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A Canadian Model of Corporate Governance

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What is Canada's actual legal model to govern its corporations? Recent landmark judicial decisions indicate Canada is shifting away from an Anglo-American definition of shareholder primacy. Yet the Canadian securities commissions have become increasingly influential in the governance sphere, and by nature are shareholder-focused. Shareholders' rights have increased well beyond what was ever contemplated by Canadian corporate laws, and the issue of greater shareholder vs. board control has now become the topic of live debate. These conflicting theoretical positions have enriched the dialogue on the current environment of Canadian corporate governance. This qualitative study brings together some of Canada's leading senior legal practitioners to opine on the fundamental principles that are driving the development of Canadian corporate governance. Taken within the context of today's legal and regulatory environment, their insights piece together the framework of a Canadian model of corporate governance to further director knowledge and help inform future research

Quel est, au Canada, le modèle juridique qui régit les sociétés par actions? De récentes décisions judiciaires de principe montrent que le Canada s'éloigne de la définition anglo-américaine de la définition de la « primauté des actionnaires ». Malgré cela, les commissions canadiennes des valeurs mobilières sont devenues de plus en plus influentes dans la sphère de régie interne, et elles sont intrinsèquement focalisées sur les actionnaires. Les droits des actionnaires se sont multipliés bien au-delà de ce qui a été envisagé par le droit canadien des sociétés, et la question de savoir qui des actionnaires ou du conseil d'administration doit exercer le plus grand contrôle est aujourd'hui le sujet d'un vif débat. Ces positions de principe conflictuelles ont alimenté le dialogue sur l'environnement actuel de la gouvernance d'entreprise au Canada. Cette étude qualitative regroupe les opinions de certains juristes canadiens de grande réputation sur les principes fondamentaux qui orientent le développement de la gouvernance d'entreprise au Canada. Pris dans le contexte de l'environnement légal et du cadre réglementaire actuels, leurs commentaires décrivent le cadre d'un modèle canadien de gouvernance d'entreprise qui aurait pour objectif d'accroître la connaissance des administrateurs et de contribuer à alimenter la future recherche.

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Introduction

Corporate governance models are frequently addressed in Anglo-American corporate legal scholarship, with shareholder primacy touted as the dominant model that governs modern corporations.¹ Common themes in academic debate include whether shareholder primacy is efficient, whether it should be the dominant model, and how it can be improved, among other things.² However, for many of Canada's legal practitioners,

1. See e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, "The End of History for Corporate Law" (2001) 89:2 *Geo LJ* 439; Charles Elson, "Five Reasons to Support Shareholder Primacy" (15 April 2010), online: NACD Directorship Blog <www.directorship.com/charles-elson-shareholder-primacy/>. Shareholder primacy is also frequently assumed to be the dominant model in articles that critique it; see e.g., Lynn Stout, "Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy" (2002) 75 *S Cal L Rev* 1189.

2. See e.g., Ian Lee, "Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate about Shareholder Primacy" (2006) 31:2 *Del J Corp L* 533; Jill Fisch, "Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy" (2006) 31:3 *J Corp L* 637.

theoretical models of governance are foreign to the day-to-day functioning of providing legal services that support good governance practices within corporations. Academic discussions on shareholder primacy and other alternative models of governance, such as director primacy,³ team production,⁴ enlightened shareholder value,⁵ and labour-oriented and state-oriented models,⁶ are rarely put to the test against the backdrop of Canadian corporate practice.

The act of recognizing a Canadian model of corporate governance has its own set of challenges. As one practitioner interviewed for this study noted:

Many Canadian executives and directors have been schooled on U.S.-style governance and that is just a function of the U.S. market being so much bigger—S.E.C. rules, media, scandals, etc....When you are trying to study corporate governance as a director or a C.E.O. might, it is easy to assume that Canadian corporate governance is one and the same as U.S. corporate governance.

While growth of corporate governance as a field of study in the past few decades has been formidable, Canadian legal scholars often rely on American research due to the lack of Canadian-specific scholarship, and much of the theoretical analysis has blurred country lines.

What *is* Canada's actual legal model to govern its corporations? This article outlines the parameters of a Canadian model of governance for directors and others to consider. Interviews were conducted with 32 leading senior legal practitioners across Canada, who spoke candidly on matters involving shareholder primacy, director duties, stakeholder interests, common law and the courts, regulatory bodies, corporate norms, and the future trajectory of Canadian corporate governance, among other things. The observations from these senior practitioners provide a pulse check on the Canadian governance landscape, offering frank and thoughtful insights on some of the fundamental principles that drive the

3. Stephen M Bainbridge, "Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance" (2003) 97:2 Nw UL Rev 547.

4. Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, "A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law" (1999) 85:2 Va L Rev 248; Stephanie Ben-Ishai, "A Team Production Theory of Canadian Corporate Law" (2006) 44 Alta L Rev 299.

5. Cynthia Williams & John Conley, "An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct" (2005) 38 Cornell Intl LJ 493; Virginia Harper Ho, "'Enlightened Shareholder Value': Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide" (2010) 36:1 J Corp L 59.

6. Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1 at 443-447. Hansmann and Kraakman describe the manager-oriented model as one that existed between the 1930s and the 1960s in the U.S. and the labour-oriented model as one that peaked in Germany in the 1970s.

decision making of Canadian corporations. Taken within the context of today's legal and regulatory environment, these insights piece together the framework of a Canadian model to help inform future research.

Section I begins by outlining the methodology of this qualitative study. Section II then examines a widely-held academic definition of the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance, made up of five core principles, and puts it to the test against Canadian corporate legal practice. Section II.1 examines the question of who should have ultimate control of the corporation, and draws upon practitioners' observations regarding the current debates on shareholder rights plans and other defensive tactics in Canada. Next, Section II.2 delves into a discussion on the management of the corporation, and the question of whether "best interests of the corporation" and "best interests of the shareholders" is a significant or negligible difference in Canadian corporate law. In Section II.3, practitioners consider the role of stakeholder interests in corporate decision making, and offer their thoughts on the landmark *BCE* decision and how its findings have affected Canadian corporations, if at all. Section II.4 then addresses the protection of minority shareholder interests, and Section II.5 considers whether the market value of a company's shares should be regarded as the principal measure of shareholders' interests. Finally, Section III provides a broader overview of Canada's legal and regulatory landscape governing Canadian corporations. How have the courts helped to form Canadian corporate governance? What has been the securities commissions' role? The article concludes with some overall remarks on the outline of a Canadian model and surmises on the future development of Canadian corporate governance.

I. Methodology

Potential participants for this study were selected based on several factors, including: (1) reviews of online profiles from prominent Canadian law firms where the senior practitioner is identified as a specialist in corporate governance, among other things, (2) appearances on "Best Lawyers in Canada" lists, "Lexpert" rankings, "Who's Who Legal," "Chambers Global," and other equivalent lists, (3) colloquial understandings as to who the leaders are in Canadian corporate governance, (4) recommendations from executive members of the Canadian Foundation for Governance Research, and (5) recommendations offered by participants on other senior practitioners appropriate for the study. Participation was limited to those practising in Toronto, Vancouver, and Calgary. This was mainly due to manageability of content, with a focus on the major financial centres of Canada in common law jurisdictions.

Invitations to participate were sent to over 100 senior legal practitioners via email, where 32 indicated interest.⁷ Questions were emailed a day or more in advance to give practitioners the option of reviewing questions beforehand. Interviews were conducted over the phone with the exception of one practitioner who supplied written answers. Comments by the practitioners were made on a not-for-attribution basis. Practitioners were informed that any identifying characteristics within their comments would be stripped from the article and were invited to speak freely. Gendered language (such as “his” or “her”) was not used in the article in order to preserve confidentiality, thus plural pronouns were used. Discussions were conversational and not beholden to the interview questions, with the interviewer taking significant liberties to ask for further elaboration or follow-up questions based on practitioners’ answers. Many practitioners provided stories and personal accounts in addition to their responses, and several referenced or provided supplemental material prior to and/or following their interviews, including journal articles, either authored by themselves or others, firm news bulletins, web-links, or any additional thoughts they had. With permission from each participant, interviews were recorded and later transcribed, with over 1,000 pages of transcriptions culminating into the following summary of findings.

This article is not meant to be treated as a quantitative study. It is a qualitative study akin to a fireside chat with a group of knowledgeable and experienced experts to gain a deeper understanding of Canada’s governance framework. Throughout the interviews, one was easily struck by the level of thoughtfulness and candor behind practitioners’ answers. As one practitioner noted during their interview, “there is a gulf between what people hope something is, think it should be, and what it is...that

7. Thank you to the following practitioners who kindly and generously contributed their time and expertise to this article: William M Ainley, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP; Rita C Andreone, QC, Lawson Lundell LLP; Jeff Barnes, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Noralee Bradley, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; William J Braithwaite, Stikeman Elliot LLP; Terrence Burgoyne, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Rob Collins, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Douglas G Copland, Borden Ladner Gervais LLP; Dallas L Droppo, Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP; Aaron S Emes, Torys LLP; Jean Fraser, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Sharon C Geraghty, Torys LLP; Mitchell H Gropper, QC, Farris, Vaughn, Wills & Murphy LLP; Stephen Halperin, Goodmans LLP; Carol Hansell, Hansell LLP; Doug H Hopkins, Boughton Law Corporation; Michael L Lee, Lawson Lundell LLP; Robert Lehodey, QC, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; Jon Levin, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Andrew J MacDougall, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP; R Hector MacKay-Dunn, QC, Farris, Vaughn, Wills & Murphy LLP; Margaret C McNee, McMillan LLP; D Shawn McReynolds, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP; William K Orr, Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP; Barry J Reiter, Bennett Jones LLP; Simon A Romano, Stikeman Elliot LLP; Richard A Shaw, QC, ICDD, Richard A Shaw Professional Corporation; John Smith, Lawson Lundell LLP; Rene R Sorell, McCarthy Tétrault LLP; Edward J Waitzer, Stikeman Elliot LLP; Tom Theodorakis, McMillan LLP; and Marvin Yontef, Bennett Jones LLP.

may, to some extent, account for some of the difference in views you are going to hear.” In carefully parsing the comments made by practitioners, every effort was made to preserve the essence of practitioners’ words, and to capture the intent behind them in the context they were given.

As this article deals with high-level legal issues, several practitioners referred to a number of legal terms, important cases, and significant transactions in their comments. In order to improve flow and readability, while also accommodating for a range of readers with different legal backgrounds, certain legal definitions and details on particular cases and transactions are provided in the footnotes. It should be noted that participants spoke for themselves and not necessarily for the organizations with which they are affiliated. Their participation should not be construed as an endorsement of this article or its findings.

II. *Examining legal principles of corporate governance*

In their well-known and often cited 2001 article “The End of History for Corporate Law,” Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, senior Yale and Harvard law professors, argued that the basic law of corporate governance across nations had already achieved a high degree of uniformity to the shareholder primacy model and that “continuing convergence toward [this] single, standard model is likely.”⁸ According to Hansmann and Kraakman, some key normative principles in this consensus include:

- (1) ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class;
- (2) the managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders;
- (3) other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers [which, together with shareholders, are included as “stakeholders”] should have their interests protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate governance;
- (4) noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders; and

8. Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1 at 439.

