Schmidt, Faye Nella2025-06-262025-06-261988https://hdl.handle.net/1828/22446A new theoretical model of mixed-motive intra-alliance negotiations is presented and tested. The assumptions in this model address: (a) cooperative and individualist goals, (b) positions of mutual dependence, (c) perceptions of power, (d) standards of fairness (equity and resource scarcity or need), and (e) outcomes (conflict and effective power). The model was developed with reference to the crisis game which simulates two-party negotiations in NATO over defense spending. It proposes that as negotiators interact over decisions relating to their cooperative and individualistic goals, several factors come into play (factors which are linked to the negotiator' s relative levels of resources and the importance of these resources to the alliance' s goals). One factor is the extent to which the negotiators are mutually dependent to obtain or maximize these goals. Another is the amount of power each is perceived to have. A third factor is the influence of the value of fairness which is assumed to impact contribution strategies and the negotiator's ability to justify the solutions they favor. These factors are used to predict levels of conflict and financial outcomes (e.g., high conflict will occur when negotiators are mutually dependent and there is a large discrepancy in their level of resource scarcity or need). In contrast to other crisis game models, this model generates predictions for a larger range of negotiation behaviors and outcomes in addition to predicting the amount of conflict. The model demonstrates a mathematical modelling approach in a complex situation, clarifies concepts important to intra-alliance negotiations, and advances theoretical knowledge. Many of the model's predictions were tested in two experiments utilizing the crisis game. These studies examined the impact of different economic contexts on several negotiation behaviors and outcomes (e.g., desired and actual financial outcomes, concessions, perceived and effective power, conflict, defense fund spending, individual contribution strategies, and the importance of goals). In Experiment I the ratio of the resources needed by the alliance (to meet external threats) to available resources was held constant while the relative resources of the negotiators were varied (100 resources were divided using a .50/.50, .75/.25, and a .95/.05 division). In Experiment 2 the .75/.25 division was replicated with a new ratio of needed to available resources (in Experiment I the total resources were less than the maximum threat and in Experiment 2 the alliance's resources exceeded it). These experiments offer substantial support for the model including its new predictions linking conflict to both of the economic factors considered. In Experiment I a curvilinear conflict pattern was found with most conflict in the .75/.25 condition. In Experiment 2 the new level of resources resulted in a low level of conflict for this resource division. These results show that the model predicts the data reported in past studies (A. Bavelas, personal communication, 1977; Lee, 1986; Vitz and Kite, 1970) as well as new economic contexts not previously considered.enAvailable to the World Wide WebThesis