Urquhart, George MacKenzie2024-08-152024-08-1519771977https://hdl.handle.net/1828/19970In the thirty years following the Second World War there have been a number of reports, studies and statements of government policy which were concerned with assigning suitable roles for the Canadian militia. Despite this attention paid to the militia, it has been in­fluenced by factors over the years which have decreased its vitality as part of Canada's defence force. The difficulties of the militia have not always been apparent to the public and there has been no account of the militia which covers the period as a whole. A lack of secondary source material necessitated personal research of files in Ottawa, primarily in the Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters. This thesis surveys the roles of the militia and the policies affecting them in the period from 1945 to 1975. In addition, consid­erable attention has been paid to the effects of the roles upon the militia at the national, formation, and unit levels. It will be seen by examining the militia at the lower levels that, despite generally accepted impressions to the contrary, it was often incapable of ful­filling its assigned roles. Above all the militia has been prevented from fulfilling its proper roles because the government, and others, have regarded it as a convenience. In the 1945 to 1950 period the government was content to rely upon planned militia strength as proof of its concern for defence while taking few steps to improve the reserves. One result of failing to improve the militia was that its shortcomings were recognized when recruiting for Korea took place in 1950 and it was not relied upon as a primary source of men. In 1951, when the Canadian army recruited for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force, it relied entirely upon the militia to produce a brigade for European service despite its inability to do so without major difficulties. In the immediate post­war years a heavy reliance had been placed upon the Second World War veteran both to enlist in the militia and to provide for such expan­sion as the formation of forces for Korea and Europe. In raising both forces, the wartime service of the veteran was considered more valuable than any militia training he may have received. In short, during the 1945 to 1950 period, little had been done to ensure that the militia could provide a new source of trained men. In 1954, a board of officers under Major-General H. Kennedy was formed to study the problems of the militia. The beneficial effects of this board were largely negated in the late 1950 1 s when plans for the survival of Canada in an atomic attack came to rest, in large part, upon the militia which was not prepared for the task. The steps taken to prepare the militia for national survival were largely ineffective and the militia entered a period of decline which coincided with changing attitudes towards reserves in general. In the early 1960's the militia was influenced by two commissions and three parliamentary committees concerned with defence. The militia was also influenced to a lesser degree by the 1964 White Paper on Defence and by plans to unify Canada's armed forces. These studies all led to a greater reliance upon forces-in-being, and as a result of this, the decline in the militia continued. In the 1970's there have been attempts to revitalize the militia to the extent that the regular army looks to the reserve to provide individual troop augmentation. The necessity of bolstering the regular force has come about because of the declining strength of the regular army following changes in defence policy in 1969. This thesis has examined some subjects which have not appeared before in secondary sources. Two examples are the brief accounts of the Young Soldiers Training Plan and the Special Militia Training Plan. It is hoped that in addition certain1 subjects have been suggested which might be examined in the future. To cite but two, the extremely impor­tant relationship between the regular army and the militia should be studied and it can be imagined that a comparison of the Canadian mili­tia with foreign reserves would be fruitful. It is hoped that this thesis might help provide a background for such studies.219 pagesAvailable to the World Wide WebThesis