporates Inuvialuit language and wilderness skills into the core curriculum requirements for children of all ages; and, adults are offered entrance into educational upgrading and the job market through Arctic College as well as ICC/industry programs to train and place Inuvialuit into seasonal jobs that allow for family camp activities in the spring and summer. Through the IFA, Inuvialuit mainland and island communities now wield the necessary power to control regional industries, public programs and to influence the Territorial devolution process transpiring in conjunction with the development potential of land claims. Inuvialuit community co-operation and consensus rule presently constitute a unique model of regional government in the Western Arctic, linking NWT devolution and constitutional development to the value of domestic resources and traditional activities in the Beaufort region.

After decades of on-again-off-again federal programs aimed at revamping regional political-economies and the quality of life in Inuit and Indian communities, the Beaufort region is enjoying a sizeable reputation throughout circumpolar countries as a frontier of government reform and steadfast cultural renewal necessitated by the IFA. While the Federal government remains hauntingly quiet on issues of political development, the IRC has emerged as a powerful force in future directions for regional government and the NWT constitution. The jumping-off point for a deeper exploration of local processes affecting government reform would be at the very IFA structures that now share GNWT powers and responsibilities in the Beaufort region. Several northern scholars engaged in the analysis of NWT devolution and land claims point to multifarious historical relationships and unconscious factors that determine how devolution will ultimately be played out. Peter Clancy remarks that devolution is:

a boring word...but potentially one of the most powerful means of achieving one of the highest aims of democracy, bringing the process of decision-making as close as possible to the people affected by it. 150

The recent proliferation of IFA co-management boards, comprised of government and Inuvialuit members overseeing the delivery of Beaufort public service and long-term economic development programs, has become a special feature

of the devolution process in the western arctic. How have IFA co-management or power-sharing structures produced regional reform and, thus, Inuvialuit self-governance? In the next chapter several main areas of political development are examined in context of the pattern of devolution embedded in the three Inuvialuit proposals for regional reform and self-governance, WARM, WARG and Prime-Public Authority, that affirm the political status of Inuvialuit communities in the Territorial (public government) system.

III

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN THE
BEAUFORT REGION, NWT

- 3.1 Inuvialuit Political-Economic Development:
 - Western Arctic Regional Municipality (WARM)
 - Western Arctic Regional Government (WARG)
 - Prime Public Authority
- 3.2 NWT Regional and Tribal Councils
- 3.3 Shared-Governance
- 3.4 The Scone Report: A *Dual-Strategy* of Development
- 3.5 Intercircumpolar Relations: Culture, Politics
and Trade

Springtime 1992

The ice road is free of snow in many areas and drivers should drive carefully now on the glare ice...

--Aklavik

Ismael Alunik turned 68 years old on February 19th. Just the day before he and Herbert Allen went hunting caribou and managed to get five around Jimmy Lake...

--Inuvik

Rumor has it that people are getting fish at Husky Lakes. If you have any big fish stories give us a call...

--Tuktoyaktuk

The muskox harvest started up about 10 days ago, they are half way through...

--Sachs Harbour

Just recently some residents have gotten caribou near the community. Although the hunters got only enough to feed their own families, the hunters still practice the Inuit tradition of sharing with others...Eddie Okheena recently got a seven foot polar bear about 90 miles south...

--Holman

Well folks, spring is just around the corner, a time to prepare for the beautiful weather, long daylight and bright scenery, and the birds and geese flying and singing away...people have been going out to outpost camps, hunting and preparing for the spring and winter coming up...

--Paulatuk

Tusaayaksat, April 1992

In this chapter the Regional/Tribal Councils and the concept of shared-governance are presented as relevant background to the explanation of current IFA outcomes and Inuvialuit approaches to establish Beaufort regional government in the western NWT. At the Territorial level prior federal and, later, GNWT devolution strategies aimed to fulfill the right of community or tribal councils to exercise limited powers in regional policy-decisions and matters of government. Following the IFA COPE was phased out to permit the IRC full authority as ICC decision-makers began the task of implementing new regional structures, such as the IDC, WMAC and ISDC (explained in Sections 2.3 and 2.4), to govern land, wildlife and other related social development projects held in trust. Once settlement legislation and Inuvialuit corporate entities came into force in 1984 COPE's role as official representative and negotiator for Inuvialuit land rights and self-governance gradually diminished as the IRC became organized and equipped to take over COPE responsibilities. Leading COPE individuals assumed administrative positions within their home communities and in the IRC which became housed in the Inuvialuit Corporate Center in Inuvik, an impressive three storey mall-like complex, in the spring of 1989. ¹⁵¹ The IRC, intent on achieving an ongoing process of community participation and negotiation vis-a-vis shared-governance, has implemented a regional program whereby the IRC,

Territorial and Federal governments form a *partnership* in which they equally contribute to Beaufort political and economic development.

It can now be said with reasonable certainty that the IFA established the types of land claim institutions capable of accomplishing the long-term political-economic goals for which COPE worked so hard and long. According to Agnes Semmler, one of COPE's co-founders and President in 1970, the current IFA fulfills what COPE wanted: that is, the right of Inuvialuit communities to decide their own directions for development. "In the early days they just came and told us what to do...we were just like their slop bucket boys and girls...until we got going strong." 152

With the possible exception of Cassidy and Dale, very few scholarly analyses of Inuvialuit institutions post-IFA provide any real assessment of IRC/ICC structures and their effect on regional policy outcomes and Beaufort governance. Cassidy and Dale point to the partnership or co-management nature of IRC and other private or Crown corporations as fundamental to successful regional policy agreements and outcomes in the settlement region. This equal participation of Beaufort corporate bodies in economic and social development is likened to a marriage contract in which Inuvialuit and outside contractors bidding for licenses to explore and extract certain natural resources agree "first that a relationship is possible and second on the general

principles they would observe." 153

As explained in the previous chapter, the communities (ICCs) determine through consensus the composition and direction of their regional corporation (IRC) in terms of who represents them on land administration and development policies for the entire region. IRC negotiations involving outside industry and federal/territorial government contracts generally reflect the unanimous consensus of leading ICC members whose opinions likewise reflect those of their home community.* ICC input into regional policies enforced by the IRC on behalf of the communities assume top priority in any negotiation process, especially on matters related to the traditional subsistence economy. The IRC's partnership role in Beaufort development basically afford the ICCs a strong voice on wildlife and land use issues and most government programs that determine IFA outcomes as well as Inuvialuit living standards. Inuvialuit surface

* While I was not permitted to participate in just any IRC/ICC session (I was requested to withdraw from discussions that pertained to whale hunting), I did witness the high respect and deference shown to community members by IRC board and other government representatives. Even in their overall demeanor and dress, elected representatives attempted to accommodate the expectations of ICC participants. It was obvious that the community membership set the tone of a regional gathering. Opening prayers and friendly greetings were said, and the concerns and ideas of every person courteously received by all. Outside the meeting place and in the communities ICC members are part of the larger community family; they are united on the same thing -- to preserve their traditional land and culture.

rights to land and protected traditional hunting and fishing grounds extending throughout the Western Arctic come under the jurisdiction of federal/territorial and IFA land use controls and regulations. The IRC agenda is to establish ongoing land and coastal joint resource management whereby Inuvialuit community authority is preeminent, which appears in the three COPE/IRC proposals for regional government explained in Section 3.1 -- WARM, WARG and Prime Public Authority. All three proposals purport to establish the true meaning of *Inuvialuit* lands specified in the IFA, to protect traditional Inuvialuit use of the natural resource base and to restore and guarantee future participation of IFA communities in all aspects of governance within the Beaufort region.

3.1 Inuvialuit Political-Economic Development: WARM/WARG and Prime Public Authority

In the midst of the 1980s NWT constitutional debates on territorial east/west division, the devolution of federal powers, and a constitutional package guaranteeing Inuit and Indian claimant representation in NWT public government, COPE proffered the concept of a Western Arctic Regional Municipality (WARM), which soon after evolved into a Western Arctic Regional Government (WARG), to the Legislative Assembly as a legitimate governing alternative for Beaufort communities. The WARM/WARG proposals appeared reasonable and appealing from two obvious standpoints:

first, the Federal government and GNWT already formally agreed that the devolution of territorial public services to Regional Councils was the way of the future; and, second, since constitutional reform entailed greater democratic representation of the communities in regional affairs, it seemed logical to grant Inuvialuit communities themselves the right to decide the direction of government within their own region.

Issues of regional regulatory authority surrounding the whole gamut of government services available to Inuvialuit communities highlighted COPE's aggressive campaign to establish a Beaufort regional government with powers to control public programs, local taxation and legislation. Actually, a Western Arctic regional municipality was proposed as early as 1977 as an addendum to the Inuvialuit's proposed Agreement-in-Principle, and in 1985 underwent revision to include such front-line items as election procedures and residency requirements for eligible voters. ¹⁵⁴ Touted by COPE as the prelude to another category of northern government, it was anticipated that WARM would ultimately supplant devolved GNWT departments managing Beaufort lands and public programs with Inuvialuit land (ILA) and community (ICC) administrative branches operating under the umbrella of the regional corporate (IRC) body. GNWT responsibilities replaced by the IRC would be provided to Inuvialuit "more efficiently and

economically" in a wide range of areas that included social, health and education services already operating in the settlement region. 155

COPE negotiated in the Legislative Assembly for Beaufort regional government powers that would allow IFA communities to achieve greater strength in caucus representation and authority within the Territorial government. Under WARM a new Regional Council would be created to represent all IFA communities with the exception of Inuvik. 156 The clear intention of the WARM proposal was to empower community councils with legislative authority and administrative powers in matters of Beaufort governance that surpassed the delegated powers and reporting functions of the devolved GNWT Regional Councils (explained in Section 3.2). In order for Inuvialuit communities to truly become active participating members in regional government a more representative Council directly accountable to the communities would be required. A fundamental principle of WARM, approved in 1985 by COPE and Beaufort area mayors, was that community councils in the region would decide the basis and structure of regional government; the voluntary association of its "member communities shall be the genesis of the regional government." 157

WARM introduced a way for COPE to test how far Ottawa and the GNWT would venture in new power-sharing

arrangements. It formed a starting point for COPE to begin dialogue in the Legislative Assembly on hard questions related to political development that were certain to follow. Some concrete functions of a WARM were articulated by COPE, generally in areas of land management, public services and legislation, but the proposal did not develop far enough to specify the distribution of governing powers or relationship of the democratically elected Regional Council to other levels of government. These issues, as well, would apparently follow later in future negotiations, especially should Inuvialuit choose to ally their corporate interests with those of the Eastern Arctic Inuit in a Nunavut jurisdiction sited northeast of the treeline. 158

The prospect of a WARM or any other options for regional governance seemed to hinge upon the settlement of NWT land claims and how devolution would be played out as IFA communities demonstrated increasing strength in regional political-economic undertakings and in the Territorial Assembly.