- (5) the market value of the publicly traded corporation's shares is the principal measure of its shareholders' interests.⁹

Arguing from an Anglo-American perspective, Hansmann and Kraakman believed that alternative governance models had already been tried and had failed.¹⁰ Pointing to shareholder primacy's assumed efficiencies and its historical economic domination, they contended that the ideological convergence of this model is unlikely to be undone, especially since "no important competitors to the standard model of corporate governance remain persuasive...."¹¹ To Hansmann and Kraakman, the ideological convergence toward the model meant that general convergence in practice would eventually follow—thus signifying, for all intents and purposes, an end of history for corporate law.¹² Economic efficiency was the main force behind Hansmann and Kraakman's presumption of the long-term international acceptance of the shareholder primacy model. They identified profit maximization, historical success, and international competitive advantage as factors that "made the virtues of [the shareholder primacy] model increasingly salient."¹³

Practitioners were provided with Hansmann and Kraakman's definition of shareholder primacy, and asked if they found the definition to be an accurate depiction of Canadian corporate governance. They were invited to weigh in on each of the five principles, and discussions followed from there.

9. *Ibid* at 440-441. There seems to be little contention in legal scholarship regarding Hansmann and Kraakman's definition of shareholder primacy. See e.g., Bainbridge, *supra* note 3 at 573 (which describes two principles of shareholder primacy: the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the principle of ultimate shareholder control); Fisch, *supra* note 2 at 637 (which asserts that shareholder primacy "defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth"); Lee, *supra* note 2 at 535 (which defines shareholder primacy as "the view that managers' fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders' wealth and preclude them from giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies").

10. These alternatives are described as manager-oriented, labour-oriented, and state-oriented models. Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1 at 443-447.

11. *Ibid* at 454.

12. *Ibid* at 455. There is also considerable discourse available on the issue of the global convergence of corporate governance, both prior to and following Hansmann and Kraakman's work. See e.g., John C Coffee Jr, "The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications" (1999) 93:3 *Nw UL Rev* 641; Jeffrey N Gordon & Mark J Roe, eds., *Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

13. Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1 at 449. It is perhaps worthwhile to note that Hansmann and Kraakman's article was published in early 2001, prior to a number of financial calamities that marked the first decade of the 21st century, including the fall of Enron Corporation and other corporate and accounting scandals in 2001-2002, and, more recently, the global financial crisis. This has not changed the tenor of the presumed dominance of shareholder primacy in Anglo-American legal scholarship, but certainly has increased its critiques.

1. *Control of the corporation*

Principle: “*Ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class.*”

Several practitioners agreed that, in Canada, control belonged with the shareholder class—but with caveats. The principle of ultimate shareholder control was described as “mostly right,” “correct subject to general laws of the land,” and “somewhat true but with very significant exceptions.” Many focused on the shareholders’ abilities to elect and remove directors as signifying ultimate control, but pointed out that this control was limited and far removed from the day-to-day control exercised by the board and management. Three practitioners likened the control of shareholders to that of voters in a democratic country, where “as citizens of the country, our voting franchise is how we elect our representatives.” Directors are the elected officials who now “have obligations to everybody and, ultimately, they have to answer to electorate or the shareholders.” Shareholders therefore are not in a position to decide the specific measures that a corporation will take in executing or adopting business plans. In that sense, there is ultimate control but “on a day-to-day basis, control really rests with the board for resolution.”

A small minority of the practitioners supported greater shareholder control since shareholders are the ones that have taken on the financial risk. However, one practitioner put it in the context of the corporation’s existence, pointing out that when the company’s financial situation has deteriorated “the party that’s economically at risk is the creditor rather than the shareholder....[In that circumstance,] there’s more obligation to the creditor.” A significant majority of the practitioners tended to prefer greater director control in general.

Interestingly, there were differing interpretations as to whether Canada was trending towards greater board or shareholder control. A few practitioners felt that Canada was moving towards greater director control in practice, noting how “the biggest change over the last ten to fifteen years has been the increased role and responsibilities of directors, ensuring governance at the board level is robust.” Other practitioners identified how administrative rules were generally changing in favour of the shareholder, as shareholders have been getting a sympathetic ear from the regulators and the stock exchanges, which have “expanded the universe of shareholders’ rights on various matters well beyond what the law ever contemplated.” In a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) context, many practitioners pointed to the securities regulators’ shareholder-centric position on defensive

tactics as representing significantly greater shareholder control in Canada, particularly when compared with the U.S. position on these measures.

a. *Poison pill debate*

Canada is considered a very bidder-friendly jurisdiction as National Policy 62-202 *Take-Over Bids—Defensive Tactics* (NP 62-202) leaves Canadian boards with a limited number of defences when faced with an unsolicited take-over bid.¹⁴ This position is now under review in Canada. The Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), the organization responsible for the securities regulation of all provinces, has released proposed National Instrument 62-105 *Security Holders Rights Plans*, which allows target boards to implement shareholder rights plans (known as “poison pills”)¹⁵ for a longer period than currently permitted when facing a hostile bid, subject to shareholder approval.¹⁶ An alternative proposal has been put forth by the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), the organization mandated by the Quebec government to regulate Quebec’s financial markets.¹⁷ The AMF proposal seeks a new regime to govern all defensive measures, allowing boards a greater overall arsenal to defend target companies in the face of unwanted take-over bids. The extended comment period for these proposals closed in July 2013.¹⁸ As one practitioner observed:

The proposals can be seen as a subtext of who actually should have ultimate decision making authority in the context of change of control transactions: whether it should be the shareholders, which is the current approach of the securities regulatory scheme and the approach the commissions have traditionally taken on poison pills, or whether the boards should be more empowered, which is the path the courts seem to have taken but the regulators have not.

14. *Take-Over Bids—Defensive Tactics*, OSC NP 62-202 (4 July 1997).

15. A shareholder rights plan is a defensive tactic employed by companies to discourage hostile takeovers. This is done by making the shares of a company less attractive to the potential acquirer, either by allowing existing shareholders to buy more shares at a discount, or allowing shareholders to buy the acquirer’s shares at a discounted price after the merger.

16. Canadian Securities Administrators, “Notice and Request for Comment: Proposed National Instrument 62-105 Security Holders Rights Plans, Proposed Companion Policy 62-105CP, and Proposed Consequential Amendments” (14 March 2013) *Ontario Securities Commission*, online: Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca>.

17. Autorité des Marchés Financiers, “Consultation Paper: An Alternative Approach to Securities Regulators’ Intervention in Defensive Tactics” *Autorité des Marchés Financiers* (14 March 2013), online: Autorité des Marchés Financiers <www.lautorite.qc.ca>.

18. For some helpful summaries providing greater detail on the current proposals, see e.g., Robert Black et al, “The Competing Visions of the CSA and AMF on Shareholder Rights Plans and Take-over Bid Defensive Tactics” Davis LLP Securities & Corporate Finance Bulletin (22 April 2013), online: Davis LLP <www.davis.ca/en/>; John Emanoilidis et al, “Canadian Companies Will be Harder to Acquire Under New Poison Pill Proposals” *Torys LLP M&A Bulletin* (14 March 2013), online: Torys LLP <www.torys.com/Publications>.

An overwhelming majority preferred the AMF proposal and felt a regime change was necessary, with one practitioner calling it “more intellectually honest” than the CSA proposal.¹⁹ Another practitioner believed the proposals were motivated by the desire of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to “get out of the pill hearing game” and that “all the OSC is doing is largely codifying what’s developed out of their own jurisprudence.” There was consensus among practitioners in the M&A field that Canadian boards did not have enough in their defensive toolkit to properly respond to take-over bids, citing how “as a board, you have no bargaining power in Canada.” One practitioner pointed out how “shares trade over so quickly once the transaction is announced that those who are holding the shares have a stake in only one thing, which is with a transaction going ahead.”²⁰ Once a bid is made for a Canadian company, it can almost be assumed that the company will be sold, as the board has no way of resisting the bid, and “ultimately no ability to negotiate the best price or find an alternate because the bidder just has to wait the board out and then go straight to the shareholders.” Many also preferred the AMF proposal because it would align more with the U.S. standard of practice in M&A transactions. The AMF position would put Canada on a more even playing field on the global capital markets, “essentially bringing us to a Delaware state of law, which means you can indefinitely keep a hostile bidder away.”

While some acknowledged the motivation behind regulators’ push for greater shareholders’ rights was due to a concern that directors could become entrenched and refuse a take-over bid to perpetuate the board’s own power, these practitioners felt that fear was unwarranted. The concern was something that “had an element of truth 30 years ago,” but nowadays “directors are acutely aware of their fiduciary duties in a change of control, and that they are exposing themselves to hellacious lawsuits if they try to entrench themselves with any form of conflict of interest.” Some practitioners seemed to share a common sentiment that the OSC was “substituting its visceral reaction for the business judgment of the directors,” leaving boards “emasculated.” Several said that “better run companies would have more director primacy” as the directors have

19. The exception was one practitioner, who thought it would be better to work within the CSA’s proposals and get them right since that was where Canada was probably going to end up, noting how the acceptance of the AMF proposal was “just never going to happen.” This practitioner did, however, prefer the AMF proposal.

20. The practitioner went on to state: “A lot of people would say that the people who bought shares are the ones whose interest you should be protecting—but that starts a step too late. If the board had the proper ability to negotiate with bidders, people wouldn’t sell as quickly and people would stick it out and reap the rewards of doing that.”

the knowledge and capability to make better long-term decisions. The majority of these practitioners said that negotiating by the board was the most effective way to obtain the best deal for shareholders. One practitioner, who strongly argued in favour of the corporation being run solely for the economic benefit of the shareholders, felt that the regulators have “tried to write a plan to eliminate the power of the board,” which philosophically “is exactly where the power ought to be” as a fiduciary of the shareholders.

Some practitioners were cautiously optimistic that the acceptance of either proposal could temper the commissions’ shareholder-centric position slightly in the future, signifying a possible trend towards greater board control. One noted how “right now the securities administrators all think, to a greater or lesser degree, that we have gone too far and it’s time to make take-over protection stronger.” Another commented that the securities regulators are making decisions “based on what they believe is the right thing for investors, but not with much thinking as to what is the right answer for a corporation.” A handful of practitioners contended that, given how the current debate on poison pills has a particular focus—which is solely looking at protecting investors in the capital markets from the commissions’ view—the debate should not be construed to represent the overall governance model in Canada.

The discussions by practitioners suggest the answer to who holds ultimate control depends very much on what aspect of the law a practitioner elects to focus on. Fiduciary duties aside, securities commissions have clearly favoured shareholders having the ultimate say in take-over situations, as investor protection is a statutory mandate set out in each commission’s enabling statute. In this context, and specifically regarding the current debate on the proper allocation of power in the treatment of poison pills, many of the practitioners expressed frustration over the fact that greater director control, in their minds, is more beneficial to shareholders by increasing their share value in the face of a take-over bid.

