Unarmed and Participatory:
Palestinian Popular Struggle and Civil Resistance Theory

by

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M.A., University of Regina, 2008
B.A., University of Regina, 2003

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Abstract

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This dissertation advances the literature on civil resistance by proposing an alternative way of thinking about action and organization, and by contributing a new case study of Palestinian struggle in the occupied West Bank.

Civil resistance, also known as civil disobedience, nonviolent action, and people power, is about challenging unjust and oppressive regimes through the strategic use of nonviolent methods, including demonstrations, marches, boycotts, strikes, sit-ins, protest camps, and many others (Sharp 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Schock 2015). This study employs an approach that minimizes analytical (as well as normative) expectations of perfectly nonviolent forms of struggle (Celikates 2015), and I link this modified pragmatic action model to an organizational principle that has generally been overlooked or discounted in the research literature. On the whole, civil-resistance studies has focused on forms of action to the detriment of exploring forms of organization, or has relegated organization to a subset of action. My research clarifies a participatory approach to organization that is community based, sometimes known as the committee or council system (Arendt 1963). It is radically democratic, yet not necessarily confined to purely horizontal forms of organization. Rather, the model allows, and requires with increasing scale, upward delegation to decision-making and other task-contingent bodies. I argue that without a theoretical framework for apprehending systems of networked and tiered popular governance, Palestinian civil resistance has been insufficiently understood. The dissertation examines Palestinian cases through this framework, linking the conjunction of unarmed action and participatory organization to highpoints of Palestinian struggle.
Among the cases is a small civil-society movement in the West Bank that began around 2009 striving to launch a global popular resistance.

My research suggests that civil-resistance theorists consider the non-dominative element of organization as they do the non-dominative element of action, that just as violent resistance strategies can counter the logic of people power, so too can centralized organization. This logic does not require that participatory organization be perfectly horizontal any more than civil resistance must be perfectly nonviolent.
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Perhaps most of all, this research is indebted to the ongoing support of my parents – thank you Mom and Dad.

And last but not least, the dissertation is the product of the boundless love and patience of my darling Zoë Seigel.
Dedication

To my life, my beloved Zoë
And to you again, Dad and Mom

For Palestine
And popular struggle everywhere
Introduction

*What was taken by force can only be restored by force.*

—Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, after losing territory to Israel in the 1967 war and common saying in the West Bank

*We know about another power, the power of the people, the power of nonviolent resistance. This is, I think, more than the power of the weapons.*

—Palestinian activist from village of Bil’in, West Bank
Popular Committee to Resist the Wall and Settlements,
BCC interview (2014)

0.1 A Puzzle

Listening to Palestinians speak about their struggle, I often heard variations on the old adage attributed to Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, “what was taken by force can only be restored by force,” including from some activists who also advocate nonviolent methods of resistance. This is not surprising, as Palestinians have ample reason to believe in the power of violence, since most of the population was displaced in the war of 1948 and forcibly barred from returning by the new Israeli state, and since the remaining pockets of Palestinian territory came under Israeli military and colonial occupation by force in 1967. It was not law, democracy, nonviolent action, or civil resistance that effectively wiped Palestine off the map and continues to deny its people basic rights and freedoms. It was violence, sheer force. And therefore, or so the saying goes, *only* force can restore what was lost. This logic informs the Palestinian Liberation Organization’s post-1967 amendment to its charter, stipulating that “armed struggle” was not only necessary but also “the only way to liberate Palestine.”

The same view is found in the works of French-Algerian author and dissident Frantz Fanon, writing, for example,

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that colonialism “will only yield when confronted with greater violence.”

This is not to suggest that Arabs are in any way exceptional for their confidence in violence as a necessary reality of world politics (or that such views are uncontested), because the same abound in Western traditions of political thought, from antiquity through modernity. Such canonical thinkers as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Max Weber, Kenneth Waltz, and many others, have upheld the dominant discourse that ‘might makes right’ (meaning that force of arms is often necessary for order, justice, or security) in schools of political thought variously known as realism, raison d’état, realpolitik, and international relations. More analogously to Arab struggle, Western discourses of resistance have also often explicitly maintained the necessity of military force, from John Locke’s right of rebellion against tyranny, to Vladimir Lenin’s armed vanguard against capitalism, to American dissidents and critics of nonviolence, such as Malcolm X and Ward Churchill. This basic view, that war is the ultimate decider and means of last resort, is not limited to so-called realist and radical schools of thought, as prominent thinkers from other schools of thought, including liberalism and communitarianism, have also expressed it.

Confounding this convention, though often escaping notice, some of the most

3 For example, “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,” Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. by R. Crawly (Mineola: Dover, 2004) p. 269; “[w]ar cannot be avoided, but can only be put off to the advantage of others [...] A prince, therefore, must not have any other object nor any other thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war, its institutions, and its discipline; because that is the only art befitting one who commands,” N. Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. by P. Bondanella (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 12, 50; “covenants, without the sword, are but words,” T. Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by J. Gaskin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 111; “[t]he decisive means of politics is the use of violence,” M. Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” in P. Lassman and R. Speirs (eds) Weber: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 360; “[a]lthough in one of its aspects war is a means of adjustment within the international system, the occurrence of war is often mistakenly taken to indicate that the system itself has broken down,” K. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 195-196.
effective phases of Palestinian struggle against Israeli oppression have not been armed but unarmed and primarily nonviolent. This dissertation examines cases of Palestinian popular resistance that have gained ground—sometimes literally, sometimes figuratively—against Israel. First and foremost, many scholars and activists agree that the unarmed uprising of the late 1980s, known as the First Intifada, mounted the strongest offensive to date against the occupation; the mass movement did not bring freedom, but it generated conditions for change, put the Palestinian struggle high on the international agenda, and leveraged enough pressure to impel Israel to seek accommodation, leading to an unprecedented process of negotiations with the Palestinian leadership. Second, in the early 2000s, amidst one of the most violent phases of the conflict—the Second Intifada—pockets of civil resistance effectively defended or reclaimed land that had been threatened or lost behind an Israeli-constructed separation barrier in the West Bank; these achievements were few and relatively small in scale, but clear victories that cut across the grain of stale-mate, setback, and defeat, that more often characterize Palestinian struggle. Third, since 2009, groups involved in the anti-wall movement expanded into an anti-occupation movement, and though its results are mixed and limited, it has been at the forefront of resistance in the West Bank for several years, assailing the legitimacy of the Israeli occupation and building up global networks of solidarity. In contrast, few if any armed movements or campaigns in the occupied territories, and none in the West Bank,

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6 Given the long and typically losing struggle against the occupation, moments of Palestinian ‘achievement,’ ‘effectiveness,’ or ‘success,’ can be defined as some combination of: advancing or attaining specific and stated goals; increasing international and domestic pressure on Israel in favor of Palestinian rights; and bolstering networks of solidarity and support, locally and globally. There is no absolute criteria for success in terms of movement outcomes; rather, effectiveness is evaluated in context, in relative terms, and is often partial.


can claim superior or even comparable results.\textsuperscript{10} This poses a puzzle. If only armed force can counter armed force, as is customary wisdom, then how is it that many of the most effective cases of Palestinian struggle have been unarmed?

0.2 Overview: Unarmed Action and Participatory Organization

To resolve this puzzle, I apply civil-resistance theory to the Palestinian case and contend that two interrelated aspects of Palestinian struggle have enhanced its effectiveness: unarmed methods and participatory organization. This framework combines action and organization as two distinct but overlaid dimensions of Palestinian struggle, variables with attributes of unarmed and participatory respectively, as distinct from their contraries, militarized and top down. This is not to suggest that either axis is a simple binary—i.e., either armed/unarmed or participatory/not-participatory. Rather they are spectrums of degree, often with gray zones and competing tendencies that must be assessed in context for predominant characteristics. With this proposed conceptual model, I offer an original interpretation of the relative gains and shortcomings of Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation over decades. According to my case studies (Chapters 3-6), the qualities of unarmed action and participatory organization complement each other in Palestinian struggle, combining in relatively effective movements. Lacking one or both attributes (unarmed, participatory), resistance has been less effective, as evidenced especially in the period of centralization and militarized struggle between the mid1990s and mid2000s, and also in the contemporary popular resistance, as the participatory bases of the movement have eroded and the movement’s momentum stalled. This is an unconventional interpretation; civil resistance remains an

\textsuperscript{10} The Gaza Strip may offer counter examples. Many Palestinians credit sustained armed resistance with the Israeli decision to withdraw its settlements from the Gaza Strip in 2005, although historians point to a range of calculated reasons: C. Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents} (Boston: Bedford, 2010), p. 506. More recently, Gazan armed resistance inflicted significant cost on the Israeli army as it invaded the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014: “[w]ith more than fifty soldiers dead, a price no one in Israel expected to pay for attacking Gaza, even the country’s top leaders appear weary,” A. Abunimah, “Daring and Lethal Palestinian Raids from Gaza Sap Israeli Morale,” \textit{Electronic Intifada} (July 30, 2014). The occupied Palestinian territories offer no other candidates for cases of effective armed struggle.
underutilized framework in conflict studies (though this has been changing\textsuperscript{11}), and, I argue, the idea of participatory organization is much less well understood than the idea of nonviolent or unarmed action. The literature has tended to overlook or discount participatory structures, in part, I suggest, because pervasive orthodoxies of political thought have privileged centralization in organization no less, or perhaps more so, than they have privileged violence in conflict.

The following paragraphs summarize the action/organization model applied in this dissertation, beginning with the action component. Unarmed action refers to a range of resistance methods undertaken by individuals or groups to challenge perceived injustice or oppression. Common methods include protests, marches, demonstrations, boycotts, work strikes, student strikes, tax strikes, sit-ins, ride-ins, human barricades, among many others. Such methods are not limited or confined to conventional institutions, legal frameworks, or constitutional procedures; indeed, these are often presupposed to be lacking or insufficient before extra-institutional, extra-legal, and extra-constitutional methods of action are deemed necessary. As the term implies, however, violence and military force are generally excluded from the purview of unarmed action. It is predominantly nonviolent, though not necessarily perfectly nonviolent. This means that practitioners need not adhere to moral philosophies of nonviolence or pacifism in order to adopt unarmed strategies. This also means that unarmed strategies of action may sometimes coexist with relatively minor acts of violence, including vandalism, property destruction, and even isolated physical attacks, if these deviations are exceptional or comparatively miniscule. Sometimes, though, unarmed action can incorporate (not merely tolerate) relatively minor acts of violence, such as damaging oppressive infrastructure or throwing stones at military forces, as argued below and in Chapter 1 and the later case chapters.

Conventionally, the primary analytical concept of civil-resistance studies is nonviolent action, also known as nonviolent resistance, civil disobedience, political defiance, or people power. The research field examines how groups and movements can challenge, reform, and sometimes overturn oppressive regimes without resorting to the

\textsuperscript{11} As discussed in Ch. 1, civil-resistance studies is burgeoning, including in American political science and international relations.
force of arms. Exemplary cases include the American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s; social-democratic resistance in Eastern Europe against Communist regimes in the 1980s; the ‘colour revolutions’ of the 2000s, including in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Lebanon, which toppled unpopular and autocratic governments; and, similarly, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of 2010-2011. Civil resistance can be effective against oppression, not because oppressors are emotionally or morally moved by nonviolence (though sometimes they may be), but because it can undermine, sever, or appropriate a regime’s social sources of power (political, economic, and cultural).

Research has also linked nonviolent strategies to increased participation rates, in comparison to armed strategies that tend to raise barriers to participation, and higher participation rates have been linked to more successful outcomes. These ideas are established in the literature on civil resistance, and they have been applied to Palestinian experience, but they remain less well understood outside the discipline and among the general public. The dissertation shows that the basic claims of civil-resistance theory provide a coherent framework for understanding the strengths and weaknesses Palestinian struggle. In some important ways, though, I show that the Palestinian case ‘speaks back,’ highlighting limits of civil-resistance theory.

One way that Palestinian struggle challenges theories of nonviolent action is through the regular practice of relatively minor acts of violence in defiance of the occupation. The pervasiveness of youth throwing stones at Israeli soldiers, even in the midst of ‘nonviolent’ resistance campaigns, has led many civil-resistance analysts to admonish Palestinian demonstrators for not being “nonviolent enough.” However, I argue that such assessments misread the conditions, even misapply the basic tenets of strategic civil-resistance theory. Stone-throwing has not been a demerit to Palestinian practices of civil resistance, but often an integral component. Dynamics on the ground suggest that civil-resistance theorists should consider an unconventional strand of the

12 See next chapter for elaboration and sources.
15 For example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), pp. 119-146; Norman (2010); King (2007); Dajani (1994); A. Rigby, Living the Intifada (London: Zed, 1991); see below, Chs. 3, 4, 5.
16 Rigby (1991), p. 1; as discussed in the next chapter.
theory, one that diminishes the utility of labeling resistance action as violent or nonviolent and instead understands the limits of civil resistance to potentially extend to the line between militarized and non-militarized strategies, that is, armed or unarmed. By learning from the Palestinian experience, interpreting rather than discounting all stone throwing, civil-resistance theory can offer a more comprehensive framework for engaging with Palestinian popular resistance, not as nonviolent struggle (though much of it is), but, more consistently, as unarmèd struggle. Chapter 1 elaborates these theoretical conceptualizations of action.

Organization is a second aspect of civil-resistance theory that offers insight into Palestinian popular struggle. Compared to the foundational emphasis on action, the role and quality of organization has been relatively marginal in civil resistance studies. What structures of decision-making processes, for example, are conducive to civil resistance? What is the relationship between organization and resistance? Studies have advanced a variety of answers, though typically in isolation from each other, sometimes mutually contradicting, and generally without debate or sustained discussion. Some claim that civil resistance benefits from command hierarchies with a monopolization of leadership capacity and enforcement mechanisms (e.g., Robert Helvey, Wendy Pearlman). Other thinkers have associated a quite different, and in some ways inverted, formulation of organization with effective civil resistance: less formal, decentralized to the community level, directly democratic, and bottom up (e.g., Hannah Arendt, Gene Sharp, Mary King). I use the term ‘participatory’ to describe this latter set of qualities. The participatory model is less conventional, often associated with social movements, and relatively small units of organization, such as town halls, neighborhood assemblies, committees, and councils, sometimes also associated with the revolutionary climates of America (1760s-1770s), Russia (1900s-1910s), Hungary (1950s) and Czechoslovakia (1960s). To this list could be added the Palestinian First Intifada (late 1980s to early 1990s). The organization of the Palestinian masses at that time was participatory, and in later periods, after 2000, Palestinian movements have often emulated the popular-

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17 These authors and the contending views are elaborated in Ch. 2.
committee model of First Intifada.\textsuperscript{18} This argument does not suggest that participatory organization is exclusive to nonviolent movements: armed insurgencies have also developed within participatory structures.\textsuperscript{19}

Nor is participatory organization limited to purely horizontal forms. The term horizontal implies lateral or egalitarian relations, a lack of hierarchal or coercive structures (vertical). Many activists with new social movements, such as Occupy Wall Street, have often eschewed all vertically in leadership and decision making as a matter of principle, insisting on complete consensus in assembly-based decision making.\textsuperscript{20} Variants of the participatory model, however, permit vertical structure in the form of tiered committees, ascending (rather than descending) levels of decision making, each constituted by democratic delegation from below, not in permanent structures but on a contingent basis, defined by the continued active participation of each implicated community and group. Participatory verticality is not defined by top-down command and control, but by bottom-up, organic, cooperative, and radically democratic coordination. It is horizontal \textit{and} may also include vertical elements, bottom heavy as opposed to top heavy, participatory as opposed to coercive. The question of organizational form, in the context of civil-resistance theory and the Palestinian case literature, is the subject of Chapter 2.

The alignment of unarmed action and participatory organization appears to have served Palestinian struggle (not enough to end the occupation, but more than other action/organization alignments over the same period). The complementarity is especially evident in the mass uprising of the late 1980s, which was non-militarized, radically democratic, and the nearest Palestinians have come to ending the Israeli occupation (Chapter 3). Years later, the villages that effectively resisted Israel’s separation barrier were avowedly nonviolent and led by directly democratic popular committees; in the

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{18} Palestinian participatory organization is elaborated in the case chapters (Chs. 3-6).
\textsuperscript{19} For example, the Chiapas movement in Mexico and the Kurdish community of Rojava in northern Syria are both known to combine practices of armed struggle with participatory governance (examination of such cases is beyond the scope of this study).
\textsuperscript{20} For example, C. Dixon, \textit{Another Politics: Talking Across Today’s Transformative Movements} (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014); A. Wilding, R. Smith, R. Gunn, “Alternative horizons–Understanding Occupy’s Politics,” \textit{openDemocracy} (Dec. 6, 2013); M. Castells, \textit{Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age} (Cambridge: Polity, 2012). These sources are quoted in Ch. 2.
midst of the bloody Second Intifada, they set examples of effective resistance against the occupation (Chapter 4). In the last several years, the committees’ efforts to grow their unarmed movement across the West Bank have been hampered, I argue, by centralizing pressures within and in opposition to the nonviolent movement (Chapters 5, 6). In short, the combined framework of unarmed and participatory helps explain the strength of the First Intifada on a mass scale, the strength of some of the villages in the anti-wall movement, and the limitations of the more recent anti-occupation movement.

The dissertation considers a number of explanations for the positive correlation between unarmed action, participatory organization, and relatively effective Palestinian resistance. First of all, according to the theory, participation is a movement’s greatest currency, and both unarmed action and participatory organization are conducive to increasing levels of participation, in different but related ways. I suggest that the openness of the governance structure presents fewer obstacles to participation than externally imposed structures, analogous to unarmed methods posing fewer barriers to participation than armed methods. Unarmed strategies are better suited to open and decentralized structures than armed strategies, because militarization requires supply lines and management of finite and vital technology, whereas nonviolent ‘weapons’ are virtually limitlessly available to all—a democratic weapon for a democratic movement. The synergy between action and organization may relate to the shared quality of non-domination, non-domination of agency (unarmed action) and non-domination in structure (participatory organization). Theoretical explanations of the action/organization relation are preliminary, mostly explored in Chapter 2, suggested throughout the body of the dissertation, and summarized and elaborated in the Conclusion.

