Conceptualizing Self, Identity, and Subjectivity:
Engagements with Theories and Theorists in Child and Youth Care

by

Scott Kouri
BA, University of Victoria, 2011

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School of Child and Youth Care

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Supervisory Committee

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Dr. Sandrina de Finney, Supervisor
School of Child and Youth Care

Dr. Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw, Departmental Member
School of Child and Youth Care
Abstract

Supervisory Committee

Dr. Sandrina de Finney, Supervisor
School of Child and Youth Care

Dr. Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw, Departmental Member
School of Child and Youth Care

The concept of the self was central to the development of North American child and youth care (CYC). The self has been understood in CYC as the mediator of knowledge and skills, the foundation of authentic and therapeutic relationships, and the essence of ethical, moral, and professional practice. In this research project, I engage with the concept of the self in CYC by analyzing the literature on the topic, conducting research conversations with scholars in the field, and articulating my own thinking on the subject. I pay particular attention to the work of faculty and students at the University of Victoria’s School of Child and Youth Care (SCYC) to better understand our current problems and possibilities for theorizing the self in relation to praxis, professionalization, and curriculum. I approach my research engagements through a geophilosophical (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003) methodology and emphasize the roles of relationship, wonder, mentorship, and connections in my research engagements.

In this thesis I analyze various conceptualizations of the self in CYC, as well as concepts of identity and subjectivity that I found to be important for understanding the topic. I focus on concepts that (1) have traditionally played a central role in CYC curriculum and professionalization; (2) emerged from my research conversations; and (3) specifically relate to issues of diversity, power, and decolonization. As a work concerned primarily with conceptualizations of the self and how they relate to CYC praxis, professionalization, and
curriculum, I articulate my own understanding and process of conceptualizing. I elaborate and experiment with my own thinking through a geophilosophical (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003) approach that emphasizes the relationship between thinking and the land and bodies through which it occurs, as well as thinking’s pragmatic, constructive, and creative aspects. I suggest that some of the important and interesting questions and possibilities for conceptualizing the self in contemporary North American CYC are related to politicized praxis as a framework for CYC; decolonization and identity-based solidarity and allyship; intersectionality as means to conceptualize diversity; mentorship and relationship in the learning encounter; immanence, dualism, and Indigenous cosmology; and the notion of a CYC community identity.
# Table of Contents

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE ........................................................................................................ II

ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... III

TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... V

LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................................... VIII

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................ IX

THANKS ......................................................................................................................................... X

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT ................................................................................ 1
  THESIS ORGANIZATION ............................................................................................................. 4
  PROFESSIONALIZATION AND EDUCATIONAL STANDARDIZATION .................................................. 8
  THE PRAXIS MODEL .................................................................................................................. 11
  EDUCATIONAL CONTEXTS ......................................................................................................... 14
  PERSONAL, FAMILIAL, CULTURAL, GEOGRAPHICAL, AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS ......................... 15
  INDIGENOUS AND SETTLER COLONIAL CONTEXT .................................................................. 21
  BEGINNING MY MA STUDIES .................................................................................................... 28
  PROCESS QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................ 29

CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 32
  PRINCIPLES: RELATIONSHIP, PROLIFERATION, EMERGENCE, AND WONDER ............................... 32
  THREE ENGAGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... 37
  GEOPHILOSOPHY: THOUGHT, BODIES, AND GEOGRAPHY .......................................................... 41
  CONNECTIVES .......................................................................................................................... 46

CHAPTER 3: CONVERSATIONAL ENGAGEMENTS ............................................................................ 53
  HANS SKOTT-MYHRE .............................................................................................................. 54
  JIN-SUN YOON ......................................................................................................................... 69
  SHANNE McCaffrey .................................................................................................................. 81
CHAPTER 4: CONNECTIVES .................................................................................................................. 94

C1: THE SELF AND SUBJECT—WESTERN PHILOSOPHY—LANGUAGE—SUSPICIONS ........................................................... 95
C2: THE CANONICAL SELF ....................................................................................................................................... 106
C3: THE AUTHENTIC SELF—PRESENCE—RELATIONAL PRACTICE—STORIES .................................................................. 109
C4: SELF-AWARENESS—ENGAGEMENT WITH DIFFERENCE—OTHERNESS ............................................................ 121
C5: THE ETHICAL AND MORAL SELF—INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY ........................................................................ 127
C6: JUNGIAN TYPES AND DREAMS—WAYS OF KNOWING—INDIVIDUATION—ALTERITY ........................................... 131
C7: DEVELOPMENT—DIVERSITY—CREATIVITY—LIFESPAN—PARENTING .............................................................. 144
C8: METAPHORS OF THE SELF ................................................................................................................................... 153
C9: CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CONSTRUCTIONISM—MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM ........................................... 156
C10: THE PROFESSIONAL SELF—MARX—PRAXIS—DECONSTRUCTION ................................................................. 169
C11: POLITICIZED PRAXIS ........................................................................................................................................ 180
C12: IDENTITY THEORIES—MULTICULTURALISM—RACE—SOLIDARITY ..................................................................... 185
C13: STRUCTURALISM—POSTSTRUCTURALISM—THE SUBJECT .................................................................................. 199
C14: IMMANENCE—AFFIRMATION—NOMADIC SUBJECTIVITY—BECOMING ........................................................... 207
C15: DECOLONIZATION—LAND AND GEOGRAPHY—MOVES TO INNOCENCE—ALLYSHIP AND SOLIDARITY ............... 217
C16: GEOGRAPHY—INDIGENOUS COSMOLOGY—ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY—IMMANENCE ............................. 222
C17: CYC-TO-COME — COMMUNITY AND TRADITION—CYC IDENTITY—HOSPITALITY ........................................... 231

CHAPTER 5: FURTHER RESEARCH: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES ................................................................. 237
List of Figures

Figure 1. The praxis framework........................................................................................................... 13
Figure 2. Log Jam Rhizome................................................................................................................ 48
Figure 3. Sword Fern Rhizome.............................................................................................................. 49
Figure 4. Mind map and painting connectives...................................................................................... 50
Figure 5. Saussure’s Sign...................................................................................................................... 201
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Context

In this thesis I explore the concept of the self as it relates to child and youth care (CYC) praxis, professionalization, and curriculum. Contemporary North American CYC is a practice approach to supporting the well-being of children, youth, and families. With roots in residential care, youth work, and developmental psychology, CYC has been developing as an academic program at the University of Victoria’s School of Child and Youth Care (SCYC) since 1973 (Anglin, 1999; Pence, 1989). Although CYC history, theory, practice approaches, and professionalization continue to be debated and contested topics, the scholarly literature, curriculum consortia, and training programs recognize a field of CYC. This field, inclusive of practice and academic domains, is generally concentrated on direct, caring, and holistic therapeutic relationships with children, youth, and families informed by developmental perspectives, systems theory, and a strengths-based approach (Anglin, 1999; Mattingly, Stuart, & VanderVen, 2010; School of Child and Youth Care, 2014). White (2007) describes the hallmarks of CYC practice as

engaging with children, youth, families and communities in collaborative and respectful ways; taking practical actions to create the conditions for young people to experience meaning, worth and connection; supporting them to imagine hopeful futures for themselves; and bringing oneself fully to the therapeutic relationship. (p. 225)

Care, as a foundational aspect of CYC, is understood in terms of the relationship between a worker and a child or youth (Anglin, 1995). The self has featured as a core concept in the understanding of the caring relationship and the fully present practitioner, and has thus enjoyed a central place in CYC theory and practice.
The concept of the self has been central to North American CYC for at least the past 40 years. Writings on the self, for example, constituted a large part of the frameworks and curricula in the first Canadian degree program in CYC, then called the Child Care Program, which was offered at the University of Victoria (UVic). The early “knowledge, skills, self” (KSS) model (School of Child and Youth Care, 2011a) and later “self-driven” (Garfat & Ricks, 1995) and “self-awareness” (Ricks, 1989) models have been used at SCYC to train practitioners and theorize practice, as well as to differentiate CYC from other professions and academic disciplines (Anglin, 1999). In the field’s early writings, the self, in addition to a state of being present that underlies caring and therapeutic relationships, was understood as the ethical cornerstone to practice (Garfat & Ricks, 1995). More contemporary conceptualizations continue in this tradition and view the self as both the mediator of professional practice (Mattingly, Stuart, & VanderVen, 2010) and an awareness or lens through which we interpret (Charles & Garfat, 2007).

Although the concept of the self has a central place and rich history in CYC, its definition, explication, and adequacy continue to be debated on a number of related fronts. First, equivocation: The concept has been defined a number of ways across time and this multiplicity is shrouded by the single term self. In the CYC literature on the self, there is a tendency to draw on a variety of philosophic and psychological theories for conceptualizing the self in CYC, but the tensions, nuances, and complexities of these different traditions are not always engaged with. The second and connected issue is contraction. With the concept’s almost innumerable relations to political, sociological and psychological theory, many important considerations have not yet been dealt with in CYC formulations. Finally, with regard to the issues of critique and proliferation, the validity and adequacy of the concept of the self has been significantly
challenged in the humanities and social sciences. Social constructionist (Gergen, 1991), feminist (de Beauvoir, 1949), Queer (Britzman, 1995, 2009; Butler, 1997, 2004), poststructural (Derrida, 1976, 1978; Foucault, 1978, 1980, 1988; St. Pierre, 2000), Indigenous (Watts, 2013), and postcolonial perspectives (Dussel, 2003; Fanon, 1961/2004, Spivak, 1976), among many others, have variously critiqued, rejected, and/or deconstructed the concept of the rational and internal self. Such critiques or alternative ways of knowing have given rise to a plurality of divergent and competing concepts, such as those of identity, subject formation, being, place-based existence, singularities and multiplicities, and subjectivity. Furthermore, the notions of identity formation, being, and subjectivity have themselves have been challenged and extended through postidentitarian, postrepresenational, and new materialist critiques (Braidotti, 2006a, b, 2009; Deleuze & Guattari, 2000, 2004). This ongoing critique and proliferation of concepts challenges static or taken-for-granted notions of the self and provides rich opportunities for dialogue.

In this thesis I explore how various descriptions and approaches to understanding the self have been taken up in CYC. I aim to provide analyses and an approach to conceptualizing the self that is creative and open-ended: I do not seek a final position but rather offer avenues for continued discussion and debate. I approach this work with an ethics of hospitality (Derrida, 2000) which foreground the dynamic, intentional, and unpredictable aspects of thought and relationships. I engage with concepts as tools for opening up CYC to new thoughts and practices, as well as examine some of the complexities with having multiple conceptualizations of the self and how these can be responded to. Throughout the thesis I work with wonder and curiosity as ways of keeping questions of the self open and to undo any final notions that I may have.

Over the course of the thesis I survey, elaborate, and analyze a number of different concepts of the self, identity, and subjectivity in terms of their interrelationships and how they
provoke and solve different problems for CYC praxis, professionalization, and curriculum. I approach this project through a geophilosophical (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003) methodology which emphasizes the connections between concepts and the problems they inaugurate and solve, the relationship between thought and the bodies and geographies which constitute it, and thinking’s creative, constructive, and pragmatic character. I use Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of concept creation to facilitate my analyses and bring new ideas into the conversation and also foreground the importance that relationships, geography, and community have for me in thinking about these issues. Rather than provide conclusive statements on the topic, my approach keeps thinking and relationships, in their vibrant, productive, complex, and dynamic character, at the forefront.

Working through a methodology of geophilosophy, I review and analyze a large sample of the literature on the self from the undergraduate and graduate curricula at SCYC. I also describe and analyze research conversations and relational engagements with scholars and students in the field. I devote particular attention to scholars who mentor and significantly inform my thinking, in order to locate myself in relation to their work and to the ongoing conversations on the self in the field. I suggest that some of the important and interesting questions and possibilities for conceptualizing the self in contemporary CYC relate to politicized praxis as a framework for CYC; decolonization and identity-based solidarity; intersectionality as a means to conceptualize diversity; mentorship and relationship in the learning encounter; immanence, dualism, and Indigenous cosmology; and notions of a CYC community.

**Thesis Organization**

In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I describe how the concept of the self informed the development of early CYC curriculum and professionalization, and how it features in the current SCYC praxis model. I also provide an account of my personal and educational
contexts and situate this research within ongoing colonialism in North America. In Chapter 2, I present my geophilosophical methodology, research principles and questions, and my approach to conceptualizing the self. Geophilosophy is explained as a way of conceptualizing that foregrounds relationships, geography, and the production of new ideas. I describe my approach to research conversations with theorists in CYC and to the literature on the self. Chapter 2 closes with an elaboration of my analytic process called connectives. Chapter 3 is an articulation of three research conversations I engaged in with theorists in CYC, foregrounding mentorship and my own learning in those relationships. The conversations introduce a variety of concepts and critiques that I further analyze in the Connectives chapter.

Chapter 4, Connectives, demonstrates my approach to conceptualizing the self in CYC in addition to an analysis of the CYC literature and my research conversations. While this chapter provides an analysis of concepts of the self, it is also purposefully playful, tangential, and open ended following the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (2003, 2004) and the geophilosophical methodology I develop in Chapter 2. Finally, Chapter 5 provides my thoughts on the potentials, problems, and possibilities for conceptualizing the self in contemporary CYC. I particularly draw attention to the development of a politicized praxis model, the role of relationship and mentorship in learning, and the importance of situating CYC and its perspectives on the self in historical, discursive, and global contexts.


CYC as a practice approach and academic discipline has a relatively short history in Canada compared to its allied fields of nursing, social work, and counselling psychology. Although various accounts can trace some of the practice contexts associated with CYC back over 100 years, the institutionalization of CYC training at a university level only began in
Canada in 1968. CYC in North America, based originally on the educator programs in Europe, became a distinct academic discipline in the late 1960s and early 70s, in part through program development at UVic (Pence, 1989). The impetus for the development of a child care program at UVic, Pence explains, came predominantly from governmental and child service agencies requesting university-level training programs for childcare workers. The Child Care Program was inaugurated at UVic in 1973 with a broad focus on training workers in child and adolescent service delivery and a specific focus on residential care settings. The School of Child Care, which delivered the program, gradually became the School of Child and Youth Care (SCYC), and the program was later renamed Child and Youth Care.

In the early 1970s, the Child Care Program mainly focused on preparing practitioners to work with children and youth “in residential and day centres, particularly those individuals with emotional, learning, and social adjustment problems” (Program description, May 1974, as cited in Pence, 1989). By the end of the 1970s, the scope of the practice field encompassed residential treatment, rehabilitation, early intervention, juvenile justice, child-life, childcare, recreation, and work in communities (Denholm, Pence, & Ferguson, 1983). In 1981 the School of Child Care hosted the first National Child Care Conference and began developing an advanced educational program that would support the professionalization of child and youth care. Throughout the 1980s SCYC developed curricula to meet training needs in specific practice areas and also began to define what exactly child and youth care was. By the 1980s, SCYC had developed individual courses with specific practice foci, as well as more encompassing frameworks for CYC education. The first formal educational framework that the school elaborated was the tripartite “knowledge, skills, self” (KSS) model of practice (Pence, 1989). The KSS model, developed in
the early 1980s and featured predominantly in SCYC curriculum for decades to come, inaugurated an unprecedented concentration on the concept of the self.

The KSS model conceptualized the self in terms of the personal values, beliefs, and assumptions the practitioner brings into practice and the meaning-making process (Ricks, 1989). The undergraduate student handbook for SCYC (2011a), which continued to advance the KSS model up until 2011 when I began this research project, described the self as the personal characteristics evidenced by presentations of thought, word and action. In terms of training and curriculum, the SCYC handbook explained that learning about one’s self involved developing awareness of thoughts, beliefs, values, communication, and actions. One of the distinguishing characteristics of CYC was thought to be the development of therapeutic or caring relationships that combined the personal and professional, which required “an integration of a complex constellation of knowledge, skills, and elements of self” (Anglin, 1999, p. 146). The self was viewed as the mediator of relationship; it comprised the personal characteristics that would facilitate therapeutic relationships, the framework for meaning making, the driving force of actions and ethics, and the capacity of being present and reflective (Fewster, 1990; Garfat & Ricks, 1995; Ricks, 1989, 1993). Not only did early CYC theorists advance the concept of the self, they also launched a generation of thinkers who would continue to elaborate theories and practice approaches around this concept. By the 1990s, a proliferation of writings, theories, and practice approaches tied the concept of the self to CYC.

Extending on the KSS model, theoretical developments in the late 1980s and 90s contributed to a more nuanced and operationalized view of the self that was related to ethics, awareness, relationship, and personal/professional development. Garfat and Ricks (1995) put forward a self-driven model of ethical decision making in which the self of the practitioner
informs and mediates the application of ethical codes and standards in specific contexts of practice. Frances Ricks (1989), professor emeritus of SCYC, advanced a self-awareness model that included self-image, material, social, and spiritual aspects of the self, and a communicable knowledge of the self. Fewster (1990, 1999) offered personal experience and insights from psychology to explicate the self in its authentic and relational nature. Importantly, these authors continued to write about the self into the third millennium. In 2008, for example, Garfat retheorized the individualistic nature of the self in terms of a relational joining of two selves. Fewster in 2010 combined the notions of the timeless interior self and unlimited human potential via an idiosyncratic patchwork of attachment theory, neuroscience, quantum theory, and integrated body psychotherapy. In 2008, Ricks and Hoskins examined the complexities of the self in relation to difference and otherness. The trend in CYC of emphasizing the importance of the self in theory and practice during the 1980s and 90s was paralleled and further impelled by educational standardization and professionalization in CYC. By the 1990s, larger CYC organizational bodies in North America were beginning to gain influence and push toward educational standardization and professionalization of the field that included a focus on the self.

Professionalization and Educational Standardization

Beyond individual academic programs, such as CYC at UVic, the self was also gaining currency in larger CYC consortiums, professional credentialing organizations, and professional associations. Two influential organizational bodies in early North American CYC were the North American Consortium of Child and Youth Care Educational Programs (NACCYCEP) and the Association for Child and Youth Care Practice (ACYCP). These organizations led the way in consolidating and standardizing the definition, scope, and educational curriculum of CYC in North America, as well as organizing and mobilizing practitioners on both sides of the border.
toward professionalization. The importance of the concept of the self was to resonate throughout these processes of standardization and professionalization.

NACCYCEP was formally established in 1990 with the purpose of advancing postsecondary CYC education. In 1995, Jim Anglin, a faculty member in CYC at UVic, published a special report on NACCYCEP’s curriculum recommendations which outlined what the consortium understood as the “unique and central” (p. 269) elements of postsecondary CYC education. The consortium’s recommendations, drafted by Henry Maier, focused on the interactional and interpersonal aspects of CYC work and defined many of the key curricular elements in terms of the self. The recommendations included the development of curriculum to support a practitioner’s “sense of self” (p. 271) and “professional use of self” (p. 272), arguing that “the most effective interactions between workers and clients are based on relationships and the professional use of self” (p. 272). For NACCYCEP, care work or care practice primarily depended on the “use of self in shared experience” (p. 273). In 1998, Mark Krueger, then president of the National Organization of Child Care Worker Associations, similarly reported on NACCYCEP and advanced an interactive youth work curriculum that foregrounded self-mediated practice and “self in action” (Krueger, 1998, p. 68). Once the self was solidified as a central concept in North American CYC curriculum, it quickly became important to professional standards and certification processes.

Between 2000 and 2007, ACYCP, a North American professional credentialing and research organization, sponsored the North American Certification Project (NACP) in developing a certification program for professionals (Eckles et al., 2009). To develop a professional certification, “the NACP defined the field of child and youth care practice, described the requisite knowledge and skills necessary for professional practice and established a
method to assess competence” (p. 2). In 2007, ACYCP organized the Child and Youth Care Certification Board (CYCCB) to further develop and implement the credentialling program, and, following two years of reviews, the Competencies for Professional Child and Youth Work Practitioners (Mattingly, Stuart, & VanderVen, 2010) was published in 2010 by ACYCP.

Known as the competency document, Competencies for Professional Child and Youth Work Practitioners (Mattingly, Stuart, & VanderVen, 2010) put forward a list of five professional competency areas and a framework for evaluating professional competence across five practice contexts. As in the work of curriculum consortiums, the concept of the self was deeply embedded in the competency document and given a full exposition as one of the contexts for practice. Some examples of the self in the competency areas include being “self-directed” and “engaged in professional and personal development and self-care” (p. 10), having “self-awareness” (p. 11) and “self-understanding” (p. 12), and assessing relationships “in an ongoing process of self reflection about the impact of the self” (p. 18). Professional practice is explained in the document to focus “on the use of self as a mediator of knowledge and skills” (p. 27). Furthermore, the competency standards dictate that “foundational to Child and Youth Care is the use of self, but to make effective use of self in practice one must first be aware of and able to articulate the nature of the self” (p. 28). The nature of the self, however, was not elaborated on, nor was the process of acquiring or evaluating such knowledge described beyond the professional educational standards of diploma or baccalaureate in CYC.

The competency document (Mattingly, Stuart, & VanderVen, 2010) has become the standard and central driving force in CYC professionalization in North America. Professionalization of the field, however, has not been achieved without significant criticisms and detractors. A recent volume (43, issue 2) of one of the field’s most high-impact journals,
Child & Youth Services, for example, specifically deconstructs, assesses, and, at times, criticizes professionalization. Although the definition of the field, its history, and its central concepts are debated and often disagreed upon, the concept of the self has been and continues to be central to CYC theory, curriculum, and professionalization. It is within these debates about the field, particularly as they relate to the concept of the self, that I situate this work. In the rest of this thesis, I explore the relationships that the concept of the self has to professionalization, curriculum, and the CYC praxis framework, and articulate some of the problems and possibilities for conceptualizing the self in 21st-century North American CYC.

The Praxis Model

At the turn of the 21st century, the concept of self was so thoroughly integrated in CYC that Garfat and Charles (2007) claimed “it would be an understatement to say that self is central to Child and Youth Care Practice” (p. 1). Furthermore, as professional competencies and curriculum standards began to circulate and take root across North America, the self was transposed from its theoretical origins into much more substantial, powerful, and overarching frameworks. The concept of the self, however, over the period of its expansion and transposition, was not articulated or used in a unitary way. Throughout this thesis I demonstrate the multiplicity of ways that the self has been conceptualized and challenged, as well as the changes that the concept has undergone in its application. I use content from SCYC curriculum as well as research conversations to analyze the articulations and changes related to the concept of self. I specifically underscore the importance of the transition at SCYC from the KSS to the praxis model (SCYC, 2011b) and propose further development of a politicized praxis framework.

Despite the existence of other conceptual frameworks throughout CYC’s relatively brief history as an academic discipline, the KSS model was the leading framework at SCYC from its
inception in the 1980s. Recently, however, the KSS model was extended and superseded by the praxis framework, which is now the central framework at SCYC. In 2007, Dr. Jennifer White, associate professor in CYC at UVic, published the groundbreaking article “Knowing, Doing and Being in Context: A Praxis-oriented Approach to Child and Youth Care.” Following White’s publication, the praxis framework quickly replaced the KSS model in course readings and field handbooks at SCYC. White (2007) recognized the need for a more dynamic framework that could “adequately represent the complexities of everyday CYC practice, while also offering a practical tool for critical reflection and analysis” (p. 225). White also provided a critique and new rendition of the concept of the self as being or ways of being.

While White (2007) retained many of the older notions of the reflexive self in action and the integration of theory and practice in the application of self-understanding, she also proposed a more embodied, embedded, and narratively informed understanding of the self, or what she called being. Knowledge, skills, and self became knowing, doing, and being in White’s work, which emphasized the active and dynamic nature of the three concepts (see Figure 1 below). White referenced many of the self theorists of the 90s, such as Ricks (1989), Fewster (1990), Krueger (1997), and Garfat (2004), while also emphasizing the difficulties of representing in words the embodiment and expression of values, ethics, habits of thought, and ways of being. White articulated the notions of being with and knowing how to be in her conceptualization of being, and provided some examples of ethical approaches and habits of mind for effective CYC. The qualities she articulated included the following: mindful and self-aware; relational and collaborative; curious and open; caring; situationally immersed; and inclusive. White inaugurated a shift in the conceptual landscape at SCYC and provided a new framework for thinking about CYC in a more dynamic, embodied, and contextualized way.
Illustrated as a web, White’s (2007) praxis framework, on the right, highlights the active and contextualized aspects of the “knowledge, skills, self” framework, which is illustrated on the left as a triangle (School of Child and Youth Care, 2011b).

White’s (2007) praxis framework proposed a situational, complex, and dynamic understanding of CYC that challenged both the notion of a static self and the notion of a standardized CYC profession or curriculum. At SCYC, the praxis framework introduced a new vocabulary for articulating the relationship between theory, practice, and self, and challenged students, instructors, and professors to rethink CYC. As an undergraduate student at SCYC from 2007 to 2011, my academic beginning coincided with the introduction of the praxis framework, and I experienced firsthand the excitement and challenge of thinking through CYC as a praxis. I had been interested in ideas of the self prior to starting at the school, and the conversations that were happening around praxis during my undergraduate studies further motivated me to
conceptualize my work in terms of a way of being and a contextualized integration of theory and practice. Furthermore, I was inspired by a number of CYC scholars (e.g., de Finney, Dean, Loiselle, & Saraceno, 2011; Gharabaghi & Krueger, 2010; Skott-Myhre & Skott-Myhre, 2011) who extended White’s model to emphasize the political and revolutionary capacities of praxis. The praxis framework supported my early conceptualizations of the self in CYC (Kouri, 2010) and generally inspired my research interests as I began my master’s studies.

**Educational Contexts**

I completed my undergraduate degree in CYC at the University of Victoria’s SCYC during the years 2007–2011 and began my MA in CYC in 2011. My particular research interest in the self, and specifically the theoretical aspects of this area, grew consistently over the years of my undergrad education and was galvanized when I was encouraged and supported by a SCYC instructor to publish a piece of writing in one of the field’s journals (Kouri, 2010). I was in my third year of undergraduate studies when I was introduced to social constructionism (Gergen, 1991) and postmodern theory, which significantly expanded my thinking on the self. I was simultaneously undergoing a Jungian analysis and studying analytic psychology. Jungian psychology and social constructionism provided me with a rich and complicating admixture for understanding and writing about the self in CYC. Having no formal training in philosophy or psychology, I found the question of the concept of the self at times overwhelming, but I was determined to try to locate my own thinking in these discourses. In that ferment, I was greatly aided by White’s (2007) praxis article in that I came to understand praxis itself as an ongoing questioning, positioning, and struggle to articulate one’s stance and live it in the world.

Another important set of conceptual frameworks for thinking about the self was taught to me through some of the more critical SCYC curriculum. In core undergraduate courses, such as
CYC 338: Applying Developmental Theory in CYC Practice, and a number of courses on Indigenous practice contexts, I was introduced to feminist theory, cross-cultural or diversity frameworks, Indigenous ways of knowing, and the history of colonization in Canada. I was taught concepts that helped me to understand or locate myself as an ethnic, cultural, gendered, educated, and able-bodied person. I learnt about processes of marginalization, racialization, colonization, and discrimination, and structures of privilege, hierarchy, oppression, and patriarchy. This part of CYC education provided me with critical theories of identity that challenged many of the unchecked and invisible assumptions I had about myself, such as my individualized understanding of my success at school and work, and how I believed that the theories of self I was interested in could be extended to all people. One of the teachings that stood out for me and started an ongoing journey full of meaning, sorrow, surprise, and learning was an Indigenous teaching related to ancestry and traditional land. I was taught the importance of knowing my family’s history and the stories my family held regarding our heritage, history, and ancestral land. I was also taught to think about how my personal, familial, and ethnocultural history and presence has been, and continues to be, related to the Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island and Canadian colonialism. These directions in my learning deeply impressed upon me the relationship between conceptions of personhood and culture, history, land, and politics. Throughout this research I have therefore explored my own and my family’s history and identity, particularly as they relate to my current social and geographical locations.

**Personal, Familial, Cultural, Geographical, and Historical Contexts**

While this research project has primarily been about engaging with a variety of theorists and theories in CYC, much of my work has also been about applying ideas to my own life and practice. In this thesis, therefore, I frequently situate myself in relation to particular
conceptualizations of self and identity, particular people who espouse certain theories, or explore how these concepts and people affected my life. In this section, I provide some reflections and analysis of my own history, and place my experience in the contexts of Middle Eastern and North American colonialisms. I emphasize my ethnic, racial, geographical, and linguistic contexts here because I found these considerations to be significant throughout my research conversations and textual analyses, and they also stood out for me at a feeling or affective level. Furthermore, through this research I came to recognize that conversations on identity, colonization and decolonization, and politicized praxis were particularly relevant and interesting to me. I did not arrive at conclusive positions on any of these issues but understood my contribution rather in terms of enriching the dialogue, developing relationships and capacities for collaborative work, and identifying potential projects within CYC that I could continue to work on with others. Recollecting my history here, I believe, provides additional context for my research, as well as helps situate me in this research.

I have always primarily identified myself as Lebanese, although my mother is of English descent. My surname Kouri is an Arabic word that is etymologically related to the Latin ‘Cura’ and traditionally given to a priest or religious figure. Our family has historically had strong ties to the Orthodox Christian Church, and I grew up amid the smell of incense and the colours of light beaming through stained glass windows of St. Nicholas Church in Montreal, Quebec. My first vocational aspiration was to be a priest. Three generations ago, in 1897, the Kouri family emigrated from Rachaiya al-wadi, Lebanon. My father’s maternal grandparents, the Kenmey family, emigrated during the same period from near Saidnaya, a famous church near the Syria-Lebanon border. Learning about this history simultaneously brought me closer to my family
through the sharing of stories and embedded the conception I had of myself in a long, worldwide colonial history.

For the half-century prior to my family’s departure from Lebanon in the 1890s, the region underwent tremendous difficulty as the Indigenous Maronite Church attempted to seize autonomous rule of Mount Lebanon from the Ottoman Empire. Hakim (2013) explains that with the investment of France, under the pretext of establishing a Christian entity in the East, the Maronite Church thought the 19th century sketched the beginnings of a Lebanese national ideal, an ideal relatively unique in the region. Between 1840 and 1860, conflicts between Maronite, Druze, and Ottoman peoples in Mount Lebanon escalated to violence, and by 1860 a complex European-Ottoman treaty emerged that established semi-independent Christian authority in the area. France continued to act in Mount Lebanon and treaty negotiations to demarcate a Christian people from Syria and the Ottoman Empire. It was not until the end of WWI and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire that the Sykes-Picot Agreement would allocate control of Lebanon to France. Lebanon, like other Middle Eastern and African nations, gained its formal independence from France while France was occupied by Germany in WWII. By the time of WWII, my paternal grandfather Michael represented the Kouri family in the Canadian Armed Forces.

My father, Gary Kouri, was born and has spent his life in North America. He served in the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment of Canada) and considers himself fully Canadian with Lebanese heritage. His military service for Canada was primarily during the Montreal bombings by the Marxist-Leninist Quebec sovereignty group Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), the Laporte kidnapping and assassination, and the application of the War Measures Act following the October Crisis of 1970. Although the threat of militant uprising against the government of Canada and the Anglophone political parties of Quebec lessened during the
1970s, tensions continued to grow around issues of Quebec sovereignty through more mainstream politics. By 1980, the year of my birth, a provincial referendum on Quebec sovereignty was called by the Parti Québécois and the federalists, who favoured unity with Canada, won with approximately 60 percent of the votes. The Quebec sovereignty movement, led mainly by the Parti Québécois, continued to be a relevant political platform during my completion of this thesis and my father’s family, mostly in Quebec, still strongly opposed it. I have never opposed the sovereignty movement myself, and now, married to a French Canadian and sharing two children with her, I have come to more fully appreciate the ethno-linguistic claims that the French-speaking Quebec population advocate for. One area I hope to explore further is the relationship between the historical French colonial rule of Lebanon and the anti-French sentiment in many Anglophone Lebanese families of Quebec. I am curious about my father’s family’s adoption of the English language and liberal and federalist politics through the hundred years of our settlement in Canada prior to my birth.

Gary Kouri (back row) serving in the Honour Guard for the Queen Mother on her visit to Canada.

I grew up in an ethnically and linguistically diverse neighborhood in Montreal, Quebec. As a Lebanese-English-Canadian, I thought about myself in a number of ways: as Lebanese,
English, Christian, male, straight, and Canadian. Although there was a diversity of Middle Eastern nationalities and ethnicities that people identified with in my childhood neighbourhood, we were predominantly English speaking and Christian. Our family was one of the most acculturate or assimilated to the English Canadian consumerist and liberal culture, having one of the longest settlement histories and being biracial. Throughout my life I have had to negotiate presenting primarily as white while identifying as Lebanese. In school, I was taught to celebrate the diverse array of cultures, ethnicities, and traditions of the people who made up Canada, including my own, but I had very little knowledge, experience, or practice of such culture. I never learned Arabic, never visited Lebanon, and I identified with the Lebanese part of my identity mainly through food, music, and aspects related to the Orthodox Church. I grew up during a time when multiculturalism was served to you for breakfast, but we still drank white milk out of small pink cardboard containers during first period at school. I think that I grew up at a time, like many children in Montreal in the 1980s, when Canada was at a crossroad where, on the one hand, Canadian multicultural policy and ideology were becoming the dominant discourse for diversity and cross-cultural relations in Canada, and on the other hand, French sovereignty and the Anglophone-francophone dichotomy were intensifying differences among other linguistic, ethnic, and cultural lines. This crossroad was also intersected by gender equality and sexual freedom movements in Montreal at the time, as well as situated within a longer and broader history of racism and colonialism in Canada.

I was inculcated in Canadian multiculturalism during my childhood years in the Protestant School Board of Montreal. The government of Canada describes multiculturalism as an inclusive model of citizenship in which equality is guaranteed before the law and the retention of ethnic, religious, and religious identities is ensured, “with no pressure to assimilate” (Canada.
20

Citizenship and Immigration, 2014, para. 6). I went to a school outside my predominantly Arab neighbourhood, which had a much more global representation, particularly of ethnicities and nationalities from Europe, the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Israel, China, and Japan. My early experiences and education around diversity, identity, and difference were contradictory at times and also founded on innumerable erasures. At school and with friends my age, I experienced racial and ethnic diversity though attitudes of inclusiveness, curiosity, and the idea of a generalized humanity. Although racial slurs and racist humour were common, physical violence and social exclusion did not seem to be prevalent. Alliances and aggressions, in my experience, ran more clearly across lines of dress, musical preference, gang or crew affiliation, and sport and recreational activity. In these circumstances, differences in race were less important than, or even challenged by, the idea of a single humanity, which seemingly contradicted a valorization of ethnicity and cultural identity. There was a dawning deconstruction of the concept of race, a hope for a postracial era, yet much ethnic and cultural pride. In hindsight, the missing, erased, or invisible pieces for me were the histories of racism, slavery, colonization, and inequality that pervaded Canadian and global history. I think my experience reflected Canadians’ desire to move forward or engage on different grounds without reconciling with history.

In my home community, in contrast to my school experience, differences, antagonisms, and hate were much more palpable and were specifically founded on race, religion, nationality, and ethnicity, usually very historically and geographically situated. English-Canadian Christian Arabs were the generalized group that my family fell into, notwithstanding our biracial generation, and we, the Christian Arabs, were clearly differentiated through discourse and locality from the French, Muslim, Jewish, Black, and Aboriginal people of Canada living in Montreal. Although a growing national sentiment of “we are Canadians” seemed to be growing
in our Arab community, the emphasis on the Arab in Arab Canadian was heavy. In these English Christian Arab spaces and discourses, the other, the French, Muslim, Black, Aboriginal, or Jew, was generally an object of anger, disgust, distrust, hatred, and avoidance. Kriesberg (2003) explains that “for an inter-group (e.g., racial, ethnic, or religious) conflict to occur, the opponents must have a sense of collective identity about themselves and about their adversary, each side believing the fight is between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (para. 2). I believe that much of these adversarial identity relations acted to preserve a sense of community, dignity, safety, and welcoming among Arab Christians, particularly those new to Canada, while also reterritorializing historical conflicts in the emerging Canadian landscape and imaginary. The most persistent erasures in these adversarial identity discourses, as well as in multicultural discourse, were related to historical and ongoing colonialism and Indigenous land and sovereignty. The pretext of debates about belonging to Canada, official languages, French sovereignty, and multiculturalism was the erasure of Indigenous life and history.

Indigenous and Settler Colonial Context

Although aspects of my Lebanese identity were formed through adversarial identity formations, early life experiences, and multicultural discourse are embedded in Canadian colonialism, it is to my English ancestry and my wife and children’s French ancestry that I turn in order to think about colonialism and Indigenous land and sovereignty. On my maternal side, our family is from Manchester, England, settling in eastern Canada around the turn of the 20th century. Sidney Brown and Doris Pearce were married in Montreal in 1928 and Doris subsequently birthed my grandfather in 1931. My grandmother was born in 1929 to the wife of Frank Farley and she in turn gave birth to my mother, Frances Joyce Brown, in 1953. Members of the maternal side of my family took part in the Canadian military during the two world wars
and the development of Canadian democracy, and they consider themselves Canadian. I was not well educated, either in school or at home, about whiteness, the settling of English people in Canada, or Europe’s colonial history. If I was taught anything, it was in line with the terra nullius myth that the Americas were discovered or that only uncivilized “Indians” lived here, a Eurocentric myth that positions white people as the harbingers of enlightenment, law, and development. I vaguely remember, for example, being 10 years old and hearing for the first time about Indians during the Oka crisis in Montreal. My understanding of the crisis was thoroughly formed by racist and colonial discourses that pitted a backwards group of Indians against the economic development interests of businesses and the province. It was not until I took the Indigenous context courses in CYC 15 years later that I began to unpack and unsettle some of the racist ideology that formed my conceptions of white people, Indigenous people, and their historical and ongoing relationships.

As a child, I never thought of my English ancestry as ethnic, linguistic, or racial, but rather as white and not in need of further definition. Frankenberg (1993) explains that “white people are not required to explain to others how ‘white’ culture works, because ‘white’ culture is the dominant culture that sets the norms. Everybody else is then compared to that norm” (p. 21). The concept of dominant whiteness, in hindsight, helps me to understand how my Lebanese heritage became meaningful for me because it provided me with some form of identifiable personhood, without which I did not even consider my identity. The concept of white privilege (Macintosh, 1988), also in hindsight, helps me to think about how I used or presented my Lebanese identity tactically to fit in or be more safe in racialized spaces or with diverse peoples while still being able to present as white when that was more beneficial. Although most of the tactical workings of my white privilege and power were intuitive or unconscious at the time, I
was well aware of the anger that racialized minorities had for white people. Specifically from hip-hop music, good friends, and urban black culture, I understood, although vaguely, the history of slavery and the ongoing racism and oppression that black peoples faced in America. What I was much less aware of was Canada’s colonial history, Indigenous history, and the oppression and systemic racism that Indigenous communities and people continue to face. This thesis is part of my process of becoming aware, accounting for these histories, relating to people in new ways, and thinking through our common and different problems and possibilities.

The land that is currently known as Canada has been the home of Indigenous Peoples for millennia (Blackstock, 2003). Blackstock explains that although there is significant diversity between the different cultures, societies, and language groups that make up First Nations and Inuit peoples, “they are all bound together by a perspective that supports a holistic interdependent worldview, communal rights and a commitment to sustainable decision making” (p. 3). Over thousands of years, Indigenous Peoples across the continent of North America, generally known now as Turtle Island to Indigenous Peoples, developed complex and functional systems of politics, economics, education, health, and spirituality (Channsoneuve, 2005).

Although contemporary anthropological and historical evidence demonstrates that cultures and societies were being established approximately 10,000 years ago, Indigenous Peoples have a number of creation stories which account for their own history and origins (Channsoneuve, 2005; Watts, 2013). Prior to European contact, the ethnically and linguistically diverse Indigenous Peoples of Turtle Island were independent, yet had “established intricate systems of political and commercial alliances among themselves” (Henry, Tator, Mattis, & Rees, 2000, p. 134).

Although the first contact that Indigenous Peoples had with Europeans is usually traced to John Cabot’s meeting with the Boethuck people or the voyages of Cristopher Columbus,
Henry et al. (2000) explain that Indigenous and non-Indigenous Peoples have had contact for over a thousand years and that these contacts can be classified into four distinct periods. The first period includes intermittent contact between Indigenous Peoples and Europeans, such as the Norse and Basque, starting in 1000 AD, as well as sustained European presence from the end of the 15th century until the 18th century. This period, Henry et al. claim, is characterized by mutual tolerance and respect, with some exceptions. Beginning in the 18th century and propelled by French and English battles for imperial supremacy in North America, the second period is marked by the formation of trading and military alliances, as well as increased conflict and death. Indigenous Peoples suffered enormous population declines as European diseases spread across the continent while at the same time the European population grew with increased immigration and settlement. The displacement and assimilation of Indigenous Peoples is indicative of the third period of Indigenous-European relations, which occurred at different times across the continent. The third period is “marked by a continuing saga of expropriation, exclusion, discrimination, coercion, subjugation, oppression, deficit, theft, appropriation, and extreme regulation” (p. 120). The fourth period, which continues today, is described by Henry et al. as distinguished by negotiations and renewal. Following the end of World War II, the authors explain, public awareness and Indigenous political mobilization increased in response to the ongoing racist attitudes and policies directed towards Indigenous Peoples. As a settler Canadian beginning my learning in this fourth period, and in the context of CYC, my work is informed by contemporary issues of Indigenous sovereignty, land claim, ongoing cultural oppression, disproportionate levels of child removal and poor health and well-being outcomes for Indigenous people, inequality, and Indigenous resistance, resurgence, and scholarship.
The complex histories and contemporary relations among Indigenous, European, and other settler peoples are an ongoing learning and engagement for me. I acknowledge historical and ongoing colonialism in the terms Alfred (2009) provides, that is, “the development of institutions and policies by European imperial and Euroamerican settler governments towards Indigenous Peoples” (p. 45). I also acknowledge settler colonialism as a particularly brutal form of colonialism which “is different from other forms of colonialism in that settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land, a homemaking that insists on settler sovereignty over all things in their new domain” (Tuck & Yang, 2012, p. 5). Colonialism is principally about land and the imperial institutions and policies which forcibly remove Indigenous presence, traditions, and life from the land. Canada, as a settler colonial state, was predicated on the discourse of an empty land, or *terra nullius*, while at the same time the British and the French colonists acknowledged First Nations land occupation when it served their purposes, such as in war strategy. Alfred (2009) explains that during conflicts between the French and British in North America, these powers needed the alliances of Indigenous nations to defeat one another and therefore recognized the sovereignty of Indigenous nations. Britain, once it defeated France in the Seven Years War and asserted control over North America, both recognized Indigenous presence through the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and initiated a systematic process of removing Indigenous people, language, and culture from the land.

The Royal Proclamation of 1763 established British rule of French territory in North America and determined that the emerging government would have responsibilities to Indigenous Peoples, particularly in land and other treaty negotiation. By the 19th century, however, “Canada decided to abandon its responsibility to settle Treaties…” (Blackstock, 2003, p. 4) and instead focused on a policy of assimilation, community dislocation, and genocide.
Wesley-Esquimaux and Smolewshi (2004) explain that following the pandemics and wars, “there would have been no one to stem the tide of colonialism because so few would have been left standing and those who survived did not have the strength of mind or body” (p. 23). Already weakened Indigenous communities were unable to protect themselves from assimilationist policies set out in the Indian Act and later enacted through the residential school system.

The Indian Act of 1876, which continues, with amendment, as law today, subjected Indigenous people to federal rule while denying them the right to vote, undermined social structures and cultural traditions, and determined the terms through which Indigenous or “Indian” people were recognized as such under law. Residential schools, the last of which closed in 1996, further destabilized kinship structures through the forcible removal of children from their families. The schools aimed at Christianization and cultural genocide through a policy of “killing the Indian in the child” (Fournier & Crey, 1997, p. 47). Forcible removal of Indigenous children from their homes and communities persisted throughout the 20th century and continues to be an active and deliberate colonial practice in Canada (Johnson & de Finney, 2006). Canadian colonization, including land theft, disease and pandemics, cultural genocide, and the forcible removal of children, is responsible for the deaths of up to “90 per cent of the continental Indigenous population and rendering Indigenous people physically, spiritually, emotionally and psychically traumatized by deep and unresolved grief” (Wesley-Esquimaux & Smolewshi, 2004, p. iii). The United Nations (2014) special rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples recently condemned Canada for the socioeconomic circumstances of Indigenous Peoples, human rights violations, and the specific issue of the hundreds of abused, missing, and murdered Indigenous women whose cases have not been investigated. Settler colonization continues to be enacted by
individuals, groups, institutions, and governments across Canada. My family’s history and my contemporary way of life are deeply embedded in and benefit from the colonization of Canada.

The historical and ongoing settler colonialism that afflicts Indigenous Peoples and other Canadians is at the root of virulent disparities and atrocities in Canada and insidiously makes its way into all aspects of life. Of particular importance to my work as a CYC graduate student, researcher, practitioner, and instructor are the ways that settler colonialism is enacted in educational contexts, professional helping, and formulations of the self. Alfred and Corntassel (2005) explains that

contemporary Settlers follow the mandate provided for them by their imperial forefathers’ colonial legacy, not by attempting to eradicate the physical signs of Indigenous Peoples as human bodies, but by trying to eradicate their existence as peoples through the erasure of the histories and geographies that provide the foundation for Indigenous cultural identities and sense of self. (p. 598)

This research project neither decolonizes land (Tuck & Yang, 2012) nor undoes the legacies and mandates that extinguish Indigenous life, geography, and culture. What I have done here is to read and listen more closely, and engage more intimately, with the people in CYC who are actively engaged in conversations about colonization and decolonization. I have attempted to situate myself in these conversations and acknowledge the generosity, knowledge, and strength that these mentors, teachers, and supervisors have shown me. I have articulated some of the problems and possibilities that I understand we have in thinking about CYC in ways that address colonialism adequately and have positioned myself as a settler in these conversations. Lastly, I have worked against the erasures that have been accomplished through decontextualized
renderings of the self and have attempted to engage with people and ideas that have typically been excluded or discredited in academic knowledge production.

**Beginning My MA Studies**

My undergraduate education in CYC furnished me with an array of concepts and frameworks for thinking about identity and the self. I began my own praxis of articulating and embodying a way of knowing, doing, and being in the world. I also developed meaningful relationships with mentors, instructors, and professors in SCYC with whom I hoped to continue to learn from and work with. I took more seriously my role and responsibility in social issues such as colonialism, racism, sexism, poverty, environmental degradation, and the conflicts in the Middle East. I was spurred on by these experiences to better understand the history and theories of the CYC field, to further situate myself in them, and to deepen my relationships with my mentors. The self had always stood out for me as both a linchpin of CYC theory and practice and a highly contested and richly theorized concept. I intuited that conceptualizations of the self could be an area that would be useful for my learning and generative for SCYC and the field.

As I began my graduate work, I read in CYC literature about the self’s relationship to ethics, relational and professional practice, ecological systems, and developmental psychology. I analyzed how CYC theorists understood or avoided questions about the self in relation to history, philosophy, politics, geography, capitalism, colonialism, science, language, and the body. In my own inquiries, I thought about the self in terms of ontology and epistemology: I questioned in what ways the self existed, in what ways it can be said that we have knowledge of the self, and how different knowledge systems interfaced. I moved from a position that assumed an existent self, to a position that treated the self as a concept per se. My praxis of knowing and embodying a way of being became more difficult as I immersed myself in millennia-old philosophic and
political debates. I found myself at times in a circular setup where the grounds for knowing the self already assumed some conception of the self and vice versa. I wondered where the self was in the dialects between agency and structure, discourse and materiality, and history and geography. The questions seemed to proliferate and I had to struggle to stay focused on CYC.

To keep this project manageable and concentrated, I imagined a CYC curriculum and community which more explicitly engaged with conceptualizations of the self in their relationship to history, philosophy, politics, social issues, and social justice. I projected that by extending my curiosities through research I could contribute to the field’s theory base and help prepare myself for academic leadership and praxis. I hoped my research could develop my relationships with my mentors by better understanding how they engaged with conceptualizing the self and create a common workspace for some of us. I understood that satisfying these hopes, questions, curiosities, and desires was beyond the scope of an MA thesis, but I wanted to better understand and more fully experience the problems and possibilities associated with them. I gradually shifted from having a set of standardized questions to a more emergent process of forming, asking, and engaging with questions.

**Process Questions**

Although I ended up in a process of asking open questions which did not directly seek specific or final answers, my hope at the outset of the project was to generate a comprehensive, organized, and representative account of the range of conceptualizations of the self in CYC. This hope was guided by the overarching question “What theories of self are used in CYC?” As I progressed in my research, however, this question, and the appeal of a clear and final answer, was impacted by the proliferation of different ideas and my interest in them. I gradually shifted from a focus on producing coherent answers to specific questions toward a more process-driven
and emergent approach. I began to live the work of researching rather than pursue an image of a product of the research. I was deeply influenced in this decision by my early readings and research relationships that emphasized a process approach to CYC work and life in general. It was also through these early readings and conversations that I developed my methodology. I thought more deeply about my relationships with the people who were engaged in this project with me, and I realized that if I wanted to be more responsive to them and make this research meaningful for them as well, I could not have a predetermined output or goal. The questions that I used in this research continuously changed depending on the circumstances, that is, the needs, interests, intensifications, and analyses that were taking place. I thought of these research questions as dynamic sets of points that contoured the problems and possibilities at hand in any given moment. The following six lines of inquiry broadly summarize the main themes I explored throughout the project:

1. **CYC conceptualizations of the self:** how have concepts of self, identity, and subjectivity been explicated in CYC, particularly in the CYC curricula at UVic and by UVic faculty? How are these concepts related to one another and to broader theoretical and philosophical frameworks? Who is saying what and to what end?

2. **Critiques and alternative conceptualizations:** What are the conceptualizations of self, identity, and subjectivity that are currently being used in CYC but are underrepresented or not represented in UVic’s CYC curricula? Which theories challenge or offer alternative conceptualizations to the more dominant notions of the self in CYC?

3. **Analyses and applications:** What are some of the complexities, problems, and possibilities related to the multiple conceptualizations of self, identity, and subjectivity in CYC? How do theories of the self relate to praxis, professionalization, and curriculum?
4. **Situate myself within CYC:** What ideas about a CYC community are being circulated? How do I understand my relationship to CYC? How does my own history, family, and ancestry relate to questions about the self? What are some future possibilities for my own research and praxis? What are my hopes and desires when it comes to CYC?