On September 14, 2014, the CSA announced that, after considering both the CSA and AMF proposals and reviewing subsequent comments, it would be pursuing a “harmonized regulatory approach” regarding take-over bids in Canada. Specifically, the CSA has indicated that its proposed amendments would require that all non-exempt take-over bids:

- (1) be subject to a mandatory majority (more than 50 per cent) minimum tender of all outstanding target securities (excluding tenders by the bidder itself or its joint actors);

- (2) be extended by the bidder for an additional 10 days once the mandatory minimum tender condition has been met and the bidder has announced its intention to immediately take up and pay for the securities deposited under the bid; and,
- (3) remain open for a minimum of 120 days, subject to the ability of the target board to waive to a period of no less than 35 days in certain circumstances and on certain conditions.²¹

The announcement does not provide any guidance as to how the regulators plan to regulate poison pills once the new regime is adopted. The CSA intends to publish the proposed amendments for comment in the first quarter of 2015.

Stepping back from the poison pill debate, the board and management clearly exert greater day-to-day control in practice. And of course, shareholders continue to have the power to elect and remove directors, as well as the power to approve fundamental changes, access the oppression remedy, and use or threaten other remedies such as class actions. Decisions that will follow the proposed amendments as to how securities commissions across Canada approach poison pills specifically, and defensive tactics as a whole under the anticipated harmonized approach, will dictate whether there will be a power swing toward greater board control in an M&A context in the future, something heavily favoured by a significant majority of the practitioners interviewed.

2. *Manage in the best interests of whom?*

Principle: “*The managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders.*”

A few practitioners conceded that people mostly think that the obligation of the board and management is to manage the corporation in the interests of its shareholders. Despite this, all practitioners agreed that the theoretical principle was inconsistent with Canadian corporate law, which under s. 122 of the *Canada Business Corporations Act* requires that directors and officers manage the corporation in the “best interests of the corporation” as opposed to the shareholders.²² The topic of the debate, then, became whether or not the difference between “best interests of the corporation”

21. Canadian Securities Administrators, News Release, 62-306, “Canadian Securities Regulators Move Forward with Harmonized Regulatory Approach for Take-Over Bids in Canada” (11 September 2014), online: Canadian Securities Administrators <www.securities-administrators.ca>.

22. *Canada Business Corporations Act*, RSC, 1985, c C-44, s 122 [CBCA] (“every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and discharging their duties shall act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation” and “exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances”).

and “best interests of the shareholders” was simply a technical one or if there was a noteworthy Canadian difference to be had.

A handful of practitioners strongly felt there was no difference, stating that “it’s the same thing” with one noting how “it’s fine for directors to believe that it is in the best interest of the corporation, which to me means the best interest of its shareholders, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court goes a little off the reservation in this allegation.” Others felt there was a difference between the two, with a few holding comparably strong views on the fact that there was a difference, including this practitioner, who stated:

It’s entirely different, that is not our common law....It should be a matter of complete indifference to the directors what the interests of the shareholders are, except if it makes a difference to the corporation. There’s nothing wrong with taking shareholders’ interests into account, but that’s incidental....I don’t think the law could possibly be clearer if you look at the corporate statutes and look at what the courts have said.

A few practitioners noted the difference when compared with the U.S., Delaware in particular, where their laws indicate that directors’ duties are to the corporation and the shareholders, which a few practitioners felt was treated as one and the same by the American courts. One distinguished how American jurisprudence “is more clearly articulate that the interest of the shareholder should be foremost in the thoughts of the board in terms of maximizing shareholder value than perhaps has been articulated historically in the Canadian jurisprudence.” There is, therefore, “a slightly different focus in Canada.” In terms of its application, one practitioner noted that boards do not have an obligation to any potential stakeholder but described it as a “kind of continuum...the board feels they have a greater obligation to consider the shareholders, employees, and the local community they operate in, but the obligation probably decreases as the strength of the relationship with other constituents increases.” Another put it in the context of proportionality:

There is a difference....You do have to consider all the influences of the company when you’re making decisions, because it is in the best interest of the corporation, but when you look at what that means—the corporation—predominately you’re talking about the investors, the people who put in their money to own a stake in the company.... As a director, you’re out there for all the world to see as to how the shareholders have judged and measured you. You don’t have that same scrutiny with these other stakeholders...so practically, directors are driven to that same relative view.

Nevertheless, a large majority of the practitioners felt that even if there was a theoretical difference between “best interests of the corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders,” the difference was “largely indistinguishable” in practice because a business case could be made that best interests of the corporation equated to the best interests of the shareholders.²³ Many expressed how one can easily make an argument that if the corporation is acting in the best interests of all of its stakeholders, over time the wealth of shareholders will be maximized. Most agreed (with a few exceptions) that the shareholders should be the foremost priority for directors, with other stakeholders’ interests being considered depending on the issue at hand.

A number of practitioners implied that the negligible difference could become relevant in narrow circumstances. For example, the difference could become acute in times of financial distress or when a significant stakeholder is involved. Two gave the example of a pipeline across First Nations territory, where in that scenario the corporation should have regard to the broader interest of stakeholders.

One of the practitioners who found a stark difference between the best interests of the corporation versus the shareholders admitted that “certainly the entire shareholder community in Canada would say it’s all about the shareholders, absolutely.” Nevertheless, this practitioner reiterated the point that doing what’s in the best interests of the corporation is really something for the directors to determine, and is not beholden to any particular stakeholder group, including shareholders. When this practitioner was informed that several participants felt that “best interests of the corporation” and “best interests of the shareholders” were of negligible difference, the practitioner responded:

If you are trying to advise a board in a manner that keeps them out of harm’s way, that’s different. Providing that kind of advice, practically speaking for a lawyer advising a client, is much different than talking about the legal theory. Because you can have all kinds of laws, but when you’ve got one group who is the most likely to sue you, you tend to worry about that group....People’s sense of right and wrong will also change over time but I don’t think the legal theory is going to change. So it is kind of a flexible concept that can accommodate a lot of different views of a lot of different kinds of directors.

23. See e.g., comments such as: “You can make an argument, at least academically you can as a director, that if we run this corporation in the best interests of all of its stakeholders over time we will maximize wealth for shareholders”; “In order to be a good corporation and do what your shareholders want and make value for your shareholders, it may make an awful lot of sense to do good things for the community or good things for the environment or good things for your employees, because it’s good for the owners.”

A few practitioners echoed this sentiment, reflecting on how Canada is more flexible in that it can, in any particular set of circumstances, put the best interests of the corporation to a wider group of stakeholders.

In a significant majority of times during a corporation's existence, directors may find there to be little practical differences between decisions made in the "best interests of the corporation" and the "best interests of the shareholders." Many practitioners felt that there should be a healthy balance and greater proportionality given to the interests of shareholders, who have taken on the financial risk. Given the strong business case to consider stakeholder interests, these interests almost always align with increasing share value in the long term. A few practitioners did cite some limited circumstances where the difference may become more acute. Simply, can "best interests of the corporation" take into account interests other than the shareholders better than "best interests of the shareholders"? The theoretical answer is obviously a yes, and the answers from these practitioners also suggest the affirmative is possible in practice. Many questioned whether actions made in favour of stakeholders' interests are even distinguishable from actions benefiting shareholders and the corporation in the long-term.

3. *Consideration of stakeholder interests*

Principle: *"Other corporate constituencies, such as creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers, should have their interests protected by contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate governance."*

While there were some differences among practitioners in the treatment of this principle and the meaning behind "participation in corporate governance,"²⁴ the overwhelming majority interpreted the principle to mean that the protection of non-shareholder stakeholder interests were outside the scope of corporate governance practices, particularly with respect to the board's corporate decision making.

A handful of practitioners agreed with the principle, citing significant protections available to non-shareholder stakeholders through contractual and regulatory means. One felt the principle was correct because

24. Some practitioners had a different interpretation of the meaning of "participation of corporate governance" in this principle. One practitioner, for example, pointed out that in continental Europe, unions were provided with representatives on boards. Any practitioner who construed the principle in this manner was in agreement with it. When the principle was interpreted to mean there was a strict choice "between people protecting their own rights, rather than having a voice in the corporate decision," then generally speaking, practitioners tended to agree that it is "an accurate statement, but it isn't a complete statement."

shareholders are the ones without contractual rights, thus directors had a primary duty to protect their interests above those that already have built-in protections through contract and/or regulation. Another felt strongly that contractual and regulatory protections were sufficient for these interests, reflecting on how “we’ve forgotten what contracts do... Corporations have to operate within a contractual set of obligations they’ve undertaken and a regular set of obligations.” When asked whether regulation was sufficient protection for environmental interests, the practitioner responded that “the people that should be sued are the government for being totally negligent about adequately regulating the destruction of our environment... the bulk of the deficiency is the intellectual paucity of environmental regulation.”

Several questioned how Canadian common law fit within this principle, with a few recognizing that courts “have become more aggressive in identifying and protecting the non-contractual rights of other corporate stakeholders” and a handful pointing out how “it’s a little bit different in Canada as a result of *BCE*—the court has decided that other stakeholders, irrespective of their contractual relationships with their company, have an interest that needs to be protected.” Practitioners were asked to opine on the 2008 decision in *BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders (BCE)*²⁵ and its impact, if any, on Canadian corporate governance practices.

a. *The BCE decision*

In brief, the facts of the *BCE* decision are as follows. The debentureholders of Bell Canada, a subsidiary of BCE Inc., used the oppression remedy to seek relief concerning the privatization of BCE by a consortium of private equity buyers under a plan of arrangement that had been determined by BCE’s directors to be in the best interests of BCE and its shareholders.²⁶ The contractual rights of the debentureholders would not be affected by the board’s decision. Upon the completion of the arrangement, the debentureholders stood to lose approximately 20 per cent of the short-term trading value of their holdings. The court ultimately found in favour of BCE Inc., and against the debentureholders’ claim.²⁷

25. *BCE Inc v 1976 Debentureholders*, 2008 SCC 69, 3 SCR 560 [*BCE*].

26. The oppression remedy will be discussed in greater detail in Section II.5.

27. Several summaries and analyses are available for further details on the case. See e.g. Mohammad Fadel, “*BCE* and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law” (2009) 48:2 Can Bus LJ 190; Edward Iacobucci, “Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court’s Approach to Corporate Fiduciary Duties” (2009) 48 Can Bus LJ 232; J Anthony VanDuzer, “*BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders*: The Supreme Court’s Hits and Misses in its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since *Peoples*” (2009) 43 UBC L Rev 205; Sarah P Bradley, “*BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders*: The New Fiduciary Duties of Fair Treatment, Statutory Compliance, and Good Corporate Citizenship?” (2010) 41:2 Ottawa L Rev 325; J Alex Moore & William Ainley, “*BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders*: An Unexamined Question Considered,” online: (2009) Davies <<http://www.dwpv.com>>.