0.3 Historical Background of Palestinian Resistance

The purpose of this section is to establish the basic historical and political background of the case studies, and to explain the underlying grievances that motivate Palestinian struggle. The conflict dates back to the aftermath of Britain’s 1917 Balfour

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21 Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
Declaration, an imperial policy statement that pledged support for “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” The Zionist commitment was incorporated into the legal regime of the British Mandate of Palestine, ratified by the League of Nations in 1922. The policy was controversial because Jews constituted only a small portion of the land’s population, and because seemingly contradictory assurances had been given to Arab leaders during the war that an Allied victory over the Ottomans would result in political independence for aspiring Arab nations.

Throughout nearly three decades of the Mandate period, British support and facilitation of Jewish immigration oscillated from permissive to restrained, usually tacking the political climate in the country: in moments of tension, crisis, or conflict, the colonial rulers downplayed the significance of the Balfour Declaration, restricted the influx of European Jewry, and sounded conciliatory tones with the agitated local population, while at other times were more receptive to Zionist pressures. From World War I to the eve of the World War II, the Jewish population of Palestine grew dramatically, mostly due to European migration. Palestinian Arab protest included a mixture of violent and nonviolent action. Violence flared up in 1921, 1929, and 1936-39, though nonviolent action was also common, including “formal statements, declarations, petitions, manifestos, assemblies, delegations, processions, marches, and motorcades.”

The most prominent Palestinian political leader of the interwar period, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al Husseini, was not ideologically opposed to violent resistance, but

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23 “His Majesty’s government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country,” quoted in Smith (2010), p. 97.


26 From 1914 to 1947, the Jewish percentage of Palestine’s population rose from about 12% (approximately 87,000 out of 677,000) to about 35% (approximately 650,000 out of 1.8 million), Lesch (2008), pp. 7, 138.

27 King (2007), p. 32.
“for the better part of the 1920s he advocated and employed rudimentary nonviolent sanctions.”\textsuperscript{28} Jewish immigration and tensions increased until finally igniting in the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, which began as an unarmed grassroots movement before escalating into an armed conflict.\textsuperscript{29} Setting precedent for the future, local committees were established early in the revolt to coordinate action,\textsuperscript{30} which included a general strike in 1936 that lasted six months, making it one of the longest in modern history.\textsuperscript{31} By the time the revolt was finally crushed in 1939 with British military forces, several thousand Arab Palestinians were dead, plus several hundred Jews and British soldiers. It was by far the most violent phase of the conflict up to that point.

The Western image of the Palestinian Arabs was tarnished because their leadership had allied itself with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Inversely, the Jewish national cause of Zionism surged as the horrors of the Holocaust became clear. In the second half of the 1940s, much of the world supported the call for the establishment of a Jewish state, and hundreds of thousands of European Holocaust survivors set their sights on their ancient biblical homeland. Britain, diminished by the war and viewed as an obstacle by the Jewish community and as an enemy by the Palestinian community, shrugged the problem off to the fledgling United Nations. In September 1947, the UN General Assembly voted in favour of a two-state partition plan in which the Jewish third of the population was to receive just over half the country (55\%), and the Arab two thirds of the population were allotted just under half (44\%) (and Jerusalem (1\%) was to remain neutral and international).\textsuperscript{32} The Arab leadership was indignant and refused to accept the premise of partition, which was widely perceived as a colonial scheme against the Arab world.

\textsuperscript{28} King (2007), p. 32; see also pp. 33-37.
\textsuperscript{32} “In Depth: UN Partition Plan,” BBC News (Nov. 29, 2001); UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Nov. 29, 1947); Bickerton and Klausner (2005), p. 87.
The Arabs, however, were not in a position to compete with the heavily armed Jewish militias or their governance institutions, many of which had been facilitated or bequeathed by the British regime. Moreover, the Arabs had never really recovered from the harsh suppression of their 1936-39 uprising. Thus, on the heals of the dead-letter partition plan, the war of 1948 became Israel’s War of Independence, an embarrassing rout for neighboring Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, and the Palestinian nakba, or ‘catastrophe.’ During the fighting, between 700,000 and 800,000 Palestinians, close to two thirds of the population, were expelled or fled from their homes and country and barred from returning. Between four and five hundred Palestinian towns and villages in the territory that became Israel were erased, either demolished, planted over, or renamed and re-appropriated. Israel’s borders were recognized by the international community along the 1949 armistice lines, affirming the new state on 78% of historic Palestine, and pushing most of the Palestinians into the remaining 22%, which became known as the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and also into neighboring countries, where many refugees (now several million) continue to live and languish as stateless people.  

Palestinian society was decimated, traumatized, and the only hope for reversing the creation of Israel shifted to the neighboring independent Arab states and their professional militaries. The fate of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, controlled by neighboring Jordan and Egypt respectively, and of the refugees across the region, quickly became entangled in the unstable politics of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. From the 1950s on, the Arab states fought several wars with Israel. During the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel conquered and occupied the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including East Jerusalem, along with the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. In response to this humiliating Arab defeat, the young Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) intensified its commitment to violence by amending its constitution to stipulate that “[a]rmed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine.”

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36 As cited in note 1 above.
Israel and the occupied territories, the PLO waged guerrilla war against Israel and Israeli interests across the region.\(^{37}\) For more than two decades, however, the PLO’s ‘only way’ failed to deliver results, never significantly challenging the Israeli state or its occupation of Palestinian territories. Exacerbating tensions, in the 1970s, in contravention to international law, the Israeli government escalated a program of transferring its own population into the occupied territories, into new and subsidized ‘settlements,’ which soon became thriving Israeli towns and cities, on the hilltops above the dispossessed.

The stage is set for the first of three major case studies of Palestinian popular resistance, the First Intifada, which erupted unplanned and unexpected in the occupied territories in December 1987. The mass uprising, along with subsequent cases of Palestinian struggle and the requisite historical developments, are elaborated in the case chapters, Chapters 3-6 (and summarized below). In brief, the First Intifada was unarmed and participatory, and it prompted an unprecedented peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, under the auspices of the Oslo Accords, legitimizing the PLO and allowing it to partially self-govern in portions of the occupied territories through the newly created governance body of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). However, these arrangements did not amount to independence or self-determination, did not end the occupation, and did not stop the expanding Israeli settlements on Palestinian land.

Over many years, going back to the mid-to-late 1980s, the lack of substantive progress on the ground contributed to the rise of more radical Islamist parties, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, as well as more militant wings of the secular parties. With the peace process increasingly resembling a façade for perpetual occupation and dispossession, despair erupted into the Second Intifada (2000-2005), an armed uprising and the most deadly phase of the conflict to date, marked by extensive suicide bombings and military operations. After the armed conflict subsided, prospects of a coherent Palestinian movement were set back by a cleavage that further estranged the two major Palestinian factions, Fatah and Hamas, which came to blows in 2007 and left Hamas in control of Gaza and Fatah in control of the West Bank and the internationally recognized PA.

Hamas is often portrayed as a rejectionist, Iran-backed, Islamist party, and Israel has maintained a ruthless blockade on the coastal enclave ever since Hamas took control. Meanwhile, the PA in the West Bank is often portrayed as a collaborationist regime, subservient to Israeli and U.S. interests. Also during this period, and beginning in 2002, Israel was constructing a separation barrier throughout the West Bank, which became the catalyst for my subsequent case studies—the new popular committees. More historical detail from the period of the First Intifada through contemporary movements in the West Bank is elaborated throughout the case chapters.

0.4 Methodology

This section summarizes the dissertation’s methodology, considering: (a) its research philosophy, including ethical position and theoretical approach; (b) case design, selection, and exclusions; (c) fieldwork methods, including participant-observation, interviews, and questionnaires; and (d) exclusions

(a) Research philosophy

I start from an ethical position grounded in critical concerns of social justice, postcolonialism, and global citizenship. As a white male born into relative privilege in Canada, a country founded on colonial dispossession, and whose recent governments have promoted anti-Palestinian policy domestically and internationally, I embody a position of privilege and responsibility toward Palestinians. More than two million people in the West Bank lack the most basic human rights, including to movement, judicial process, and political representation (and those in the besieged Gaza Strip have it

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38 For example, the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper consistently voted against UN General Assembly resolutions supportive of Palestinian statehood (which were supported by virtually every other member nation), and took steps to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel in occupied Jerusalem (an internationally unprecedented step): C. Clark, “Baird Underlines Israel Support with Controversial East Jerusalem Visit,” Globe and Mail (Apr. 11, 2013), and under Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, the Parliament of Canada formally condemned a nonviolent Palestinian initiative, the international Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions campaign against Israel, which calls for the implementation of international law in respect of Palestinian rights: “Canadian Parliament Overwhelmingly Passes Anti-BDS Motion,” Jerusalem Post (Feb. 22, 2016).
worse\textsuperscript{39}). With a Canadian passport, I can come and go freely\textsuperscript{40} to the West Bank, while the Palestinians are as prisoners in their own land. My hope is that this dissertation and resultant publications and projects may raise awareness about Palestinian struggle and help stimulate more constructive practices of global solidarity (such as engaging with Palestinian popular resistance through social media, supporting international boycott campaigns, visiting Palestine, and undertaking other forms of direct action).

In my treatment of Palestinian resistance, I have strived to foreground Palestinian voices, especially in the latter case chapters, and also to avoid moralization and patronization. In the West Bank for six months,\textsuperscript{41} I was a student, an observer, a listener, and sometimes a participant. There is little relevant practical knowledge I could impart to Palestinians and much that I have learned from them. The dissertation is not about how Palestinians \textit{ought} to resist (if there is any operative \textit{ought}, it applies to individuals of privilege: see Conclusion). Rather, this dissertation examines arguments and data concerning what methods of resistance work, and why, without passing abstract moral judgment. Under international law, Palestinians have a right to resist the Israeli occupation by any means, including by arms (short of breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other established international humanitarian laws, such as targeting noncombatants). I have also sought to make the theory more receptive to the case, so that the Palestinian experience ‘speaks back.’ My thesis is the product of the Palestinian encounter (concerning the possibility of relatively minor violence in civil resistance and of verticality in participatory organization).

The theoretical framework of the dissertation comes from civil-resistance studies. The academic literature emerged in response to twentieth-century historical experiences, such as the nonviolent Indian struggle against British colonialism and the U.S. civil rights movement. Since the 1970s, the study is often associated with the analytical categories of Gene Sharp, founder of the pragmatic or strategic school of civil-resistance studies. The

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} Actually, passing through Israeli security to reach the occupied territories can be tedious and is never assured, as the Israelis routinely deny, and sometimes ban, suspected Palestinian sympathizers.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Three months in the summer of 2010, and three months in the fall-winter of 2013-2014, the former as a volunteer and traveller, the latter as a volunteer and researcher.
\end{itemize}
research field and theoretical framework are elaborated in the first two chapters, then applied in the following four case chapters. The application implicitly affirms the explanatory value of the theory, except in two interrelated ways. My work shows that common civil-resistance analyses do not fully account for, and sometimes misconstrue, the dynamics of Palestinian action and organization in subtle but consequential ways. Combining particular understandings of unarmed and participatory struggle, the dissertation develops an augmented framework that brings the Palestinian case into clearer focus, with the implication that the theoretical literature loosen its identification of civil resistance with nonviolent action and re-examine the place of organization in the theory.

The dissertation adopts a mixed methodological approach, employing a range of interpretive and empirical methods. My major sources fall into three major categories: academic studies of civil resistance (elaborated in the next two chapters and cited throughout the dissertation), the general literature on Palestinian struggle (including scholarship, government documents, journalism, public statements, NGO reports, and social media), and original fieldwork conducted in the West Bank (including participant observation, interviews and questionnaires, as elaborated below and in the Appendices). This diversified approach to sources and methods triangulates findings and textures analysis.42

(b) Case design, selection, and exclusions

Case studies are the backbone of most civil-resistance studies.43 My case studies are structured around the following questions. What is Palestinian popular resistance? What has it achieved? How has it acted and organized? What were the dynamics of unarmed action and participatory organization? How do Palestinian activists and their communities understand these forms of action and organization? To answer these

43 “Most studies of nonviolent action have been case studies, and users of this book will generally also be doing case studies,” R. McCarthy and G. Sharp, Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide (New York: Garland, 1997), p. xxviii.
questions, my cases present narrative accounts with analysis that remains attentive to precise modes of action and organization, linking these back to the theoretical framework identified at the outset. The unarmed and participatory conjunction offers coherent explanations for the variation in outcomes over time across a succession of cases. Cases in which action and organization were at their most unarmed and participatory have been more effective than cases in which one or both of these qualities were deficient.

My major focus is three cases of Palestinian civil resistance. The first two of my three cases stand out as prominent success stories, at least relative to the context and history of Palestinian struggle: the First Intifada and the anti-wall popular resistance (Chapters 3 and 4 respectively). Both are distinguished by their unarmed and participatory qualities, though on two very different scales, one mass and one localized. I have chosen these two cases for their salience in terms relative effectiveness, and for their exemplification of the unarmed and participatory qualities under investigation. My third case (the anti-occupation popular resistance, Chapters 4 and 5) is an outgrowth of the second case, and has been relatively less effective than either preceding case, in terms of advancing its goals (though its goals (ending the occupation) are considerably more ambitious targeting portions of the separation barrier). The anti-occupation movement is unarmed and predominantly nonviolent, but, my research suggests, it has drifted from the participatory foundations of the previous cases, and I argue that this participatory deficit sheds light on the movement’s lack of domestic growth (along with other factors, internal and external). I have selected the anti-occupation civil-resistance movement as my third major case study, because, since 2009, it has been at the forefront of civil resistance in the West Bank, in terms of sustained direct-action campaigns and global solidarity work, and because it has been underreported and understudied. To a lesser extent, and as a measure of control and corroboration, the case chapters also explore contrary examples, in which Palestinian resistance was dominated by armed methods and/or command.

44 The boundaries of case studies are often artificial and subjective, loosely structured around thematic instances or episodes. At its broadest, the history of Palestinian struggle could be considered as a case, just as certain phases, regions, and aspects could also be cast as cases—cases within cases. Mine are structured around popular-committee-led movements and campaigns of varying size and duration.
hierarchies, and the results were less positive, in some cases disastrous.\textsuperscript{45}

My case design is small-n and follows a most-similar design.\textsuperscript{46} Selecting several cases within the Palestinian context allows for isolating specific variables while controlling for innumerable more. The exercise is theory testing and theory refining. Analysis is primarily within case, to comprehend the situated dynamics of action and organization, although in some sections, and in the Conclusion, I incorporate cross-case analysis, highlighting that the same theoretical framework accounts for subtle variations in outcomes over time. The case studies compile accounts, including original accounts, of Palestinian struggle, contributing broadly to Palestine studies and resistance studies, as well as to civil-resistance studies in particular. The cases shed light on civil-resistance theory, and on recurrent themes in Palestinian struggle, but the findings are not necessarily generalizable beyond this context. Further research and wider case comparisons would be required to determine to what extent the findings are unique to the Palestinian condition or transferable (the Conclusion further raises some of these issues).

It should be emphasized that this study focuses on one dimension of Palestinian struggle: popular resistance against the Israeli occupation. This framing excludes many other aspects of Palestinian struggle and the wider conflict. For example, I do not consider the plight of Palestinian refugees in neighboring Arab states who number in the millions, survivors and descendants of those displaced by war in 1948 and 1967.\textsuperscript{47} Nor do I examine the conditions of Palestinian citizens of Israel (“Arab Israelis”), who number more than a million or about a fifth of Israel’s citizenry.\textsuperscript{48} The plight of Gaza since 2007 is also missing from this study, since it broke relations with the PA in the West Bank and

\textsuperscript{45} Specifically, the last section of Ch. 3 examines the period of centralization and armed struggle, spanning the mid1990s to the mid2000s, and Chs. 5 and 6 address the adverse impact of the encroachment and opposition of the centralized Palestinian Authority. The role and efficacy of armed struggle is also briefly raised in Sections 0.3 above and 3.1 below.

\textsuperscript{46} My case methodology is influenced by discussions in George and Bennett (2005) and Harrison and Callan (2013).

\textsuperscript{47} See, for example, R. Brynen and R. El Rifai (eds), \textit{Palestinian Refugees: Challenges of Repatriation and Development} (London: I.B. Taurus, 2007).

\textsuperscript{48} These Palestinians have more opportunities and rights than their brethren under occupation but still confront legal and social discrimination. See, for example, I. Pappé, \textit{The Forgotten Palestinians: A History of the Palestinians in Israel} (Yale University Press, 2011).
became besieged by Israel (with Egyptian complicity).\textsuperscript{49} Palestinian traditions of armed struggle, which have waxed and waned over the years, also fall largely outside the scope of this study; yet these cannot be ignored, especially for their interplay with other forms of resistance and their influence on the policies and behavior of the Israeli government and military (examples are discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.4).\textsuperscript{50} My focus largely excludes the Israeli perspective, though the reactions of the Israeli public and state/military are often implicated in the analysis, particularly with reference to Palestinian stone throwing (Section 3.2) and suicide bombing (Section 3.4.), and also with reference to the general challenges Palestinians face in terms of converting Israeli attitudes, given the conditions of the conflict (Section 1.3).\textsuperscript{51} Lastly, my emphasis on community-based organizing in the territories minimizes the role of international and transnational activism, such as boycott and divestment campaigns against Israel (although these are raised in connection to advocacy work by activists in the West Bank in the case chapters and again in the Conclusion). My purpose is not to tell the whole Palestinian story, but to focus on a cross-section: traditions of grassroots committee-based direct-action campaigns against the Israeli occupation. This focus is justified, because these traditions most exemplify the dynamics of unarmed and participatory resistance, and, I argue, have historically fostered the most effective phases of struggle to date.\textsuperscript{52}

(c) Fieldwork methods

For three months from December 2013 through February 2014, I conducted field research into popular resistance in the West Bank, including participant observation, interviews, and questionnaires (each elaborated in this section). The purpose was to

\textsuperscript{49} Although Gaza comes up in reference to a series of international civilian flotillas that have sought, through nonviolent direct action, to challenge the illegal blockade of the coastal enclave. Periodic Israeli attacks have killed thousands of Gazans and levels tens of thousands of homes, apparently in response to frequent rocket fire that disrupted Israeli life and killed several people over the years: see, for example, Blumenthal (2015); Chomsky and Pappe (2013); D. Rose, “The Gaza Bombshell,” \textit{Vanity Fair} (April 2008); S. Roy, \textit{The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development} (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995).