By the mid 1980s a more organized system of community consultation and co-operation operating to ensure full representation of Inuvialuit communities within the Legislative Assembly began to solidify under the direction of COPE. Although the WARM proposal fizzled out on the negotiation tables as COPE committed itself to the enormous task of IFA implementation, the existing principles of

regional governance contained in WARM were left to be negotiated later on. Immediately following settlement legislation COPE turned its attentions and energies toward developing IFA institutions and shortly afterward in September 1985 substantial portions of WARM were revived in the WARG proposal, re-presented by COPE to a Constitutional Alliance forum in Coppermine (NWT). This second time WARM/WARG was presented with greater vigor and accompanied by increased political contention as the debate in Ottawa and Yellowknife on boundary division accelerated. Regional governance in the western NWT generated mixed emotions and unresolved conflict between Inuvialuit and other claimant and GNWT Constitutional Alliance members fearing alienation of potential Beaufort oil revenues from the GNWT's already meager tax base through new land and political jurisdictions. Other complex issues of democratic representation evoking concern in the Legislative Assembly were also raised by members requesting a clearer definition of constitutional rights belonging to non-Inuvialuit Canadians residing within the jurisdiction of a WARG. 159

Should language and culture determine government boundaries and powers? Were the underlying premises of the WARM/WARG proposals racist? In other words, would rights belonging to non-Inuvialuit Canadians contributing to the region's history and development be adversely affected

under WARG? Constitutional debates in the Legislative Assembly focused on the IFA and Inuvialuit proposals for Beaufort regional government took on an experimental nature as such questions relating to boundary division and the devolution of GNWT powers to IFA structures were searched out. WARG accommodated the general direction of the Assembly, which followed along the line of the ANCSA approach establishing greater community representation within central government, while stretching the political process to include constitutional entrenchment of IFA community powers and, specifically, the collective right of Inuvialuit to control land, natural resources and public agencies operating in the Beaufort region. Issues of guaranteed representation, such as language rights and social/cultural development, were also presented in the (modified WARM) WARG proposal as responsibilities of government that could be more effectively fulfilled at the regional level rather than from Yellowknife. Additionally, the guaranteed representation afforded to IFA communities under WARG would not be limited to Inuvialuit beneficiaries but included other claimant and non-claimant groups permanently residing within settlement lands. 160

WARM and WARG essentially constituted one and the same paradigm of regional government with the exception of a few revisions and clarifications appearing in the latter proposal that deal directly with issues related to IFA

community representation and intergovernmental relations. The Western Arctic regional government would have superseded all other governing interests in the Beaufort region "subject only to inconsistent central government legislation." ¹⁶¹ In some respects similar to the North Slope Borough government in Alaska, WARG would have established strong regional government with delegated legislative authority; but, unlike the Alaskan model of Inuit self-government, WARG in principle protected all future IRC/ICC powers and authority in Beaufort governance emanating from the IFA.

The political aspirations of COPE were revived for constitutional debate during the round of negotiations involving WARG. WARG contained principles that struck once again at the very core of NWT constitutional reform -- land claims, boundary issues and development. The Prime Public Authority model of regional government, tabled by the IRC during the Fourth Session of the Legislative Assembly in 1989, ¹⁶² dealt more specifically with the IFA and Beaufort political-economic development. In this third proposal the IRC approach to the Assembly was more clearly on the basis that *they*, Inuvialuit, have meaningful contributions to offer to the people and constitutional process of the NWT. The IRC based this claim largely upon corporate regional achievements succeeding the IFA. Under the IFA, regional governance is based upon *community*

authority in the management of land, natural resources, public services and, in short, in the full exercise of IFA economic and social programs designed to improve Inuvialuit opportunities within settlement lands. In its exposition of Prime Public Authority, in terms of how it would function in Beaufort communities and relate to the Constitutional Alliance's broader mandate to reach a consensus on NWT political development, the IRC's emphasis was less upon earlier issues of NWT boundary division and of restructuring government in the regions and more on the importance of community empowerment in northern governance (however it may evolve).

In the Prime Public Authority model of regional governance, as coined by the IRC, communities would be the *prime* decision-makers in Beaufort social and economic development. ¹⁶³ For example, Inuvialuit Hunters and Trappers Committees (HTCs), chaired by many of the same community members elected to their respective ICCs, already operate in all six IFA communities and greatly contribute to regional policy decisions pertaining to the allocation of funds for wildlife research, harvest quotas and resource development on sites surrounding traditional family lands. Community Councils have also assumed a more primary governing role in Beaufort public and social service programs, mobilizing local expertise, talent and fund-raising for areas where it is needed. The incorporation of

Inuvialuktun into school curricula as a language requirement (taught in classrooms by recruited elders), revision of policies related to foster care and adoption services for Inuvialuit children (placing children into the care of close relatives or friends), and increasing Inuvialuit representation on community health, education and housing boards all attest to ICC precedence in governing powers and responsibilities at the regional level. 164

Informal implementation of the Prime Public Authority model in four Inuvialuit communities, Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, Holman and Sachs Harbour, where Inuvialuit tend to spend most of their lives out on the land, was reported in 1989 by the IRC to be in its beginning stage. 165 The 1986 IRC Annual Report revealed that all four communities had established ICCs which demonstrated a strong willingness to achieve consensus and work cooperatively with other Beaufort governing bodies on land issues and to succeed in shared political-economic ventures. The Tuktoyaktuk ICC, outstanding for its concessional agreements with Esso Resources pertaining to a large oil rigging and storage plant, invited and won travel approval from the IRC for other ICC representatives to examine and make recommendations as to how the project would best serve the Beaufort region. 166 Tuktoyaktuk offers perhaps the clearest example of how Prime Public Authority works in an

Inuvialuit community where the ICC, industry and hamlet boards as well as other ICC members come together to form one prime governing body that represents all combined interests. This marriage of local interests where each party consents to be equally involved and legally cognizant of the health and future wellbeing of the community and the region as a whole is how it all comes together. In the words of IRC Chairperson, Roger Gruben, a Prime Public Authority is simply what each community is capable of organizing and providing for its own members in terms of government structures and services -- "a community government is what the community itself defines as its own government." 167

Other recent examples of Prime Public Authority found in the four Inuvialuit pilot communities mentioned above reveal varying degrees and approaches to amalgamating local interests and of becoming incorporated into the regional political-economy. Certainly, the wildlife concerns of each community remain pivotal to ongoing and new governing strategies. Inuvialuit regional development programs aimed at alleviating social and economic problems through funding and support of traditional activities have revived community participation in many new directions. In 1993 Tuktoyaktuk and Sachs Harbour participated in organizing moose tanning workshops to encourage Inuvialuit to combine their skills with the growing art and tourist industry.¹⁶⁸

Moreover, the revival of traditional Inuvialuit hunting activities and art sparked by such programs has spread to other surrounding Mackenzie Delta communities outside the pilot program. At the regional level, this resurgence of community awareness and co-operation in relation to Prime Public Authority appears to be paying off. Communities are developing their own opportunities and asserting their right to local decision-making and to determine the direction of their regional governing body. In January 1994 Inuvialuit communities rallied together to express concerns with regard to IRC accountability and elected a new chairperson, Robert Kuptana, to represent them at the regional level. During this same year the communities demonstrated strength at the national level, winning through arbitration the approval of their demand for full compensation from Canada of all costs pertaining to DEW Line material and environmental cleanup.¹⁶⁹

The implications of the Prime Public Authority model for the development of Beaufort regional government and NWT constitutional reform are great. There seems to be a new spirit of co-operation between all levels of government in the region. As a forum recommending political development, the Constitutional Alliance has increasingly recognized the vital role community councils fulfill as co-managers and advisors to GNWT departments controlling regional programs. The IRC, on the other hand, additionally

recognizes that regional governance requires an equal commitment from all tiers of representative government. 170

In the Beaufort region this means a strong commitment from the ICCs to share in local governing responsibilities routinely held by Ottawa and Yellowknife and from central authorities to yield legislative approval and formal recognition of legitimate IRC/ICC entities controlling IFA lands and royalties held in trust.

The 1984 land settlement, which granted the legal title of property to Inuvialuit land and business corporations, raises interesting possibilities with regard to municipal bylaws, general laws and GNWT policies governing land use and determining long-term topographic and demographic outcomes affecting development in the Beaufort region. In the Prime Public Authority paradigm ongoing co-operation between all levels of local government is assumed. Unlike previous federal/territorial centralist tendencies which bypass the need for regional government, this third IRC proposal is principally based upon Beaufort intergovernmental relations and the perception that ultimate reform in the western NWT will only be realized through shared-governance or a partnership of interests engaging community priorities for development. Federal/territorial discretionary powers to determine devolution strategies unilaterally in the Western Arctic are a thing of the past. At the same time, the IRC

commitment to enhance IFA community authority over Beaufort lands and resources has proven remarkably resilient in the Legislative Assembly, and in terms of progressing toward what COPE initially set out to do in WARM/WARG. The IRC has made it clear to the Constitutional Alliance that the ICCs "are prepared to move ahead" in the 1990s to develop new IFA structures establishing Beaufort regional government, and that Inuvialuit envisage a future NWT constitution based upon shared powers and responsibilities and intergovernmental co-operation. ¹⁷¹ Indeed, the initiation of Prime Public Authority represents a positive turn toward the IRC's long-term goal for Inuvialuit self-governance, and, for wide recognition within the Legislative Assembly of IFA community governments as key 'building blocks' in the Beaufort political-economy.