In its decision, the SCC reiterated its findings in the 2004 decision of *Peoples Department Store Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise*²⁸ that directors were permitted to consider the interests of, among others, “shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.”²⁹ The court’s finding that the debentureholders had a reasonable expectation for their interests to be considered implies an obligation on the board to at least consider such interests. The court held that directors were “not confined to short-term profit or share value,” but that, where the corporation is an ongoing concern, directors were to look to the long-term interests of the company, and the context of this duty varied with the situation at hand.³⁰ The court also reinforced its support for the business judgment rule.³¹ Moreover, the court held that directors were required to act in the best interests of the company “viewed as a good corporate citizen”³² and “commensurate with the corporation’s duties as a responsible corporate citizen.”³³ The court did not elaborate further on their concept of good corporate citizenry.

No practitioner expressed dismay over the ultimate result of *BCE*. Many specified that whatever they felt about the rest of the decision, the end result in favour of BCE Inc. was the correct one. A handful of practitioners found the SCC’s findings in *BCE* very positive overall, making comments that they “quite liked the decision” and its conclusion, calling it “a breath of fresh air,” and declaring that the court in *BCE* “really started to get it right.” These practitioners were pleased that the decision “gave a little more ammunition to the notion that the board can take a broader view when it makes its decisions.”

28. *Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise*, 2004 SCC 68, 3 SCR 461 [*Peoples*]. In brief, following the bankruptcy of Peoples Department Stores Inc., the trustee brought an action against the company’s directors for breaching their fiduciary duties by, prior to the bankruptcy, implementing a credit scheme that favoured Peoples’ parent company, Wise Stores Inc., over its creditors. The Supreme Court found that when considering what is in the best interests of the corporation, directors may consider stakeholder interests and that in this instance there was no breach. Several summaries and analyses are available for further details on the case. See e.g. Catherine Francis, “*Peoples Department Store Inc. v. Wise: The Expanded Scope of Directors’ and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties and Duty of Care*” (2005) 41 Can Bus LJ 175; Darcy L MacPherson, “Supreme Court Restates Directors’ Fiduciary Duty—A Comment on *Peoples Department Stores v. Wise*” (2005) 43:2 Alta L Rev 383.

29. *BCE*, *supra* note 25 at para 39.

30. *Ibid* at para 38. Regarding the oppression remedy, the court found there was no violation by the directors in their fiduciary duties.

31. The business judgment rule means that courts will defer to the directors’ business judgment so long as those directors used an appropriate degree of prudence and diligence in reaching a reasonable business decision at the particular time the decision was made. See *Peoples*, *supra* note 28 at paras 64-65.

32. *BCE*, *supra* note 25 at para 66.

33. *Ibid* at para 82.

Others expressed hesitancy over how important the case was to Canadian corporate law. One practitioner, for example, was “not a believer that one case is particularly important in the general scheme of things” or that a particular case “fell off one side or the other at the head of a pin on a very narrow point.” Instead, the practitioner felt it was important to consider the “run of cases” and with respect to *Peoples* and *BCE*, they felt that “neither of them did anything particularly surprising” and that it “was not a watershed.” A few practitioners considered the decision “a reflection of the times” that was also “a product of a lot of things that preceded it, and not just within the legal arena but within society, in the larger sense.” Another practitioner, who previously expressed that “best interests of the corporation” had a significantly different intent and meaning than “best interests of the shareholders,” believed the court had simply “repeated the law the way it’s always been,” and echoed the sentiment that the decision was one that happened gradually along a broader trend in Canadian corporate governance history. The practitioner felt that, aside from the good corporate citizen concept, the decision “wasn’t groundbreaking.”

Interestingly, the majority of practitioners found several problems with how the findings of the court were articulated, calling it “a thin piece of work,” “incoherent,” “terrible,” “peculiar,” “written by people who didn’t understand corporate law,” “basically written by their clerks,” and the articulation of the fiduciary duties of the board “contrary to common sense” and “a bit impractical, frankly.” Several felt that the decision would not assist the lower courts on what the right approach was to oppression, fairness, etc., depending on the context.

Nevertheless, many conceded that the decision could not be ignored, since “it’s the Supreme Court of Canada and it’s a very recent and big case.” One practitioner said that *BCE* is “kind of a dog’s breakfast; there’s something in there for everybody” but there was no question that *BCE* has caused legal advisors “to tell any board that they can—and indeed should—take into account non-shareholder value issues.” The practitioner pointed out that “these are all things that we used to take into account before *BCE*, but *BCE* is now giving you more of an overt license to do it.”

Many practitioners felt the decision was a clear step away from a shareholder primacy model of governance, with one stating that it “clarified

that the *Revlon* rule³⁴ does not apply in Canada, and boards are not required to act as the role of auctioneer in an M&A context, with their sole goal being to maximize shareholder value.” Nevertheless, a few practitioners bemoaned the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada left questions open when they could have been settled. One wished that the Supreme Court of Canada “had been far more hawkish and clear” and “would really like the court to specifically clarify Canada’s take on corporate governance versus the U.S. because we are such a small market compared to our neighbours—we’re inundated with U.S. information.”

b. *Good corporate citizen*

Practitioners were asked whether they thought boards were aware of the Supreme Court’s comments regarding how the best interests of the corporation are to be “viewed as a good corporate citizen” and “commensurate with a responsible corporate citizen” as per *BCE*.

Answers were split down the middle, with almost half either somewhat disagreeing or disagreeing, and the other half either agreeing or strongly agreeing. There tended to be two camps among practitioners, with one considering the good corporate citizen concept “an interesting throwaway line...a bit gratuitous,” and the other finding that it “really does set Canada on its own path.” Some practitioners pointed out that the good corporate citizen concept was something “better understood amongst the lawyers” and “business people tend to not pay that much attention to it or not be as aware of it.” A handful of practitioners also noted that many companies want to be viewed as good corporate citizens, and “this is not because of anything the Supreme Court says.” One sensed that the good corporate citizen concept was “not getting any airtime” in small to mid-cap companies struggling for capital relative to larger companies that were “not going to live or die quarter by quarter” because “it’s hard to think of these concepts when you’re in survival mode.”

There was much discussion on how the “good corporate citizen” concept was difficult to apply, as can be seen from these various responses:

34. The *Revlon* rule refers to the fiduciary duty of American boards to maximize shareholder value in change of control transactions. *Revlon Inc v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings*, 506 A 2d 173 (Del Sup Ct 1986). Prior to 2004, a series of cases in Canada, particularly from Ontario, spoke to the existence of a fiduciary duty for directors to take reasonable steps to maximize shareholder value. See e.g., *Casurina Limited Partnership v Rio Algom Ltd* (2004), 40 BLR (3d) 112 at para 27 (ONCA); *Pacifica Papers Inc v Johnstone* (2001), 15 BLR (3d) 249 at para 30 (BCSC) affirmed in *Pacifica Papers Inc v Johnstone* (2001), 93 BCLR (3d) 20 (BCCA); *Gazit (1997) Inc v Centrefund Realty Corp* (2000), 8 BLR (3d) 81 at para 69 (Ont SCJ); *CW Shareholdings Inc v WIC Western International Communications Ltd* (1998) 160 DLR (4th) 131 (On Ct J (Gen Div)); *Benson v Third Canadian General Investment Trust Ltd* (1993), 14 OR (3d) 493 at 500 (On Ct J (Gen Div)); *347883 Alberta Ltd v Producers Pipelines Inc* (1991), 80 DLR (4th) 359 at 399-402 (SKCA).

Nobody really knows what it means. If I went to a client and said, “Be sure when you do that that you’re acting as a good corporate citizen because that’s what *BCE* says,” the next line is going to be, “And what does that mean?” and I’m going to shrug and say, “I don’t really know.” They’ll say, “Why did you tell me that? What do you want us to do with that?” Practically speaking people don’t run around talking about it that way.

Obviously a good corporate citizen is better than saying, “You better up your profits this quarter.” But I really do think it’s a bit of apple pie, motherhood type of statement. It’s pretty hard to say. I mean, are you going to have liability if you’re not viewed by the outside as a good corporate citizen?

The Supreme Court makes this bizarre statement to stakeholders about good corporate citizenship and then specifically refers to some purported stakeholders. If you’re going to go there, you either should have given guidance or not gone there. They sort of left it. They got it out there, but it’s still sort of a blank page.

One practitioner felt that there was an “upwards trend” towards good corporate citizenry, and wasn’t sure if that was a reflection of legal development so much as “a maturing of some of the thinking that goes on in the boardroom,” while a handful noted that an increase in independent directors and director education is “really having an impact” on director awareness of these legal concepts.³⁵

A small group of practitioners felt the need to qualify their answers, citing how their personal preferences on the matter were divergent from their legal take on the state of the common law. These practitioners, most of whom found *BCE* a disappointment in its applicability to legal practice, expressly stated that they appreciated the direction of the court in supporting more of a “social conscience” in corporations. Despite this, a few questioned whether the law had the capacity to do so; others questioned whether it was even appropriate.

c. Influential to practice?

Practitioners were asked whether *BCE* had influenced the decision making of Canadian boards. The collective response was that boards have been influenced by the decision, with almost all agreeing or strongly agreeing, and only one practitioner somewhat disagreeing. Nevertheless, there was significant consensus that the influence was more regarding the *process*

35. One practitioner had a notably different take, finding director education and certification programs a “huge disservice to the capital markets” because they cause inexperienced people to believe they have the tools to sit on a board “just because he or she has taken a course—that’s a nonstarter.”

of decision making, and there was serious question as to whether it had made a difference in terms of changing results. On how the *BCE* decision largely influenced the process, here are some select responses from various practitioners:

That's why take-overs in Canada are so complex; the documentation is so complex, and they outline in great detail every meeting that's been held, every discussion that's been held, what the fairness opinion said, what other valuations have said, etc....The result becomes a very process-driven process; processes can be used to defend judgments, but they don't necessarily facilitate making good judgments.

Let me repeat something I have said to counsel boards at various situations: the reason you hire lawyers and investment bankers and all of that is so that you can demonstrate how thorough a process you went through. You sat through the process, and you basically say: we dotted our i's and we crossed our t's and this was the result we have.

Did we consider the various issues? Did we record that we considered them? Did we get the advice that we needed to consider them? *BCE* has built into corporate governance more procedural requirements. My instinct is ... where you had situations where people were attempting to be conscientious I suspect they would have got to the same place, but now they won't get there without jumping through hoops.