\textsuperscript{50} For an overview of Palestinian armed struggle, see Sayigh (1997).

\textsuperscript{51} The study would have benefited from qualitative interviews with Israeli actors to better understand the diversity of attitudes toward different forms of Palestinian action and organization, but this was beyond the time and resource constraints of the study.

\textsuperscript{52} Criteria for effectiveness is considered above in note 6 and throughout case chapters.
understand, document, and distill the practices and attitudes of activists and the broader public concerning the tactical and organizational approaches of the popular committees. To protect the identity of participants and encourage candid contributions, I adopted a uniform set of confidentiality measures that protected the identities of all respondents, from first contact through recruitment and research contribution, and adhered to current best practices of electronic data storage and encryption, as was explained to respondents verbally and in writing.

In terms of participant observation, I was partially embedded with the popular resistance for three months from December 1 through February 28, 2014. During that period, I worked as a volunteer for a human rights organization called Palestine Monitor, where my job was to report on rights violations across the West Bank and also report on the regular protest activities of the popular committees. This work facilitated access to networks of activists (as I had learned in 2010 when I worked for the same organization and was first introduced to the popular committees). Parallel to this organizational affiliation with Palestine Monitor, I also attended ten weekly Friday demonstrations as a private participant/observer between two prominent sites of popular resistance, the villages of Bil’n and Nabi Saleh (five Fridays each). In addition to those ten days, I also spent an additional eight days and nights as a guest in the two villages, getting to know activists, their families, and their communities, and another three days and a night in the village of Budrus, which had been a leader in the movement several years earlier. I also spent many hours meeting with many activists in Ramallah, informally at cafés and accompanying them on errands and at social events. I also spent three days and two nights at the Jordan Valley protest camp of Ein Hijleh, which was one of the largest actions undertaken by the popular committees (detailed in Chapter 5). Participant observation informed my understanding of the popular resistance, and introduced me to many activists.

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Palestine Monitor received international funding through the Palestinian Authority and was under the directorship of Mustafa Barghouti, member of the Palestinian Legislative Council and head of Palestinian National Initiative, a progressive and youth-oriented party that has been at the forefront, among the political class, of preaching and practicing unarmed struggle. During my three-month 2013-2014 internship with Palestine Monitor, I wrote 17 reports, 10 of which focused on or touched on popular resistance: see “Mike J.C.” Palestine Monitor. [http://tinyurl.com/jdafoxm](http://tinyurl.com/jdafoxm)
More formally, my research design collected data through interviews and questionnaires. Interviews with Palestinians activists yielded a depth of qualitative insight into the contemporary popular committee movement (I sometimes use “Popular Struggle” as a proper noun to denote this particular movement and distinguish it from popular struggle generally). All participant recruitment was done in person, in January and February 2014, after developing connections and networks through the month of December by attending weekly demonstrations and through my reporting with Palestine Monitor. To maximize my understanding of the movement’s approach to action and organization, I sought to interview prominent activists with experience in the movement.

I interviewed 20 respondents in 21 separate interviews (one respondent twice), for a total of 25 hours of recorded interview, including with 18 active leaders, members, and supporters of the movement, including one politician. Two of the 20 respondents were close to the movement, but separate and critical of it (one of whom I interviewed twice). Interviews were semi-structured mostly around three sets of questions. The first set of questions concerned the respondent’s experience, his or her perspective on the popular struggle, and his or her motivations. The second set of questions focused on action, inquiring into the practices, tactics, and strategies of the movement. The third set of questions asked about organization, how the movement convened, deliberated, consulted, made decisions, and sought to expand participation. I did not read questions verbatim, but asked informally with conversational style; nor did I rigidly adhere to the guide sequence, if the discussion took on a productive course of its own. Data analysis consisted of coding the complete transcripts by theme, including goals, achievements, and several aspects of action and organization, and highlighting areas of agreement and disagreement. The result was a qualitative topographical map of the Popular Struggle and its approach to action and organization. Appendix 1 includes a more thorough profile of interview respondents, more detail on the conditions of recruitment and documentation, and samples of questions and responses.54

Whereas the interviews provide interpretive depth and first-hand accounts from

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54 My approach to interviews has also been influenced by the example of a comparable study, Norman (2010), pp. 119-130, as well as by discussions in Harrison and Callan (2013) and George and Bennett (2005).
experienced activists, plus insights from two critics, the questionnaires offer more general
glimpses of wider publics’ perceptions of the popular resistance. The single-page
questionnaires asked participants in Arabic to confidentially identify their gender and age
bracket, and then to respond to a series of multiple-choice questions about tactics and
strategy, and then about forms of organization, with one open-ended question at the end.

With the help of an assistant, or sometimes two or three at a time, I administered 201
surveys at six locations, mostly around three university campuses across the West Bank,
secondarily from within two of the villages involved in the movement, and thirdly from a
café in the city centre of Nablus. All participants were recruited randomly, allowing for
secondary snow-ball recruitment when the opportunity presented itself (snowballing
accounts for a small minority of the total respondents). To maintain the randomness and
integrity of the sample, I did not ask known activists, acquaintances, or friends to fill out
the survey, because most of these were likely to be biased in favour of the popular
committees, and I only administered surveys in pre-planned drives with the reasonable
expectation of recruiting at least a dozen or more participants. The data was compiled
into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet and parsed by numerous filters to compare and
contrast results by theme, location, and respondent type. A major contribution of the
survey data has been to illuminate a significant dissatisfaction among the public with
some of the approaches of the popular committees, including from within the
communities of Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, as elaborated in Chapter 6. Appendix 2 contains
more detail about the methodology of the questionnaires, as well as copies and data
charts.55

0.5 Outline

This section summarizes the structure of the dissertation. The first two chapters
elaborate the theoretical approach, respectively action and organization (Chapters 1 and
2), and the subsequent four chapters work through the case material, beginning with the
First Intifada and its aftermath (Chapter 3), then turning to the contemporary Popular
Struggle movement in the West Bank, which I divide into two overlapping phases: the

55 My approach to questionnaires has also been influenced by the comparable design of Norman
(2010), pp. 119-130.
anti-wall popular resistance since 2002 (Chapter 4), and its outgrowth, the anti-occupation popular resistance since 2009 (Chapter 5), ending with an examination of the participatory limitations of the movement (Chapter 6). The latter three case chapters contain comprehensive descriptive accounts, because, even though the anti-wall movement (subject of Chapter 4) has been studied and is well documented, existing sources are scattered, incomplete, and outdated; and because almost no scholarship exists on the subsequent anti-occupation popular resistance (Chapters 5 and 6). This dissertation provides a comprehensive account of a popular-committee movement spanning more than ten years. Lastly, the Conclusion summarizes the thesis and raises broader ethical questions.

To elaborate, Chapter 1 outlines the action axis of analysis, situating it within the literature on civil resistance. This framework encompasses demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, disobedience, and other forms of nonviolent action. Such methods effect power relations by altering social patterns of cooperation, consent, and obedience. The research field has found that civil resistance operates in ways that challenge common stereotypes about the subject matter: it does not depend on (though it may benefit from) principled or spiritual commitments to nonviolence; it can be effective even against oppressive and undemocratic regimes; and empirically, it has outperformed armed resistance over time, around the world, in terms of achieving political objectives (even against oppressive and undemocratic regimes). My approach differs from conventional civil-resistance theory by adopting a minority school of thought that rejects the nomenclature of, and analytical fixation on, ‘nonviolent’ methods of resistance, allowing that civil resistance may sometimes be violent, to limited extents, depending on the context (though typically not breaching the threshold of militarized struggle). Thus, the productive analytical concept for Palestinian popular resistance is not nonviolent action but unarmed action.

Chapter 2 adds the organizational axis of the framework. Participatory forms of mobilization and decision-making have been insufficiently explored in civil-resistance studies, and theorists have advanced contending organizational models, including through Palestinian case studies, sometimes describing the same case material with apparently mutually contradictory models. Some approaches identify decentralized and directly democratic organization as assets to civil resistance, while others privilege structured
command hierarchies. However, the most common approach to organization, when taken up at all (the question has most often been marginal compared to the field’s interest in action) is an agnostic view in which different organizational forms are presumed to be neutral choices for resistance movements, determined by context: sometimes open and democratic resistance may be practical, sometimes command and control may be practical. The agnostic disposition is one shared by most other subfields of political thought toward the question of violence and nonviolence in struggle—i.e., either or both violence and nonviolence may have their place, depending on circumstances. Yet civil-resistance theory argues that the distinction between violence and nonviolence in resistance does make a practical difference, and that empirically (and theoretically), there is strong basis to be leery of the plausibility of the effectiveness of armed struggle, including under oppressive and conflict-prone circumstances. My research suggests that a similar recognition might be appropriate for thinking about organization, that the distinction between top-down and bottom-up forms of organization may also make a practical difference. Empirically (and theoretically), I argue there is a strong basis, at least in the Palestinian case, to be as leery of the resort to command hierarchies as to the taking up of arms (which is not to say that neither can ever have a place, but that both have generally proven problematic). Chapter 2 also makes clear that participatory organization does not mean perfectly or exclusively ‘horizontal’ structure, precluding any possibility of upward delegation to contingent leadership or decision making bodies. In the following case chapters, I argue that both analytical specifications to action and organization—unarmed and participatory—are required to grasp the trends of Palestinian popular resistance.

The first case chapter, Chapter 3, covers the watershed First Intifada, which began in December 1987 and extended into the early 1990s. The mass uprising was unarmed and predominantly nonviolent—the major exception was stone throwing. Lacking their own state institutions and facing continuous threat of repression, Palestinians in the occupied territories were organized through civil society into networks and layers of popular committees. For weeks, months, and even years, the First Intifada captivated Western news media and diplomatic institutions, and pushed Israeli society toward a crisis. The First Intifada did not end the Israeli occupation, but many Palestinians and
analysts regard it as the closest Palestinians have come to achieving that goal. It raised the stature of the Palestinian struggle to new heights, isolated Israel internationally, and exacerbated divisions and dissent within Israeli society. The chapter also contrasts the Intifada with its aftermath, an approximately ten-year period characterized by centralization and militarization, culminating in Second Intifada of 2000, which was more destructive than the First Intifada and widely considered counterproductive to the Palestinian cause. Among many West Bank activists today, the First Intifada is regarded as a ‘golden age’ of popular resistance.

The remaining three case chapters turn to a series of popular resistance campaigns in the West Bank going back to the early 2000s, much smaller in scale than the First Intifada. Beginning in 2002, Chapter 4 recounts a rural movement in the West Bank that challenged Israel’s construction of a massive separation barrier, called alternately a “security fence” or an “apartheid wall.” The barrier split dozens of Palestinian towns and villages from their fields and orchards, further threatening their already strained livelihoods. Rural networks of activists mobilized their communities into popular committees, harkening back to the modes of the First Intifada, and waged unarmed struggle, often working closely with Israeli and international activists and pursuing legal cases against the barrier in the Israeli courts. The actions of the committees became known loosely as the popular resistance against the wall. Many villages were unsuccessful and many more took little or no action, but some effectively thwarted or reversed construction plans and attendant land losses, most notably (but not only) the villages of Budrus (2003-2004) and Bil’in (2005-present). Budrus achieved its objective through nonviolent direct action amidst one of the most violent periods of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Bil’in also scored a number of other “small victories” concerning the local settlement project, in addition to achieving its major objective against the barrier in 2011. The activists of Bil’in introduced new practices, including staging creative and sometimes theatrical protests, standardizing Friday demonstrations in which communities weekly protest the separation barrier, and building international and global solidarity through branding and outreach strategies. After 2005, similar approaches were adopted and adapted, to varying degrees and durations, by dozens of different communities. The achievements of the anti-wall popular resistance are modest in number and small in scale,
but still remarkable, considering that Palestinian efforts have rarely frustrated, denied, or reversed Israeli land and settlement policy in the occupied territories, and, in the West Bank at least, instances of armed struggle can only be cited to the effect of detrimental outcomes. The key to the success of the popular committees during this latter period, I argue, is the same conjunction of unarmed strategies and participatory structures that powered the First Intifada. These examples challenge the old adage about force and “only” force.

This background forms the basis for original research into a third case of Palestinian civil resistance, an outgrowth of the anti-wall popular resistance that might be termed the anti-occupation popular resistance. I call this expanded movement the Popular Struggle for short, encompassing both the anti-wall and the broader anti-occupation aspects, especially in connection to a leadership network associated with Bil’in and their approaches to action and organization. Chapter 5 outlines the movement’s goals, organizational extent, and repertoire of direct action. The aim of the movement is to hone a sustainable model of popular resistance that can be replicated across the territories and even around the world; their aim is to launch a “Third and Global Intifada.” The movement is led by a small group of popular committees involved with the anti-wall movement, mostly from the villages of Bil’in, Nabi Saleh, and al-Ma’asara, networked with up to a dozen more popular committees partaking in the shared vision of unarmed action, Friday demonstrations, and global media outreach. The popular committees have forged a close working alliance with a group of independent youth activists based in Ramallah, adding youthful urgency and tech-savvy to their somewhat aging movement (which is made up of many activists from the First Intifada). At the same time, the committees have embraced officialdom, registering their movement as an NGO through the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority (PA), and also developing supportive links with European organizations through the institutions of the European Union. The movement also accepted the endorsements of the top leadership bodies of Fateh and the PA, and a stream of funding of tens of thousands of dollars from the PA. These more formal governmental and nongovernmental affiliations have aided the movement materially though threatened to undermine its local creditability and participatory character. During this period, the Popular Struggle diversified Friday
demonstrations (to target more than just local extensions of separation barrier). Since 2009, they have targeted and breached the concrete wall around Jerusalem in media events promoted like press conferences. They also developed other kinds of direct action, including blocking settler highways, building protest camps on land threatened by settlement expansion, and reclaiming lost villages in the Jordan Valley. It may be too soon to discount the small but vibrant Popular Struggle, but it has so far failed to generate mass or arguably even significant levels of participation from the major population centres of the West Bank (though the movement has earned remarkable achievements).

The last case study, Chapter 6, turns the organizational gaze inside the movement. While the previous chapter sketched the movement’s external inter-organizational cartography, as well as its arsenal of tactics, this chapter investigates the participatory extent of the popular committees in the context of their communities. For the most part, the committees seem to meet their stated ideals of free, open, democratic, and community-based organization. However, at least during the period of fieldwork, there were also indications of mistrust toward them from the public and within their own communities, mostly concerning perceptions of exclusion and special interests, (as well as some concerns over tactics, raised in previous chapters). I have found that affiliation with large and centralized institutions, and the provision of salary to ‘volunteer’ activists, contributed to the erosion of the bases of support for the popular committees. I suggest that the weak and in some ways negative growth of the Popular Struggle is tied to its shift away from the thoroughgoing participatory forms of organization that had characterized its more momentous early phases against the separation barrier. Under the circumstances, this research suggests that an expansion of community-based social programs, an increased investment in local constructive work, especially land related, offers potential for strengthening local levels of trust and participation.

Finally, the Conclusion returns to the puzzle posed at the outset. To a modest extent, or in a limited number of cases, Palestinians have been able to bypass Nasser’s maxim by finding a functional equivalent to armed force—civil resistance. In other words, as civil-resistance studies have long maintained, force of arms is neither the only nor the best means of last resort in struggles for freedom and justice. However, in the Palestinian case, conventional civil-resistance theory misses the mark in two particular
ways: by an almost dogmatic fixation on literal nonviolence in action, and by undertheorizing the dynamics of participatory organization. This adjusted action/organization framework helps explain the strengths and weaknesses of Palestinian struggle over time. The Conclusion summarizes this argument, as well as raising implications for Palestinian struggle, for resistance and governance theory, and for global ethics.
Chapter 1 – Civil Resistance Theory I: Unarmed Action

It is said by some persons and groups that nonviolent struggle only succeeds by melting the hearts of the oppressors. However, it has been coercive and even destroyed extreme dictatorships.

— Gene Sharp, 2003

1.0 Introduction

Civil resistance refers to unarmed and predominantly nonviolent action undertaken by individuals, groups, or movements, striving to overcome conditions of oppression or injustice, often in conflict or conflict-prone situations. When conventional institutional pathways for addressing grievances and pursuing change are unavailable, civil resistance offers a ‘third way’ between the poles of passive acquiescence and taking up arms, between submission and militancy. This chapter and the following chapter respectively examine the actional and the organizational aspects of civil-resistance theory as they pertain to the dissertation. In subsequent chapters, the combined analytical framework, which weds a particular kind of strategic agency with a particular kind of movement structure, becomes a key for deciphering the ebb and flow of achievements and setbacks in Palestinian popular resistance in the occupied territories. The conclusion of the dissertation is that unarmed action and participatory organization have proven to be a relatively effective conjunction of technique and form in Palestinian struggle.

This chapter elaborates the action axis of the framework. The first three sections outline the ‘pragmatic’ or ‘strategic’ school of nonviolent-action studies, considering in turn the basic background of the field in theory and practice, then the methods-centric orientation of the discipline, and then the power dynamics that are said to undergird nonviolent struggle. This framework derives largely from the formulations of Gene Sharp in the 1970s, and it has gradually become more prominent in academia and public discourse, especially in the last couple decades. The strategic approach is primarily about

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1 G. Sharp, There are Realistic Alternatives (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2003), p. 9.
action; it should not be confused with other common conceptualizations of nonviolent resistance, such as those that emphasize philosophy, morality, religion, or spirituality (though these may also be important factors), or those that operate solely within established legal and political channels (though these may also be used). Civil resistance works by targeting power at its social sources—the consent and cooperation of people not only within the opposing regime but also among the resistance population and across implicated or potentially implicated third parties. Finally, the chapter’s fourth section identifies an unconventional current of the pragmatic school of civil resistance, one that de-emphasizes the language of violence and nonviolence in its resistance analysis and opts instead for a more permissive and less ambiguous distinction between militarized and non-militarized action (while also allowing for analytical exceptions and gray zones). The resultant conceptualization of action—unarmed and predominantly (though not necessarily entirely) nonviolent—retains space for principled nonviolence, or at least does not preclude it, while engaging the dynamics and nuances of Palestinian popular resistance more productively than conventional Sharpian approaches. While the following sections mark thematic shifts, a continuous narrative or overview of the field arcs through the chapter.