5. **Methodological experimentation:** How can emergence, relationship, and geography be part of a methodology? What is my own perspective on thinking and conceptualizing?

6. **Develop relationships:** How can I build, develop, and strengthen relationships with my teachers, mentors, and other CYC theorists? How have relationships shaped my research?

   In the next chapter I develop a geophilosophical methodology for engaging with my contexts, questions, and hopes related to conceptualizing the self in CYC. I describe how I involved myself in research conversations with theorists and with literature on the self in CYC. I highlight the importance of relationships and connections in my research engagements, and how the concepts of emergence and proliferation helped me to see this project as open and ongoing. Finally, I articulate my approach to conceptualizing and advance an analytic framework for keeping thinking in motion through Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003, 2004) notions of immanence, rhizome, and concept creation.
Chapter 2: Methodology

To better understand, analyze, and extend conceptualizations of the self in CYC, as well as develop mentorship relationships and my own perspective on conceptualization, I constructed a geophilosophical methodology. My methodology is informed by Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003) philosophy, or geophilosophy, as a situated and embodied process of creating concepts to solve the problems of life. Geophilosophy is a particular way of knowing which emphasizes the relationship between thinking and the land and bodies through which it occurs, as well as thinking’s pragmatic, constructive, and creative aspects. Importantly, this research is about conceptualizations of the self, and this methodology is about the process of conceptualizing. Rather than take for granted or reify the self, I approach the self in this research as a concept with particular functions in CYC praxis, professionalization, and curriculum.

This chapter explicates how I understand my conceptualization process and analytic procedure which entails the development and construction of concepts. I will build toward a full exposition of my geophilosophical methodology by describing the concepts that constitute my research principles and relational engagements. My research principles include my ethics, stance, and values and will be described through the concepts of relationship, emergence, proliferation, and wonder. My engagements describe how I have performed this research: (1) with texts; (2) in individual and group conversations, and relational engagements; and (3) with my own process of conceptualizing. With the research principles and engagements elaborated, I then explicate my geophilosophical methodology and connectives analytic.

Principles: Relationship, Proliferation, Emergence, and Wonder

Four principles guided my research: relationship, proliferation, emergence, and wonder. These principles constitute my ethics, stance, and perspective on the project. They were informed
by the engagements and relationships that occurred throughout the research. Relationships, as the first principle, were the cornerstone and energy that made this project possible. In this research, I purposefully initiated research conversations with mentors, peers, and professors whom I found interesting and enjoyed spending time with, and whose work I desired to know more about. This research had value for me because I felt that through it I developed intentional and meaningful relationships with the people who engage, interest, support, and challenge me. I hope that in some small ways my effort in this project reciprocated the commitment and engagement I was shown. I worked toward mutuality, respect, hospitality, appreciation, humility, and safety in my research engagements. In Chapter 3, I provide summaries of three conversational engagements that highlight my relational approach. My understanding of relationship was continuously informed by CYC notions of relational practice, the relational self, and CYC community and identity as I studied them more closely. At times I also worked with theories and theorists that attempt to undo or replace the notion of a rational individual who willfully or intentionally enters into relationships, and those theories influenced my approach as well. I found that juxtaposing these different ideas about relationship created new ways of acting in the world and new concepts for thinking about self and community in CYC.

In this research I found that concepts, possibilities for acting, and relationships proliferated. The more I read, the more there was to read; the more time I spent with people I enjoyed, the more opportunities for experience together opened up. Proliferation is the concept that helped me think through this intensification of concepts and relationship. Perhaps relationships and concepts proliferated due to the nature of the topic, the scope of the project, my own habits of thinking and relating, or, as Patti Lather (2006) contends, perhaps “proliferation happens” (p. 42). Proliferation, as a way of thinking and relating, contrasts with a more
contained or organized approach and “is about saying yes to the messiness, to that which
interrupts and exceeds” (p. 48). Once I began saying yes to that which exceeded my plans and
followed tangential thoughts, desires, and relationships wherever they would go, I was no longer
able to subject the project to a very coherent organization or structure: I juxtaposed, compared,
and combined different thoughts, thinkers, relationships, and paradigms more experimentally,
more playfully. Lather explains that it is only when we work with a multiplicity of paradigms
that we have the opportunity to engage in the plays and contestations between them. These plays
and contestations and the ideas and relationships that emerged from them became the material of
my analysis and creativity. Proliferation is particularly distinguishable in this research through
the plays, differences, and interactions between dominant and emergent knowledges.
Proliferation, from a geophilosophical perspective, emerges out of the incessant collisions and
reorganizations that bodies enact in a particular geography, and the problems and possibilities
that these interactions inaugurate.

Emergence, my third principle, helps define thought as a product of the complex patterns
and systems of bodies in relationship. Deleuze and Guattari (2003, 2004) understand bodies as
dynamic assemblages which have particular or idiosyncratic capacities to relate, affect and be
affected, and produce. Bodies are understood by Deleuze and Guattari in the broadest sense,
inclusive of human bodies, animal bodies, bodies of land and water, fungal bodies, cellular
bodies, planetary bodies, etc. Bodies, therefore, are composed of other bodies and in turn
compose more complex bodies. Furthermore, every network of bodies has particular expressive
capacities, most simply understood as capacities to interact, express, and affect and be affected
by other assemblages (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). Following Deleuze and Guattari, I understand
thought as an emergent or expressive capacity of assemblages of particular bodies. Thought,
therefore, is released from its anthropocentric, centred, internalized, intentional, and individualistic conceptualization, and regarded as a capacity of an assemblage of different forms of life that constitute a geography. A geography, in this sense, is the spatial and intensive relations between bodies. One research participant who follows this more inclusive concept of bodies stated that “we think” to emphasize the emergence of thought as a relational production. Understood as an emergent property of networks of bodies interacting, thoughts proliferate as bodies interact, form, decompose, and relate in variable ways. The capacity to think creatively or wonder about these relations allows for new or novel configurations to occur which in turn proliferate new thought ad infinitum.

The capacity to wonder in an open and creative way has been developing for me throughout this project. Wonder, as my final principle, was beautifully spoken to by a research participant as “the cultivation of curiosity uninterrupted by answers; imagining questions that open onto other questions.” My own sense of wonder intensified in this project when I gave up trying to explain, contain, or capture the theories of others and instead made connections, developed relationships, and experimented with thought. MacLure (2013) calls wonder the other of classification, insisting that classification establishes or reinforces a hierarchical topography of knowledge and bodies through capture, representation, and organization. In contrast, wonder, for MacLure, extends unstable, mobile, decentralized, and unceasing processes that can perform new acts of thinking, worlding, and subject formation. Wonder helped me keep this project on the move, helped me to make new connections, and breathe new life and enjoyment into my work.

My four principles emerged from my research as well as guided it. Through the project I was constantly revising my approach and methodology based on what I was hearing from participants and committee, and what I was reading in the literature. These four principles mostly
worked in harmony but also at times contradicted one another. For example, I realized that the proliferation of new concepts, worlds, relationships, and subjects is not always wanted, enjoyed, or accepted by all. While I did take up an attitude of experimentation and enjoyment in the production of the new, the concept of relationship helped me to think through the disruptions or violence that new encounters or productions can entail. In Lather’s (2006) description of proliferation, the messiness and vying for power in the relationships between different paradigms is not utopic or innocent. Watts (2013) provides an example of such a violent encounter between paradigms when she contends that colonialism operationalizes itself through the misrepresentations that the Euro-Western epistemology-ontology divide enacts on Indigenous cosmologies. Watts explains that it is in the encounter with Euro-Western philosophy that Indigenous creation histories and ways of life are made unbelievable or mythological. I therefore questioned the enthusiasm I had for bringing different ways of knowing together and considered the destructions that are caused or even needed to produce the new. Connections, proliferations, and curiosities can produce violence, sickness, humiliation, appropriation, dilution, anger, death, and suffering; they can undo traditions, ecosystems, relationships, identities, and life. Proliferation and wonder therefore need to be counterbalanced by the principle of relationship and by some means of analysis and sense of purpose or direction.

At times in this thesis I worked toward elaborating critiques of proliferation and creativity, but such activities seemed to continue to produce new ideas. I am still curious about how much my thirst and enjoyment of the new and wondrous is structured by my social location and habits of consumption. At times, wonder was also a form of endurance for me, a way of keeping going in the face of adversity, pain, or desperation, a way for me to keep asking how we might live and think differently. In the following sections I explain how relationships and
connections guided my approach to research engagements. I describe my research in terms of my engagements with texts, participants, and my own conceptualization process, and close the chapter with an elaboration of my geophilosophical methodology and connectives process.

**Three Engagements**

Although there were many changes in the directions, focal points, approaches, and questions in this research process, I did have three consistent avenues of engagement: (1) with literature on the self in CYC; (2) in research conversations; and (3) with my own process of thinking. These three forms of engagement, for me, were sustained, intentional, and productive research activities: they were ways of being in relationship with people, texts, and ideas. The principle of relationship helped me to value consistency and accountability in my engagements, particularly in my relationships with the people who participated. These three ways of engagement, text, conversation, and conceptualization interacted with and intensified each other. For example, some participants introduced me to new texts and theories to explore, and the texts I read sometimes developed my interest in speaking with a particular author. My engagements significantly informed the directions I took, questions I asked, and decisions I made; “*we* thought.”

**Engagements with texts.** My textual engagements included reviewing SCYC undergraduate curriculum, as well as readings suggested to me by research participants. I began by manually searching the terms *self*, *identity*, *subject*, and *subjectivity* in the course readings from SCYC undergraduate and graduate curricula for the years 2008–2012. I also cross-referenced the 2008–2012 curricula with an updated program reading list for the years 2013–2014 and added new readings to the review that contained the search terms. I included transcripts of some audio recordings from courses, but I did not consider instructor notes or lectures,
handouts, or guest presentations due to the difficulty in retrieving these. I created summaries of the material using direct quotes and critical evaluations. I specifically made notes of any connections the search terms had to theoretical frameworks, praxis, professionalization, or practitioner training. The lenses I used to do preliminary readings and decide on relevant points were informed by the emerging perspectives from the research: the geophilosophical methodology, particularly the connectives analytic elaborated below, attempts to account for these processes.

In addition to SCYC curriculum materials, I also reviewed texts that were recommended to me in the research conversations. Participants from research interviews provided me with numerous references to literature containing conceptualizations of self, identity, and subjectivity in addition to those included in SCYC curricula. At times I also expanded on these textual references by searching for readings through academic search engines. The process of expanding my textual review through conversation-referenced material helped me to identify theories being used in CYC that were underrepresented or not represented in the curricula. The process of reviewing conversation referenced literature seemed to support my engagements with participants as I better understood their work and was able to have more nuanced conversations with them. I often returned to participants to discuss the readings I had done and the connections these readings had with their perspectives.

**Participant Conversations.** I engaged in research conversations for the purpose of: (1) increasing my understanding of the work of particular CYC scholars; (2) locating conceptualizations of the self that were being used in CYC but not represented in the curricula at UVic; and (3) developing ongoing relationships or starting new relationships with scholars in CYC. The criteria for participation in the research were: (1) having contributed the CYC
academic literature; (2) teaching CYC at a college or university; or (3) studying CYC at a graduate level. In total, I engaged in research conversations with six individuals and three groups (ranging from 3 -11 people per group). The number of engagements I had with each participant or group ranged from one to six and variously included in-person conversations, email and internet chat exchanges, transcript reviews, and reviews of conversation summaries and analyses. Initial conversations were semistructured and focused on concepts and problems related to theorizing self, identity, and subjectivity in CYC.

I created an “Invitation to Participate” document which I sent to colleagues and fellow graduate students, and I made personal requests to a number of my mentors at SCYC. I used the invitation as an opportunity to thank my teachers, colleagues, friends, and mentors for all that they had contributed to my learning and to show a continued interest in working with them and their ideas. These invitations were some of my first steps in developing a relational approach in my research process. At this early juncture in my research when I was sending out invitations and receiving responses, I realized the necessity of having to make choices regarding the scope and purpose of my work. I shifted my focus from a comprehensive survey of theories used in CYC to the more relational approach of engaging with the people and projects I felt an affinity with. Although many important people who participated in this research choose to remain anonymous, I have the privilege of acknowledging the contributions of Shanne McCaffrey, Michael Burns, Jin-Sun Yoon, Jeff Smith, Nicole Land, Vanessa Vondruska, and Hans Skott-Myhre. Furthermore, I am deeply appreciative for the ongoing engagements with my supervisors Sandrina de Finney and Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw.

What I had first envisioned as a systematic, comprehensive, and representative approach to accounting for CYC theories slowly became a more personal and relational matter. I realized
that, although I wanted to survey a great theoretical breadth, it would not be possible to accomplish such a feat while also taking the time to listen carefully to any one person or read intensely in any one area. Negotiating between the span of theories reviewed and the depth to which I engaged with people and theories was continual work for me. Breadth and depth, however, were not dichotomous poles. The more I engaged with one person, the more I experienced the rich variety of ideas they used, and, conversely, the more I surveyed a range of ideas, the more nuance and complex interrelationship I saw for any one theory.

In addition to exploring the connection between theories of self and aspects of CYC practice, many participants also shared personal stories. Some spoke about how, through personal experience, they came to conceptualize the self in the way they did, or how concepts of self were inadequate for understanding their personal experiences. In many cases, I felt deeply connected to the people who engaged in this research. Some participants had been mentors and friends for years prior to the research and some were completely new people in my life. These engagements gave me an opportunity to become more knowledgeable and involved in the ideas and projects that my peers, colleagues, and mentors were working on in CYC. I have summarized three participant engagements that stood out for me in terms of the importance of the perspectives shared and the role that the individuals came to occupy in my life. These engagements deeply impacted my own sense of self and relationship and of what my research could accomplish. I began to emphasize mentorship, positioning, and shared projects in my relationships, and to analyze my own process of conceptualizing.

**Conceptualization.** Attempting to understand, put into words, and analyze my own process of conceptualizing was an ongoing struggle for me throughout this research project. When I first began the research, having been introduced to social constructionism in my
undergraduate studies, I was already skeptical about the notion that words and concepts objectively represent things in the world, particularly the self. Social constructionism locates conceptualization in social practice and questions the concepts of truth, objectivity, and the self, arguing that “we could use our language to construct alternative worlds” (Gergen, 2009, p. 5). Poststructural feminism (e.g., Braidotti, 2006a; Butler, 1997, 2004; St. Pierre, 2000), which I was introduced to in my graduate studies, helped me to further question the process of conceptualizing by situating the relationships among language, objects, subjects, and bodies in ethical, political, sexual, and structural domains. Feminist poststructuralism locates thought within social practices and between bodies, emphasizing the discrepancies, inequalities, and power relations which constitute and are a consequence of language practices. Finally, during my research conversations, the work of Deleuze and Guattari (2003, 2004) was introduced to me as a view that informed much of social constructionism and feminist poststructuralism. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of geophilosophy helped me to clarify how I could think about methodology and the process of conceptualization, and to analyze my research engagements productively.

Geophilosophy: Thought, Bodies, and Geography

Geophilosophy is the process of determining problems and developing concepts along the lines of transformation that they contain as virtual possibilities (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003). Following Nietzsche’s (2006) perspectivism and exasperating his materialist tendencies, Deleuze and Guattari develop geophilosophy as the immanent articulation of thought constituted by an earth, people, territory, and the bodies that compose them. I work with the concept of geophilosophy in the typically Deleuzian style of inserting difference, idiosyncrasy, and intimate purposes into the ideas of other thinkers, and therefore claim engagement and functionality rather than hermeneutic accuracy in my exposition. Following Deleuze and Guatarri’s (2000) maxim, I
attempt to add the question “how does it work?” (p. 108) to questions of meaning and interpretation. In my methodology, I adapt Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003) concept of geophilosophy to keep wonder, proliferation, and relationships productive. In this section, I elaborate my geophilosophical methodology through the concepts of immanence and rhizome, and end by articulating my analytic framework which I call connectives.

**Immanence.** Immanence is an ontological commitment to not bifurcating or hierarchically ordering the substance of existence (Deleuze, 2001). Immanent ontology, in the work of Gilles Deleuze, comes through the lineage of Spinoza, Bergson, and Nietzsche, and tracks an alternative line of philosophy in the Western history of ideas (May, 2005). Immanence posits existence as a single self-organizing system without an outside: all things, forces, thoughts, and events are part of this one plane without a separation or ordering principle (Deleuze). Transcendence, in contrast to immanence, generally differentiates between the substances of existence and orders them hierarchically. As an ordering principle or outside agency, transcendence in the history of Western philosophy has taken the form god, man, mind, spirit, knowledge, science, and language. Immanence, alternatively, is the challenge of expressing life as a totality within which forces, events, thoughts, and relationships are all mutually constituting and contingently arranged. An immanent perspective views thought as existing throughout, rather than outside or beyond, the bodies that compose it.

In his collaborations with the Lacanian psychoanalyst and political activist Felix Guattari, Deleuze sets immanent philosophy, or geophilosophy, to work on capitalism, psychoanalysis, and the history of Western philosophy itself (2003). Of particular importance to this research project is Deleuze and Guattari’s articulation of thinking as an immanent experimentation and intervention in the world. When there is no longer an ontological separation between thought and
the bodies through which it occurs, concepts become active participants in the world rather than representations of it. Deleuze and Guattari therefore shift the conceptual agenda from developing concepts and theories which represent reality to a pragmatic constructivism. In their work *What is Philosophy*, Deleuze and Guattari set out to transform philosophy from a metaphysical, communicative, or reflective practice to a constructivism which has immediate pragmatic utility. They claim that philosophy is the art of forming concepts which cast and recast the problems and solutions of life. Concepts, they posit, intervene by extracting or actualizing the virtual possibilities and differences inherent in the bodies that produce them. Conceptualization, in other words, is done according to a set of problems particular to a configuration of bodies in a geography and provides possible solutions for those problems.

The challenge to think about conceptualization as happening on a plane which does not ontologically separate matter and mind helped me to move from questions about the truth, referentiality, and validity of concepts of the self to questions about how certain concepts function. I was able to think about concepts as solutions to problems or possibilities for action and relationship. Specifically, an immanent approach to conceptualizing helped me to unfold my own problems by seeing an intimate relationship between the concepts I took up, the problems I was able to address, and the relationships I was able to have. In Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003) technical vocabulary, I was constructing a plane of immanence, seeking “what it means to think, to make use of thought, to find one’s bearings in thought” (p. 37). That being said, however, the folding of mind and matter achieved through immanent philosophy coincided with the deconstruction of myself as an independent, rational, and transcendent thinker separated from my body, relationships, and geography; we were constructing a plane of immanence.
A plane of immanence is Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003) image for the backdrop of conceptual connections that are forever multiplying and reconfiguring throughout a geography. Thought occurs, in this view, at the intensive points of connection between bodies as they articulate and experiment with their own problems for living. Concepts, therefore, are in a reciprocal relationship with the bodies that compose them. Thought is produced at the intensive points of interaction between cellular bodies, planetary bodies, complex animal bodies, flows of blood, sweat, and electricity, and all else that composes the geography. Reciprocally, however, the thought that is expressed by the bodies in collision affect their flows, speeds, differentiations, expressions, and organizations. I have come to think about this reciprocal relationship between concepts and bodies in terms of habits and possibilities. On the one hand, concepts speak the relational habits of bodies as well as their inherent possibilities. For example, a complex body such as an animal’s contains all forms of difference (changes in microbes, flows of blood cells, hair growth, etc.) that can be reduced to a single stable identity through a concept (such as a name or category), or explored in its difference through concepts that attend to its becomings. On the other hand, habitual relationships or patterns of relating produce repetitive thought and concepts, whereas novel relationships or affective relations can produce new concepts. The analysis therefore shifts from a concept’s representational accuracy to its capacities for solving the problems of bodies in relationship, expressing the virtual difference that all life contains, and ability to explore what bodies can do. Deleuze and Guattari propose experimentation as one approach to creating concepts, exploring capacities, and actualizing difference.

From a geophilosophical perspective, bodies in dynamic relation produce capriciousness in thought, and such thought reciprocally make perceptible the internal differences within the system of bodies and propel their actualization (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003). Experimentation in
relationships, therefore, can facilitate changes in thought, and concepts can have pragmatic and interventive value. Importantly, the relevance or pragmatic utility of thought can only be rightfully apprehended by the bodies whose relationships it alters. This immanent measure of relevance can again be contrasted to transcendence which inserts an overarching principle, whether it is god, man, law, rationality, or truth, that judges from a predetermined outside position and imparts from above. A plane of immanence, in contrast, sets out the values, problems, and parameters of life livable by a particular set of bodies in relation. Applying this image of thought to research first necessitated a transformation from a goal to a process orientation, and then inaugurated a focus on relationship, problem definition, and concept creation. Lastly, it challenged the representational image of thought in analysis and inaugurated the concept of connectives as a way to think in motion.

**Methodology.** Deleuze and Guattari (2003) explain that philosophy is the creation of concepts according to a style, set of problems, and a geography. Geophilosophy as a research methodology provided me with a lens to think about the overlaps and disjunctions among my own goals, ideas, and projects and those of the people I was engaged with. I became more aware of how particular concepts were historically and geographically situated, and how relationships were facilitated, organized, or prevented by those concepts. I began using concepts as a way of relating to other people, their projects, and the geography that we composed. I also explored how new concepts were produced through the intensification of relationships. As I tethered conceptualization to a material geography and history of thought, I began to pay greater attention to the joys, pains, and capacities to act that concepts facilitated. Rather than concepts being understood in terms of their truth and falsity, therefore, my criteria became the expressions or diminishments of life that particular thoughts sustained. The challenge for me in applying this
perspective to methodology was to develop concepts that open up possibilities, addressed problems, and expressed creativity in the relations I had been part of during the research. One of the first steps for me was to develop a creative way of engaging with others’ work and keep our projects on the move and pragmatic. As an experiment, I developed the concept of connectives, which provided me with a way of doing analysis that felt liberating, creative, and enjoyable. Connectives was my approach to mixing, transposing, comparing, juxtaposing, and generally playing with concepts and frameworks rather than systematically analyzing or representing them for some predetermined or teleological purpose. Although I enjoyed closely reading others’ work, the idea of accurate summary or critique was never as enjoyable or productive as being playfully creative, intimately related, and taking some risks in my engagements.

**Connectives**

Connectives kept concepts in motion on the plane of immanence which was perpetually populated by new problems and concepts. Connectives were the slowing down of thought so as to make it perceptible while not losing so much ground to transcendence as to make thought calcify into stable entities whose internal difference, compositional relations or assemblages, and productive capacities were lost. Connectives developed to help solve the problem of working with data in an immanent way: to resist subjecting the process to a predetermined guiding principle, telos, method, or analytic, while still being responsible for my engagements with participants and my responsibilities to my school and supervisor. Immanence required that methods, analytics, and even researcher and participants emerged from the processes of living and practices of life rather than coming before, standing outside, or being applied or subjected to a research project. This impossibility of immanence, of a fully open and contingent process, is the aporia in which connectives developed.
*The Deleuze Dictionary* (Parr, 2010) was the first and only place that I have come across the word *connectives*. Parr’s dictionary is a fairly standard glossary of terms with page-long entries for many of Deleuze’s important concepts. At the end of each dictionary entry, however, Parr marks out three or four related dictionary entries, or what she calls *connectives*. While I read Parr’s dictionary, I used the *connectives* provided to move about the dictionary in a non-linear way, gaining a better sense of interconnectivity of Deleuze’s concepts; deepen my sense of particular terms by understanding the conceptual relationships they shared; see how any term took on a different meaning depending on the other terms with which it was assembled; and, at times, simply get lost or keep on moving. I developed Parr’s concept of *connectives* into an analytic approach to keep my work enjoyable and on the move, and to highlight the rhizomatic, rather than linear or arborescent, nature of my thinking.

The concept of *connectives* that I developed was inspired by Deleuze’s (2001) immanent ontology and propelled by his and Guattari’s (2004) figure of the rhizome. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari use a rhizome to map their image of thought. They describe the rhizome, in contradistinction to the highly structured arborescent image of thought, as connecting “any point to any other point” (p. 23). The authors describe rats and tubers as rhizomes, and a research participant, Jeff Smith, brought my attention to the fact that log jams are rhizomes, even taking pictures of one while on a canoe trip with my son and I (see Figure 2). Sword ferns are also rhizomes, as was pointed out by my son who had just completed a project and painting of the plant (see Figure 3) when I asked his permission to use the log jam picture of him. The unpredictable connections between telling my son about why his picture was in my thesis and his recent completion of a project on a rhizome is an example of a *connective*. Deleuze and Guattari state that the rhizome as a map “must be produced, constructed, a map that is always detachable,
connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entranceways and exits and its own lines of
flight” (p. 21). As an analytic, the figure of the rhizome helped me keep the materials of the
research in motion and generate multiple entrances, connections, possibilities, and exits.

The connectives analytic allowed me to retain some of the internal consistency of
concepts analyzed in this project, but primarily acted to keep them in motion by reformulating
them in relation to new and different concepts and problems. By assembling a concept or
problem with different concepts and problems, I found that their internal difference or virtual
possibility could be accentuated. Concepts were therefore not treated as finished artifacts, or
representatives of solidified thoughts, bodies, and objects, but rather as multiplicities capable of
different articulations depending on their relationships with the other concepts and problems.
Through connectives I did not necessarily explicate concepts accurately; I juxtaposed and
assembled concepts with an eye towards differences that would invite new relationships and
understandings, to explore the concepts along their own virtual lines of development. This was
always an experiment in thinking for which the validity criteria were usefulness, enjoyment, and
the capacity to reconfigure problems and produce new affects, relationships, and vistas for living.

Figure 2. Log Jam Rhizome.

A structure connected at all points with multiple entry points. Photo on right taken by Jeff
Smith, research participant on a canoe trip with Cypress and Scott Kouri.
Sword Ferns, a native plant of British Columbia, have a subterranean rhizome. Painting by Cypress Kouri.

Connectives were my way of taking pieces of thought from diverse places and cobble them together in new ways and for my own projects and purposes: to create a patchwork of experience and affect. They were momentary and singular assemblages of concepts, associations, fragments, and thoughts. Through the connectives I got lost, was surprised, determined new problems, and at times created concepts. Rather than represent a variety of theories of the self in CYC, or evaluate them from one position or another, I played among ideas and engaged with those that were interesting, enjoyable, or helped facilitate interesting and enjoyable relationships. My thinking often shot off in different directions, and at different speeds, depending on the conversations, daydreams, intuitions, or readings I was engaged in. Rather than unifying all these experiences by finding an underlying theme or imposing an overarching narrative or structure, connectives allowed me to follow through on thoughts and relationships on the basis on affect, ethics, desire, and contingency. I would often territorialize connectives on a mind-map or painting: sometimes this would end in chaos and sometimes a consistency would form (see Figure 2). Many times, connectives were conversations with a friend or research participant.
Connectives as a patchwork of different concepts, affects, and expressions which help to keep thinking and analysis on the move.

Although much of the contents of the connectives in this project started as summaries of other people’s work, it was the active and changing relationships these summaries had to other concepts and problems that formed the plane of immanence on which I worked. Connectives at times began with representations or summaries of the work of authors in the field, but were my own idiosyncratic understandings of those texts, specific to the problematics and other bodies of work with which I was engaged at the time. I sporadically introduced one body of knowledge into a new contexts or problem and conversely returned to older contexts and problems with newer ideas. In this sense, connectives did not have a predetermined goal or telos other than rousing thought, mediating between chaos and transcendence, producing affect and the capacity to connect, and setting up an experiment. Goals were contingently assembled based on the relationships that I was a part of and therefore I was perpetually negotiating between commitments and new ventures. Connectives functioned to allow desire and inspiration to pass through the research system and direct reading and writing rather than as a systematic method. Connectives acted to alter concepts by varying their performance as they were transposed into new assemblages with other concepts and I was transformed in the process.
In producing the connectives as a finalized product or representing them as stable in this more closed thesis rendering, much of the life, vibrancy, flow, energy, and creativity in them was lost. Writing this section in the past tense feels, similarly, like a small death. Whatever life still remains in the connectives, it will be up to myself and readers to plug into them anew and make something of it. The connectives were thought, produced and written immanently and rhizomatically, and can be engaged with, read and added to in the same style. I have used footnotes to represent, in some small way, how my thoughts were moving and developing; they can be followed instead of reading the text linearly, or new connectives can be constructed as new thoughts emerge for the reader while engaging with the text. There is no direction for how to work connectives, only materials, the philosophy of immanence, and untapped capacities. I also invite you to connect your own thoughts, problems, desires, capacities, and relationships to this project. I invite you to take what is useful and interesting and to leave what is not.

Although connectives helped me to keep thought moving, they did not allow me to fully express the meaningfulness of specific and unique relationships that did endure the shifts and changes of more quickly transposing thought. This mediating between commitments, responsibilities, and consistency in relationships on the one hand, and experimentation, deterritorialization, and movement on the other, was a productive tension for me. Following a principle of relationship, the more enduring, stable, and situated thinking I did was related to my research conversations. I have summarized three of these conversational engagements in the next Chapter highlighting the work of some of my mentors and kept the Connectives chapter distinct to represent my own attempts at a disjunctive and creative thinking. My experience was that stable and personal relationships occurred simultaneously with more rhizomatic thought, but like writing immanence within the context of a prevalent mind-body dualism, it was a struggle to re-
present these interweaved experiences within a thesis text. In Chapter 3, therefore, I summarize three research conversations and in Chapter 4 provide my own analysis through the connectives analytic.
Chapter 3: Conversational Engagements

For this project, I undertook to have research conversations with theorists in the field, including graduate students, instructors, writers, and college and university faculty. In total I spoke with six individuals and three groups (ranging from 3 to 11 people per group). The number of discrete conversations I had with each individual or group ranged from one to five, and each conversation lasted approximately one to two hours. The conversations were semistructured and focused on theories of the self, identity, and subjectivity, extending into conversations about praxis, professionalization, personal experience, and theoretical frameworks, among other topics.

I prepared for the conversations by familiarizing myself with the writings of each participant when available and provided each person with a list of potential questions that we could discuss. I followed the participants’ lead in the questions, concepts, and topics covered, while also being upfront about my own interests and ideas. Every conversation had a different tone and rhythm, but I generally tried to be present, receptive, responsive, respectful, and curious. I asked open ended questions, paraphrased, summarized, and asked for clarification when I felt I needed it. I took notes of specific concepts, frameworks, or any literature or authors that participants mentioned. Once I had transcribed the conversations, I sent them to the participants for their feedback, commentary, and editing.

In terms of approach and analysis, although Deleuzian geophilosophy inspired experimentations, deterritorializations, and a collectivizing of thought, I was also deeply committed to an ethics of relationship that emphasized recognition, endurance of relationship, and faithful interpretation. In all the conversations, I attempted to stay close to people’s stories and theories, particularly by paraphrasing during interviews, requesting editing and expansions on transcripts, and having some participants read and comment on my conversation summaries.
In this chapter, I narrate, summarize, and analyze my engagements with three research participants, Hans Skott-Myhre, Jin-Sun Yoon, and Shanne McCaffrey, highlighting ideas of self, identity, and subjectivity that we spoke about, as well as how my relationship with them developed over the course of a number of years. I specifically speak to my engagements with these individuals because they stood out for me in their impact on my own thinking and the quality of relationship that we developed. My engagements with these three people were significant because of the mentorship and friendship I felt in the relationships and the shared projects that have blossomed from our collaborations. In this chapter I attempt to stay as close as possible to the content and spirit of our talks and have had each summary read and commented on by the participant.

Although I only summarize three engagements in this chapter, I audio recorded, transcribed, and received verification or feedback for all of the research conversations. In total, I had nearly 200 typed single spaced pages of transcripts replete with concepts, insights, critiques, hopes, histories, knowledges, and experiences. Every single research conversation I had inspired my curiosity, reaffirmed my interest in this project, and provided me with new avenues to follow and think about. In this chapter I summarize three conversational engagements, and in Chapter 4: Connectives, I engage with a wider variety of the ideas that emerged from the research as a whole including all of the conversational and textual engagements.

**Hans Skott-Myhre**

Hans Skott-Myhre is full professor in Child and Youth Studies at Brock University and an adjunct professor to UVic’s School of Child and Youth Care (SCYC). He is a cultural theorist specifically interested in liberatory politics and how youth-adult relationships have the capacity to challenge global capitalism. His research foci include identity, community, revolutionary
subjectivity, the body, and creative expression. His 2008 book *Youth and Subculture: Creating New Spaces for Radical Youth Work* was used as a textbook in the graduate program at SCYC during my studies there.

I met Hans in 2011 at the UVic CYC in Action III conference. At the conference, I attended two formal events in which Hans participated: a roundtable conversation and a panel discussion. The roundtable conversation, entitled “Conversations on Conversing in Child and Youth Care,” was inspired by a discussion in an online CYC forum regarding the ways in which practitioners and scholars speak about the field. The roundtable was later published as an article with the same title (de Finney, Little, Skott-Myhre, & Gharabaghi, 2012). At the conference and in the article, Hans levels a critique of the workings of colonialism, capitalism, and whiteness in contemporary CYC. For example, Hans argues that

> the idea that we, as child and youth care workers, can somehow operate in a realm of pure relationship absent an active struggle to overcome the practices imbedded in our common history of colonization is an act of massive and destructive denial. . . . There can be no field of relational child and youth care without undoing the regimes of privilege and power rooted in the practices and beliefs of whiteness. (de Finney et al., 2012, p. 139)

Hans also demonstrates concern with the reappropriation of CYC work by capitalism through the ubiquitous objective of preparing children and youth for work and maintaining the status quo. He points out that “ideas that allow us to justify controlling and disciplining young people, to rationalize dismissing their wisdom, and to valorize our own power and superiority as adults” (de Finney et al., 2012, p. 133) are advantageous to the ruling class. In the article, Hans specifically called on CYC workers to rid themselves of their addiction to power and global capital.

The second conference event that Hans participated in and I attended was a panel discussion with Kathy Skott-Myhre and Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw entitled “Becoming-Animal, Becoming Worldly Through Rethinking, Reclaiming, and Reconnecting.” The room in
which the session took place was full, and the session was a conference highlight for many of us. The panel’s stated intention was to construct alternatives to neoliberal and globalist-informed child and youth studies by engaging perspectives that collapsed the binaries of human/nonhuman, mind/body, and subject/object. Hans’s presentation focused on CYC as a social diagram that maps the relations between child and adult, particularly in institutional settings. He used the concept of social diagrams to analyze CYC in terms of its distribution of social norms, disciplinary practices, ideas of normalcy and deviance, and coding of behaviour. Hans later published his presentation as an article titled “The Question of Doors” (H. Skott-Myhre, 2012b) in which he argues for a revolutionary project that aims “to destroy the institution itself so as to release the life it contains into the social” (p. 328). Intrigued by the radical rethinking of CYC as a liberatory praxis, I wondered why I had not heard of this approach in my earlier studies and what possibilities it contained for the future of CYC.

In the months that followed the conference, I began reading Hans’s (2008) seminal book *Youth and Subculture as Creative Force: Creating New Spaces for Radical Youth Work*. In the book, Hans uses Deleuze and Foucault to conceptualize a mutually liberatory CYC praxis in which youth and adults can collaboratively challenge domineering ideology and power. His analysis specifically explores identity as a social construct, a problematic, a performance, and a possibility for liberation and creativity, arguing that under conditions of global capitalism, the desire for the freedom to creatively produce ourselves without the constraints of capitalist production makes the exploration of the subjectum, or the subject that is free to creatively act, imperative for any project that proposes youth-adult relations as the ground for producing new worlds. (p. 5)
Here Hans draws on Balibar’s (1994) concepts *subjectum* and *subjectus* to describe human relations in terms of their expressive capacities and modes of capture. Later in the book, Hans connects the analysis of the subject to Spinoza’s ontology of immanence to work the body back into performative theories of the subject.

I was enthralled by the book (Skott-Myhre, 2008) and soon began communicating with Hans regarding the ideas in it. At my request, Hans made further reading recommendations for me. It was at this time, and in conjunction with Hans’s text, that a professor and a small group of students at UVic, including myself, (re)started a Deleuze and Guattari reading group to explore how poststructural thought could be used in CYC. I felt excited and engaged by the friendships that were building around this area of theory. I hoped to continue to build my relationships with Hans and the people in our reading group and develop my capacity to deploy Deleuzian thought in my research and practice. I sensed that Hans would probably be a very fun and interesting person to converse with in my research engagements.

Hans agreed to be part of my research project, and we set up a time to meet at his home in Ontario. Hans hosted me with great generosity, and I felt much more like a welcome friend than a student or researcher. The experience of friendship and the feelings of welcome were new ways of entering theoretical discussions for me and were the beginnings of my thinking about the importance of relationship in scholarship, research, and knowledge production. We had many informal conversations in the time I stayed with him, as well as very specific exchanges on concepts of the self, subjectivity, and identity. Hans began our first formal research conversation by explaining how the self was, for him, a habit. He stated: “It is habitual linguistically and it is habitual performatively.” Linguistically, he explained, the self is the repetitious use of the term “I” or “me,” which covers up all the dynamic, transforming, evolving, and decomposing aspects
of a body in interaction with other bodies and environments. Working from a thoroughly materialist perspective, Hans articulated a theory of how the body gets organized and captured by particular linguistic habits, such as self-reference. He recited an opening quote from a Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* to help explain how the notion of the self was taken up by the philosophers in relation to their collaborative writings:

>The two of us wrote Anti-Oedipus together. Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. . . . Why have we kept our own names? Out of habit, purely out of habit. . . . Also because it’s nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun rises, when everybody knows it’s only a manner of speaking. To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. . . . We have been aided, inspired, multiplied. (pp. 3–4)

The implication here is that the “I,” in its reference to a single identity or stable personhood, can be upheld as the pinnacle of importance, reified as a material existent, and therefore minimize all the changes, variations, and dynamisms of a body in relationship. It can also, in contrast, be relegated to the level of unimportance and used simply as a convention that facilitates social interactions and further becomings.

Hans further explained that the notion that the self as a set of habitual behavioural performances—what we recognize as “our” patterned and embodied acting in the world—covers up the infinite relations between bodies that constitute those actions, as well as the infinite capacities for acting differently that those relations make possible. Hans clarified that since his interests were primarily ethological, in the sense of attending to systems, functions, and
capacities, he rarely uses the terms *self* or *individual* but prefers the concepts *subjects* or *singularities*. Although I had been reading Hans’s work for some time, I found his immediate dismissal of the concept of the self surprising. In this dismissal, however, I was offered a different theoretical framework that included the concepts of the subject, singularities, and bodies, a critique of the taken-for-granted notion of the self, and a framework for understanding the self as a concept.

In our first research encounter, Hans introduced me to Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, which would later become important to my understanding of the process of conceptualization. He explained that for Deleuze and Guattari, concepts are geographically and historically founded such that they resolve certain kinds of problems in a particular historical moment, for a particular group of people, in a particular place. . . . Certain sorts of ideas arise, certain sorts of habits of speech, habits of performativity, habits of reflection, and those concepts arise out of those habits as a way of sort of crystallizing, in a more sort of forming concretions, or forms of repetition, habits that solve certain sorts of problems.

This way of looking at the process of conceptualizing considers the relationships among people, other bodies, geographies, and histories, and the problems that arise from these relations. The context and utility of a concept is primary over its truth claims or representational functions. The self, from this perspective, is understood as a historical and geographic product and a tool or habit that allows for certain capacities to express themselves and others to be muted. The concept of the self can be a platform for personal liberation or a basis for rights in one context, whereas in another it can be an oppressive normative standard, such as when it is associated with dominant whiteness, masculinity, heterosexuality, or rationality. Hans articulated his analysis of the self, and its alternatives, in terms of the problems they respond to and the capacities and relationships that they allow and prevent.
Hans explained that the concept of the self emerged as a response to the problems of the 15th to 17th centuries: theocracy, the monarchical system, and homogenous collectivities. In these contexts, the concept of the self was generally useful in liberating and protecting individual life. Four hundred years later, however, Hans was “dubious as to whether the set of problems that concept was designed to address either, one, still exist, or whether, if they still exist, this concept of the self is adequate.” If the self is primarily a concept, and concepts are formed to solve problems, then the question of the self’s utility as a concept depends directly on the problems one is engaged to solve. Defining his conception of CYC in terms of liberation and expression, Hans determined that the self as a concept is expended at this moment, but could possibly be useful at other times and for other purposes. It was in this specific context that Hans went on to state, “I think the self is finished, I think it’s done.” He clarified that although we might continue to use this outdated concept to solve our current problems, it would, at best, be ineffective, and at worst, it would “deepen the groove of habitual behaviour, the groove of who we think we are, the ditch, the rut . . . the anteriorized-Western-agentic-self-expressing-individual.”

From the start of our talks, Hans always seemed to be open to different perspectives, and he emphasized the importance of having diverse projects at work within CYC. Although he critiqued the concept of the self, he recognized its utility for some purposes, as well as the importance of having a nuanced understanding of a variety of other concepts related to identity, self, and the subject. He brought my attention to the possibilities of creating and experimenting with new concepts, as well as the potential available in pieces of old concepts and practices that “never did get finished, that were foreclosed, or blocked, that were shut down or buried.” He explained that if one is interested in projects of liberation, then these other concepts, both newly formed and historically buried, are potentially useful.
For Hans, the concept of the self no longer has liberatory capacities nor adequately responds to the problems of our times: capitalism, neocolonialism, prevalent whiteness and heteronormativity, racism, and environmental degradation. He explained that in our current context we are struggling to find new concepts with which to replace the self: “We are playing with new ideas, singularities, multiplicities, multitudes, with collectivities, with old Indigenous, ancient Indigenous concepts of group identity, with we-are-I. . . . You used to be a self then, now what?” He framed his particular understanding of our current times and replacement terms for the self through concepts developed by Deleuze (1992) and by Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005, 2009). Working with Deleuze, Hans explained that in a digital, anxiety-saturated, and indeterminate society of control, like our own, the subject is never able to fully arrive, and projects of liberation, such as his, require new forms of subjectivity and revolt. Deleuze and Guattari explicate forms of antifascist, singularized, nomadic, and expressive subjectivities throughout their work, and Hans, among others, has been working with these new concepts to develop a liberatory CYC praxis.

Hans also introduced me to Hardt and Negri, social theorists working in the Deleuzian line of political philosophy, who address the relationship between the social and the subjective in the current global context. The social analyses and concepts that these authors introduce in their major collaborative works update much of Deleuze’s thought for contemporary times. Hardt and Negri (2000, 2005, 2009), in redefining the current social regime and the subjectivities produced therein, develop the concepts of *Empire* and *multitude*. The concept of Empire is used by Hardt and Negri (2000) to designate the new networks of power, including multinational corporations, supernational institutions, and powerful nation-states, in relation to the current state of perpetual war and crisis across the globe. Multitude, on the other hand, is designated as the “living
alternative that grows within Empire” (Hardt & Negri, 2005, p. xiii), made up of innumerable points of connection, collaboration, and commonality among different agents. Multitude, like Empire, is a network, but one that is premised on difference and the ability of different groups of people to discover or produce the common, a basis for communicating and acting together. The replacement concept for subjectivity that Hardt and Negri develop in relation to Empire and multitude is singularity, a concept that does away with interiority and individuality.

Hardt and Negri (2000, 2009) define singularity in relation to multitude and in contrast to identity and individualism. They argue that identity and identity politics, such as workers solidarity, were, and continue to be, important vehicles for political struggle against capitalism, but because identity is so deeply entangled with notions of property and sovereignty, its revolutionary potential is limited. Hans endorsed the concept of singularity, particularly in its capacity for rethinking subjectivity outside capitalist ideology. He explicated it as follows:

Singularity is a set of capacities of any given body that can only be expressed in relation to other bodies. So it, in and of itself, any given body has a set of capacities that is unique to it, but there is no internality to a singularity. In other words, there is no inside from which expression can arise. Expression arises in collision with other bodies which bring forward the expressive capacities of the bodies in collision. So there is no—it’s a flat surface, it’s an immanent surface, there is no internal, there is no internal self, no one behind the eyeballs, there is no soul or notion of an unconscious, if you will. The singularity is a purely contingent expression of capacity in a particular moment under particular circumstances in a particular assemblage, its components.

Hans concurred with Hardt and Negri’s (2000, 2009) critiques of group identity based on ownership and sovereignty and elaborated an alternative ontology through the concept of becoming.

While I was visiting him, Hans shared a paper with me that dealt specifically with the concept of identity in its violent and revolutionary capacities. The article was published a year later as “Fleeing Identity: Towards a Revolutionary Politics of Relationship” (H. Skott-Myhre,
In the paper, Hans explores the construction of whiteness in Western semiology, as an identity, in relation to colonization and decolonization, and in anticapitalist revolution and CYC praxis. His critique, which continues to challenge and provoke me, is that identifying with a people “always puts one at odds with those who are not your people” (p. 334). He goes on to explain that one’s people “is a contemporary web of interconnected lines of force and capacity that cannot be described or adequately accounted for in any linguistic form” (p. 334). Identity, in this sense, is not a historical lineage, but rather a momentary tactic deployed to protect the creative and living forces of a contemporary web of relations. The danger of using identity as a tactic to protect creative life force, however, is that it can block further becomings if it becomes calcified, habituated, or reified. Hans writes that in the case of sustaining the practices, beliefs and languages of a group under assault by a dominating force, it is important to recognize that this tactic [identity] is designed to keep the creative capacities of these practices as living force. It can become dangerous if tactics become romanticized or historicized. (p. 335)

This understanding of identity provides a basis for rethinking politics along the lines of singularity developed by Hardt and Negri (2005), but it seems to contrast with Indigenous or other forms of identity politics that are based on history, people, or location.

Building on the political philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari (2003, 2004) and Hardt and Negri (2000, 2009), Hans suggests a praxis free of identity and full of becoming—full of processes of becoming different. He also suggests that, rather than being caught in the Western semiology of the self, we use the politics of identity as a contested and rich space of encounter and transformation. He writes that “the foundational function of a forceful identity politics is not to be found in the configuration of the identity” (2012a, p. 340), but in a drive to resist enslavement. Identity, in this sense, is not an end but a means to liberation: the beginning of a process and a way of moving forward. Revolution and liberation, therefore, are not fostered by
identifying with a group, people, or past, but by becoming other than what we are. The ideal proposed here is not specifically prescriptive because becoming other that what we currently are is an open process full of contingency and interactivity. The suggestion does, however, contain a subtle prescription for undoing identity and being open to an undisclosed and unpredictable future. Not unlike the violence enacted by the history of the Western semiology and dominant whiteness that Hans is attempting to escape, the redeployment of a framework for undoing identity, developed in the lineage of Western thought and in the heart of the empire (France in the case of Deleuze and Guattari, America in the case of Hardt, and Italy in the case of Negri), poses serious questions and hazards for those subjects whose identities have been made most vulnerable or disposable.

I asked Hans about the potential damage that undoing identity might pose for colonized or oppressed peoples. He replied that from the perspective of becomings, identity formations under colonial or otherwise genocidal conditions are a protective tactic. He explained that colonial domination is a form of homogenization in which the habits and beliefs of one group are under assault by another, and therefore the very variability and diversity of groups in general is under assault. In such circumstances, entire worlds or trajectories of becoming are in jeopardy:

The living force of the existing habits and beliefs, in other words the, if you wish, the ecological diversity of differing group of peoples with different habits and beliefs and differing ways of describing things, and different ways of representing the world, different language structures, because of course, your language structure is also, among other things, a way of understanding how a particular world was perceived and put together. And when you extinguish that, you literally lose a world. When you extinguish a mode of language, or a mode of description, or a mode of spiritual belief, or a mode of spiritual practice, or a mode of cultural practice, you lose a world.

Hans reemphasized, however, that these worlds and practices were ongoing becomings of creative and expressive life force, always transforming and only identifiable as this or that group once an outside force is pressed upon them. Without a system of capture, whether despotic,
capitalistic, fascist, or colonial, life proceeds along lines of change that do not presuppose identities. Under conditions of capture and assault, however, Hans argued that it is tactically useful to be able to assert oneself, one’s group, and one’s habits and practices as an identity:

It is important to realize that it is specifically a tactic—it can become calcified if it is romanticized or if the mistake is made to hold in place those habits. . . . It’s to keep the door open of the becoming of those habits once there becomes a space . . . once the colonial project lightens to look for the ruptures and fractures, to continue the becoming. If it becomes calcified and reactive and built on resentment and ‘no,’ as opposed to an affirmation of difference, then once it gets into the negative, ‘no’ to the dominant culture, ‘no’ which means we are going to stay the same, then you have calcification and a new form of fascism.

Hans likened identity formation to an immune system: In times of duress, asserting identity can have a protective function, but an overresponse, in this case through a reactive identity against an invasive agent that is no longer active, can harm the body it was meant to protect.

The ideas Hans put forward regarding colonialism raised questions for me that I continued to work on throughout my research. First, the concept of becoming places creative life force in general as the primary imperative. Individual people, groups, or even species are seen as instantiations of life force and therefore primarily measured according to their becomings or ongoing perpetuation of life force in general. The second point that raised concern for me was the interpretive problem of measuring the threat of the invasive, viral, or colonial agent. Political concepts such as Empire provide important analytics for reconceptualizing colonialism and imperialism in the 21st century, but continue to foreground Euro-Western scholarship and their problems and solutions. For example, while Euro-Western scholars are theorizing global capitalism and Empire as the new forms of capture, and multitudes, singularities, and becomings as the revolutionary political force, there is a risk of obscuring, equating, or lessening our analyses of colonialism and Indigenous sovereignty. Indigenous scholars remind us of how newly configured liberatory projects can distract from the repatriation of Indigenous lands (Tuck
& Yang, 2012) or ignore the violence enacted on Indigenous cosmologies when interpreted through Euro-Western epistemology-ontology divides (Watts, 2013). As a settler on Indigenous territory, I believe a good measure for the usefulness of any contemporary social theory is its ability to facilitate decolonization, reconciliation, and the redress of harms, assessed on a basis developed by, and in the terms of, those peoples most affected.

