Ayers, James Douglas2024-08-122024-08-1219841984https://hdl.handle.net/1828/17006This study examines the nature of explanation in psychological behaviorism and the relation of behaviorism to commonsensical and philosophical discussion of action. The central thesis in the study is that the type of explan­ation in behavioral psychology provides a correct but limited approach to understanding important aspects of action. This thesis is supported by an examination of representative criticisms, an analysis of explanation per se, an analysis of the concern within behavioral psychology for action as a class of behavior, and finally, by an argu­ment for compatibility of behavioristic and intentional explanation in which the different explanation types are shown to be appropriate to particular questions. The study begins with a brief sketch of the behaviorist position and then moves to an examination of representative analytic criticisms; all of which suggest that behaviorism, in spite of whatever facts it offers up, fails to explain action. An analysis of explanation is then given in which a classification of different types of explanation is pre­sented, criteria of adequacy and relevancy are developed and the significance of context dependency for explanation is demonstrated. The analytic distinctions developed in the consideration of explanation are then applied in an examin­ation of the development of a behavioristic account of action. This leads to a more detailed consideration of some of the work of B. F. Skinner and, in particular, of his claim that a behavioral analysis on the model of operant condition­ing can deal adequately with intentional action. The questions about adequacy of explanation raised in the criticisms of behaviorism are then addressed and it is argued that some of the criticisms rest on a misunderstand­ing of the explanatory project in behaviorism. Finally, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, the question of the compatibility of the behaviorist position with intentional explanation is examined. Here it is argued that, while a demonstration of compatibility based on an analysis of wants and beliefs as causes of action is inadequate, compatibility can be demonstrated in terms of context dependency.186 pagesAvailable to the World Wide WebThesis