3.2 Regional and Tribal Councils

Regional and Tribal Councils initially developed as a result of NWT land claims and long-standing issues related to land ownership and the lack of effective local control over natural resources. As explained in Section 1.3 the political and legal question became *who owned the land?* In the Western Arctic land and community control over land-based activities, issues in the main that stimulated preliminary land claim negotiations, became paramount in IFA provisions that established new Beaufort governing

structures designed to protect Inuvialuit cultural and political-economic interests. The GNWT passed legislative approval of the Councils in 1983 which initially functioned to safeguard government's role in the future direction of land claims and government reform in the regions. Not until the late 1980s were the Councils actually affirmed by the GNWT as important public government fora through which communities could address local concerns and participate in future regional policy directions. 172

Established by the 1983 GNWT Ordinance Respecting Regional and Tribal Councils, the approved role of the Councils was to improve government services by acting in an advisory capacity to the GNWT concerning community needs. Council members, elected by the communities, were delegated authority to administer government-funded programs and by majority vote enact regional by-laws deemed necessary to enhance Inuit and Indian and other community interests. 173

The 1983 Ordinance laid the groundwork for new regional structures and an outgrowth of public policies that in effect expanded the parameters of Inuit and Indian claimant interests to include participation, co-operation, in intergovernmental relations and future development. In the western NWT the Councils basically functioned to promote dialogue and co-operation between Inuvialuit and Loucheux/Slavey Indian communities and GNWT ministerial departments, and to give assent to certain devolution and

associated long-term development strategies in the various regions.

As greater coordination of their common interests evolved through the Regional Councils, Inuvialuit communities began (by the late 1980s) to present a strong force in the Legislative Assembly on local issues and territorial policy-decisions affecting development within settlement lands. In fact, Inuvialuit soon occupied positions within IRC and GNWT Regional Councils both of which became headed by elected Inuvialuit members in 1988-89 (Danny Norris, Regional Council President and Roger Gruben, IRC Chairperson).¹⁷⁴ Council members soon introduced new regional policies and resolutions into the Territorial administration system whereby Inuvialuit communities could apprise GNWT departments of local realities and successfully move the Assembly to approve government reforms and devolution compatible with IFA political-economic and social agendas. In 1987 the Beau-Del Regional Council was established for Beaufort Sea/Mackenzie Delta communities in order "to resolve problems, discuss issues and make recommendations" to the GNWT on how to make government "more responsive to the needs of the people."¹⁷⁵

The Beau-Del Regional Council convenes in Inuvik during designated times per annum and is comprised of elected Inuvialuit, Loucheux Indian, government and other

local representatives. The Beau-Del Council is authorized under the 1983 Ordinance to decide regional policies in just about every conceivable area of concern to residents of the region. Any interested person may observe Council proceedings, but are not allowed to participate alongside elected members deciding policy directions. Council responsibilities range from very important matters to smaller agenda items, such as, whether Council should approve construction of a river crossing bridge. ¹⁷⁶ Major policy reforms implemented through Beau-Del and other NWT Regional Council resolutions or bylaws, specifically in such neglected areas as housing, education and healthcare, initially offset a growing stalemate between various GNWT and Inuit and Indian claimant members in the Legislative Assembly for a common ground on land claim and constitutional development. ¹⁷⁷

The chance of GNWT and Inuit/Indian claimant parties to arrive at agreement on new political jurisdictions and regional government boundaries appeared remote, especially to those northern analysts who approached the issue during the 1980s from the standpoint of Dene or Nunavut political development. Gurston Dacks presented the argument that political development in NWT regions tends to be dominated by devolution trends set into motion by the Federal government (begun during the early 1980s). ¹⁷⁸ Two main competing forces in NWT Constitutional development are

raised, one being federal policies for regional reform and devolution and, the other, land claim initiatives for self-government. Dacks concludes that these two conflicting approaches to regional development complicates Inuit and Indian claimant goals for self-governance and clears the way for federal top-down devolution strategies in the NWT.

To a certain degree the formation and activities of the Beau-DeL Council did defuse the urgency felt by Inuvialuit for new political boundaries and the devolution of GNWT responsibilities to regional government bodies deciding political-economic directions. However, once the question of land ownership became finally settled through the IFA, boundary issues began to undergo an astonishing metamorphosis. For Inuvialuit it was no longer simply a question of who owned the land or land *rights*, but one of legitimacy and which level of government best represented and protected the real interests of the communities. Options to improve upon community/regional governance opened up even more as the IFA and pending Loucheux and Slavey Indian land settlements enlarged the political platform of all claimants rising to meet the development challenge. By the early 1990s the Legislative Assembly had already begun to show signs of bending toward IRC and other claimant proposals for government reform in the regions. In spite of early attempts by both the Federal and

Territorial governments to separate land claims from the devolution process and political development it became increasingly apparent that the one followed close behind the other. 179

The Beau-Del Regional Council, formed shortly following the IFA, became, beyond a mere sounding board for territorial policy decisions, another stepping-stone for Inuvialuit to progress into a greater political role in NWT public government and the formation of a new constitution. Participation of Inuvialuit in Council activities did not detract from the IRC's agenda for government reform and devolution but, rather, as becomes more clear in the next several sections, whet the appetite of Inuvialuit for even greater regional autonomy and self-government. This particular phase of NWT government reform bolstered the IRC's growing confidence to develop new possibilities for Beaufort regional governance, and to achieve constitutional entrenchment of the right of IFA communities to form legitimate self-governing bodies. Demonstrating optimism and perseverance in COPE's original endorsement of greater Beaufort community powers and authority in regional affairs, the IRC and ICCs moved forward to implement IFA co-management bodies equally representative of Inuvialuit and GNWT/federal land interests in the settlement region. In the previous section, one aspect of this new direction is explained through a rise in community empowerment and

the development of the Prime Public Authority model of Inuvialuit self-governance. In the remaining sections, we find at the regional level an ongoing momentum for greater Inuvialuit self-governance that has developed into a powerful force determining the types of regional and territorial representative institutions in the Western Arctic. While the GNWT has yet to ratify Inuvialuit principles and newly formed structures of regional government, COPE and, later, IRC proposals tabled in Legislative Assembly house sessions have moved the Assembly to review, develop and promote legislation guaranteeing Inuvialuit the right to *share* in government powers controlling matters of local interest.

3.3 Shared-Governance

Waiting for a new deal, for improved economic and social conditions, is how arctic communities have become best regarded by some northern analysts who observe land claims as the latest phase in NWT boosterism.¹⁸⁰ From this perspective, land claims in the 1980s and 90s contribute a third participant to northern political and economic progress, introducing new shared-governing structures that incorporate Inuit and Indian objectives into government and industry programs for development in the regions. In the Beaufort region shared-governance has undoubtedly evolved out of the response of Inuvialuit to

previous bilateral government/industry relations and policy-decisions. On the other hand, as a political platform shared-governance has endured and developed primarily as a result of Inuvialuit community solidarity and co-operation not introduced but preserved and enhanced through the land claim process.

As indicated in Chapter One, surviving the rigors of the arctic environment and, later, the effects of northern industrialization and federal intervention upon local culture is a learned part of life in the Beaufort region. Inuvialuit traditionally share in essential community responsibilities of hunting and trapping, trade and planning social policies as circumstances warrant. In the words of one observer of Inuit history and culture, "...they were resourceful. They had to be: their survival depended on it." ¹⁸¹ Survival, in the competing world of the 1990s, continues to depend upon the traditional sharing of material resources and social obligations, albeit federal, GNWT and commercial activities countered by Inuvialuit claims to land constitute a strong factor influencing current community strategies for survival and self-governance.

COPE, emphasizing the need for constitutional protection of Inuvialuit homelands in the western NWT, stepped up political pressure in the Legislative Assembly for the entrenchment of regional power-sharing arrangements

soon after enactment of the IFA. Universal principles of majority rule and representation inherent in Canadian democracy, it was argued, did not accommodate the conventions of public consultation, co-operation and consensus fundamental to Inuvialuit political and social organization. ¹⁸² Experience had shown that the predominant Canadian government system tended to undermine the legitimate role of elected regional claimant bodies, as in the James Bay scenario, and COPE moved soon after the 1984 settlement to refine their concept of power-sharing in the context of the territorial-wide reform and constitutional development taking place.

The timing of events in the Beaufort region and in the Legislative Assembly during the mid 1980s could hardly have been more fortuitous in terms of successful Beaufort reform. COPE and, later, the IRC began to boldly promulgate new shared-governing structures and agendas under the IFA while, simultaneously, the question of land claims turned the Assembly into a powerhouse of ideas on northern governance in Canada. ¹⁸³ In response to regional issues being raised by Inuit and Indian claimants the GNWT Aboriginal Rights and Constitutional Development Secretariat, a political think-tank of qualified professionals and claimants who recommend to the Executive Council on how to proceed with land claims, proposed a three-tiered Territorial government with Executive/

Legislative, Constitutional Alliance and Land Claims branches each functioning to weave into NWT public government "a tapestry of interests, rights, culture ... with aboriginal claims being a most important strand." 184

In contrast to the James Bay Agreement, which lacked a cohesive approach to formal implementation of its provisions, the IFA was viewed by the Secretariat as holding more promise and potential for success in terms of molding government reform and the devolution process in the Beaufort region. A 1986 poll conducted by COPE confirmed the general consensus of IFA communities themselves that the Beaufort was now ready for "strong regional government", and that this is what they desired the Assembly to approve. 185

Throughout prolonged periods of frequent change and uncertainty engendered by government/industry activities in the Western Arctic, Inuvialuit communities demonstrated a strong sense of local self-sufficiency and solidarity which bloomed into a conscious attempt to circumvent federal conceptions of polity and economic success. Today, the IFA is espoused by Inuvialuit leadership as the legislative masterpiece from which future critical questioning of regional reforms and creative interpretation of NWT constitutionalism will derive. A semi-autonomous regional government that accommodates IFA administrative structures and community conventions within the Territorial system is

fully endorsed by the IRC as a necessary first-step toward constitutional entrenchment of Inuvialuit rights to land and self-determination. Important land and boundary issues related to shared-governance and constitutional development currently being negotiated by Inuvialuit in the Legislative Assembly are focused upon the local realities and political-economic climate in the Beaufort region, summoning the Assembly to approve substantive government reforms transpiring in IFA communities.