Lastly, I am left wondering about the possibility of analyzing critiques of identity on the basis of identity, that is to say, to recognize and question the privilege to define or do away with identity. I am concerned about the power and privilege that determines who gets to decide what identity is? Who gets to decide what life means? Who gets to make ontological decisions? Hans goes a long way in answering these questions by making colonization and whiteness visible and by clearly stating that identity is invaluable under certain conditions. Conversely, however, Hans’s perspective raised questions for me regarding how my identity interfaced with my own research and authorship on identity: What would it mean for me, someone who benefits from white, cisgender, settler, and male privilege, to make declarative statements about what identity is, how it works as a process, or what it might be for another person, particularly a person or group marginalized through processes of identity formation? What is it to flee or to deconstruct whiteness or other identity categories when non-whites cannot flee being coloured in the same ways? What, if any, is the special relationship between poststructuralism or Deleuzian thought and critical, feminist, and Indigenous theory?

When I brought some of these questions to Hans’ attention, he clarified for me that his conception of flight as it relates to identity is specifically not a way out or escape, but rather a way into “certain deterritorialized intensities” or becomings. Furthermore, he explicated how flights of identity are only accessible to minority subject positions and not available to those in
majority positions. Working with a philosophy of immanence, Hans explained that creative expressions of life are happening everywhere and at all times, but much of them become recaptured and subjugated in dominant codes, representations, and axiomatics. It is therefore our ability to experiment along lines of flight of identity that pass through or disrupt the dominant codes and express themselves in singular and non-recuperable ways that hold promise for upsetting the dominant system and expressing life more freely. Such deterritorialized intensities which escape capture by the dominant system are specifically those available to the minoritarian.

Following Deleuze and Guattari (2004), minority identity, or minoritarian positions, function outside the dominant codes of society and are therefore less definable and containable by them. Minoritarian identities are defined rather by flux, speeds of change, relationships with one another, and their ability to flee social codes and control. Minoritarian identity, however, is generally under threat by capitalist and colonialist systems seeking to appropriate or otherwise usurp their creative productions. By using ridged identity categories as a tactic to preserve the creative life force of bodies under assault by a dominant system, by submitting flights of identity to stable categories, life may be preserved, but calcification can also set in and interrupt the more freely expressing life flows that identifications were originally intended to protect.

In terms of majoritarian identities, conversely, flights of identity and becoming are less accessible as the productive life forces of these bodies are already in a state of capture. These more stable and consolidated identities, produced within the dominant codes and categories, have their chances of flight specifically through becoming-minoritarian; connecting with flows of becoming outside the dominant system. Hans (2006) suggests “becoming visible” (p. 219) and dismantling discourses of otherness for those of us in majoritarian positions. He situates discourses and practices of othering, particularly of creating knowledge of the other, in
Enlightenment and colonial histories, and argues that othering function through visibilities. Visibility is the dominant or central powers ability to see, know, appropriate, and exclude the other, historically functional through concepts of race, insanity, homosexuality, and poverty. Visibility of the other simultaneously protect those in power as their identities could remain unexamined or taken for granted. Becoming visible, for Hans, is a process of undoing majoritarian privilege by accounting for our own subjectivities, remembering our own histories and communities, and making ourselves open to scrutiny.

In the years that followed those initial interviews, I continued to read Hans’s work and to talk with him about Deleuze and Guattari and the connection between identity and anticolonial praxis. Hans helped me work through the text *What Is Philosophy* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003), through which I constructed my geophilosophical methodology. I also continued to meet with our small Deleuze and Guattari reading group, which morphed, grew, and broke down a number of times. It was in these relationships with Hans and our reading group that I felt the most passionate about my thesis research. It was hard for me to distinguish between my enjoyment of the theory and my enjoyment of the people with whom I was reading and theorizing. It became apparent to me that if I were going to enjoy my research and work, it would have to be guided by my relationships with the people around me as much, or even more, than the theories they used. It was in these early interviews that I moved toward a methodology of connection and the direct experience of relationship, mentoring, and a respectful engagement with commonality and difference. It was also in these relationships that I started to imagine a more politicized CYC capable of responding to the challenges of our current geopolitical moment. I continue to be mentored by Hans through various reading groups and writing projects that we both take part in.
Jin-Sun Yoon

Professor Jin-Sun Yoon has been a faculty member in SCYC since 2002 and recently won the UVic Harry Hickman Alumni Award for Excellence in Teaching. Beyond her commitment to educational leadership, Jin-Sun is very active in community engagement and social justice projects. She is a founding member of *antidote: Multiracial and Indigenous Girls and Women’s Network*, which is a place of safety and empowerment for young women traditionally marginalized or underserved. She has also been the chair for SCYC’s community life portfolio, cross-cultural and equity portfolios, and is co-chair of the Minority and Indigenous Women Instructors’ Network at UVic. Jin-Sun is widely recognized for her ability to connect with students and her capacity to design, develop, and deliver courses and bring fresh curricular approaches to SCYC.

I consider Jin-Sun to be my first mentor in CYC. As an undergraduate student at SCYC, I took nearly all my courses by distance education. Jin-Sun reached out to me in small personal ways and helped me feel more connected to the school. For example, she asked about my family, showed interest in personal details, and recognized my strengths and hopes. In class, her critical and straightforward questions pushed me to think through many of my assumptions, particularly about gender, class, and race. I appreciated being respectfully challenged to recognize how my social location was implicated in my thought and practice. Also, I was inspired by the breadth of her community involvement and her thoroughgoing social justice perspective. It was Jin-Sun’s invitations to participate in community and university-related projects that cultivated my sense of involvement in the school. Her inviting, caring, and purposeful approach turned the relational theories I was learning into a lived experience.
Into my MA studies, Jin-Sun mentored me in the sense that she guided my professional work as a counsellor, youth worker, and teaching assistant. I was not the only student for whom she was a mentor and a point of real connection with the school. She has been a leader at the school for those of us affected by or interested in addressing issues of identity, social justice, diversity, and decolonization. It was without question that I would invite Jin-Sun to participate in my research project in order to learn more about her theoretical and community-based work. I also hoped to reciprocate many of the relational qualities she showed me, such as acknowledgement, respect, interest, and mutual support. Lastly, I hoped to make her work more visible in CYC and position myself in solidarity with her.

Prior to our research conversations, I reviewed the curriculum that Jin-Sun developed and delivered for CYC 338: Applying Developmental Theory in CYC Practice. CYC 338 contextualizes CYC lifespan and development courses through the deployment of feminist, queer, anticolonial, antiracist, and cultural identity development theories. Starting from the perspectives of neurobiology, developmental psychology, psychiatry, and ecological systems theory, the 338 curriculum situates individual development in social processes. Critical and sociologically informed analyses are used to focus on how colonization, globalization, social stratification, racism, sexism, minoritization, and marginalization affect developmental processes. The complexity of development and identity, theorized in terms of both inherent individual and socially transmitted processes, is accomplished in 338 through social, biological, psychological, and historical analyses. Jin-Sun emphasizes how social processes can come to be understood in personal terms and therefore theorizes: gender in relation to gender socialization and patriarchy; ethnicity in the context of ethnocentrism; race within racism and racialization processes; and sexual orientation with reference to heterosexism and homophobia. In her
teaching, writing, and interviews for this research project, Jin-Sun continued to endorse an intersectional framework for working within these tensions.

Jin-Sun (2012) proposes that the use of intersectional frameworks in CYC is one of the most effective and socially responsible approaches to preparing students for practice in a quickly diversifying Canadian context. She introduced intersectionality to our CYC 338 class via Audre Lorde’s (2007) statement that “there is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not live single-issue lives” (p. 138). Lorde’s quotation speaks to the layered and multiple facets of identity as they relate to people’s struggles for social justice and freedom from oppression. In this sense, intersectional theory both relies on and struggles against socially constructed identity categories that produce interrelated yet differential experiences of oppression, discrimination, power, and privilege. Although identity markers can be used as a basis to account for oppression, Jin-Sun consistently focuses on “institutionalized conditions of oppression” (Yoon, 2011, CYC 338 notes, week 17), rather than the ranking of individual oppression based on a measure of additive injustices. In this way intersectionality brings a strong political analytic to questions of the construction of identity and subject formation. Intersectionality also explores how identity can be used to transform oppressive structures.

Jin-Sun later introduced us to the work of Kimberlé Crenshaw, whose 1991 “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color” catapulted intersectionality into academic, political, and legal discourse and inspired a generation of feminists, particularly women of colour. Working in the contexts of second-wave feminism and civil rights, Crenshaw’s key insight is that experiences of oppression, violence, and discrimination against black women need to be analyzed and responded to in terms of the interrelated systems of racism and sexism. For Crenshaw, conceptualizing or addressing sexism
or racism independent of the other is insufficient. In addition to arguing that systems of oppression reinforce one another, Crenshaw also claims that (1) political activism needs to deal with both the positive and negative aspects of identity; and (2) emphasis needs to be placed on intragroup differences of oppression (differential experiences within any one axis of identity). These insights are concisely articulated in Crenshaw’s statement that “the problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend differences, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite—that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences” (p. 1242). In this statement, Crenshaw wrestles with the seemingly conflicting views of identity as a social construction to be overcome and as a platform for detailed analysis and precise politics. As with other feminists and critical race theorists of the time, Crenshaw’s early work engages with identity categories in terms of their social construction, material effects, affects, and meanings. She does not wholeheartedly endorse the elimination of the categories of race and gender, arguing instead that race and gender, although socially constructed, are the vehicles through which human equality can be achieved.

Another important consideration that Jin-Sun invited me to think through in 338 was the processes of socialization that tie individual development to discriminatory discourses and institutions. She argues that humans inherently categorize and discriminate and that these processes are not essentially problematic but rather quite useful for survival and flourishing. What is problematic, however, are the social mechanisms, discourses of hate, and usurpations of power that use categorizations to privilege some groups while oppressing others. The socialization of values and roles through which virtually every society or culture attempts to impart norms to its young members often functions disenfranchise some groups while centering
or privileging others. Intersectionality, in this sense, helps make visible the complex workings of power and privilege within a society.

Intersectionality provides the analytic tools for critical interventions in institutionalized discrimination. Intersectionality exists because “there is a dominant norm or discourse that upholds systemic and institutional homophobia, racism, sexism, classism, ableism, sizeism, and all the other ways in which people are marginalized, problematized, and disempowered” (Yoon, CYC 338, 2011, week 19 notes). Building on the argument of humans’ inherent categorizing function, Jin-Sun explains that being judgmental is not necessarily to be avoided, but judgments should be analyzed based on their location in a discourse, identity politics, and consequences in terms of upholding or dismantling oppressive systems. Simply put, Jin-Sun states that “we are all biased and we’d better learn how to make better judgments.” I believe that Jin-Sun’s argument that it is more productive to work towards good judgment than to claim that one is non-judgmental is in line with Crenshaw’s (1991) advancement of a politics that is not geared towards emptying the categories used to dominate and discriminate of their social significance, but rather uses such categories as tools to address systems of domination themselves.

The dilemma between outright rejecting identity categories that oppress individuals and groups and using them as political tools is nicely metaphorized in Audre Lorde’s (2007) claim that “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (p. 112). Here, Lorde seems to be advocating a refusal and resistance in relation to identity categories, but examining the quotation in its original context provides a more complex picture. The statement with the surrounding sentences from Sister Outsider reads:
It is learning how to take our differences and make them strengths. For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change. (p. 112)

I read Lorde here as arguing that the identity categories used by dominant power to disenfranchise people are transformable into strengths and a basis for community and solidarity. I believe that Lorde is hoping to redefine or revise the values attributed to a category, or correct the functioning of the boundaries between categories, so that they can be used to connect rather than separate. The idea that identity categories can be used as a platform for understanding the interconnections among forms of oppression, as well as the necessary connections for conceptualizing and affirming resistance, circles back to Jin-Sun’s direction that the categories of intersectionality not be used to compare oppressed individuals but as tools for analysis.

Within the debate on the possible uses of concepts such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and ability, I believe that a focus on using identity categories as analytical tools or for developing solidarity and resistance is feasible and called for. The deployment of such categories, however, must also be tempered with an awareness of the already overcoded features of these social constructs. Using these categories strategically, analytically, or as a resource needs to be considered in conjunction with the overwhelming historical and cultural assumptions and biases that continue to operate and code these concepts. Redeploying identity categories based in and saturated with racism, heterosexism, classism, and the like can continue, I believe, to perpetuate their problematic usage and work to reify them. Jin-Sun, over the course of many years, helped me to develop the conceptual background and vocabulary to start engaging in theoretical debates on identity, social issues, and praxis. Very importantly, however, she always
inspired an embodied, personal, and relational approach to theoretical work by emphasizing the necessity of applying such theories and concepts to my own lived experience.

It was within our learning relationship, filled with conceptual questions and challenges, that Jin-Sun and I began our research engagements. As in the courses she taught, Jin-Sun very much wove her personal history, identity, and journey into the conversation. The connections she made between the personal, familial, cultural, political, communal, and academic spheres of her life were strong and always seemed mutually reinforcing. Jin-Sun reminded me, through telling her stories, that my own family, body, history, language, performances, location, and situatedness within society and social discourse are inextricably tied to my practice, thought, research, and relationships. Our conversations led me to be more curious and interested in my own cultural and ethnic identities, my gendered subjectivity, and how I perform, benefit from, suffer from, and use my identity in my work and thinking. Two points that became increasingly important for me (not to the exclusion of others) was being an anglophone from Quebec and being half Lebanese. These two aspects of my identity—or rather, locations within social structures, history, and discourse—became relevant to me, I believe, because of the political unrest in both the Middle East and Quebec. During the time of my research, it seemed like these aspects of my identity were important to the extent that I emphasized them as important, as well as to the degree to which they were covered in the media and popular conversation. In the end, however, I was usually able to set some parts of my identity aside to either enjoy some other part of life or to work on other projects. It became evident that some aspects of my identity, such as generally passing for white and male, provided a shelter or haven for pacing out my engagement with race and gender. Furthermore, situating my experiences of safety, choice, and opportunity within the dominance of anglophone, male, settler, and white norms in Victoria, BC, I
understand that my ability to do research was facilitated by structural power and privilege. Over time, Jin-Sun helped me to develop critical concepts for understanding how these aspects of my identity were situated in social locations of discrimination and privilege, and how a more nuanced understanding of my identity was possible through critical developmental theories.

Although I am an ethnic hybrid, my skin colour has consistently been read as white as far as I can tell, and I benefit from white privilege in many ways. The low visibility of my Lebanese ethnicity has provided me with many benefits, which I have come to see as having structured my life course. First of all, I have been able to explore and understand my ethnic and racial identity on my own terms and in my own time. I am never asked to explain my ethnicity, to identify one way or another, or to speak for Arabs or Lebs in general. I understand whiteness in this sense as a shield, but also as a sacrifice. In the becoming-white of my father’s lineage and the becoming-Arab of my mother’s lineage, as produced in my and my siblings’ births, we have at once been afforded privilege, protection, and power through whiteness, while also sacrificing a great amount of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic identity on the Arab side. As much as I have the freedom to pursue or not pursue my ethnic identity, the lack of impetus and familial conveyance of our heritage is also a painful loss. Furthermore, assimilation into a Canadian identity apart from both English and Lebanese affiliations is an enticing safeguard, stronghold, and disavowal.

Growing up in an ethnically diverse area of Montreal, Quebec, around the time that the multiculturalism policy was turned into an act, I experienced many different attitudes and approaches to diversity. I think we, the urban children of 1980s Montreal, experienced a turning point in cultural discourses on race, ethnicity, culture, immigration, assimilation, and reconciliation/confrontation with First Nations Peoples at an important developmental period of our lives. On the one hand, our schools were changing to include diversity issues as a major
component of curriculum, while on the other hand, older generations continued to battle on racial, religious, linguistic, and cultural lines. Amid the intense disputes between Anglo- and Franco-Canadians, the 1980s were also a time of intense dispute between First Nations and settler Canadians. The Oka Crisis occurred when I was about 10 years old. While everyone from my racially diverse and mainly first- or second-generation immigrant neighborhood seemed united on the settler side, many of us youths listened to the Kanehsatake United Voices Radio shows and developed a more positive imaginary of the Mohawks and other First Nations.

Although I personally knew people from dozens of countries across the world, I did not know any First Nations kids or families, at least none that identified as such to me. My knowledge and experience of First Peoples at that time was totally abstract, based on TV reports and newspaper images. Once the crisis deescalated, however, discussions on First Nations rights seemed to die down in the media, and we just kept on listening to the great hip-hop programs Kanehsatake would air.

It was through the guidance and support of Jin-Sun Yoon and my supervisor Sandrina de Finney that 20 years later, while writing this thesis, I could go back and think through the complexities of these issues with greater critical insight. Reexamining my own and my family’s history has been a very big part of learning to situate my work within ongoing struggles for justice in the face of colonialism, racism, sexism, and other forms of violence and oppression. I believe that I can now better appreciate, understand, and, to a limited extent, participate in current Indigenous movements such as Idle No More. Furthermore, this learning has helped me situate myself in relation to the revolutions occurring in the Middle East, to transnational migration, and to the ongoing language conflicts in Quebec. I continue to try and conceptualize the connections among the French colonialism of Lebanon, my family’s migration to Canada,
and our particular situatedness in both the Anglo-Franco conflicts as well as First Nations struggles. I continued, through these theories and considerations, to return to CYC theory with more interest in how our conceptualizations of self and identity are either connected to or disconnected from social, historical, and political processes.

Jin-Sun, as an educational leader in theorizing the connections between the individual and the political in CYC, has been working on racial, minority, ethnic, and cultural identity development models for over two decades. In the CYC courses I took with her, she provided numerous models from the scholarly literature to help us conceptualize ourselves, children, youth, families, and communities in terms of identity development. In simplified form for teaching purposes, Jin-Sun uses a racial identity development model adapted from Sue and Sue (2008) that is composed of five stages: (1) conformity; (2) dissonance; (3) resistance and immersion; (4) introspection; and (5) integrative awareness. In terms of interpersonal practice, Jin-Sun always emphasizes the importance of running at least two analyses concurrently to understand the parallels and discordances between a practitioner and a client related to their respective stages of identity development. Jin-Sun cautions, however, that developmental modeling, particularly linear modeling, is only a starting place that needs to be contextualized and critiqued. These models represent an attempt to engage practitioners in processes of reflection, critique, and analysis rather than attempting to explain diversity, development, and difference absolutely. Furthermore, these identity development models specifically apply to pluralistic societies with European sociopolitical origins and a colonial history. They are for training purposes only; they do not capture the fluid and dynamic reality of identity relations. In recent years, Jin-Sun has been enhancing and combining these models to formulate her own model for understanding CYC practice issues in the context of identity development.
Jin-Sun is currently working on a difference development model based on the identity development research of Sue and Sue (2008) and combining intersectional theory, neuropsychology, and ethnocultural allodynia (Comas-Díaz & Jacobsen, 2001). Her model theorizes how our cultural contexts, interpersonal relationships, and identities manifest at a neurobiological level. She argues that when analyses of power, privilege, and identity development are combined, a compelling argument can be made that the development of oppressed or marginalized people is taxed at the biological and neurological levels. Furthermore, she is developing conceptualizations of the relational aspects of identity development, particularly notions of ascription, assimilation, cultural safety, and minoritization. Jin-Sun (CYC 338, 2011, week 20 notes) argues that “there is a toll living in the psychological dominance of Whiteness in a society that is institutionally Eurocentric (marked by statutory holidays, faces on currency, dominant historical and political figures, etc.).”

In all of her work, Jin-Sun has contextualized her teaching and theory in historical and geographical contexts. She continually rethinks and updates her approaches and theories in terms of histories of colonialism, the changing demographics of practitioners and clients, changing attitudes and dominant ideologies, and the site of convergence, which is present-day Canada. For example, she is currently rethinking cultural competence and diversity training in the context of a rapidly changing demographic of racialized and minoritized children, youth, and practitioners (Yoon, 2012). She advocates for a critical evaluation of social norms and best practices, the power and privilege afforded to practitioners, and dominant ideologies of heteronormativity, ethnocentrism, and racism. Jin-Sun emphasized in our interviews that although CYC uses an ecological or systems theory to contextualize individual experiences, it equally omits, for the most part, the all-important chronosystem.
The chronosystem, according to Jin-Sun, is what contextualizes all individualized identities, and even systems themselves, in time and across geography according to larger patterns and politics. Context can be used, via intersectionality, to understand how the systems that shape an individual’s context are themselves affected by historical and political forces, and how context is always shifting depending on the configuration of people and systems you find yourself in. This more relational aspect of context has been elaborated by Jin-Sun in terms of cultural or identity salience, the social ascriptions or codings that provide identity from the outside, and the relative safety afforded or adaptability needed to navigate contexts. In terms of relational practice, Jin-Sun is developing a comprehensive training model that has the capacity to understand interactions and practice across multilayered or pluricultural identities that are in constant development or processes of adapting. These models emphasize the relational ethics and critical consciousness necessary to address systemic issues affecting individuals and communities. They stress the importance of understanding a practitioner’s own social location in terms of the privilege afforded to them through multiple systems of power and, conversely, the risks or discriminations a practitioner can face due to systems of injustice. Her model and approach hold promise for conceptualizing solidarity and justice in relational practice via an analysis of power and privilege along contextualized, complex, and changing identity lines.

Jin-Sun repeatedly underlines the importance of theorizing colonization and decolonization as part of any practice or framework for understanding identity or seeking social justice. She is very active in anticolonial projects, particularly in solidarity with Indigenous Peoples, but also in terms of curricular and personal decolonization. She explained to me how these commitments are perpetually challenged in contexts where whiteness and colonial mentality thrive, including university settings. What I take from her anticolonial pedagogy is the
importance of working in solidarity with Indigenous individuals and communities, analyzing CYC in historical and colonial terms, understanding oneself in social and historical terms, making Indigenous resistance more visible, making SCYC a safer place for Indigenous learners, prioritizing those most affected by oppression and discrimination, and undoing the false belief that not recognizing difference works toward social justice. Lastly, I learned that these projects take ongoing effort, commitment, community solidarity, and good doses of humour and vulnerability.

The relational qualities of honesty, patience, generosity, and welcome that I have been shown by Jin-Sun have inspired much of my approach to learning, teaching, practice, and doing research. I have tried, through my conversations and interactions, to embody this kind of relational approach. I have used my research project as a vehicle to get better acquainted with Jin-Sun and her theoretical work, and I hope that my project can work to make her important contributions more visible in our CYC community. I believe that mentorship and a critical and generous approach is crucial for a CYC praxis rooted in interdependence.

Shanne McCaffrey

Shanne McCaffrey is a faculty member in SCYC with a background in law, education, and social services. At SCYC, she chairs a portfolio that supports Indigenous students called Supporting Indigenous Learners Knowledge & Skills (SILKS). Shanne is also on the steering committee for the Siem Smun’ eem Indigenous Child Well-being Research Network. Her academic and research interests include the relationship between Indigenous people and land; child welfare; colonialism; and community development.

Shanne was one of my professors during my undergraduate studies, and is the person I credit for first raising my critical awareness of Indigenous Peoples, colonization, my location as
a settler, and the necessary work of allyship and healing in CYC. Shanne is a Cree Métis woman dedicated to understanding and confronting how colonization shapes the current circumstances and relationships among Indigenous, Métis, and non-Indigenous people and communities. Shanne taught me in two of my undergraduate CYC courses at UVic, has supported my academic and practice work, and has recently taken me on as an assistant to her teaching at the school. In my undergraduate courses with her, I found that she went about teaching in a respectful, patient way. Like many settlers, in my first real confrontations with the facts of historical and ongoing colonization in Canada, I reacted with a range of psychological and emotional defenses: denial, blame, forgetfulness, minimization of the facts, egocentrism, outrage, self-pity, and guilt. I am still amazed at Shanne’s capacity to endure these reactions and work with me as I confronted and learnt to relate more effectively to the complexities of my identity and relationship to Indigenous people, the land, my own history, our shared histories.

Shanne developed a relationship with me in which I could confront the realities of colonization and my own reactions to them. Her strength, compassion, and commitment sustained our relationship through my own reactive outbursts and self-centredness. She has recently taken on mentoring me as I learn to address colonialism in my work as a teaching assistant and instructor in CYC. She is always willing to think through the complexities of how our identities reveal themselves and inform and impact teaching and learning situations. She brings a spirit of collaboration and appreciation to learning experiences and works to recognize the values and knowledge that every learner contributes to the learning situation. Shanne inspires in me a very personal and intimate approach to learning and teaching, particularly about historical, political, legal, and systemic issues.
Outside the school, Shanne’s immense generosity of spirit and care became profoundly more significant to me when one of my children got sick. While I was writing this thesis, my son Cypress was diagnosed and treated for cancer. Shanne helped us by sharing Cree medicines, gifts, and teachings. She also provided me with support through her teachings and wise words. My son held the medicines Shanne gave to him throughout his nights at the hospital and loved showing them and talking about them to his nurses and visitors. Her healing approach provided a spiritual and playful element that Cypress was able to take in and be proud of. Now healed and back home, Cypress has his medicine pouch and gifts hanging by his bed, and we still learn from the teachings associated with them.

In our research interviews, Shanne explained to me that she lives a Cree and Buddhist philosophy, and that she brings this approach into her teaching and practice. She open-heartedly shared Cree and Buddhist teachings with me and talked to me about the practical importance of bringing spirituality into CYC theory and practice. We talked about the traumas of spiritual devaluation and the undermining of Indigenous healing practices and cosmology through colonization. Shanne sees Indigenous cultural and spiritual revitalization as important for healing and good relations on this land. She demonstrates how spiritual and cultural healing is necessary for all children, youth, families, and communities that are affected by colonization, including Indigenous Peoples, settlers, and people with other relations to this land.

One important teaching Shanne shared with me was in regards to working with people’s suffering. Shanne explained that suffering is related to attachment to temporary things, ego, place, ideals, environments, and contexts. If we can release attachment, we can move with greater strength, and lessening attachment to the ego can lead to the growth of humility. Furthermore, Shanne taught me that everyone experiences suffering, and if suffering is worked
with in a good way, it can often become medicine that people can use to help others. Cree and Buddhist teachings say that pain and suffering “come to settle in” our spirit as medicine. This means that, in CYC, conversations about personal, familial, and community suffering and healing need to have a more prominent place. Shanne stresses the need for collaboration in regards to transforming suffering into healing, both within the academy and between academics and community members. She also expressed a hope to see more conversations about suffering, healing, and spirituality in CYC.

A second teaching Shanne shared with me in our interviews was what she called her blanket metaphor. Blankets, I was told, are sacred for many Indigenous Peoples, as well as for people of many other cultures. Shanne uses the idea of a blanket to conceptualize a person’s identity as part of a historical and cultural context. She explains that we all walk with a blanket; this blanket has a tapestry, which is a rich symbol of our historical and cultural context. Some people you meet, Shanne says, understand your blanket and its symbols and therefore understand your story; some people, however, do not see your blanket. For CYC practitioners, she says, as people providing care to others, the important questions are, “How can we work to see your blankets? How can we work as interpreters of blankets?” Similarly, in our teaching, if we do not recognize students’ strengths, then we do not see their blankets, their spirit, or their story.

Thirdly, Shanne introduced me to the Cree laws connected to having good relations with other humans, plants, and animals. The teachings she has shared with me relate to how and why one does not do harm, and how to go about specific kinds of takings in a good way when they are necessary. She describes the strong connection she feels between Buddhist and Cree teachings regarding living in mutual relationships with other humans, plants, trees, animals, the land, earth, and water. The teachings were shared orally and Shanne explained the importance of
being with people and taking the time to teach in a personal way, which academic writing
tseldom provides. Whenever we meet, I feel a strong presence and intentionality in the way she
talks and in what she says. And, despite her emphasis on being with people in learning, she has
the capacity to be similarly present in phone conversations and in online learning forums.

Although Shanne repeatedly emphasizes the importance of oral teachings, having a
context for sharing teachings, and approaching every experience with humility and care, she is
also able to express and address, in writing, the horrors and disrespect of historical and
contemporary colonization. For example, she writes that

from the beginning of contact in the Americas, the tentacles of colonization have
insidiously spread out to reach, squeeze, and grasp anything that comes into their path. Aboriginal people have been, to put it bluntly, terrorized and subjugated by the atrocities of colonialism for centuries. Our families, collectives, and communities have been broken, our children abducted, our languages, culture, and spirituality outlawed. The colonization of the Americas has been a pervasive and destructive force overwhelming Aboriginal people causing multi-generational trauma. Its effects linger on in successive generations of the people, families, and communities and with these effects come the stories. (McCaffrey, 2010, p. 343)

Furthermore, in a beautiful, saddening, and powerful narrative called *Locating My Indian Self in the Academy’s Tenure Process* (McCaffrey, 2011), Shanne explains how colonization infiltrates and structures academic processes at UVic. She describes how her self, her
multifaceted and integrated sense of who she is, was attacked and disrespected by a university process and faculty actions reminiscent of, or rather continuous with, colonialism. She explains that, for her, a Cree Métis scholar working in community, and for other Indigenous scholars and educators, the higher levels of university were a place “devoid of spirit, identity, culture and Indigenous traditions” (McCaffrey, 2011, para. 1).

In *Transforming the Academy: Indigenous Education* (McCaffrey, 2011), Shanne
describes how she put forward to a committee a portfolio for her tenure evaluation. The portfolio
included meaningful gifts from community, stories of relationships and responsibilities, and pieces of her Indigenous self in addition to academic measures, achievements, and contributions. She described many cultural, ceremonial, and community pieces as related to her Indigenous self and “scholarship of engagement” with Indigenous communities. Her portfolio, however, through the multilevel process of tenure evaluation, was decried by some as unacademic or unscholarly, as something that did not fit, or that took away from a truly academic portfolio or personality. Some individuals on the committee rearranged, degraded, and treated her portfolio with what she considered disrespect. Shanne describes her reflections on a preliminary evaluation of the portfolio in these words:

It was time for me to re-think not only my portfolio, but my Indian self and how I wanted to (re)present that self to the academy. I needed to find a way that I could connect with my spirit, my identity and ancestry in an academy, located, importantly, on traditional Lekwungen territory. (McCaffrey, 2011, para. 1)

Shanne (2011) goes on to describe how she went to her mother for support, and how she decided not only to not compartmentalize herself, but to confront the racism, colonialism, and stratification that structures the academic trajectory. She illustrates in her article the pride, strength, and depth of knowledge and feeling that many of us have come to love and appreciate in her. She tells of a letter written on traditional salmon coloured paper that she placed at the front of her portfolio and how she stood up in person to the committee. Below are some excerpts from her “Salmon Letter” on Indigenizing the tenure process:

I was hired to be a teacher, a senior instructor and I was also hired for being an Indian; for those cultural mysteries, traditions, and relationships that I am fortunate to enjoy. To those systems, social conventions, politics, culture that I know the signs, language and codes of membership to. To knowing those intricate matrices of relationships between nations and communities, traditions, cultures and protocols essential to working in effective reciprocal partnerships and circles with diverse and strong cultural peoples.

Every part of my authentic whole self that I bring to the relationships I have in and out of the academy are denied a space or a place in the tenure process. Only my scholarly self...
need stand up and take a bow, while the Indian self in me is pulled from the binders, piece by piece. My Indian self is not honoured or valued in this process. That side is banished to reside in the shadows and darkness, daring to peek out for a chance to speak—my speak—speak my truth. My Indian self is “Kguss kay tin” (lonely and sad).

I am being taught through this process to pull that Indian self inward, allowing my Euro-western self to stand up and take a bow, when this is not my culture, these are not my ways. I have grieved, wailed and felt deep sorrow and confusion about this colonial process. I ask: ‘Am I assimilated enough to be accepted?’ ‘Do I want to be assimilated enough?’ ‘Is this the measure, the standard they speak of?’ The only self that need appear is my Euro-western self, while my Indian self shrinks and recedes to the shadows. ‘Can I really move forward this way?’ My Indian self is an outcast in this process. There is no invitation for the Indian in me to come forward. My tears have been pregnant with sorrow as I struggle to move out of this place of contradiction, control and imbalance.

Now it is this very Indian self, that I am being denied the right to voice, express, represent in an institutionalized tenure process. The Indian self in me demands that I make reparation—that I acknowledge this Indian self. I straighten my shoulders and I whisper aloud: ‘I am not you. Don’t assume I aspire to be like you. I am not aspiring to be like you. I am “me.” I am aspiring to learn and grow into the person that I am meant to be.’ My Indian self nods; ‘Gway-iss’ (good). Yet, this is the Indian self that this institution and others are always seeking from me—my Indian eyes, head, and heart.

If I dance the hoop dance and spin all the hoops, take all directions to show my academic and scholarly self, will I be assimilated enough, white enough, colonized enough, institutionalized and finally good enough for the academy? At what cost to my spirit, sense of self-identity, responsibility to my ancestry, and authenticity will be damaged and negotiated in this process. What about my Indian self? My Indian self grins and pokes me forward—‘ma kee skway in’ (you’re crazy).

The tenure process will not take the Indian out of me or from me. I am clinging to my brownness, arms wrapped around like a straight jacket with my fingernails embedded deeply into my back, hanging on like a dog soldier, to life to limb, to spirit and membership to the collective and to self, especially to my Indian self. You cannot pull it from me. It is not a shroud that can be donned and then taken off. It is skin that blankets me and is rooted in blood and bone, to my being, my self, my spirit, and my identity. It is me. My Indian self takes a creep forward another step and says ‘kin stoo tin?’ (Do you understand?) I reply: ‘ehheh, kin stoo ta tin’ (I understand).

I have been taught to critique, to assess and evaluate. I have a responsibility to start the conversation of the colonial process of tenure. So here I am today, hovering around the academy. In or out, on the teeter—totter. To be brought in to be corseted and cloistered by colonial fingers that are pinching the Indian in me into silence, seclusion until it is time for that Indian to be brought into the light again. Now is that time. ‘Peeyeswak!’ (Thunder) ‘Peeyeswak’!
I have been taught to tell the truth. Sometimes I am more successful at this than other times. But I have a responsibility to tell the truth especially to my Indian self, my cultural self and beloved ancestry. This tenure process has been damaging. It is colonialism living inside my head, like a fuzzy fungus that causes confusion and unease and pain. At first I did not recognize this invasive discomfort until I actually sat down and moved to that deep place and began thinking—thinking with all of myself represented, speaking with the Indian in me. ‘kee nan skomitin’ (Thank you) I say to myself.

I have a responsibility to those who have come before me, to honour, validate and acknowledge and stand them up. This must be done first. These are my ways, my ways of knowing, doing, being. My Indian self comes into the light and screams joyously: ‘Ka kee oni wa ga ma gannuck’ (All my relations). (par. 16-25, emphasis in original)

Shanne’s integrity, strength, courage, and willingness to engage colonial structures and mindsets are wonderfully expressed here. Also, her willingness to share teachings transformatively with those who try to hurt her and discredit her knowledge comes through clearly as another decolonizing ethic. Her ability to translate between oral teachings and written language is inspiring. Her critical insight and ability to connect the structural and personal demonstrates her leadership in the Indigenization movement at our school. I am very encouraged that Shanne has recognized my work as a shared work with hers, and that she has called it “honest and revealing.” Shanne’s encouragement and friendship have been integral to my own development of a relational, purposeful, and political approach to CYC work and research.

Shanne, while being a woman of deep feeling and traditional knowledge, is also a law scholar who is particularly knowledgeable about Indigenous treaty negotiations, the overrepresentation of Indigenous people in the justice system, and Indigenous child welfare. She has been my primary teacher in the area of Indigenous or Aboriginal law, which is particularly relevant to at least two different identity issues. First, Indigenous identity is intimately tied to land and the traditions and history related to the land. Second, Canadian legal recognition processes dictate how Indigenous Peoples of Canada are acknowledged as Indian, Aboriginal, Métis, and Inuit and how these recognitions imply particular relationships to the state.
Shanne argues that training in the justice system needs much more emphasis on diversity, gender, and colonization, and that learning about laws that impact Indigenous people is important for all CYC practitioners. Although my coursework and discussions with her have been elaborate, she has specifically emphasized the importance of Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the Gladue report process, which allow for the unique historical context of Aboriginal people to be taken into consideration in criminal sentencing, Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution Act, which protects Aboriginal and treaty rights, and Delgamuukw v. the Queen, a BC Supreme Court case that questioned Aboriginal territorial title and the evidentiary merit of oral history.

The Gladue Principle elaborates how and why, under Section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code of Canada (2014), judges must take into account (through a Gladue report) the unique historical context of Aboriginal persons for criminal sentencing purposes. Subsection e was added to Section 718.2 in 1996 to address the significantly disproportionate and increasing number of incarcerated Aboriginal people compared to their non-Aboriginal counterparts. It reads: “All available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders.” With subsection e in place, a judge sentencing an accused Aboriginal person could now consider “such colonizing systems and forces as residential schools, child welfare issues, substance addiction, abuse, poverty, loss of autonomy, and loss of cultural identity.” (McCaffrey, 2010, p. 341). The Gladue Principle therefore provides a legal basis for understanding individual actions within the context of identity, culture, and history.

Confusion, complications, and problems arise, however, when information regarding an Aboriginal person’s unique historical context is not immediately available. Shanne argues that
the subsection acknowledges that the role of historical and ongoing colonization is consequential to Indigenous people’s experience and actions. She explains that “using this section as an additional tool of analysis, the judge and the court can consider the unique experiences, context, and circumstances of the Aboriginal person’s life, factors that may have played a role in bringing this person before the court” (McCaffrey, 2010, p. 340). At first however, the subsection was not fully implemented for all Aboriginal people before the criminal justice system. It was, and still is, a tool that must be applied, clarified, and reviewed in ongoing cases. Furthermore, Shanne (2012) argues that a Gladue report approach can and should be taken in child welfare cases, which generally do not adequately consider historical and contemporary aspects of colonization.

While the Gladue Principle addresses the rights of Aboriginal people in the criminal justice system, the Constitution Act of 1982, Section 35, recognizes and protects existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. The Act does not define such rights; it is through cases such as R. v. Calder and R. v. Sparrow that these rights are slowly being interpreted and given details. Delgamuukw v. the Queen was a momentous case in this regard as the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en Nations attempted to prove that traditional practices constituted title over land. Furthermore, Delgamuukw was a very significant case as it was one of the first times that oral history was heard as evidence in a BC court. Not only are treaties, the legitimacy of oral histories, and issues of sovereignty still being argued in courts across the country, the very recognition of certain Indigenous Peoples is still unclear in Canadian law. While the Constitution Act of 1982, Section 35, recognizes Aboriginal rights, the Act contains some ambiguity regarding who is recognized as Aboriginal by the Canadian government. One specific example of the complications of recognition can be found in the change from the 1867 Constitution Act, which mentions “Indians,” to the 1982 Constitution Act mention of “Indian, Inuit, and Métis
peoples.” It is still not clear in Canadian law whether the “Indians” specified in 1867 are the same as those specified in 1982, which would exclude Inuit and Métis from the category “Indian,” or if the older category of Indian includes the two new categories or Inuit and Métis. This complication regarding recognition has consequence in terms of jurisdiction, rights, and status, particularly in regards to land claims. Although Shanne emphasizes the importance of law in land decolonization and Indigenous self-governance, she also put emphasis on the daily, personal, and educational aspects of decolonization.

For Shanne, decolonization includes, on one hand, a personal, community, and spiritual dimension, while on the other, it involves practical actions in the world and in institutions. In terms of the spiritual aspects of decolonization, Shanne encourages all people to understand their own history, suffering, and teachings. She told me that meditation is a powerful decolonizing tool for her because it can bring clarity around what is important and what can be left as periphery. She understands decolonization as knowing one’s own blanket and the medicines that have come from our suffering, as well as an ability to interpret and appreciate others’ blankets. She also sees dreams as a powerful force for directing and getting feedback on our waking lives. She believes that decolonization means engaging with people in healing, and focusing on healing rather than change. Change, from her Buddhist and Cree perspective, is ceaseless, and the focus on intervention should address a person’s history and suffering. This notion of change also runs counter to a philosophy that promotes attachments to things, people, and ego. Instead, Shanne promotes a view of learning to let go of attachments through transforming suffering into healing and medicine.

On the practical and action-oriented side of decolonizing practice, Shanne has worked tirelessly at the university and in community. She is on the steering committee of Siem
Smun’ee, the Indigenous Child Well-being Research Network. At UVic she works to increase access and supports for Indigenous people. In specific reference to SCYC, she has been central in the Supporting Indigenous Learners Knowledge & Skills (SILKS) portfolio, which provides mentorship and connects Indigenous students to on- and off-campus resources. Shanne understands decolonizing SCYC in terms of recruiting more Indigenous learners, providing them with more educational and personal supports, and analyzing our decolonization projects in terms of tangible effects for students. She argues for a reconceptualization of learning outcomes and outputs that better attend to the diverse strengths Indigenous students bring to SCYC, including ceremony, oral tradition, and community connection. As well, Shanne says it is important to break down institutional and educational hierarchies and embrace the idea that every person in the learning encounter has teachings and knowledge. At a faculty level, she advocates for co-teaching, collaboration, supporting others when they are suffering, the use of healing, and developing a CYC community in which people are aware and supportive of each other’s work.

**Summary**

The research conversations that I engaged in with Hans Skott-Myhre, Jin-Sun Yoon, and Shanne McCaffrey were particularly meaningful for me in terms of both their theoretical content and relational qualities. The concepts and theoretical frameworks that these three individuals shared with me, although at times different from one another, have gradually come to be pivotal in my own thinking and theorizations. I have continually returned to their ideas of self, identity, and subjectivity in CYC throughout my research process and have, through these concepts and relationships, begun to situate myself in CYC debates and projects. Specifically, I see my own work as making a small contribution to a growing CYC movement committed to social justice, anti-capitalism, decolonization, sustainability, and liberatory or politicized praxis. Furthermore,
I believe that the relational qualities that characterized my relationships with these three individuals, particularly enjoyment, inspiration, mentorship, and mutual acknowledgement and respect, support such collaborative projects. In the next chapter, I will continue to engage with the ideas from these conversations, as well as analyze the material from my other conversations and textual engagements. I take a more experimental and rhizomatic approach in Chapter 4: Connectives, juxtaposing, assembling, connecting, comparing, and generally patchworking the many ideas that were shared with me in all of my conversation in order to develop my own concepts and positions in CYC.
Chapter 4: Connectives

In this chapter I use the connectives approach to analyze the literature on the self in CYC and further engage with the ideas that emerged from my research conversations. The connectives approach to analysis does not offer an overarching narrative or structure, but juxtaposes, compares, and assembles ideas rhizomatically. To more clearly represent my thinking, I have edited, organized, and generally manicured the messier workspace that I found productive and enlivening during my research. I have, however, also attempted to capture what is less containable in words: those intuitions, speedy thoughts, flows, conjunctions and disjunctions, and affects. Throughout, the synthesis of ideas into a cohesive whole – an approach that reflects an integrated consciousness or transcendent narrative - is confronted by a disjunctive and dispersed variety of divergent and excessive relationships, subjectivities, becomings, and ideas.

The following quote helped me to think outside of a strictly organized narrative or linear approach to analysis:

Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there, try out continuums of intensities segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004, p. 178)

Following Deleuze and Guattari’s (2004) recommendations to experiment, experience, and keep on the move, I have at times approached analysis in a nonlinear, fragmented, and productive style. In general, affect, interest, relationships with others, historical familiarity, novelty, and intuition influenced my choice of foci. I allowed my attention to move freely and playfully in the available material and ideas, and at times did not try to cleanly resolve these
disjunctions and plays through neat transitions or post-hoc connections or patterns. I invite readers to approach this chapter according to their own tastes and to take what is of interest and leave what is not. My hope in developing this approach was to encourage thought, enjoyment, creativity, and connection, rather than to lead a reader through a specific argument and to a final conclusion. For me, the multiplicity of articulations of the self and other concepts deconstructs any single and stable notion, and provides tools for building certain projects. While working through the connectives approach, I assembled, disassembled, and reassembled ideas and research material idiosyncratically, randomly, experimentally, and on the basis of affect and pragmatism. In the final chapter I relay some of my own key insights and where the research took me, but here I invite readers to engage and experiment in their own way.

I have created footnotes in this chapter as one way to move through the text. Connecting the text through the footnotes more closely resembles my thinking process compared to a linear and logical progression. In the footnotes, the letter C, for Connective, and the number that follows it, can be used to move from section to section in the chapter. I invite readers to start at whatever section is of interest and continue to move about the text in ways that are desirable or interesting. For a more functional engagement, sections and arguments can be uprooted from their current contexts and assembled differently depending on pragmatic need. Lastly, I invite readers to adapt, change, dislodge, and plug into any part of this text with their own interests or for their own purposes, to make new connections and keep this work open, alive, and moving.

C1: The Self and Subject—Western Philosophy—Language—Suspicions

The Cartesian ontology and image of the self has dominated Western thinking for nearly 400 years. Throughout the second half of the second millennium AD, Western philosophy, espoused in the texts of predominantly Caucasian European Christian heterosexual males,
travelled the globe through the passages of colonialism and imperialism. Descartes (1637/1996), as a foundational thinker in Western philosophy, proposes a split between mind and matter and describes the self as reflective, perceiving, questioning, and the foundation for knowledge. These claims of a mind-matter dualism and a self-reflective consciousness, although highly contested, have embedded themselves in many philosophical discourses on the self, including much of CYC theory. One research participant spoke of Descartes’ influence in CYC this way:

It’s like the grooves of Descartes, we get caught in the grooves of Descartes or of binary, that even in our thinking, when trying to think in new ways we get caught in the grooves because the grooves are so deep. . . . Our mother tongue

Although these grooves are so deep, alternative concepts and frameworks have offered different perspectives on the self in CYC, or at least tools to critique the more dominant notions.

Alternative ontologies\(^1\), such as that of immanence, collapse the mind-body dualism at its roots and articulate the mind and body such that

there is no thought without the body. So in that sense, it is a thoroughly immanent system and the calcifications of habit, as we know from brain science in fact, run deep grooves through, habitual grooves through the brain, patterns of neuronal interchange and so forth and those can in fact cause significant inability to be flexible, to have brain growth, to have expansion of various capacities within thought, for example. (Hans Skott-Myhre, Interview)

**Western philosophic context.** The modern\(^2\) concept of the self in Western philosophy can be traced in variable form from classical Greek philosophy to Descartes’ cogito. Plato (1992, version), in his dialogues on the death of Socrates, argued that the soul is immortal and distinct

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\(^1\) **C16: Geography—Indigenous Cosmology—Ontology and Epistemology - Immanence.** Although immanence provides an alternative to dualist ontologies, Indigenous land-based cosmology provides a complete counterpoint which criticizes the Western project of separating ontology from epistemology in the first place (Watts, 2013). Furthermore, Eve Tuck (2010) warns of the possible appropriations Western theories, such as those of immanence, can make of Indigenous knowledge.

\(^2\) **C9: Constructivism and Constructionism—Modernism and Postmodernism.** The concepts of modern and postmodern are defined in a variety of ways with particular reference to discourse, power, and conceptualizations of the self.
from the mortal body. The soul, for Plato, was a form that brought forth life in the material body and existed in another world after the physical death. Aristotle (2008, version), highly indebted to Plato but divergent from the latter’s clear separation of soul and body, developed the notion of the soul as the essence of a thing or living being. In Aristotle, for example, cutting was the essence of a knife and, following the same logic, he argued that the essence or soul of a human body was rational activity. Platonism and Aristotelianism flourished for centuries in the Western hemisphere and gradually entwined with Christian theology, particularly in scholasticism, to produce variable articulations of the self based on the ideas of essence or soul. In the 17th century, Descartes criticized classical and scholastic philosophy and formulated the modern philosophical conception of the self.

Descartes (1637/1996) founded a new philosophy on a skepticism applied to received, doubtful, and conjectural knowledge. He argued that sense perceptions and received knowledge can be ambiguous or suspect, and therefore unable to found a philosophy seeking absolute truth. Descartes’ skeptical approach left him doubting everything except the very fact of his doubting. His new philosophy, therefore, was founded on the cogito, or the self present consciousness that thinks and doubts. In Meditation II, Descartes argued that the proposition “I am” or “I exist” is necessarily true when put forward by a mind that conceives itself as such, and is therefore a reliable foundation for philosophy. The cogito, or thinking self, becomes the only rational basis of existence and is described as distinctly different from the body, extensive reality, or matter. The thinking mind and the objects of extensive reality henceforth form two distinct ontological categories, the latter being perceived and acted on by the former.

Dussel (2003) explains that Descartes’ separation of the mind from the body was firmly embedded in a European conceit that claimed a god’s eye view of the world removed from any
spatial or historical coordinates. Throughout the Enlightenment period, he argues, Europeans usurped the power once attributed to an all-seeing and -knowing god, endowing themselves with a subjectivity in a paternalistic relationship to the material world and non-Europeans others. For Dussel, the image of the conscious mind acting on an innate matter was also predicated on the prevalent conquering or colonial attitudes of the 1500s during Europe’s rise as an imperial power. Alcoff (2012) emphasizes that for Descartes and European modernity in general, “the knowing I is imagined to be both universal arbiter and neutral or perspectiveless observer and as such need not give an account of its own prejudgments or accord presumptive authority to others” (p. 63). The production of a European consciousness free of historical and material tethering and endowed with an undoubtable existence shot through with a sentiment of mastery and voraciousness justified much of the invasiveness of this philosophy throughout Europe’s colonies. As the spread of colonialism and Western philosophy intensified, so too did racist discourses that differentiated between a normative white or European subject and those marked by differences in skin, hair, and bone and categorized as other (Du Bois, 1897/1970).

Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, during the years of war between colonial and Indigenous nations in North America and worldwide, Western idealist philosophers such as Kant (1781/2003), as well as empiricists such as Hume (1740/2003), wrestled with the notion of a unified self and its relationship to empirical reality, the body, spirit, and God. Kant proposed a critical philosophy in which subjective experience was understood in terms of universal or transcendental structures whereby consciousness had subjective awareness of objects in the world through representations. However, Kant participated in a growing anthropology based on racial taxonomies, and privileged these “universal” structures of consciousness and reason to “men,” which he understood as white and civilized (Eze, 1997). Hume, contrary to Kant’s
transcendentalism, foreclosed the possibility of a consciousness that unifies or underlies the multiplicity of sense perceptions that constitute temporal experience. Hegel (1807/1998), a representative of teleological and dialectical thinking, viewed individual and social self-consciousness as a necessary and progressive development. Following another century of dialogue in Western philosophy on the self, and the continued spread of European philosophy and dominance across the globe, the conversation shifted again within Western thought through structuralism\textsuperscript{3} and what Ricoeur (1970) called “the school of suspicion” (p. 32).

