Zielke, Dustin2010-09-072010-09-0720102010-09-07http://hdl.handle.net/1828/3029This thesis argues that in order to demonstrate the possibility and sensibility of Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo's 'weak religious belief', it should be understood as the becoming uncertain of traditional, metaphysical (strong) belief. The difference between weak belief and strong belief can thereby be understood not as two distinct modes of belief, but as an event of weakening in the history of belief that has yet to be realized by those who believe with the support of metaphysical certainty. Since Vattimo aligns metaphysics with violence, and since he aligns traditional belief with metaphysics, to demonstrate and defend the possibility of Vattimo’s weak belief amounts to the reduction of violence in the world. However, the possibility and validity of weak belief has been called into question by thinkers such as Richard Rorty. In light of a review of the arguments and counter-arguments between Rorty and Vattimo, I argue that it is possible to distinguish weak belief from strong belief as long as this remains a weak distinction.enAvailable to the World Wide WebWeak ThoughtChristianityRichard RortyReligionPhilosophy of ReligionMartin HeideggerOnto-theologySecularizationDeath of GodFriedrich NietzscheEthicsWeak DistinctionUVic Subject Index::Humanities and Social Sciences::Religion::Religion--PhilosophyUVic Subject Index::Humanities and Social Sciences::PhilosophyUVic Subject Index::Humanities and Social Sciences::TheologyThesis