3.4 The Scone-Report: A Dual-Strategy of Development

In January 1989 the GNWT, responding to the increasing momentum for regional reform being fueled by the IFA and other land claims, assigned the Special Committee on the Northern Economy to hold public hearings and workshops in NWT communities and submit a profile of local economies and opportunities for development. ¹⁸⁶ Participants in the Inuvik sessions included elected representatives from the IRC, Inuvik Town Office and other notable local personalities and business owners speaking on the subject of the Beaufort economy. Suggested solutions to economic problems supported radical change in the regional infrastructure, even including the Beaufort banking system which, like many financial institutions in the north, failed to fund and meet the needs of local businesses. In short, what Inuvik participants conveyed to the Special

Committee was that future GNWT economic programs would best serve Beaufort communities by allowing them a full choice in the types of local institutions and tough policy decisions that impact their region. 187

"How can your community diversify its economic activities? What areas seem to have the most potential for development...?"; questions ranking at the top of the Special Committee's list, which Inuvialuit participants attempted to answer during scheduled community workshops, were parceled out in final sections of the Scone Report. 188

A new approach to sustainable development not borrowed from southern board rooms but reflecting true community-based options is required to break new ground in the NWT economy. Little is explicitly mentioned in the Scone Report that relates to specific possibilities for sustainable community development, and it tends to gloss over the relevance of land claims and Inuit and Indian strategies for shared-governance to development in the regions. Rather, the approach of the Special Committee was to identify preliminary principles or an "ethic of development" that undergirds specific GNWT policy-directions for territorial-wide reform appearing in their final report. 189

Pointing to the necessity for GNWT policies and programs that would best serve community needs, the Special Committee first enquired into the economic conditions of

the communities. As explained in the introductory chapter above, the Special Committee's profile of NWT communities appearing in the Scone Report consists of two opposite categories -- developed and underdeveloped. In short, under the category of developed communities is identified a diverse range of employment opportunities in the public and private sectors, the employment in underdeveloped communities simply described as far lower than the 'national average'. Existing potentials for economic development were said to be based upon government statistics collected in the late 1980s, specifically, on community population size, ethnicity, percentage of residents educated and in the workforce. ¹⁹⁰ The focus then turns to the economic opportunities both types of communities may expect by the year 2000.

The measure of opportunity employed in the Scone Report revamps age old notions of 'native advantage/disadvantage' and fails to recognize how small communities in the Canadian arctic survived and adjusted to seemingly insurmountable challenges and changing political-economic circumstances: "...the gap is continually getting wider. The developed communities are getting poorer...In underdeveloped communities, government must carry on the work of development." ¹⁹¹ An underlying concern here and throughout much of the Scone Report is that local business ventures initially funded by Ottawa must, to avoid going

belly-up, continue to be subsidized by government until a strong private sector takes over what government started. Unfortunately, economic and social gains induced through government capital and incentives for growth in northern industry did not bring lasting benefits to the communities; and, to continue along the lines of an earlier analogy, government has 'run out of matches' to maintain what it began.

Sustainable development, as it pertains to NWT communities referred to in the Scone Report, is based upon an expected economic shift from the domestic transfer economy to a viable, productive private sector. However, the identified problem of the NWT economy is that there remain more underdeveloped than developed communities despite continued efforts by government over the past forty-odd years to reverse the situation. Government transfer payments presently constitute the motor for growth in a majority of NWT enterprises with over half of employment opportunities realized through the public service industry; oil and mining take second place. 192

The lesson learned from past policy mistakes is that local incentives for lasting, sustainable development in the NWT cannot be orchestrated by central government but must originate out of local impulses and community-based options to reroute domestic resources and promote business growth.

The aforementioned 'ethic of development' permeates

the Special Committee's recommendations for economic reform and represents a turning-point in GNWT policies promoting large-scale industrial/business and stable infrastructure growth in the regions. The Special Committee conceded that while government had developed "more and more community services at the community level... instead of helping people to stand on their own two feet, we were making them more and more dependent".¹⁹³ The Committee then moved on to link the present economic condition of most communities to the lack of a government strategy to facilitate or coordinate viable business achievements at the regional level. Hence, the Special Committee's final recommendation was for a long-term dual-strategy, rerouting human and material resources so that economic opportunities in the small, so-called underdeveloped communities might be realized thanks to wealth generated in the more modern regional centers.¹⁹⁴ This recommended dual-strategy for economic development adds a certain twist to the meaning of cooperation and resource-sharing that at once purports to advance existing community opportunities for business growth and GNWT devolution tactics to transfer government services from the communities to certain designated regional centers. In the end, the Special Committee's focus on an economic strategy, which links the needs of the smaller communities to the business success and the potential for growth experienced in the larger developed

centers, is integrally related to administrative devolution and anticipated expenditures of government in the new age of federal fiscal constraints affecting GNWT operations in the regions.

GNWT action to regionalize public services and transfer ministerial responsibilities to designated district departments is rooted in both the rapid development of land claim institutions (the IRC in the Western Arctic) and a resulting need for the GNWT to legitimize its role in the territorial political-economy. Gurston Dacks writes: "In a practical sense, devolution is institution building. Devolution gives the government more money, more person years and more services to provide. In this way, it enables the government to build up its clientele, whether they be employees...or recipients of GNWT services." ¹⁹⁵ Dacks explains that the current overall trend of devolution has provided a means whereby the GNWT may gain regional support from prospective claimant constituencies and escape from their collective demands for special constitutional status in NWT public government. Insofar as the Special Committee's recommendations back GNWT devolution strategies to build regional co-operation or a territorial roundtable bringing community interests together in the regions, the electoral prospect of Inuit and Indian claimants for affecting government reforms and economic policies remain curiously

avoided. Serious treatment of the relevance of land claims to the entire devolution process is deferred by the Special Committee in lieu of territorial-wide and other outside forces determining the direction of local political-economies.

Why the apparent reluctance by the Special Committee to explore possibilities for strong regional government and economic development through the route of comprehensive claims? Aside from the fact that the topic of regional government is beyond the scope of the Committee's mandate, complex issues related to devolution and boundary considerations tend to obscure real possibilities for political-economic reform in the context of a land settlement. In a study of Village Alaska, Thomas A. Morehouse observes that "a society's politics affect the production and distribution of wealth, and its economies affect the production and distribution of power".¹⁹⁶ In the Beaufort region, the proliferation of legitimate and economically viable claimant institutions functioning to pool community resources and effectively administer regional services previously controlled by GNWT departments has led to "...meaningful participation and co-operation ...to develop those structures that are required by those we [the IRC] represent".¹⁹⁷ This is where the IRC approach and recommendations appearing in the Scone Report for regional development diverge: in the flow of human and

material resources and the degree of control provided community governments over regional policies and programs. In the Scone Report we find that government services and opportunities for development are effectively channeled away from the smaller communities into the larger regional (government) centers, and, at the regional level, government assumes the lead to ensure that communities are integrated into the regional political-economy. Existing IFA land structures and Inuvialuit proposals for self-government, in particular the Prime Public Authority model being developed in the expanding ICC/IRC network and Beaufort infrastructure, continue to be viewed by the GNWT as a mixed blessing. Once the emphasis begins to shift from the systematic, controlled, regionalization of government services to exclusive jurisdictional rights based upon shared community histories and political-economic interests, the GNWT is pushed to a turning point in the devolution process which, to date, constitutes an unprecedented level of political power-sharing and direction in the theme of partnership pursued by Inuvialuit in the Western Arctic.

Progress on NWT constitutional reform and the development of regional government appear to some northern analysts at a critical juncture in terms of resolving Inuit and Indian boundary issues and proposals to establish political-economic institutions that represent their

community interests. Gordon Robertson makes the case that particular regional issues and areas of shared management between Inuit claimants and federal/territorial departments in the high arctic are on the verge of a new "innovative" approach to governance north of sixty as land claim outcomes open up the next phase of constitutional negotiations. 198 In the Beaufort region Inuvialuit have entered into the post-IFA phase of negotiating the nature and scope of community and regional government powers; however, IFA outcomes and Inuvialuit negotiations to establish self-government appear at this early stage experimental and transitory. Speaking as an outside observer, a fair assessment of the Inuvialuit struggle to reform government within their home region is that they refuse to be rushed. A lot remains to be seen, tried, tested and possibly rejected by Inuvialuit as they collectively decide the nature and direction of representative government for Beaufort communities. The tendency to explain away, *carte blanche*, land claim outcomes and regional developments as one would the demarcations and contours of a new map seems misguided. Especially when such analyses are compared to the real experiences of those who *tell the story* of an unfolding life in many respects similar to that of a developing fetus with its entire constitution, bone, muscle and sinew, mirroring all that has gone before.

3.5 Intercircumpolar Relations: Culture, Politics and Trade

In previous chapters it is noted that the history of arctic development has been primarily explained in the literature in terms of the effects of European society, industrialization and state intervention upon the surrounding natural and cultural environment. What remains to be explored in this section is a contrasting viewpoint and more compelling explanation of past and unfolding political-economic events in circumpolar regions as people of similar language and culture share local resources and governing powers within their home territories. The central claim here is that new and innovative approaches to northern governance are evolving through the Inuvialuit land claim process in the western NWT. In concluding, it is worth emphasizing that *innovation* has always been an integral part of negotiating governing strategies in arctic regions where change and survival are a way of life, reflecting the peoples' endurance and commitment to their land and to each other.