The Cartesian self (1637/1996), under revision throughout the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries, received its most sustained critiques from the masters of suspicion Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud (Ricoeur, 1970). Nietzsche rethought the self in terms of its history, morality, and embodiment, whereas Marx returned consciousness to material conditions of life and class, and Freud posited an ego wrenched between bodily drives and cultural rules. From the introduction of the cogito, it took at least 200 years for the masters of suspicion to significantly challenge the rational self arrived at by Descartes and 300 years for the philosophy of immanence to be integrated with empiricism and idealism by Deleuze (1994). During this time, the concept of the subject gradually became used as an alternative or critique of the independence and transcendence of the self from social and historical realities. Furthermore, the concept of the subject became common as the locus of analysis shifted from an independent, integrated, rational self on the one hand, and constitutive social, historical, linguistic, and unconscious factors on the other.

\textsuperscript{3} C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject. Structuralism understands elements in a system as related to larger structures and attempts to elaborate the nature or organization of these structures. Semiotics, or structural linguistics, examines linguistic signs, such as “self” or “identity”, in relation to a differential system of language and its use in practice. Structural linguistics therefore challenges referentiality, or the perspective that signs directly correlate with objects in the world.
The self and the subject go for a drive. In a group interview with CYC graduate students and professors, the difference between the self and the subject was explored through an automotive metaphor. One participant grappled with the difference in this way:

Well, that whole who’s the driver thing . . . The subject or subjectified, subjectivity, then the self is the driver, that metaphor . . . It’s in a book by Giroux, talking about the self is the driver and the subject is the passenger, something like that . . . Is there an object? Was it like self, subject, I don’t even remember, and was there an object? Would the body be the object? And then the self here and the passenger, sounds kind of creepy. (Group interview)

The specific quote in Nealon and Giroux (2012) reads as follows:

In the end, we tend to understand the ‘self’ as always in the driver’s seat, whereas the ‘subject’ is more of a passenger, who may have a say in the destinations and routes but is not wholly or simply in control of them. The self is causing things to happen, whereas the subject is necessarily responding to things that happen. (p. 38)

Nealon and Giroux tease out some of the differences between the terms subject and self by arguing that, when in reference to a person, subject usually “conveys the sense of being subject to something or someone” (p. 36). The examples the authors provide include a person being “subject to” or “the subject of” some kind of authority, such as a monarchy, education, the police or laws, an investigation, research, or a government. The self, on the other hand, tends to be associated with a unified, coherent, rational, agentic being who is self-present and self-determining: what Hans Skott-Myhre in an interview called the “anteriorized-Western-agentic-self-expressing-individual.”

The self generally alludes to an individual essence prior to cultural and social relationships, whereas the subject directly references contingency on social and cultural

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4 C9: Constructivism and Constructionism—Modernism and Postmodernism. Foucault (1980), among others, complicates the relationship between social processes and the formation of the subject through an analysis of power and how knowledge or discourse is taken up and practiced by an individual.
influences (Nealon & Giroux, 2012). From the perspective of the concept of the self, social relationships, language, and even history are constituted by already existing individual selves in interaction. From the perspective of the concept of the subject, in contrast, social life, among other factors, such as history and the unconscious, constitute the individual. The self is thought to be in some ways unique, pregiven, self-present, and encapsulated, whereas the subject is related to a structure or set of forces that arrange or configure its actions, thoughts, and possibilities. The self is “the strangely intangible core . . . the “subject” is an outwardly generated concept, an effect” (p. 37).

In overly generalized and simplistic terms that will be elaborated on and complexified throughout this chapter, the self can be conceptualized as internal, consistent, causal, and free, whereas the subject is dependent, conditioned, and, at best, responding to external influence (Nealon & Giroux, 2012). The self is independent, unique, agentic, conscious, and speaking; the subject is conditioned, categorized, formed, spoken, and structured. The clear differentiation between the self and the subject provides an initial point of departure for understanding the two concepts, but it becomes complicated when the interactions between an agentic self and a subjecting structure or power are considered.

The subject/self juxtaposition as described above is reminiscent of the nurture/nature debate and reintroduces many of the same problems. The subject, in this picture, is always already in relationship to culture, family, society, discourse, information, and power that precede, outlast, interact with, and envelop it, curtailing, influencing, framing, and directing any and all or most internal agency and experience. The self, on the other hand, has some capacity for agency, internal reflection, self-knowledge, consistency, and authenticity. It is in the interplay of the self and subject so described, much like in the interaction between nature and nurture, that the
interesting complexities of the two terms survive. Nealon and Giroux (2012) explore some of this more complicated interplay through another metaphor, that of the author and reader:

The tricky thing that ‘subjectivity’ adds to the vocabulary of the ‘self’ is the fact that the interpreter himself or herself is also one of those cultural signs within the process of making meaning; the subject, like the reader, makes meanings, but the subject is also acted upon by meanings. Although readers interpret texts, they are always subject to—one might say interpreted by—their cultures. (p. 41).

In my understanding, the concept of subjectivity complicates the concept of the self because, while subjectivity provides a foundation for thinking of individuals as having their own interpretations (as when contrasted to objectivity), it also implies that the subject is part of a larger meaning-making process that includes them. Subjects are subjected to the language, categories, and representational systems that provide them with demarcations through which to make interpretations, while also being subject themselves to the same coding systems. It is in this context that the term text is expanded to include all facts of life in that everything in life is subject to interpretation. Bodies, for example, are coded and interpreted as gendered, racial, and desirable, while creative acts are judged in terms of beauty and land is read in terms of resources, pristineness, or accessibility. The subject, being one such event that is interpreted, is therefore always within a textual or interpretive social process of meaning making and cannot gain a privileged position relative to itself or social texts. While the notion of the subject challenges the presupposition that individuals’ interpretations are their own, it also offers a way to analyze how

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5 C10: The Professional Self—Marx—Praxis—Deconstruction. The notion of a textual world is also developed through Derrida’s (1988) claim that there is nothing outside of the text. Derrida’s intertwined argument that all readings are made in context is juxtaposed to anti-colonial and Marxist notions of praxis to develop the concept of a deconstructive praxis.
social, historical, linguistic, and unconscious forces are imposed, internalized, performed, or otherwise produce a self.

Interpellation: Language, text, subjectivity. Althusser (1971), as an example of a theorist wrestling with the interplay between self and subject, proposes that we are first and foremost subject to language, history, and ideology. For Althusser, historically situated language and ideology function to organize the relations within society to such an extent that those with authority can order others into subject positions and maintain capitalist relations of power. The individual is subjected to the language, callings, and categories of institutional power through a process Althusser calls *interpellation*: the process through which individuals are recruited and transformed into subjects with specific identities, positions, and relations to the material conditions of production. The concept of interpellation was one of the first ideas I was introduced to for thinking through some of the complex relations among self, subject, history, capitalism, language, and power. One participant spoke to how language calls for identity in this way:

> How do we communicate? How do we take out the ‘I’ and the ‘mes and the self. . . . Myself, yourself. . . . So when we are talking about introductions, we always ask ‘who are you?’ instead of ‘what are you becoming?’

Interpellation, for Althusser, is a hailing, the “you, over there, stop” of a police officer, the turn toward that is the moment the individual becomes subject. It is in this turn toward authority as a specified category of identity that “ideology and the hailing or interpellation of individuals as subjects are one and the same thing” (Althusser, p. 175). Nealon and Giroux (2012) insist that it is in the assumption that the authority is calling to one in particular that the line supposedly demarcating the free self from the subject is effectively blurred: “We freely and

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6 C14: Immanence—Affirmation—Nomadic Subjectivity—Becoming. The concept of becoming is elaborated through an ontology of immanence and a conception of subjectivity as nomadic.
willfully make ourselves subjects in all of our responses, in all those moments when we recognize ourselves as well as others” (p. 46, emphasis in original). It is the imaginary relationship that we enact in relation to our material existence, through ideological structures fostered by state apparatuses, that subjectivity is determined. To extend the argument further, the very notion of a free self is also an already determined part of our ideological framework in Western culture, a particular subjectivity called out to by teachers, clergy, movies, stories, and parents. The self, in this sense, is already part of the capitalist ideological structure in that it prefaces a choosing, desiring, self-expressing, and autonomous individual. Nealon and Giroux, adapting Althusser, argue that even our ideas of freedom or resistance to subjection are culturally conditioned: Any and all responses to the authority are pregiven through the same historical, material, and ideological structures. This inability to get outside the context of subject formation is what Derrida (1976, 1988), a student of Althusser, determines as there being no outside text.

Derrida’s (1988) claim that there is nothing outside of text (or context) can be read as the impossibility of stepping outside language to validate truth claims related to the subject or self. All language is inescapably self-referential in that we can never speak of something or someone without reference to the entire coding and contextualizing systems that make it intelligible. The deconstructive argument that there is nothing outside text implies somewhat of a reversal of the metaphysics of Western philosophy, which places presence and essence before construction and interpretation (Caputo, 1997). Language is no longer seen as something employed by an agent in communication, but rather that which orders the subject in a variety of ways. In a research conversation with Hans Skott-Myhre, he cited Deleuze and Guattari and put it this way:

Language doesn’t actually communicate, it orders. So it doesn’t transmit anything other than orders. So language always transmits orders. It orders the world through distinguishing between this and that and it orders you as a subject into that modal
structure, so the minute you say ‘I know that I am X, a Canadian,’ you have now ordered
yourself into a whole set of habits, a whole set of things you believe now you know.

Language, therefore orders the subject in at least two interrelated ways: (1) according to a
hierarchy, categorization, organization, or structure; and (2) in the sense of telling, administering,
summoning, demanding, or commanding. Applying this analysis of language and the subject to
the context of development, we can see how society and language order children and youth in
terms of development (one stage before the next), achievement (first-place and A students),
potential distribution in society (what are you going to be when you grow up?), or type (athletic,
social, intellectual). These orderings are generally hierarchical and usually also include the
second type of orders, orders of behaviour (studious, compliant, slow to warm up, rebellious).
The very organizing of “children” and “youth” into categories distinct from themselves and
adults (order of the first type), furthermore, is replete with orders of comportment, behaviour,
and emotions (second type). Burman (1994) explicitly criticizes the language of developmental
psychology in terms of how it acts to decontextualize parenting, child behaviour, and family
functioning and subject them to normalizing discourses. In the CYC literature, Gharabaghi
(2010) argues that language is one of the most covert elements within power imbalance between
practitioners and children, and in its more productive function, orders bodies into particular
configurations, relationships, habits of behaviour, and prescribed activities.

Throughout my research I heard and read many articulations of how language and
subjectivity are intertwined. Lacan (1991) and Deleuze and Guattari (2000), for example, view
subjects as subjects of language in terms of the organization of consciousness, bodies, and the
unconscious along semiotic chains of association. Carastathis (2008) believes that language
functions to form the subject according to categories (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, class, role in
production). For Hans Skott-Myhre (2008), linguistic representations habituate or associate a
subject to repetitive forms of practice, and for Althusser (1971) and Derrida (1980), interpretation is part of all of life, including the subject; life can be understood as a text and self-representation, such as our sense of identity, structures our experience and actions. Language, in many ways, produces a subject and provides opportunities and contractions for expressing life. Although theorists like Althusser work to understand how life is summoned and organized by language, other thinkers focus on the excesses of life relative to language. One example of the latter group from CYC is Hans Skott-Myhre (2008), who turns to the ontology of immanence and Balibar’s (a contemporary of Althusser) notions of subjectum and subjectus to further differentiate the subject in terms of its relationship to language. Throughout my research, the complexities of the relationships among language, power, history, society, culture, colonization, and the self or subject have stood out as important considerations for CYC and the theories we use to conceptualize praxis. Theorizations of the self as situated, constituted by power and structures, or marked by colonialism or capitalism, however, are not consistently included in the canonical texts of CYC.

C2: The Canonical Self

The canonical self is a concept I developed to help me think through a central portion of the CYC literature related to the concept of the self. For me, the canonical self is an aggregate of the writings of a small group of CYC theorists that together constitute the dominant conceptualization of the self in the field’s literature, particularly at SCYC during the time of my undergraduate studies and thesis research. The main authors who contributed to this body of literature, and who have thus come to hold a place of authority in articulating the self for the field, include Frances Ricks (1989, 1993, 2001), Thom Garfat (1998, 2003; Garfat & Charles,

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7 C10: The Professional Self—Marx—Praxis—Deconstruction. The concepts of subjectum and subjectus are used to explore how CYC praxis can be understood in terms of revolutionary and liberatory adult-youth relationships.
2007; Garfat & Ricks, 1995), Gerry Fewster (1990, 1999, 2010), and Mark Krueger (1991, 1994, 1997, 2007, 2009). Many other individuals at SCYC, and in North American more generally, have contributed to CYC’s rendition of the self; however, the texts of these four authors constitute what I believe to be the canonical literature.

A professor of CYC explained to me in a research conversation that during the period of 1970–1990, SCYC developed a postsecondary child and youth care training model that included considerations of the practitioner’s own values and beliefs within the context of an academic institution generally devoid of self-reflection and personal analysis for practitioner training. Furthermore, during the 1990s and 2000s, as curriculum standardization and professionalization became important in North American CYC, the emphasis on self-awareness, reflection, and presence continued to grow as a central focus in CYC. The canonical authors who wrote prolifically about the self during the 80s and 90s—and continue to do in some cases up to the present day—were influenced and engaged by other innovators in the CYC field and other disciplines, such as Henry Maier (1979, 1987, 1995), Michael Baizerman (1974, 1994, 1995), Edna Guttman (1991), Fritz Redl (1966; Redl & Wineman, 1952), Jerome Bruner (1990), and Karen VanderVen (1979, 1999). Combined, these theorists have worked for over 50 years to articulate a foundational theory of self and its relationship to knowledge and practice in CYC. These relationships between the self and knowledge and practice primarily include self-reflection

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8C8: Metaphors of the Self. Dr. Marie Hoskins, professor of CYC, has contributed a great amount to the CYC literature on the self including. I consider her outside the canonical self because (1) her writings specifically on the self are more in a dialogue with counselling and psychology and (2) by generally approaching the self from a social constructionist perspective, her rendition is vastly different than those of the other authors.

9 C6: Jungian Types and Dreams—Ways of Knowing—Individuation—Alterity. Michael Burns (2012) recently wrote a book called The Self in Child and Youth Care: A Celebration. Although Burns has contributed to CYC understandings of the self in practice, his work is not highly visible in the undergraduate curriculum at SCYC. In a research conversation with him, we discussed his work, particularly as it related to C. G. Jung’s notion of the self and individuation.
and engagement with others\textsuperscript{10}, ethical and moral practice\textsuperscript{11}, and authenticity and relational practice\textsuperscript{12}. Within the canonical discourse, understanding and articulating the self has come to be understood as necessary for effective, professional, authentic, and ethical CYC practice.

Although the self is described with some variability in the canonical texts, the authority imbued to these authors, intra-group referentiality, use of personal experience as evidence, shared assumptions around individuality and introspection, reflexive rather than definitive articulations, and depoliticized understanding of the self all constitute the canonical nature of the self’s distribution in CYC. Nealon and Giroux (2012) explain that “to be an author in the canonical sense is to be invested literally with author/ity, to be taken seriously and even revered for your accomplishments” (p. 11). It is in reference to the issue of authority as it is employed in relation to a particular articulation of the self in CYC that the canonical self emerges and necessitates critique. Furthermore, because much of CYC practice takes place in representation of the state or some other paternalistic authority, the subjectivities that are articulated as foundational to practice necessitate analysis in terms of power and authority. Throughout this chapter I engage, critique, and explore alternatives to the canonical articulation of the self in CYC.

Importantly, I am not standing outside of this particular CYC tradition to level a critique: I was trained through these canonical texts, have engaged with them thoroughly in my education and research, and consider myself to be, in some small way, part of a new generation of self-

\textsuperscript{10} \textbf{C4: Self-Awareness—Engagement with Difference—Otherness}. Self awareness as it relates to CYC training and relational practice is explored through the writings of Ricks (1989) and Ricks and Hoskins (2008).

\textsuperscript{11} \textbf{C5: The Ethical and Moral Self—Individual and Society}. The self-driven model of ethical practice (Garfat & Ricks, 1995) is elaborated and connected to morality (Magnuson, 1995), professional ethics (Mattingly, 1995), and concerned responsiveness (Ricks & Bellefeuille, 2003). The work of Canadian philosopher Dr. Charles Taylor is also interwoven through the concepts of communitarianism and inwardness.

theorists in CYC. My interest here is rather to use the canonical notions of self-reflection and questioning assumptions to interrogate the very foundations of our thinking on the self in CYC and to open our theories and traditions to their own future. I work at this project from within the very CYC context, community, and conversations that I seek to open up. As such, I perform a doubling practice that is characteristic of a poststructural or deconstructive approach. Lather (2001) describes doubling practices as a simultaneous working-within and troubling-from-within. My doubling practice therefore recognizes the need for intelligible and identifiable repetitions, while also pushing toward subversive repetitions that disrupt the overcoding of knowledge and identity. This type of conservative transgression is a double gesture that depends on a shared horizon or frame to transgress and gives new inclinations and twists to those shared lines: new life, movement, and vitality. In my view, this approach is useful and appropriate because it emphasizes the dimensions of difference, productivity, and otherness that constitute our very notions of identity, context, self, similarity, and community.

C3: The Authentic Self—Presence—Relational Practice—Stories

Gerry Fewster. Gerry Fewster (1990, 1999, 2010) is one the most visible figures in articulating a CYC perspective of the Self. Fewster (1999) generally capitalizes the s in Self and describes it variously as the experiencing of a unique perspective, an inner voice or real essence, and “a mind-boggling notion that urges me to come to terms with my place in the cosmos” (para. 2). In the company of Frances Ricks, Mark Krueger, and Thom Garfat, Fewster has literally written the book on the self in CYC. His first major work on the self (1990), Being

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13 C17: CYC-to-Come—Community and Tradition—CYC Identity—Hospitality. Using Derrida’s (2000) notion of hospitality, I deconstruct notions of CYC community, identity and core theories to develop the concept of a CYC-to-Come. CYC-to-Come is an immanent critique set to undo stable and exclusionary notions of what CYC is, who belongs to CYC, or how it is thought about and done.

14 C4: Self-Awareness—Engagement with Difference—Otherness. In one research conversation, a professor of CYC emphasized the experiential or phenomenological aspect of the self but also argued that theories of the self could detract from engagements with the other.
in Child Care: A Journey into Self, which is cited in nearly all the other canonical writers’ works, argues that the experience of self is the heart of CYC practice. Although he draws consistently on psychological theories in his engagements with the self, he also critiques them and works on a perpetually evolving and self-critical theory that integrates psychology, new age theory and science, and personal experience. In his article “Turning Myself Inside Out: My Theory of Me” (1999), Fewster reflects on a lifelong journey of engaging, analyzing, and conceptualizing the self.

Moving back and forth between theories of the self and his lived experience of himself, Fewster (1999) intertwines his examinations of both approaches—the intellectual and the experiential—with examples from his practice with children and youth. In terms of relationships, he explores the paradox of needing autonomy for relatedness, stating that “the more I am able to experience my Self as a separate and unique being, the more I am able to become an active participant in seeking, creating, and sustaining my relationships with others—and vice versa” (para. 3). He also explores the mind-body connection via his training in Western psychology, his forays into new age experience and energetics, and his ongoing work to hear his internal voice. Fewster shares the insight that, “when my mind opens up to what my body already knows, I will be free to become all that I am” (para. 34). It is important to Fewster to continually reconceptualize the self in the light of new experience, to seek empirical evidence for the self, and to explore the utility of concepts and evidence for working with the self. In the end, he suggests that “the Self emerges through direct contact with other Selves” (para. 52). Fewster provides over a dozen perspectives on the self as he shares his personal journey of integrating a core self with theoretical ideas and practice examples. Fewster, who lives on Vancouver Island,
continues to contribute to CYC understandings of the self through writing, conference presentations, and practitioner training.

**Presence, Self-Knowledge, Stories.** I first met Mark Krueger at the 2008 Child and Youth Care in Action Conference at UVic where he was awarded for outstanding leadership in CYC. Krueger has been acknowledged for his direct work with you, as well as his literary and theoretical contributions to CYC, including numerous writings on the self. Krueger (1997) extrapolates insights from research contexts to explore how using presence or self in understanding, learning, and interpretation can be useful in CYC work, and how CYC work often employs stories as a frame. Krueger explains that self-understanding, including knowing one’s feelings and consciousness, can lead “to a deeper understanding of the meaning of what is occurring” (p. 154), and in practice contexts, to “understand the subjective world of the child by sharing the road to self-discovery” (p. 154). The author contends that CYC workers frame experience in stories, integrating three sets of thoughts: (1) the uniqueness of the story due to the worker’s presence in it; (2) the existence of the story achieved through recollection; and (3) the interpretation based on familial and cultural experience. Krueger provides four themes that he understands as being important to the use of story in CYC practice: dialogue, accuracy, actions, and intuition.

In describing the self as a reflective and interpreting being that can come to understand itself in the process of storying experience, Krueger (1997) highlights the regular practice of using experiential approaches to think about CYC work. He emphasizes the subjective nature of storying and CYC work, while noting that some sort of objective accuracy is also possible through the reflective process. Although he posits a cultural and familial component to the practice of telling and interpreting stories, there is insufficient acknowledgment, I believe, of the
power and structures that allows one to be a legitimate storyteller or have a valid interpretation. There seems to be, in Krueger’s account, an assumption that an individual can story and reflect on experience relatively independent of structural forces (economic, unconscious, linguistic, social).¹⁵ Social constructionists¹⁶ and feminists, by contrast, explicitly locate stories and subjectivities in power relations, and activists like Cathy Richardson (2005) similarly trouble the notion of an innocent or ahistorical story.

Richardson (2005) explores the relationships of power that allow some stories to be foregrounded while others are made invisible. For example, she states that “the Canadian Métis have commonly been in the background of someone else’s story, someone else’s history. Until recently, Métis history has been told by non-Métis people” (p. 55). Through telling her own story of completing a PhD in CYC and reflecting on stories shared with her by other Métis individuals during her research, Richardson explains how the topic of a Métis self is connected to cultural stories and history.¹⁷ Unlike Krueger, Richardson directly connects her story to “the world of institutionalized racism, colonialism, and historical oppression” (p. 55). Importantly, however, she notes that the participants in her research emphasized stories of responding to racism and colonialism rather than being affected by it.

**Genuineness.** While Krueger’s earlier work emphasized practitioner meaning making, more recently he has explored genuineness in human interactions, and he has this to say about his experience: “I had to know self so I could be available to mirror back my experience of the

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¹⁵ Krueger (2007) returns to the concept of presence from a more critical perspective in his article “Questioning my presence in multicultural youth work.

¹⁶ C9: Constructivism and Constructionism—Modernism and Postmodernism. Social constructionism locates all experience within social narratives or discourses which structure the telling of stories as well as the relative legitimacy of storytellers and interpretations.

¹⁷ C10: Identity Theories. The location of Métis identity is explored by Richardson (2002) in terms of inhabiting both an identity of oppressed and oppressor. This hybridized identity challenges clear notions of power and privilege articulated along determined identity lines.
other” (2009, p. 49). Such genuine interactions are predicated on the ability to be present, curious, and sensitive, he says, but at bottom, youth are really “waiting for someone real” (p. 50) to show up. Krueger explains that this “real” person is someone whom they can emulate, some who can be with youth through their own questioning of who they are. Michael Burns, in a research interview, connected the idea of presence and being real to Krueger’s theory like this:

Well, you know Mark Krueger’s term presence, I think that is part of it, but in order for me to be present with you, whether in an interview or whether I am counselling you or you are counselling me, I do need to drop the mask and you will know and I will know when I do. If you are not present, if you are preoccupied, not well, something is going on in your personal life. . . . I think that is preparation.

In a different conversation, Burns said:

I think the key to having teens and young adults appreciate the self is for them to do two things. One—project the theory onto someone they know—a child, youth, or adult—it is much easier at this stage of development to understand a theory but not necessarily apply it to oneself. The second is awareness in the here and now—I feel that once they experience more of themselves in the now they will become curious about the then.

Lastly, when we explored these ideas of projecting the true self onto a present adult who is prepared and present in the context of educating or training CYC practitioners, Burns said:

Difficult stage for our students—most humans do not develop cognitively to the stage of critical self-reflection till mid-twenties. And as you know Jung did not feel we were matured until our mid to late thirties. Mindfulness I feel will help the student get there.

Who Am I? In “How Am I Who I Am? Self in Child and Youth Care Practice,” Garfat and Charles (2007) explicitly attend to presence, authenticity, and training practitioners in reflective practice through attention to the self. The authors speak authoritatively about conceptualization of self in CYC while relying on only a very small and closely knit body of literature to make their claims. In their presentation of the theory of self, Garfat and Charles rely primarily on the views of self articulated by Ricks (1989), Fewster (1990), and their own individual previous publications. They speak of the influences of culture, time, personal
experience, and history on definitions of the self, yet do not situate their rendition of self in any of these domains. The authors continually recognize a difficulty in expecting a situated self to define itself, yet perpetually deliver a singular and final definition.

Garfat and Charles (2007) begin their exposition of the self by claiming that “it would be an understatement to say that the self is central to Child and Youth Care Practice” (p. 6). Next, they relate the idea of self to the concepts of context, being, other, and responsibility. Their concept of the context of self is underdeveloped except for some indication that a “true individual self” exists that mediates all experience, yet is only knowable within “the vulnerable context of an intimate relationship” (p. 6). The authors maintain that the self, as a way of being, is manifest as a presence in relationship rather than as a tool, technique, or strategy. In a seeming contradiction, they posit a true authentic self at the core of every individual, while at the same time contending that this self is a dynamic way of being that is manifest through an aware and present engagement with others. The self is, on the one hand, “the centrality of that which we are” (p. 7), while at the same time it is constituted through relationship-based constructions of meaning “that we grow and change while constantly redefining who we are in the moment” (p. 6). Overall, the rendition of self put forward by Garfat and Charles seems to tread a line between psychoanalytic renditions of personhood and constructivist notions of the dialogic co-creation of experience and meaning. The authors argue that knowing and being a self is an obligation for practitioners in the CYC field.

In “Four Parts Magic: The Anatomy of a Child and Youth Care Intervention,” Garfat (2003), adjunct assistant professor at SCYC, analyzes the therapeutic moment of CYC interventions and uses examples to demonstrate how interventions take place through noticing, connecting, giving meaning, and speculating on the meaning making of others. He then goes on
to explain how “checking-in with self” (p. 8), “monitoring self-presentation” (p. 11), and “the utilization of self” (p. 12) are all processes that occur throughout the interventive process. Checking in with self is explained as a self-awareness of one’s own experience and the assumptions and constructs that structure experience and meaning. The monitoring of self-presentation is the process of scrutinizing one’s external self, including behaviour, body, and interactions, and how they might impact others. For Garfat, the utilization of self involves the intentional actions a practitioner makes “using some characteristic of herself or her experience to influence the process of intervention” (p. 12). Some examples of these characteristics are exposing emotional experience, appearing confused, or showing annoyance. Garfat explains that to use the self, one needs to be in touch with experience, understand one’s presentation, and have insight into the possible impacts of presentation and use of self.

**Relational Practice.** Garfat (2008) describes the self in terms of its individual existence, but positions CYC practice as a relational endeavour that manifests in the joining of self and other in the performance of a co-created “in-between” (p. 9). The in-between he describes contains both self and other in an interconnected and synchronized “we” where both selves are maintained. As the context for a CYC relationship and healing, the in-between is relational in the sense that it refers to the experience of self and other in the interaction and doing of relationship. Relational practice, for Garfat, although distinctively attentive to in-the-moment presence, also necessitates a monitoring of self and a check-in with other.

Borrowing the metaphor of the self as a lens for viewing the experienced world from Ricks (1993)\(^\text{18}\), Garfat (2008) puts forward the idea of a “perceiving self” (p. 10) and asks us to turn our lens on our self and our experiences. He asks the reader to ponder who we are, how we

know ourselves, and what the limits are to our full engagement of self. He explores the self as the experience when we have our reflection is turned on itself. The self in this rendition is therefore the observer, the instrument of observation, and the observed. The self is able to know itself, but is also self-limiting in the sense that it makes decisions regarding which perspectives it is attuned to and which it cuts off. These choices of perspectives therefore structure the experience of self, other, and the in-between, and can limit connection. Garfat, however, also proposes transcending these limitations of perspective and connection through “the purity of self that is present in the in-between” (p. 11). The in-between provides the opportunity to experience self through relationship with other, and in a truly connected relationship, the guarded self is said to be cast aside and the real self honestly exposed.

Bellefeuille and Jameson (2008) build on Garfat’s (2008) notion of the relational space in-between selves and elaborate a relational-centred practice and pedagogy framework based on a “non-individualistic construal of selfhood” (p. 39). They contend that the nonindividualistic view “represents the flip side of the more traditional narrative of the self in contemporary Western culture, which is characterized as the autonomous, separate, ego-based individual” (p. 39). The nonindividualistic elucidation of selfhood they put forward builds on the relational views of self advanced by Gergen (1999) and the psychoanalytic-developmental research of Stern (1985), while also using examples from Buddhism and African philosophy. Bellefeuille and Jamieson read Gergen as elucidating identity in terms of social construction and Stern as putting forward a research-based developmental perspective that illustrates that a separate sense of self is possessed at birth.

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19 C9: Constructivism and Constructionism—Modernism and Postmodernism. The non-individualistic perspective offered by Bellefeuille and Jamison, particularly through examples from Buddhism and African philosophy, are extended and engaged with through social constructionism.
Although Stern (1985) does emphasize interpersonal relationships, what he calls emergent social relatedness, he does so by means of positing a “core self” that is “separate, cohesive, bounded, physical unity, with a sense of [its] own agency, affectivity, and continuity in time” (p. 10). Stern draws on psychoanalysts Sullivan and Kohut and premises the subjective sense of self as the fundamental organizing principle of development that is catalyzed by domains of relatedness (Applegate, 1989). Stern argues that infants are born differentiated and without confusion between self and other, and that early development consists of making connections. He views development as emergent in the sense that nonlinearity and discontinuity are central. Guattari (1995) goes as far as reading Stern to the effect that there are multiple subjective processes working in parallel within an infant, and these subjective and shared processes, or organizations of affects, continue to function in parallel throughout life.

Despite their employment of Stern’s research and Gergen’s social constructionist perspective, Bellefeuille and Jamieson (2008) contend that most people in the CYC field would agree that the most severe behavioural and emotional issues in children, youth, and adults are a result of a lack of secure attachment and a consequent lack of relational skills. This view reflects a lingering attachment perspective based on individualism that is found in other North American accounts of CYC (e.g., Fewster, 2010, Phelan, 2008), and it relies on psychoanalytic and more individualistic models of selfhood and development. Furthermore, Bellefeuille and Jamieson argue that relational practice depends on specific practitioner qualities of interpersonal collaboration, being in the moment, attitude of openness, authenticity, improvisation, achieving, social justice, enhanced curiosity, and listening relationally. I read this list as informed by an individualistic perspective in which a person can have mastery of certain qualities and skills. Lastly, a core tenant of relational practice is that psychological growth depends on authentic and
empathetic relationships that also seem predicated on a separate or individual self. While Bellefeuille and Jamieson (2008) argue that relational practice focuses on “who we are as practitioners” (p. 8), they, at the same time, posit a nonindividualistic conception of selfhood.

In terms of authenticity, Bellefeuille and Jamieson (2008) trace the concept of the self historically, from Heidegger to Erikson, Maslow, Rogers, and Freire. They contend that being an authentic self has been variously defined in terms of genuineness, owning personal experience, consistency between value and action, and encouraging others. They read Heidegger as explicating authenticity as “a state of being that is active, congruent, contemplative, dynamic, and teleological” (p. 52). This perspective on authenticity highlights responsibility and ownership of one’s actions and the realization or experience of distinctness from others. The humanistic tradition represented by Maslow and Rogers, in comparison, theorizes a core human nature or authentic self that can be realized through processes of self-exploration and the satisfaction of universal human needs. Interestingly, the authors also introduce a dichotomy between the conceptualization of authenticity as an “individual-differences variable (i.e., an internal structure representing the core, real self) or as a relational construct (i.e., a unique experience of self with a particular ‘other’)” (p. 52). Furthermore, they explore conceptualizations of authenticity as an ongoing journey rather than a destination, and, drawing on Freire, as a critically informed participation in a society rife with contradictions.

Hoskins and Leseho (1996) also provide philosophic and psychological context for the various articulations of the self and authenticity found in counselling practice. The two metaphors for the self that they most tightly connect with notions of authenticity are the

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20 C8: Metaphors of the Self. Hoskins and Leseho (1996) survey numerous conceptualizations of the self such as the integrated, unitary, narrative, possible, empty, internalized, and dialogical. The authors divide the conceptualizations into the categories of traditional, which the authenticity laden integrated and unitary perspective fall into, and postmodern.
artichoke and the board of directors. The artichoke metaphor relates to a conceptualization of the self as unitary, which Hoskins and Leseho trace to Kohut’s cohesive self theory that emphasizes agency at the centre of psychic experience. The artichoke represents the individual, which, at the core, contains a nucleus, inheritance, or fingerprint. The essential core, however, gradually becomes covered with protective layers as interactions with the environment are endured. The core is the true self of the individual and the protective layers “insulate the child’s true essence” (p. 243). These protective layers could also be understood as masks, adopted identities, or roles. As valuable as they are, however, these layers conceal the true and cohesive self within, and it is the point of life, or at least counselling, to shed and discard the protective layers and connect with the singular core self that one has always been underneath.

The board of directors metaphor, in contrast to the artichoke metaphor that seeks to discard the inauthentic aspects of self, represents the variable identities and aspects of the individual as personae to be integrated into a higher self (Hoskins & Leseho). The higher self, therefore, can be figured as the CEO or the board’s chair who listens to the various claims, positions, needs, perspectives, expressions, and attitudes of the discrete personae and integrates them into an authentic whole. The integrated perspective sees even the most problematic or unwanted tendencies of the individual serve an important function in the psychic matrix of the individual. In this view, the self has the capacity to form a whole from these disparate fragments. Hoskins and Leseho offer the work of Carl Jung as an example of an integrated approach to conceptualizing the self.

**Individuation.** In a research conversation that I had with Michael Burns, he connected authenticity to the idea of a blueprint for one’s life, specifically drawing on the work of Carl Jung. Burns (2012) recently wrote *The Self in Child and Youth Care: A Celebration*, in which he
describes Jung’s view of the self as “a separate and interrelated phenomenon that originates inside of each of us and among us at the same time. A relationship that is solely unique but heavily influenced by the culture and the collective” (p. 11). Burn’s book is written as a workbook for self-reflection, particularly as it relates to CYC practice. It offers over 300 pages of reflective questions organized into the following categories: self-care or strengthening the self; the arts, or appreciating the self; society, or understanding the self; family, or distinguishing the self; and transformative learning, or cultivating the self. Although informed by Jung, Burns also takes a solution-focused and transformative learning approach in his book with the aim of moving the reader toward the development of their own capacities, strengths, and meaning making.

In our interview, Burns used Jung’s developmental perspective, known as individuation, to conceptualize individual growth and authenticity:

Well, if we go back to Jung, he says that you have an authentic self and you also have a blueprint for the rest of your life, an authentic life... He believed the blueprint was there at birth. As soon as you were born it was there. Also it takes, if we use his terms, it takes 35-40 years to begin to understand that at the depth that we are talking about. Yeah, he believed and I believe to, you see it, look at your baby, you see it there. I mean how could anything be inauthentic?

I understand Burns as reiterating the idea that all aspects of the personality are unique and have a function in an individual’s growth and development. Jungian individuation is the process of consciously developing the unique and innate potentialities of an individual psyche (Hall, 1983).

“Adaptation, Individuation, Collectivity,” an essay that is considered by some Jungians to have been written almost 50 years prior to its publication in 1964 and anticipating most of Jung’s later work, outlines the relationship between the collective and the psychological development of the individual. Adaptation, Jung contends, is a dual process of adapting to outer and inner conditions; the neglect of either invariantly compromises development. Jung, in this sense,
characterized Freud’s psychoanalysis as extroverted and Adler’s psychology as introverted, leaving himself the task of unifying the two attitude types within his analytic psychology (Sharp, 1987). Individuation, as a special case of exclusive adaptation to inner reality, detaches the individual from conformity with the collective and necessitates a counterbalance in the form of production of values for the collective. These values must be realizable and acknowledged by the collective because the collective is of absolute importance and “demands the highest collaborative achievement from every individual” (p. 452). Individuation and collectivity are reciprocal opposites, and any movement toward the solitude of individuation must effect an equivalent contribution to society. Jung’s engagement with the collective or reciprocating aspects of individuation, as well as relational aspects of the self’s engagement with others, is reflected throughout the CYC literature, particularly in the self-awareness and practitioner training models.

C4: Self-Awareness—Engagement with Difference—Otherness

Self-awareness. Ricks (1989), although acknowledging that the concept of the self is amorphous, puts forward three principle of self-awareness: (1) the self is available to awareness; (2) the self-image produced by this awareness is affected by new information and therefore changes; and (3) this changing self-image affects the functioning or behaviour of the self. The self-awareness model that Ricks proposes for CYC contains two major categories: beliefs and style. In his model, beliefs are statements held to be true and styles, or “presentation[s] of individuality” (p. 37), are the essence of one’s being. Self-awareness is tied so intimately to presence and the self per se that in this model, “presence of self and action of self comes into

21 C6: Jungian Types and Dreams—Ways of Knowing—Individuation—Alterity. Jungian individuation, particularly the approaches of dream interpretation and personality typology, is elaborated in detail. Furthermore, through a conversation with poststructuralism I further elaborate a Jungian perspective on otherness and relationship to collective life.
operation only when one’s attention is turned inward, and until or unless that happens, there is no self to be present” (p. 35). Ricks proposes moving beyond a view of self-awareness as summary knowledge of views, values, beliefs, personal characteristics, etc., toward a more active state or dispositional presence in which being aware is “to act in knowing what is; to be present in that knowing, and taking that presence into action” (p. 34).

For conceptual and training purposes, Ricks (1989) describes the self as a “combination of being/presenting one’s thoughts, feelings and behavioural acts out of one’s construction of reality or world view” (pp. 35–36). Ricks describes the self in terms of positions, or configurations within a temporal dimension, that are evident as thoughts, feelings, and acts. These positions are postures of the self and are “bottom line statements of one’s being or the essence of who one is” (p. 39). While Ricks argues for increased self-awareness and presence, she also cautions that positions or constructions of reality “are constructed from one’s reality and they serve one by maintaining that reality” (p. 39). Self-awareness therefore necessitates critical evaluation of potential deceptions done in a “safe environment for self-awareness discoveries” (p. 40). Once the beliefs, values, attitudes, style, feelings, and actions of a person are brought into conscious awareness at a specific time—then, and only then—is there a being or becoming self. The self, therefore, is provisional, subjective, and transitory, yet at any given moment or position can be thought of as having a specific essence or bottom line.

In the context of practitioner training, Ricks (1993) reflects on the role of a worker’s own needs and desires, and their capacity to impose particular interpretations and directions on clients. Ricks proposes a model of practitioner training called therapeutic education to integrate personal growth in curriculum objectives. She argues that child and youth care training should “adopt a new approach which incorporates a therapeutic element” because “just about every
student in a counsellor training program will need help with personal issues if they are to be effective in their work” (p. 22). Ricks proposes a complete reworking of departmental values and structures to accommodate for an educational approach that centres the student’s personal growth needs. She ties the therapeutic education model to the KSS model and explains the conjunction as a process whereby personal learning supports the learning of others, individual differences are attended to, learners direct learning, and trust and care are central to the learning process. Positing the development of self as the focus of education, Ricks argues that “educators must have clarity about the self and how to assist students in inquiring and discovering the self whether they are teaching research or intervention methods” (p. 33).

**Self-awareness and the engagement with difference.** In her 1989 model of self-awareness, Ricks takes up the idea that being present to the other (client) is impossible without being present to the self (practitioner). She goes so far as to claim that “to know about the client requires being aware of self since the client only exists out of one’s self experience of the other person” (p. 35) and that “without self there is no other” (2001, para. 1). Stated like this, self-awareness borders on solipsism and subjective idealism. Ricks, however is specifically speaking to the awareness of the practitioner rather than to the actual physical existence of other people. From the outset, she puts forward self-awareness as a precondition for knowing and being accountable to the children and families that CYC practitioners work with. Almost 20 years after Ricks put forward the self-awareness model, she, with Hoskins, returned to the idea of understanding otherness and difference through the lens of self-awareness (2008).

Ricks and Hoskins (2008) situate their investigation into self and the experience of difference within a dynamic and shifting globalized world. They argue that, “due to globalization and increased connectedness, people are challenged to re-examine old assumptions about
differences as expressed through language” (p. 283). The authors explore the challenges inherent in engaging with the complexities of difference and argue for a raised level of consciousness in CYC practitioners. They contend that differences themselves must be more consciously appraised and that practitioners must better understand their relationship to differences. Building on the self-awareness model, the authors conclude that negotiating difference is a process of “coming to terms with one’s self” (p. 285) through self-observation and cocreated consciousness.

In describing self-observation and cocreated consciousness, Ricks and Hoskins (2008) take up the position that individuals build rational frameworks, or construct systems, to interpret, organize, and manage the complexities of life. These construct systems rely on assumptions, beliefs, bias, and interpretive schemes to assimilate information, make sense of reality, and provide choices for action. When engaging with difference, however, our construct systems are challenged and possibly threatened because our basic assumptions and beliefs are not attuned to all of these new experiences. There is a tendency, Ricks and Hoskins contend, for individuals to minimize or withdraw from the experience of difference because of the perceived threat to their construct framework, sense of self, or professional identity. On the other hand, however, sophisticated self-observation and cocreated consciousness are alternative approaches to engaging with difference.

A sophisticated self-observer, Ricks and Hoskins (2008) explain, has the capacity to incorporate knowledge of how the interaction among self, other, and context affects their experience and understanding of the world. Cocreated consciousness, accordingly, is a process of taking a stance in relation to others, while at the same time deconstructing the beliefs, assumptions, and values that underlie that stance. Constructing and deconstructing experience is a collaborative effort in which understandings are shared, explored, and questioned (Ricks and
Hoskins, 2008). The self in this rendering is an ongoing and situated complexity that weaves history, context, and relationships into a reflexive engagement with other. Ricks and Hoskins conclude by remarking that, not only is this perspective infinite in the “possibilities for creativity, communion, and compassion,” it also “demands from everyone the capacity to be helpful and merciful in understanding themselves and others in the moment” (p. 307). This cocreated matrix in which self, other, relationships, and ways of being creatively emerge from conscious relationship opens enormous possibility and dynamism in CYC practice. This dynamic cocreative process, however, seems to challenge more static understandings of CYC practice as a set of abilities, knowledges, or skills that are applied to particular individuals who fall into predetermined developmental categories. The model Ricks and Hoskins (2008) provide puts difference at the centre, whereas models of professionalization and credentialing seem to centre standardization and similarity of competence and ability. The cocreation of knowledge and experience that the authors put forward can be contrasted, however, with a more radical focus on the other that was put forward in a research interview with another professor of CYC.

**The experiencing person and the other.** A professor in CYC, in a research conversation, highlighted the importance of experience, presence, and observation in engagements with others. As a comparison with the abstract concepts and theories of the self that are usually circulated in CYC and the cocreative approach suggested by Ricks and Hoskins (2008), this participant pointed out that we foreground theories of self too much without having people experience self in practice and the whole question of working to understand other and then paying attention. I think we’re overdoing, and getting in the way of, paying attention. . . . Being present to the other, that is for me, far more important than a theory of self. I don’t have much patience for theories of self when my real focus is “how am I of any use here?”
The juxtaposition of conceptualizing the self and experiencing the self, particularly in relation to another person, for this participant expressed a danger of centering or even imposing our own frameworks and ideas on the people we are attempting to engage, perhaps even including a cocreative framework. Rather than having a preestablished notion of the self, other, and engagement, “following the lead of the other person” was of the utmost importance, this person explained:

I cannot tell you ahead of time what that is going to be, nor can I tell you which of the multiple ways of understanding a variety of different ways of being and doing in the world, could I say in advance of the engagement. . . . I cannot know until I am in it. . . . I think that if we foreground theories of self too much without having people experience self in practice and the whole question of working to understand other and then paying attention, I think we are overdoing, and getting in the way of, paying attention.

Rather than conceptualize, map, and cognitively ruminate on the self, therefore, this participant emphasized that for practitioner training, the lived phenomenological experience of the self in relation to the other should be primary:

Paying attention, paying attention to all the information the person is giving us: their facial expressions, their emotional expressions, the flow of the voice, their voice tone, their body posture, their focus, what is it that they are bringing into the conversation.

The closest conceptualization of the experiencing self that she elaborated on was as

the experiencing person. . . . I am looking through these eyes and I haven’t changed, although what I see and how I see it may change over time. I have been looking through these eyes since I could see. It comes back to that self, the ‘I’ that sees, hears, tastes, and touches. There isn’t a multiplicity there, there is a multiplicity of experience, but I am that that experiences and I am not some other.

That exploration of the self, however, was again interrupted by a more important focus on the other and their own unique experience, such that

understanding you or anyone else as a wholly and completely other than myself and as someone who exists whether I am there or not. So irrespective of my subjectivity, I am doing my best to connect with you as wholly and completely separate from my experience of you. It is what makes it possible to demand of myself that I set myself aside in order to know you. . . . The recognition of your otherness than mine is highly
important to me and stops me from imagining that empathy is putting myself in your shoes. It’s more than that. It is recognizing that your experience is likely not the way I would be if I were in your shoes but always premised on how you are in your shoes. That is a quest very difficult to achieve but one that I would prefer than the reduction to subjectivity.

C5: The Ethical and Moral Self—Individual and Society

Garfat and Ricks (1995) raise the question of the relationship between doing right and being effective in CYC. They also introduce the concepts of context and self into the ethical decision-making process. Their self-driven model of ethical decision making holds that the self of the practitioner informs and mediates the application of ethical codes and standards in specific contexts of practice. The self in this model includes the values, beliefs, and abilities of the worker, which interact with unique situations to resolve problems that can inform future ethical deliberations. The focus is on a responsible and self-aware individual who moderates ethical practice rather than “being driven by external variables” (p. 397). A distinction is drawn between an internal self and the external world that bears on it.

According to Garfat and Ricks (1995), the attributes necessary for a functional self-driven ethics include (1) a knowledge of self defined as a present self-awareness in terms of how values, beliefs, and previous experience act to inform current experience; (2) critical thinking skills, including the capacity to identify and challenge assumptions and the role of context; (3) consideration for alternative choices; and (4) utilizing evaluation and feedback. Throughout their description of the self-driven model, the authors position the practitioner as the mediator of ethics and the dispenser of ethical choices on a client. Although it emphasizes the unique context of every ethical dilemma, this model lacks consideration of the client’s choices, values, and beliefs. The self-awareness model determines values as feeling based, thoughts as belief based,
and ethics—or the rules for what one should and should not do—as based in the ability to analyze what one does in the world.

Building on Garfat and Ricks’s (1995) self-driven model and attending more to others in ethical decision making, Ricks and Bellefeuille (2004) put forward the concept of concerned responsiveness. They argue that concerned responsiveness and the participatory inquiry approach it inheres in bridge the concepts of knowing self and attending to the other and include negotiating values, incorporating different voices in constructing the problem, subjecting personal beliefs and knowledge to scrutiny, and co-creating the context of care. Ricks and Bellefeuille also prioritize critical analysis as central to ethical practice. Leading with the assumption that “internal maps of reality” (p. 118) shape practitioners’ perceptions and interpretations, they argue for an ethical stance of not-knowing or of being curiously engaged with the unknown. A stance of inquiry and not-knowing therefore challenges practitioners to rediscover the ethical and the self in the shifting and unique context of every experience.

White (2005) continues in this line of emphasizing the role of the self and context in practice ethics. She posits that ethical caring depends on “the development of an ideal self . . . in congruence with one’s best remembrance of caring and being cared-for” (p. 13). Agreeing with Ricks and Garfat (1995), she highlights the personal and context-based character of ethical deliberation while also emphasizing the impact and involvement of an individual’s personal history. Her approach to ethical decision making assumes a self that is temporally positioned between a personal historical narrative and an imagined future self, reminiscent of the bridge metaphor provided by Hoskins and Leseho (1996) for the possible selves theory. By 2007, White
had significantly developed her conception of ethics through a praxis model that highlights the political, social, and moral character of practice.\textsuperscript{22}

Mattingly (1995), situating the development of CYC ethics in the context of professionalization, puts forward a process view of ethics that she calls “doing ethics” (p. 387). Drawing on research and perspectives from a wide range of organizations and individuals, she describes “doing ethics” as an ongoing process consisting of developing ethical vision, articulating ethical concerns, applying standards and values, acting as a responsible ethical agent, and ongoing ethical development. Mattingly focuses on the professional levels of doing ethics, such as governing CYC agencies, and concludes that “the most fundamental issue is whether professional ethics has a positive impact on the quality of service delivered to the children, youth and families whom we serve” (p. 391). This description of ethics renders the self as an instrument in the process of effectiveness and efficiency.

Magnuson (1995) enters the discussion on CYC ethics with a response to Mattingly (1995) and Garfat and Ricks (1995) and proposes a dialogical approach to ethics. In his view, a dialogical ethics is “driven by the self in engagement with others” (p. 405). Others, in an ethical context, can be clients, other staff, rules, organizational values, and the traditions of ethical decision making themselves (Magnuson). In response to the questions of effectiveness raised by Mattingly (1995) and Garfat and Ricks (1995), Magnuson argues that, without the moral sources of CYC practice having been made explicit, discussions of effectiveness have come to dominate over questions of morality. The question of morality he raises at this juncture opens onto

\textsuperscript{22} \textbf{C11: Politicized Praxis}. White’s (2007) conceptualization of CYC as praxis provides a framework for situating practice and the self in social, historical, and political domains. The praxis model has since been used to politicize CYC and respond to specific social justice issues.
questions regarding the universal and eternal character of moral principles, as well as individuals as moral agents and issues of judgment in practice.