1.1 Origins of the Field

Civil resistance has a long history, though it has only been named and singled out for study since the early twentieth century.² For many generations, the ancient Roman people practiced it as a matter of course against their kings and aristocracy, including acts of collective protest called secessio, in which the population walked out of the city and refused to cooperate with the state or serve in the army until popular demands were met.³

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² M. Gandhi is a pioneering figure in practice and thought; see his Indian Home Rule or Hind Swaraj (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1938 [1909]). In the social sciences, C. Case produced the first and only monograph until the 1930s: Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Methods of Social Pressure (New York: Century, 1923); afterward, works begin to appear with increasing frequency.

³ M. Grant, History of Rome (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), p. 63; K. Raaflaub, Social Struggles in Archaic Rome: New Perspectives on the Conflict of the Orders, 2nd edn (Malden: Blackwell, 2005). During the Italian Renaissance, Niccolò Machiavelli, the famous theorist of political violence, also praised the bloodless mechanisms of contestation built into the ancient Roman Republic: “Rome reached this perfection through the discord between the plebeians and the Senate [...] From the era of the Tarquins
With hindsight, much political struggle throughout history could be recast as civil resistance, even though the distinction of ‘nonviolent action’ scarcely emerged in discourse until after the advent of industrial violence; unprecedented capacity to kill and destroy accompanied the recognition of nonviolent ways to struggle.\(^4\) For most of the last hundred years, however, civil-resistance theory has remained marginal in academia and political thought. This has been changing for the last few decades, especially since 2000, though outside the specialist literature the basic claims of the theory along with their political implications (posing a realistic alternative to violence in oppressive and conflict-prone situations) remain poorly understood.

The charismatic figures of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. often dominate the public imagination of the limits and potential of civil resistance.\(^5\) Mass nonviolence has been credited with a capacity to challenge and sometimes persuade liberal powers like the British Empire and the American government; yet the Indian independence movement and the American civil-rights movement are still often registered as somewhat exceptional, not only for their overly mythologized leaders, but also because their grievances were legitimate, shared by millions, and directed at regimes that happened to respect human rights and the rule of law. Against such views, Gene Sharp has argued since the 1970s that the conflict dynamics underlying these iconic movements have been more prevalent throughout history, more accessible to ordinary


people, and frequently more effective against undemocratic regimes than has generally been recognized. Since Sharp, researchers have increasingly paid attention to civil resistance around the world and in past struggles and conflicts.

In the last thirty years, major civil-resistance movements have challenged and overcome oppressive regimes, sometimes evidencing the transmission of knowledge from case to case, and slowly raising the profile of the field in practice and study. In 1986, mass protest in the Philippines led to the ouster of a long-entrenched dictator and introduced the term ‘people power’ into the lexicon of civil resistance. Contemporaneously, in Eastern Europe, nonviolent pro-democracy movements undermined Communist regimes and precipitated the peaceful breakup and dissolution of the Soviet Union. The movements in East Asia and in East Europe were undoubtedly very different, each particular to their societies, yet civil resistance-theory responded at the time with a unified framework for describing and explaining both. According to the theory, the power of the regimes was not inherently material, not in the institutions or in the security forces; rather, the power was essentially in the behavior of the populations that allowed the regimes to persist (or not). “All government is based on consent.” Sharp

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6 Sharp (1973). For this text, Sharp is widely considered the founder of the theory of strategic nonviolent struggle.


10 For example, the following monographs treat both cases (among others): B. Martin, Social Defence, Social Change (London: Freedom Press, 1993); Ackerman and DuVall (2000).
wrote in 1973, and “[c]onsent can be withdrawn.” The subversive notion is that all power, even military power, depends on obedience and cooperation and is therefore vulnerable to disobedience and noncooperation. Sharp did not originate this conceptualization of power; it goes back much further, most prominently to Gandhi in the early twentieth century, who pioneered the idea of nonviolent resistance—“[i]f man will only realize that it is unmanly to obey laws that are unjust, no man’s tyranny will enslave him.”

Into the new millennium, the transmission of strategic nonviolent-action theory has become increasingly prevalent, seemingly to pass and adapt from region to region and movement to movement. In Belgrade, organizers of the prominent Otpor! (‘resistance!’) group have acknowledged their debt to Sharp’s ideas. The Serbian civil-society organization played a lead role in a large opposition coalition that undertook a series of protests, culminating in October 2000, when hundreds of thousands of demonstrators converged on the grounds around state buildings until the disputed re-election of President Slobodan Milošević was overturned. Over the next decade and a half, this

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12 Gandhi (1938 [1909]), p. 56; also, “the immutable maxim, that government of the people is possible only so long as they consent either consciously or unconsciously to be governed,” M. Gandhi in J. Brown (ed) The Essential Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 309, also pp. 137, 166, 313. Comparable conceptualizations of power and its vulnerabilities can be found in earlier texts: L. Tolstoy, The Kingdom of God is Within You (1894); H. Thoreau, “Civil Disobedience” (1849); É. de La Boétie, Discourse on Voluntary Servitude (1576).
basic protest model—occupying public spaces and demanding change of government—was replicated in up to a dozen world capitals from Tunis to Tehran. Aiding the organic cascade, many of the same Serbians from *Otpor!* formed a new organization called the Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) in order to disseminate their ideas and practices internationally, working at times with academics and research institutions.15

Their work has been identified among the mix of influences making up the so-called Rose, Orange, and Cedar Revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Lebanon in 2003, 2004, and 2005 respectively.16 In each case, civil-society organizations adopted simple colors and logos, cleverly marketed their campaigns across social and conventional media, and escalated resistance from low-risk protests, such as wearing colour patches on clothing or shutting lights off at particular times, to converging *en masse* in public squares. In Iran, the Green Movement of 2009 followed the same pattern, though it arguably lacked a large-enough base of support across the country and was effectively repressed by state security.17

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Despite the failure in Tehran, many of the same ideas and practices can be traced into the 2010s with the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings of the Arab Spring. The spread of knowledge from Otpor! and the ‘colour revolutions,’ including related scholarly research literature, is documented in academia and news media. The revolutions in Tunis and Cairo were not only televised but live-streamed around the world, and they quickly prompted waves of similar movements across the Middle East, especially in Bahrain and Yemen and to a lesser extent in Libya and Syria, and also several other countries. Over the summer and fall of 2011, new social movements in Spain, North America, and Latin America adopted many of the same methods, often recognizing and expressing solidarity with the others. There is no suggestion that Sharp’s civil-

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18 “The early successes of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen were more or less textbook cases of how civil resistance is supposed to work. Some of the activists involved had benefited from training and advice provided by the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, which had been carefully honing and encouraging such tactics for a couple of decades [although] their role should not be exaggerated,” C. Mallat and E. Mortimer, “The Background to Civil Resistance in the Middle East,” in Roberts et al (2016), p. 24; see also “groups committed to nonviolence in Tunisia [...] had been collaborating with their Egyptian counterparts for several years [...] One of them [a future organizer of Egypt’s April 6 movement]. Mohammed Adel, travelled to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. There he enrolled in a one-week training program directed by the Centre for Applied Non-Violent Action and Strategies (CANVAS),” J. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 57-59; S. Zunes, “How to Discredit your Democratic Opponents in Egypt,” OpenDemocracy (Feb. 17, 2014); “[t]hey were especially drawn to a Serbian youth movement called Otpor, which had helped topple the dictator Slobodan Milosevic by drawing on the ideas of an American political thinker, Gene Sharp,” D. Kirkpatrick and D. Sanger “A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History,” NYT (Feb. 13, 2011); the “International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, which trains democracy activists, slipped into Cairo several years ago to conduct a workshop, among the papers it distributed was Mr. Sharp’s ‘198 Methods of Nonviolent Action’ [...] an Egyptian blogger and activist who attended the workshop and later organized similar sessions on her own, said trainees were active in both the Tunisia and Egypt revolts. She said that some activists translated excerpts of Mr. Sharp’s work into Arabic, and that his message of ‘attacking weaknesses of dictators’ stuck with them. Peter Ackerman, a onetime student of Mr. Sharp who founded the nonviolence center and ran the Cairo workshop, cites his former mentor as proof that ‘ideas have power’,” S. Stolberg, “Shy U.S. Intellectual Created Playbook Used in a Revolution,” NYT (Feb. 16, 2011); “Sharp and AEI [Albert Einstein Institution] have also worked closely in recent years with pro-democracy activists battling U.S.-backed dictatorships in such countries as Egypt and Equatorial Guinea as well as with Palestinians resistin the U.S.-backed Israeli occupation,” Zunes, (2008).


resistance theory *caused* any of these movements, yet activists and organizers have repeatedly cited it as a factor, along with others, foreign and domestic, at least since Serbia in 2000.\(^{21}\)

### 1.2 On Methods

While occupying public squares has been a hallmark of mass civil resistance, the repertoire of civil-resistance methods is much larger, encompassing a diverse range of social and political activity. In movements that achieved significant reform or regime change, worker strikes have usually been crucial factors, though these have often received less attention than street protests (perhaps partly for being less photogenic). In Egypt, for example, while many thousands of Egyptians were hunkered down in Tahrir Square before the cameras of the world, many more had gone on strike, culminating in a near shutdown of the national economy just two days before the army intervened and pressured the president to stand down.\(^{22}\) Similarly, in Tunisia, the president fled the country the very day that a general strike reached the capital.\(^{23}\) There were also many other smaller scale actions going back months and years in both countries, preparing the groundswell for the larger mobilizations of late 2010, early 2011. For example, in Egypt small and sporadic demonstrations, including symbolic protests (one involving hundreds of brooms and demonstrators sweeping), sporadic labour actions, and social-media networking, marked the period leading up to the historic 2011 revolution.\(^{24}\) And in Tunisia, many towns in the Gafsa district had set a precedent in 2008 by combining work stoppages with “demonstrations, occupations and blockages of public spaces, sitdown


\(^{22}\) “workers from both the public and private sectors, including those from the petroleum, railroad, banking, retail, manufacturing, public transportation, healthcare, and heavy industry sectors, struck on February 9, 2011 [...] two days before the army told Mubarak he had to go,” Gelvin (2015), pp. 61-62.


and hunger strikes,” to garner national sympathy and defy the government for several months before the revolt was exhausted and defeated.25

In 1973, Sharp offered a way of thinking about the diverse array of action practiced by civil-resistance movements. He catalogued an annotated glossary of 198 methods of nonviolent action, parsed into three broad categories of escalating resistance intensity: (1) protest and persuasion (e.g., chanting, marching, picketing, walk-outs, graffiti, satire, or any agitation that aims to express grievances, raise awareness, and build support); (2) noncooperation (e.g., work strikes, student strikes, tax strikes, boycotts of products and services, resignations, or any other politically charged acts of withdrawal or omission); and (3) direct intervention (e.g., hunger strikes, sit-ins, human-chain blockades, alternate institution building, or other disruptive methods that intervene into the status quo and impel a response from the opposing regime).26 Most civil-resistance methods can be cast primarily into one of these three main categories—persuasive protest, acts of omission, and disruptive intervention—though they are not watertight compartments, as some methods fall under more than one heading.27 By compiling and documenting hundreds of disparate methods of civil resistance, Sharp illustrates the broad range of options available to movements or groups determined to take political action. And by dividing the methods into three differentiated tiers, Sharp offers a basic scheme for ranking the escalation or intensity of civil resistance. Methods of persuasive protest are typically the first methods to be practiced, the ‘ground floor’ of most movements, and many movements never pass beyond this minimally disruptive level. Acts of noncooperation and of direct intervention often indicate more advanced movements, progressively raising the stakes and provoking opponents to respond, whether with concession or repression. “Some methods,” Sharp summarizes, “are basically symbolic

27 For example, labour strikes are classic examples of noncooperation but may also function as protest and persuasion, and also as a kind of intervention in the economic order; similarly, demonstrations, which may be primarily communicative, may also directly intervene if they obstruct traffic or violate laws of assembly, or also be a kind of noncooperation, if the demonstrators refuse to obey the commands of police or security forces to cease and disperse.
actions, some involve a withdrawal of particular types of cooperation, others are largely direct interventions in a conflict situation.”

By emphasizing methods over other considerations such as motives or morals, a key facet of the study becomes apparent. “Nonviolent action is identified by what people do,” Sharp says, “not by what they believe.”

Movements may adopt strategies that are nonviolent without embracing any creed or philosophy of pacifism (though such ethical considerations may also be welcome factors). Typically, methods of civil resistance are adopted for pragmatic reasons. Demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience are practical and accessible ways for ordinary people to struggle and resist, regardless of normative views on violence and nonviolence in struggles against oppression.

This approach should not be confused with spiritual or ethical philosophies of nonviolence. For example, Gandhi’s civil resistance includes nonviolence as a life duty, in speech and thought as well as in action and resistance, even under threat of deadly repression. Additionally, Gandhi insists that oppressors must be willingly converted to right and justice rather than being compelled or pressured to yield against their will, even through nonviolent means. In distinction, Sharp and the pragmatists have maintained that “nonviolent action does not require its practitioners to ‘love’ their opponent, nor to try to convert him. Clearly this technique has been applied by people who hated their opponent and desired to coerce him. Such emotions and attitudes can coexist with the use of nonviolent means.”

Sharp and the pragmatists are more flexible, less absolute, in their approach to nonviolent resistance. They draw the line at physical violence or the threat of it, rather than focusing on violence in any sweeping sense, including in speech and thought (though these may also be factors). The point is not to reject or discourage

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28 Sharp (1973), p. 114
30 For example: “excludes the use of violence in any shape or form, whether in thought, speech, or deed,” M. Gandhi, Non-Violent Resistance (Satyagraha) (Mineola: Dover, 2001), p. 56, also pp. 41, 54-56, 77, 78, 84, 93; also Gandhi (2008): “without any exceptions,” p. 20, also pp. 198, 333, 354.
31 For example, “[m]y method is conversion, not coercion […] appeal to the sympathetic chords in the governors […] reach the hearts,” Gandhi (2008), pp. 153, 310, 370.
33 “‘Violence’ is used here with the restricted meaning of physical violence against persons to inflict injury or death, or action dependent on the threat of such results, not as a term of moral or political
principled pacifism, but to clarify that ideological commitments are not a prerequisite for undertaking civil resistance.

By isolating methods, Sharp’s approach narrows the idea of nonviolent action to something of a utilitarian or instrumentalist technique, while simultaneously broadening the field in other ways. The methods-based approach expands awareness of the range of options available to ordinary people determined to take action, while also striving to expand the appeal of civil resistance by emphasizing its strategic efficacy. Hardy Merriman explains, “[t]hose who are not committed to religious or ethical nonviolence may be more likely to adopt nonviolent action if it is presented to them as a pragmatic and effective way of waging conflict, rather than as a religious or ethical creed to which people should convert.” Additionally, the focus on methods expands the range of historical cases to examine for research purposes. By narrowing the criteria from broadly philosophical to merely political action, other cases throughout history emerge, inviting nonviolent-action analysis, even if they were not understood as “nonviolent” at the time.

Sharp:

For example to an extent which has on the whole been ignored, the American colonists used nonviolent resistance in their struggle against Britain, refusing to pay taxes and debts, refusing to import, refusing to obey laws they considered unjust, using independent political institutions, and severing social and economic contact with both the British and pro-British colonists. The methods-based approach allows revolutionary America to be studied for its experience of nonviolent action, even though the revolution is not conventionally considered ‘nonviolent,’ and the participants may not have espoused nonviolence or even strategically distinguished between the concepts of violent and nonviolent action. Researchers can ask, what did they do? How did they do it? What worked, and what did not work? Ronald McCarthy and Christopher Kruegler summarize: “by arguing that researchers must recognize nonviolent action by certain of its features, Sharp opts for a

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opinion,” Sharp (2003), p. 1, n. 1; however, “if in addition they can refrain from hostility, ill will and hatred, and perhaps even demonstrate personal goodwill for members of the opponent group, they may have greater chances of success,” Sharp (1973), p. 634.  
34 Merriman (2009), p. 18.  
minimum definition of nonviolent action that throws open an entire field of research.”

In this way, the methods-based approach reveals much of the Palestinian experience to nonviolent-action theory. For the most part, Palestinian activists have not condemned armed resistance in principle, nor have they expected to win over the hearts of their Israeli oppressors. Yet Palestinians have become experienced practitioners of strategic nonviolent action. As the case chapters of this study show, Palestinians have a long tradition of strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience, alternative institution building, and many other methods of nonviolent direct action, generally without espousing nonviolence as a creed, and usually without the descriptor ‘nonviolent.’

If, however, the idea of philosophical nonviolence is tied to the idea of civil resistance, then the theory has narrower applicability to the Palestinian case, and Palestinians exemplify it much less. This is not because Palestinians are less nonviolent than other peoples, but because principled nonviolence—the moral injunction against all violence even in defense of self and community—is not a widespread ethical conviction in any society. Sharp’s methods-based formulation casts a net that corresponds more closely to the experience and dynamics of Palestinian popular struggle.

1.3 On Power Dynamics

According to Sharp, methods of nonviolent action work “by reducing or severing the power of the opponent at its sources.” Regimes and resistance movements alike depend on social sources of power, meaning the consent, obedience, and cooperation of relevant individuals, groups, and institutions (whether soldiers, technocrats, taxpayers, workers, consumers, artists, unions, etc.). Civil resistance movements aim to constrict or appropriate the oppressor’s social sources of power, while bolstering their own. Power

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37 La u’nf, literally ‘no violence’ was marginal in Palestinian resistance discourse before the last ten or fifteen years, as activists have increasingly adopted the language: see case chapters (Chs. 3, 4, and 5).