If you're faced with a take-over bid and you've some competing stakeholders, clearly *BCE* will be mentioned. If you're going into a plan of arrangement and you need to do the fairness criteria, it may be mentioned but more as something that's entirely decipherable rather than unclear....*Magna* was one of the first cases where it was really argued in detail. It was not pretty.³⁶

36. *Re Magna International* (2010), 101 OR (3d) 736 (Sup Ct) [*Magna, Sup Ct*], aff'd (2010), 101 OR (3d) 721 (Div Ct) [*Magna, Div Ct*]; Ontario Securities Commission, "In the Matter of The Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S-5, as Amended and In the Matter of Magna International Inc and In the Matter of the Stronach Trust and 446 Holdings Inc" Decision and Order (24 June 2010), online: OSC <<http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Proceedings/>>. Briefly, the *Magna* decision attempted to expand and/or clarify on some findings in *BCE*. The court confirmed that it would only consider whether there is a valid business purpose from the perspective of the corporation; there is no need to determine a valid business purpose from the shareholders' perspective. However, where the court is considering different interests within the same class of stakeholders, more weight can be placed on the shareholder vote in determining the fairness and reasonableness of the arrangement than in circumstances where the court is balancing competing interests between different classes of stakeholders. The details of *Magna* are particularly complex, thus readers are encouraged to review the several summaries and analyses available for further details on the case. See e.g., Edward Iacobucci, "Making Sense of *Magna*" (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 237; Anita Anand, "Was *Magna* in the Public Interest?" (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall LJ 311; Emmanuel Pressman et al, "Key Lessons from the *Magna* Decision" Osler Corporate Review (September 2010), online: Osler <www.osler.com>; Kent E Thomson et al, "The Magna Proceedings: Devising a Litigation Strategy and Elaboration on the *BCE* Test," online: (2011) Lexpert/American Lawyer, Davies <www.dwpv.com>.

There were many that pointed to the risks of having an overloaded process, and how it can quickly become boilerplate, stating how “the more you make something process-driven, the less meaning it has for people.”

In answering whether Canadian directors in actuality consider non-shareholder stakeholders in their corporate decision making, whether it be due to Canadian corporate law or otherwise, 71 per cent agreed that directors take stakeholder interests into account, 10 per cent remained neutral, and 19 per cent disagreed. Several suspected that any consideration of stakeholder interests was due more from business motivations than anything required by corporate law.

One practitioner acknowledged that “it’s early days yet, it’s hard to tell” what the effects of *BCE* are, but as a practical matter “a lot of practitioners would probably tell you that a high enough offer price in a take-over will still prevail.” A handful of practitioners noted that the decision “may have given a target board some more ammunition with which to fight off a bid that they don’t like.” Others were much more skeptical as to the impact of the decision. When advising clients, one practitioner put it bluntly: “I say, ‘the owners get the money and at the end of the day the Supreme Court said that’s right.’ Cut through all of the flowery language, the nice poetry, that’s what happened.”

As with the similar finding from practitioners’ comments in Section II.2 with regard to the “best interests of the corporation,” practitioners tended to feel that the exercise of considering stakeholder interests could result in a different result in narrow circumstances. A few practitioners provided theoretical examples, and a small number referenced the TMX/Maple transaction as “a great test case where the board could have come to a non-maximizing shareholder value decision.”³⁷ One practitioner pointed out that oftentimes it was not just a process issue for boards, but some stakeholders are a force to be reckoned with in any case. Creditors, for example, can be very influential and it is difficult for boards to ignore them. The practitioner put it this way: “The board is not sitting around saying,

37. The TMX/Maple transaction involved the takeover of the TMX Group Ltd., Canada’s main stock exchange company, by a consortium of banks and pension funds under the Maple Group Acquisition Corp. One practitioner described how in the transaction,

The board clearly felt strongly that it had fiduciary obligations to stakeholders that went well beyond the shareholders, because they act as a market for the financial system and it was very important. Interestingly, OSC was wearing two hats in that transaction. The one hat [was concerned about] shareholder interests being protected...but they were also the regulator of the Toronto Stock Exchange and very much wanted the ultimate owner of the Toronto Stock Exchange to honor all those other obligations it has to other stakeholders.

The practitioner noted how the transaction was “a lot of pure corporate theory playing out in practice, where the securities regulators and corporate theory have collided...trying to come up with a transaction that would be good for the Canadian market and good for the shareholders of the TMX.”

‘Gee, I wonder who this would harm? Maybe it would be the creditors.’ Usually the creditors are right in their face, it’s not like they have to put the creditors on their agenda.” Another reflected on how the desire to consider stakeholder interests tended to be linked to lifespan of the corporation, as directors were more inclined to listen to stakeholder interests when the company is in insolvency or near insolvency.

d. *Extent of consideration: May, Should, or Obligated?*

The *BCE* decision left open for many—directors, practitioners, and academics alike—the question as to the extent of obligation to consider stakeholder interests.³⁸ Thus, in an attempt to see if there was some consensus among this group of leading Canadian practitioners, all were asked the question, “Do you believe directors may, should, or are obligated to consider stakeholder interests?”

Several practitioners did not commit to one option, but chose two (such as “between may and should” or “they should and they are obligated to”). On the continuum of may being the least restrictive for directors, and obligated being the most, where the most restrictive answer was used as the recorded answer of the practitioner, 44 per cent of practitioners said directors were obligated to consider stakeholder interests, 40 per cent felt that directors should consider them, and 16 per cent felt directors may consider them. Comments that help to colour in practitioners’ answers, as well as other noteworthy ones, are cited below.

One practitioner, who believed there was a legal obligation, summarized the sentiment echoed by most of the practitioners who answered in that manner, stating that “the trick is they can make a decision that may be counter to those interests, but they’re obligated to consider them in the event.” For practitioners that did not think there was an obligation, a few offered reasons why, explaining that “it doesn’t seem possible for the same group of people to owe conflicting duties to two different groups” and that it is almost impossible to impose this kind of an obligation to have regard for the interests of all stakeholders, because “how do you differentiate,

38. See e.g., Iacobucci, *supra* note 27 at 234; Edward Waitzer & Johnny Jaswal, “Peoples, BCE, and the Good Corporate ‘Citizen’” (2009) 47 *Osgoode Hall LJ* 439 at 442. Regarding the decision, Waitzer and Jaswal noted how:

Even the questions of whether directors may consider, should consider, or are obliged to consider stakeholder interests, and, if so, at what point, were not addressed clearly by the Court. Early in its reasons, it noted that, in *Peoples*, ‘this Court found that although directors *must* consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate, although *not mandatory*, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or particular groups of stakeholders’ [emphasis in original]. Later, the Court stated that ‘the duty of directors to act in the best interests of the corporation comprehends a duty to treat individual stakeholders...equitably and fairly.’ Is this duty mandatory?

how do you favour, how do you choose?” Many concluded that once they have taken stakeholder interests into account, then the decision made, absent conflicts of interest and gross negligence, “should not be second guessed” as per the business judgment rule. Thus, the obligation really became one of process.

Even in circumstances where one believed the law requires less than obligatory consideration, several practitioners recommended caution on the matter, saying “it’s an easy test to meet and it’s a foolish test to fail.” One practitioner in particular pointed out that “if you don’t pay attention to a stakeholder interest, then you are left defending yourself saying, ‘I didn’t have an obligation to do it.’” The practitioner went on to state:

Why not just pay attention to it and then decide to dismiss it? This is where we get caught up in process so much as lawyers. It’s just a safer thing to do. Turn your mind to it. Decide if it’s important then move on. Our job is to protect our clients and so, it’d just be crazy for us to say, “you don’t have to consider that.” It’s much safer to say, “Consider it, balance it, then decide what you think is the right thing to do.”

Most found that there was little change to corporate decision making subsequent to *BCE*, and a handful felt that this was because Canadian corporate law had already progressed to incorporating stakeholder interests through the oppression remedy and “best interests of the corporation,” among other things. It may be that in the past “it just wasn’t as open a discussion” as one practitioner put it, but the consideration of stakeholder interests seems to have become a live issue in Canadian corporate governance practices. Some practitioners were disappointed with how *BCE* has forced a very process-driven exercise in Canada. Practitioners did not offer any solutions as to how to counteract the negative aspects of this process without stripping away the broader goals and/or interests that presumably are aiming to be served.

In the aftermath of *BCE*, it is somewhat unclear from a legal stance how the consideration of non-shareholder stakeholders fits in the decision making equation for Canadian directors. Practitioners cited a range of reasons why directors should consider stakeholder interests: due to *BCE*, concerns regarding the oppression remedy, the business case for doing so, or simply to play it safe given the ambiguity of Canada’s legal position on the matter. Given that the combined total of 84 per cent of the practitioners interviewed felt that directors were either obligated to or should consider stakeholder interests as a practical legal matter, directors may be well served by considering non-shareholder stakeholder interests in their

corporate decision making, and documenting such process whenever possible.

With regard to the good corporate citizen concept, one practitioner noted how the concept was “a bit of surprise coming out of our courts... they are not usually quite so bold.” Practitioners were split on how the concept has resonated with Canadian boards, if at all. Many found it highly irrelevant to board decision making, whereas others felt boards were keenly aware, but emphasized there were usually broader business reasons for companies electing to act with a social conscience. There is a high chance that without the push of external market forces, such as changing business trends and strategies, process alone will do little in motivating corporations to act as good corporate citizens—the concept seems to have been somewhat lost in translation from the courts.³⁹ Corporations are free to capitalize on the statement made by the Supreme Court, but since there is no legal meaning behind the concept, they equally can ignore it. The likelihood that it will become more relevant as a corporate governance tool in the future is unclear at this point in Canadian corporate legal history.⁴⁰

4. *Protection for minority shareholders*

Principle: “*Noncontrolling shareholders should receive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders.*”

Many practitioners reflected on how Canada is home to several controlled companies, thus strong minority protection is particularly important. In Canada, it is easy for both founding and institutional shareholders to be able to exert extreme pressure on boards. Due to those significant players and illiquid stock, one practitioner noted how “movement in the stock can be quite dramatic.” That being said, there was overwhelming agreement that the principle of minority shareholder protection was “baked into our corporate law.” Given the several options available to minority shareholders and other stakeholders, there tended to be consensus that in Canada, “we

39. See, e.g., David A Lubin & Daniel C Esty, “The Sustainability Imperative” (May 2010) Harvard Business Review 2, citing how sustainability is an “emerging megatrend” that may soon “force fundamental and persistent shifts in how companies compete” at 2.

40. Industry Canada opened a consultation process regarding revisions to the *Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA)*, and included a request for comment on whether elements of corporate social responsibility should be included. The public consultation closed on 15 May 2014. Industry Canada, “Consultation on the *Canada Business Corporations Act*,” online: Industry Canada <www.ic.gc.ca>.

are well taken care of.”⁴¹ The oppression remedy⁴² in corporate law and Multilateral Instrument 61-101 *Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions*⁴³ from the securities regulators were often cited by practitioners as the most notable protections, although others raised the ability to bring derivative actions,⁴⁴ and another pointed to specific rules under the Toronto Stock Exchange requiring minority approvals.

In particular, a number of practitioners expressed how the minority protection principle was “more true in Canada than in the U.S.,” in that “we are fairly unique” by having the concept of an oppression remedy, which protects not only minority shareholders but other stakeholders as well. One commented on how the oppression remedy in the past was existing “but only theoretically available,” whereas now it becomes an important tool in corporate law. Another expressed that the remedy “really does work” in that “it scares the majority shareholders more than anything. You can get into court in pretty short order. Courts do listen even though the cases may have gone a lot of times the other way.”⁴⁵ On the other hand, one practitioner pointed to some limitations in the oppression remedy. It is only available against shareholders that own more than 50 per cent of the

41. There were two notable exceptions in the group. One practitioner felt that there “is not enough of a corporate perspective to protect the minority—it needs to go further” and “would just prefer to see it dealt with in corporate legislation, rather than securities.” Another, who did support the principle of minority protection, felt somewhat less sympathetic towards the plight of minority shareholders, reflecting on how “if I buy shares as a minority in a controlled corporation, I do so knowing that it is a controlled corporation and that there’s going to be a controlling shareholder at the end of the day.”