For Magnuson (1995), it is imperative to ground CYC ethics in moral criteria that originate outside practice and therefore have the capacity to evaluate all of practice. Borrowing from the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1991), Magnuson puts forward respect for life, meaningfulness, and dignity as three dimensions of morality that can support ethical decision making. Furthermore, such moral foundations are argued to be a better standard of effective practice in terms of enhancing “the dignity and quality of life of children” (Magnuson, 1995, p. 411). Taylor’s (1991) moral philosophy is intimately tied to the philosopher’s studies of the self, and it ultimately substantiates Magnuson’s claims for dialogical ethics.

Taylor (1989, 1991) traces narratives of the self through history and describes the orientation of the modern self in terms of its inwardness. For him, this inwardness corresponds to an assumed individualism, emancipation from previous moral horizons, and a focus on the immanent in place of the transcendent. Such an emancipated individualism places the value of authenticity as the moral axis of life and proposes a self that is in constant contact with an inward voice23 (Dueck, 2011). In tracing the development of the modern self, Taylor highlights the socially constructed nature of conceptions of the self, such as notions of an internal voice, while also maintaining some universal moral attributes of the self. While he argues for a universal moral standard of human dignity, for example, Taylor also understands that the social frameworks for understanding what a dignified or moral life entails change over time.

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23 C3: The Authentic Self—Presence—Relational Practice—Stories. In his article “Turning myself inside out: My theory of me,” Fewster (1999) works through a number of approaches to theorizing the self but maintains that throughout his educational, theoretical, and practice experience, there has always been an internal voice which has guided his development.
A framework, for Taylor (1989), interweaves the dimensions of moral life and provides the background measures for moral judgments. Frameworks also inform the meaning of a good life at any point in time and explain what acts or positions are dignified. Rather than succumbing to a postmodern relativism, Taylor retheorizes the self in a dialogic relationship to the social milieu through which its own foundational conceptions are generated. Keba (2010) describes Taylor’s subtle and well-elaborated description of identity as “a matter of dialogical self-interpretation, the locus of which is the society as a whole rather than any individuals that compose it” (p. 14). In a simplified form, Taylor (1991) levels a communitarian critique of liberal individualism in which the self is an ongoing project of becoming a specific sort of person through interaction with others. This view implies mutual recognition and affirmation between self and other, and a negotiation of the specific determinations of the absolute moral dimensions of respect, meaning, and dignity.

C6: Jungian Types and Dreams—Ways of Knowing—Individuation—Alterity

Jungian psychology has been important for me as a life practice for over ten years. I began a personal analysis before starting my undergraduate education in CYC and have continued to use dream interpretation and personality theory to guide my work and, more generally, my life. I was surprised that two participants in my research spoke about the influence of Jungian psychology on their work in CYC. In this section I introduce Jung’s theory of development, known as individuation, and provide an overview of his approach to dream interpretation and personality categorization. I then explore Jung’s connections with Eastern psychology and engage Jung in a conversation with poststructuralism. I put emphasis on Jung’s thought because it is how I learnt to think about the self before engaging with other theories.
Carl Gustav Jung was born on Lake Constance, Switzerland, in 1875. His early life was shared between the small village religiosity of his family and the stones and creeks of the natural world. His lifelong philosophic meanderings led him into and out of a medical career, a relationship with Freud, a number of personal crises, and numerous situated symbioses with the natural world. Jung’s theoretically rich and somewhat enigmatic opus challenges the most philosophic and scientific of minds; however, the depth of his message resonates with countless uninitiated. Jung spawned an entire psychology around the concept of the Self, and the Self has been a preoccupation of analytic and lay psychologists worldwide since.

**Jungian Individuation.** The *principium individuationis*, or principle of individuation, is a phrase the spans recorded philosophical history and here refers to the propensity for a living human subject to develop along a unique and authentic path (Stein, 2006). In an research conversation with Michael Burns, he explained that for him, individuation was

Coming to a realization that I have arrived, I don’t necessarily need backup or support to survive. I am an individual, but now in our context, as we have this conversation, I am an individual in relationship, so that makes it a bit more cloudier and complicated. Have I really individuated? I think it takes time, and I think some of us individuate earlier than others, but I would say it’s about having enough life experiences to say “so this is what this is about, this is where I fit in, I have been able to be successful, so I have arrived, I can now feel comfortable in my own skin”.

Jung uses the individuation principle to understand how changes occur at individual and collective levels, with specific reference to the development of consciousness. Contrary to the idea of individualism, in which an individual identifies with one aspect of their being or personality, individuation involves maintaining relationships with the various aspects of the psyche and to the collective.

In his book on individuation, Stein (2006) tells a story involving Martin Buber and Carl Rogers that illustrates the general misinterpretation of Jungian individuation. In the story, Buber,
author of *I and Thou* (1970), challenges Rogers on his definition of “person” and goes on to also challenge Jung’s idea of individuation. Buber argues that Jung is advocating for the development of certain prominent characteristics of a particular human being at the expense of real contact and reciprocity with the world. Stein argues conversely that individuation is precisely the development of lesser known aspects of oneself to more fully engage in human and worldly relationships. Ultimately, the brevity of human life and the expansiveness of the unconscious preclude a full conscious integration of all aspects of inner psychic reality; therefore, the true measure of human development is the authenticity of the relationships within the psyche and their impact on collective life. Moreover, an individuated personality, through its developed and integrated inner relationships, is more fully capable of genuine contact and reciprocity with others (Stein).

Jung’s concept of individuation is variously interpreted as a specific phase or type of development (Jung, 1964), a lifelong opus (Stein, 2006a), a characteristic of political consciousness (Samuels, 1993), or as having special relevance to periods of development, such as childhood (Fordham, 1969; Main, 2008). However it is considered, the process of individuation is generally theorized as consisting of two movements: *separatio* (the differentiation of oneself from identifications with inner and outer figures) and *coniunctio* (the integration of differentiated material into the conscious personality). In terms of stages of development, Stein (2006b) contends that individuation can be conceived of as occurring within three stages, with transitional crisis points between them. The scope of this paper does not allow for a full exploration of these developmental phases; however, it is important to note that in the end, very little that is human is foreign to the individuated psyche. The complexities and diversities of inner and outer reality are first differentiated and then integrated within the
relationship of ego and self. The process operates to raise personal consciousness as well as cultural and global consciousness.

Edinger (1972) describes individuation as the process of developing a conscious relationship between ego and self and healing the split between subject and object. At birth, the ego is nonexistent or totally identified with the self: all is unconscious. As healthy development progresses, the ego emerges and a relationship or axis between the ego and the self develops. Ideally, this process continues and the ego forms a conscious relationship with the self without being identified with it. The process of individuation continues—within limits, since all of the unconscious cannot be made conscious—however, the dichotomous split between ego and self is mended and a sense of wholeness emerges. In contemporary Euro-Western societies, where meaning and the symbolic are becoming less accessible to humankind through religion, individuation as a way of life offers one approach to meaning, wholeness, and connectedness. Although the specific practices that facilitate individuation are necessarily individual, Jung proposed general areas of application, such as personal analysis, working with typology, dream and fairy tale interpretation, and engaging in religious, spiritual, or other ritualistic practices.

**Ways of Knowing.** In 1994, Dr. Sibylle Artz, professor of CYC at UVic, published a book called *Feeling as a Way of Knowing: A Practical Guide for Working with Emotional Experience.* Artz developed some of Jung’s personality type theory into a six-step strategy for child and youth care workers. Through the six steps, Artz explores emotional expression in relation to interpersonal communication, learning, bonding, perception, and the development of a sense of self. She provides a historical overview of emotions in psychology, including neurophysiological, instinctual, psychical, and humanist perspectives. She then introduces Jung’s perspective on emotional experience and his formulation of how experience gets structured and
organized at an individual level through the functions of intuiting, thinking, feeling, and sensing. Artz explains that although these functions work simultaneously and interact, individuals often tend to prefer or rely on one or two faculties while decreasing their dependence on the others. The book provides numerous practice examples, worksheets, personal experiments, and other strategies for exploring the meanings of emotional experiences. Artz proposes that working intentionally with emotional material can expand our knowledge of self and others.

**Jungian Psychological Types.** Jung’s typology, or model of psychological types, combined his 20 years of clinical experience with his broad study of historical and cross-cultural material on the subject. Psychological types, for Jung, refers to types of consciousness rather than types of people (Beebe, 2006). Jung (1921) described psychological types as developed orientations of the ego in its relationships to inner and outer reality. Typology includes two basic attitudes, introversion and extraversion, and four basic functions: thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. Introversion and extraversion are terms that describe the process and direction of movement of psychic energy in the relationship between ego/subject and other/object (Jung, 1921). They are psychological modes of adaptation that emerge from an innate psychological core. Introversion is characterized by the general movement of psychic energy from object/other to the ego and extraversion describes the general propensity for energy to be moving from ego to object/other (Sharp, 1987; Von Franz, 1971). Jung used the terms as adjectives, such as in extraverted thinking, to demonstrate their descriptive and dependent quality. He argued that all people use both processes; however, they use them differently and to differing degrees (Jung, 1921). Beebe (2006) describes introversion as a movement away from the external object/other/experience to the most related inner idea/meaning/archetype that matches with it. Extraversion, on the other hand, is a tendency to merge, adjust to, or identify with the object.
Sharp (1987) summarizes introversion as being associated with hesitancy, reflection, internal/subjective motivation, and a shrinking away from the object, whereas in extraversion, the subject is characterized by an outgoingness that adapts easily to situations and is motivated by external factors.

The four functions within Jung’s typology are the capacities of the ego to orient itself to reality: thinking is the process of defining reality; feeling is the assignation of value; sensation is the registering of reality as real; and intuition is a divination of implication and possibility (Beebe, 2006). Jung described thinking and feeling as rational and discriminating functions of judgment, with thinking being the faculty of logical discrimination and feeling the faculty of discerning likes and dislikes. Both thinking and feeling are “based on a reflective, linear process that coalesces into a particular judgment” (Sharp, 1987, p. 16). The evaluative quality of these functions is what groups them as rational. Sensation and intuition, on the other hand, are irrational in the sense that they are beyond or outside of reason; they are more empirical or perceptive ways of knowing. Sensation is the faculty of immediately perceiving the outside world, whereas intuition deals with past and future, hunches and prospects.

As processes for relating to experience, every individual exercises the entire range of typological orientations, albeit in varying degrees of development. Jung theorized that the processes of individuation, particularly in analysis, parallel the differentiation of the psychological types. Differentiation in this case is the process by which each function becomes available to consciousness for application in the appropriate circumstance (Sharp, 1987). Invariably, however, development proceeds along distinctive pathways and one function is generally more developed than the others. The most utilized and developed function of an individual ego is called the superior function and the least developed the inferior function.
Although Jung categorically argued in favour of an essentialist view of human psychology, he also appreciated the effects of environment and context on development. In childhood, he theorized, an individual’s innate superior function is generally supported as a gift or strength of the individual, which further promotes its development. The inferior function, by contrast, is most closely related to the unconscious, undadapted, underutilized, and degenerated side of the personality (Von Franz, 1971). In the case that the development of an individual’s essential typology is suppressed, either due to family or cultural environment, the individual is considered a distorted type (Von Franz, 1971). In general, Jung’s model assumes an imbalance and promotes a developmental perspective in which the inferior function is gradually integrated into the psyche as a whole.

The inferior function, as the despised or unadapted aspect of the psyche, often holds the key to healing and wholeness. Von Franz (1971), in her extensive research in the area, argues that the inferior function “always makes a bridge to the unconscious” (p. 10). It is important to note that the unconscious is not necessarily a quality of interiority, as introverted attitudes will often display unconsciousness in their relationship to external reality. The inferior function is slow, hard to work on, touchy, tyrannical, charged with affect, covered up, magical, primitive, archaic, and generally bothersome to consciousness. On the other hand, the inferior function provides the possibility of reinvigorating the psyche when the one-sided dominant superior becomes weary of the world toward the middle of life. The ecstatic state, the opportunity for wholeness and a relationship to the infinite all align with the inferior function. Jung’s typology describes the inherent qualities of engaging available to all humans (see Appendix A) and in this sense are modes of differently apprehending and engaging with reality.
**Dream Interpretation.** Jung (1934), in his seminal essay on dreams entitled *The Practical Use of Dream-Analysis*, argued that the value of dream interpretation in psychotherapy will rise and fall with a person’s acceptance or rejection of the unconscious. Jung then went on to offer a practical approach to dream analysis (see Appendix B). A Jungian approach to dream interpretation, as with the rest of Jung’s theory, rests on the entire system of analytic psychology and its concepts, specifically the unconscious, individuation, and the Self. Within a Jungian framework, everyday waking consciousness is by definition partial and incomplete. The dream provides another aspect, a psychic snapshot of the unconscious situation at the time of the dream (Betts, 2007). A dream, as a manifestation of the unconscious, is a response, commentary, compensatory mechanism, or attempt at balance and wholeness within the psyche. Hall (1983) describes the compensatory or regulatory aspect of dreams in three ways: (1) raising conscious awareness of behaviours, attitudes, or complexes of the dreamer; (2) a requisition for the ego to adapt more completely to the individuation process; and (3) restructuring the relationships within the psyche through archetypal or dream-ego activity. Betts (2007) more simplistically describes the compensatory nature of dreams as the unconscious making a comment on the ego stance by doing one of three things: (1) providing the opposite side to a one-sided ego stance; (2) affirming the conscious position; or (3) coinciding with the conscious attitude. In conjunction with compensatory dreams, Betts also identifies the following types of dreams: traumatic reworking; childhood; prospective; transference; and repetitive. Dream interpretation, as a method for establishing dialectic and compensatory relationships between consciousness and the unconscious, is therefore a subjective and potentially therapeutic process.

A dream is a commentary from the unconscious related to the ego stance or conscious attitude of the dreamer. Jung (1934) argued that dream interpretation needed to remain as close
as possible to the dreamer, their conscious situation, and the subjective relevance that the dream symbols had for them. The symbols of dreams, although emerging from a transpersonal archetypal core, may not be regarded semiotically and must take into account the psychic and social context of the dreamer as well as the historical and cultural significance of the symbols. Jung clearly differentiated between a sign, referring to something known/conscious, and a symbol, referring to the best possible formulation of an as-yet-unknown content. In the dialectic between known and unknown, same and other, it is the symbol that offers the possibility of growth and development. A dream interpretation therefore deals with the in-between space of consciousness and the unconscious and engages with the symbols of dreams to achieve a meaning that will transform consciousness through the integration of unconscious material. That is not to say that a dreamer fully takes on the symbols offered in dreams. Rather, the dream provides the material required for an engagement between consciousness and the unconscious. A consciousness able to sustain the tension between known and unknown is required for the symbol to become meaningful. The ongoing dialectic between the evolving dreamer and the generative unconscious, in which unconscious material is slowly integrated into consciousness through an interpretive act, becomes the fuel for the development of the individual.

**Jungian Self and Taoism.** Jung’s first uses of the term Self were in the 1920s when it began to replace the term *individuality* in his writing. Jung never gave a final definition of the Self, and he variously used the word to describe the centre of the psyche, the totality of the psyche, the goal of individuation, psychic wholeness, the process of transcending inner fragmentation, a numinous experience or symbol, the goal of life, a principle of orientation and meaning, the essence of individuality, and the union of opposites, or *complexio oppositorum.*
Jung found through personal exploration and work with patients that inherent in every human was a principle of order and coordination.

Later in his theorizing, Jung placed the concept of the Self alongside the religious images of God in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam and the philosophical insights of Hinduism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The concept of the Self as a union of opposites or a transcendent totality emerged from Jung’s engagement with Eastern philosophy (Coleman, 2006; Huskinson, 2002) and he began using the capitalized Self to highlight this parallel with the transcendent. Jung’s focus on this divine aspect of the Self was elaborated in his work *Aion* (1951), which explored the phenomenology of the Self, including experiences and expressions such as the Christ symbol, mandalas, and the symbolism of alchemy. Jung was a world traveler who spent a great part of his life engaging with the symbols and psychologies of cultures worldwide. He was a facilitator of dialogue between East and West in the early part of the 20th century and he wrote the introductions and commentaries to many Eastern texts as they were translated for Western readers. In a commentary included in a German translation of the IChing, Jung argued that the new relationship forming between East and West was a sign that Westerners were beginning to relate to an otherness within.

Jung is said to have been something of a Taoist himself (Clarke, 1994), moving with the flow of life, having a strong bond with nature, and having the capacity to synthesize seeming opposition into a greater whole. Clarke argues that there is a strong similitude between Jung’s concepts of Self and the philosophy of nature in Taoism. Specifically, Jung was drawn to the holistic and ever-changing aspects of Taoism and its affinity with nature. Moreover, Clarke writes that “the concepts of *yang* and *yin*, opposing yet complementary principles that underpin all of reality and human experience, matched with remarkable exactness [Jung’s] consecution of
the psyche as a self-balancing system governed by the tension of opposing principles” (p. 80). Jung took a hermeneutical approach to engaging with Eastern texts, which allowed for the alterity of cultural difference to remain in the foreground as he grappled to connect with them. He applied this hermeneutical, or interpretive, approach in his work with patients and his own unconscious; Jung always sought to build a bridge of understanding rather than impose an interpretive framework on the other (Clarke, 1994). Within his dialogues with the East, Jung developed his concept of Self in close relationship with the Tao as a union of opposites. One reading of this engagement culminates in the insight that the developmental process of the human being is a form of a yes-saying to all of oneself. The journey to achieving this unity, or what the Taoist alchemical text Secret of the Golden Flower, calls a Diamond Body, is, however, through the labyrinthine unconscious of spirit-beings, or what Jung calls fragmented parts of the psyche (Clarke, 1994). Jung’s view of Self and nature is that of a telos rendered through a union of opposites: self/other, human/nature, Western/Eastern.

**Jung, alterity, Self, and other.** Huskinson (2002) takes up the concept of alterity as described by Levinas to trouble the discursive production of the Self within analytic psychology and provide a definition of Self from outside this system. She begins with an equivocation between Levinas’s concept of Other and Jung’s Self. As Other to the ego, the Self is overpowering, necessary, and irreconcilable. In the place of seeking a firm explication of existence and reality, Levinas (1969) argued that all things in themselves are constituted out of a relationship with others. Relationship and otherness are the source for ethics and understanding and require a full responsiveness that is beyond the capacity of intellect and language. Furthermore, Levinas contested the notion of a primary ontological subject, claiming that any objective knowledge would be a demand for obedience from another (Lock & Strong, 2010).
Direct relationship to an unknowable other is therefore phenomenologically primary and the actual basis of subjectivity and ethics (Levinas, 1969). Braidotti, a contemporary poststructural feminist, calls this primacy of relationship a complete indebtedness to the other (Braidotti, 2009).

Huskinson, following Levinas, argues that Same (in this case the ego) and the Other (self) cannot be part of a greater totality or whole because that would invalidate their separateness. The Self or Other is therefore a violent force in relation to ego consciousness, “an affective experience that can bring destruction and transformation to all that was hitherto considered secure and fundamental” (p. 437). In this sense, the self is viewed as a numinous experience of otherness that can only partially be represented and understood in consciousness and never assimilated within it. Huskinson concludes therefore that the reductive intellect can never arrive at a satisfactory definition of the Self and that necessary internal postulates of self within analytic psychology contravene Levinas’s ethic of Other.

Saban (2011) interestingly critiques Huskinson’s (2002) equivocation of self and other on the very grounds that Huskinson attempted to challenge. He argues that Huskinson’s definition of self as an irreconcilable other is in complete contrast to Jung’s description of self as a transcendence of opposites. Saban, however, does not linger long in his critique, but rather proposes a Derridian deconstruction that attends to the tensions of various definitions of self rather than making a choice for one over another. In this way, Saban aligns himself with Jung’s belief in the ambiguities and potential of tension between opposites. Furthermore, and in a seeming reconciliation with Huskinson, Saban emphasizes Jung’s attitude of “unmediated openness to psychic phenomena, an approach of ‘not-knowing’, and [ asserts] that the unsettling

24 C14: Immanence—Affirmation—Nomadic Subjectivity—Becoming. Braidotti’s (2006, 2009) philosophy of nomadism is elaborated through affirmative engagement with the other in processes of transformation.
and disruptive effect of the Other is a kind of gift, which can enable us to avoid becoming muffled and restricted by our own ego-syntonic structures” (p. 98).

In contrast to Huskinson (2002), Saban (2011) delivers a Jungian view of the self as the radical alterity of the unconscious, which can decentre the ego while simultaneously engaging in a transcendent synthesis of same and other. Otherness in this regard is therefore only a temporary state that is ideally transcended in a new conscious synthesis that includes the other. Again, Saban does not side with the “absolute Other” argument or the “transcendent whole” argument but rather holds the tenuous space in-between as an opportunity for exploration.

Saban (2011) takes up Derrida’s notion of *différance* to demonstrate that “the ambiguities and paradoxes which Jung insisted were intrinsic to his intuitions about the self-concept have the potential to suggest a remarkably subtle vision of Selfhood manifesting precisely within the tensions generated between Same and Other” (p. 92). For Saban, a reading of Jung that features the “plurality, ambiguity, alterity and heteronomy of the self” (p. 97) opens to a deconstructionist approach that answers to the paradoxes among the various elucidations of self in Jung. Saban explains that *différance* in Derrida critiques the absolute opposition of ideas like same/other, interior/exterior, and true/false and prefers attention to be placed on the tensions in-between. Applied to the Jungian self, a deconstructivist turn—rather than attending to the seemingly contradictory accounts of Self as centre, process, totality, dialectic—would take up a space in the tensions between the definitions. Huskinson (2002), on the other hand, argues that the unconscious and self are so completely other that they defy conscious comprehension and incorporation.

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25 **C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject.** The concept of *différance* is located within the structuralist analysis of language and applied to subject formation highlighting the untenable assumptions at the centre of Western conceptions of the self.
The poststructural engagements with Jungian thought in the analytic psychology literature were my first introductions to deconstruction, critiques of language, and notions of alterity. Since this introduction, I have continued to learn about poststructuralism and have gradually become acquainted with Deleuzian thought. Although I have lost confidence in much of Jung’s theorizing, at a practical and experiential level, Jungian psychology continues to provide meaning to my life. Particularly, Jung’s concept of individuation as a lifelong process of integrating pieces of a vast unconscious into a life continues to resonate with me. In the next section, I will look at how CYC has conceptualized development and how some theorists in CYC have brought poststructural critiques to these theories.

C7: Development—Diversity—Creativity—Lifespan—Parenting

During the years 2006-2013, The child and youth care curriculum at UVic made use of two textbooks to set the foundation for the developmental perspective in the undergraduate curriculum: *Life-Span Development* (Santrock, Mackenzie-Rivers, Leung, & Malcomson, 2005) and *Lives Across Cultures* (Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2008). At the time this thesis was being written, the development courses had been under review and there had been a movement toward reading the original writings of development psychologists. *Life-Span Development* tracks lifelong human change and growth using empirically informed psychological, biological, anthropological, and sociological theory. The text arranges development by age and stage groupings and, although the authors mention the influence of context and culture on development, they do not consider how development itself can be understood differently across cultures. Santrock, Mackenzie-Rivers, Leung, and Malcomson (2005) predominantly rely on the theory of Western psychology (e.g., Freud, Pavlov, Piaget, Skinner, Erikson, Lorenz, and Banduras) and briefly introduce cultural-historic and systems theorists such as Vygotsky and
Bronfenbrenner. The overall emphasis of Santrock et al. is on normative individual development in a Western context. The authors furthermore substantiate their claims using scientific research findings, which are transmitted randomly throughout the text in an oversimplified and uncritical form. The general presentation of *Life-Span Development* is of an authoritative, comprehensive, and scientific explanation of how development occurs.

In comparison to *Life-Span Development*, the SCYC curriculum also includes the text *Lives Across Cultures: Cross-cultural human development* (Gardiner & Kosmitzki, 2008) to contextualize development and highlight cross-cultural differences. Gardiner and Kosmitzki (2008) take up a cross-cultural perspective designed to “expand awareness and sensitivity to global similarities and differences in behaviour” (p. xiii) while concurrently aiming to reduce ethnocentric thinking. The frameworks they employ to this end are the ecological model (Bronfenbrenner, 1977) and the developmental niche theory (Super & Harkness, 1994). Gardiner and Kosmitzki explain that the ecological model describes individual development as occurring within concentric and enveloped levels of relationships, moving from the individual, through family and social relationships, to the larger societal and global levels. Developmental niche theory depicts an individual developing within a proximal setting composed of a physical and social setting, customs of child care and child rearing, and caretakers with specific and influential psychological dispositions. Both models emphasize an individual within a context, with the greater emphasis placed on proximal influence or at least the mediation of social influences through proximal relationships.

Gardiner and Kosmitzki (2008) contend that, although there are “culture-specific aspects of the self” (p. 142), there are also considerable similarities across cultures with regard to the development of a sense of self. These similarities include recognition of self as separate from
others and the possession of personal desires, attributes, and preferences. Although the authors
explicate numerous cultural differences among specific groups’ definitions or enactments of self,
they generally deliver a simple and dichotomous categorization of views on self reflecting either
individualistic or collective views. They do, however, present a nuanced categorization system
by looking at the individual/collective binary through the lens of relationship types. The four
conceptions of self they present are (1) an individualistic/independent self that remains stable
because relationships with others do not have much impact on definitions of self; (2)
interdependent/collective conceptions in which relationships are very significant; (3) a relational
self in which a distinct self is defined in relation to others; and (4) encompassing as a self-
concept defined through unequal and nonmutual relationships. Gardiner and Kosmitzki’s cross-
cultural perspective challenges universalizing and ethnocentric conceptions of the self, but still
invites a view of the self that is static, bound to contextual circumstances, and articulated through
Euro-Western language and concepts.

Applying developmental theory. Phelan (2008), a CYC practitioner and educator,
explicates the applications of developmental psychology by arguing that “all developmental
theories organize human growth and capability in a series of stages that occur in a predetermined
pattern” (p.74). Mastering tasks and competencies in predictable order, he argues, is the goal and
target for effective CYC practice. A worker’s priority is to determine which developmental stage
the person is in and support growth into the next stage. This approach requires that the workers
themselves be developmentally functional and capable of assessing lags in the development of
others. These lags in development are the primary problems of the children, youth, and families
who come into contact with CYC practitioners and it is imperative, Phelan argues, that
practitioners be knowledgeable and capable of intervening in developmentally driven
dysfunction. He asserts that it is a practitioner’s duty to understand and correct the developmental roadblocks that prevent healthy functioning.

Phelan (2008) contends that, due to poor attachment and negative past experiences, the children, youth, and families who generally come into contact with CYC practitioners do not have the developmental capacity to understand the generosity they receive from workers. From their “stuck” and “distorted reality,” he goes on, “the concepts of caring for and nurturing children are beyond the experiential and cognitive ability of many of our youth and parents to grasp” (p. 75). Phelan takes up the metaphor of an individual stuck on a deserted island to render his perspective, in which a developmental “line in the sand” (p. 74) needs to be crossed, without which “our charges” (p. 75) would be doomed in a permanent “stuckness” (p. 75). By deploying their theoretical knowledge of development and their practical relational qualities, practitioners “can create this growth and change opportunity” (p. 76). Phelan’s perspective argues for meeting people where they are at in the developmental hierarchy and understanding the world through their perspective. This approach opens new lines of communication, makes strengths visible, and offers an interpretive lens for comprehending the seeming irrationality of developmentally stuck behaviour. In so doing, however, Phelan posits an expert knowledge, complete with a language of lack, that can reduce all behaviours and challenges to pathology and developmental insufficiency.

Phelan (2008) argues that all change and helping theory is based on the goal of initiating “our charges” into “The Functioning Club” in which self-control and empathy can guarantee good behaviour. The developmental necessities for remaining in the club include autonomy, personal agency, and power—all of which ensure “the ability to manage life challenges without [CYC workers’] support” (p. 89). Phelan positions CYC workers as developmental police and
doctors, replete with the tools, power, and mandate to monitor, assess, and fix the deviant and problematic. He does not challenge the ubiquity or certainty of the dominant descriptions of functionality nor the individuals and groups who benefit from well-behaving subjects. In his approach, the universalized discourse of development is operationalized to justify the submission of individual and family behaviour to the domination of practitioners, agencies, and capitalist society in general.

In contrast to Phelan’s totalizing view of development, Pacini-Ketchabaw and Berikoff (2008) work at disrupting the absolutist knowledge produced and reproduced in developmental theory. Traditional developmental theory, in their critique, is said to construct children’s identities as generally fixed, with some malleability only under conditions of individual intervention. In their analysis of early childhood education dialogues, Pacini-Ketchabaw and Berikoff find that the dominance of individualized developmental approaches minimizes the significance of racism and racialization in children’s interactions. Moreover, rather than contextualizing behaviours such as violence or resistance to violence, a developmental perspective silences structural forces such as marginalization, isolation, and stigmatization (Pacini-Ketchabaw & Berikoff, 2008).

Pacini-Ketchabaw (2008, 2011) invites CYC practitioners, students, and theorists to question the discursive regimes of developmental psychology and the function that developmental theories play in constructing children and childhood in CYC conceptualizations and practice. She argues that in any construction of subjectivity, such as those of childhood, particular interests are served and other voices are silenced. In the case of CYC, conceptualizations of children and development are understood as generally objective and outside social, political, cultural, and economic interests. Pacini-Ketchabaw suggests that CYC
can become more socially engaged and revolutionary if developmental theories are decentred, critiqued, and relocated within social realities and power relations. Power relations in particular must be examined in terms of the relationship between those being described and those who are doing the describing and the subjects that follow from such constructions. Once the dominant view of development is loosened, alternative perspectives can emerge and be evaluated on their productive capacity or some other ethical standard.

**Becoming child.** Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari (2004), Hans Skott-Myhre (2008) proposes a framework for understanding development outside the social and psychological concepts of age-based maturation and progression. Conceived as a characteristic that adults and youth commonly share, child as subjectum, or a creative self-productive event, is a nonhierarchical vision of age that offers the potential of creativity and vitality across the lifespan. Child in this view refers to the creatively expressive force that occurs “in different ways at different points in time for each subject” (Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 8). This vision of child destabilizes the categories of childhood proposed by developmental theory as expressed in Phelan (2008) and Santrock et al. (2005) and elides the boundaries between children and adults. Childhood is therefore seen not as a category that is contrasted to the category of adulthood, but rather as a status or attribute that is universally accessible to all humans and capable of political force.

Another avenue through which to enter into the concept of the self or child as subjectum is the concept of performativity. Hans Skott-Myhre (2008), in this regard, takes up the ideas of an event horizon (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) and the performative subject (Butler, 1990). Following Butler, he argues that when youth is considered as a series of performative acts, “the subject as subjectum creates itself in the moment of the act” (H. Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 11) only
to be perpetually constituted anew in the next act. The performative youth, therefore, is in a constant state of producing him or herself from the creative force of all possible acts that could potentially happen but have not yet happened. The subjectum, in this regard, is never in a state of arrival or repeat performances, but rather is producing itself in a moment that is finished in the same instance it occurs. These performances intersect and interact with other events, subjects, and performances to produce boundless possibilities of becoming. To map this vision of the self, Skott-Myhre offers the image of a plane or surface without depth or interiority. On this plane, life is produced and performed at the intersections of all the elements, or lines of force, unique to a moment in time (Skott-Myhre, 2008). These criss-crossing lines of force include, but are not limited to, technology, philosophy, history, bodies, art, tradition, biochemical matter, and politics. The events, becomings, or self are the ever-intersecting and redirecting lines of intersection. The subjectum, therefore, never arrives in a fixed state capable of being comprehensively defined. Although each series of acts creates a boundary, or possible set of definitions, within which social, scientific, and psychological categories can be applied, the next act, made up of surplus possible events, defies the definitions of a bounded, consistent, and limited view of the individual. Every definition or set of categories falls short of capturing “the complex dynamism of creative force in any given action” (Skott-Myhre, 2008, p. 11).

Developmental psychology in this rendering is a temporary territory of discourse within which concepts can be deployed but are forever exceeded by the creative potential of the subjectum. This view challenges the establishment of expert knowledges and categories of similarity on which most developmental curriculum is founded.

A message for parents. Interestingly, Fewster (2010), a psychotherapist, educator, and founding editor of the Journal of Child and Youth Care, comes to many of the same conclusions
as Skott-Myhre (2008) regarding the inestimable creative potential of the human; however, he arrives there through a very different path. In a book he wrote for parents, Fewster (2010) delivers an admittedly personal and idiosyncratic developmental framework. Supported primarily through his intuitions and personal experiences, Fewster draws on neuroscience, psychoanalysis, object-relations, attachment theory, quantum theory, and integrated body psychotherapy in a seemingly haphazard way to justify his claims for a timeless human interior. Fewster (2010) argues for a picture of the self that is infinite in its spectrum of possibilities and potentials yet hampered by individual parents failing to parent themselves and to respond to the relational needs of their children.

In Don’t Let Your Kids Be Normal, Fewster (2010) reduces political, ideological, and environmental constraints on development to projections of individual psyches inundated by fear. Rather than changing the contexts in which development takes place, Fewster argues, developing curiosity, compassion, caring, and awareness at the individual level is paramount to solving society’s ills. Only the recognition of an authentic self within each parent can intercede in the intergenerational transmission of fear that catalyzes hostility and insecurity worldwide. Fewster places unprecedented blame and responsibility on parents for their lack of personal development that, in turn, interferes with their children’s development. On the other hand, Fewster reassures parents about their natural belonging in this world, their infinite core authentic selves, and a practical avenue for personal and intergenerational healing. This healing, he argues, is available only through consciousness raising and authentic relationships based on the universal communication systems of intuition and energy.

Fewster (2010), in a Rousseauian turn, claims that children inherently know what they need to develop, and that it is only adult fear, projection, and rejection that stifle children’s
potential. In his view, parents make individual choices to allow the mythology of medical diagnosis and the practices of pharmaceutical companies to maintain power over their children. Here again, he reduces all social phenomena to failures in parenting, a reading of the social order that does not account for issues of power, finance, or discourse related to the medical industry. Fewster locates himself within the psychological establishment and renders it, himself included, as a soulless enterprise incapable of meaningful relationship. Again, however, he holds out a glimmering piece of salvation in the form of a reading of quantum theory that offers a radically new vision of reality in which humans are an integral and purposeful aspect of the cosmos.

Fewster (2010) takes up many causes in his book, and although he presents some scientific evidence for his claims, he generally employs an emotional and moralistic persuasiveness. For example, he takes up the research of Daniel Stern\(^\text{26}\) (1985) on infancy to make sweeping claims about prenatal care and childbirth practices. He goes as far as to claim that the connection between mother and baby is so sensitive and intuitive that even the thought of abortion on the side of the mother can have lifelong traumatic effects on the child. Furthermore, Fewster argues that the use of anaesthetics during childbirth is a failure on the part of the mother that results in lifelong helplessness and feelings of abandonment. Fewster takes up similar opinionated and unevidenced stances to strike at parental discipline, lack of separation from mother, formal education in schools, and parents’ lack of personal individuation. While he admits that his claims can be read as mother blaming, he continues to not only leave social practices out of the scene, but present fathers as relatively ineffectual as well.

The avenues Fewster (2010) proposes for personal and intergenerational healing include the following: reconnecting with soul or spirit; recognizing chosen limitations on self and

\(^{26}\) *C3: The Authentic Self—Presence—Relational Practice—Stories.* Daniel Stern’s (1985) research is briefly explored in terms of theorizing the development of selfhood and relationship in infancy.
making new choices; conscious awareness of personal history; use of breath and presence; mirroring practices; healthy attachment; and developing the capacity of the self to be its own witness. Repudiating most forms of professional helping and developmental theory, Fewster proposes many techniques that, although they may seem easy for him to grasp, are perhaps outside the capacity or resource base of many parents. Furthermore, by reducing all human difficulty to parenting failures, Fewster ignores many social dynamics, intersections of identity and context, and the possibility of changing the social realities that help shape how humans change. Fewster does, however, align with Skott-Myhre in his view that humans have a near limitless potential and are constantly pressing toward active self-creation within relationships.

C8: Metaphors of the Self

Although concepts of self, identity, and subjectivity abound in CYC literature, they have received little comprehensive review or classification of their range. Marie Hoskins, professor in CYC at UVic, has, however, investigated the self as a concept in counselling theories and her texts are used in SCYC curriculum. I was introduced to Hoskins and Leseho’s (1996) “Metaphors of the Self: Implications for Counselors” in undergraduate studies and the article became influential in my understanding and appreciation of the diversity of theories of the self in circulation among human service practitioners. In the article, Hoskins and Leseho analyze the prevalent theories of the self in counselling literature in terms of their metaphoric articulations, categorize these metaphors as either traditional or postmodern, and elaborate practice implications.

Metaphorical language, Hoskins and Leseho believe, brings clarity to an unknown concept. In the process of describing a lesser-known object, however, metaphors (and language more generally) shape the concepts under consideration and therefore complicate the relationship
between the metaphor and what it is supposedly clarifying (Hoskins & Leseho). Hoskins and Leseho argue that practitioners are guided in their approaches by the metaphors or theories of the self to which they have access; therefore, the metaphors themselves recirculate as social activity. Categorizing various metaphors as traditional or postmodern, they refer to the unitary self, the integrated self, the narrative self, possible selves, the empty self, and internalized selves. For the most part, the authors focus on the approaches to practice and therapeutic goals that are associated with each conceptualization.

The two traditional perspectives of the self that Hoskins and Leseho (1996) begin with, the unitary and the integrated, reflect a description of the self as an enduring autonomous core, in the case of the former, and a higher cohesive authentic self in the case of the latter. The unitary self is analogous, they contend, to an artichoke with a psychic fingerprint at its core: it is vulnerable when it is young and develops protective layers as it interacts and adapts to an outer world. These protective layers, however, are not the true self, and the goals of counselling and development, from this perspective, include discarding aspects of the self that do not relate to the true core, and finding a sense of cohesion in life.²⁷ One research participant used a metaphor of an onion to speak about the true self: “I think we go back to who we are, if we can be that authentic person, whatever path you take, whether it is yoga, Buddhism, whatever path that helps you unravel or peel back the onion.”

The integrated self, while similarly positing an essence or authentic core, does not contend that the protective layers need to be peeled back, but rather integrated. Those who write

about the integrated self, such as Jung\textsuperscript{28}, believe in a higher actualized self and that the path to that cohesive and authentic whole is through the integration of all aspects of oneself. Hoskins and Leseho offer a board of directors as a metaphor for this view, describing the self as the board’s chair and the other aspects of the personality as members of the board. The work of counselling is to find how the disparate pieces of one’s life can be brought together into a whole.

The postmodern perspectives and metaphors in Hoskins and Leseho (1996) include the following: the narrative self as comparable to an author who uses language and stories, both personal and cultural, to engage in an ongoing process of narration\textsuperscript{29}; possible selves as a bridge between past and future events, which are shaped by sociocultural influences\textsuperscript{30}; the empty self as a holograph, which is incapable of connecting with history or spirituality due to current consumerist culture; and the internalized selves perspective, which is broken down into a community of selves metaphor and a dialogical self metaphor. The community of selves metaphor is similar to the integrated self view of traditional psychology, but Hoskins and Leseho insists that within this view, there is less of an organizing centre and more of a cooperative diversity of voices. The dialogical self is reminiscent of a theatre performance with a variety of characters, dialogues, dramas, and acts representing the complexity, interdependence, and polivocality of self-organization. The self in this rendering is a synthesizing process that does not unify the diversity and complexity, as in the integrated metaphor, but rather organizes and balances the plentitude of autonomous characters in the play.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{C6: Jungian Types and Dreams—Ways of Knowing—Individuation—Alterity}, Jungian psychology theorizes the self as the principle of integration relative to the various aspects of the psyche. Facilitative approaches to integration, or individuation, include dream interpretation, personal analysis, and understanding typology.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{C3: The Authentic Self—Presence—Relational Practice—Stories}, Kreuger (1997) emphasizes the use of story in CYC practice and presence of the self while Richardson (2005) highlights the cultural and social contexts which shape the story telling process.

\textsuperscript{30} \textit{C5: The Ethical and Moral Self—Individual and Society}, White (2005) locates ethical deliberations between an individual’s historical experiences of care and their projections of a future self, and within a social context.
Hoskins and Leseho’s (1996) clear set of metaphors create some boundaries between theoretical perspectives and allow practitioners to be more explicit and intentional with their applications of theory. The categorization of theories according to metaphoric language is aesthetically inviting; however, these gross categorizations, or metaphors, do at times simplify highly nuanced bodies of literature within each category. Similarly, the authors provide a limited account for their categories of traditional and postmodern, which minimizes some possibly important aspects of each. For example, a fuller articulation of the traditional and postmodern could be explored in terms of how these metaphors take place in, constitute, or are a product of, particular historical and cultural contexts or power relations. Lastly, Hoskins and Leseho (1996) focus on the client’s self, but do not specifically address how the theories relate to the practitioner’s self. For example, client problems and goals for therapy are explored in terms of various theories of the self, but issues regarding how the self is theorized in terms of the development and training of the practitioner are not explored. This one-sided analysis made me curious about the differences between how theorists conceptualize client selves and how they conceptualize their own self, professional or personal.

C9: Constructivism and Constructionism—Modernism and Postmodernism

Piaget (1954) inaugurates constructivism through a description of learning as a process whereby individuals integrate new information from their environments into existing cognitive schemata. Piaget understands this acquisition and organization of information as happening through processes of assimilation, adaptation, and organization. Vygotsky (1978) similarly argues that humans actively construct their understandings of the world through an engagement with it and emphasizes the social and cultural dimensions of these processes. Both Vygotsky and Piaget are central figures in the developmental theories used to conceptualize child development
Constructivism as an epistemology, however, has outgrown its original learning or developmental theories context and has come to encompass a vast family of theoretical perspectives, sometimes including social constructionism. Vance Peavy (course content), for example, contends that a broad definition of constructivism can be used to incorporate a range of theories that challenge positivist approaches to methodology, epistemology, and human service.

Constructivist perspectives are generally in line with disciplines and philosophies that are characterized by postmodernism in the sense of accentuating the construction, rather than the discovery, of knowledge and identities (Raskin, 2002). In the constructionist paradigm, identity, knowledge, and truth are contextually situated, socially negotiated, and more interpretational and interpersonal than essential or objective. Danziger (1997) explains that notwithstanding the diverse renderings of the terms constructivist and constructionist within each group, and the overlap between them, constructivists at one extreme maintain an “essentially Kantian distinction between an individualized phenomenal world and an unknowable real (read noumenal) world” (p. 403), while constructionists emphasize a social interpretation of reality and subjectivity that abolishes the bounded subject and objective reality altogether. Constructivists can be distinguished from constructionists by their views concerning the existence of an external reality (Raskin). On the one hand, constructivists argue that there is an external reality, but that humans can only know it through their constructions of it. This type of constructivism characterizes both Piaget and Vygotsky. On the other hand, social constructionists do not necessarily believe in the existence of an observer-independent reality.

Social constructionism, as a paradigm suspicious of claims of objectivity and independence, generally avoids the notion of an isolated knower (Gergen, 2007, 2009). For

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31 C7: Development—Diversity—Creativity—Lifespan—Parenting. Developmental theory as a foundational aspect of CYC theory is explored through SCYC curriculum material. Critical perspectives on developmental theory are also engaged with.
social constructionists, psychic life is relational, conversational, and embedded in social practices. The self for social constructionists is therefore described as fluid, fleeting, and without a stable essence; the self changes in relation to social context, and multiple selves can exist within an individual as they simultaneously respond to and create different selves in shifting contexts (Raskin, 1999). From this perspective, all mental constructions, including the self, are in principle without decidable or stable referent and are therefore inaccessible through empirical study. The analysis shifts from an empirical or objective study of the self to the discourse and power relations that help form the self.

The social constructionist view of the self emphasizes how discourse, or the power-imbued language and social practices at use in a social group, provide the resources for constructing the self. The social constructionist Kenneth Gergen (2007, 2009) furthermore argues that the dominant discourses of a group, particularly those of the self, uphold the institutions of power in this society and marginalize competing traditions. To contest the dominant forms of constructing the self, whether in psychology or human service work, he proposes a critical practice that promotes radical and alternative ways of inquiry. Gergen directly connects modern psychology and the construction of identities based in a discourse of pathology to the widespread oppressions and injustice in modern society.

**Modernism—Postmodernism.** Gergen (1991), in his highly influential early work *The Saturated Self*, surveys conceptualizations of the self from periods and perspectives he defines as romantic, modern, and postmodern. He makes two main arguments in this work: (1) that the language or characterizations of self that are available in a social group function to limit or make possible forms of being, action, and sociability; and (2) that current conceptualizations—and therefore experiences—of self and social life, at least in North America or the wider developed
world, are impacted by what he calls social saturation. Tracing conceptualizations of the self throughout history allows Gergen to demonstrate how current characterizations and experiences of self and social relationships need to be considered in the context of recent advances in communication technology and related increases in social inundation, opportunities, conflicts, and responsibilities.

The self-contained individual self born of romantic and modernist discourse first began to be shaken by cultural and historical perspectives. As anthropologists and historians surveyed the relationships among cultural practices, language, and constructions of selfhood, it became evident that the contention that the individual self was a universal and inalienable truth needed to be scrutinized. The second, and possibly final, great blow to the individual self was the rise in communication technologies and what Gergen (1991) calls social saturation. No longer produced within a consistent and unitary language of selfhood, the socially saturated self is perpetually bombarded, or rather produced, within a matrix of varying discourses.

Gergen (1991) traces characterizations of the self through history and argues that prior to social saturation conceptualizations of the self were most influenced by romantic and modernist views. The romantic view of the self is described by Gergen as providing a vocabulary of individual depth: a characterization of personhood founded on passion, creativity, and a moral soul. This characterization forms the baseline from which relationships of commitment and dedication are anticipated and a life purpose emanates. A modernist view, on the other hand, constructs the self in terms of rationality, consciousness, belief, and opinion. Relationships under this regime are intentional, predictable, stable, and based in honesty and rational choice. Although both the romantic and modernist conceptualizations of the self continue to structure much of human experience, Gergen argues that a seismic shift in the production of selfhood has
taken place with the emergence of communications technology and the resulting amplification and multiplication of voices. Gergen therefore equates the process of social saturation with the postmodern condition:

Emerging technologies saturate us with the voices of humankind—both harmonious and alien. As we absorb their varied rhymes and reasons, they become part of us and we of them. Social saturation furnishes us with a multiplicity of incoherent and unrelated languages of the self. For everything we “know to be true” about ourselves, other voices within respond with doubt and even derision. This fragmentation of self-conceptions corresponds to a multiplicity of incoherent and disconnected relationships. These relationships pull us in myriad directions, inviting us to play such a variety of roles that the very concept of an “authentic self” with knowable characteristics recedes from view. The fully saturated self becomes no self at all. (pp. 6–7)

Rather than furnishing humans with a new or refined view of the self, the postmodern condition is characterized by plurality, possibility, and doubt. A variety of languages, voices, or conceptualizations of the self collide, producing even greater numbers of new forms of personhood, or jostle and compete for dominance and legitimacy. The paradox of the postmodern conception of the self is therefore in this multiplicity: there are at the same time a vast variety of conceptualizations of the self circulating while the postmodern can still be singularly identified by this variety, production, and completion. A perspectivism prevails in which once authentic, true, or essential characteristics are transformed into discourse, construction, or product. The core self, which could identify others and objects across its boundaries, is now produced by the confluence of objects and others zigzagging, folding, unfolding, and reconstructing: “the center fails to hold” (Gergen, 1991, p. 7).
Howard (2007) renders a nuanced reading of contemporary individualization theory and proposes three “distinct models of self-identity and individualized biography” (p. 25) based on the works of Bauman, Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, and Giddens. Individualization theory analyzes the rise of personal identity as a consequence of modernization. It asserts that contemporary individuals employ choice, self-identity strategies, and reflexive biography to cope with shifting social and institutional demand (Howard, 2007). Howard differentiates between first or heavy modernity and late or liquid modernity, which, although not specifically tied to dates, coincide with changes in cultural worldviews or paradigms. First modernity, according to Howard, is generally conceived of as starting during the Enlightenment with the demise of communal bonds and the beginning of capitalism. Late or heavy modernity, on the other hand, is associated with postindustrialism, globalization, “and the widespread calling into question of linear narratives of human progress” (p. 27). Although this second stage of modernity is sometimes conceptualized as a postmodern period, individualization theorists generally see it as a new phase of modernity (Howard, 2007). The division of modernity according to shifts in values and worldview is vague and difficult to reliably assess; however, it does provide a way of making generalized remarks regarding shifts in some cultures and societies.

Howard’s (2007) reading of Giddens describes the individual’s primary process of identity formation as the creating of a coherent and stable biographical narrative that can be employed to manage the uncertainty of modern society and create personal meaning. Individuals, in this rendering, use reflexivity to develop identity trajectories, which include goals that have the potential for a sense of accomplishment. Importantly, individuals depend on the acceptance and affirmation of others in forming their identity, and they develop relationships that will help them to satisfy their personal goals. The biographical storytelling in this account of selfhood is
reminiscent of the narrative perspective articulated by Hoskins and Leseho (1996) and similarly emphasizes choice and agency as a response to shifting social dynamics. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, according to Howard, describe identity formation as an experimentation process in which various attempts at personality are deployed to navigate the contradictions of late modernity. The metaphor of an experimenter is coupled with the metaphor of a defective jigsaw puzzle to describe how the attempt at completion or cohesion of identity is ultimately impossible.

Howard’s (2007) portrayal of Bauman is a dismal account of how individuals endlessly search for an elusive self-identity that is precluded “in a world that is bereft of predictable structures and norms” (p. 29). Coherence and identity completion is impossible in this rendering, but the belief in such a goal is necessary for continued functioning. Individuals continually take up and dispose of identities in the process of trying to connect with others, while deceiving themselves by thinking that a stable self is attainable. The stable self therefore becomes the perpetually dislocated and reconstructed self without centre. Language, or rather discourse, constitutes the self rather than the other way around. The shift from a view of the self as the speaker of language to an analysis of how a subject is produced by power-imbued discourse provides an avenue for criticizing the productive effects of social practices.