In the Scone Report we find reflected a particular perspective of economic reality that has taken shape in southern Canada, where a shaken economy has moved government and industries to search out new long-term goals and 'diversification'. To attract southern capital the NWT economy must, it is argued, also exhibit diversity, and the

Scone Report indicates a current trend in GNWT policy to commit to economic solutions through the small business sector. Along this line of reasoning the Special Committee calls for a consolidation of community resources into the larger NWT urban centers, a seemingly logical choice for developing intergovernmental relations and commerce in the regions. How does the Special Committee's contingency plan for regional reform compare to the issues or concerns of claimants, and, more specifically, to those of Inuvialuit? While the core concerns are much the same, the reclamation of Inuvialuit lands and a heightened sense of cultural awareness have produced a resurgence of community co-operation to develop political-economic solutions and opportunities in the context of their land settlement; and, with the customer of choice apparently no longer predominantly government or industry in the south, the former fixation on community disadvantage or 'underdevelopment' can now be observed to be shifting toward *possibilities* for development occurring in circumpolar regions as a result of the IFA.

The regionalization of GNWT operations, pre- and post IFA, has enhanced the ability of Inuvialuit communities, in particular the ICCs, to influence a sequence of local reforms that concentrate policy-making powers and processes of government within their traditional home territory. As explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.3, under the IFA the ICCs

have gradually assumed a primary role in matters of regional governance, and IRC advisory and ancillary corporate bodies (such as the aforementioned Wildlife Management Advisory Council), now interact on a variety of levels with federal and GNWT ministries deciding regional policies that affect the quality of life in Inuvialuit communities. The IRC stresses far-reaching Inuvialuit stakes in the regional political-economy that extend beyond settlement lands, and the picture gradually coming into focus includes NWT and other northern industries, public/private enterprises and community/regional governments that harbor shared policy concerns.

With federal/territorial funding for local programs long in decline, the IRC and ICCs have moved into a more central role in the sponsorship and management of regional agencies operating to enhance community incentives and potentials for Beaufort development. In the early stages of IFA implementation key COPE individuals opted to transfer their main office from the government center of Inuvik to one of the smaller IFA communities in order to better promote community input or participation in regional programs and services. ¹⁹⁹ Faced with impending fiscal cutbacks and the rapid devolution of federal powers to Yellowknife, COPE urged GNWT policy-planners to proceed with Beaufort reform on the basis that the western NWT is absolutely bound to the political-economic aspirations of

IFA communities. Potential local benefits anticipated from any long-term strategy for reform would require that time and money go toward assisting the IRC in its objectives for infrastructure growth and to link all six IFA communities to regional programs promoted by government. In the case of tourism, for example, an economic program highly promoted by the GNWT, all aspects related to its successful development would depend upon the preservation and cultivation of community cultural identities, talents and input fundamental to incurring growth in the industry. 200 Other economic potentials related to renewable and non-renewable resource development in the Beaufort region also depend upon certain topographic, demographic and historical community realities.

Local geographies, traditional family migration and subsistence patterns on the land differ from region to region as well as within regions. In the Beaufort region, Inuvialuit who live below the treeline primarily depend upon the rapid migration of caribou and other wildlife native to delta lands and rivers for subsistence. Those living in the barrens and coastal plains hunt grazing muskoxen, the polar bear, whale and other favorites supplying the Inuit diet and material staples. Harvesting practices and local economies, therefore, are also varied. An economic survey of Sachs Harbour (1965), conducted by Peter Usher, described the community as one which developed

through its own initiative and the opportunities of becoming market trappers. ²⁰¹ Today, although greatly reduced in population size, the remaining families of Sachs Harbour continue to develop local resources for participation in the market economy, launching the first meat export industry to Japan where muskox is sold as a novelty food item. ²⁰² While some communities may opt for economic development through international market strategies, others may rather choose to revive more traditional trades, such as the Aklavik community co-op store which features hand-tanned leather and other art products, by building on the growing tourist industry. ²⁰³

The above illustrations underline the wide diversity of local economies and possible directions each community may take in the larger Beaufort IFA corporate network. Presently, the IRC's principle agenda for Beaufort development is to promote devolution strategies attuned to community capabilities and levels of co-operation in the regional political-economy. A current devolution trend in the Beaufort region since 1984 is largely attributed to successful IRC programs inviting GNWT/IRC power-sharing and greater community participation in regional governance under the rubric of Joint Management. ²⁰⁴ IFA *joint-management* programs, especially in the areas of wildlife preservation and usage in the traditional economy, have developed beyond a mere synthesis or 'concurrent model' of

territorial and Inuvialuit claimant priorities for development to become the convention through which the IRC may negotiate future directions for regional governance in the western NWT.

Far from being a government giveaway, newly devolved GNWT programs and services subsumed by the IRC signify the political buoyancy of Inuvialuit communities to assume governing powers and responsibilities through co-operation and the joint-management of regional ventures pioneered under the IFA. While the aim of federal/GNWT devolution has been to bring government decision-making "closer to the people" it represents, Peter Clancy points to a range of local variables that made "the rather simple impulse...a complex, multifaceted phenomenon." ²⁰⁵ In other words there are a variety of potentials surrounding devolution that derive from the vast differences and unique circumstances of communities in arctic regions. Clancy moves on to suggest that the history of devolution in the Territories has tended toward protecting Ottawa's jurisdictional interests. ²⁰⁶ The concept of shared-governance (explained in Section 2.3) and, more specifically, the Prime Public Authority consociational paradigm are recent trends that present a practicable solution to Clancy's analysis of NWT devolution politics. With Prime Public Authority the tendency is to circumvent the strain of *territorial* devolution and unrealistic government jurisdictions (as

seen in James Bay) to allow for the development of regional intergovernmental relations emanating from salient historical experiences and community co-operation.

Throughout circumpolar regions Inuit claimants are currently coming together to collaborate on the larger consequences of devolution in terms of how the transfer of central government powers and ensuing strategies for development may bring new and lasting benefits to their communities. A more recent aspect of devolution transpiring in the Beaufort region involves international joint ventures between the IRC and Inuit claimants from other regions of Alaska and Russia. Visits of delegations from both countries, such as at the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, have raised regional awareness about issues related to a wide range of political-economic topics, including Inuit self-governance. Another dimension of the concept of power-sharing has been recognized in the Beaufort region. A November 1991 Inupiat delegation from Alaska's North Slope visiting Inuvik began "...a new era in Inupiat/Inuvialuit relations...They came, they saw, they danced...heralding in this new era of cooperation and joint ventures".²⁰⁷ Inupiat/Inuvialuit diplomatic relations center on shared histories, family ties and lands, in particular, lands in the Western Arctic reserved for wildlife refuge, which retain rich deposits of fossil fuel. To develop existing possibilities in the northern energy

market, a newly formed subsidiary of the IRC's economic development branch, the Inuvialuit Petroleum Corporation, has presently extended Inuvialuit relations to Inuit in the autonomous region of Chukotka, eastern Siberia, and embarked on a joint-study agreement pertaining to the feasibility of exporting crude oil from Chukotka to the United States and Canada. 208

Clearly, Beaufort regional government is in the making. Inuvialuit intergovernmental relations as well as international trade agreements comprise yet another phase in the developments from the land claim process. Beaufort regional government seems more real as the scope of intergovernmental networking and relations rapidly expand, even beyond national boundaries. For the time being, the full meaning of Inuvialuit self-governance and its ultimate effect on the NWT constitutional process still wait to be found.

CONCLUSION

At 3:00 pm, Thursday, June fourth, Aklavik mayor Roger Allen declared the hamlet a state of emergency after flood waters began lapping at the stairs of local homes. Elders were evacuated to Inuvik as the Peel River rose to seventeen and a half feet over the winter low...unusually thick ice jamming up the river systems, and a large spring run-off, were to blame for the flooding. Mayor Allen said...crews and volunteers had already begun the task of cleaning up...

"Everything is okay ..."

-- Tusaayaksat, June 19, 1992

An attempt has been made in this study of the Inuvialuit land settlement and development of Beaufort regional government to maintain a flexible analytical approach, avoiding sharp comparisons or contrasts of IFA structures to political models of Inuit or other local government systems existing in regions elsewhere. For sure, a full explanation of the IFA and Inuvialuit self-governance in the Western NWT is an exercise of political-economic thought that requires as much creativity as those who originally conceived the idea. The implementation of IFA shared-management structures, joining Inuvialuit corporate objectives to federal/territorial and other regional interests, appear to be part of a transitory phase in the Western Arctic land claim process. The IFA establishes Inuvialuit ownership of land and rights to traditional land activities in the Beaufort region but leaves the nature and organization of regional government to be decided by IFA community consensus in the future. This fact derives from Section 20 of the IFA which clearly states that the Agreement "is not intended to inhibit or advance devolution or transfer of the jurisdiction or powers" of central government in the Beaufort region; on the other hand, Canada, agrees to "ensure that such devolution or transfer does not prejudicially affect the carrying out of its obligations under this Agreement." 209

IFA terms and provisions, specifically, those found in

Sections 11, 12 and 14 that deal with Inuvialuit use and management of wildlife, altogether allow for future possibilities of Beaufort political-economic development arising through settlement legislation. In Chapter Two it was noted that lands shared by Inuvialuit with Inuit and Indian claimants bordering Alaska and Northern Yukon receive special treatment in the IFA which empower the IRC to permit or limit use of the renewable/nonrenewable resource base according to ICC principles and objectives for land development. IFA joint management boards and concession agreements implemented by the IRC with other interested parties have evolved a unique approach to effecting local reforms on behalf of all six IFA communities and to governance in the Beaufort region. The Prime Public Authority paradigm represents such an approach and appears to hold much promise for future success in a majority of IFA communities, and in the Assembly in terms of quickening the eventual constitutional entrenchment of Beaufort regional government in the western NWT.