38 “Only in rare historical instances did a group or a leader have a personal belief that rejected violence in principle,” Sharp (2005).

shifts follow the realignment of patterns of consent, obedience, and cooperation, which occur across first, second, and third parties to a conflict (resistance group, oppressor group, and external groups). Sharp elaborates:

To a degree which has never been adequately appreciated, the nonviolent technique operates by producing power changes. Both the relative power and the absolute power of each of the contending groups are subject to constant and rapid alterations [and] the actionists seek continually to increase their own strength and that of their supporters. They will usually seek and gain assistance and active participation also from among the wider group affected by the grievances. In addition, the nature of nonviolent struggle makes it possible for the actionists also to win considerable support even in the camp of the opponent and among third parties. This potential is much greater than with violence.\(^\text{40}\)

The key to nonviolent action is generating solidarity and support on behalf of a movement and sowing noncooperation and dissent with regard to the opponent.

For thinking about sources of power in a conflict, Sharp offers six categories.\(^\text{41}\) They are: (1) authority/legitimacy, such as can be derived from status, accreditation, experience, tradition, democratic process, or other input; (2) human capital, the amount of people, the power of numbers, absolute and relative; (3) skills and knowledge, including science and technology, which enhance capabilities of people and organizations; (4) ideology and other intangible factors, such as habits, customs, and religion, which can psychologically influence people’s tendencies to obey or disobey; (5) material resources, such as energy, capital, finance—economic clout; and (6) capacity to sanction, the ability to compel obedience through violent or nonviolent inducement, such as social ostracism, legal prosecution, or violent crackdown. These six categories are distinct, though there is some overlap between them and they can coexist in individual referents. They share in common one crucial feature: they are rooted in consent: “[a] closer examination of the sources of the ruler’s power will indicate that they depend intimately upon the obedience and cooperation of the subjects.”\(^\text{42}\)

Robert Helvey supplements this abstract power typology with the more concrete


\(^{41}\) Sharp (1973), pp. 11-12, 744-754; Sharp (2005), pp. 28-30, 419-421.

idea of “pillars of support.”\footnote{43} This refers to particular organizations and institutions that embody various combinations of the six social sources of power, such as specific factories or businesses (incorporating \textit{material resources, skills/knowledge, human resources}), universities (\textit{skills/knowledge, authority/legitimacy, ideology}) student groups (\textit{authority/legitimacy, human resources}), newspapers (\textit{skills/knowledge, ideology}), police departments (\textit{sanctions, authority/legitimacy, skills/knowledge, material}), militaries (typically embodying all six social sources of power, especially sanctions), and so on. Regimes and resistance movements can have their own distinct pillars of support, or they can be shared and contested between them. Mapping out power dynamics into sources and pillars, across all parties to a conflict, can help identify vulnerabilities and opportunities, and al.\footnote{44} To illustrate, in the case of the Iranian revolution of 1978-1979,\footnote{45} the regime depended heavily on the oil industry (which manifested \textit{material resources} as well as elements of \textit{skills/knowledge}), and when oil workers struck \textit{en masse} in November 1978, the regime lost one of its crucial pillars of support. The shah then ordered the military to put an end to the popular uprising, but the generals refused to comply, and the shah found he had lost his most important pillar of all—the military; he fled the country shortly after. The fall of the Iranian regime in early 1979 illustrates how civil resistance, pragmatic nonviolent action, can dramatically alter the social bases of power enough to effectively unbalance and even topple oppressive regimes.

Sharp adds a general caveat that seems to apply less to the Palestinian case. Sharp suggests that third parties should remain a ‘third priority’ for activists and organizers. This is because more significant gains and losses tend to occur within and across first and second parties to a conflict, including their shared or respective sources and pillars, rather than external or international players. Simply put, relying on outsiders or “foreign


\footnote{44} “Any regime will rely on some pillars of support more than on others [requiring] identification and analysis [and] attention to key institutions and organizations,” R. Helvey (2004), p. 9; “assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of one’s opponents, of one’s own group, and of third parties which may assist or hinder the campaign,” Sharp (2003), pp. 19-20; Sharp (2010), pp. 47-48; Sharp (2005), pp. 450-454, 530-540; P. Ackerman and C. Kruegler, \textit{Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century} (Westport: Praeger, 1994).

saviors” is bad strategy. Third parties, however, often play vital roles; Véronique Dudouet details numerous advantages that have accrued to nonviolent movements through the fostering of third-party support. The reach of foreign actors may also be increasing in an increasingly globalized and interconnected world, as technological advances in communication and transportation continue to compress the distance between domestic and foreign. Moreover, third parties may become necessary targets of civil resistance to the extent that they provide essential support to opponent regimes. For example, Israel has traditionally been dependent on third-party support, going back to the British Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations Mandate system that facilitated emigration of European Jewry to Palestine between the World Wars. In the last half century, Israel has depended heavily on the U.S. for material resources, more than three billion dollars per year since the late 1970s, orders of magnitude more than any other country over the same period (except Egypt, ranking second at about two thirds of Israel’s total U.S. aid). This dependence extends to the diplomatic sphere, as the U.S. has used its position on the United Nations Security Council to shield Israel from censure

46 “Third party and international support has generally had limited use and effectiveness,” and “ought to be seen as supplementary and complementary to the internal resistance, but never as the main actions of the struggle,” Sharp (2005), p. 412; “there are grave problems with this reliance on an outside savior. Such confidence may be totally misplaced. Usually no foreign saviors are coming, and if a foreign state does intervene, it probably should not be trusted,” Sharp (2010), p. 6; this view is shared and elaborated in S. Zunes and S. Ibrahim, “External Actors and Nonviolent Struggle in the Middle East,” in Stephan (2009).

47 “[O]ne should reassert up front that successful civil resistance must be homegrown [but b]y offering context-sensitive technical and material assistance to local civil resistance movements, enhancing their visibility and legitimacy, or protecting activists, third-party actors have played pivotal secondary support roles in recent “people power” revolutions. They represent welcome forms of intervention, which do not undermine but reinforce the power and ability of local actors to be key drivers of constructive social change in their own society,” V. Dudouet, “Sources, Functions, and Dilemmas of External Assistance to Civil Resistance Movements,” in Schock (2015[a]), p. 194. Palestinian activists have experienced such support: Chapters 4 and 5.


and sanction, helping to defend Israel’s legitimacy against accusations of war crimes.\textsuperscript{50}

The U.S. special relationship with Israel is a key pillar of support of the occupation. Palestinian activists and their supporters cannot afford to underestimate the importance of this third party. This may mean seeking to inform and persuade the U.S. electorate through creative acts of protest, promoting boycotts and other forms of noncooperation, or directly intervening in policies and actions of the U.S. government (Palestinians have been building their capacities along these fronts in recent years in collaboration with Western civil-society actors, as Chapters 4 and 5 show).

Effective civil resistance often depends on exposure and publicity among relevant communities and parties to the conflict. For this reason, media typically plays a key role. In the Arab Spring of 2010-2011, social media and satellite news were crucial platforms, leading some commentators to characterize the uprisings (somewhat speciously) as Twitter and Facebook revolutions.\textsuperscript{51} Similarly, the Iranian revolution of 1979 was sometimes dubbed the cassette-tape revolution, for the smuggled devices that carried Ayatollah Khomenei’s subversive speeches into Iran.\textsuperscript{52} Other revolutions were labeled by the fax machine and the telegraph.\textsuperscript{53} In each of these cases, the role of the particular medium should not be overstated or taken to overshadow the message, the agency, or the work of the organizers and their supporters, which may be conditioned by the communication technology (facilitated, amplified, structured, limited, etc.) but not caused by it. Publicity, in one form or another, has been an important factor in civil resistance since the advent of industrialized print in the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{54}

In contests over the social sources of power, for and against pillars of support, and across all media channels, nonviolent resistance has proven more effective than violent resistance, according to the research literature. “It is evident,” concludes one of the most


\textsuperscript{52} Zunes and Ibrahim (2009), p. 91; Saizegara and Stephan (2009), pp. 192, 194.

\textsuperscript{53} For example, “fax revolutions [...] Xerox Revolution,” Gelvin (2015), p. 55; “as Iran’s constitutional revolution became known as the ‘telegraph revolution,’ Saizegara and Stephan (2009), p. 194.

\textsuperscript{54} Gandhi founded his first newspaper in 1904 and spent the rest of his life editing and editorializing in several print publications.
cited empirical studies in the field, “that especially among campaigns seeking regime change or liberation from foreign occupation, nonviolent resistance has been strategically superior.”55 Armed resistance engages oppressive regimes where they have the greatest advantage, usually a preponderance of force, and armed resistance also makes increased military repression easier to justify to the public, local and international, under the norm of security and contra ‘terrorism.’ Additionally, violent struggle can complicate and obscure the legitimacy claims of the aggrieved group, distracting from the message of the movement. The less violence in resistance, or the greater the disparity between the uses of violence by oppressor and oppressed, the greater the likelihood (but no guarantee) of social sources of power shifting against the oppressor group and in favor of the resistance group: by “(1) winning sympathy and support, (2) reducing casualties, (3) inducing disaffection and even mutiny of the opponents’ troops, and (4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle.”56

Especially against nonviolent demonstrators, acts of brute repression can sometimes (though not always) cause the aggrieved group to become more united and determined, cause neutral and third parties to become more sympathetic, and cause regime supporters to raise doubts or even defect. Conversely, acts of violent resistance may threaten the resistance’s social sources of power, by raising ethical and logistical barriers to participation among the support group, by causing neutral or third parties to remain indifferent or even support repression, and by causing the oppressor group to become more united in its front against the militant opposition.57 This power dynamic is called “backfire,” when violent acts, whether of resistance or repression, inadvertently

and adversely impact the actor’s social bases of support. Because backfire can sometimes be a significant factor, movements and regimes sometimes seek to capitalize off their opponent’s violence, to highlight it, to document, publicize, and disseminate it, and sometimes even to provoke it. From the resistance perspective, Sharp calls this interplay “political jiu-jitsu.” As in the Japanese martial art, a physically weaker party may manipulate the momentum of an attacking opponent, rather than meeting the force directly, causing the attacker to lose balance and become vulnerable to other kinds of (social) pressure. For these reasons Sharp concludes that movements do better when they maintain “nonviolent discipline,” even in the face of severe repression. Chenoweth and Stephan summarize the advantages of unarmed over armed struggle: “[n]onviolent resistance campaigns are more likely to pull apart the opponent’s pillars of support rather than push them together; to divide rather than unify the opponent; and to raise the political, social, and economic costs to the regime rather than to the regime’s opposition.”

Finally, this dissertation also draws on another of Sharp’s standardizations of the dynamics of nonviolent action: the idea of three (or four) “mechanisms of change.” These are processes through which nonviolent methods can achieve their goals vis-à-vis opposing regimes, through which political transformation happens. The mechanisms are, in order of escalating nonviolent social pressure: conversion, accommodation, coercion, and disintegration. Sharp summarizes:

In conversion the opponent has been inwardly changed so that he wants to make the changes desired by the nonviolent actionists. In accommodation, the opponent does not agree with the changes (he has not been converted), and he could continue the struggle (he has not been non-violently coerced), but nevertheless he has concluded that it is best to grant some or all of the demands […] In nonviolent coercion the opponent has not changed his

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60. Sharp (1973), pp. 657-658, 695-698; Sharp (2005), pp. 405-407. Earlier, nonviolence scholar R. Gregg had used the term “moral jiu jitsu” to describe the psychological processes of an opponent’s moral persuasion and conversion under the repeated stimulus of nonviolent action, pp. 43-51.
62. For this analytic construct, Sharp credits G. Lakey, The Sociological Mechanisms of Nonviolent Action (Oakville: Peace Research Institute, 1968), though the fourth was Sharp’s addition.
mind on the issues and wants to continue the struggle, but is unable to do so; the sources of his power and means of control have been taken away from him without the use of violence.\footnote{Sharp (1973), p. 706, also pp. 69, 705-755; Sharp (2005), pp. 45-47, 415-421; Sharp (2010), pp. 35-37; Helvey (2004), pp. 25-34.}

To elaborate each in turn, \textit{conversion} refers to transforming the opponent’s beliefs, bringing them into alignment with the political demands of the resistance. This is Gandhian transformation, an ideal outcome. “My method is conversion, not coercion.” Gandhi professed.\footnote{Gandhi (2008), p. 153, also, “appeal to the sympathetic chords in the governors,” p. 310, “reach the hearts,” p. 370.} However, Sharp and the pragmatists distinguish themselves by emphasizing that opponent conversion, however desirable, has been the least common mechanism of change in the history of civil resistance; oppressive regimes rarely surrender power willingly, and activists and organizers are therefore advised not to count on it.\footnote{Sharp (1973), pp. 705-755; Sharp (2005) pp. 46, 416-417, 511; Sharp (2010), p. 35; K. Schock, \textit{Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005), p. 8; Helvey (2004), p. 26; T. Weber, “‘The Marchers Simply Walked Forward until Struck Down’: Nonviolent Suffering and Conversion,” \textit{Peace & Change} 18 (July 1993). It should be noted that this downgrading of the emphasis on conversion applies only to the oppressor; otherwise, conversion plays a fundamental dynamic in nonviolent struggle, within the resistance group and across its actual and potential supports, local and foreign, and even among the fence-sitters or more neutrally inclined members of the opponent’s support group. Social sources of power shift as people are ‘converted’ to new consent patterns (they are not coerced but do so voluntarily). The oppressors, however (those in power and their immediate supporters/beneficiaries), are rarely converted and typically must be pressured to change against their will.}

This development in the literature (the recognition that opponent conversion is not typically a realistic outcome against oppressive regimes), has relevance to the Palestinian experience. Skeptics of the prospects for civil resistance against the occupation often point to the unlikelihood of Israel \textit{willingly} relinquishing occupied Palestinian territory (this is partly due to seemingly irreconcilable claims to the land, and also partly due to the “social distance” between the two populations\footnote{On these potential limitations for Palestinian civil resistance: A. Carter, “People Power and Protest: The Literature on Civil Resistance in Historical Context,” in Roberts and Garton Ash (2009), pp. 37-38; J. Galtung, \textit{Nonviolence and Israel Palestine} (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Institute for Peace, 1989), p. 19.}); yet clearly some segments of Israeli society \textit{have} been moved to support Palestinian popular struggle, if not in large or decisive numbers, from human rights groups, to individual activists, to conscientious military objectors (see the discussion of the First Intifada in Section 3.2(i) and the role of Israeli activists in the anti-wall movement discussed in Chapter 4). Importantly, this does
not mean that tertiary parties to the conflict, such as Europe and the United States, cannot be converted to the Palestinian cause. More importantly, as Sharp has argued, opponent conversion is just one possible mechanism of achieving change against repressive regimes.

The second is *accommodation*. This means that the opponent makes some concessions because the cost of not doing so is deemed higher or risky; the regime does not feel threatened existentially or enough to yield fully but calculates significant gain through compromise. This change mechanism has generally been the norm in labour/management disputes, as Sharp points out, with both sides typically settling for less than their optimum outcomes. However, Sharp also warns that this mechanism becomes less reliable under conditions of vast power disparity, particularly against dictatorships; lacking accountability or enforcement mechanisms, oppressive regimes tend to over promise and under deliver.\(^6\) This limitation of accommodation is evident in the Palestinian case. In the 1990s, Palestinians were offered and accepted accommodation in the form of the Oslo Accords. However, and as Sharp might have predicted, Palestinians would come to feel betrayed when the compromise did not end the occupation or the settlement expansion.

Thirdly, *nonviolent coercion* means that the opponent is left with no other feasible options but to yield. The time for compromise has passed, and the resistance group has leveraged decisive pressure. When civil resistance achieves its goals against oppressive regimes, this is most often the mechanism of change. For example, the Shah of Iran fled the country in 1979, not because he was converted or cut a deal (though he tried to do the latter in his waning days), but because the popular uprising had *forced* him from power. The same was true when President Ben Ali fled Tunisia in January 2011. And the same will most likely be required to end the Israeli occupation: generating enough pressure (social, political, economic) to compel the Israeli state.

Sharp later adds a fourth mechanism of change, as a dramatic extension of

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\(^6\) “Many strikes are settled in this manner, for example, with both sides attaining some of their objectives but neither achieving all it wanted. [...] A struggle to bring down a dictatorship is not one of these,” Sharp (2010), p. 36; Sharp (1973), pp. 733-741; “the greater the differential in the relative power balance or imbalance between the sides in the conflict, the more likely it is that breaches and poor enforcement of the compromise agreement will occur,” Merriman (2009), p. 22.
nonviolent coercion: *regime disintegration*: “[i]n more extreme situations, the noncooperation and defiance are so vast and strong that the previous regime simply falls apart.”68 Sharp notes that this severe change mechanism is not a common process, and he adds that it carries added risks of instability and disorder.69 One cannot discount the possibility of such chaos filling the vacuum in the Palestinian territories, should the Israeli regime completely disintegrate. Together, the four mechanisms of change comprise a spectrum of processes through which oppressive conditions can be transformed by unarmed struggle.

Each of these aspects of power dynamics in civil-resistance studies are evident in the Palestinian cases, as further detailed throughout Chapters 3-6. Social sources of power and pillars of support are intensely contested between Palestinians and Israelis, and backfire has regularly beleaguered the violence of both sides. The claim that unarmed methods are more effective against oppressive regimes than armed methods is reinforced by the contention of many Palestinians (and analysts) that their most powerful movement to date against the Israeli occupation was the unarmed uprising of the First Intifada in the late 1980s. Communications technology has been among the factors facilitating Palestinian struggle, from the underground printing presses of the First Intifada to the social-media campaigns of the Popular Struggle. In terms of change mechanisms, Palestinians have little prospect of *converting* the Israeli regime, were lured into an insufficient process of *compromise*, and strive ultimately to *coerce* Israel’s hand (and, as I argue in the coming chapters, the relatively few successes Palestinians have scored against the occupation have been through this latter mechanism, nonviolent coercion).

Combined, the methods (1.2) and power dynamics (1.3) of civil resistance constitute the major part of the action framework of analysis that is applied and developed in this dissertation. However, the action framework is incomplete. It applies to the Palestinian experience imperfectly. According to the scholarly literature, while Palestinians have strong traditions of *predominantly* nonviolent struggle, they have been tarnished by pervasive (if relatively minor) practices of violence, particularly stone

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68 Sharp (2005), p. 46.
throwing. The following section argues that on this issue, the academics have it wrong, and that the Palestinian ‘Davids’ have mostly practiced civil resistance that has been both advantageous and unarmed, even though not entirely nonviolent.