42. The oppression remedy is set forth in s 241 of the *BCA* and similar provincial statutes to describe the broader right of action on behalf of certain stakeholders (such as creditors) to apply to a court to rectify matters complained of where: (i) any act or omission of the corporation effects a result; (ii) the business or affairs of the corporation have been carried on or conducted in a manner; or (iii) the powers of the directors of the corporation have been exercised in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer. This right goes beyond shareholders of a corporation.

43. *Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions*, OSC MI 61-101, 31 OSCB 1321 (1 Feb 2008).

44. A derivative action set forth under s 239 of the *BCA* and similar provincial statutes creates a broader right of action on behalf of certain stakeholders (such as creditors), in addition to shareholders, to bring on behalf of a corporation to enforce the directors’ duty to the corporation when the directors are themselves unwilling to do so. A complainant, who may be a registered or beneficial holder of a security (including shares and debt obligations), a director or officer or former director or officer of the corporation, or “any other person who, in the discretion of the court, is a proper person to make an application,” may bring an action, upon obtaining the leave of the court, to enforce a right of the corporation, including rights correlative to the duties of the officers and directors of the corporation.

45. See also, Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially Considered: 1995–2001” (2004) 30 *Queen’s LJ* 79. In reviewing oppression cases in Canada, Ben-Ishai and Puri contend that Canadian courts have applied the remedy in a way that reflects the primacy of shareholder interests and nexus of contracts model in corporate law. However, the increasing success of creditors as non-shareholder applicants pointed to a possible change in attitude by the courts. Ben-Ishai and Puri suggest the cautious approach by the courts is likely to continue in the near future.

company and a claimant also has to be an affiliate of the company to be a proper defendant. Since there are a lot of Canadian companies controlled by 40-45 per cent of shareholders, the practitioner felt that the remedy had more limited use than one would assume.

Regarding MI 61-101, most felt it had gone a long way toward ensuring procedural and substantive fairness in related party transactions. There was an exception made by one practitioner, who felt that the rule did not prevent enough transactions that some would consider abusive because “it simply becomes a kind of formula to get through” and therefore in many instances “it just degenerates into a process.”⁴⁶

Other options were also considered by the practitioners. A few noted that while derivative actions were possible in Canada, they were not common and “terribly expensive to launch,” and very few practitioners referenced this option. Others highlighted how the Toronto Stock Exchange has provided greater protection for minority shareholders by providing majority and minority requirements for approval of certain types of transactions, which listed companies are required to follow.⁴⁷

Overall, most felt there was a good balance between the oppression remedy and MI 61-101 in protecting minority interests. Reflecting on Canada’s position in the principle, a few practitioners expressed how the strength of Canada’s statutory remedies, some of which specifically take into account the interests of other stakeholders, meant that Canada “cannot have a model that is a hundred per cent shareholder primacy.”

Clearly, there are built-in principles in Canadian common law designed to protect minority shareholders from exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders. While there were some nuances as to how effective the principles were in practice, the general sentiment amongst practitioners was that this principle was well supported in Canadian statutory and common law rules, and that Canada also offers statutory protections to other stakeholders beyond what is outlined in the principle.

46. The practitioner cited *Magna* as an example (see *Magna*, *supra* note 36 for further references), stating:

There was vehement disagreement about whether that is a fair transaction or not and yet it passed muster through that whole process...What the OSC will say is, “at least we put it out in the open.” People see what’s going on. Yes, it may only be process, but it can’t be done behind closed doors and if someone’s unhappy with it, then they can go to court and try to put a stop to it and so on. The argument that would come up is not that one shareholder has some protection, but is it strong protection? That’s where you might find some difference of opinion.

47. For further discussion on the role the Toronto Stock Exchange has played in Canadian corporate governance, see Section III.3.a.

5. *Principal measure of shareholder interests*

Principle: *“The market value of the publicly traded corporation’s shares is the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests.”*

Under Hansmann and Kraakman’s definition of shareholder primacy, the corporation is managed in the best interests of its shareholders, and in identifying those the principal measure in a public company is the market value of the company’s shares. For Canadian public companies, since the proxy voting system does not make the identity of a company’s shareholders accessible to its board, and since directors are to manage a corporation in its best interests—which many practitioners identify as predominately meaning the interests of its shareholders—how can Canadian directors know what shareholders’ interests are? Presumably market value is the measure. Practitioners’ responses, however, were mixed, with many finding the principle problematic or incomplete, and others qualifying it in several instances.

Several practitioners expressed that, while it was hard to escape measuring a company’s worth by market capital or by share price, sometimes market value doesn’t have any resemblance to intrinsic value, particularly for highly illiquid stocks. Market value, explained some practitioners, “has nothing to do with the shareholder” and “more to do with shareholders’ expectations.” Many said that the applicability of the principle depended in large part on the type of company and the investment criteria, with a few practitioners citing how since there are many illiquid companies in Canada, market value “is not really useful figure.” It is just one of many measures and “doesn’t really tell that much.” Some practitioners recognized circumstances where in the short-term market value will dip, such as in cyclical businesses or in fluctuations expected in anticipation of an M&A transaction. As put by one, “sometimes the best interest of the corporation will point you in the other direction and... quite often a board will take a step that does drive down or diminish share price in the short term in the long-term best interest of the company.” Many practitioners observed that, from the point of view of legal theory, those directors “are perfectly entitled to do that and indeed, they are doing the right thing.”⁴⁸ Despite this, some noted that many external pressures force boards and management to do things in the short term to prevent driving down the trading value at the expense of long-term benefit.

48. Practitioners noted how it is usually the case in an acquisition transaction that the acquirer shares drop and the target company’s shares go up, especially if shares are going to be issued by the acquirer to complete the deal.

There were many practitioners who came down hard on the principle as a whole. One said that “if recent market experience has demonstrated anything, it is how fallible market values are as a measure of corporate or shareholder value.” Another found the principle “completely ridiculous” and “sufficiently obtuse,” contending that the market value on any given date never represents the true value. Still one other practitioner who strongly disagreed with the principle made the argument that if market value were the sole test, “you would say that the current Canadian practice on poison pills, which is finally now under review, is the right practice...and essentially eliminate the efficacy of the poison pill.” Overall, practitioners tended to agree with one practitioner’s comment that “it makes all kinds of sense to do a whole bunch of things that don’t generate short-term value for shareholders if it advances long-term interests.”

The assertion that market value is an unreliable measure in relation to the intrinsic value of a company is certainly not novel. One of the common arguments against the shareholder primacy model is its overreliance on market value as representative of shareholders’ interests. It has been well-documented in academia and elsewhere that market value is a fundamentally flawed measure of value in many instances, representing at times “irrational exuberance and anxiety” in the marketplace, with the events leading up to the global financial crisis as the most recent and obvious example.⁴⁹ How to combat the negatives associated with relying on this measure is unclear, and beyond the scope of this article.

III. *Canadian legal and regulatory landscape*

While the securities commissions’ stance on defensive tactics is largely touched upon in Section II.1.a regarding the poison pill debate, and the courts’ proficiency in recent common law decisions is discussed in Section II.3.a, this Section III discusses these issues from a broader perspective, addressing the nation’s corporate legal and regulatory landscape and practitioners’ views on how the courts, regulators, and other bodies have shaped the development of corporate governance standards in Canada.

1. *Inadequacy of legislators and courts as governance leaders*

There seemed to be a common understanding among many of the practitioners that the legislators and the courts were less influential in the development of corporate governance in Canada for a variety of reasons. While legislative action may be an appropriate route in governance

49. Peter Huang, “Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety” in Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith, eds, *The Law and Economics of Irrational Behaviour* (Chicago: Stanford University Press, 2005).

reform, only a few practitioners mentioned the role of the legislators in the development of corporate governance in Canada. That itself may signal how small a role they have played in the governance sphere, and indeed of those that brought up the role of legislators during discussions it was almost always to point out their insignificance in Canadian governance. One practitioner pointed out that “legislators aren’t well equipped” to deal with corporate issues and that corporate legislation “changes very infrequently in Canada.” Any efforts to illicit legislative change become “an extremely slow progression.” Another practitioner reasoned that corporate legislation is “not something that politicians get particularly excited about” as “it’s not something their constituency gets excited about.” Furthermore, since corporate legislation operates on a federal and provincial level, and can vary by jurisdiction, it has not proven to be a robust method of helping governance practices evolve in Canada.

As for the courts, many practitioners did not shy away from their strong feelings on the inadequacies of the courts in providing clarity in governance:

I’ll let my cynicism shine through here. As a broad overgeneralization, the courts are staffed by ex-litigators, many of which do not come from a corporate background...and that applies to the Supreme Court of Canada quite nicely. As a result, they’ve come to these decisions with immense brain power but not a lot of practical, corporate experience.

I don’t think that the Canadian judges have a lot of self-confidence when they go to corporate law, and that’s why decisions like *BCE* and *Peoples* are so weak...they have been criticized as not being done with a huge amount of conviction or expertise...When you go to court in Canada, you’re going to get a very conservative kind of reaction...we don’t have a lot of knock ‘em dead corporate cases.

Off the top of my head, I couldn’t name a corporate solicitor that’s gone to the bench. You can have some challenges where you’ve got somebody dealing with a business case that really has no background on how these things really work, but anything really weighty in the business sense, no matter which way it goes, is likely to be appealed. Often these things shake out at the higher courts because, in general, these courts are quite sophisticated.

Too few of our judges have any commercial experience...It’s a bit of a crap game of who’s going to hear the case. The real fear of going to court in a corporate matter is you’ll get somebody who you’ve got to sort of start educating.

A few practitioners noted how the courts may be limited in developing governance standards in Canada because “all the courts can do is discourage

bad behaviour by sanctioning it. They simply have no instrumentalities to promote good behaviour.” A number of practitioners noted that generally, the courts give a lot of deference to the board due to the business judgment rule, with one practitioner observing that “it’s a pretty low bar to jump over in order for the courts to say, ‘I have to defer.’” If the boards have followed proper process, avoided conflicts, and obtained enough information to make an informed decision, Canadian courts have shown that they are very reluctant to interfere.

Several lamented on the differences in Canada’s courts compared to the U.S., noting that “there is a lot more self-confidence about the way things are done there,” and commenting on how Canada does not have a set of developed common law principles in corporate law as they do in Delaware. Practitioners noted how the Delaware courts in particular have “a very active and knowledgeable court system,” so that state has the opportunity to be the national corporate law-maker, whereas that is simply not the case in Canada. Practitioners generally found that Canadian courts have become “intellectually shallow on business issues” because of the securities commissions’ deep involvement with public companies, although many practitioners found that the Ontario commercial list of judges was particularly adept. Several appreciated the strength of the Ontario commercial court, calling it “proficient” and “sophisticated” while others noted how provinces like Alberta make an effort to direct particular corporate cases to certain judges. One practitioner even envisioned a day when Canada would have a bench as advanced as the Delaware courts, commenting that “we can get there” and pointing to how judges on the Ontario commercial bench “are able to come up with some very nuanced and good decision making in real time.” Indeed, some practitioners noted that, while the courts haven’t been as influential in the past on corporate governance, “litigation is increasing,” and one practitioner pointed out that “courts are being used in the governance world more tactically, so people will fire in court procedures as a tactical matter, as shareholders against boards, boards against shareholders.”

