Zimmerman, David2025-04-232025-04-2319890-8020-2687-7https://hdl.handle.net/1828/21966During the Second World War, the Royal Canadian Navy played a vital role in the Battle of the Atlantic, second only to that of the Royal Navy. But in its sea war against the German submarines, the RCN was hampered by battles of another kind. Mackenzie King's nationalistic policies blocked it from cooperating with other forces, and the Royal Navy failed to give it the high-technology equipment needed to detect and destroy U-boats. In the face of these obstacles the RCN was forced to develop from an almost non-existent pre-war infrastructure a system of supplying its escort vessels with the necessary electronic detection systems and anti-submarine weaponry. The Great Naval Rattle of Ottawa tells the story of how Canadian naval officers, scientists, and politicians tried to come to grips with the harsh realities of this war of high technology in the Atlantic. It was a battle fought not on the high seas but in the offices of the nation's capital. David Zimmerman offers an account of national failure. The reasons were diverse - the limited pre-war infrastructure, poor leadership, naval conservatism, inadequate international technical liaison, and the Admiralty's refusal to give reasonable assistance to Canadian efforts. One key factor was the failure to integrate effectively the scientist with the sailor, caused by the different institutional goals of the navy and the National Research Council of Canada. Zimmerman suggests that C.J. Mackenzie, the NRC president, was an empire builder rather man an effective manager, and lacked the inspired genius to link science with the navy. By focusing on the relations and achievements of the various institutions involved and on the personalities who influenced them, David Zimmerman debunks the myth of Canadian scientific success in the war. What remains in its place is an account of mismanagement, self-interest, and political expediency.enBook