**Discourse.** Discourse is a concept and analytic that attempts to critically situate knowledge, language, and social practices in relation to politics, history, and power (Law & Madigan, 1998). For Foucault (1979), language, or discourse, is a productive social force which constitutes the world and subjectivity for the language user and reinforces power relations within society. Language systems, such as psychology, psychiatry, and medicine, operate as discursive regimes that produce and reinforcingly privilege normative systems of thought and behaviour: as discourse is articulated and disseminated socially, its productive power is extended (Gergen,
The legitimacy of a discourse, its truth value, and recognition as a scientific practice, are therefore understood in terms of the power relations that sustain and extend it, as well as the subjects who are able to speak it with authority.\(^{32}\) Foucault (1980) argues that truth is produced by the restraint of alternative knowledges and linked in a circular system of power relations. Therefore, no essential truths, realities, or selves exist, only discourse and relationships to and within it.

The dominant discourses that circulate within a society, including that society’s definition(s) of self, can be considered as interconnected systems of power-imbued language. Dominant discourses function in a society as normative frameworks that organize social relationships and delineate the matrix of activity, while marginal discourses compete and produce incompatible versions of reality (Law & Madigan, 1998). Subjectivities, such as the “the at-risk-youth” or “the professional CYC practitioner,” for example, are not theorized to exist in some essential way outside of language, but are rather understood as constructed or produced through processes of subjectification, objectification, and other socially constitutive practices embedded in discourse. Foucault (1978, 1976/1980) argued that discourses are essentially relations of power and knowledge that produce subject positions that particular bodies then take up. Rather than being necessarily due to natural, internal, or essential qualities of the human body, subject positions are taken up or assigned based on political and historical circumstance. Within this dynamic and productive interplay of discourse, psychology, over the past century-and-a-half, has been legitimated as a science and achieved an overriding position in relation to other claims of knowledge regarding the mind, soul, or self. As the language constructs of psychology now guide the practice of many human service and care practitioners, these

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\(^{32}\) **C2: The Canonical Self.** The authority afforded to a small group of CYC theorists in CYC is explored in terms of a particular rendition of the self that comes to be seen as central and necessary for practice.
discourses simultaneously work to limit the influence of diverse traditions, practices, and knowledge systems, such as Indigenous knowledges. The discursive domination of psychology includes, for example, a strong influence on academic literature and research, university positions, and insurance coverages. In terms of articulating what the self is, the image of the deficient, defective, or problem-saturated person holds currency (Gergen, 2007).

North American societies, Gergen (2007) argues, are quickly losing variability of forms of interpretation, self-definition, and social practice; they are losing terminologies, grassroots vernacular, and metaphors for understanding experience and the self. Gergen offers a few examples: the overwhelming dispensation of drugs for apathy and depression where once these were religious issues of guilt remedied with spiritual consultation and a relationship with God; interpreting being infatuated, having the blues, and loving sexual encounters as obsession, depression, and addiction. In the context of doing violence-prevention and anticolonialism work with children, families, and communities, Richardson and Wade (2010) explore how expressions of resistance aimed at preserving dignity are systematically redefined by authorities as poor or failed parenting. Building on research done by Coates and Wade (2007), the authors describe how language, particularly in the context of contemporary colonial relations between Indigenous people and individuals who represent state authority, is used to “1) conceal violence, 2) conceal resistance, 3) mitigate the responsibility of the perpetrator and 4) to shift the blame onto the victim” (p. 138). Richardson and Wade argue that by individualizing experiences of violence and disconnecting them from systemic oppression, blame and responsibly is shifted onto the victims of violence. For example, the authors show how mothers who are targeted by violence are often held responsible for stopping the violence inflicted on themselves and their children, blamed for

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33 C16: Geography—Indigenous Cosmology—Ontology and Epistemology—Immanence. The devaluation or foreclosures of Indigenous knowledge systems is analyzed in terms of the dominance of Western philosophical foundations.
failing to protect their children, or characterized as weak or depressed. Such operations of language and authority cycle back into oppressive conditions by further undermining mothers and Indigenous communities through the forcible removal of children.

Through analyzing power and discourse, Gergen (2007) and Richardson and Wade (2010) connect the language of pathology to moral and political control. Gergen claims that classifying politically neutral experiences, such as sadness or lethargy, as mental illnesses contributes to a process of making such behaviours socially manageable to the benefit of the most powerful. Richardson and Wade demonstrate how victim blaming and the recoding of resistance and struggles for dignity may replicate colonial dominance and destabilize Indigenous families and communities. In an antipsychiatry context, Szasz (2007) shows that mental illness is consistently a label for disapproved of or marginal behaviours. For example, in the face of a psychiatric discourse that pathologized, diagnosed, and prescribed cures for homosexuality, Szasz advocated for gay rights. The transition to discourse from language therefore provides an analysis of (1) the productive power of discourse in shaping and forming the self; and (2) the power relations in a society, which operate to privilege and oppress particular individuals and groups through knowledge and discourse.

From a constructionist perspective, the psychological realities of a culture or society are achieved through the discursive frames of interpretations and relations of power that provide and reinforce those very discourses (Madigan, 1998). In the process of discursive reproduction, cultural knowledge claims are internalized, performed, and reproduced throughout society and knowledge becomes a set of living practices that are situated in interpersonal relationships rather than handed down from above. Power, knowledge, and truth are therefore disseminated and decentralized: they are performed in the interactions of individuals and groups. Alternative
constructions of reality, alternative performances of subjectivity, and alternative claims to truth are subjugated through interpersonal practices of speaking and behaviour. Discourse, knowledge, power, and subjectivity are therefore embedded in every social interaction, narratively produced and limited, and embodied or performed as subjectivity. This social constructionist perspective on power, discourse, and knowledge is what informs White’s (2007) articulation of ways of knowing and ways of being as embedded, embodied, and narratively informed.

Constructionism—Cross-Cultural Knowledge Exchange. Bellefeuille and Jamieson (2008) draw parallels between a nonindividualist perspective of selfhood and traditional South African and Buddhist perspectives. In South Africa, the concept of Ubuntu, popularized by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, emphasizes mutual reliance and the impossibility of isolating a person from their community, while the teachings of Buddhism similarly call attention to the illusory nature of the isolated self (Bellefeuille & Jamieson). Bellefeuille and Jamieson argue that these traditional perspectives promote an understanding of subjectivity and relatedness as an “us” rather than a “you and I” (p. 40), a co-created, shared space in which connection, dialogue, and genuineness prevail in CYC practice. This relational turn coincides with a constructionist analysis of how practice and practitioners themselves are constituted through social relationships and discourse (Danziger, 1997).

Gergen and Hosking (2008) enter social constructivism into a “dialogue with Buddhism” in which they “find remarkable affinities in major assumptions and implications” (p. 299). Although these authors find similarities between social constructionism and Buddhism in the analysis of what they call a nonfoundational or artificially constructed self, these two perspectives seem to be incongruent in terms of experience, ontology, and reality on the one hand and questions of how to move forward in practice on the other. On the first question,
Buddhism posits an experience and experiencing agent, while constructionists generally struggle with accounting for experience as it “reinstates the individual as a primary source or ontological foundation of being” (Gergen & Hosking, 2008, p. 306). On the second question, Buddhism favours liberation through deconstructing the self and constructivists grapple with how to maintain a relationship with the surrounding ways of life generated by an individualistic tradition. These considerations bring up two questions for relational CYC praxis: How can reality, experience, and subjectivity themselves be considered as emerging from relationship rather than an experiencing agent? How can relational CYC practitioners maintain living relationships within discourses of individualism?

The social constructivist perspective that Bellefeuille and Jamieson draw from Gergen speaks about a narrated self who emerges from relationships and conversations that are themselves situated within cultural discourses and social contexts. In this account, self-conception and identity do not exist prior to discourse or within an individual. The constructivist self (Gergen 1999), emerging in different form according to the symbolic and linguistic practices within particular contexts, therefore contrasts sharply with Stern’s (1985) developmental perspective, which argues that a sense of separate self is possessed at birth with many predesigned qualities that serve “as the primary subjective perspective that organizes social experience and therefore now moves to center stage as the phenomenon that dominates early social development” (p. 11). Additionally, at an epistemological level, constructivism challenges the psychological project of using language to accurately map an external reality, arguing instead that “any claims to knowledge are culturally and historically situated” (Gergen & Hosking, 2008, p. 301). Notwithstanding these contradictions, social constructivism and Stern’s developmental psychoanalysis do challenge the individualistic construal of autonomous selfhood.
Writing from the fields of CYC and early childhood education, Dahlberg, Moss, and Pence (2007) critique the global spread of the Western individualistic paradigm from a postmodern and seemingly constructionist perspective. The universalizing of theories from Western developmental psychology, the authors argue, has devastating effects on non-Western cultures worldwide. The majority (or developing) world to which these theories are exported, however, have not stood idly by but have introduced an uncertainty about certainty in Western psychology and philosophy. The challenge to rethink psychology’s truth claims on cross-cultural and epistemological grounds draws attention to the relationship between knowledge and power in the constitution of truth and science. From a constructionist perspective, it is in the confrontation, complications, and contradictions that arise when discourses collide and vie for legitimacy that the workings of power are discernible.

Dahlberg et al. (2007) argue that a countermovement to the discursive spread of Western theories exists worldwide that emphasizes the importance and legitimacy of reconnecting with cultural beliefs and practices. While the majority world is nonetheless interested in accessing resources and knowledge from Western societies, there is also a trend to either return to or further traditional practices and ways of knowing. The interactions between different knowledge systems have produced an important dynamic for rethinking science, epistemology, and subjectivity in both the West and the majority world. Dahlberg et al. argue that there is a growing tendency to synthesize scientific perspectives and the postmodern perspective into a method that approaches knowledge relationally and based on a spirit of inquiry.

**Postmodernity and Science.** A professor of CYC, in a research interview, spoke about science and postmodernity and explained that the idea of the latter originated in architecture and was generally a “revisiting of modernism.” This professor contrasted the more general
understanding of postmodernism as a critique of objectivity with a view of science as the pursuit of understanding without a claim to truth. Science, in this context, was elaborated as an enterprise in which researchers attempt to prove themselves wrong through a variety of approaches and analytics. In contrast to the postmodern critique of truth claims or grand narratives, a person working with the scientific method can never prove herself right, this professor explained, but only show that she has not yet proven herself wrong. In this view, critical postmodern philosophy, ironically, is the only grand narrative, truth claim, or reductive philosophy insofar as it attempts to explain away other philosophies and scientific approaches. Specifically in relation to CYC theory, this participant stated, “We have set aside science far too much”:

The worst theoretical reductionism that we are doing right now, which is also the most paradoxical, is postmodernism. . . . I mean, it is so amusing, it has almost become gospel. To what end? To find out who the right people are, who the right thinkers are?

Postmodernism here is being described as a paradoxical or contradictory because the claim that all theories are local and constructed narratives cannot avoid its own critique. Although I have not found constructionist theorists who specifically respond to this critique, the work of Jacques Derrida, and deconstructionist thinking generally, specifically engages with this issue. In the following section I will build towards a deconstructionist critique of praxis to examine CYC professionalization and community identity.

C10: The Professional Self—Marx—Praxis—Deconstruction

Professional certification. The North American Certification Project (NACP) is a credentialing standard for professional child and youth work in North America (Mattingly, Stuart, & VanderVen, 2010). Mattingly, Stuart, and VanderVen (2010) detail the NACP’s competency document, which elaborates the skills, attitudes, knowledges, and abilities necessary
for professional practice across five contexts. The first practice context the authors elaborate on is the self, which the competencies variably describe as culturally situated, the mediator of knowledge and skills, a pole in the self-other dialectic relationship, a professional boundary, a sense of professional identity, and as essential for practice. Mattingly et al. argue that “foundational to Child and Youth Care is the use of self, but to make effective use of self in practice one must first be aware of and able to articulate the nature of the self” (p. 28). It is evident in the NACP competency document that professional CYC has arrived at a reflexive place where the articulation of the nature of the self is necessary; however, this definition is left up to individual practitioners or educational facilities to develop. At SCYC, White’s (2007) praxis model has been taken up as the primary framework for the integration and articulation of knowledge, skills, and self.

**Toward a politicized praxis framework.** White (2007) takes up the concept of praxis to provide a framework for engaging with diverse ways of approaching, theorizing, and applying self in CYC. In contrast to the NACP competency document (Mattingly et al., 2010), which White (2007) critiques as flat and informed by an instrumental/technical rational paradigm, a praxis framework resists standardization and highlights the complex situatedness of all CYC work. Rejecting the majority view that the complexities of human service can be conceptualized and measured in standardized forms and delivered by a homogenous group of practitioners, White’s praxis framework uses a web metaphor to appreciate the “active, intersecting, embedded, shifting and asymmetrical qualities of everyday practice” (White, p. 241). Although praxis is approximate to current understandings of practice, it involves the integration of theory and practice manifested in the application of self-understanding (White). Praxis necessitates an ongoing, situated, dialogic, and emergent stance in relation to theory, practice, and
conceptualizations. Being, as a replacement term for self in the praxis model, highlights the active and relational orientation that practitioners take in their work. White provides the following examples as ways of being ethically orientated in the world: mindful, collaborative, curious, respectful, caring, responsive, and accountable.

In contrast to contemporary ideas of practice, praxis is risky, free, and a more value-laden form of action (Smith, 1999). For example, White uses verbs to linguistically transform knowledge to knowing, skills to doing, and self to being. This change in language better reflects the active, dynamic, and situated nature of CYC and the self. Rather than replace or reject a competence-based approach, a praxis framework works to expand thinking, challenge underlying assumptions, and recognize the social, moral, and political character of the CYC field. Praxis entails making political contexts and social justice issues visible in their impacts on practitioners, children, youth, and families (White, 2007). White (2007) argues that the praxis dimensions of knowing, doing, and being are diverse and multiple and “always get expressed within specific historical, sociocultural, political and institutional contexts” (While, 2012, p. 227). While she provides the praxis model as a framework for rethinking CYC, numerous other researchers, practitioners, and scholars have taken up the notion of praxis as a viable framework for a specifically politicized approach to CYC.

Politicized praxis, as I am defining it, theorizes CYC along similar lines to White’s, but explicitly includes a determination that is world transformative. White traces the concept of praxis back to the critical philosophies of Freire and Habermas, but she omits any reference to

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34 C14: Immanence—Affirmation—Nomadic Subjectivity—Becoming. Although White (2007) works towards a more active rendition of the self by using the concept of being, other theorists have drawn on Deleuze and Guattari (2001, 2003) and Braidotti (2006, 2009) to conceptualize processes of becoming which further move the self away from its articulation as a stable identity or structure.

C11: Politicized Praxis. Numerous researchers, practitioners, and scholars in CYC have used a praxis framework to address specific socio-cultural and political aspects of CYC. Not only do these authors consider the impact of injustices on children, youth, families, and communities, but they also advocate for a CYC praxis which is transformative of the social conditions which generate injustices.
Marx (1845/1998), who argued that “the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it” (p. 574). Nor does she reference Fanon (1952/2008), who said “what matters is not to know the world but to change it” (p. xviii). Tuck and Yang (2012) contrast Freire’s critical pedagogy to Fanon’s (1961/2004) *The Wretched of the Earth*, critiquing Freire as locating liberation abstractly in the consciousness of the oppressed, whereas Fanon situates liberation “in the particularities of colonization, in the specific structural and interpersonal categories of Native and settler” (p. 20). It is with the impetus to change the specific structures of colonization and capitalism that produce experiences of injustice and oppression that politicized praxis, I believe, has the potential for situating and revolutionizing White’s original framework.

**Marxist Praxis.** In describing CYC praxis as political, for example, Skott-Myhre and Skott-Myhre (2011) encourage the use of theories that have the capacity to allow the thinking through of practice choices that challenge society’s dominant social forces. The authors specifically take up a Marxist reading of praxis to extend the political aspects of White’s (2007) proposals, arguing that praxis “requires that we not only theorize and reflect, but that our theories allow us new avenues of action that have the capacity to change the world” (p. 42). They suggest that professionalization and standards of competence draw on and sustain hierarchy, power, and profiteering systems and therefore deprive youth and youth work of their revolutionary political potential. Kathy Skott-Myhre (2012) extends this critique, arguing that within the discourse of professionalism, “the call for professional boundaries becomes a political call for collusion in the ongoing project of defining the terms and conditions of what one can do and where one can go” (p. 305). Politicized praxis, conversely, is an active political approach enlivened by the complex relations between youth and adults (Skott-Myhre & Skott-Myhre).
Hans Skott-Myhre (2005b) takes up the idea of praxis and youth-adult relations to launch a strong Marxist critique of efforts to professionalize CYC work. He sees efforts to certify and professionalize CYC practitioners as an “assimilation of youth work into the domains of capital appropriation” (p. 170), as well as a further separation between youth and adults. He further (2005a) argues that the systematic delineation of a boundary between the groups “adults” and “youth” in the training of most youth work programs perpetuates a segregation of both groups’ political interests. Through provision of services that seek to serve disadvantaged and marginalized youth, he argues, youth workers actually prepare youth for the exploitation practices of global capitalism. This form of preparatory youth work is argued as assisting youth in developing the skills, tools, behaviours, affective states, and social identities to perpetuate a society and global economy that is thoroughly capitalist and exploitative.

Hans Skott-Myhre (2005a) proposes a Marxist vision for defining youth work as a means to the mutual liberation of youth worker and youth alike through the creative forces inherent in staying connected to each other, their material conditions, and the products of their work. To bring these concepts together, he uses the Marxist idea of “use value” and defines it as “that creative force which is only useful to the youth and youth workers themselves and cannot be exploited by someone else” (p. 147). A subjectivity constituted by use value works toward the mutual liberation and productivity of youth and youth worker. Skott-Myhre concludes by inviting youth workers to fully engage with their own lived experiences and those of the people with whom they work. He contends that the ability to “avoid alienation from the actual conditions of lived experience” and the “capacity to continue to affectively respond within an environment and society filled with loss, despair, fear, loneliness and grief” (p. 155) hold transformative potential to undertake radical and liberating youth work.
**Subjectus and Subjectum.** The political dimensions of praxis, including both the sociopolitical context in which CYC is done and the interpersonal relationships through which it is done, lead Hans Skott-Myhre (2008) to use the term *subject*, rather than *individual* or *self*, to describe a person in relationship to context. A subject, or *subjectus* following the work of Baibar (1994), implies that human beings are generally subjected to the power of an authority (e.g., parent, sovereign, law, organization, professional, professional organization) that limits their autonomy, creativity, and freedom. A subject, therefore, can be any person whose identity is primarily defined in relation to an authority. A subject, or subjectus, can furthermore be located in power relations with multiple structures or authorities simultaneously; therefore, the relative autonomy and creativity of the subject can change depending on position, relation, and location.

Skott-Myhre (2008) proposes the *subjectum* as an alternative mode of human experience that “is defined through its ability to creatively produce itself” (p. 4). This ability to creatively self-produce, in contrast to being produced through the mediation of power dynamics, as in the subject or subjectus, is a function of relationships and connections in community (Skott-Myhre, 2008). The subjectum is not found inside the social categories of contemporary society that demand bounded and individual selves, such as practitioner and client, but rather in radical relationships in which established hierarchies are transgressed and transformed. Self-production in this sense is a potential that is found primarily in children, youth, artists, and, to a certain extent, athletes and entertainers (Skott-Myhre). Although this creative potential is always set within the systems of power prevalent in a society or context, it provides the opportunity for relationships that are transformative and impactful in a society. In its application to CYC, it is

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*C1: The Self and Subject—Western Philosophy—Language—Suspicions.* The differentiation between the concepts of self and subject are specifically articulated in terms of their temporal and constitutive relationship with social structures, language, and power.
within the transgressed and transformed boundaries between adult/child, practitioner/client, and authority/dependent that politicized praxis and creative self-production are performed.

Returning to the concept of praxis from a Marxist perspective with the concepts of subjectus and subjectum, Skott-Myhre and Skott-Myhre (2011) argue that engaging in creative and hierarchy-destabilizing relationships with children, youth, and families is the revolutionary tactic necessary for political change. The authors encourage entering into the creative self-production of children and youth—the subjectum—as a political project of social change through a challenge to the oppression of subject formation as a process of social control—the subjectus. In this sense, Hans Skott-Myhre (2005b) argues that communist praxis is not an ideology, which is defined as a set of ideas removed from experience, but is “deeply rooted in the actual lived conditions of the youth and adults who come together in the world of youth work” (p. 169).

Communist praxis challenges the social categories that separate youth and adults and returns the creative force or subjectum inherent in the meeting of these groups to within their own desire and power for creating life. This post-Marxist reading of praxis as a world-changing ethics is impossible to predetermine, standardize, or specify. It is a dynamic view of social liberation and the creative potential of human relations.

Professional Social Justice. Bellefeuille and Jamieson (2008), claiming a different view of praxis as social justice, advocate for a critical consciousness and ethical reasoning in a CYC practice that assists workers in being capable of responsibility. In applying praxis to globalization, Bellefeuille and Jamieson focus on the material disparities among individuals and groups and the dominant interests that benefit from such arrangements. Their approach to social injustices, however, differs from Skott-Myhre’s (2005a, 2005b) in that they argue for a strong CYC professional group capable of addressing economic disadvantage, oppression, and
marginalization at a social level. Although Bellefeuille and Jamieson call for new ideas and approaches from within CYC, they continue to seek solutions from within the current socioeconomic system and suggest, for example, that “subsidized housing for marginal wage earners, education to prevent early pregnancies and unwanted or unhealthy babies, education and employment opportunities in the trades and service sectors, and life skills education for those who have been marginalized” (p. 54) are necessary to achieving social justice. In their attempt at describing the self in the context of socially just praxis, Bellefeuille and Jamieson trace the concept of self and authenticity through Western psychology, as well as proposing their own relational and nonindividualistic understanding of the self.³⁷

**Deconstructive Praxis.** Although critiques of professionalization abound in CYC, I do not believe that professionalization is automatically politically suspect, as some authors do. Similarly, as I have argued above, although praxis situates itself within sociopolitical contexts, I do not believe that is inherently politically transformative. Derrida (1988) writes that although there is always something political about attempting to stabilize contexts, such as professionalization attempts to do with CYC practice, it does not follow that such actions are politically suspect by necessity. He argues instead that an agenda is always implied in any contextual configurations, but that contextual configuration, and hence politics, are always necessary. A deconstructionist perspective, or deconstructive praxis, therefore demonstrates that neutrality is impossible and that any process or critique issues from one context or another.

The logic of Derrida’s (1988) claim that there is nothing outside text, rather than being a homage to textuality, is more of an argument that none of us can stand outside of a context to critique. The critique of professionalization, as with all else, is a political act that is intelligible

³⁷ C3: The Authentic Self—Presence—Relational Practice—Stories. Bellefeuille and Jameson (2012) propose a non-individualistic conceptualization of relational practice and attempt to offer through it an alternative to the autonomous self which is prevalent in Western philosophy and psychology.
and analyzable from within one or another context of meaning. The claim that there is “nothing outside the text” (p. 136) plays on the structuralist analysis of differential systems of language that understands that a text is always overrun by all the divisions and boundaries that a text may seem to have. A text is never complete, bounded, or secure; it is always open to reinterpretation, play of meaning, and the involvement of history, politics, the unconscious, and so forth (Derrida, 1978). There is no more a text that functions “in an immediate way, as the name of an intelligible textual object, counterposed to an extratextual outside” (Barnett, 1999, p. 284). The text is no longer a stable entity between stable entities, “but is given priority as a constitutive play of chance and necessity” (p. 284); it brings together a textured interweaving of differences. Without a clear border that lets in and keeps out certain interpretations, constructs, meanings, and readings, a text is no longer approachable from the outside, no longer situatable within a stable context.

Praxis under deconstructive pressure, similarly, does not move us toward a higher ground of practice where we as CYC, having successfully deconstructed our positions and acknowledged our political situatedness, now set out from an “outside text” position to help those still caught up in the web of text and context. Deconstruction, rather, seems to instigate what Hans Skott-Myhre (de Finney, Skott-Myhre, Little, & Gharabaghi, 2012) calls a “political project designed to constantly undermine the fundamental assumptions of our field” (p. 134). Skott-Myhre (de Finney et al., 2012) furthermore follows Marx in promoting contradiction and uncertainty as a means of making visible “the actual machinery of domination” (p. 134). Although in solidarity with a Marxist critique, deconstruction lacks the stability, realism, or objective “outside text” necessary for a comprehensive structural and materialist understanding.

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38 C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject. Structuralism, particularly in its relationship with linguistics, is the backdrop of many critiques of the self.
of history or the means of emancipation from domination. Praxis, therefore, under conditions of
poststructuralism, becomes a self-subverting opening onto the yet-to-come: a deconstructive
praxis.

Lather (2003) works from a deconstructive perspective and challenges the notions that a
deconstructive praxis can be conflated with Marxist ideological critique or that deconstruction
can serve clear and useful purposes. She renders Derrida’s “nothing outside text” as “nothing
that is not caught in a network of differences and references that give a textual structure to what
we can know of the world” (p. 258). In this reading of intertextuality, all cultural practices are
delimited and inscribed by frameworks that are produced by and productive of networks of
power. Intertextuality is a critique of logocentrism, a searching for the failures of language to
provide stable meanings, and a working within the ruins of such failures. In terms of the “cultural
constitution of subjectivity,” which deconstructive textuality makes visible, Lather writes:

Here the complexity of subject formation includes how various axes of power are
mutually constitutive, productive of different local regimes of power and knowledge that
locate subjects and require complex negotiations of relations, including the interruption
of coherence and complete subordination to the demands of regulatory regimes. Engaging
the real is not what it used to be. Different ideas about materiality, reality,
representations, and truth distinguish different epistemological orientations where reality
does not precede representation but is constituted by it. (pp. 258–259)

In terms of praxis, which is intractable and perhaps indistinguishable from subject
formation, Lather places deconstructive efforts again in the wastelands beyond assured concepts
and “in excess of traditional political agendas” (p. 258). This excess moves beyond the
dialecticism of Marx, most especially its dogmatic configurations, yet it returns to a Marxist
reading of justice that foregrounds the asymmetries in relationships. The task is no longer to uncover hidden material or structural injustice, but to set to work a different logic that “works against the leveling processes of the dialectic and for the excess, the nonrecuperable remainder, the different, the other/outside of the logic of noncontradiction” (p. 259). Deconstruction demands the impossible in an engagement with the Other.

Although the “posts” and Marxism share the task of understanding representational practices as socially and historically located, Lather (2003) argues that the two approaches differ in ontological positioning. Marxism, as an enlightenment and modernist project, proposes a materialist ontology, whereas deconstruction is ontologically indeterminate, even in regard to its own existence. Deconstruction (if there is such a thing) is interested “in complicit practices and excessive differences rather than unveiling structures and illuminating the forces and relations of production” (p. 260). Whereas a Marxist analysis may focus on the objective structures that organize the production of material substantience, the ideological structure that substantiates consciousness, or the relations among individuals in production processes, deconstructive praxis opens onto the excesses, contradictions, and failures of these frameworks themselves.

Deconstruction eschews notions of correct consciousness, categorical thinking, intentional agency, and reason more generally. Lather writes that “indeterminacy and paradox become conditions of affirmative power by undoing fixities and mapping new possibilities for playing out relations between identity and difference, margins and centers” (p. 260).

Furthermore, “the deconstructive shift is from the real to the production of the reality effect” (p. 260). From this perspective, therefore, “praxiological engagements” (Lather, 2003, p. 260) open to difference and abide within the immanent sphere of which there is no outside. Deconstruction is complicit in its participation in reinscription; however, this participation is propelled by the
respectful engagement with the Other. Lather describes this praxis as getting lost in “an ethical relationality of non-authoritarian authority to what we know and how we know it” (p. 261), which resonates with Hans Skott-Myhre’s (de Finney et al., 2012) call for CYC as a “political project designed to constantly undermine the fundamental assumptions of our field” (p. 134). Praxis thus extends beyond conceptualizations of the field and opens onto a praxis of hospitality.

The impossibility of how deconstruction cannot be applied while at the same time is always-already in motion is deconstruction in a nutshell (Caputo, 1977). Lather (2003) writes that “deconstruction is aimed at provoking fields into new moves and spaces where they hardly recognize themselves in becoming otherwise, the unforeseeable that they are already becoming” (p. 261). To be CYC for me, therefore, is to be within and against, to keep alive and transgress, to do and undo in the same movement. Deconstruction invites us to sustain our tradition through engaging with the new and the other, that which exceeds our boundaries and lives on the far side of tradition and legitimation. Praxis, in this form, is reinscribed as a shaping of a “future that must remain to come, in excess of our codes but, still, always already: forces already active in the present” (Lather, 2003, p. 262): A CYC-to Come.39

C11: Politicized Praxis

In a special issue of the International Journal of Child, Youth, and Family Studies (Vol. 2–3, 2012), a roundtable conversation that occurred at the CYC in Action II conference at UVic is documented in which Sandrina de Finney, Hans Skott-Myhre, J. N. Cole Little, and Kiaras Gharabaghi discuss politicized CYC praxis. In this conversation (de Finney et al., 2012), de Finney calls for “a more productive praxis of social change” (p. 130) and Little looks toward

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39 C17: CYC-to-Come—Community and Tradition—CYC Identity—Hospitality. I propose the concept of CYC-to-Come as a way of introducing deconstruction and hospitality into CYC notions of community and identity.
conversations that deconstruct “the dialect of CYC praxis with a focus on gender, identity, and social change” (p. 132). de Finney summarizes the current tasks of politicizing praxis by asking:

What gets lost when we become stuck in the familiar contours of normative theories and practices? What knowledge and ways of being flow outside the overwhelmingly EuroWestern perspectives that so define our field? What critical theories—specifically, anti and postcolonial, Indigenous, feminist, queer, and other analyses of resistance, hope, transformation—can contribute to these discussions, and to a more productive praxis of social change? (p. 130)

Other articles in the special issue also examine CYC praxis in terms of its complicity or contestation of colonialism, racism, neoliberalism, global capitalism, and other forms of oppression. For example, Saraceno (2012) calls for a deconstruction of “the theories, structures, and values that shape how we practice” (p. 248) and a contestation of notions related to progress, economic development, and care founded on dominant notions of whiteness.40 Notions of whiteness were previously secured, Saraceno argues, through practices of subjugating other identities and normalizing white identities and experience. By situating white identities within colonialism, neoliberalism, and oppression, notions of care founded in white dominance can be deconstructed, decolonizing discourses can be taken up, and Indigenous and other subjugated or racialized identities can be proudly reclaimed. A decolonizing stance, however, necessitates not only scrutinizing subject identity categorizations, but disrupting privilege and making explicit “how neo-colonialism continues to operate in normative ways of knowing, doing, and being in professional helping and CYC” (p. 260). Saraceno proposes that future helping relationship are instituted not through new professional rules or codes, but rather through practices of “mapping

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40 C12: Identity Theories—Multiculturalism—Race—Solidarity. Whiteness is explored in relation to privilege, solidarity, allyship, and racial development.
out new, engaged methods to uncover, track, and resist these hidden hegemonic normative values and practices” (p. 261). The deconstruction of CYC theories, structures, and values therefore is an attempt to move from a practice steeped in coloniality and a Western ontology to a politicized praxis of social justice.

Examining the relationship between professional CYC practice and ongoing colonialism in Canada, Saraceno (2012) argues that “the assumption that professionalized helping is better [than community problem solving and local solutions] follows the natural logic of a Western ontology, with its inherent privileging of hierarchy, power, and a paternalistic stance” (p. 257). Professionalism, as a hegemonic tendency, can be contrasted to a CYC praxis grounded in collectivism, decolonization, social justice, and the creative capacities of those generally constructed as clients. Saraceno proposes a politicized praxis informed by feminism, anticolonialism, queer theory, solidarity, and affirmative politics as possible avenues beyond the Western ontology that currently structures praxis and professionalism discourses. With specific reference to rethinking the self, Saraceno proposes the use of intersectional frameworks for understanding how identity is constituted through hegemonic power. Furthermore, poststructural and queer analyses of identity are proposed as ways to trouble the functioning of norms in the construction of subjects.

Also arguing for new politicized theoretical engagements in CYC, Loiselle, de Finney, Khanna, and Corcoran (2012) present transtheoretical practice and research vignettes steeped in

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41 C16: Geography—Indigenous Cosmology—Ontology and Epistemology—Immanence. The dominant Western ontology of dualism is contrasted to the philosophy of immanence proposed by Deleuze and Guattari (200,2004) and further subjected to an anti-colonial critique founded on Indigenous cosmology (Watts, 2013).


43 C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject. Poststructuralism, with roots in structural linguistics, specifically engages with language as foundational to the self. Poststructuralism, in broad terms, proposes a decentered and differed notion of the subject.
activist perspectives on colonialism, neoliberalism, and social change to critically address and trouble “exclusionary notions of CYC” (p. 178). The authors examine the role that “Indigenous, postcolonial, queer, feminist, and poststructural” (p. 178) perspectives can play in reconfiguring CYC in its responsiveness to diverse children, youth, families and communities. Loiselle et al. assert an ethical commitment to challenge neocolonialism and neoliberalism in CYC through collaborating with youth to respond to local environments and relationships in a “critical relational praxis” (p. 200). Such a praxis expands the notion of CYC praxis to include practices and theories that address issues of racism, poverty, colonialism, and social justice. Politicized praxis therefore is founded on a critique of neocolonialism in which educational and economic difficulties of minoritized children, youth, families, and communities are no longer individualized but reinscribed in the social and political contexts that create and perpetuate inequalities. Politicized anticolonial praxis therefore challenges the “dominant, White, middle class, patriarchal values of individualism, rational choice, and self-realization [that] are embedded in capitalist, neoliberal structures” (p. 181). The authors call for a complete reconceptualization of CYC praxis inclusive of the formulation of the self or subject and its relationship to society in terms of its constitution, power relations, and participation.

de Finney, Dean, Loiselle, and Saraceno (2011) similarly “track the impacts of minoritization by exploring links between historical structural inequities and the positioning of minoritized groups as being in need of professional intervention” (p. 361). The authors use queer, Indigenous, anti-racist, feminist, and postcolonial theories to analyze the impacts of neoliberalism and neocolonialism on the unequal experiences of groups of children in residential care. The authors argue that processes of minoritization—the positioning of individuals and groups as other and/or inferior to a normalized or dominant group—are directly related to the
chronic overrepresentation of Indigenous, racialized, queer, and poor children and youth in residential care. de Finney et al. argue for a politicized praxis informed by frameworks outside the Euro-Western paradigm that attend to structural and systemic issues. By introducing the critical concept of minoritization into the dialogue on identity, the authors inextricably tie social and subject formation processes together.

While arguing for a new politics in CYC that addresses neoliberalism, political hegemony, and dominant culture, Gharabaghi and Krueger (2010) do not make the same connections that Loiselle et al. (2012) and de Finney et al. (2011) make among CYC praxis, social/discursive structures, minoritization, and formulations of the self. To the contrary, Gharabaghi and Krueger argue that unifying concepts such as relationship and the self can be the foundation for a new counter-hegemonic politics in CYC. The authors do not specifically define the self in this context, but hint toward the taken-for-granted notion of the self (what I have called the canonical self\textsuperscript{44}) as central to CYC. The political script based on self and relationship that Gharabaghi and Krueger reflect on as a possible unifying narrative for the field consists of recognizing how the CYC field supports, rather than challenges, the status quo.

Gharabaghi and Krueger (2010) explore how, in response to poverty, material inequality, and other injustices, the tendency in Western society—and CYC—has been to mitigate the impacts of such forces and adjust our norms and expectations. The authors challenge CYC theorists to consider how social problems are conceptualized and how these conceptualizations serve particular political and economic interests. CYC practitioners, when seen as mitigating the negative impacts of social issues on behalf of or at the bequest of the most powerful, for example, do not necessarily act for the benefit of those affected or society as a whole:

\textsuperscript{44} C2: The Canonical Self. The canonical self is a concept which aggregates the central writings on the self as a core concept for CYC. The self as articulated in its canonical form is ambiguous yet wholly obvious consisting of a self-reflective, authentic, present, and experiencing.
We cannot argue credibly that our profession, our discipline, or our field stands outside of or even in opposition to the status quo; we may even have to accept that we perpetuate the status quo by practicing a politics informed by the disempowered categories of collective complacency and bureaucratic process. (pp. 29–30)

It is in the context of race and class struggle that Gharabaghi and Krueger call for reflection on how CYC praxis is conceptualized and acted out as a politics of the field.

**C12: Identity Theories—Multiculturalism—Race—Solidarity**

**Intersectionality.** An intersectional framework, or intersectionality as a paradigm, is a feminist approach that attempts to apprehend and address the complexities of inequality at subjective and social levels. Through an analysis of interlocking and mutually reinforcing social structures, hierarchies, or processes of discrimination, intersectionality provides a framework for analyzing differential experiences of oppression related to social identities (Bilge, 2010). Bilge explains that intersectionality was first developed by black feminists to address the interlocking quality of systems of dominance along race, gender, and class lines. Intersectionality is introduced in the CYC curriculum at UVic though a brief text written by the Association for Woman’s Rights in Development (AWID; 2004). AWID defines intersectionality as “an analytical tool for studying, understanding and responding to the ways in which gender intersects with other identities and how these intersections contribute to unique experiences of oppression and privilege” (p. 1). Intersectionality is premised on the description of identity as situated, multiple, and layered. The situatedness of identity relates to identity’s embeddedness within local and global political, economic, and social systems that structure experiences of oppression, discrimination, power, and privilege. Identity factors that impact experience, especially those of privilege and oppression, include gender, skin colour, race, age, caste, ethnicity, language, sexual
orientation, ancestry, religion, ability and health, culture, socioeconomic class, geographic location, citizen status (migrant/immigrant/displaced/refugee), Indigeneity, and education level (Association for Woman’s Rights in Development, 2004).

The concept of a layered or intersectional identity emphasizes that the factors of identity intersect with each other within a context to create unique experiences that are substantively different from each other. Identity factors are not additive but rather intersect to create unique and “substantively distinct experiences” (Association for Woman’s Rights in Development, 2004, p. 2) of privilege and oppression. Furthermore, these identity markers or axes can have variable degrees of salience, can change in relevance and effect based on context, and can be both ascribed and/or self-asserted. Intersectionality provides a tool for understanding how identities are fluid and directly related to social structures, hierarchies, processes, and representations. As a feminist analytic tool, intersectionality provides a resource for linking identity factors and social structures to individual and group experiences. The analysis intersectionality provides is complex, dynamic, and political, requiring a formulation of identity that calls for a politicized responsiveness to individual experiences. Intersectional analysis is ideally informed by the “views of women of the full diversity of identities” (Association for Woman’s Rights in Development, 2004, p. 6) aimed at social justice goals. AWID contends that the convergence of the many layered aspects of identity within a social matrix creates specific experiences of privilege and oppression (Association for Woman’s Rights in Development, 2004).

Multiculturalism. Professor of CYC Sandrina de Finney (2010) applies an intersectional analysis to explore subject formation practices of racialized girls and to answer the question “How do ethnic-minority, immigrant, and Aboriginal girls in Canada negotiate dominant
whiteness, struggle for social inclusion, and identify themselves and others” (p. 471)? de Finney argues that “racialized girls often feel disengaged from each other” (p. 471) and that multicultural discourses are inadequate for conceptualizing racialized girls processes of subject formation and group belonging in the context of neocolonialism, Anglonationalism, and social exclusion. She proposes that Indigenous and transnational theories are more fruitful for understanding how “discourses of Aboriginality, immigration, multiculturalism, and Canadianness take hold in the lives of diverse racialized girls” (p. 484). She also proposes, however, a vision of resistance and solidarity through the adaptability of multicultural discourse and shared sites of struggle.

Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw (2007), professor of CYC at UVic, similarly explored how discourses of multiculturalism are enacted in child care. Pacini-Ketchabaw works to unravel the assumptions of “sensitivity, tolerance, and acceptance of difference that characterize Canadian multiculturalism” (p. 222). She argues that child care acts as a site of governance through control, regulation, administration, and intervention in the lives of children and families. Such governance, however, is argued to be differentially applied to populations depending on citizenship, immigrant status, and interpretations of race. Using Foucault’s concept of governmentality, Pacini-Ketchabaw explains how power functions through networks of discursive relations to produce, rather than simply discipline, subjects. In this sense, multicultural discourse reproduces power relations and social identities. Her research found that practitioners deploy multicultural discourse to understand themselves and families as flexible and accommodating in the process of adapting to difference and becoming what she calls citizen-subjects. Citizen-subjects, in this context, are flexible subjects able to respond to the needs of ever-changing standards and the needs of global-capitalist markets. Her research demonstrates
the complicity in dominant discourses that practitioners enact through their deployment of taken-for-granted notions and representations of identity and approaches to difference.

Nxumalo (2012) works to unsettle representational practices in early childhood education related to diversity, development, and difference. In particular, she offers a way to reconsider and reengage with the taken-for-granted relationship between self and culture through “attending to material-discursive assemblages and the affective becomings that emerge in intra-activities between human and more-than-human bodies” (p. 283). Nxumalo pays close attention to “the situated trajectories and multiplicities of subjectivities” (p. 283) and suggests reconceptualizing subjectivity in its material-discursive, situated, and relational becomings. She proposes understanding subjectivities as emergent with the forces, rhythms, and relations that constitute them and which they constitute as a way out of static understandings of identity, diversity, and difference predicated on multiculturalist discourse.

Nxumalo (2012) critiques multicultural discourse in terms of the fixities it sets in motion through representations of difference and diversity predicated on the recognition and tolerance of cultural identities. She introduces the concept of becoming to unsettle fixed representations of identity and explain that subjectivities emerge as effects of material and discursive intraactivity. Such a view of subjectivity “foregrounds relationality; envisioning the subject as multiple and hybrid assemblages of intrinsically creative, relational, rhizomatic, and intensive desiring forces that exceed humanistic conceptions and embrace the more-than-human” (p. 286). By highlighting the multiple, creative, material-discursive, and hybrid in subjectivity, Nxumalo argues that systemic forces that sustain racism and oppression can be made more visible in encounters, specifically highlighting the unpredictable and transformative reconfigurations of the bodies and intensities that constitute subjectivity. Using the concept of becoming to undo fixed
identities and analyze racism and oppression in specific contexts raises questions regarding how intersectional frameworks can be employed through postidentitarian theory.\textsuperscript{45}

**Positioning—Allyship.** Carastathis (2008) differentiates three related meanings of the term *intersectionality* as referring to (1) the production of subjects and identity in “the relation between relations of oppression and privilege” (p. 24); (2) an analysis of social location that emphasizes the irreducibility and simultaneity of different forms of structural oppression and privilege; and (3) the historical fact of the marginalization and lack of political representation of black women in both antiracist and feminist politics. Intersectionality can further be differentiated between identitarian and postidentitarian approaches, as well as different theorizations of causality related to the structural, political, and identity-forming facets of intersectional analysis. For example, one intersectional account may claim that discrimination occurs on the basis of already-existing complex identities, whereas another account may causally prioritize intersecting political relations that produce identities. What holds all these analyses together is a view that discrete or additive conceptions of oppression, privilege, and identity are inadequate in addressing the phenomenological, discursive, and political realities of individuals and groups discriminated against by multiple forms of oppression. In response to early and universalizing feminism, Carastathis explains that

> the unitary conception of ‘women’ was conclusively deemed inadequate to the task of properly representing concrete women, variegated as they are by micro- and macro-relations of racialized class and implicated as they are in geopolitical relations of imperialism and (neo)colonialism. (p. 26)

\textsuperscript{45} C14: Immanence—Affirmation—Nomadic Subjectivity—Becoming. The concept of becoming is articulated through Braidotti’s (2006) notion of nomadic subjectivity.
Carastathis (2008) argues for a theorization of political identities as emerging from oppositional practice grounded in a delineation of the epistemological and the political. The epistemological component of this project is a making visible of the false universalisms of identity, whereas the political aspect is an application of this epistemology to praxis. Universalisms related to identity in early feminist politics or their intersectional redeployments “conjures the very ontology that its exponents set out to undermine” (p. 27). In terms of the purity or exclusivity of the categories of intersectional analysis, Carastathis argues that any axis is already marked and inflected by the categories it is theorized to intersect with: the axis of gender is already racialized and the category of race is always gendered. She draws the conclusion that intersectional analysis therefore (1) does little to analyze, or at worst undermines the analysis, of the unified (white male) subjects, and (2) “illuminates the role of political intersectionality in constituting the intersectional identity of the hyper-oppressed” (p. 28).

Intersectional models fail to redress political representation insofar as they redeploy the ontological categories of identity and do not recognize “that race, gender, and class are not identic properties of individuals or groups, but rather, are political relations which structure the lived experience of the subjects they interpellate” (Carastathis, 2008, p. 29). The suggestion therefore is that rather than attempting to politically represent disenfranchised and oppressed individuals and groups through identity politics, it is more important and effective to “unearth conceptually and transform practically those relations which produce them” (p. 29). The goal is not to end identity politics or ambitions for representation, but rather to emphasize power relations and the structures that produce identity. Conceptually, this means moving from theorizing identity to theorizing subjectivity in order to undo the reification of categories of
identity and focus on the relations of power through which subjects are produced. In terms of praxis, challenging racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression means doing solidarity work.

Solidarity, for Carastathis (2008), has three elements: intersectional structural analysis in the production of subjects; commitments to transforming oppressive structural relations; and distinction between being *positioned* within privileging and oppressing relations and *positioning* in solidarity with communities struggling toward transformation. The starting point for solidarity is therefore the epistemological task of understanding our complicity in structures of oppression. The next task of solidarity is to move beyond theorization and abstraction into political and practical action. The emphasis on transformative work at a structural level “consists in confronting the implications of the fact that the condition of possibility of our own ‘liberation’—historically limited through it may be—is the continuing subjugation of the global South, in post/neocolonies, on reserves, in prisons, export processing zones, inside and outside the borders of white settler societies” (p. 30). Solidarity requires an analysis of systems of global structural domination and a positioning and situating of oneself in solidarity with others. It is in the movement from being situated to situating oneself that an active subjectivity is possible.

**Whiteness and racism.** In the SCYC curriculum, white identity and concepts of allyship are introduced through McIntosh’s (2002) “White privilege: Unpacking the invisible knapsack”. McIntosh uses the metaphor of an invisible backpack full of “special provisions, maps, passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools and blank checks” (p. 97) to describe the unacknowledged benefits and unearned assets that white people are conferred. She argues that the invisibility of these privileges is systematically hidden and that “whites are carefully taught not to recognize white privilege” (p. 97). Furthermore, she contends that whites are taught to conceive of themselves as morally neutral and to conceive of racism as specific and individual acts of
intolerance. McIntosh investigates her personal experiences of whiteness and puts forward a list of 26 privileges that she enjoys and that she observes are not enjoyed by her “African American co-workers” (p. 98). Her situated approach to understanding the systematic and unseen nature of privilege demands that white individuals account for the structural benefits that normalize their experiences of self, which are grounded in racism and exploitation. McIntosh also brings attention to the interlocking systems of oppression based on other identity markers, such as age, sexual identity, social and economic class, and religion.

As a critique of McIntosh (2002), there is a tendency in her work to use binaries to describe sex and race, which, although it is important to mark out privilege and oppression, reinforces a use of language that dichotomizes and reinforces opposition. As an example of a more complex and fluid understanding of difference in the CYC curriculum literature, Richardson (2002) relates her experience as a Métis woman as embodying both the oppressor and the oppressed. Situating herself between the binaries of European and Aboriginal, Richardson recognizes the importance of making visible “multiple cultural heritages” (p. 84), which blurs or complicates binary distinctions. Although an intersectional approach could be one way to conceptualize the complexity of people of multiple heritages, Richardson provides an account that is based in the particular histories and struggles of her Indigenous and European heritage.

Exploring the concepts of oppression, identity, and forgiveness as a Métis person, Richardson (2002) explains that the Métis are the descendants of European fur traders and Native women, people who were often the mediators between European and Native cultures. Following the arrival of European women during the settlement period of Canadian colonial history, however, Native women and their Métis children were gradually marginalized in society and
suffered a loss of land. As a result of government assimilationist and colonial policy, Richardson explains, “landlessness was followed by a Métis diaspora: families were separated and the culture was destabilized” (p. 84). Historically, the Métis became an invisible people because their identity was not legible as either “white” or “Indian.” Richardson explores the variety of contemporary ways that Métis individuals and groups are proudly asserting their identity, culture, and heritage. She emphasizes that claiming a Métis identity involves being aware of and negotiating a relationship with the complexities of being the descendant of both the oppressors and the oppressed within a contemporary context of racism and marginalization, particularly as cultural mediators in the face of ongoing colonialism.

Richardson (2005) locates the Métis people as founding, yet also at “the periphery of the Canadian historical, cultural and social landscape.” (p. 56). Elaborating on a research project concerning the enactment of personal and cultural Métis identity, Richardson explains that the Métis identity is beginning to be asserted and written back into Canadian historical and contemporary narratives. The author situates such identity enactments in the context of colonialism and a European Canada and use the concept of tactical responses in order to explicate how identity “is created through a process of social interaction and dialogic relationships between the inner world and external world” (p. 57). Richardson situates her analysis of Métis identity creation in the context of colonial, postcolonial, resistance, and response based literatures. Richardson situates her work in the perspectives of: symbolic interactionism which understands self-creation mediated by values and the organization of experience; narrative theories that highlight the storied aspects of self, particularly in connection with storytelling traditions; response based notions of creative and prudent agency in contexts of violence and oppression.
In the particular context of oppressive colonial conditions in Canada, Richardson highlights the Métis people’s enactment of “tactics for self-reservation and the preservation of dignity” (p. 60). For example, she analyzes strategic efforts to appear to fit in to dominant whiteness in order to find safety from racism and discrimination. Richardson uses the concept of a third space to help explain her research in terms of participants stories coalescing “around the theme of creating a space where “Métis-ness, Métis community and Métis knowledge can be shared” (p. 63). Furthermore, “third space offers a place where hybridity, or being mixed-race, can be experienced holistically and celebrated as central to Métis culture” (p. 66). Such experiences of wholeness, Richardson explains, are cultural and political strategies for challenging the homogenization of identity and opening new possibilities for identity expression. Richardson (2002, 2005) provides a nuanced and complex rendering of identity where responses to racism can be strategic, local, and historically situated.