The IFA provides the legal basis whereby Inuvialuit may achieve constitutional reforms guaranteeing Beaufort communities full partnership or shared-governance in northern Canada. Although IFA corporate bodies, which include the IRC and ICCs, have developed a formal process whereby the communities decide the direction of regional policies and reforms, the institution of Inuvialuit self-

governance as yet awaits legislative approval and constitutional entrenchment in NWT public government. Waiting, as some northern analysts concur, for government to represent their local interests is an expectation that Inuvialuit have learned to live with. Should this fact connote a sense of drudgery or futility, it is not the end of *the story*. On the Arctic time clock, the past one hundred years are only the beginning of modern governance in the Western NWT and, speaking from first hand experience, to practice patience as time slowly moves by is a noticeably important part of being Inuvialuit. It then comes as no surprise that the IRC vision resounds with a paean of irrepressible hope borne of *much* waiting, and, that: "with imagination, creativity and hard work, the people of the NWT can create a form of government that accommodates our geographic and demographic needs" and of which "Inuvialuit welcome the opportunity to participate." 210

Land settlements in the Eastern and Western NWT recently establishing the Inuit territory of Nunavut, and, more importantly, Gwich'in tribal lands that formed another regional jurisdiction in 1992 bordering IFA lands create even greater possibilities for a unique style of government in the Canadian north. 211 Already, the IRC has organized yet another joint committee to work co-operatively with the Gwich'in Tribal Council (GTC) to, like Nunavut, create an

autonomous political jurisdiction which would surpass the current delegated municipal functions of regional government and deal directly with Ottawa. ²¹² In October 1993 IRC and GTC leaders met to plan the new regional jurisdiction and government under which seven member communities are currently represented. The existing plan is nondescript but the political dialogue very familiar by now: the IRC/GTC regional government will be "a partnership of communities" and which will "enjoy wide ranging authority".²¹³ No doubt, the study of Beaufort regional government will continue to be a challenge for northern scholars as events related to jurisdictional boundaries and NWT constitutional reform emanating from Inuvialuit/Gwich'in and other land claim agreements in the Western Arctic break new ground.

Footnotes:

- 1) Note: Reference to "just talk from people on the street" originally appeared in a local Inuvik newspaper quoting a leading political figure; I read this line at a particularly low point of my Thesis research and accepted it as good advice on how to continue.
- 2) Interview with Robert DeLury, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Inuvik, NWT (January 18, 1989)
- 3) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 17, No. 2, Inuvik, NWT (April 1990); p. 1

Final approval of the Inuvialuit land claim took place on June 5, 1984 which is now the official Inuvialuit Day to commemorate ratification of the IFA.
- 4) Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA), Section 7(1)(a); p. 5, and, See Map, Illustration I
- 5) *ibid*; p. 5-14
Section 7, entitled 'Inuvialuit and Crown Land', specifies the total land area included in the IFA of which Canada retains certain rights; for example, of land access to the extent of 100 feet of navigable waterway, but these rights are attached to conditions protecting Inuvialuit interests. "The right is limited to the use of rivers, lakes, water bodies, sea coast and inlets for travel, recreation or emergency, and does not permit any person using it to engage in any development activity or to harvest wildlife."
- 6) Note: See IFA, Section 6, for further delineation of the individual corporations and their functions.
- 7) Interview with Robert DeLury, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Inuvik, NWT (January 18, 1989)
- 8) *ibid*
- 9) The Scone Report: Building Our Economic Future, GNWT publication, Inkit Ltd., Yellowknife, NWT (October 1989); p. 24-25
- 10) Morris Zaslow, The Northwest Territories, 1905 - 1980, Canadian Historical Association in Ottawa (1984); p. 3-4

- 11) Wilf Bean, Regional Government in the Western Northwest Territories: A Discussion Paper, prepared for the Western Constitutional Forum and Legislative Assembly Special Committee on Constitutional Development, Edmonton, Alberta (1983); p. 9-12
- 12) Note: The Inuvik Region (located in the high arctic western NWT) includes all but one of the Inuvialuit communities, Holman (located more central arctic in the Kitikmeot Region), represented in the IFA. Other communities in the Inuvik Region primarily populated by Loucheux, Slavey and Hare Indian exist south of traditional Inuvialuit country.
- 13) Vernon Quinn, Beautiful Canada, Frederick A. Stokes Company, Printed in the United States of America (1925); p. 338
- 14) *ibid*; p. 321-338
- 15) *ibid*; p. 337
- 16) Frank C. Stabler and Eric C. Howe, Socio-Economic Transformation of the Native People of the Northwest Territories 1800 - 2000, Department of Agricultural Economics and Department of Economics, University of Saskatchewan (January 1990); p. 1-2

Federal transfer payments are the NWT economy according to Stabler and Howe, and they refer to studies from the 1950s-80s evaluating the cash income of Inuit and Indian residents.
- 17) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions: Forty Years of Northern Political Development', Arctic, Vol. 40, No. 4, Arctic Institute of North America, University of Calgary, Alberta (December 1987); p. 312-314
- 18) *ibid*; p. 313-314
- 19) *ibid*; p. 314-315
- 20) Peter Clancy, Political Devolution and Wildlife Management, Consortium for Devolution Research, Yellowknife, NWT (April 15-16, 1989); p. 1-2
- 21) Peter Clancy, Politics By Remote Control: Historical Perspectives on Devolution in Canada's North, paper presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Universite Laval,

- Quebec (June 1989); p. 28
- 22) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1387
- 23) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions...'; p. 313
- 24) Peter Clancy, 'Political Devolution and...'; p. 65,
and,
Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, Western Constitutional Forum Chronology of Events, January 1982 - June 1986, GNWT publication, Canarctic Graphics Ltd., Yellowknife, NWT (1987); p. 105-106
- 25) Kate Irving and Debbie Delancy, What Does Government Do In The Western Northwest Territories?, prepared for the WCF, Fee Yee Consulting Ltd., Yellowknife, NWT (July 1987); p. A-6
- 26) *ibid*; p. A-9 and IFA, Section 12 and 17; p. 18-22, 33
Inuvialuit participation in Beaufort economic and social development is protected under IFA sections requiring that a Participation Agreement or private contract determine the terms of any land project.
- 27) 'The Scone...'; p. 1
- 28) Michael S. Whittington, 'Political and Constitutional Development in the NWT and Yukon: The Issues and the Interests', Michael S. Whittington, ed., The North, (Volume 72 of Collected Research Studies of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects of Canada) University of Toronto Press, Toronto (July 6, 1984); p. 64
- 29) *ibid*; p. 58
- 30) IFA, Section 6; p. 4-5
- 31) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 8, No. 4, Inuvik, NWT (February 28, 1991); p. 1

The Inuit Circumpolar Conference brings together Inuit communities from throughout circumpolar regions of Canada, Alaska, Greenland and the USSR. The ICC has assembled every three years since 1977 to address a wide range of political-economic and social issues relevant to Inuit communities. Previous conferences have been held in Alaska and

Greenland and the second ICC assembly to convene in Canada was hosted by the IRC in Inuvik during the summer of 1992.

- 32) Michael S. Whittington, 'Political and ...'; p. 86-87, and,

Note: Inuvialuit elders recall stories told by their parents of how distant relations traveled from Alaska to Canada, and regard Inuit living near the Alaska/Yukon border as distant relations.

- 33) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 7, No. 11, Inuvik, NWT (September 10, 1990); p. 8

- 34) Morris Zaslow, 'The Northwest...'; p. 6
Zaslow reports that Inuit and Indian 'acculturation' involved the transformation from a "nomadic...Stone Age level of development" to a settled trapping way of life after the arrival of European traders, religion and government.

- 35) Peter Freuchen, Book of the Eskimos, Copyright @ 1961 by Peter Freuchen Estate; p. 303

Freuchen first visited Inuit of Greenland in 1906 while part of a Danish government-sponsored expedition and continued on to travel and write about his arctic journies in Russia, Siberia, Lapland, Alaska and Canada, keeping a daily record of people with whom he came into contact. He claimed a certain right to speak about "the Eskimos" because he was "one of the last civilized men who met the Eskimos when they still lived like men in the Stone Age." He entertained a dream that modern progress would come "for the backward and underprivileged people of these places". Retrospectively, he asserted that "Far from being discouraged at the changes I see and yearning for a return to times that are past, I look forward..." Freuchen believed his mission in life was to plant seeds of progress in the arctic and his book provides a narrative account of how he accomplished this in the context of trading, marriage, friendship and other areas.

- 36) *ibid*; p. 303

- 37) Vernon Quinn, 'Beautiful...'; p. 321-338

- 38) Morris Zaslow, 'The Northwest...'; p. 6
Zaslow begins his historical account of Inuit

society in the early 1800s when European contact with Inuit and Indian communities resulted in a "fur-trapping way of life" and a dependency "on the iron products, textiles, tea, tobacco and other goods that could be secured in exchange for their furs."

- 39) Stabler and Howe, 'Socio-Economic...'; p. 6
- 40) *ibid*; p. 2
 Stabler and Howe claim that arctic urbanization accelerated the transformation of Inuit and Indian societies toward that of southern Canada, and that the traditional economies collapsed as people became conformed to the use of modern products and conveniences.
- 41) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 7, No. 11, Inuvik, NWT (September 10, 1990); p. 8
- 42) See: Peter Usher, Banks Island: An Area Economic Survey, Industrial Division, Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, Ottawa (1965)
- 43) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 7, No. 9, Inuvik, NWT (August 3, 1990); p. 8
- 44) Alice French, My Name Is Masak, Peguis Publishers Limited, Winnipeg, Manitoba (1976); p. 16-18, 21

Commonly referred to as the 'big flu', outbreaks of influenza claimed many lives during the winter according to several personal accounts. Like Erigaktoak, French recalls the sad spectacle of large gravesites dug to accommodate men, women and children who died in the same epidemic. French's own family later experienced tuberculosis and difficult moments of separation as did so many others. After her mother became quarantined with the illness, French and other siblings were sent away to boarding school while her father continued to hunt and trap: "My father had gone back to his trap-line and we would not hear from him for a long time. It was not out of cruelty but necessity that he left us."