2. Guidance from securities commissions

Whether by choice or through a process of elimination, securities commissions are now playing a major role in shaping Canadian corporate governance practices. One practitioner described it this way: “Canada is split into two—what the courts say, and what the securities commissions say. And what the practitioners determine to be one way or the other tends to be reflective of which power source they believe has the most sway, and is the most relevant.” By virtue of the fact that the securities

commissions are by design created for the purpose of protecting investors, with a “public interest” jurisdiction to protect the capital markets, many practitioners sensed that their influence has pushed Canada towards a more shareholder-centric model of governance.⁵⁰

Most practitioners identified with one practitioner’s statement that “it’s the securities commissions through the CSA, their national umbrella, which have driven the standards of corporate governance.” Many found it a curious Canadian phenomenon that the securities regulators were significantly affecting the corporate legal sphere. Practitioners recounted how when the securities regulators initially began encroaching on a space that was traditionally for the legislatures and the courts, it was “extraordinarily controversial.” When the commissions first proposed adding special approval thresholds on related party and other transactions over a decade ago, one practitioner stated that

[i]t was a hot issue at the time as to whether they were overstepping their jurisdiction. They were a specialized securities regulatory body, not a specialized corporate governance body or a corporate law body, so what business did they have in changing what the legislature had enacted in the *Business Corporations Act*? This has nothing to do with the raising of capital, the issuance of securities, or the fitness to sell securities of individuals that need license under the traditional views of what the *Securities Act* was there for.

The regulators’ involvement was understandable to some, in that the commissions have an interest in the governance of organizations accessing the capital market because “if they are better governed, presumably they will need less securities regulation.” Practitioners reflected on how eventually people got past the notion of the securities commissions overstepping their jurisdiction and have now generally accepted the commissions’ role in the Canadian corporate governance sphere.

A couple of practitioners, upon reflection, considered the role of the commissions from a theoretical standpoint. One practitioner recalled how the OSC recently came out with a paper on board diversity and measures through disclosure to encourage having more women on boards, and reflected,

My first reaction is, although it’s a subject that interests me, is this the right place for the securities commission? Traditionally they kept out of the issues like that, and it really caused me to think about whether they belong there and whether that’s the right thing for the securities

50. *Securities Act*, RSO 1990, c S-5, s 127(1) para 3. See also the equivalent section in other provincial acts.

commission to do. I suspect their conclusion is if they don't, nobody else will, and somehow they work that into their 'public interest' mandate that it will be in the best interest of Ontario investors if they can add this diversity dimension to boards...but it's a surprising step.

The other said that, in terms of appropriate jurisdiction under the CSA and AMF proposals, "there's an open question...their jurisdiction ends somewhere and some defensive tactics in theory wouldn't involve any sort of securities issuance." Nevertheless, both said that practitioners have tended to follow what the securities commissions have said, whether or not it's securities-related or corporate law-related, without questioning their jurisdictional reach.

When asked explicitly whether the securities commissions were overstepping their role, several practitioners felt this was absolutely the case, but nevertheless, "there's a void, someone's got to fill it." The growing role of the securities commissions in developing governance standards has been evident. Among the several ways that the commissions have influenced governance standards, one practitioner recounted specifically how the commissions have required disclosure about director independence, have imposed independence standards for audit committees, and have made other disclosure requirements related to executive compensation, "which ultimately influences the board's behaviour if it has to be disclosed." Other ways that they have influenced boards are pronouncements about selective disclosure. As one practitioner noted, "having the commission up there hovering on top of the corporation does influence the way directors see their job, the way boards are put together, and the way they conduct themselves."

Overall, the practitioners' viewpoints in terms of the appropriateness of the commissions' role in governance tended to vary. The majority felt the regulators were "better than the alternative." For example, a few noted that the Alberta Securities Commission has been quite effective in reform, commenting on how their past involvement in the National Policy 58-201 *Corporate Governance Guidelines*⁵¹ has helped increase the overall quality of corporate governance in Canada. Absent the securities commissions establishing rules and guidelines, and the courts enforcing them, Canada would not have the robust system that exists today. Another pointed out that the commissions have probably gone as far as they can in the governance sphere, and "having got to that point, nobody's going to come out today and say, oh get rid of all that, it doesn't do anything." Some pointed to

51. *Corporate Governance Guidelines*, OSCNP 58-201, 28 OSCB 3640 (15 April 2005).

how the commissions have “been positive in creating more fairness in transactions” under MI 61-101. Whether or not the practitioners agreed or disagreed with what the securities commissions did generally, many conceded that the regulators are “knowledgeable and better equipped” than legislative or judicial bodies in the field, and the courts are helpful in providing outside constraints when the securities commissions “become a little bit too zealous.”

Other practitioners tended to express general unhappiness over the regulators’ dominance in the governance area. Several felt the commissions are not well-versed in evidentiary rules and “make it up as they go along.” They also often fail to establish principles that can guide lower courts, with some agreeing that the commissions “are more effective on the rule-making side than the jurisprudential side.” A few remarked that the commissions have often disregarded findings from the courts. One practitioner noted that Canada’s stance on defensive tactics “seems to give a short shrift to what *BCE* is about...ultimately, the securities regulators are just saying, ‘We don’t care about *BCE*—that’s just the Supreme Court of Canada, who cares.’” And for a few practitioners, it was highly regrettable that the securities commissions have dominated, with one stating that there is “no place or need for securities regulators to interfere with the carefully engineered corporate structure.” This practitioner found that the commissions’ interference inhibits boards’ ability to fulfill their mandated duties, resulting in “the fate of the company being put in the hands of arbitrary shareholders.” The practitioner found the commissions’ myopic focus on shareholder democracy “farcical” and said that “Canadian business, our communities and society at large, are the losers as a result.” This practitioner much preferred that the securities regulators follow the lead of the courts in *BCE*, and the AMF proposal with regard to defensive tactics.

Many practitioners felt that greater power by the securities commissions in the governance sphere would mean greater shareholder primacy in Canada. One reflected on how, “notwithstanding all of the academic and judicial writing on the duties of the directors, as long as the securities commission holds their current view, we are, in an M&A context, still very much of the shareholder primacy model and that was tested very much by the *Magna* case.” Another reflected a general sentiment by some of the practitioners that “what’s in the best interest of the shareholder doesn’t align with better governance. That’s where it falls down.”

The underlying issue tended to rest on the fact that since the securities regulators are able to act on a coordinated basis across the nation they are better equipped than those dealing with the administration of the

corporate laws. One practitioner pointed out that the CSA “becomes a very convenient place to deal with changes,” citing how the shareholder advisory group, the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, in terms of changes that they or their constituency would like to make, “deliberately seeks out changes through securities regulation” because they don’t view it as practical to pursue changes in corporate legislation, even if, from a philosophical perspective, it is more appropriate for that venue.

3. *Other players*

A number of non-regulatory bodies were addressed by practitioners in terms of their influence to Canadian governance. The few that received particular airtime from some practitioners included the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX), the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (CCGG), and Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS).

a. *Toronto Stock Exchange*

As a practical matter, most if not all public entities are listed on the TSX, hence they are regulated by the TSX.⁵² To be granted a listing, companies are required to sign a listing agreement where they agree to comply with TSX rules, including any subsequent rules issued by the TSX over time. The TSX played a historical role in sponsoring the 1994 Dey Report⁵³ and, similar to some of the discussions in the previous section, there were open questions as to the appropriateness of the stock exchange in requiring rules beyond what was provided in the statutes.

One practitioner noted how the shareholder community has “very effectively and perceptively focused on the stock exchange as an instrumentality through which the boundaries could shift in favour of shareholder votes on more and more things.” A number noted how shareholder groups have had some success in persuading TSX management to increase shareholders’ rights to approve actions that were traditionally in the hands of the board. Several shared the sentiment of this practitioner that “it is a very interesting phenomenon that the employees of a for-profit listed company are making decisions that affect the relationship between the rights of shareholders and the power of a board to manage the business and affairs of the company,” and a number expressed some latent concern over this. The practitioner went on to comment that “it seems like a curious group of individuals from a policy perspective to be making corporate law,

52. One practitioner noted how the universe of issuers with publicly traded securities that are not listed on the TSX or TSX Venture Exchange is very small.

53. Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, *Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada* (Toronto: Toronto Stock Exchange, 1994).

effectively,” and another stated that “at a certain point you begin to wonder whether it’s appropriate for them to make governance rules.” Another practitioner’s view was pragmatic, in that “if [the TSX rules] work for the way these companies operate, I guess I’m okay with that” but they did emphasize that

sometimes you worry there’s a bit of a conflict of interest because the exchanges want to attract the issuers to the exchange. The exchange goes all over the world in places where there are growing economies to encourage people to get listed in Canada. So there is a certain tension that they would want to make it attractive to be listed here.

While the exchange is not making universal rules for particular jurisdictions, they are making rules for every listed company and “it’s a bit naïve to suggest that if a company does not like their rules, [it] can just delist and go somewhere else.” Thus, some practitioners identified the TSX as “a battleground where governance issues are discussed and are dealt with because it’s a place that is willing to entertain the discussion.”

However, a number of practitioners noted that the TSX has “taken a backseat” on influencing governance practices of late, with one pointing out that once the securities commissions began getting involved in governance matters, “more or less the people didn’t pay attention any more to what the stock exchange was saying.” Another practitioner felt, however, that the TSX was “stepping back into the governance game” and “giving more powers to the shareholders.” Still, one other practitioner shared how “you never feel with the TSX that they serve a comprehensive philosophy about how governance should be.”

b. Shareholder advisory groups

A handful of practitioners expressed their views on the influence of shareholder advisory groups in Canada, specifically the CCGG and ISS. Again, due to the lack of guidance from the courts and legislatures on governance, these practitioners found the rise of shareholder advisory groups a very positive one generally, as the organization has stepped in to advance good governance principles nationwide and has been influential in setting and regularizing several governance standards. Nevertheless, a number of these practitioners expressed their level of discomfort with the amount of power and influence held by these representatives of institutional shareholders.

