Wan, YanniQin, JiahuShi, YangFu, WeimingXiao, Feng2024-03-182024-03-182024Wan, Y., Qin, J., Shi, Y., Fu, W., & Xiao, F. (2024). Stackelberg–Nash game approach for price-based demand response in retail electricity trading. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 155(Part B), 109577. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109577https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109577https://hdl.handle.net/1828/16214This paper studies the price-based demand response problem in a deregulated retail electricity trading, aiming to coordinate the energy consumption behavior of end-users under dynamic retail prices. The challenge here is that in addition to the hierarchical decision-making process between utility company and end-users considered in existing works, the non-cooperative and competitive interdependence among end-users cannot be ignored. To address this issue, we first construct a novel Stackelberg–Nash game, in which the Stackelberg game is used to capture the hierarchical decision-making process between utility company and end-users, while the Nash game is dedicated to describing the interdependence among end-users. Then the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium is provided along with theoretical analysis. On the basis of the analysis of equilibrium, we propose a distributed iterative algorithm with an adaptive step size, which is benchmarked with a fixed step-size algorithm. The comparison results on a real-life residential retail electricity market show that our proposed algorithm has better performance in terms of effectiveness and scalability.enAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalsmart griddemand responseStackelberg-Nash Game (SNG)Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium (SNE)retail electricity tradingArticleDepartment of Mechanical Engineering