- 45) *ibid*; p. 82-83
 French writes: "By the middle of September we had picked enough berries to last us through the winter. These, with dried fruits and a few crates of apples and oranges for special occasions, would be our

desserts. Our meat supplies would be taken care of by our fathers who were hunters. This was the contribution our parents made to pay for our schooling. The money to pay for the staff and the upkeep of the buildings came from the collection plates of the churches down south. This was supplemented by the government to keep the school and hospital going."

- 46) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 7, No. 9, Inuvik, NWT (August 3, 1990); p. 8
- 47) *ibid*; p. 8
- 48) Alfred P. Aquilina, The Mackenzie: Yesterday and Beyond, Hancock House Publishers, Vancouver, BC (1981); p. 176
- 49) Alice French, 'My Name...'; p. 11
- 50) *ibid*; p. 7
- 51) *ibid*; p. 5-13
- 52) *ibid*; p. 59-63
- 53) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions...'; p. 311-312
- 54) Franklyn Griffiths, 'Where Vision and Illusion Meet', Politics of the Northwest Passage, Franklyn Griffiths, ed., McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal (1987); p. 17
- 55) Peter Cummings, 'Canada's North and Native Rights', Bradford W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, Ontario (1989); p. 700-702
- 56) Morris Zaslow, 'The Northwest...'; p. 15
- 57) *ibid*; p. 12
- 58) *ibid*; p. 15
- 59) *ibid*; p. 18
- 60) *ibid*; p. 18-19
- 61) *ibid*; p. 19

- 62) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions...'; p. 310
- 63) Oran R. Young, 'Arctic Shipping: An American Perspective', Franklyn Griffiths, ed., Politics of the Northwest Passage, McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal (1987); p. 116
- 64) *ibid*; p. 119-120
 Young identifies domestic and external political interests in the high arctic in terms of "security and energy independence"; while arctic waters remain vital to military operations and continental security, "the goal of energy independence is a powerful political force in the United States, and the idea of the arctic as a storehouse of hydrocarbons is firmly implanted in the public mind."
- 65) Thomas R. Berger, Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland, Douglas and McIntyre, Vancouver/Toronto (1988) Revised Edition; p. 151
- 66) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions...'; p. 314
 The 1969 White Paper on Indian Policy proposed to repeal the protection afforded treaty lands through the Indian Act and, thus, terminate the reserve system to reverse the 'disadvantage' status and promote equality of Indian citizens with other Canadians.
- And,
- See: Bradford W. Morse, 'The Resolution of Land Claims', Bradford W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, Ontario (1989); p. 618
- 67) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions...'; p. 315
- 68) *ibid*; p. 314
- 69) *ibid*; p. 315
- 70) *ibid*; p. 315
- 71) *ibid*; p. 314-316
- 72) Thomas R. Berger, 'Northern Frontier...'; p. 151
- 73) *ibid*; p. 154
- 74) *ibid*; p. 153

- 75) *ibid*; p. 151-154
- 76) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 23, Inuvik, NWT
(December 31, 1993); p. 2
- 77) Thomas R. Berger, 'Northern Frontier...'; p. 254
- 78) Inuvialuit Nunangat, COPE proposal for an Agreement-
in-Principle (May 13, 1977); Part IV, p. 19-20
- 79) Morris Zaslow, 'The Northwest...'; p. 19
- 80) *ibid*; p. 19-21
- 81) Michael Asch, Home and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights
and the Canadian Constitution, Methuen Publications,
Toronto, Ontario (1984); p. 93-99
- 82) Thomas R. Berger, 'Northern Frontier...'; p. 27
- 83) Frances Abele, 'Canadian Contradictions...';
p. 315-316
- 84) 'Inuvialuit Nunangat...'; p. 19-20
- 85) Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale, After Native Claims?
The Implications of Comprehensive Claims Settlements
for Natural Resources in British Columbia, Oolichan
Books and The Institute for Research on Public
Policy, Lantzville, BC and Halifax, Nova Scotia
(1988); p. 162
- 86) *ibid*; p. 162-163
- 87) GNWT Annual Report, GNWT publication, Yellowknife, NWT
(1987); p. 8
- 88) Michael S. Whittington, 'Political and...'; p. 104-105
Whittington argues that the end-result of land
claims and events leading to the organization of an
eastern/western arctic caucus in the Legislative
Assembly has been "genuine cooperation and not co-
optation." This particular development in NWT
governance is largely attributed by Whittington to
an increase of Inuit and Dene representatives
assuming ministerial posts; "...the natives of the
NWT have learned to use the assembly in their own
unique fashion and to their political ends,..."
- 89) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western
Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 1-3

The Constitutional Alliance in 1982 was initially comprised of members of the Legislative Assembly, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, Dene Nation, Metis Association of the NWT and COPE.

- 90) *ibid*; Appendix A, p. 1-11
By the late 1980s both the NCF and WCF came to agreement on the unique rights of regional governments to co-operate or power share with other levels of Territorial government. WCF participants, including Inuvialuit, arguing in the Legislative Assembly in favor of regional government have yet to realize the passage of legislation protecting Inuit and Indian priorities for political-economic development in the western NWT.
- 91) Nellie Cournoyea, MLA, Special Speech Presentation at the official opening ceremony of the Inuvialuit Corporate Center, Inuvik, NWT (Spring 1989)
- 92) 'The Scone...'; p. 11
Population statistics cited in the Scone Report place Inuit groups in 35% of the total people residing in the NWT. Dene groups constitute 16%, Metis 17% and non-Inuit/Indian 42% of the total population.
- 93) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 116-122
- 94) Constitutional Conference: January 19-22, 1982; GNWT publication, Yellowknife, NWT (1982); p. cc22.17
- 95) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 4-5
- 96) *ibid*; Appendix B, p. 142
Note: Boundary issues are not easily resolved through comprehensive claims creating new jurisdictional arrangements because within every so-called *boundary* exist areas of shared interest. For example, within the boundary of the Western Arctic claim Indian and Metis residents have organized band councils to protect their political and cultural rights. New jurisdictions created as a result of a land settlement do not necessarily mean the end of all outstanding land and boundary issues within the corresponding region.
- 97) *ibid*; p. 53

- 98) Inuvialuit Game Council workshop, Inuvik, NWT
(February 1989)

Six Community Corporations (ICCs) are established under the IFA to represent all Inuvialuit interests and to control development activity initiated by the Inuvialuit Land Administration (ILA) and Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) with any other party within the settlement region. ICC responsibilities are very broad, taking up the gamut of harvesting issues and legislation affecting the traditional economy. However, ICC powers are shared with other government agencies and a proposed development project must necessarily involve lengthy negotiation, participation agreements between Inuvialuit and other interested parties and, in the event of dispute, arbitration. See IFA, Section 18.

- 99) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 23, Inuvik, NWT
(December 31, 1993); p. 2

- 100) 'Constitutional Conference...'; p. cc23.20-23.23

- 101) Wendy Moss, 'The Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement', Bradford W. Morse, ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, Metis and Inuit Rights in Canada, Carleton University Press, Ottawa, Ontario (1985); p. 684

- 102) *ibid*; p. 684

Construction of the James Bay hydro electric facility was approved by the Quebec government without any negotiation with Cree and Inuit communities in the region. The land had not been ceded to Quebec and in approving construction the provincial government had acted contrary to the 1912 Boundary Extension Act which obligated Quebec to "satisfy all charges and expenditures in connection with or arising out of" the surrender of Indian lands.

- 103) Katherine A. Graham, Diane Duttie and Judith Mackenzie, Regional Governments: A Selective Review, prepared for the Western Constitutional Forum and Legislative Assembly Special Committee on Constitutional Development, Institute of Local Government, Queen's University at Kingston, Ontario (May 1983); Chapter II, p. 6-7

- 104) Wendy Moss, 'The Implementation...'; p. 686

- 105) *ibid*; p. 688
- 106) *ibid*; p. 688-689
- 107) *ibid*; p. 688
- 108) *ibid*; p. 688-692
- 109) Katherine A. Graham, Diane Duttie and Judith Mackenzie, 'Regional Governments...'; p. 6, 8-22
- 110) *ibid*; p. 8-22
- 111) Wendy Moss, 'The Implementation...'; p. 691,
and,
Katherine A. Graham, Diane Duttie and Judith Mackenzie, 'Regional Government...'; p. 22
- 112) *ibid*; p. 12-21
- 113) Wendy Moss, 'The Implementation...'; p. 691
- 114) Wilf Bean, 'Regional Government...'; p. 26
- 115) *ibid*; p. 26
- 116) *ibid*; p. 27
- 117) *ibid*; p. 29-30
- 118) *ibid*; p. 39-41
- 119) *ibid*; p. 31-35
- 120) *ibid*; p. 40-41
- 121) *ibid*; p. 41-44
- 122) *ibid*; p. 43
- 123) Thomas A. Morehouse, 'Rebuilding the Political Economies of Alaska Native Villages', ISER Occasional Papers, No. 21, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Anchorage, Alaska (1989); p. 21-22
- 124) Richard Spaulding, Partners for the Future, Canarctic Ltd., Yellowknife, NWT (1985); p. 97-98
- 125) Thomas R. Berger, 'Northern Frontier...'; p. 254-255

- 126) 'Inuvialuit Nunangat...'; Part iv, p. 19
- 127) Inuvialuit Renewable Resource Conservation and Management Plan, Wildlife Management Advisory Council, Inuvik, NWT (1988); p. 2
- 128) IFA, Section 2; p. 2
- 129) 'Inuvialuit Nunangat...'; Part v, p 27
- 130) IFA, Section 12(46); p. 21
- 131) 'Inuvialuit Renewable Resource...'; p. 6-14
- 132) IFA, Section 12; p. 18
- 133) Northern Yukon National Park, Environment Canada Parks Service Newsletter, No. 1, Ministry of Environment Canada, Ottawa, Ontario (June 1991); p. 4-5
- 134) *ibid*; p. 2-5
- 135) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 9, No. 2, Inuvik, NWT (February 10, 1992); p. 7
- 136) Peter Burnett, 'Environmental Politics and Inuit Self-Government', Franklyn Griffiths, ed., Politics of the Northwest Passage, McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal (1987); p. 198,
and,
Tusaayaksat, Vol. 8, No. 21, Inuvik, NWT (December 6, 1991); p. 6-7
- 137) Thomas R. Berger, 'Northern Frontier...'; p. 242
- 138) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 8, No. 21, Inuvik, NWT (December 6, 1991); p. 6-7
- 139) IFA, Section 10; p. 15
- 140) IFA, Section 10; p. 15-16
- 141) Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale, 'After Native...'; p. 159
- 142) *ibid*; 160-163
- 143) Jessie Hill, Beaufort Explorations, Dome Petroleum, Ltd., Inuvik, NWT [no date submitted in publication]; p. 52-80

- 144) Interview with Robert DeLury, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Inuvik, NWT (January 18, 1989),
and,
IFA, Section 6; p. 4-5
- 145) IFA, Section 7(100); p. 13
- 146) Interview with Dr. Noah Carpenter, Comox, B.C.
(August 1989)

Note: Dr. Carpenter comes from an Inuvialuit family from Sachs Harbour and, although no longer living in the Western Arctic, he returned to be involved in the issue of Beaufort oil development during the early 1970s. He is currently a member of the NWT Science Council.