1.4 Pushing Pragmatism

Despite distinguishing themselves from less flexible and more absolutist conceptualizations of principled nonviolence—by allowing exceptions and gray zones concerning violence in speech and thought—pragmatic civil-resistance theorists have nevertheless generally maintained an uncompromising exclusion from their model: all acts (and threats) of direct physical violence. Sharp insists that violence, to any physical extent, is separate from and counter to the dynamics of civil resistance.\(^70\) Sharp also extends this analytical prohibition to all acts of sabotage and property destruction.\(^71\) This does not mean that a nonviolent campaign is annulled at the first instance of violence or vandalism; Sharp allows that violent outbursts may sometimes be inevitable but emphasizes that they must be minimized and differentiated from the movement to the maximum extent possible.\(^72\) This means that while movements need not be perfectly nonviolent, they should strive to be so, in order to maximize their advantages in contests

\(^70\) Civil resistance “is an extremely different phenomenon from violence of all types. [...] Nonviolent behavior is a requirement for the successful operation of this technique. [...] Success in nonviolent struggle requires that only nonviolent ‘weapons’ be used [...] For the above changes to occur, the nonviolent resisters must refuse to use violence, [...] must not resort to violence,” Sharp (2005), pp. 21, 391, 406, 408.

\(^71\) “Sabotage—defined for this discussion as ‘acts of demolition and destruction of property’—is not compatible with nonviolent struggle. The dynamics and mechanisms of sabotage are different from those of nonviolent struggle. Sabotage [...] requires secrecy in planning and conducting missions [...] requires only a few persons to implement plans and hence reduces the number of effective resisters [...] is a physical-material action, not a human-social action, indicating a basic conceptual shift in how the conflict is best waged [...] attempts to undermine the opponents by destroying their property, not by withdrawal of consent by the population, thereby potentially weakening a fundamental approach of nonviolent struggle,” Sharp (2005), pp. 390-391; G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), pp. 131-132. Sharp even disparages the 1773 Boston Tea Party: the destruction of British tea imports at harbor was perceived by some, even among the activists’ networks of local support, as a violent and alienating act (1973), p. 602. On property destruction, Sharp is in full agreement with Gandhi.

\(^72\) “In some cases, limited violence against the dictatorship may be inevitable. Frustration and hatred of the regime may explode into violence. Or, certain groups may be unwilling to abandon violent means even though they recognize the important role of nonviolent struggle. In these cases, political defiance does not need to be abandoned. However, it will be necessary to separate the violent action as far as possible from the nonviolent action,” Sharp (2010), p. 33.
over the social sources of power. Physical violence can sometimes be excused or excepted, but it cannot be incorporated into the dynamics of civil resistance.

While Sharp represents the mainstream of strategic civil-resistance theory, other pragmatists have been more permissive of exceptions and gray zones with regards to physical violence. In particular, many theorists have challenged Sharp’s rigid categorization of all sabotage and property damage as counter to nonviolent resistance, by granting that harm to inanimate objects does not necessarily undermine a movement’s social bases in the same way that physically harming (or threatening to physically harm) people typically does.73 This point is illustrated by the Palestinian resistance technique of damaging or breaking through the Israeli-made separation barrier that winds through the occupied West Bank and around East Jerusalem (Chapters 4 and 5). The action is symbolic, often carefully staged and choreographed, or linked to significant political anniversaries (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall), in order to attract international media and raise awareness of the impact of structure and of the conditions of life under occupation it represents. Damaging the barrier is generally not interpreted as an attack or a security threat; only the activists themselves face any dangers (typically limited to arrest or detention, though sometimes worse). It is a kind of civil resistance, primarily persuasive protest (and secondarily direct intervention), even though it involves physical violence against a structure, and therefore contravenes Sharp’s proscriptions. To bridge the analytical gap between the theory and the Palestinian experience, Sarah Scruggs has proposed redescribing this particular practice not as sabotage or property destruction, but as “Disassembly of Oppressive Structures [...] and it should be added to the literature on nonviolent methods.”74

73 For example, “nonviolent protest or resistance [...] may involve minor sabotage,” A. Carter, H. Clark, and M. Randle, People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography of Nonviolent Action (London: Housmans, 2006), pp. 1-2; “some forms of nonviolent civil disobedience involve the deliberate, if largely symbolic, destruction of state property,” I. Atack, Nonviolence in Political Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 2012), p. 126; “sabotage and property destruction may or may not be considered a form of nonviolent action depending on the context and likelihood that human injury or death will result,” Schock (2015[b]), p. 10; “we should therefore insist that civility is quite compatible with a variety of actions often classified as violent by the media and the state [sometimes including] the destruction of private or public property,” Celikates (2015), p. 67.

More unconventionally, pushing pragmatism, some civil-resistance theorists have argued for relaxing the *a priori* disqualification of all direct violence against other people. For Robin Celikates, context is decisive: with reference to the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul and then across Turkey over the summer of 2013, and referencing the earlier Arab Spring movements as well—throughout all of which street clashes with security forces were not uncommon—he argues that permitting the pejorative label of ‘violent’ to define the style of the popular protests is to misrecognize the operative dynamics of political contestation (and to play into a discourse that legitimizes militarized responses by states). Rather, Celikates writes, “relatively minor forms of violence in defense against police aggression [and some] destruction of private or public property”\textsuperscript{75} did not tip the “logic” of these movements from civil resistance into militarized resistance:

What is decisive for the civility of protest is not that it is nonviolent in a sense that would exclude these forms of action or that it is purely symbolic and remains “peaceful” and “civilized,” but rather that it does not follow a military logic and replace civil and civic resistance with armed force aimed at the physical destruction of an (imagined) enemy.

In other words, Celikates proposes that conceptualizations of civil resistance may be more productively bounded at the threshold between non-militarized and militarized struggle. This means that ‘unarmed’ is a more precise signifier than ‘nonviolent,’ at least for describing some forms of civil resistance, particularly in oppressive and conflict-prone conditions.

Celikates’ article does not raise Palestinian stone throwing, but the argument is relevant. For example, the First Intifada of the late 1980s (Chapter 3) was a mass uprising, unarmed, non-militarized, and sustained for more than two years, involving regular street demonstrations and protests, strikes and boycotts of all kinds (social, economical, political), and comprehensive alternative institution building. Yet, stone throwing was also extensive, even emblematic of the movement (stones were typically thrown at Israeli soldiers in Palestinian communities, though the practice extended to targeting settlers). Because of this, Sharp and the pragmatists have grudgingly castigated Palestinian popular resistance. They regard the stone throwing with some sympathy,

\textsuperscript{75} Celikates (2015), p. 67.
under the circumstances of protracted and severely violent oppression, but ultimately as a liability, a violent demerit working against Palestinian power dynamics. Representing a widely shared view in the literature, Sharp writes,

The 15 percent or so of the uprising that is constituted by low-level violence involves chiefly stone throwing. Palestinians see the stones as ways of expressing their defiance and rage about the injustices and sufferings they have endured for decades. But while it is true that compared to shootings and beatings [by Israeli soldiers against Palestinian demonstrators], the limited action of stone throwing is very mild, it is necessary to state that stones are not merely symbolic as most Palestinians intend—or explain—them to be; rocks of significant size are also thrown, and petrol bombs (Molotov cocktails) have been used against—and have killed—Israelis. Stone throwing is also almost guaranteed to produce high Palestinian casualties—as indeed it has. [...] I have found it extremely difficult to find a Palestinian justification of this heavy price in terms of the instrumental effectiveness of that form of action.76

The first point is that Sharp has unnecessarily linked petrol bombs to stone throwing. For its incendiary property, and for the significantly increased probability of causing severe injury or death, throwing Molotov cocktails even at armoured soldiers arguably crosses Celikates’ line into armed struggle, into militarized resistance. Petrol bombs are therefore exceptions to civil resistance, not part of it. In distinction, I show in Chapter 3, stone throwing during this period proved a key dynamic, arguably a linchpin, of the unarmed and otherwise predominantly nonviolent uprising—which was known at the time as the Intifada of the stones (intifadat al-hijara). Dramatic photos and video of Palestinian youth hurling stones at Israeli occupation forces, inverting the conventional David and Goliath narrative, catapulted the Palestinian story into newspapers and television news

76 G. Sharp, “The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19:1 (1989), p. 7, original emphases. This is the common view in civil resistance studies: “the stones fed Israeli fear and let antagonists criticize the uprising as inherently violent, thus diminishing its political results [and] to neutralize Israeli dread and fright [...] might have required cessation of all throwing of stones,” King (2007), pp. 264, 313, emphasis added; “the intifada was compromised by those who threw stones and Molotov cocktails,” Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 495; “a stone can cause injuries but can also kill, so when you are afraid of a stone you may be afraid of being not only injured but killed. Therefore, there is not much difference. [...] Gene Sharp has said repeatedly that the use of nonviolent action together with violent struggle weakens nonviolent struggle. The use of limited violence among so many powerful techniques of nonviolence used by Palestinians has weakened the nonviolent aspect of the struggle,” E. Kaufman, “Limited Violence and the Palestinian Struggle,” in MacQueen (1992), p. 101; “has not been nonviolent enough [and] under certain circumstances stones can kill, as can firebombs and Molotov Cocktails. Even when they do not kill they can create fear and panic—and reinforce the image of the other as fundamentally threatening,” A. Rigby, *Living the Intifada* (London: Zed, 1991), pp. 1, 191.
programs around the world. Under these conditions, Palestinian stone throwing has operated, on the whole but not always, more like civil resistance than it has like armed resistance: for galvanizing communities at the grassroots level, for eliciting disproportionate Israeli repression that regularly backfired, for raising international awareness and sympathy for the Palestinian cause, and for not crossing the line into militarized resistance. While these dynamics were most on display during the First Intifada, stone throwing remains a regular component of Palestinian popular struggle (though some groups minimize and discourage it, and it is often kept away from, or peripheral to, peaceful marches). I am not suggesting that stone throwing generally qualifies as civil resistance or necessarily meets Celikates’ criteria of limited violence in self-defence. Rather, context matters, and in the context of Palestinians struggling under Israeli occupation, stone throwing has often functioned as civil resistance.

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Leaving organizational models for the next chapter, this chapter has constructed a particular formulation of strategic civil-resistance: unarmed action. As the case chapters elaborate, Sharp’s methods-based approach brings Palestinian resistance to the forefront, spotlighting a wide range of classic and innovative nonviolent practices. The social conceptualization of power, emphasizing pillars of support and patterns of popular consent, cooperation, and obedience, sheds light on the fundamental zones of contestation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and on the double-edged nature of militarized action (which can cut both ways). Yet, in some ways the pragmatists have not been pragmatic enough. This dissertation applies a notion of civil resistance that has been adapted and specified to incorporate (as opposed to merely tolerate) some forms of violence, on the grounds that it is unarmed, relatively minor, and conducive to productive shifts in social sources of power. With this analytical refinement the theory more closely comprehends and engages with Palestinian practices of popular resistance.

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77 Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 398, elaborated below in Ch. 3.
Chapter 2 – Civil Resistance Theory II: Participatory Organization

Each time they appeared, they sprang up as the spontaneous organs of the people, not only outside of all revolutionary parties but entirely unexpected by them and their leaders.

– Hannah Arendt, 1963

2.0 Introduction

The first chapter outlined the framework of strategic unarmed action, drawing on a particular strain of pragmatic civil-resistance studies, which emphasizes methods and power, while dissociating from the sometimes-restrictive discourse of ‘nonviolent’ resistance. This chapter outlines the framework of participatory organization, drawing on the same literature and many of the same authors. ‘Participatory organization’ is used in this study to approximate a set of related and overlapping organizational ideals: grassroots, transparent, inclusive, informal, voluntary, bottom up, and directly or radically democratic. These qualities exist in shades, not absolutes, and can be conceptualized in opposition to their contraries: large scale, secretive, official, centralized, top down, and coercive. The basic units of participatory organizing are typically community-based groups, such as popular councils or committees, which may be networked or layered to expand with the breadth and depth of a movement. Combined, the frameworks of unarmed action and participatory organization offer a kind of agency/structure model that illuminates and explains relatively momentous periods of Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation (following chapters).

Compared to the prominent place of action in the study of civil resistance, organizational dynamics are underexplored. Frameworks have been advanced, but often in isolation, with little or no engagement or debate between them, even though they offer different and sometimes incompatible analyses. This chapter addresses these issues. First,

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I show that the participatory model can be traced through three thinkers, Mohandas Gandhi, Hannah Arendt, and Gene Sharp, even though these authors are not typically known or cited for their work on organization (as opposed to their work on action). Then, drawing on the analyses of Mary Elizabeth King and Julie Norman, I show that participatory organizational forms have been identified in Palestinian popular resistance. Despite significant agreement across these several authors, the participatory model remains poorly understood and underrepresented in studies of civil resistance. It has contenders in contrary models that emphasize regimented, centralized, top-down, hierarchal forms of decision making and mobilization, as in the works, to varying degrees, of Robert Helvey, Wendy Pearlman, and Michael Bröning. I argue that this latter approach does not accurately capture the kinds of organization undergirding peak moments of Palestinian resistance, including especially the First Intifada of the late 1980s (Chapter 3) and a series of achievements by new popular committees that formed in response to the Israeli construction of a separation barrier in the West Bank in the 2000s (Chapters 4 and 5).

The present inquiry can be framed as a response to an appeal issued by Mary King in her 2007 study of the nonviolent and democratic aspects of Palestinian struggle during the First Intifada of the late 1980s. In her introduction, referring generically to the literature on civil resistance, King remarks, “[l]ittle is known about what actually happens inside nonviolent social campaigns, in part because of the failure of universities, social scientists, news media, and policymakers to study them systematically and interrogate the power of nonviolent sanctions and the dynamics of organized efforts to employ them.” She is pointing to the obscure relationship between action and organization in political struggle. In her conclusion, she adds, “[s]ince the dynamics of what takes place inside nonviolent mobilizations is poorly understood, any such struggle should be critically examined because of the need to expand knowledge and improve strategy for the technique.” These comments, bookending her study of Palestinian popular organization

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(details of which are elaborated below), constitute a challenge to her colleagues in the field: investigate the organization of civil resistance.

A few years later, as if responding to King’s call, three separate studies by three different authors each advanced original—and seemingly rival—formulations of organization in Palestinian civil resistance. The authors do not reference each other and give no indication of expressly responding to King’s call for further research (though each of the three cites King’s work on the First Intifada). First, Julie Norman’s Second Intifada: Civil Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2010) shows, among other arguments, that community-based and directly democratic organization was an asset to the rural anti-wall resistance movement in the occupied West Bank in the mid-2000s. In contrast, Wendy Pearlman’s Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) characterizes Weberian “command and control” structures as advantageous to Palestinian civil resistance, even sometimes at the expense of democratizing pressures. Thirdly, Michael Bröning, in The Politics of Change in Palestine: State-Building and Non-Violent Resistance (London: Pluto Press, 2011) speculates that a balanced approach offers the strongest potential for Palestinians to achieve transformative change: integrating but preserving both the centralized structure of the Palestinian Authority and the decentralized democratic action committees of the grassroots. These three approaches to organization in Palestinian civil resistance can be characterized respectively as participatory, hierarchal, and mixed. Between them, a debate is set, but until now uncommenced.

I argue that the strengths and weaknesses of the several authors’ organizational models become clearer by drawing on and extending Mary King’s conclusions about the First Intifada to other phases of Palestinian resistance. My research finds: (a) Norman’s characterization of the anti-wall popular committees is consistent with King’s analysis of the First Intifada and with the thesis of the dissertation, backed up by the ideas of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp (i.e., that participatory organization strengthens civil resistance); (b) Pearlman’s model, to the extent that it privileges (at least in framing if not always in substance) hierarchal command over open/democratic organization, is not supported by the data it examines; and (c) Bröning’s mixed model, moderate and compelling though it might be in theory, is not borne out by the subsequent failure of the centralized
Palestinian Authority to significantly support the popular resistance on the ground and instead to actually repress it. I conclude that the participatory model best describes organizational dynamics during periods of relatively effective Palestinian resistance. This conclusion pertains to Palestinian cases under analysis; it is not necessarily generalizable. To comprehend the empirical data, I tap the organizational theory of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp. The theory helps explain how participatory organization has accompanied some of the most effective examples of Palestinian resistance, and in turn, the case study seems to affirm the theory. For the most part, however, contemporary civil-resistance studies overlook or too quickly dismiss the participatory approach. Before elaborating on the texts at the nexus of nonviolent action, democratic organization, and Palestinian struggle, this chapter first situates the organizational question within the larger literature on civil resistance, considering the participatory model in depth, then pointing to alternative and more common conceptualizations.

2.1 Organization in the Literature on Civil Resistance

In the literature on nonviolent struggle, the question of to what extent, and how, a resistance movement can be democratic is an open question and one that has been insufficiently studied, as Mary King has suggested (above). However, prominent thinkers in the field, including Mohandas Gandhi, Hannah Arendt, and Gene Sharp, have addressed these questions and proposed a supportive relationship between participatory organization and nonviolent resistance. In this section, I examine those arguments, which, together, provide theoretical weight for the argument of the dissertation (that Palestinian struggle has been more effective when unarmed strategies have aligned with participatory organizing). In addition, I show that Gandhi’s, Arendt’s, and Sharp’s ideas on organization are under-recognized in the literature on civil resistance, despite the authors’ much larger profiles in terms of their work on action.