Specifically, these practitioners shared concerns over how the CCGG has more sway outside their constituent membership and “has made themselves players in the market.” Canadian demographics allow for these groups to wield enormous amounts of power since significant amounts of

concentrated investment capital in Canada are managed by funds and fund managers. Many of those funds' operational policies state that, on any matters that go to a shareholder vote, they will vote with the CCGG or ISS's recommendations without looking behind why they are recommending it, "giving these groups more influence than anybody bargained for." One practitioner commented specifically on how the ISS, being the watchdog for institutional shareholders and public companies, "have a bee in their bonnet about how much power they have over the words they say about companies." This practitioner pointed out how "the comment of 'I like this practice' or 'I don't like that practice'" from the ISS "could turn majority voting from an 80 per cent approval to a 50 per cent approval" and they can influence all kinds of decisions. The practitioners noted how public companies are occasionally frustrated with the level of influence wielded by these groups, with one explaining that "there's no recourse if information put out by these groups is wrong, and it dramatically affects a decision that a company is taking." Another reflected on how "investors may not understand that they're not getting much in terms of independent analysis on some of these big corporate decisions when they invest in a fund." Most of these practitioners expressed a need for either disclosure rules, guidelines, or some other form of regulation to control these groups due to their enormous ability to influence the market.

There is an interesting phenomenon in Canadian governance. While it seems clear that the courts have tended towards greater board control and broader consideration for stakeholder interests, by and large the judiciary have fallen by the wayside in terms of developing corporate governance practices, with the exception of the occasional important case that brings particular issues to the forefront. For public companies, the securities commissions have increasingly stepped up their role in corporate governance to fill this void, along with other non-regulatory bodies like the TSX and shareholder advisory groups. These groups are very influential in the regulation of public companies, and by design seek to protect shareholders' investments, which most often translates to increasing shareholders' rights. It remains to be seen from the CSA's proposed harmonized approach to take-over bids and any final determinations regarding the CSA's proposed National Instrument 62-105 and the AMF proposal as to whether the regulators will be tempering their positions toward shareholder primacy in the future.

Conclusion

One practitioner commented that good governance simply boiled down to one concept: common sense. Another had a unique take on the importance

of governance in Canada, or lack of importance, finding “there is scant evidence whether good governance makes any difference” and likening it to a chicken soup theory, meaning “people say it does help because they want it to....I have never seen a bad decision become a good decision because of corporate governance.” This position was imparted to another practitioner, querying whether that practitioner agreed with the position. Reflecting for a moment, the practitioner responded:

You know what would be even better...it’s the stone soup theory. To me that has some real appeal, because then, it’s artificial. It’s a stone, but everybody is contributing something. It does make something; it makes something worthwhile for everybody’s benefit. How we got there? Nobody individually knows.

Corporate governance is in a constant state of evolution, deriving from various laws, customs, and processes, with legal, regulatory, and institutional pressures as well as issues tied specifically to particular product and service markets. It is undeniable that there are significant normative underpinnings. The exercise of outlining a Canadian model of corporate governance is a tricky one: comparative analysis can be drawn from not only theoretical definitions but real world national comparisons as well, based on a variety of selected factors. One practitioner in the study reflected on how corporate governance “is one of those things that people struggle to define,” and another noted that corporate governance “is a never-ending process...standards today are different than they were ten years ago, twenty years ago, and so on....” Outlining a national model may be a daunting task, and part and parcel of staking a position is that it is particularly vulnerable to alternative viewpoints, exceptions, and criticisms. Nevertheless, a healthy and robust discussion on the big picture view of Canadian corporate governance is needed. While American academic articles are frequently churned out addressing corporate governance issues, the discussion only occurs in fits and starts within Canadian legal scholarship. This qualitative study brings together some of the top corporate legal minds in Canada to opine on the fundamental principles that are driving the development of Canadian corporate governance today.

In speaking with 32 highly trained and highly skilled legal professionals on Canadian governance matters, similar debates and discussions tended to take shape, and these debates and centres of tension mark the borders of how Canadian corporate governance is being challenged and developed—be it through the courts, legislators, securities regulators, or other bodies and external forces. One practitioner described the corporation as “more of an organism, with various components through it. That organism

is a growing, evolving one, and it changes with the times, and beneath the society in which it operates.” This is also true of a holistic national governance framework that guides these corporations.

Practitioners’ views on an overall Canadian model tended to depend in large part on what each practitioner found most compelling: the constancy of the corporate statutes and trajectory of the common law, or the power and influence held by the regulators. Leaving aside change of control transactions for the moment, the building blocks of Canadian corporate law have some notable differences when compared with the academic definition of Anglo-American shareholder primacy, and common law developments have emphasized those differences. The legislation requires management to act in “best interests of the corporation” and makes available the oppression remedy, and taken with the 2004 *Peoples* decision and the 2008 *BCE* decision, practitioners tended to agree that Canada corporate law has “overtones of a broader stakeholder model.” One practitioner put it succinctly:

In fact, the shareholders do not have primacy in the corporate context in Canada, although directors generally think that they do. It’s a very difficult distinction that the Canadian courts made based upon our corporate statutes and it’s a very difficult distinction to explain to boards of directors.

Perhaps this difficult distinction may be why many practitioners tend to keep those nuances in a Canadian model limited to boilerplate provisions. Several practitioners found the differences in Canadian law compelling and important, but the majority found the practical impact of these differences largely boiled down to a change of the process in corporate decision making only. Indeed, as one commented, “the areas of distinction between Canada and the U.S. that’s recognized by high-end M&A corporate lawyers in Canada probably isn’t recognized anywhere else.” Another practitioner found this to be due to the fact that “the Canadian public, in my mind, is so influenced by the U.S. experience, the U.S. media, and U.S. information that it doesn’t even know whether the law in Canada is the same or different.” And for many practitioners, de-emphasizing the difference does little to no harm—keeping the focus on ensuring the process is complied with, but ending up with the same answer after going through the process is a less controversial route, from a legal viewpoint.

Of course, the current state of Canadian corporate law is only one part of a larger story. For public companies, the Canadian securities commissions have become increasingly influential in the governance sphere. Isolated to a public M&A context, the lack of defensive protections available

to boards and the shareholder-centric position held by the regulators generally point to greater shareholder control in Canada. Interestingly, a significant majority of practitioners did not prefer this trend. While a few included broader communitarian reasons, the large majority focused on how boards were not being utilized effectively in unlocking greater value for their shareholders in M&A transactions. So in fact priorities between the regulators and those practitioners supporting greater board control are very much aligned—getting the highest share value for their shareholders is the priority. Regulators have tended towards increasing shareholder rights in order to accomplish that goal, whereas the overwhelming majority of practitioners in this study felt that action is misplaced. They contend that directors are in the best position to unlock share value, as it is their fiduciary duty in the best interests of the corporation, but directors are being denied the proper tools to do so. The practitioners' concerns tended to be focused on *how* the regulators have elected to protect shareholders' value—it should not be through shareholder approvals they say, but through greater powers bestowed on the board to exercise their duties to the corporation—which in almost all cases should translate to greater shareholder value. The CSA's proposed harmonized approach to regulating take-over bids may signal a step away from how Canadian governance is currently forming in the M&A context. Indeed, as one practitioner put it, “the shareholder primacy model has different ingredients to it” meaning “there are some elements that are stronger than in others” and most importantly, “the sands on this can shift.”

The conflicting theoretical positions from the courts and the securities commissions have enriched the dialogue on the current environment of Canadian corporate governance. One practitioner noted how “we’re still digesting the *BCE* decision—we’ve got a ways to go” and another wondered if Canada is experiencing “an overture in decisions.” While most felt that Canadian governance norms and culture are becoming quite well-developed, the frequent pull in different directions from the regulators and influential power sources in Canada has left Canadian governance in a “period of uncertainty. We’re still trying to figure out what the model should be.” Corporate statutes have not changed, but power dynamics can shift. The rise of board education and influence has created more robust mechanisms to govern corporations, while the mobilization of collective action by shareholder advisory groups like the CCGG and the ISS has meant that institutional investors in Canada are a significant force to be reckoned with.

The common law has made the process of considering stakeholders in the best interests of the corporation more overt, well beyond what is

assumed in Anglo-American corporate legal scholarship. Layered onto this corporate legal base, the securities commissions have provided other measures to bolster the field of corporate governance in Canada, while seeking to protect the integrity of the capital markets and the interests of investors within those markets. These efforts, along with those from other organizations, have raised and normalized governance standards, increased checks and balances, and helped to develop a stronger voice in the corporate governance movement within the last several decades. Tensions may be part and parcel of vigorous development, and the current debate on the treatment of poison pills should be seen as another healthy milestone in the evolution of Canadian corporate governance.

Looking ahead, directors, policymakers, and scholars will benefit from recognizing the tenets and the pressure points that form a Canadian model of corporate governance. While this qualitative study has shown that there can be a range of opinion as to how a Canadian model is defined, there are takeaways. The high-level assumption that Canadian corporate law is one and the same as American corporate law is incorrect. The hotly debated topic of shareholder primacy within American scholarship—regarding its merits, failings, suggested reforms, etc.—needs to be reengineered when catering to a Canadian audience. The way in which Canadian corporate laws have been formed by the legislature, and have been interpreted by the courts, indicates that Canada has a more flexible model of governance which incorporates the consideration of non-shareholder stakeholder interests in corporate decision making. Landmark decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada have emphasized these statutory differences, particularly in *BCE*, causing many practitioners to inform boards that they can—and indeed should—take into account non-shareholder value issues. Stakeholder interests may have always had a role in governance under Canadian statutory laws, but the courts have now generated a need for boards to document their process of considering those interests.

The dominance of the securities commissions in corporate governance has led to several consequences, some of which have been immensely positive for Canadian corporate development—such as the enhancement of shareholders' rights in particular areas—and other consequences that have been negative. In particular, the commissions' tendency toward equating greater shareholder control to better investor protection is problematic. The fundamental principles that have formed the building blocks of Canadian corporate law since the *CBCA*'s implementation in 1976, such as the board's fiduciary duties to the best interests of the corporation, and others that have been enhanced through the common law, such as the consideration of broader stakeholder interests, provide the best protection

for share value. As for reformers looking beyond share value in the pursuit of more sustainable public companies, the path of least resistance in the current corporate environment is also through increased board control, not greater shareholders' voting rights.

The legislature and the courts can and should be providing the critical foundations for our corporate laws, but in recent history they have not proven to be robust methods of helping governance practices evolve in Canada. The *CBCA* was last comprehensively revised in 2001, and since then there have been significant shifts in Canadian governance standards. The long awaited consultation process by Industry Canada regarding revisions to the *CBCA* now provides legislators with the opportunity to ensure that Canadian governance moves along the desired path of development.

Although in its early stages, the CSA's move to lessen Canada's bidder-friendly position through its proposed "harmonized" regulatory approach is a step in the right direction to correct power imbalances between hostile bidders and target boards. Industry Canada may need to be deferential to the jurisdictions that have been overtaken by securities commissions or other bodies such as the TSX in certain instances, but on the other hand, there are areas where Industry Canada must take the lead in forming the laws that govern Canada's corporations. Canada's corporate laws need to be modernized to reflect Canada's leading position in good governance practices, as set by those in the legislature and the judiciary who have the mandate to consider the development of Canadian corporations as a whole, and not just in relation to its investors. Industry Canada should seek to offer carefully engineered corporate structures that will put Canada in the forefront of corporations best equipped to deal with future economic, social, and environmental challenges. While legislators have taken a back seat in corporate governance reform in that last decade, that is no reason to shy away at this juncture in Canada's corporate legal history.

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