Odell, Arthur Charles2024-08-152024-08-1519761976https://hdl.handle.net/1828/19168To attempt to raise specialised military formations virtually from "scratch" and pit them against a successful, established enemy is a formidable task. Such problem confronted Canadian and Allied military planners during the Second World War. The intention of this thesis is to explore the process or f'orm1ng an armoured division in Canada, the prob­lems faced in consolidating it, and the difficulties imposed by an insuf­ficient supply of material and lack of experience. To better understand the situation faced by Canada in the early days of the Second World War, it is necessary to examine the inter-war development (or non-development) of armoured fighting vehicles and the doctrines of mechanized warfare. There was considerable apathy and even hostility to the concept of the tank; it was viewed by some as a threat to the horse and by others as an expensive curiosity. The arguments pro and con continued until the outbreak of the war. During the 1930's the dictators had re-armed, making armoured machines the main feature of their armies and finally silencing criticism of tanks in the democracies. The position of the Canadian military at this time was hardly enviable. Although attempts were being made to update thinking and modernise equipment, scarcely anything had been accomplished by September, 1939, when Hitler's Panzers startled the world. The adoption of armoured fighting vehicles was no longer in doubt; the question was how to field competitive divisions in the briefest time possible. The history of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division offers much of interest vis-à-vis military unpreparedness and the results of it. In many instances the trials undergone by the Division were typical of similar experiences in other Canadian and Allied divisions. Few soldiers in Canada had an accurate idea of the length of time required to develop an armoured division from the ground up. The thesis focuses on the progress of the 5th Armoured from an untrained collection of militia and Permanent Force regiments in 1940 to the steeled, tested fighting force of 1945. The various training stage are detailed, and the problems arising during these phases are discussed. Solutions had to be enforced prior to further progress in the training programme. Following the examination of the 5th Armoured's training periods in Canada and Great Britain, the Division's part in the Italian and the Netherlands Campaigns is related, with reference to restrictions placed on armoured warfare in these two theatres and the flexibility and adaptability of thought and action to overcome them. Of significance too is the correlation between experience gained and improved performance. The successes won by the Division were a reflection of this as well as of training. Military formations are complex entities. An armoured division could not be put together quickly; it took years to elevate the 5th to a state of combat efficiency. Ideal conditions were seldom present. Development was hindered by lack of equipment and enough qualified instructors. Implicit in the history of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division is the condition of weapons systems in peacetime democracies, and the capability of these systems to preform the functions for which they have been created and maintained. Clearly, on the eve of Second World War the defensive postures of the western democracies were ridiculously weak, and served almost as an invitation for Hitler to exploit and conquer. Fortunately there was time to rectify past sins of military omission and smash the Axis. However, the disquieting conclusion is that in future there is unlikely to be any saving period of grace to set the military house in order should a "wolf" appear at the door.113 pagesAvailable to the World Wide WebThesis