A pioneer of nonviolent action also staked out the participatory end of the organization spectrum, advocating decentralized, community-based, and directly democratic governance. “Here,” Gandhi says of his idealized social order, “there is
perfect democracy based upon individual freedom,”⁴ including the participation of women, religious minorities, and the ‘untouchable’ caste.⁵ Contrary to large dominator hierarchies, Gandhi advocates “enlightened anarchy […] a Stateless society,”⁶ in which every village becomes “a complete republic,”⁷ led by a governing committee (Panchayat) “annually elected by adult villagers, male and female.”⁸ This simple schema is community based, inclusive, and directly democratic. Individual village/republics may network or federate horizontally in cooperative interrelationships, but never impose one upon the other; indeed, Gandhi stresses his rejection of all forms of vertical organizing (much as he stresses his rejection of all forms of violence): “[i]n this structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be ever-widening, never-ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will be an oceanic circle.”⁹

Gandhi’s interest in local democracy partakes of his wider commitment to a Hindu nationalist movement known as swadeshi (self-reliance or self-sufficiency). For Gandhi, swadeshi refers not only to the economy but also to culture and politics. Tapping local resources at the expense of external dependencies means embracing the Hindu religion, the practice of khadi (cloth spinning), and the fashion of the loincloth, in addition to rooting governance in the local. Swadeshi is important to Gandhi for its potential to fortify the collective Indian identity while simultaneously weaning the people off exploitive and harmful foreign dependencies. Complete swadeshi would mean, ipso facto, complete independence (swaraj, or home rule). Gandhi’s governance philosophy, in other words, is not merely an aspirational goal but also the way to achieve the goal, in

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⁵ New communities, or ashrams, founded by Gandhi “created new forms of social interaction unfettered by existing conventions of caste, gender, and religious difference. For example, [w]omen were also members of the ashram communities as equals with men, and not subjected to patriarchal authority as they would have been in family homes in most of India,” J. Brown, “Introduction,” Gandhi (2008), p. xvii.
⁶ Gandhi (2008), pp. 102, 105.
⁷ “My idea […] is a complete republic, independent of its neighbours for its own vital wants, and yet interdependent for many others in which dependence is a necessity,” Gandhi (2008), p. 102.
⁸ Gandhi (2008), p. 103, adding, “[t]his Panchayat will be the legislature, judiciary and executive combined to operate for its year of office,” p. 103, “every village will be a republic or a Panchayat having full powers,” p. 158.
⁹ Gandhi (2008), p. 158. On this particular point—the apparent insistence on exclusively and perfectly horizontal forms of organizing—the dissertation’s participatory model differs from Gandhi’s, for incorporating some forms of verticality (elaborated below with reference to Arendt).
a prefigurative sense (means as constitutive of outcomes). “Independence must begin at the bottom,” he writes, capturing the essentially democratic nature of his approach to struggle.

Gandhi condenses his organizational ideas (of direct democracy, localism, horizontality, and self-sufficiency) into the “constructive program.” This is his political platform for ending British colonial rule through a vigorous and otherwise mundane regimen of social services and community organizing. Gandhi aims to put every pair of hands to work in sustainable and subsistence living, centred around traditional labour, farming and chores, and in the process strengthen both individuals and communities. The program is predicated on the principles of self-reliance and inclusion, on the “independence of every unit, be it the humblest of the nation, without distinction of race, colour or creed [and] never exclusive.” For Gandhi, the constructive program is more important than civil disobedience and direct resistance, because attaining these governance norms—becoming self-sufficient and independent—would render moot the need for further resistance. The British would have no customers, no clients, no constituency, and hence no hold over India. According Gandhi, the constructive program’s “wholesale fulfillment is complete independence.” This is organization as resistance.

In the framework of this dissertation, Gandhi can be located precisely at the extreme poles of each of the action and organization axes. In terms of action, Gandhi stakes out the nonviolent end of the spectrum, rejecting all violence and brooking no compromise. Organizationally, he occupies the radically democratic extreme, community based and perfectly horizontal, rejecting all large-scale, centralized, and top-down forms of government. Gandhi therefore challenges conventional politics in two senses: by insisting on perfectly nonviolent action, in defiance of Machiavellian conceptualizations

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11 M. Gandhi (2008), p. 165, adding, “every village has to be self-sustained and capable of managing its affairs even to the extent of defending itself against the whole world [but t]his does not exclude dependence on and willing help from neighbours or from the world. It will be free and voluntary play of forces,” p. 158.
12 M. Gandhi, The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, 98 volumes, electronic publication (New Delhi: Publications Division Government of India, 1999), vol. 88, p. 325, emphasis added; “civil disobedience is not absolutely necessary to win freedom [...] if the co-operation of the whole nation is secured in the constructive program,” Gandhi (2008), p. 182.
of violence (whether realist, liberal, anarchist, or socialist traditions), and by insisting on radically democratic, local, and perfectly horizontal organization, which challenges monopolistic and authoritarian predispositions toward large-scale command hierarchies.

Gandhi the community organizer, however, is relatively unknown compared to the Gandhi of nonviolent action. As H.J.N. Horsburgh writes, “constructive work is the most neglected feature of Gandhian nonviolence.” In part, this is because Gandhi’s radical localism was often perceived as a peculiarity even among his countrymen; according to Judith Brown, “few people shared the breadth of his vision of reconstruction in India, and he sadly recognized that more often than not his fellow Congressmen left his ideas about the Constructive Programme lying on the floor of their meetings rather than taking them seriously.” For Karuna Mantena, Gandhi’s “alternative vision of a decentralized, nonviolent polity” (the “perfect democracy” as Gandhi called it) was too “often subsumed under his well-known rejection of modern civilization and, in this vein, too quickly dismissed as naively traditionalist.” In other words, Gandhi’s alternative to conventional hierarchal models of governance fell into the same dustbin as his critique of modern medicine and technology. However, elements of Gandhi’s constructive program do persist in civil-resistance studies in the notion of alternative institution building, or parallel government; their formal functions align (organization as a means of empowering a population to resist or differentiate from oppressive institutions) but alternative institution building is rarely given the weight that Gandhi ascribed to the constructive program, and the substantive emphasis on participatory democracy has been largely neutralized or jettisoned (the place and quality of alternative institutions in civil-resistance studies is raised below in connection with Sharp). Overall, despite Gandhi’s often celebrated work on nonviolent action, his commitment to radically democratic organization has often been passed over and under-recognized—a casualty of the


scholarly deficiency identified by Mary King at the beginning of this chapter, concerning the shadow over the inner workings of resistance movements.

Hannah Arendt is an exception to King’s observation. Arendt’s work on popularly governed resistance is crucial to this dissertation’s analysis of Palestinian popular resistance. Arendt’s contribution in her On Revolutions (1963) shows that the same pattern of participatory organization, in the form of networked and tiered grassroots committees or councils, has recurred spontaneously in historically disparate mass revolts. For example, she illuminates the parallels between the American town-hall model in the years leading up to the Declaration of Independence and Thomas Jefferson’s ward system of “elementary republics”; the Paris Commune of 1871 and its precursor socialist federations; the 1905 and 1917 Russian workers’ councils or soviets that were promised (but denied) power by their armed vanguard; the rätesystem or ‘council system’ that spread across Germany during the November Revolution of 1918; and the social committees that appeared across Hungary during the mass uprising of 1956.\textsuperscript{16} In revolutionary movements, as if emerging from the collapse of the legitimacy of hierarchal rule (whether monarchal or imperial), community-based organizations become the basic units of governance and primary leadership of resistance. In each case, people at the grassroots formed ad hoc democratic councils or committees, which Arendt calls variously “organs of the people,” “organs of action,” “popular organs,” and “organs of order.”\textsuperscript{17} To her series of cases, Arendt could have added Gandhi’s village republics and the related constructive program (though she does not cite them). One of the contributions of this dissertation is to add to the ranks of Arendt’s cases the experiences of Palestinian popular resistance committees (below and subsequent case chapters).

In the following passage, Arendt offers a more concrete portrayal of the council/committee system. Discussing Russia in 1917 and Hungary in 1956, she elaborates:

\begin{quote}
In both instances councils or soviets had sprung up everywhere, completely independent of one another, workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ councils in the case of Russia, the most disparate kinds of councils in the case of Hungary: neighborhood councils that emerged in all residential districts, so-
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} Arendt (2006), pp. 255, 261, 263, 265, and throughout.
called revolutionary councils that grew out of fighting together in the streets, councils of writers and artists, born in the coffee houses of Budapest, students’ and youths’ councils at the universities, workers’ councils in the factories, councils in the army, among the civil servants, and so on [...] The most striking aspect of these spontaneous developments is that in both instances it took these independent and highly disparate organs no more than a few weeks, in the case of Russia, or a few days, in the case of Hungary, to begin the process of coordination and integration through the formation of higher councils of regional or provincial character, from which finally the delegates to an assembly representing the whole country could be chosen.18

This is participatory organization. It is broadly based, inclusive, inherently democratic, and rooted in the local.

Significantly, Arendt’s depiction also includes a ‘vertical’ component (“higher councils [...] delegates,” etc.). This upward or centralizing impetus should not be confused with the verticality, hierarchy, or centralization of authoritarian rule. The verticality of tiered popular committees, through directly democratic delegation, is bottom up rather than top down, rooted in the explicit and active consent of community members rather than through estranged decision-making or enforcement mechanisms from above. Arendt acknowledges that the radically democratic participatory model can take on a pyramidal formation, resembling authoritarian structures, but only superficially—in shape, not in function or process, as the directional arrows of decision-making and mobilization flow upward rather than downward.19

This does not mean that participatory organization is, or can be, leaderless. Rather, it is ‘leaderful.”20 The system requires leadership in the form of individuals and groups taking initiative, leading by example, so that similarly motivated others might act in concert, bringing with them their diverse constituencies (families, peers, colleagues).

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19 “No doubt this form of government, if fully developed, would have assumed again the shape of a pyramid, which, of course, is the shape of an essentially authoritarian government. But while, in all authoritarian government we know of, authority is filtered down from above, in this case authority would have been generated neither at the top nor at the bottom, but on each of the pyramid’s layers,” Arendt (2006), p. 270.
There is space for charismatic leaders, if a community is persuaded by their ideas, but the system does not require prominent or official leaders. Typically, decisions are made by steering and coordinating committees, composed of elected members or delegates immediately accountable to their respective bases. Figuratively, the power is primarily horizontally oriented, because it is open, inclusive, and democratic rather than coercive, authoritarian, top down, or top heavy. Yet it is also vertical or centralized to the extent that it is comprised of nested and ascending levels of governance, enabling larger-scale decision-making and coordination. This is a nuance that Gandhi seems to preclude by his expressions of perfectly horizontal governance, as noted above.

The distinction that radically democratic resistance organization can include both horizontal and vertical axes is pertinent today as new social movements have often leaned toward equating radical democracy with an exclusively horizontal emphasis, conveying little or no mention of capacities or mechanisms for coordinating decisions and actions among large groups and movements.\(^{21}\) In Chris Dixon’s 300-page survey of recent North American social movements, the word or root “horizontal” occurs nearly 40 times but “vertical” does not appear.\(^{22}\) Closely related is the sometimes extreme insistence on unanimous consensus as the only legitimate mode of reaching decisions, as opposed to recognizing that majority votes are sometimes appropriate.\(^{23}\) Marxist David has critiqued the contemporary fixation on strict horizontality in radical movements:

> The only politically correct form of organization in many radical circles is non-state, non-hierarchical, and horizontal [...] A fetishism of organizational preference (pure horizontality, for example) all too often stands in the way of exploring appropriate and effective solutions [...] I am not saying horizontality is bad—indeed, I think it an excellent objective—but that we should acknowledge its limits as a hegemonic organizational principle, and

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\(^{21}\) For example: “[o]ccupy’s non-dominant, horizontal and ‘mutually recognising’ politics is the mark of a truly radical, revolutionary (participatory) horizon [...] commitment to ‘horizontality’ – which we see as rooted in mutual recognition,” A. Wilding, R. Smith, and R. Gunn, “Alternative horizons – Understanding Occupy’s Politics,” openDemocracy (Dec. 6, 2013); “like the experience of Internet networks [...] horizontality is the norm, and there is little need for leadership because the coordination functions can be exercised by the network itself through interaction between its nodes,” M. Castells, Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age (Cambridge: Polity, 2012), p. 129, and, quoting a common Occupy slogan, “horizontal, leaderless, consensus-based open meeting,” p. 180.

\(^{22}\) Dixon (2014).

be prepared to go far beyond it when necessary.\textsuperscript{24} Harvey is urging that the radical organizational imagination not be bound by simplistic, however pervasive, idealizations of a free and democratic community. The framework of this dissertation takes Harvey’s advice seriously, integrating degrees and manifestations of verticality within radically democratic horizons—especially since this is the emergent lesson of the case of Palestinian popular resistance (next section and Chapter 3).

Looking at many revolutionary movements, the experience is often spontaneously repeated. Arendt is struck that theorists, historians, and revolutionaries seemed to have completely overlooked this radically democratic tradition. “They failed to understand,” she writes, “to what extent the council system confronted them with an entirely new form of government, with a new public space for freedom which was constituted and organized during the course of the revolution itself.”\textsuperscript{25} Arendt’s observation on the paucity of such analysis supports Mary King’s claim of a blind spot in the research field, the failure to methodically investigate the inner relational workings of popular struggles. Not surprisingly, then, Arendt’s views on radical and revolutionary democratic organization have not deeply infiltrated dominant political thought or the literature on civil resistance,\textsuperscript{26} even though she is often cited as an authority on nonviolent action and civil disobedience.

One major scholar of civil resistance does take up, and expand, Arendt’s organizational analysis. Among his voluminous works on nonviolent action, Gene Sharp also periodically addresses the question of organization, and his response is that radically democratic organization bolsters nonviolent struggle and reduces vulnerability to

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{24}] D. Harvey, Rebel Cities: From the Right to the City to the Urban Revolution (London: Verso, 2012), pp. 69-70.
\item[\textsuperscript{26}] For example, Arendt’s “nonviolent democracy as acting in concert [has] often [been] overlooked or ridiculed in the literature on democracy and power,” J. Tully, “Middle East Legal and Governmental Pluralism: A View of the Field from the Demos,” Middle East Law and Governance 4 (2012), p. 236, note 27. Arendt’s unconventionality on this topic is also indicated by the fact that neither she nor her argument is mentioned in a sociological staple on revolutions, T. Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983 [1979]) which overall espouses the opposite view—that revolutions are the stuff of violence and hierarchy. A. Carter is an exception, concluding about Arendt’s work: “this potential for truly democratic politics is expressed in the organizational forms of these revolutions, starting with assemblies at a very local level and by a process of delegation and confederation creating a nation-wide democratic structure,” People Power and Political Change: Key Issues and Concepts (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 66.
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oppressive rule. For example, his *From Dictatorship to Democracy* not only posits democracy as the *goal* of struggle but also as the *way*. Dubbing his anti-dictatorial program “democratic resistance” or “democratic struggle,”27 Sharp summarizes the logic this way:

Combined with political defiance during the phase of selective resistance, the growth of autonomous social, economic, cultural, and political institutions *progressively expands the ‘democratic space’ of the society* and shrinks the control of the dictatorship. As the civil institutions of the society become stronger vis-à-vis the dictatorship, then, whatever the dictators may wish, the population is incrementally building an independent society outside of their control.28

Sharp is describing structural change from the bottom up, or inside out. Developing vibrant, pluralistic, decentralized, democratic, civil society institutions fosters the social sources of power, or causes their balance to shift in favor of the movement.

This view is already on display in Sharp’s signature 1973 text, albeit in admittedly “brief discussion” tucked into the book’s final chapter, 800 pages in (i.e., it is not prominently featured):

There may be a causal connection between the relative concentration or diffusion of power in the society and the technique of struggle, or final sanction, relied upon by that society to maintain the social system or to change it. Political violence and nonviolent action may produce quite different effects on the future concentration of power in society.29

Sharp suggests that social reliance on violent methods may tend towards centralization and tyranny, whereas habits of nonviolent contestation may foster freedom and democracy. In two subsections called, “Violence and centralization of power” and “Nonviolent action and decentralization of power,” Sharp respectively addresses the “centralizing effect” of “violent revolutions and wars,” and the quite different influences of nonviolent struggle:

Not only does this technique lack the centralizing effects of political violence, but nonviolent action appears by its very nature to contribute to the diffusion of effective power throughout the society. This diffusion, in

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28 Sharp (2010), p. 69, emphasis added.
turn, is likely to make it easier in the long run for the subjects to control their ruler’s exercise of power in the future. The increased potential for popular control means more freedom and more democracy.\footnote{Sharp (1973), p. 802.}

Sharp uses the term “loki of power” to describe dispersed and decentralized social groups, organizations, and institutions, ranging from civil society to political and economic spheres.\footnote{Sharp (1973), pp. 799-806.}

Sharp’s most sustained analysis of the joint question of organization and action is his 1980 Social Power and Political Freedom. The unifying theme of this collection of essays is the need to critically re-examine the failures of centralization, elitism, and violence in their capacity to diminish the recurrence of war, tyranny, and genocide. Sharp highlights the common failing—the resort to violence—in both domains, martial action and coercive organization. The text also expounds the argument that the dispersal of social power into a plurality of localized groups acts as an impediment to centralizing tendencies of political power, and that such dispersal could be achieved by actively developing alternative local institutions, “constructive programs” of independence and self-reliance in all aspects of social life.\footnote{G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), Ch. 1 and throughout, especially Chs. 2, 6, 11, 12. Gandhi’s influence is not discussed in this text, but Sharp refers the reader to his Gandhi as a Political Strategist (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1979), Ch. 5, “The Theory of Gandhi’s Constructive Program.”}

Favourably reviewing Arendt’s On Revolution, Sharp acknowledges the significance of “direct participating democracy in the course of various revolutionary situations” and how “this system of direct popular political participation has repeatedly emerged simultaneously.”\footnote{Sharp (1980), pp. 152, 155.} More, Sharp also speculates extensively about an internal consistency between movement structure and movement agency, between organization and action, between kinds of sanctions and kinds of governance. In Sharp’s view, while Arendt captures the organizational aspect of nonviolent revolution, she does not conjoin her organizational analysis with the logic of nonviolent action.\footnote{Arendt’s book, according to Sharp, fails to distinguish between the council system and choice of sanctions; Arendt treats local organization as the alternative to political violence, but in fact, the choice between violent and nonviolent sanctions remains for any form of organization: “the council system is by itself an inadequate answer. A technique of struggle, a system of sanctions, is also required which is both}
connection itself becomes the object of inquiry. “The relationships between social and political structures and sanctions may be far more significant than we have realized,” he writes, aiming to wed the question of organization to the question of action, to integrate the agency and structure of political nonviolence (though he does not explicitly use the agency/structure analogy).