**Responding to racism.** Bishop (1994) reflects on the reactions white individuals have to ideas of racism and has created three categories for understanding differences in their responses: (1) the backlashers who deny the existence of racism; (2) the guilty who personalize and become defensive or paralyzed; and (3) the allies who strive to learn more and act on their new knowledge. The process of becoming an ally, Bishop maintains, involves understanding one’s identity as an oppressor as part of a system of power structures, recognizing that the experience of oppression is different than a white person’s construction of it, and working with others for change in which the oppressed are the leaders. In terms of the construction of a white identity, Bishop in line with McIntosh, argues that it is impossible for white people to be nonracist because the benefits of oppression are impossible, in the current context, to disavow. The more
strategic and ethical position for a white person working as an ally against racism is to take up a position of antiracism and continue to acknowledge the effects and privileges that racism entails.

As a training manual for antiracism found in SCYC curriculum, Estable, Meyer and Pon’s (1997) *Teach Me to Thunder* includes a timeline of groups’ immigration to Canada; a quiz on immigration, race, culture, colonization, and civics; and a culture wheel that situates cultural identity at the centre of all other identity markers, such as age, gender, and social class, and systemic influences, such as politics, societal norms, and government policies. Again, these thoughts on identity reflect a view that identity is formed through social and historical experiences and that raising consciousness is foundational for addressing social and political issues. A second approach that is used in SCYC curriculum for developing critical and cross-cultural awareness is raising awareness of one’s own cultural heritage and social location. Two resources in SCYC curriculum that are emphasized in this regard are Robinson’s (2005) *Multiple Identities Defined* and a variety of texts by Sue and Sue (2008).

Robinson (2005) puts forward a dialectical cross-cultural view in which culture is acknowledged but has a relative importance depending on the developing person’s engagement with it. Building on Arredondo (1992), Robinson puts forward three dimensions of human difference: (1) present-at-birth characteristics, such as age, culture, sexual orientation, sex, language, social class, ability/disability; (2) individual achievements, such as education, income, marital status, religion, work experience, hobbies, and citizenship; and (3) historical circumstances that influence present and future. Understanding human development as a convergence of these “multiple identity constructs” (p. 6), Robinson argues, amounts to a holistic view of people.
The categorization of identity constructs that Robinson (2005) puts forward is questionable, but it at least offers a dynamic and reciprocal view of human development at the intersections of culture and history. Some questions that arise in analyzing this system include the following: Is sexual orientation in-born? Are education, income, religion, availability of work, and citizenship truly individual achievements or are they limited and provided by social structures? What is the benefit of considering these three dimensions separately rather than viewing all the factors individually? The benefits that are achieved through a multiple identity perspective are the allowance for complexity and a model for conceptualizing balance and holism. Although Robinson’s (2005) framework emphasizes the individual and individual identity, the author also at times takes up a social constructionist perspective to level a critique against the universalizing discourse of individualism. Robinson adamantly proclaims that “the primary focus on the individual is not standard in every culture” (p. 6) and argues that both individualism and collectivism “have roots in political and economic history, religion, and philosophy” (p. 7). Individualism, she contends, is philosophically and economically supported in Western society through a dominant positivistic-empirical worldview, and it has led to a fragmentation between matter and spirit.

Robinson (2005) further contextualizes identity variables within North American society. She claims that human characteristics are socially constructed, have particular meanings attached to them, and “operate as status variables in society” (p. 42). This means that social forces work to create contextual understandings of difference and maintain a valuing system in which particular identities are granted higher status than others. The stratification of identities as a social process and construction, Robinson contends, is evident in the fact that race, gender, religion, and sexual orientation are not in themselves oppressive; however, racism, sexism, heterosexism, and class
elitism are. The implications for the development of a self-concept in the matrix of socially constructed and identities relate specifically to the devaluation of difference or the divergence from a normative standard, a struggle to maintain a positive self-concept, and an ignorance regarding the vast similarities between all people.

Sue and Sue (2008) put forward a rich summary of racial and cultural development models that challenge monolithic views of minority groups as well as colour-blind approaches to issues of racialization. The authors present a meta-framework of identity development that uses linear and stage-based exposition for categorization purposes, but they also note that identity development is fluid, dynamic, and mediated by a number of variables. Arguing that individuals from minority groups are significantly impacted by sociocultural factors, they posit shared “patterns of adjustment to cultural oppression” (p. 242) and propose five stages in a racial/cultural identity development model (R/CID) for people who belong to minority groups: conformity, in which dominant social values are preferred; dissonance and appreciating revolve around challenges to racial/cultural self-concept; resistance to majority and immersion in minority culture; introspection and the development of proactive self-definition; and integrative awareness, including an inner sense of security and appreciation for diverse cultural groups and experiences.

Sue and Sue (2008) also explore the dynamics of whiteness in Eurocentric societies. They argue that white people generally perceive themselves as unbiased and are chronically exposed to “ethnocentric monoculturalism as manifested in white supremacy” (p. 264); they contend that freedom from cultural conditioning is a prerequisite for developing a nonracist white identity. The authors review many models of white racial identity development and put forward an integrated model in which white racial development is described as passing through seven
phases: (1) *naiveté* marked by curiosity in early life; (2) *conformity* or the absorption of ethnocentrically based universal values and norms; (3) *dissonance* when difference is confronted and bias becomes apparent; (4) *resistance and immersion* when racism is questioned and challenged; (5) *introspection* when oppression is seen at a social level and a personal stance is developed; (6) *integrative awareness* when the self is understood as a racial/cultural being and social-level oppression is challenged; (7) *commitment to antiracist action and alliance*.

While Sue and Sue (2008) provide an invaluable review of the literature on identity development models, they rely on the United States as their context and do not adequately explore the diverse experiences of racial/cultural development in different social contexts. As a text for conceptualizing identity development at SCYC, however, it has some usefulness when one considers that a significant parallel to the US is found in many pluricultural societies that are founded on European colonization and controlled immigration. Nor do Sue and Sue specifically address acculturation across generations, intersectional factors such as age and gender, or specific development issues related to Indigeneity. Lastly, the authors are heavily embedded in a psychological paradigm that understands identity and relations across difference in terms of individual growth, development, and accomplishment.

As another perspective on cross-cultural counselling in the CYC curriculum, Baruth and Manning (2007) argue that “formal preparation and firsthand experiences with people of differing cultural backgrounds are essential for multicultural counseling to be effective” (p. 56). Relying on research from the 1980s, the authors conclude that counsellors who are “most different” (p. 57) from their clients have the greatest difficulty effecting change. To prepare counsellors for diversity and improve their effectiveness, Baruth and Manning suggest, among other practices, an awareness of self that includes understanding one’s own cultural experiences
and how cultural location impacts beliefs about counselling, counselling expectations, values, and opportunities. Shebib (2006) similarly contends that culturally competent counsellors have an awareness of self and “consider how factors such as their own race, culture, sexual orientation, and religion shape their worldview and impact their work with clients who are different from them” (p. 316). Baruth and Manning (2007) describe a number of opportunities for counsellor self-development, including making a commitment to value the client’s culture; participating in diverse cultural activities, attending seminars on diversity issues and reading books, and using self-reflection to identify personal racist attitudes. The authors conclude by claiming that achieving cross-cultural effectiveness is a “professional task to be mastered” that requires “enthusiasm and commitment” (p. 78). While they clearly include the counsellor’s cultural position as an important factor in counselling, Baruth and Manning pose diversity as a problem that needs solution and transcendence. Their approach reflects an attitude of tolerance or of having to make exceptions to practice as usual to account for cultural factors.

C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject

Structuralism. Ferdinand de Saussure gave three courses on general linguistics at the University of Geneva between 1906 and 1911. Following his untimely death at age 55, Saussure’s students compiled their course notes into the text we know in English as Course in General Linguistics (Saussure, 1959). In the book, Saussure proposed a number of new directions for analyzing language: language use in the context of a community of speakers; the structure of language itself in terms of the relationships between the signs; and processes of signification and representation in the relationship between a word and a concept. Saussure understood structural linguistics as a branch of semiology (the study of sign systems) that focused on the signs both in active language use in a community of speakers (parole) and as part
of a linguistic structure that provided the rules and relationships necessary for attaining meaning (langue). He also made innovative claims regarding the relationship between a word and a concept, which challenged correlationist accounts of language.

Saussure (1959) importantly argued that, rather than representing or correlating with objects and events in the world, words relate to, or trigger, concepts and ideas. He argued that words, or rather sound-images in his technical vocabulary (to include the psychological verbalization), were inseparably related to concepts. The term he gave to the sound-image/concept pair was sign (see figure 4). Applied to the case of the self, the sign “self” would be comprised of an inseparable pair of a sound-image and a concept: on the sound-image side it would be the spoken or mentally articulated phonetic self, and the concept side would be the thought, conceptualization, or idea of the self. A sign was the totality of a concept and a related trigger that could be spoken either out loud or psychologically.

Saussure argued that this relationship between sound-image and concept was arbitrary: any sound-image, prior to the structure of language having been imposed, could be used to represent the triggered concept. He used the example of having different words from different languages related to the same concept. In the case of the concept of self, the actual sound-image used to represent it is not demanded by the concept “self” and could have been replaced with any other sound. This arbitrariness of the relationship between sound-image and concept, however, is limited by the language and the other sound-images in use. The birthplace of structural linguistics is in the insight that every sign is a pair of sound-image and concept and also that every sign is intricately related to other signs in a system and attains value therein.
Saussure (1959) proposed that a sign is a combination of a concept and a sound-image (a), also called a signified and signifier (b). The concept is what is thought when the sound-image is spoken out loud or internally, or written (c).

The key analysis Saussure (1959) provided in the early 1900s was about the relationships among the signs in a given system. Since words do not attain their meaning by directly representing objects and events outside of language, Saussure investigated the structure of language itself for this function. He argued that the value of a sign in a linguistic system can be said to be attained through differential relations such that a sign attains meaning, or rather value, by how it is not all the other signs it is associated with. Differential value is attained by a sign’s negative relation to other signs—that is, a sign being related to but having a different position in the system. Words do not point at any present thing in the world, but negatively differ from all that they are not. The sign “self,” for example, as a compound of the word *self* and our concept self, has a value that is determined by its relationship to all the other signs that it is related to but not identical with. The sign “self” has value in that it is related to, but not identical to, the sign “other,” not the sign “man” or “woman,” not “animal,” not “person,” not “individual,” not “spirit” or “god,” not “identity,” not “subject,” or any other sign it might be related to in one way...
or another. It is the relationship of the sign to all of its associated signs that is of importance. These relationships structure the use and meaning of any instantiation of language. Saussure studied the structure of language and how it allowed for and constrained meaningful language use. He initiated a way of thinking about language that called into question human agency in the meaning-making process, but it wasn’t until the mid 20th century that structuralism was radicalized as a full decentring and critique of the humanist subject in language use.

Poststructuralism. Balibar (2003), reflecting on his encyclopedic work with Rajchman *French Philosophy Since 1945*, asserts that structuralism was the “decisive moment” (p. 2) in latter-20th-century French philosophy, signaling French thought’s most significant challenges and inclinations. Structuralism, not being a particular movement or school but rather an engagement with the work of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss and an encounter with their problematics, endured profuse transformation through the interventions of poststructuralists such as Althusser, Deleuze, and Derrida. Balibar argues that because structuralism is generally a critique of institutions, categories, and organizing systems, it is difficult to clarify the differences between structuralism and poststructuralism. He includes poststructuralism within structuralism and specifically describes what he believes are the important relationships among structuralism, the late-20th-century French university system, and the concepts of subject and subjectivity.

Structuralism’s genesis can be approximated to mid-century France. Balibar (2003) situates some of its earliest engagements as in particular reference to the “concatenation of significations of subject (*sujet*), subjection (*sujection* and *assujettissement*), subjectivity (*subjectivité*), and subjectiviation (*subjectivation*)” in French philosophy (p. 7). He also locates the early swell in structuralist thinking as a reaction to philosophical anthropology, which assumed a transcendental dualism capable of constituting the human as both a subject and object
of knowledge. Structuralism here posed the question of the dissemination, construction, and/or
distribution of the human rather than a philosophy of the human per se.

Structuralism, as it relates to the concepts of self, subject, or subjectivity, is perhaps most
lucid in its polemic against the enlightenment humanism that reigned in 18th-century Europe.
Balibar (2003) describes structuralism as reacting to subjectivity conceptualized “within the
teleological horizon of a coincidence or reconciliation between individuality (whether particular
or collective) and consciousness (or the self-presence that effectively actualizes meanings)” (p. 9).
Simply put, this telos is a subject that can exist within itself and procure and communicate an
ideal of its own truth and meaning. Furthermore, this idealized self can be abstracted from the
material world and identified with a general humanity. Importantly, structuralism is not a
thoroughgoing rejection of such a subject, but rather a critique on new terms. Balibar elaborates
two terms of structuralism’s engagement with humanism: the first, to destitute, is a more
classical structuralist argument, while the second, the oxymoronic, signals a turn to
poststructuralism.

*To destitute* is the first characterization Balibar (2003) gives to structuralism in its
relation to the subject defined by humanism. Again, this is not a declaration of truth or falsity, or
a thorough annihilation, inversion, or negation, but a critique that simultaneously deconstructs
and reconstructs the subject. The subject of humanism is dethroned from its privileged position
as the generator of structures or meaning and is relegated to the level of an effect of structure(s).
Rather than being the cause or guarantor of meaning, the subject is itself a product of a structure
that composes or produces it and its meanings. Structuralism demonstrates how subjects are born
into the language, material circumstances, history, and sociocultural structures, practices, and
positions of their times. Language, materiality, and culture provide the means and limits for
constituting or conceiving subjectivity and thereby radically curtail autonomy, self-determination, and self-presence. The individuality, agency, and essence of the humanistic subject are understood as a product of structures and therefore pass “from constitutive to constituted subjectivity” (Balibar, 2003, p. 10).

Balibar’s second characterization of structuralism in relation to the subject is oxymoronic, which is somewhat of a poststructural critique of the overdetermination of the first characterization. In this turn, the notion of structure itself is under an equally deconstructive pressure as the notion of subjectivity: structure is pushed to its own impassive limit and radically transformed. Although structuralism began as a movement that sought to provide an objective account of the structures that constituted thought and subjectivity, one of the immediate consequences of structuralist thinking implies that every thought, even that of structure, is always already constituted by a structure, as well as constituted by representations of it. There is in this movement a reengagement with the problems of agency, or, at minimum, human activity (particularly language use), in the mutual constitution of structure and subject. Balibar writes that structure is therefore never “a totality or system of parts submitted to a law of discreteness, difference or variation and invariance” (p. 14), but rather a second-order system that “puts into place a difference of differences, which can be called the “subject” and which determines our perspective on the system” (p. 15). This movement in structuralism, I believe, allows for an analysis of power in terms of the relationships between subject and structure and between varying, overlapping, and competing systems of subject formation.

**Deconstruction.** The poststructural insight that meaning is deferred indefinitely and that structures change temporally and vie for dominance in relation to one another disrupts structuralism’s basic tenants of immutability and authority. The norms and foundations that
would guarantee a structure’s functioning and constitutive power are always subject to the play of difference and its performance in subjects: there is no meta-structure but equally no outside of structure. For Derrida (1976), the undoing of presence, essence, and order equally applies to the subject and to structure; the analysis is shifted from discovering truths about the subjects and structures to an analysis of their construction, products, ruptures, contradictions, and how they act to limit the play of difference. Derrida’s (1976) main critique and contribution to Saussurean structural linguistics was his creation of the concept *différance*, which conjoins the concept to *differ*, in the sense of being different from or being differentially related to, and the concept to *defer*, in the sense of being put off or assigned elsewhere. One interpretation of *différance* is that a sign’s meaning is interminably differed in the play of signification. Where Saussure saw the linguistic structure as stable and able to provide consistent value or meaning to a sign through differential relations, Derrida argued that the value of a sign was deferred indefinitely, thereby undermining the attainment of meaning. In the case of the sign “self,” therefore, a poststructural analysis demonstrates that beyond the concept having no direct or positive meaning (as in referring to something directly), meaning through a differential system is also a dubitable project. The sign “self” therefore might differentially relate to all the signs mentioned above (e.g., “other,” “man” or “woman,” “individual”), but rather than having these terms and the structure they form secure its meaning, these signs are understood in turn as differentially relating to and depending on other relationships to other signs, ad infinitum. Meaning is therefore always put off, differed, or somewhere between absent and present. St. Pierre (2000) contends that poststructuralism “radically modifies de Saussure’s theory by positing that the meaning of the signified is never fixed once and for all but is constantly differed” (p. 481). Meaning, from a poststructuralist perspective, no longer refers to specific things in the world or to a static
linguistic system, but is a perpetually shifting landscape of semiology. The role of context in this regard is to temporarily fix meanings through the establishment of seemingly secure systems of concepts, which depends on centring terms and suppressing the play of difference. From this perspective, therefore, texts, contexts, and epistemology are neither stable nor innocent: they are interrelated systems of social practices that create, repress, and structure experience, language use, and action.

No longer are structures understood as deep and conclusively determining of a subject; instead they function at the surface of human activity and are reproduced therein. I interpret this return to the analysis of human activity as structuralism’s point of (re)engagement with materialism on the one hand and social constructionism on the other. My use of the term poststructuralism therefore indicates a reflexive thinking particularly interested in the relationships among structures, particularly linguistic structures, materiality, particularly the body, and human practices. Poststructuralism also implies a political and affective engagement with these questions, which are bound up with ideas of resistance, social transformation, utopia, pain and enjoyment, endurance, friendship, and hospitality.46

Balibar (2003) interprets these radical transformations in structuralism as an effect of structuralist thinking and therefore reconciles the structuralism of destitution with oxymoronic poststructuralism:

The tendency is for structuralists to move from one gesture to the other—one is tempted to say, from a “structuralism of structures,” that is, one that seeks to discover structures and invariants, to a structuralism “without structures,” that is, one that seeks their indeterminacy or immanent negation. (p. 11)

46 C17: CYC-to-Come—Community and Tradition—CYC Identity—Hospitality. The concepts of deconstruction and hospitality are applied to CYC traditions, identities, and community. Hospitality is used as a way to think about the future of CYC and relationships between differences within and outside the borders of CYC.
Whether in the first characterization of the constituting subject reconceptualized as the constituted of structure, or the stronger poststructural sense of “structuralism beyond its own explanatory constitution” (Balibar, 2003, p. 11, italics in original), (post)structuralism is persistent in its engagement with the subject. Structuralism, in its many forms, specifically queries the relationships among language, representation, and subject formation; the role of the subject’s enunciations in the process of subject formation; the material, political, and sociocultural practices that produce subjects; and the possibilities for resistance, agency, or freedom within structures. Lather (2003), adapting Derrida’s critique of language’s capacity to provide stable meanings or structures for subjectivity writes:

Here the complexity of subject formation includes how various axes of power are mutually constitutive, productive of different local regimes of power and knowledge that locate subjects and require complex negotiations of relations, including the interruption of coherence and complete subordination to the demands of regulatory regimes. Engaging the real is not what it used to be. Different ideas about materiality, reality, representations, and truth distinguish different epistemological orientations where reality does not precede representation but is constituted by it. (pp. 258–259)

C14: Immanence—Affirmation—Nomadic Subjectivity—Becoming

The complex interface between poststructural, Indigenous, Deleuzian, and decolonizing perspectives or approaches has been the most interesting, challenging, and productive space for my thinking throughout this thesis. The difficulties, problematics, conceptual tools, and possibilities that have emerged from my engagements with these bodies of knowledge and ways of being have influenced my methodology, concerns and questions, and thinking on the self more generally. It was specifically in my conversations, both formal and informal, with my friends,
supervisors, and research participants that this thinking and experimentation with life happened. I am particularly grateful for the conversations I shared with Nicole Land, Jeff Smith, and Vanessa Vondruska as we grappled with this material together. I am also very thankful for the ongoing dialogue I shared with my supervisors Sandrina de Finney and Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw who provided me with key insights, critical questions, reading material, and their own ideas on the subject matter. It was through innumerable conversations, reading groups, reviews of each others writing, and meetings with all of these brilliant people that the following ideas were formed.

Immanence. Immanence is an ontology most fully developed by Spinoza in *The Ethics* (1677/2007). Spinoza, an excommunicated Jew whose family was themselves feeling Catholic inquisition, drew on Jewish mysticism and pre-Socratic thinkers to develop his philosophy. Spinoza offers an alternative philosophy to that of Descartes (1637/1996), which ontologically separates mind and matter. Cartesian dualism further inserts a hierarchy into these two distinct substances and posits the mind as more valuable than the body. Spinoza, a contemporary of Descartes, provided a univocal or immanent ontology that understood mind, thought, bodies, and all else as different modes of expression of a single ontological substance. Deleuze and Guattari (2000, 2003, 2004) return to Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence to reconceive subjectivity, ethics, thinking, land, politics, and social relationships outside dualist philosophy. May (2005) further situates Deleuze within an ontological debate between the continental and analytic traditions of Western philosophy, describing the former as generally concerned with the “question of being that cannot be addressed in terms of constituent beings” (p. 14) and the latter as interested in the nature of the specific beings of the universe. According to May, the continental tradition, following Heidegger, sees “in the attempt to reduce the question of being to that of beings a symptom of an age that is too ready to accept the terms in which science
conceives the world” (p. 14). However, Deleuze and Guattari diverge from the continental and analytic traditions in their rejection of a stable existence or terms of definition. Instead, they propose an ontology of difference in which existence perpetually produces itself differently. In a sense, Deleuze and Guattari return, with some scientists, to a new world, “a world and a universe that may be more alive than we have been led to think” (May, p. 73).

Whereas other 20th-century continental philosophers were skeptical or critical of positivist projects determined to discover the truth or identity of being, Deleuze upheld a creative attitude toward ontology through his concept of difference. For Deleuze (1968), difference is an ontological claim that processes of change and differentiation underlie any identities that come to be thought as particular beings or things through representations. Deleuze’s approach to philosophy, including his collaborations with Guattari (2000, 2003, 2004), is a creative activity that seeks to elicit the differences inherent in the (arrangement of) bodies that constitute thought. May (2005) explains that when ontology is conflated with identity and representation, the articulation of the essences of existence depends on (1) the stability of that which is being identified (concept/signified) and (2) the stability of the concept being used to describe it (sound-image/signifier). The stability of both signifier and signified are highly contested from a poststructural perspective47 and have inaugurated a veritable crisis for the human sciences. Deleuze and Guattari, rather than seeing the critique of representation as an impasse, treat it as a starting point. Instead of thought that discovers and captures, they propose thinking as creativity, invention, destabilization, improvisation, and an engine for life lived anew. May (2005) describes Deleuze as pushing the ontological project to its limit and, in so doing, finding “the question of how one might live to be raised afresh and ready to offer surprising answers” (p. 16).

47 C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject. The concepts of signifier and signified are elaborated and poststructuralism is engaged with to critique stable referential relationships between the two.
By positing difference as fundamental to all that there is, Deleuze (1968) challenges us to understand conceptual creativity as productive of possibilities for life. If all of existence is the actualization of difference, it is our capacity to think and live differently that makes life livable. In the hands of Deleuze, ontology is a way of affirming life, difference, and the interconnections and intensities of force, materiality, and affect. Rather than striving for a truth of being or the identity of what exists, Deleuze and Guattari introduce a vast number of concepts and life forms that work to perpetually “open the question of how one might live to new vistas” (May, 2005, p. 17). In What is Philosophy (2003), Deleuze and Guattari talk specifically about the relationships among philosophy, social relations, and the earth. The book articulates the roles of the philosopher and the practice of conceptualizing in processes of transformation and revolution. Deleuze and Guattari deal specifically with imperialism, capitalism, psychoanalysis, linguistics, and the history of European thought more generally. They place thinking at the forefront of revolution and resistance to the present by virtue of thinking’s capacity to open new relations and configurations of bodies. For them, a yes saying to the present, to all of the present, moves beyond an acceptance of things as they are and affirms all that could be: life’s internal differences. A yes saying or affirmative approach actively resists the present since the actual is not what we are but, rather, what we become, what we are in the process of becoming—that is to say, the Other, our becoming-other. The present, on the contrary, is what we are and, thereby, what already we are ceasing to be. (p. 112)

Deleuze and Guattari (2003) view life as a process of becoming in which thought is produced and intervenes. The notion of life as process makes representations of life difficult in that change undermines the repeatability or re-presentation of an event through signification. Thought, rather than communicating re-presentations, is intimately involved in the process of
transformation; hence philosophy is not about truth but about political and ethical interventions. Thought can be used to call forth virtual possibilities. Thought can concentrate and make perceptible the internal differences and possibilities that representation conceals. Affirming and experimenting across the range of not-yet-actual connections, however, is somewhat unpredictable. Deleuze (1983) reads Nietzsche’s (1969) ode to dance, dice, and chaos as turning chance into affirmation, or a yes-saying to contingency and necessity. Deleuze writes that the dice which are thrown once are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity. Necessity is affirmed of change in exactly the sense that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity. (p. 26, emphasis in original)

Being is the necessary events and entities that are produced from contingent and unpredictable processes, encounters, and transformations. The poles of necessity and chance or being and becoming are inseparable, however, such that the virtual possibilities or chances inherent in any necessity or being immanently work to reconfigure them along their own lines of possibility. Affirming the present in its full virtual, contingent, and chaotic character is exactly the same as resisting the present or static being. Applied to thinking, Deleuze and Guattari (2003) contrast an affirmative image of thought to dogmatism. For them, the dogmatic image of thought as representation and communication of stable ideas from one mind to the next misses out on becomings. They argue that we do not lack communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack resistance to the present. The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and people that do not yet exist. Europeanization does not
constitute a becoming but merely the history of capitalism, which prevents the becoming of subjugated peoples. (p. 108)

The problem posed by the future form of earth and people in the quote above calls for the creation of concepts of subjectivity and geography which escape the capture of Europeanization and capitalism, and which also respond to the becomings of subjugated peoples. Rosi Braidotti, feminist materialist philosopher working in the lineage of Spinoza and Deleuze, puts forward the concept of nomadic subjectivity to respond to these problems.

Nomadic subjectivity. Building on the concepts of immanence, affirmation, and becoming, Braidotti (2006b) puts forward a “non-unitary, nomadic or rhizomatic view” (p. 5) of subjectivity, which, although fragmented, is “functional, coherent and accountable, mostly because it is embedded and embodied” (p. 4). Nonunitary nomadic subjectivity, for Braidotti, is situated in the contemporary and paradoxical spaces of posthumanism and postindustrialism. She explains that a posthumanistic subjectivity emerges from the tensions created as callous technology-mediated power relations converge with idealistic notions of human individuality, dignity, and justice. Postindustrial subjectivity, similarly, is situated within the dialectic between neoconservative notions of human nature and information-technology-mediated capitalist liberalism. A paradox emerges, Braidotti argues, when globalization and technology combine the ecstatic embracement of everything new (e.g., toys, lifestyles, weapons) with the complete rejection of deep social, ecological, or individual change. Nomadic subjectivity attempts to deal with the question of ethics and subjectivity without direction from technological or moralistic imperatives. Affirmation, especially in regard to the alterity of all life beings, is central to Braidotti’s (2006a, 2009) feminist poststructural ethics of affect, passion, and subjectivity.
Braidotti (2009) situates affirmative politics in the dialogue between critique and creativity, in the balance between the creation of hopeful alternatives on the one hand and the negative critique involved in resisting the present on the other. Affirmation recasts critique as an affirmation of the other rather than its negation. The ethical ideal, therefore, becomes to increase capacity for relationship with multiple others and work toward the transmutation of values through creative alternatives. Moving beyond oppositional consciousness as negativity, Braidotti seeks a means of subject formation attached to the affirmative otherness of human, posthuman, and other-than-human relations. This expanded definition of otherness, which includes all earth-others, implies a larger sense of community and interconnection, “an eco-philosophy of multiple belongings for subjects constituted in and by multiplicity” (p. 47). Otherness, for Braidotti, “is the threshold of transformative encounters” (p. 46) that prompt and mobilize “flows of affirmation of values and forces which are not yet sustained by the current conditions” (p. 49).

Newbury (2012), a postdoctoral fellow at SCYC, takes up Braidotti’s (2006) conceptualization of subjectivity as nomadic to challenge the individualization of social processes in human service work. She explores the paradoxical relationship in neoliberal societies between a heightened focus on the universalized individual and the rendering of that individual invisible by discounting “the particular dimensions of experience that differentiate us from one another” (p. 458). Newbury explains that many contemporary notions of the individual are rooted in Enlightenment thinking while being strengthen by neoliberal discourses. Such an individual is seen as self-determining, self-serving, and a “reflection of empirical reality” (p. 460), all of which have served a capitalist economy since industrialization.

Newbury (2012) draws on Braidotti (2006b) in her critique of the anthropocentric and universal conceptualization of the individual. Working with Braidotti’s conception of the
nomadic subject, Newbury proposes that an embedded and embodied nonunitarian subject can provide the basis for ethical practice and resistance to neoliberalist discourse and practice. The conceptualization of the subject as nomadic foregrounds the body in its vulnerability and relatedness, which provides analytics for addressing the diversity in human experience. The author also argues that such a conception of the subject allows for critiquing the individualization of social forces and structures. Newbury also introduces the concepts of the relational subject and the situated subject alongside the nomadic nonunitary subject to trace new paths of ethical engagement. She suggests that nomadic conceptualization of the subject provides the basis for ethics of sustainability, disruption, and solidarity and applies them in policy, prevention, and community development contexts, what Braidotti calls affirmative feminist politics. Braidotti (2009) contends that such an ethics is no longer territorialized on the distinction between good and evil, but rather “between affirmation and negation, or positive and negative affects.” (p. 50).

**Affirmation and Zoe.** Affirmation, in the Nietzschean and Deleuzian sense employed by Braidotti (2009), is the prospective belief that negative affect and circumstance can and will be transformed. Braidotti herself uses the example of the psychological phenomenon of change resulting from negative affect that destabilizes the ego. Negative affect holds the possibility of a nomadic transformative process that centres on the same being overtaken by the affect and changed by it. In this rendering of the negative, experiences of affect and psychological movement are highlighted as catalysts for change, whereas stagnation and rigidification are synonymous with violence to self and other. Braidotti’s (2006a, 2009) feminist-materialist reading of Deleuze continues in the ontological project of difference and specifically addresses subjectivity, human and nonhuman relations, and the contemporary issues of environmental catastrophe and neoliberal capitalism. Braidotti, following Deleuze (1968/1994), emphasizes
difference over identity and therefore becoming over being: the proposition that change and the fluidity of all things is what there is. In Braidotti’s work, an ontology of difference and becoming moves from the emphasis on individuals and their knowledge to the dynamic and transformative connections and interactions that are immanent to all events, material occurrences, thoughts, and subjectivities. In terms of the problematics of earth and people, Braidotti invites us to use the concepts of Zoe and becoming to think with new hope about life and vulnerability.

Braidotti (2009), in her situated and political renditions of the terms becoming and Zoe, argues that the traditional unified vision of the subject which rendered woman, nature, and native as the other in modernism, returns at the end of postmodernism as a non-unitarian subject who’s other is vitality or life force. In relation to bios or bio-power (Foucault, 1978), the body is associated to knowledge, intervention, control and the “the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life” (p. 136). The other side of bio-power is the possibility of being left as bare perishable life through governmental intervention or the lack thereof. Zoe is this bare being alive of the body: “the generative vitality of non- or pre-human or animal life.” (p. 37). Bios, as the intellectual and self-reflexive manipulation of life related to social hygiene, governmentality, and control, stands in contrast to Zoe, which is “the mindless vitality of Life carrying on independently of and regardless of rational control” (p. 37). Braidotti argues that the colonized version of “the human” identified by whiteness, maleness, heterosexuality, wealth, and standard language use has been historically conflated with bios, whereas Zoe came to be associated with woman, nature, and racialized other. In advanced capitalism, and in connection with biotechnological advances, Zoe, as the life force represented as the “others” of the traditional subject, has now taken a central place in political economy (Braidotti, 2009). The intersections of Zoe, bios, capital, politics, and technology are now the becomings or contested and
transformative spaces of contemporary subjectivity. Ethical discourse, from this nonunitary perspective of subjectivity, is about “forces, desires, and values that act as empowering modes of being” rather than a moralistic set of “negative, resentful emotions and life-denying reactive passions” (Braidotti, 2006a, p. 236). A consideration of Zoe as the nonrepresentable becoming of life force queries new approaches to thinking of life, the subject, and others.

Working in the remains of a poststructural critique of representation, language, and subjectivity, Braidotti (2006b) describes Zoe as “the endless vitality of life as continuous becoming” (p. 41). This approach to understanding life dissolves the notion of an individual human subject facing mortality and inscribes subjectivity as a site of multiple belongings and becomings. The human organism, in this view, is an embodied affective intersection of multiple forces, intensities, and processes. In terms of theorizing the subject from such a neovitalist position, we need particular, local, and accurate descriptions of the intersecting forces that collide to produce the contradictions, possibilities, and actualities of singular experiences of life and death. By grounding relational practices in an ontology of difference, becoming, and affirmative neovitalism, the multiplicities previously reduced and repressed by the totalizing concept of self are open to be acknowledged as singularities that exceed representation and the manipulation of bios. Furthermore, our practices of engaging become radical projects of transformation and creation, events in a dynamic flow of the production of difference.

Braidotti (2006a) builds on Spinoza’s concept of endurance and states that “endurance is self-affirmation. It is also an ethical principle of affirmation of the positivity of the intensive subject—its joyful affirmation as potentia. The subject is a “spatiotemporal compound which frames the boundaries of processes of becoming” (p. 244). Here Braidotti highlights the

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C12: Identity Theories—Multiculturalism—Race—Solidarity. Nxumalo (2012) calls for an unsettling of representational practices of race and diversity and an analytic situated in the specific flows, forces, bodies and becomings in an encounter.
embodied maintenance of pain or pleasure without being destroyed by it. Endurance is the ability to endure the transformation from negative to positive affect, which becomes the hallmark of sustainability and self-preservation within experimental praxiological engagements. It is the endurance and working through of fear, pain, or anxiety to the point of transformation, rather than the avoidance, suppression, control, disgust, resignation, or rejection of suffering and death, that affirms the transformative potential of life in all its difference. Braidotti (2009) writes: “Paradoxically, it is those who have already cracked up a bit, those who have suffered pain and injury, who are better placed to take the lead in the process of ethical transformation” (p. 53). In terms of constituting new earths and new peoples, Braidotti’s rendition of the nomadic subject proposes that engagements with difference and others, including land and other forms of life, is necessary for sustainability and survival.

To further engage with the Spinosist ontology of immanence, Deleuzian notion of becoming, and Braidotti’s conception of nomadic subjectivity, I will juxtapose it with Indigenous and postcolonial perspectives on geography, thought, and identity. Situating my thesis work within contemporary settler colonialism in North America, it has been important and generative for me to bring these different ways of knowing together. Prior to engaging in this conjunction of ideas in Connective 16, however, I will review some writings on decolonization and allyship to further situate my analysis and develop some of the conceptual tools.

C15: Decolonization—Land and Geography—Moves to Innocence—Allyship and Solidarity

Ritskes (2013), a self-identified settler, raises considerations for settlers and Indigenous people regarding the potential harms of allyship and solidarity. He does not directly develop the concepts of allyship and solidarity but does indicate that they are built on a concept of difference.
I read Ritskes deployment of the concept of difference in this context as referring to differences between identities, namely Indigenous and non-Indigenous or settler people or groups. This notion of difference between identities can be contrasted to a Deleuzian notion of internal or ontological difference. Difference based on prior identity requires that two entities, subjects, or groups have a high degree of consistency which can be used to contrast with another relatively stable entity or identity. Difference in itself, by contrast, perpetually seeks the internal self-differentiations which disrupt any seeming identity. With the example of the Indigenous and Settler identity categories, for example, difference based solidarity must understand the dissimilarities, disparities, and distinctions between these relatively stable categories. Conversely, ontological difference seeks to trace the internal differences that undo the categories themselves: from the differences between groups that comprise the category settlers, to the differences between the individuals that make up any one group of settlers, to the differences within any individual which make up that individual, ad infinitum.

Using an identity based notion of difference, Ritskes (2013) first notes distraction and the hijacking of Indigenous messages as potential harms that can come as settlers attempt to support Indigenous people in their struggles for sovereignty. Second, he claims that “whiteness dominates” when settlers are unable to set aside privilege, do not see solidarity as a violent and unsettling process for themselves, and cannot take a back seat and listen. Lastly, he questions the costs incurred in educating and relating with settlers. Situating his critique in contemporary solidarity contexts such as Idle No More, he questions the effects of many voices in movements and how, citing Tuck and Yang (2012), such social movements can be used as moves to innocence by settlers.
Tuck and Yang (2012) elaborate six settler moves to innocence that can be “entangled in resettlement, reoccupation, and reinhabitation that actually further settler colonialism” (p. 1). These moves avoid the actual consequences of decolonization and preserve settler comforts and futures. The first two moves the authors warn of are nativism, the practice of claiming Indigenous ancestry to deflect the settler identity, and adoption, the appropriation of the other’s pain, knowledge, land, or identity in fantasy or through activism and sympathies. The next two moves to settler innocence are equivocation and conscientization, the former being a homogenization of various forms of oppression (such as wealth inequality, sexisms, and ablebodiedism) with colonization and the latter being the development of critical settler consciousness in the place of repatriating land. Move five, “A(s)t(e)risk peoples” (p. 22) is the counting and codification of Indigenous peoples as at-risk and self-destructive, or representing them through an asterisk in large data sets and thereby relegating their realities to footnotes or relative unimportance in large sample sizes. Lastly, move six brings attention to the incommensurability between decolonization and other social justice activities. Tuck and Yang use the example of the Occupy movement, which, while expressing resistance to global capitalism, is largely precolonial in that the redistribution of wealth called for takes for granted a common claim to land and resources. This final settler move highlights Tuck and Yang’s clear definition of decolonization as the termination of land occupation and settler futures, whether socialist, egalitarian, democratic, or otherwise.

Decolonization is not a metaphor. Tuck and Yang (2012) emphatically state that “decolonization brings about the repatriation of Indigenous land and life” (p. 1). Furthermore, they argue that any movement, regardless of its utopian, critical, or socially just aims, may be incommensurable with decolonization if Indigenous futures and sovereignty without a settler
state are not at the forefront. Particularly, they reject settler attempts to reconcile guilt and complicity through metaphorizing decolonization or appropriating it within other critical, liberal, or social justice work. According to Tuck and Yang, settler colonialism is first and foremost the theft and occupation of Indigenous land. Colonialism, however, also governs public and compulsory learning and structures what counts as knowledge, thought, and philosophy. Within settler colonialism, the preeminent issue is land:

Land is what is most valuable, contested, required, both because settlers have made Indigenous land their new home and source of capital, and also because the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents a profound epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence. This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation. (p. 5)

Settler colonialism operates by making Indigenous lands the property of the state and settlers. Compared with exploitative colonial projects which seek to extract resources from the rich areas of Indigenous land for appropriation by the metropole, settler colonialism affords “no spatial separation between metropole and colony.” (p. 5). To achieve a settler colonial state, therefore, requires that Indigenous peoples, particularly their relationships to land, be destroyed or made invisible. Decolonization in a settler colonial context, therefore, means specifically repatriating Indigenous land, recognizing and revitalizing the various ways in which Indigenous peoples have relationships to land, and undoing settler futures that depend on Indigenous lands.

**Indigenous and postcolonial theory.** In contrast to Tuck and Yang’s (2012) claim for Indigenous primacy, Desai (2011) is concerned about the privileging of either diasporic or Indigenous claims. Acknowledging the differences between settler colonialism and postcolonialism, he reminds us that the postcolonial is not universally realized. He proposes the
category of subalternity to work through these differences, arguing that the subaltern identity is relational in that it reflects a shifting subject positioning and can therefore be more accountable to shifting power differentials. Drawing on Spivak’s (1999) conceptualization of the subaltern as those who are completely outside dominant power, Dasai argues that the subaltern is perpetually renegotiated as a position relative to particular problematics and politics in particular contexts. Although Desai uses the term subaltern to transcend differences between the diasporic and the Indigenous, he allegorically separates them with a comparison of “roots and routes” (p. 61).

In terms of identity, the allegory of roots and routes reflects Indigenous place-based identities compared to postcolonial uses of poststructural theory to release the fixity of identity, promoting deferral, nomadism, and becoming. While reflecting on a trip to Ecuador, however, Desai backtracks on this theorization, suggesting that the construction of Indigenous discourses is “productively enabled” (p. 65) by the experiences of diaspora just as much as the diasporic depends on the space of authenticity. He thus returns to the difference between Indigenous and diasporic people and proposes a “healthy interplay between the centripetal and the centrifugal, between rootedness and diaspora and indeed between tradition and modernity, that allows for the possibility of a promising future” (p. 65).

Byrd (2011) enters into this conversation between the postcolonial and the Indigenous to investigate the limitations and failures of postcolonial theory in addressing American Indian contexts. She uses the resources of Indigenous, postcolonial, poststructural, and literary theories to intervene in the postcolonial and Indigenous exchange. One of her primary interventions is to use the concepts of cacophony and transit to unmask the workings of race and multiculturalism
discourses that render their colonial underpinnings imperceptible⁴⁹. She contends that colonization both structurally and materially constitutes race theory while being differed in racial analyses. In this sense, the author brings both the material requirements of colonial institutions (the land, water, air, animals, and plants) and the discursive underpinnings of liberal, critical, and postcolonial theories within the range of her critique. Byrd’s particular targets of critique are the American academic system and the US government more generally. She analyzes how discourses on Indianness are deployed locally to maintain hegemonic control of Indian land at the same time they are used internationally to enact worldwide empire.

**C16: Geography—Indigenous Cosmology—Ontology and Epistemology—Immanence**

Returning to Deleuze and Guattari (2000, 2003, 2004), Braidotti (2006a, 2009), and Spinoza’s (1677/2007), through Indigenous and anti-colonial critiques and perspectives, I attempt here to engage between these two lines of communication. I pay attention to the complexity of working between diverse ways of knowing, particularly as they relate to subjectivity and geography, and try to draw out my own curiosities as I engage with these bodies of knowledge in an academic context.

Poststructural and Deleuzian philosophy has generally been interested in the processes and power relations associated with the othering and suppression of diverse ways of knowing. Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence, derived from a lineage of Jewish mysticism and pre-Socratic philosophy, was rejected by both his Jewish community and the dominant Catholic church of the time. Derrida (1976) and other poststructuralist were strong critics of the dominant grammar, language, and thought that consolidated hegemonic knowledge. Deleuze and Guattari were both politically involved in the anti-colonial fight for liberation in Algeria (Dosse, 2010)

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⁴⁹ **C12: Identity Theories—Multiculturalism—Race—Solidarity.** Pacini-Ketchabaw analyzes how multicultural discourse are subtly deployed in child care contexts to position practitioners and families as flexible and accommodating in the process of adapting to difference and becoming what she calls citizen-subjects.
and both sought sources of knowledge outside the hegemonic theoretical frame. While these philosophers can be argued to challenge or disrupt the dominance of hegemonic thought, the language and density of their texts—which at times provides rich critique and escape routes from dominant modes of thought—can also act as a barrier for dialogue with others. More poignantly, the language of immanent or poststructural philosophy can further disempower diverse ways of knowing as they becomes more desirable, fashionable, or pervasive as a critical counterpoint to dominant forms of knowledge. On the one hand, immanent and poststructuralist philosophy provides critiques of the dominant forms of thought secured by capitalism, colonialism, and Eurocentrism, while on the other hand they potentially institute their own challenges, appropriations, distractions, and omissions in relation to Indigenous and anti-colonial praxis. While immanent and poststructural philosophies provide new vocabularies and analytics for engaging in critique and transformation, they do not necessarily do so on the terms of those most oppressed by systems of dominance, and they may in fact work to invisibilize people’s struggles for their own cultural, ontological, epistemological, or cosmological recognition and continuance.

While immanent ontology and poststructural thought are critiques of the dominant forms of knowledge of their time, they continue to be a products of such systems including their colonial and capitalist foundations. Watts (2013) for example critiques the very categories of ontology and epistemology as oppressive to Indigenous worldviews and provides a penetrating analysis of the importance of the terms of reference in any debate. Watts begins her critique of Western philosophy generally by briefly sharing Haudenosaunee and Anishnaabe creation histories. She emphasizes two points; first, that the events described in these histories took place, and second, that many Indigenous accounts “describe a theoretical understanding of the world
via a physical embodiment—Place-Thought” (p. 21). Place-Thought, she explains, is “the non-distinctive space where place and thought were never separated because they never could or can be separated” (p. 21). Furthermore, Place-Thought presupposes that the land thinks and is alive, and that nonhumans and humans obtain agency through these thoughts. While Place-Thought can be seen as similar to Spinoza’s (1677/2007) immanent ontology or Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003, 2004) geophilosophy as the thought of an earth and people, Watts’s anticolonial critique raises numerous questions for poststructuralist, posthuman, and nomadic thinkers.

Watts (2013) addresses the distinction made in Euro-Western philosophy between ontology and epistemology and argues that, in contrast to Indigenous cosmologies, which are animate and literal, Euro-Western thought is abstract and reserves thinking and agency for humans. Watts traces Euro-Western philosophy to Descartes and shows how epistemology, when separated from ontology, is described “as one’s perception of the world as being distinct from what is in the world, or what constitutes it” (p. 24). In contrast, Indigenous cosmologies, particularly those of the Haudenosaunee and Anishnaabe, which Watts identifies with, understand thought as arising from the land, all elements in nature, and their relations throughout a long history beginning in creation. Place-Thought, in this sense, does not propose a thinking subject that inscribes empty land, animals, and objects with representations or abstractions in order to explain them. Rather, Place-Thought is an understanding that all that there is has agency and produces thought, desire, and communication.

The Euro-Western separation of ontology and epistemology is a pillar in the hierarchical structure that places humans, by virtue of their reason and capacity for abstraction and agency, above animals, land, and other live and inanimate objects (Watts, 2013). The same ontological separation and ordering of existents is what historically premised God as above and outside the
human and natural world. This ontology is best described as an ontology of transcendence in that the substances of existence (such as mind, spirit, god, matter) are separate and hierarchically ordered. As I have argued throughout this thesis, a similar critique of the separation of earth and thought is a central point of divergence for Deleuze and Guattari, Spinoza, and other poststructuralists from the Euro-Western mainstream (May, 2005). An ontology of immanence, particularly as articulated by Spinoza as God (1677/2007) or as geophilosophy by Deleuze and Guattari (2003), is precisely the notion that all of existence is one and mutually constitutive.

Hans Skott-Myhre explained the immanentist view of geography to me in this way:

Geography is not just physical but thought, and this is a reference to Spinoza, right? There is no separating thought and physical, and so thought, the mental, if you will, is, of course, always the thought of the body, but not just the human body but the body in a complex ontology with all bodies. And so thought shouldn’t be imagined to be in some way separable from literal geography, not just the geography of thought, as in thought lays out a plane, but literally in its mutual contiguity with physicality. You know, thought is the thought of the body, and body is not simply the human body. I said this before but I want to reemphasize it, not just the human body but all bodies, all the encompassing bodies. So thought therefore does not arise in one mind. The mental geography is not your mind, my mind, it is thought per se in a particular moment. So we have this geography which is ‘not confined to providing historical form with a substance’ so we are going to quickly move away from this idea of geography as the United States or ‘this back yard’ or ‘the ocean’ or the things we have named and mapped. So geography doesn’t just give substance to these historical forms, to these places, right? It’s not merely physical. Geography is not simply the physical because the physical is always thought and thought is always physical, so it’s a strong anti-Cartesian statement that it is not merely physical and human, particularly it is not necessarily human, right?

While Deleuze and Guattari (2003) seem to be in line with Watts (2013) on the analysis of transcendence or the epistemological-ontological divide in Euro-Western thought, one central distinction in their work is regarding the problems and possibilities of differences in these registers. Deleuze and Guattari seem to be future oriented and interested in experimenting with connections between different thought systems whereas Watts is adamant of the importance of retaining, returning, and committing to Indigenous cosmology or place-thought. This is not to
say that Watts calls for a static knowledge, essentialisms, or a backwards turning, but rather a “commitment to the land…because it continues to be removed, cemented, or ignored” (p. 32). Watts is interested in “conversations about bodies in action and how gritty flesh is elementally moved to protect and reclaim territories” (p. 32), whereas Deleuze and Guattari seek a “new earth and new people” (p. 109). The differences between these lines of argument are relevant for me when thinking through relations between Indigenous and non-Indigenous people, how these categories are structured, and how their respective knowledge systems relate to each another.

Conflating Euro-Western approaches, Watts (2013) critiques them as abstracting Indigenous history and attempting to grasp an element of the real “as a gateway for non-Indigenous thinkers to re-imagine their world” (p. 26). Deleuze and Guattari (2004) are particularly vulnerable to the critique of abstracting and appropriating due to their concept of nomadism, which simultaneously reinvigorates a Euro-Western concept used to classify Indigenous peoples while also promoting a postidentitarian subject free of territorialized identity. Although Deleuze and Guattari (2003) are specifically seeking the conceptual means to form identities and territories outside or disruptive of current capitalist, colonial, or fascistic coding systems, the call for “the people to come and the new earth” (p. 109) can be deleterious to projects seeking to revitalize tradition, connection to land, or history. In their defence, however, the concept of nomadism they develop is specifically articulated as a process of escape from representations that totalize knowledge and identity, thereby opening thought, Western thought at least, to previously subjugated or ignored ways of knowing and being.

Nomadic philosophy, a perspective formed on the notion of the perpetual becoming and flux of any individual, group, or system, understands the fixing of identity, history, knowledge, land, or a people as a tactical response to oppression. Hans Skott-Myhre explained that,
under colonial domination in which the habits and beliefs of a particular group are under assault by another group who wishes them to adopt their habits and beliefs, one of the tactics that is sometimes necessary in order to keep the living force of the existing habits and beliefs, in other words the, if you wish, the ecological diversity of differing groups of peoples with different habits and beliefs and differing ways of describing things, and different ways of representing the world, different language structures, because of course, your language structure is also, among other things, a way of understanding how a particular world was perceived and put together. And when you extinguish that you literally lose a world, when you extinguish a mode of language, or a mode of description, or a mode of spiritual belief, or a mode of spiritual practice, or a mode of cultural practice, you lose a world. That world, of course, is only useful to the degree that it is a kind of becoming, that it is in its own trajectory of becoming, along its own lineage and its own particular historical and geographical configurations.

The concept of nomadic subjectivity, or becoming, rather than that of identity, therefore claims that a history and people are only necessary under conditions of colonialism or oppression, but otherwise would shift, change, mutate, as the geography and relations that compose it dictate.