- 147) IFA, Section 6; p. 4-5
- 148) *ibid*; p. 4-5
- 149) *ibid*; p. 4-5
- 150) Peter Clancy, 'Politics By Remote...'; p. 2
- 151) Note: The official opening ceremony of the Inuvialuit Corporate Center drew an impressive gathering of community residents, government dignitaries and respected COPE negotiators. The RCMP attended in full ceremonial garb, and the main speakers were Roger Gruben, IRC Chairperson, and Nellie Cournoyea, MLA.
- 152) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 23, Inuvik, NWT
(December 31, 1993); p. 2
- 153) Frank Cassidy and Norman Dale, 'After Native...';
p. 162
- 154) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western Constitutional Forum Chronology...';
Appendix A, p. 12,
and,
Richard Spaulding, 'Partners for...'; p. 98-104
- 155) 'Inuvialuit Nunangat...'; p. 19
- 156) Richard Spaulding, 'Partners for...'; p. 66
- 157) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western Constitutional Forum Chronology...';

Appendix A, p. 12

- 158) *ibid*; p. 145-148
- 159) Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Inuvik Regional News verbatim file, Inuvik, NWT (Feb. 27, 1986)
- 160) Richard Spaulding, 'Partners for...'; p. 77-78
- 161) *ibid*; p. 72,
and,
Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. Appendix A. p. 6-7
- 162) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly, Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1384-1394
- 163) *ibid*; p. 1387-1389
- 164) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 9, No. 16, Inuvik, NWT (December 2, 1992); p. 1-2, 5,9

In 'A Good Start to Community Self-Government' Dodie Malegana notes her community's transformation from dependency upon Canadian government for development of their "political, social and economic physical structure" to new directions of self-government.
- 165) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly, Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1389,
and,
Inuvialuit Game Council workshop, Inuvik, NWT (February 1989)
- 166) Inuvialuit Regional Corporation Annual Report, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Inuvik, NWT (1987); p. 35
- 167) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1386-1387
- 168) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 17, Inuvik, NWT (October 13, 1993); p. 5
- 169) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 11, No. 2, Inuvik, NWT (January 28, 1994); p. 1,
and,

- Tusaayaksat, Vol. 11, No. 5, Inuvik, NWT
(March 11, 1994); p. 14
- 170) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western
Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 102-106
- 171) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the
Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly
Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1389
- 172) Political and Constitutional Development in the
Northwest Territories, tabled in the Legislative
Assembly for debate on the future direction of NWT
public government, Yellowknife, NWT
(November 4, 1988); p. 5
- 173) An Ordinance Respecting Regional and Tribal Councils,
GNWT publication, Yellowknife, NWT (September 10,
1983); p. 221-223,
and,
An Ordinance to Amend the Regional and Tribal Councils
Ordinance, GNWT publication, Yellowknife, NWT
(November 9, 1984)
- 174) Note: During my stay in Inuvik, Roger Gruben was the
IRC Chairperson (since 1986) and was declared
reelected when no one ran against him (January
1990). Danny Norris was president of the Regional
Council until elected NWT Commissioner in 1990.
- 175) Town of Inuvik Council Motion, no. 87-7676, Inuvik,
NWT (August 1987)
- 176) Beau-Del Regional Council Resolutions, GNWT
publication, Inuvik, NWT (April 15, 1987)
- 177) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western
Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 17-48
- 178) Gurston Dacks, Devolution and Political Development in
the Canadian North, paper presentation at the Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Political Science
Association, Quebec City (June 3, 1989); p. 1-2, 10
- 179) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the
Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly,
Yellowknife, NWT (April 18, 1992); p. 1394-1401
- 180) Michael S. Whittington, 'Introduction: Northern
Studies', Michael S. Whittington, ed., The North
(Vol. 72 of Collected Research Studies of the Royal

Commission on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects of Canada) University of Toronto Press,
Toronto (July 6, 1984); p. 3

- 181) Alfred P. Aquilina, 'The Mackenzie...'; p. 168, 190-191
- 182) Richard Spaulding, 'Partners for...'; p. 74-79,
and,
Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western
Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 111, 119-121
- 183) Political and Constitutional Development in the
Northwest Territories, NWT Legislative Assembly
Tabled Document, No. 56-88(2), Yellowknife, NWT
(November 4, 1988); p. 1-9
- 184) Creating A Better Tomorrow, GNWT Aboriginal Rights and
Constitutional Development Secretariat publication,
Yellowknife, NWT; [No date submitted in
publication]; p. 30
- 185) Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, 'Western
Constitutional Forum Chronology...'; p. 92-103
- 186) 'The Scone...'; p. 4-5
- 187) Special Committee on the Northern Economy, panel and
workshop sessions, Inuvik, NWT (April 1989)
- 188) *ibid*;
Note: Workshop participants were organized into
small discussion groups which included at least one
Special Committee member who asked the group
questions to generate local input on possible
directions for economic development in Beaufort
communities. I joined with the group of Arctic
College students and Brian Lewis, MLA.
And,
'The Scone...'; p. 53-68
- 189) 'The Scone...'; p. 43-51
- 190) *ibid*; p. 11-27
- 191) *ibid*; p. 26 and 30
- 192) *ibid*; p. 12-15
- 193) *ibid*; p. 45

- 194) *ibid*; p. 26-27, 38-42 and 47-51
- 195) Gurston Dacks, 'Devolution and...'; p. 10
- 196) Thomas A. Morehouse, 'Rebuilding the...'; p. 1
- 197) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1393
- 198) Gordon Robertson, 'Innovation North of Sixty', Steve Iveson and Aggie Brockman, ed., Western Constitutional Forum Chronology of Events 1982-1987, Canarctic Graphics Ltd., Yellowknife, NWT (1987); p. 140-148
- 199) Inuvialuit Regional Corporation Annual Report, Inuvialuit Regional Corporation, Inuvik, NWT (1987); p. 3-36

Note: Several leading Inuvialuit politicians removed or joined their COPE responsibilities in Inuvik to their home ICCs; for example, Roger Gruben, acting IRC Chairperson, became a Tuktoyaktuk board director. Additionally, the ILA office was transferred to Tuktoyaktuk where the bulk of industrial and land activity takes place in order to improve Inuvialuit communication and cooperation with industry.

- 200) 'Inuvialuit Renewable Resource...'; p. 12
Note: A main objective of IFA joint management committees is to assess and develop the commercial potential of Inuvialuit renewable resources in such areas as sports hunting, fishing and wildlife group tours.
- 201) See: Peter Usher, Banks Island: An Area Economic Survey, Industrial Division, Department of Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, Ottawa (1965)
- 202) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 7, No. 10, Inuvik, NWT (September 30, 1990); p. 2
- 203) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 8, No. 6, Inuvik, NWT (March 29, 1991); p. 3
- 204) 'Inuvialuit Renewable Resource...'; p.1-6
Note: The above plan incorporates community-based priorities for development of the Inuvialuit resource base into the general mandate of the

Wildlife Management Advisory Council and Fisheries Joint Management Committee, which were established under the IFA to conserve and manage wildlife in the settlement region.

- 205) Peter Clancy, 'Politics By...'; p. 27-30, 32
- 206) *ibid*; p. 3, 7, 12-17
- 207) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 8, No. 21, Inuvik, NWT
(December 6, 1991); p. 6
- 208) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 9, No. 17, Inuvik, NWT
(December 21, 1992); p. 15
- 209) IFA, Section 20; p. 37
- 210) HANSARD Official Report, Legislative Assembly of the
Northwest Territories, 4th Session, 11th Assembly
Yellowknife, NWT (April 6, 1989); p. 1389-1390
- 211) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 1, Inuvik, NWT
(January 15, 1993); p. 1
- 212) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 16, Inuvik, NWT
(September 27, 1993) ; p. 1
- 213) Tusaayaksat, Vol. 10, No. 15, Inuvik, NWT
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Appendix

List of Abbreviations:

ANCSA	Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
COPE	Committee for Original Peoples Entitlement
GNWT	Government of the Northwest Territories
GTC	Gwitch'in Tribal Council
HTC	Hunters and Trappers Committee
ICC	Inuvialuit Community Corporation
IDC	Inuvialuit Development Corporation
IFA	Inuvialuit Final Agreement
IGC	Inuvialuit Game Council
ILA	Inuvialuit Land Administration
ISDF	Inuvialuit Social Development Fund
NCF	Nunavut Constitutional Forum
TFN	Tungavik Federation of Nunavut
WARG	Western Arctic Regional Government
WARM	Western Arctic Regional Municipality
WCF	Western Constitutional Forum
WMAC	Wildlife Management Advisory Council

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