In an interview with a CYC graduate student who identified herself as a settler on Coast Salish territory, this emphasis on fluidity and becoming in relation to identity and colonization was made in this way:

Like I hold on to the settler, the white settler. I don’t know if that is identity or self, but I hold on to that for self-location. . . . Well, if you are naming yourself a settler, you’re doing something. . . . You’re taking ownership of something. . . . Yeah, responsibility. . . . But that is not even a coherent subject, it is shifting and changing, through space, through context, it’s not the same, because it is reinventing itself in the idea of the settler. As soon as you troubled it, it becomes something different and it comes up in another space, right?

From an immanent or nomadic perspective, the notion of becoming is ontological in that life, identity, and culture are fluid processes that shift and change in interaction with discourse and materiality. Becoming, as articulated in the quotes above, can be seen as a tactic, a possibility, a responsibility, or simply what happens. Grande (2004), however, states that notions of fluidity have never benefited Indigenous Peoples. The author further explains how colonial governments have used notions of fluid identity “as a rationale for dismantling the structures of
tribal life” and claims that “in spite of its “democratic” promise, postmodernism and its ludic theories of identity fail to provide indigenous communities the theoretical grounding for asserting their claims as colonized peoples, and, more important, impede construction of transcendent emancipatory theories” (p. 112). I read Grande as criticizing Western theories as impractical and lofty, not attuned to the realities of Indigenous struggles.

I wonder, therefore, what analytics are necessary to understand the privilege and opportunity that some subjects find in the processes of becoming, and conversely, what calls are being made for subjects to not outpace their subjectivity. Perhaps the very notion of becoming postidentititarian is premised on the recognition of a certain form of subjectivity, location, or theoretical achievement. The distinction between identity and becoming therefore highlights two important and interconnected considerations for me in working between nomadic and Indigenous ways of knowing. The first consideration is what Watts calls the necessity for colonialism “to make Indigenous Peoples stand in disbelief of themselves and their histories” (p. 20) and the other is what Tuck (2010) calls the issue of “false inventions and giving credit where credit is due” (p. 646).

Watts (2013) argues that the operationalization of colonialism includes an attempt to discredit, mythologize, misrepresent, or otherwise undermine Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of themselves and their histories. The filtering of Indigenous cosmologies through the Euro-Western epistemology-ontology divide is explained as one way that colonialism attempts this misrepresentation and misrecognition. Watts also extends this critique to posthuman, ecofeminist, and science studies thinkers (e.g., Latour and Haraway) who try to theorize the agency of the more-than-human world within the epistemology-ontology paradigm or who use Indigenous histories as stories, tropes, or “an abstracted tool of the West” (p. 28). Although
Watts does not specifically address the immanent and geophilosophical lineages within Western philosophy who collapse the ontology-epistemology divide and attempt to speak literally rather than figuratively, Indigenous philosopher and youth researcher Eve Tuck (2010; Tuck and Yang, 2014) does.

Tuck (2010) specifically addresses Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy and argues that some their most central concepts are strikingly similarity to Indigenous knowledge. Tuck describes how central notions of Deleuze’s thought, such as the rhizome, are exceptionally similar to notions of interconnectedness that have been central to Indigenous frameworks for thousands of years. For Tuck, these similarities need to be reconciled in the context of the “colonizer’s and academy’s long history of exploiting, romanticizing, and mining of Indigenous knowledge” (p. 646). Although Deleuzian thought has a specific philosophical lineage to the ideas of the Dutch Jewish pantheist, monist, mystic, and immanentist Baruch Spinoza, the critique that recognition and respect for particular ideas are structured within colonization can still be applied to Deleuze and Guattari’s. For the most part within the Western academy, Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of rhizome, nomadism, and geophilosophy are treated as novel, revolutionary, and worthy of reading while little credit is given to Indigenous knowledge keepers for centuries and millennia of similarly developed thought in other traditions. It is the West’s willingness to take the trouble and time to read and recognize philosophies written in dominant languages and to accredit novelty and insight to one of the academy’s own that is troubling here. In my current context of trying to think through decolonizing and revolutionary CYC praxis in an academic context, the use of poststructural and Deleuzian thought has brought up concerns regarding its appropriateness. Tuck’s (2010) critique claims that Deleuzian thought provides many of the same insights as some Indigenous knowledge systems thereby reintroducing
Indigenous ideas to a limited readership through a new and highly complex, technical, and sophisticated vocabulary, while disconnecting this thought from the actual changes needed on Indigenous territory.

While the decolonizing analysis of poststructural and immanent philosophies challenges their application to decolonization projects in settler colonial states, Tuck and Yang (2012) also argue that “the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts” (p. 28). Incommensurability, for Tuck and Yang, highlights the distinctness of decolonization relative to other projects and recognizes that opportunities for solidarity can “only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations,” while “lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable” (p. 28). Throughout this thesis, and particularly this chapter, I have brought together diverse ways of knowing and being in order to work productively at their intersections, engage their differences, and understand where I stand on issues that are incommensurable. It is within this contingent, difference-centered space of critical or political praxis that I think CYC as a community must develop a new vocabulary and framework for rethinking our engagements with each other and with children, youth, families, and communities.

I have not attempted to specifically develop this new vocabulary myself, but rather highlighted the range of perspectives and voices to be engaged in this process. It is in this interface, conjunction, or confrontation between Indigenous worldviews and anti-colonial projects on the one side, and postidentitarian and immanent theories on the other that I think CYC conceptualizations of self, identity, and subjectivity are most interesting and potentially generative. Importantly, and partially the reason for my interest and investments in these ideas, these two lines of thought have intersected, collided, and amplified one another in this research through the relationships I have had with people engaged in them. Particularly, in grappling with
the commonalities and incommensurabilities of Indigenous and Deleuzian thought, I must thank Hans Skott-Myhre, Nicole Land, Jeff Smith, Vanessa Vondruska, Sandrina de Finney, and Veronica Pacini-Ketchabaw who have engaged alongside me throughout this project.

**C17: CYC-to-Come—Community and Tradition—CYC Identity—Hospitality**

Daniel Scott (2012), professor of CYC at UVic, works with Caputo’s (2006) etymological investigation of the word *community* to explore the potentials for inclusion and exclusion under the CYC community banner. Communities, from the Latin *communis*, are generally established on terms of shared identities and commonalities (Caputo, 1997) and therefore require engaging with difference(s) within and outside the community borders. While *communis* refers to a common (that is, a piece of land for common use), the tail end of the word, *munis*, also refers to defense or fortification and indirectly to munitions (Caputo). Internally, a community generally seeks a commonality or essence to unite what is disparate within its borders while, in relation to those outside its borders, it differentiates between us and them. A community is a homestead in which peace depends on its fortifications. Caputo states: “If a community is too welcoming, it loses its identity, if it keeps its identity, it becomes unwelcoming” (p. 113). With the multiplicity of theories and approaches harboured within the CYC community, it is imperative that we ask how CYC relates to differences, diversities, and identities within and outside its borders.

Derrida (cited in Caputo, 1997) maintains that both pure unity and pure diversity are impossible and, if possible, would be nothing less than death. Similarly, the self-identical is impossible, and if possible, it would be death. Living languages change as they are used, and the moment it would be otherwise, they would die. The individual subject is composed of a myriad of selves, and the point at which self-differentiation ends, so too the subject. A political party has
factions and dissenters, without which it would be totalitarian. As an alternative to purity and multiplicity, deconstruction advocates for “highly heterogeneous, porous, self-differentiating quasi-identities, unstable identities, if that is what they are, that are not identical with themselves, that do not close over and form a seamless web of the selfsame” (Caputo, 1997, p. 107). With a gesture of responsibility toward the incoming of the other, the internally differentiated community is always already open to the coming and play of difference. This internal self-differentiation Caputo (1997) calls a “we” who cannot settle into being at home with themselves, a “we” who cannot finally say “we.” Difference is necessary to identity and therefore the politics of difference are paramount. Difference is the movement and possibility of future, which allows concepts, communities, and identities to continue. A CYC attuned to its internal difference and vulnerable and hospitable to the incoming of the other is what I term CYC-to-Come.

In reference to the relationship between a social community and the children and youth in care, Hans Skott-Myhre (2012b) writes:

They cause us trouble because when they are with us in community, they produce holes in the fabric of our lives, our habits, our comforts, and our commonality.

Their difference must be secluded away and not missed except in the solitude of those who know they also do not really belong to the commonality of the social.

(p. 327)

Difference, from the perspective of a self-identical or stable community, is a rupture. Our CYC community, generally intent on engaging the young people excluded from the normal and comfortable social community, is therefore a ripe location for investigating the politics that inform our relationship to inter- and extra-communal difference.
The orientation we take toward those whose directions do not easily align with the community calls for thinking through our relationship to those whose directions are different than our own. A strong telos or goal orientation of a community requires a repression of the headings of the other or subsumes the other into an identity in the form of unity-in-difference. Caputo (1997) argues that Derrida’s idea of difference\textsuperscript{50} works to deconstruct a Hegelian notion that all differences or oppositions gather themselves together in an ever-expanding unity. Deconstructing Hegelian teleology helps us to see what Derrida was actually up to; he avoids essentialism and argues for “a certain contingent assembly of unities subject always to more radical open-endedness that constantly runs the risk of going adrift” (Caputo, p. 117). This drift or shifting takes the place of a direction or program in terms of history and destiny. Deconstruction moves against accumulation and the dominant heading, in our times neoliberalism and global capitalism. Today in CYC, we are faced with dealing with the heading-otherwise of the other within our community borders as well as the accumulated momentum of social forces that press up toward collusion.

Hospitality, as the welcoming of the other, is the more socially palatable way to state what deconstruction is (Caputo, 1997). From the linguistic through the personal to the social (if there are such divides), hospitality is a yes-saying to the coming of the other. In deconstructing the word hospitality, Caputo, not surprisingly, finds that the word’s etymology carries its own opposite. He explains that the Latin hostis originally meant stranger, but came to mean enemy or hostile over time, while pets means to have power. The extension of welcome is therefore “a function of the power of the host to remain master of the premises” (p. 110). This inward tension of hospitality, or rather its own auto-deconstruction, and therefore its impossibility, is precisely

\textsuperscript{50} C13: Structuralism—Poststructuralism—the Subject. Derrida’s (1976) concept of différance is employed to deconstruct stable language systems and the subjects.
its possibility. Deconstruction is an opening to the future, to hospitality to come, never self-same, never contained; hospitality, like all else, “is inhabited from within” (p. 112).

Westmoreland (2008) contrasts the hospitality of rights and laws that are conditional and coextensive with established relationships to pure, unconditional hospitality. Based on the laws of the state, individuals are identified, divided, and categorized into “citizens and non-citizens, citizens and foreigners, hosts and guests” (p. 2). A host, in this sense, demands something of the guest (e.g., name, origin, intent) and applies a system whereby guests are recognizable, restricted, and indebted for the hospitality extended to them. Barnett (2005) describes conditional hospitality as an exchange for something, such as good conduct, respect, obedience, or repayment. Conditional hospitality is offered from a place of self-possession and mastery and is coloured by overtones of paternalism and tolerance.

Unconditional hospitality, as contrasted with the hospitality of the law, would efface any law that conditioned or limited the absolute openness to the other. Derrida (2000) insists, however, that even the obligation to give over all that one has to the other would still inscribe hospitality within the law. Absolute hospitality, according to Derrida, is the impossible call to completely break with laws, duties, politics, and rights in the relationship with the other. In this sense, then, hospitality is involved with the singular, the event, ethics, and aporia. We can only know the absolute in terms of limits, such as giving without return and welcoming without restriction, but absolute unconditioned hospitality exceeds such formalizations (Westmoreland, 2008). To welcome unconditionally, therefore, means to be rid of security and open to the unexpected, including the incoming of possible violence and disruption. Westmoreland (2008) explains that Derrida is pointing toward a stance in which sovereignty and authority give way to benevolence and the overturning of power, repositioning the guest as the host’s host.
Barnett (2005) argues that the impossibility that absolute hospitality must go through provides a critique of practices in which “any ordered discourse of responsibility, organized infrastructure of laws and rights or regulated arrangement of boundaries is thought to contravene a principle of unlimited responsibility towards otherness by introducing a degree of calculation into the practice of care” (p. 14). This critique opens CYC up to some of its fundamental premises regarding the outwardly apolitical and generous practices of care and responsibility practitioners are supposed to deliver. It further destabilizes the homogeneity within CYC by asking who, within our community, is served by particular practices, concepts, structures, and approaches to care that we learn, practice, and teach. I am arguing here that contemporary CYC is already inhabited by heterogeneous identities and performances, as well as being challenged to account for its relationship to the others outside its community boundaries, such as clients, organizations, other disciplines, and other communities. The idea of a CYC community may work to stabilize this heterogeneity into a seemingly coherent and intelligible whole, but I propose that the idea of a CYC-to-Come, an ethics of hospitality toward difference, the event, and the headings of the other, can open us up to productive relationships within and across our community borders.

Barnett (2005) argues against mapping the ethics of absolute hospitality against the hospitality of politics for two reasons: (1) it implies that self or community could be extracted from existing positions, relationships, and commitments in favour of new ones; and (2) it implies an always-already-accepted acceptance of responsibility and welcome by an abstract other. Barnett summarizes Derrida’s later work as a deconstruction of the binaries between conditionality and unconditionality and a move toward singularities in which hospitality requires that a guest be greeted as a particular somebody. This moves hospitality beyond indifference and
toward recognition of particular, not all, guests. The affirmation of boundaries as the condition of possibility and impossibility of hospitality resurfaces the questions of indifference to one’s own power in the form of opening to the hostility of the other. It also places responsibility in terms of the exclusion of certain other subjects.

Identities, at either the individual or community level, are constituted through practices, discourses, bodies, performances, coding systems, and knowledge. Identities are furthermore constructed in relation to other identities through processes of either identification to same or differentiation from other. Relational identity formation, from this perspective, therefore “works primarily by excluding some element that takes on the role of the Other, setting up an image of nonidentity that confirms the identity of the self or the collective community” (Barnett, 2005, p. 7). All relating, from this perspective, becomes a process of boundary maintenance and “territorial integrity of communities or selves” (p. 7). The questions of identity, community, praxis, field, territory, and meaning therefore become questions of prefacing difference, maintaining boundaries, relating across them, and moving with intention. I am here asking that we in CYC today relate to the traces of our history and the processes of our present (colonialism, neoliberalism, capitalism, racism) that can undo coherent notions of community, self, or intent and purpose, while also hesitating to subsume the radical project of praxis to new dominant forms. I wonder what it means for us to relate across theoretical divides, to relate to those headed elsewhere. The stances we take up in relation to our internal self-differentiations, I argue, reciprocally affect our relational capacities to receive the yet-to-come: the future of CYC.
Chapter 5: Further Research: Problems and Possibilities

In this chapter I extend what I believe to be the most interesting and significant findings of this research and consider possible directions for conceptualizing the self, identity, and subjectivity in relation to CYC praxis, curriculum, pedagogy, and community. Specifically, I elaborate on the concepts of politicized praxis, relational pedagogy, geophilosophical curriculum, and CYC-to-come. Rather than circle back to my introduction and original questions, or close this thesis neatly in some other way, I explore what this thesis could become through pragmatic application and further conceptual experimentation.

Scope

To understand the key concepts related to the self in CYC, I conducted research conversations with 17 scholars and graduate students in the field through individual and group interviews, and reviewed a large portion of the literature related to the self in CYC. Although my thinking and approach were influenced by innumerable factors, texts, contexts, people, and other life forces, I believe this project would be significantly enriched by increased direct participation and a broader scope of literature. As I continue to research and write about concepts of the self in CYC, it will be important for me to converse with practitioners, undergraduate students, and children, youth, and families themselves about the ways in which thinking about the self are relevant to them. In terms of the literature that I engage with, in future research it would be appealing for me to examine CYC curricula from other institutions, as well as literature from related fields. Finally, I believe it would be interesting to better understand the role that organizations and governments have in shaping how the self is conceptualized and operationalized in practice.
Focused Concepts and Hauntings

In this thesis, I have engaged numerous concepts related to the self, such as becoming, cogito, colonialism, community, constructionism and constructivism, culture, decolonization, deconstruction, development, discourse, ethics, ethnicity, immanence, individuation, intersectionality, language, multitude, other, performativity, postmodernism and, praxis, presence, race, self-awareness, self-concept, singularity, subject formation, subjectivity, (post)structuralism, and the unconscious. And, while I have engaged with many concepts, almost innumerable other concepts were indicated in my research but exceeded my capacity to formally include them in this thesis, including biopsychosocial, biology, desire, event, existentialism, feminism (first and second wave), masculinity, phenomenology, posthumanism, queer theory, rhythm, science and science studies, self-esteem, standpoint theory, and systems theory.

The geophilosophical approach that I developed through Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003) explication of philosophy as the creation of concepts intimately related to a people and land was one of the first concepts I introduced in this project. I developed the notion of geophilosophy by reconfiguring it in a research methodologies context, and this work facilitated the development of the concept of connectives as a research analytic. Through this analytic I developed the concepts of the canonical self, politicized praxis, and CYC-to-Come. None of the concepts that I worked with were purely original, but rather were specifically developed in response to the particular problems and possibilities of the relationships, geographies, and contexts that I was a part of. In this final chapter I continue in the geophilosophical approach by developing the concepts of relational pedagogy and geophilosophical curriculum, and by further configuring politicized praxis to current Canadian CYC contexts. I close with the concept CYC-to-Come.
**Productive Tensions**

The first productive tension I experienced in this research was between situated relationships and rhizomatic connections. For me, situated relationships were intentional engagements in which clarity of purpose, sustained engagement, respect, and rigorous listening/reading helped me to develop meaningful and enduring bonds. Rhizomatic connections, in contrast, were tangential, unpredictable, disjunctive, creative engagements that generally proliferated new ideas and kept things on the move, dynamic, excessive, and generally chaotic.

While both situated relationships and rhizomatic connections occurred simultaneously, conceptually bifurcating them helped me to understand and articulate my methodology and the problems and possibilities it afforded. I was able, through this tension, to develop my research principles of emergence, proliferation, relationship, and wonder. I was also able to engage with the concepts of identity, becoming, solidarity, and CYC community, not only theoretically, but as a lived experience.

The second productive tension I worked in throughout this research was applying different conceptualizations of the self to my own experiences while simultaneously writing about them. Although my main aim in this project was to engage with concepts, each concept of the self had an intimate impact on how I lived, acted, and understood myself in the research. In addition, each theory of the self that I encountered had different implications for research, specifically in terms of methodology, epistemology, and writing. I attempted to experiment throughout this project with different ways of being a researcher, from acting as a rational consciousness determined to comprehend and organize the works of others, to a specifically situated individual with a particular social location replete with interests, privileges, and interpretations, to a dispersed relational event in a flow of becoming. At times, it was
emotionally and cognitively challenging to subject myself to the analyses that each theory (or critique) of self provided while at the same time writing about them. Some theories contrasted or precluded others, some ways of writing reinstated an “I” that other theories were determined to deconstruct. In the end, I believe that the blend of coherence and incoherence, relationship and rhizome, and creativity and repetition was productive, if challenging.

**Proliferation**

As a thinker and as a writer (if the two can be separated), I had great difficulty editing or choosing what to include and omit in this thesis. From an immanent perspective, all the thoughts I engaged with mutually constituted and conditioned, and diffracted and intensified, one another, however the speeds and complexities of these thoughts outpaced my capacity to capture or represent them in writing. There were (and still are) innumerable ideas that haunt this written product, helping push this thesis at times to excess. Conversely, through this work I learned a simple joy of being with my thoughts, enjoying them, and not needing to communicate them to others. I learned to sit with an experience and not cut it short or write it out, but allow its speeds to move me without the need for external acknowledgement or visible effects. I believe that speeds and excesses in thought provided me with new possibilities and ways to creatively engage with ideas, while concentration and specificity allowed for projects and relationships to manifest. Taking this learning into future research and practice, I understand that making focused choices and committing to specific projects and relationships are important relational and pragmatic capacities to develop. I am also more aware of the contributions and complications that divergent and creative thinking can produce in terms of alternatives, resistances, and exits from the present.
Relational Pedagogy

The focus on relationships and relational practice in CYC became a lived experience for me during this research and many of my research relationships inspired me to think about what a relational CYC pedagogy could be. Particularly, I thank my supervisor Sandrina de Finney for giving me the experience of commitment in learning and joy in struggle. Relational pedagogy is a concept that helps me speak to mentorship, friendship, enjoyment, and shared projects in learning and research engagements. In this research, I experienced many participants as committing to communicate their experience and knowledge with me based on an understanding that we shared values, interests, and projects. Learning became more inspirational, enjoyable, and pragmatic for me when I developed a bond with the people I was doing research with. I also found that strong relationships helped to bring hope and purpose into exploring issues such as racism, colonization and decolonization, capitalism, environmental degradation, and systemic disempowerment. At times I even felt joy and pleasure while conversing on difficult issues which contrasted with my experience of reading on my own, which often brought up feelings of paralysis, frustration, deflation, or guilt. In general I felt that my capacity to act in the world—and my associated joy—increased as my ability to connect with others and their ideas increased. I felt that investments in relationships and projects built on each other and perpetually generated more possibilities. I also appreciated how relationships and projects begun in this research provided avenues and future possibilities beyond this thesis. Over time, this reciprocal augmentation of joy, capacity, interest, and connection expanded still further to include connection with the environment, materiality, and nonhuman earth others, or what I have more broadly called, following Deleuze and Guattari (2003), a geography.
Over the course of my research, the development of a relational approach became as, if not more, important than the content area, or, rather, the two became less distinguishable from one another. I felt that the ways of being a researcher intimately affected what I was able to know and how I was able to know it. Furthermore, I became gradually more aware of how my relationships were set within particular histories and geographies, and potentially responded to them. These experiences of learning in relationship have initiated a vocational curiosity regarding how my practice as an instructor, researcher, and practitioner need to be further informed by a relational, politicized, and situated approaches. As a person of non-Indigenous ancestry working in what is now known as British Columbia, Canada, it has become increasingly important for me to learn what I can about colonization, capitalism, and environmental degradation and to be active in social groups resisting such processes.

Nxumalo (2012) proposes a relational pedagogy and ethics in CYC that embrace complexity, experimentation, and becoming, and that foreground “the ability to build and enhance relations and connections to others” (p. 297). Importantly, she extends relations beyond the human-to-human realm and proposes the inclusion of more-than-human and nonhuman earth others. I understand such a relational approach as developing the capacity to be aware of and open to the full range of possibilities inherent in a given situation. Throughout this thesis I have drawn on Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003) notion of geography to conceptualize how all the bodies, from microscopic organisms and minerals to oceans and mammals, assemble in idiosyncratic relationships and produce thoughts and events immanently. Although I did not represent such textured geographies in my analyses, over time I developed an awareness of how the arrangement of chairs, the lighting, smell of the air, and the sunlight all constituted the thoughts that were produced in an encounter. I also omitted in my descriptions the smiles, late
arrivals, communication technologies and glitches, and bodily aches that were also part of these encounters. Although my awareness and engagement with the geography has been enhanced, my capacity to write it more fully into the work has still to develop.

Also in line with Nxumalo (2012), I found that having predefined goals or definite ideas about identity could limit the thought and expression of bodies in relationship. In some early research conversations, I believe that I was caught up in my own predetermined goals for the research to the point that I hindered a more creative and emergent process. I realized this with one participant in particular when we went for a walk following a formal interview and had a much more interesting and engaged conversation than the one we audio-taped. Similarly, there were times when my identity as a student or researcher, I think, influenced or limited, the types of interactions I was able to have with people identified as professors or instructors. Conversely, however, I have come to realize that sustained relationships, stable identities, and clear goals are also at times important, useful, and enjoyable. It has been an honour to be recognized as a student contributing to a particular area of CYC, and it has also been enjoyable to construct small projects that can be sustained because they are well thought out, structured, and goal oriented. I learned that a politics of location, identity, and relationship are important ethics for me as I engage with the disruptions and fluxes that becomings can entail. Taking these insights into practice and educational contexts for me means maintaining a sense of presence, openness, and wonder, while also being strategic, pragmatic, and committed. I also take with me willingness to being undone by, yet endure within, new relationships, intensities, and directions.

**Geophilosophical Curriculum**

CYC has grown at UVic from a small outgrowth of the psychology department to a full school offering undergraduate and graduate degrees. The curriculum at SCYC, similarly, has
developed from having no CYC specific courses to a standardized model inclusive of mandatory core courses, course sequencings, and the opportunity to be accredited with a child protection, early years, or Indigenous specialization. Beyond a gradual standardization of curriculum at SCYC, there has also been a move across North America to homogenize curriculum via consortiums, professionalization, and educational standardization. While the general movement toward a unified field of CYC has propelled professionalization and communication across the discipline, there is a risk that CYC is being reduced to particular approaches, theories, and conceptualizations, thereby excluding others. One participant in this research argued that

the problem with CYC is that there’s not very many places to go. If we have any intention of having this sort of field of CYC, we gotta get some work done in getting a few more departments at different universities with different sorts of orientations and different kinds of agendas. UVic can’t do it all, not possible, shouldn’t, it should do as UVic does and students should go there, but for right now if you want an MA or PhD in CYC then that’s where you’re going, unless you want to go to Australia. So in that sense, CYC as a field is a fallacy.

CYC as a field, particularly as it is defined at SCYC, has achieved some level of internal consolidation, as well as differentiation from related fields, through central concepts and frameworks such as developmental theory, systems theory, and the concept of the self. This research has demonstrated that, in reference to one of the most central concepts in CYC, the self, there is a great diversity of definitions and understandings, as well as alternative conceptualizations. The diversity of conceptualizations of the self in CYC, and the projects, pedagogies, and practices they relate to, raise questions for our field and its curricula. With a rich and diverse range of conceptual options available for developing a foundational CYC curriculum, I believe it is necessary to clearly articulate the rationale for using particular approaches and excluding others. For myself, two related sets of questions emerged for me regarding the concept of the self in curriculum, and they relate to (1) the centrality and definition
of the self at SCYC and (2) the more general question of having a standardized and structured curriculum rather than one assembled contingently.

First, this research has led me to question why the theories of self that are prevalent are so, and to what end and whose advantage. What I have termed the canonical self, an aggregate of a small number of theorists’ writings in the field, plays a central role in educating students as to what a self is and how it is developed and used in practice. There is some historical precedent for the canonical self, such as the desire to include a concept of personhood and a professional self into a practice-based academic discipline. However, the concept of the self, as it is articulated or taken-for-granted in the canonical texts, has not shown itself to be in any way necessary, natural, substantiated, or obvious. Adding the term canonical when referencing the concept of the self as articulated in core CYC literature has both helped me to locate it within a particular history, and to undo some of the reifications that go along with the notion of the self by considering it specifically as a concept - and moreover, a concept among many.

I argue, following Yoon (2012), that with the increasing diversity of CYC students and CYC service recipients in Canada, it may be time to rethink and critique our central concepts. Specific critiques and considerations that were brought up during this research include the usefulness of the concept of the self for addressing or conceptualizing social and contextual factors, and the role that the concept of the self plays in limiting other ways of knowing. What I found to be helpful to my examination of concepts was a genealogical analysis that places concepts in a historical context, particularly in relation to the problems, configurations, and attitudes of the bodies through which they were thought. By tracing the lines of development of concepts, it was easier for me to both appreciate the rationale and purposefulness of their construction, and to realize the inapplicability and needlessness of certain concepts in certain
situations. I argue that there is no necessity for the standard definition of the concept of the self or its centrality and that CYC can diversify as a field and achieve more wide-ranging impacts by rethinking this concept. Furthermore, I wonder about the very idea or necessity of having central concepts all together. Although in the next two sections I argue for the further development of a foundational politicized praxis framework in CYC, I first experiment with the concept of a geophilosophical curriculum to think through an alternative to foundational concepts altogether.

Geophilosophical curriculum is a concept that responds to the question of an alternative to a standardized curriculum. Expanding out from my question about the self as a central concept, this research has led me to query the necessity of having a standardized curriculum in general. My sense is that the concept of a centered, unified, and coherent self is in some way related to the idea of a unified, structured, and coherent curriculum or program. I wonder about the relationship between the understanding that all people have a self and the idea that knowing about this self is important for preparing practitioners to respond to the diverse circumstances of children, youth, and families. Although notions of therapeutic relationship and authenticity may be argued to be useful in all circumstances, the CYC approach grounded in humanistic counselling and developmental psychology can be critiqued as limited and limiting from a multitude of perspectives brought up in this research. As with the concept of the self, I argue that there is promise in reconsidering central concepts, curriculum and the organization of programs in more social and political terms, but I also propose a curriculum contingently assembled based on the needs, materials, interests, and bodies that are implicated. This view of curriculum more closely resembles a situated and idiosyncratic rendition of the self than the coherent and unified one. Following a more rhizomatic and immanent philosophy, I believe it would be interesting to experiment at SCYC with a geophilosophical curriculum based on the idiosyncrasies and
pragmatic needs of all those involved in the learning encounter. Such an experimental and
decentralized curriculum would allow for a particular configuration of bodies (students, teachers,
classrooms, technologies, texts, and perhaps even service recipients) to develop their own
problematics, concepts, and solutions contingently. I therefore propose a geophilosophical
curriculum that analyzes the relationships among the bodies that constitute the learning
assemblage in terms of their immanent problems, concepts, and, capacities, rather than a
curriculum based on predetermined roles, concepts, outcomes, and progressions. My own
experience in this research of experimenting in relationships to determine the thoughts, ethics,
principles, projects, needs, and possibilities, for example, has led me from an interest in the self
to the notion of politicized praxis and CYC-to-Come.

**Politicized Praxis and the Canadian Humanscape**

Postsecondary education, particularly human service training programs such as CYC, are
increasingly being understood as responsible for preparing citizens to participate in our world of
unbalanced internationalization, legacies of colonialism, and ideologies that support inequity
(Jorgenson & Shultz, 2012). In Canada, visible minority, Indigenous, and immigrant populations
are consistently, yet differentially, found to be impacted on health and economic outcome
measures (Pendakur & Pendakur, 2011; Veenstra, 2011; Wu, Noh, Kaspar, & Schimmele, 2003),
disproportionately involved with foster care (Assembly of First Nations, 2008; Statistics Canada,
2011a), and underrepresented in political decision-making processes (Black & Erikson, 2006).
Given the rapidly growing diversity of children, youth, and families in Canada, spurred in part by
increasing immigration from outside Europe and high birth rates in Indigenous and racialized
minority groups (Statistics Canada, 2010, 2011b), attending to disparities in these populations is
an urgent CYC practice issue.
Traditional models of CYC that inform national curricula and practice standards are grounded in assumptions of individualism, meritocracy, objectivity, and cultural essentialism, and they do not adequately represent or respond to the realities and experiences of diverse Canadian populations (de Finney, Dean, Loiselle, & Saraceno, 2011; Yoon, 2012). Contemporary CYC must develop alternatives to individualizing, essentializing, and pathologizing approaches to care and elaborate strategies that address inequitable social realities (de Finney, Little, Skott-Myhre, & Gharabaghi, 2012; Gharabaghi & Krueger, 2010; Kivel, 2007). Tyyskä (2009) argues that rather than reducing the interplay of complex social and identity factors to single-issue approaches, a broad perspective inclusive of social, political, and economic features is necessary to prepare practitioners for contemporary practice. Research in CYC (e.g., de Finney, 2010; di Tomasso, 2012; Pacini-Ketchabaw, 2007) suggests that practice approaches that conceptualize and respond to differential experiences of inequity related to identity and sociocultural factors are important for improving practitioner responsiveness to Indigenous, racialized, visible minority, immigrant, and marginalized children and youth.

Although CYC has traditionally been committed to providing contextualized care through direct practice, there are significant gaps in current CYC models of practice. To better respond to Canada’s rapidly changing populations, CYC requires new models of practice that integrate research on sociocultural processes, inequity, and identity. This research has led me to question how CYC can better respond to today’s diverse child and youth populations by critically revising our foundational philosophies, questioning professional roles, and politicizing practice. Although Canada’s child and youth populations are heterogeneous and impacted differentially by sociocultural factors such as poverty, racism, globalization, and sexism, I argue that a praxis framework that premises these processes can advance our state of knowledge and practice.
significantly. The current leading model in CYC conjoins theory and practice in praxis and defines that praxis as self-aware and accountable action that responds to sociocultural, historical, and political contexts (White, 2007). While this model offers a language for research and training, it has yet to be (1) systematically linked to research on globalization and neoliberalism (Burnett, 2004), heterosexism (Morris, 2011), individualization (White, 2011), neocolonialism (de Finney, 2010), civic education (Claes, Hooghe, & Dietlind 2009), representation (Nxumalo, 2012), identity (Kouri, 2012), cultural hegemony (Saraceno, 2012), and/or revolution (Skott-Myhre, 2004, Skott-Myhre & Gretzinger, 2006); (2) consolidated with practitioner experiences of working with minoritized and marginalized youth; or (3) directly connected to practitioner training, curriculum, pedagogy, and practice standards. I propose that these next steps in the development of the CYC praxis model will provide the tools necessary to prepare practitioners for contemporary and projected CYC contexts. With the changing demographics of youth in Canada, it is urgent to prepare CYC practitioners with praxis training that includes intersectional analyses, anticolonial frameworks, and critical cross-cultural skills (Yoon, 2012).

**Politicized Praxis: Responding to Global Capitalism and Neocolonialism**

In light of Canada’s changing demographics and the growing scholarship calling for a more responsive, socially engaged approach to CYC, I explored what theoretical changes could facilitate the development of a politicized CYC praxis. I found that at least three important and interrelated conceptual dimensions could help develop the concept of the self toward a more politicized and socially engaged praxis in CYC: global capitalism and empire; neocolonialism, Indigenous sovereignty, and decolonization; and intersectionality, power, privilege, and oppression.
One participant in this research suggested that Hardt and Negri’s (2000, 2005, 2009) work on empire and multitude could help rethink the self in terms of a network premised on difference and the ability of heterogeneous groups to discover or produce a basis for communicating and acting together. Empire is a way of thinking about networks of power that keep the globe in perpetual war and reap the benefits through globalized capitalism. Simultaneously, as power, war, and capital are rethought by Hardt and Negri (2005, 2009) through a network and process ontology, the forms of common action and subjectivity that constitute that resistance are also reconceptualized. The replacement term for the subject in Hardt and Negri’s immanent framework is singularity. A singularity does not have an inside, but is contingently assembled by a network of forces and bodies that constitute it.

In a research conversation I had with Hans Skott-Myhre, the importance of theorizing global capitalism in CYC was explicated in terms of the types of relationships and goals we have in adult-youth interactions. He contrasted revolutionary relationships based on common liberatory aspirations to patriarchal adult-youth relationships aimed at the preparation of children and youth for work in a system that oppresses them. I therefore suggest developing and experimenting with relational pedagogies, politicized and liberatory praxis frameworks, and geophilosophical curricula to explore the capacities of educators and students for challenging the dominant status quo and to create new forms of resistance to global capitalism.

The second point that was brought up in this research was the importance of conceptualizing colonization, decolonization, and settler and Indigenous relations through multiple levels of self, curriculum and school, and land-based politics. Numerous research participants, as well as texts in the field, argue that CYC must recognize its embeddedness and implication in historical and ongoing colonization (e.g. de Finney, Little, Skott-Myhre, &
Gharabaghi, 2012; Loiselle, de Finney, Khanna, & Corcoran, 2012; Saraceno, 2012). In the research conversations I had, it was further explained to me that processes of decolonization could be enabled through a variety of approaches and on a number of levels. The points that stood out for me included decolonizing land, curriculum, ways of knowing, relationships, the self, identity-based politics, and solidarity. The strongest and most political argument that I heard regarding decolonization was a nonnegotiable call to repatriate Indigenous lands (Tuck & Yang, 2012). Although the call to repatriate lands was not directly spoken by many theorists in the CYC field, the call for conversations regarding land repatriation was, as were calls for understanding how to support students who are engaged in such projects.

Decolonization of curriculum was explained to me as a deconstruction of CYC theories and values steeped in colonization and Eurocentrism and advancing a curricular approach that values Indigenous knowledge and practices. Three participants adamantly explained that decolonizing SCYC specifically involves making education more accessible for Indigenous students. This means, for example, providing more supports for students, prioritizing Indigenous student learning and participation, and recognizing alternative ways of knowing and practicing. Practical steps for this form of decolonization include recognizing the diverse ways Indigenous students contribute to learning engagements through traditional knowledge and community- and land-based practices. There was an emphasis in this research regarding SCYC’s need to academically recognize and validate community and kinship work, oral traditions and knowledge, and diverse healing and cultural practices. It was also suggested that curriculum include images, histories, and accurate information provided by Indigenous people themselves rather than those of settler scholars and other academics.
In terms of pedagogy, there was a call for instructors and professors to learn to work with anger, resentment, shame, and guilt related to colonization. This was explained by one participant in terms of people in power understanding their own histories and implications in neocolonialism, and articulated by another participant as honouring the diverse reactions people have to conversations on colonization as part of their own healing. Lastly, decolonizing curriculum and pedagogy would also entail increasing the quantity of literature from Indigenous writers across the program, as well as engaging more Indigenous speakers, instructors, and media across the program rather than concentrating Indigenous material in specific courses.

Decolonization of the self was primarily elaborated in terms of understanding one’s own history, ancestry, and relationship to particular lands. This was a particularly important avenue of my research as I took the time to learn more about my familial history and how my family came to settle in North America through the transits of colonial empire (Byrd, 2011). One research participant indicated that it was important for her to understand the similarities and differences between the histories of the Indigenous Peoples of this land and her own people’s colonial history and struggles for independence. Making these colonial similarities and differences visible, and working through them, was indicated as one way for settlers to initiate anti-colonial Indigenous-settler relationships and work towards solidarity. One participant explained that solidarity meant coming from that place of deep respect for the stewardship and for Indigenous ways of knowing. Being very respectful about that, and understanding myself as a settler with Indigenous history from my own ancestral country, and being able to work in that kind of solidarity. So that is how I understand it now. So my job now is then to connect with other settlers and get them to understand those things.

During my research, I applied some of these teachings to my own life and found that it was useful for me to learn more about my own history and make some connections between the
wars that are currently being fought in Lebanon and the rest of the Middle East—which I now understand as being partially a product of colonial interventions there—and the Indigenous sovereignty movements in Canada. Gaining a more nuanced understanding of the similarities and differences between postcolonial states and settler colonial states, I believe, helped me to better understand the current Canadian context and begin to situate myself as an ally to Indigenous people and sovereignty movements. For example, I now recognize the importance of: acknowledging unceded Indigenous territory and settler colonialism; theorizing race, colonization, and power in concepts of the self and praxis; engaging with Indigenous scholarship; taking part in protests and making resurgence and resistance visible; and seeking knowledge and guidance from Indigenous people. Similar to one research participant, I also felt that being more knowledgeable about different yet shared colonial histories better prepared me to have conversations about colonization with Indigenous and settler people.

Another significant point made regarding decolonization was related to conceptualizing the self or identity in terms of power, privilege, discrimination and oppression. Intersectionality was proposed as one framework for theorizing identity as inextricably related to social processes, history, and power. Questions were raised, however, about the usefulness of relegating Indigeneity to only one axis in an intersectional framework as compared to centring Indigenous issues as primary in the conceptualizations and analyses of identity and politics. As an example of a decolonizing ethics related to using one’s power and privilege, one participant suggested prioritizing and making resources or options more available for Indigenous students and service recipients. This participant also explained that finding Indigenous people to complete academic or practice work, such as inviting Indigenous speakers to make presentations or seeking
Indigenous researchers to complete research projects related to Indigenous issues, was preferable than having non-Indigenous scholars and practitioners complete such work.

At a school or collegial level, decolonization was talked about in terms of the relationships between instructors, professors, and students. One participant looked toward an action-based future and a critical mass of people who wouldn’t have to continually be hashing out the same stuff. Like for example, that decolonization is a part of our mission, personal and curriculum and training and the field, you know. So as opposed to being a theoretical idea, so sort of an embodied idea.

Another participant spoke about faculty and instructors at the school supporting one another through personal suffering and healing by co-teaching, compassion, and care. The simpler issue of being aware and supportive of one another’s work was also referenced. Through this research, I found that becoming more knowledgeable about my colleagues’ and teachers’ works was invaluable for building relationships and solidarity. Simultaneously, becoming familiar with writers and thinkers in the field at a more embodied and personal level helped me to position myself within current debates. It was through the theoretical, as well as affective, embodied, and personal relationships that I have come to understand decolonization, particularly as it intersects with neoliberalism, as the most important issue for a politicized CYC praxis to explicitly address.

Future of the Field: CYC-to-Come

Although I have argued that a politicized praxis framework which premises social processes, Indigeneity and decolonization, current Canadian demographics, anti-capitalism, and revolutionary subjectivities is important to prepare practitioners for contemporary and future CYC contexts, I have also proposed a more open-ended, rhizomatic, and continentally assembled approach to curriculum and pedagogy. This productive tension between situated and rhizomatic engagements has led me to believe that stable or final understandings of identity, context,
relationships, community, practice, and CYC more generally may enhance or limit relational capacities both within our community and in relation to those outside our community or engaged with us. The question of who we are as individuals or a field, and the similar question we ask of others, I argue, needs to be perpetually asked and extended indefinitely into the future to avoid foreclosures. Conversely, however, I also argue that the recognitions, acknowledgements, and consistency of relationships that allow for sharing, dignity, depth, safety, and building trust and congruence are all invaluable aspects of relational work. In this sense, I have proposed an ethics of hospitality (Derrida, 2000), a relational pedagogy, and a conceptual approach of geophilosophy (Deleuze & Guattari, 2003) as both the impossible gestures of a community that can never fully know itself and a stance that is always to come, more than human, and open to the future.
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(Originally published 1984)


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Appendix A

Eight Classic Types of Jungian Psychology

(Beebe, 2006; Hillman, 1971; Jung, 1921; Sharp, 1987; Von Franz, 1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior Introverted Intuition/Inferior Extraverted Sensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Connects to the background processes of the unconscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Raises unconscious material to the level of things</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Responsible for visionary experiences and considered mystical or flakey to others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mystical day-dreamer and is seen as the most useless of people by rational types</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct awareness of archetypes as images and the slow processes of the unconscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Artists, poets, prophets, shamans, and visionaries are extreme examples of introverted intuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Difficulties noticing personal bodily needs and managing appetites and habits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vagueness related to factual data and the external situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sensations are either completely lacking or overtake consciousness with great intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Trouble approaching sex as there is little attention to body of subject or other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior Introverted Thinking/Inferior Extraverted Feeling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Psychic energy moves from the objects/others of the outside world to the thoughts of subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Thinking continues unabated by external conventions or ideas of appropriateness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Difficult to articulate thinking as it is perpetually being refined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concern with the logical process of the mind, thinking, ideas and theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Full of extreme judgments for external objects: love/hate, good/bad, wonderful/terrible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Valuing of external things is undeveloped yet spread everywhere and is oppressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Where there is love there is no thinking</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior Introverted Feeling/Inferior Extraverted Thinking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Relates to the archetypal image of a situation. Strives after inner intensity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Slow, internal and careful assessment of things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Still waters run deep” (Jung, 1921).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Silent and hard to understand. Motives are well hidden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Internalized scale of values with significant affect to the subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Silent loyalty and positive secret influence on surroundings. Ethical backbone of a group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interested in many outward facts and is easily overwhelmed by the material: intellectual monomania. Tendency to stiff and unyielding thinking about objects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Superior Introverted Sensation/Inferior Extraverted Intuition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• An orientation to internal bodily sensations caused by an external object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The sensed object, although highly important, takes second place to the sensing subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Subjective content intervenes in the from the unconscious to intercept the effect of the object</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concrete and focused on the present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Can sit and stare endlessly as sense perceptions are absorbed subjectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Future possibilities do not exist unless in collective and prophetic (usually negative) forms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Superior Extraverted Intuition/ Inferior Introverted Sensation
- Completely engaged with the possibility of objects/others to the neglect of the persons own life
- Can intuit the unforeseen possibilities, potentialities, and backgrounds of situations and objects
- Entrepreneurial, can sense creativity, forward looking, and in-advance
- Realize the possibilities of others and miss out on themselves
- Slow, unpunctual and rarely reaps from the far off vision. Does not wait long enough
- Does not tend to physicality and misses outer appearances
- Can be exaggeratedly focused on fitness and health fads
- Always jumping to something new
- As visions become reality they lack energy and new visions are needed
- Lack of judgment, callous, exploitative.

### Superior Extraverted Thinking/Inferior Introverted Feeling
- Enamored of established ideas and neglecting of fresh thinking
- Subordinated to formula, rules, and principles
- Elevates an intellectual formula for all people. Universal applicability of ideas
- Compilers of encyclopedias and clarifiers of external situations
- Start with the basic facts and stay with the objective situation rather than the idea behind them
- Lack of connection with subjective ideals, values and meanings
- Overly idealized mystical attachment to them to meaning
- Can organize all of outward life but lacks in the ability to connect with the subjective meaning
- The values of life remain strong and unconscious with the subject
- Strong, invisible and unrecognized loyalities.
- Can become overwhelmed with value-based material, especially near death
- Intellectual consideration precedes action

### Superior Extraverted Feeling/Inferior Introverted Thinking
- Adjusted to external conditions such as the emotions, values and prejudices of others and society
- Highly capable of relationship, appreciation and sympathy.
- Make friends easily with little illusion and clear evaluation of people.
- Can easily get what they want
- Makes others feel accepted and wonderful.
- Often sacrifice themselves for others, always finds the value of what needs to be done
- Dislike for philosophical thinking and abstraction, yet can be unaware of it.
- Engages outwardly with unconscious, cynical, negative thinking
- Adapts to a system of thought without working out an individual standpoint
- focuses negative thoughts internally and negate personal worth

### Superior Extraverted Sensation/Inferior Introverted Intuition
- Seeks the accumulation of experiences of concrete objects
- Riveted on external reality to the loss of other experiences
- Fashion conscious, well organized, prompt, and attentive to the details of life
- Love is attached to the attraction via sense impression of the loved
- Sense and relate in a concrete and practical way to outer objects
- Relates anything approaching the intuitive as mystical or mad.
- Experiences dark fears of personal illness or misfortune. Negative self-depreciative attitude.
- Naive attachment to religious movements
Appendix B

Jungian Dream Interpretation Process (Betts, 2007; Hall, 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preparation/Sleep Hygiene</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Prepare dream journal, pen, light, other recording devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Be aware of effects of food, exercise, drugs, alcohol/caffeine movies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prompt or remind the ego that a dream will be recorded upon awakening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Journal conscious attitude: activities, concerns, affects, relationships, anxiety of the previous days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Note the context of the waking life experience at the time of the dream</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Report/Record the Dream</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Repeat dream in half-conscious state of waking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Immediately write/record the dream upon waking: completely and with detail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Do not edit, correct or make sense of anything: include numbers, nonsensical words, symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sketch, paint or artistically represent images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Note the narrative or dramatic structure: problem, development, crisis, conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Note the affect and emotion while in the dream and the emotional state upon waking/recording</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Associative Process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Record personal facts, thoughts, memories, feelings related to images and figures in the dream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Freely associate to the dream starting with the recent, near and personal and moving outwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Spontaneously link ideas, perceptions, images, fantasies, themes, memories, and affect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Associate to the dream as a whole (connect to conscious attitude) and to individual symbols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The symbol is never something known: maintain a tension between known and unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amplification</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Amplify dream symbols and activities with cultural/historical/mythological/universal parallels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Thematic/narrative/metaphorical amplification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Avoid over-intellectualization and inflation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Enables differing but simultaneous perspectives/interpretations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective and Objective Levels</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- How does the dream relate to real world circumstances: is the dream realistic and accurate to facts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Objective approach associates images and symbols to external circumstances and people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Subjective approach relates dream content to intrapsychic structures: comments on unconscious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dream interpretation can suggest changes at either intrapsychic (subjective) or objective levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reductive and Prospective Lens</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Reductive lens traces current situation to origins in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prospective lens is teleological: what is the dream moving the dreamer towards, goal directed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Dreams can suggest reductive or synthetic approach to the analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Synthetic approach to establish personal uniqueness of dream imagery within universal patterns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation/Position of Dream Ego</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Structural shifts / borders and boundaries in dreams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Relational and identity structures: persona, anima/animus, shadow, ego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Self-ego axis: mandalas, voice of god, numinous symbols, flying saucer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Complex in Dream Content and Associations
- Complex: emotionally related group of ideas and images bonded by affect and archetypal core
- Ego can become overwhelmed by a complex: affect laden, modified sense of reality and identity
- Affect-ego state is characteristic of most dreams: attention to emotional tone/response of ego
- Relationship between dream-ego’s affect and the dramatics/changes in the dream

### Compensation
- What ego stance are the dream contents, associations, solution and affect compensating for
- What conscious attitudes, behaviours or relationships is the dream related to

### Dream Solution
- What is the relationship between the beginning and end of the dream
- What solution does the dream offer to the problem it presented

### Bringing it Together
- What interconnections are there among amplifications, associations, content and dream ego
- What interconnections are there between dream material and conscious attitude
- What is the story of the dream with amplified material and compensatory information

### Dreams Over Time / Dream Series / Themes
- How are dream series/themes approximating or diverging from outer situation
- Progressive differentiation of dream figures / images /symbols
- Repetitive and recurrent dreams
- What are the themes, patterns or processes occurring in dreams over time

### Transference / Countertransference
- Dreams of the analyst
- Involvement of the analyst’s unconscious factors

### Active Imagination
- Engagement with dream content/figures/images/symbols/affect in conscious life
- Dreaming the dream forward with imagination techniques
- Art and artistic representation and engagement with the dream

### Dreams are Alive and Unknown
- Dream interpretations are never final or exhausted
- Avoid assumptions regarding interpretive approach: approach every dream anew
- Avoid semiotic approach: no dream dictionaries
- Don’t thrash a dream: allow for an element of the unknown to remain with the dream
- Carry dream around, turn it over and over, look at it from every possible angle

### Meaning and Validity
- Dream interpretations propose a new or adjusted conscious attitude
- New attitude can reflect changes at an objective (outer) or subjective (intrapsychic) level
- Dream interpretations are hypothetical and tentative
- Dreamer owns the dream: if the dream interpretation does not fit for the dreamer it is revised
- How do subsequent events and dreams support, revise or invalidate the interpretation