Sharp’s 1980 thesis is that nonviolent sanctions—the capacity to nonviolently leverage or withdraw social power—conduce to radically or directly democratic organization, because their proliferation tends to empower people at the local level. Unlike technological weaponry for armed fighters, nonviolent methods are generally immaterial and effectively limitlessly available to ordinary people. No single establishment can monopolize the resources of nonviolent resistance and in the process institutionalize control over society. Additionally, Sharp argues, the nonviolent methods themselves, the undertaking of direct civic action, noncooperation with structures of oppression, and alternative institution building, generate a kind of self-confidence, self-reliance, and solidarity that is popular in the widest, most inclusive, sense of the term.

This view re-appears briefly in Sharp’s 2005 Waging Nonviolent Struggle:

Widespread use of nonviolent action in place of political violence tends to diffuse power among the populace. The people using this technique become more self-reliant by developing their leadership capacities [and it] tends to be more democratic, does not rely on violence to maintain group cohesion, and depends upon the acceptance of its moral authority, political and strategic judgment, and popular support.

Conversely, Sharp argues, violent sanctions have the opposite effect: “political violence contributes to the concentration of power.” Violent action contributes to political centralization because the specialized nature of military struggle, the imperatives

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35 Sharp (1980), p. 19, also “[w]e need to give serious attention to both to the question of the structure of a society which is compatible with political freedom, and also to the question of the sanctions relied upon by the society to defend itself and to enforce its standards and policies,” p. 59, and, “[t]o a degree hitherto unrecognized, the nature of the ultimate sanction used by a society may determine the nature of that society,” p. 327.

36 Sharp (1980), pp. 60-62, 342-346;


of centralized command and control in marshalling the material resources necessary for arms and weaponry, the need for secrecy in protecting military infrastructure and supply lines (rendering highly problematic democratic decision-making), plus the fact that violent conflict, or its amplified risk of producing chaos and instability, tends to erode or destroy civil society institutions, which must be strong to constitute “dispersed loci of power” capable of warding off centralizing and oppressive impulses.\textsuperscript{39} In short, according to Sharp, violence centralizes and nonviolence democratizes. Top-down governance or resistance organization is coercive and consonant with violent sanctions; participatory organization is nonviolent and socially powerful, a political vaccine or antidote against oppressive structures.

Given Sharp’s diagnosis of the modern problems of violence and tyranny, the prognosis is to devolve power and to democratize society:

In order to reduce progressively the size of the existing central State apparatus, and thereby its dangers, it will be necessary to create or strengthen smaller-scale institutions (loci of power) with decentralized decision-making to provide genuine needs, and then gradually to shift to them tasks now carried out by the State. We need to aim toward a much larger number of institutions, each individually operating on a smaller scale with high democratic participation, cooperating where needed with others on projects of regional and national concern.\textsuperscript{40}

Sharp wants to move society away from hierarchal models and toward Arendt’s revolutionary “organs of the people.” This organizational move parallels or complements Sharp’s much larger body of scholarship on nonviolent action, which aims for the progressive substitution of violent for nonviolent sanctions. But in this work (1980), virtually alone among Sharp’s works, he privileges the possibility that the two causes are inextricably linked—nonviolent sanctions and devolved governance. This is the thesis I

\textsuperscript{39}“The scale, technology, and severity of modern wars, combined with the requirements of an effective military system, have contributed very significantly to the growth of political centralization. The need for effective command, control of resources, transportation, manpower, and military secrets is among the significant factors which have operated to produce that result [and] violent sanctions appear to contribute causally to increased centralization of effective power. This occurs in the form of increased centralization in decision-making, in the structure of the political system, and in the control of the capacity to apply the sanctions themselves,” Sharp (1980) pp. 316, 327, see also pp. 59, 317, 327, 331-336, 359; and, more briefly, Sharp (2005): “political violence often contributes to the destruction of a society’s independent institutions,” p. 427.

\textsuperscript{40}Sharp (1980), p. 359.
take up and extend within the general literature on civil resistance and through Palestinian case studies.

Despite Sharp’s prominent place in the field, he is mostly known for his work on action; his Arendtian leanings on organization are scarcely noted, just as the ideas underlying them are generally marginalized (as Arendt and King have suggested). For example, in a chapter called “Elite reform or grassroots initiative?” Brian Martin, a prominent researcher in the field, considers whether nonviolent defence forces should be led from above or from below, and he cites Sharp as an example of a proponent of the former—leadership from above—accusing Sharp of speaking only to conventional state and military command structures.41 By generalizing from two of Sharp’s works in which Sharp takes up the question of organization, but in the context of policy proposals for existing state institutions,42 Martin misconstrues Sharp’s views on organization as elitist and top down, giving no indication of the contrary analyses cited above. “Gene Sharp is the best example of an advocate of social defence who aims his arguments at governmental and military elites,”43 Martin writes. Contra Sharp’s purported statism, Martin urges that “[s]elf-reliance developed at the grassroots could be better mobilised against a repressive government or against a coup supported by government leaders—a situation only poorly addressed by Sharp.”44 As I have shown, however, Sharp has extensively addressed the topic, especially his 1980 Social Power and Political Freedom, though also sporadically across his work. Other scholars of nonviolent resistance have similarly mischaracterized Sharp’s work on organization, including Kurt Schock and Thomas Weber.45 This is remarkable considering that Sharp is widely regarded as the

44 Martin (1993), p. 32, adding, “Sharp’s writings are immensely valuable to social activists, who will continue to read and refer to his work even if he does not consider their activities [of grassroots organizing] worthy of mention,” p. 35, emphasis added.
45 K. Schock accuses Sharp of failing to address the importance of grassroots alternative structures to challenge state power: “[w]hile Sharp acknowledges creative nonviolent intervention as a technique of nonviolent action, he under theorizes its centrality for promoting political change. A more comprehensive understanding of unarmed insurrections, and more generally of resistance to structures of oppression and the process of democratization, must consider the existence or creation of alternative structures capable of
founder of civil-resistance studies, which would suggest that his works were better read. The disconnect is partially explained by the relative dearth of thought invested in the question of organization in civil-resistance studies.

Also tellingly, Sharp’s protégé Robert Helvey at times espouses the opposite position, speaking against democratic organization in resistance (although his treatment is cursory). Helvey warns against “the mistaken notion that the struggle for democracy requires democratic organizational structures to wage the conflict. This is a nonviolent war, but war, nevertheless.”

More pointedly, he adds, “[a]s in any war, decision-making by committee is inappropriate.” The failure to mention that his mentor espoused the opposite view may not have been wilful; the dissoance may be symptomatic of King’s lacunae.

To an extent, Sharp’s work on organization is little known because Sharp himself never adequately articulates the ideas in an integral way with his more extensive work on action, never clearly defining the relationship between action and organization, at least not after his 1980 formulation. For example, in most of Sharp’s work, including his classic 1973 *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* and most of what he has published since, Sharp reduces the topic of organization to a mere handful of methods, seven in total out of a list of 198. These include a mixture of social, economic, and political alternative institution building:

174, “establishing new social patterns;”

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R. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals* (Boston: Albert Einstein Institution, 2004), p. 137, continuing immediately, “[i]t requires strong leadership and discipline. It is not a ‘happening’ but a well planned and executed strategy to destroy a dictatorship,” see also p. 69, where he describes the advantages of a secret leadership, unknown even to most members of the movement.

Helvey (2004), p. 122. Yet, compare with his inconsistent statements at pp. 89, 108, 114-115, which seem to support local, participatory organizing (the apparent contradiction may be explained by the lack of sustained thought on the subject, giving rise to inconsistent statements).

Sharp (1973), pp. 390-392, referring broadly to life habits that are also subversive. A good
179, “alternative social institutions”;¹⁴⁹
180, “alternative communication system”;¹⁵⁰
190, “alternative markets”;¹⁵¹
191, “alternative transportation”;¹⁵²
192, “alternative economic institutions”;¹⁵³
198, “dual sovereignty and parallel government”;¹⁵⁴

The significance Sharp attaches to alternative organization is implicit in the high ranking of these methods, culminating in the most advanced condition of struggle, the establishment of an independent polity, in method 198 of 198 (as Chapter 1 indicated, the list of methods escalates in conflict intensity from persuasive protest, through noncooperation, to direct intervention). Sharp also notes that such advanced institutions have “only rarely been deliberately initiated and developed,”¹⁵⁵ in part reflecting a general “absence of theoretical foundations and studies of the strategic role of parallel government.”¹⁵⁶ Sharp is saying that organization in civil-resistance studies is poorly understood, while granting it an important role. However, by subsuming the range of alternative institution building into his list of 198 methods of nonviolent action, Sharp collapses the organizational dimension into the domain of action, and the agency/structure distinction is elided. While alternative institution building is a method of

example is what anti-Soviet dissident Vaclav Havel calls “second cultures,” or “living within the truth,” The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (London: Hutchinson, 1985).

¹⁴⁹ Sharp (1973), pp. 398-400, referring to any social structures, from sports leagues to education and medical services, that defy the political status quo. For example, in the 1980s, Palestinians developed a range of social services as part of their campaign to differentiate from and undermine the institutions of the occupation (next chapter).

¹⁵⁰ Sharp (1973), pp. 400-401, including subversive newspaper or pamphlet production/distribution, and, more contemporaneously, online social media, which bypass conventional or state media.

¹⁵¹ Sharp (1973), pp. 413-414, referring to the illicit provision/distribution of supplies and food in order to “meet needs of the populace [while] keeping goods out of the enemy’s hands,” p. 414.

¹⁵² Sharp (1973), pp. 414-415, giving the example of arrangements with black taxi drivers during the Montgomery bus boycott of the 1950s.

¹⁵³ Sharp (1973), pp. 415-416, giving the example, among others, of black farmers organizing cooperatives in the 1960s to challenge discriminatory exploitation of their labour and produce.

¹⁵⁴ Sharp (1973), pp. 423-432, giving several examples from around the world, including the build-up to the American and Russian Revolutions, when networked community-based organizing, respectively the town-hall and workers-council systems, became existential threats to their imperial rulers for having established alternative political communities.


nonviolent resistance, broadly construed, it is also an organizational activity with a structural component that enfolds, facilitates, and conditions most of the other methods, such as boycotts, strikes, demonstrations, and sit-ins. There is an inconsistency, in other words, between Sharp’s differentiation of action and organization in his 1980 work, and his tendency to otherwise relegate organization to a small corner of the action spectrum.

Sharp’s failure to incorporate organization more coherently into his theory of civil resistance is indicated by his modest response to a question from an audience member at public discussion in 2012. Asked if he is interested or “concerned about the internal power dynamics” of civil-resistance movements, Sharp responds:

I can be concerned about it without knowing much about it. Because I have not studied the dynamics within resistance movements. I know that they are very important. I know that they can really mess up the movement. There will be groups operating within those movements to take it over for their own political purposes [...] But it’s very difficult and very important and if people like you and others can learn how best that should be organized and conducted, and make that knowledge available, that would be very useful. 57

Here, Sharp overlooks his own ideas, developed most extensively in his 1980 book, an omission that partakes in the organizational gap running through the research literature (the gap identified by King and Arendt).

Of course, there is not complete silence on the topic. In addition to those already cited, many civil-resistance studies have raised the question, though most have not. Among those that have, a variety of isolated and divergent responses are offered, typically without mutual reference, debate, or sustained analysis. So while there may be broad agreement on action (on nonviolent and unarmed methods and their socially rooted power dynamics), there is no such consensus on organization. The remaining paragraphs of this section consider some examples of these diverse views, all of which are located somewhere along the spectrum already mapped out between radically democratic organization and more conventional command hierarchies. Some studies, for example, warn against privileging horizontality and participatory democracy in resistance and lean

instead toward advising less-than-democratic command structures.\textsuperscript{58} Other studies in which the question of organization would seem to be relevant have conspicuously overlooked it.\textsuperscript{59} Sometimes, when directly democratic approaches are advanced, they are framed in terms of prefigurative politics, the means-as-constitutive approach, which maintains that the forms of pursuing change inform the outcomes; just as the quality of action is said to condition the outcome (as either violent or nonviolent), so too the quality of organization is said to condition the outcome (as either democratic or undemocratic).\textsuperscript{60}

April Carter defers to Arendt’s analysis of radically democratic governance in revolutionary movements, but doubts Sharp’s notion of a special connection between it and nonviolent resistance. Rather, Carter points out, Arendian participatory structures have supported both violent and nonviolent struggles.\textsuperscript{61} The power of participatory organization (its capacity to facilitate and sustain resistance) is not tied to the nonviolence of the methods, she suggests, but to high levels of social cohesion, from a shared sense of community and common cause, from within which space may arise for resilient and cooperative governance (and such cohesion has not been restricted to nonviolent movements).\textsuperscript{62} However, Carter does not address the various arguments raised by Sharp concerning the centralizing and decentralizing tendencies of violence and nonviolence respectively (above).


\textsuperscript{59} For example, E. Chenoweth and M. Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) elaborate a thesis that links nonviolent methods to increased participation rates, and the two combined with movement success, yet the authors do not consider if organizational kind (i.e., democratic or not) might facilitate or hinder participation.

\textsuperscript{60} Resistance movements “have to become what they want their country to become: open in form and democratic in function,” P. Ackerman and J. DuVall, \textit{A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p. 503. “Underlying this way of democratization [practiced during the 2011 Egyptian uprising] is the Gandhian premise that democracy and peace can be brought about only by democratic and peaceful means[,] The nonviolent democracy they strive to uphold in all their different activities is not an instrumental means contingently related to the ends they seek to bring about. The means are the ends. They manifest the way of government they wish to bring about,” Tully (2012), pp. 228, 226-227. In his study of North American social movements, Dixon charts a predominant “anti-authoritarian strain” that is radically democratic, anarchic, and premised on the notion of “prefigurative politics,” (2014), pp. 2, 65-66, and especially 82-105.

\textsuperscript{61} “Radical democracy has been associated with violent as well as nonviolent movements,” A. Carter, \textit{Direct Action and Democracy Today} (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 244.

Perhaps the most common response to the question of organizational form in civil-resistance studies is to agnostically identify different positions while privileging none. As Kurt Schock succinctly writes,

Sustained collective action implies some form of organization. Organizations may range from formal and hierarchical with defined organizational structures and membership, to informal and decentralized with loose network-like structures. At one end of the continuum are centralized organizations such as labor unions, established NGOs and opposition political parties, while at the other end are affinity groups composed of a small number of people, usually a maximum of 15, who have close personal relations and act together on specific projects or actions [...] Whatever degree of formality and centralization, movements must create organizations that are sufficiently robust to structure sustained relations with authorities, yet flexible enough to permit informal connections that link people to one another to aggregate and coordinate political action, such as through partly autonomous and contextually rooted local organizations linked by connective structures. 63

Schock gives no suggestion that some points along that continuum are better suited than others to civil resistance. Similarly, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler write,

There are obviously many ways to organize societies for conflict, and we do not want to suggest that there is a preferred model or ideal. In functional terms, however, we see three strata of organization at which strength and flexibility need to be developed, if the tasks of nonviolent struggle are to be performed well. They are the leadership, the operational corps, and the broad civilian population. 64

Leadership, for example, may be singular or quite dispersed, so long as it can advance the needs of the resistance. The form is less important than the ability to get the job done. 65

63 K. Schock, Civil Resistance Today (Cambridge: Polity, 2015) pp. 103-104. Schock’s description of “affinity groups” closely matches Palestinian popular resistance committees. My major disagreement is that the centralized end of Schock’s spectrum appears not to extend past conventional labour unions; I would add strict command hierarchies, which resemble monarchy and authoritarianism more than the bureaucratic and representative structures of unions.


65 Two other examples: “Someone, or usually some group, typically needs to exercise […] two central leadership functions (making strategic decisions and motivating the resistance movement participants). The history of nonviolent struggle clarifies that there are many ways to do this […] The key point here is that whatever the leadership arrangements, they need to facilitate the sustenance for modification of effective resistance as required by ships and environmental context. Ultimately, effective resistance depends more on strong core leadership practices than on leadership structure,” M. Mattaini, Strategic Nonviolent Power: The Science of Satyagraha (Edmonton: AU Press, 2013), p. 123. According to
While civil-resistance theory almost universally answers the question of ‘armed versus unarmed?’ with ‘unarmed,’ the question of ‘participatory of not participatory?’ is often answered with, ‘either,’ or ‘it depends.’

My research suggests that civil-resistance studies should more seriously consider the arguments of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp, that directly democratic organization offers a practical benefit, being better suited to civil resistance than top-down command-and-control models. However, I am not talking about a model that is entirely horizontal; rather, it is compatible with bottom-up structure. Just as Gandhi’s approach to absolute nonviolence appears too demanding and idealistic under oppressive and conflict-prone conditions (though the logic remains compelling at the armed/unarmed threshold), so too the language of perfect horizontalilty fails to engage the experience of participatory movements that have tiered their leadership structures in order to facilitate coordinated action (without sacrificing their radically democratic character). Put differently, armed and authoritarian qualities in a movement are antithetical to the dynamics of civil resistance, even though this does not mean that civil resistance must be perfectly nonviolent or perfectly horizontal.

This section has shown that a number of studies link action and organization, though contrary views persist and the question is unresolved. The same can be said of the literature that takes up this question with specific reference to the Palestinian case study.

### 2.2 Organization in the Literature on Palestinian Civil Resistance

After the Six Day War in June 1967, Israel took control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from neighboring Arab states, which had controlled the territories since the armistice of 1949. As an occupying power under international law, Israel became responsible for the welfare of the population and ensuring the provision of basic services. However, for Palestinians the occupation was illegitimate. Over the course of the first

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the editors of a social movements reader, the notion of non-state-like organization only came to researchers’ attention in the late 1960s, and today, social movement organizations are understood to “vary enormously. Some have a great deal of formal structure and rules, while others have nothing but informal traditions and habits. Some are centralized and hierarchical, others decentralized and egalitarian,” J. Goodwin and J. Jasper (eds) *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts*, 2nd edition (Malden: Blackwell, 2009), p. 189.
twenty years, they developed local and democratic governance committees to manage daily life and respond to social and political needs. Beginning in December 1987, this infrastructure became the backbone of a mass uprising.\footnote{On the organization of the First Intifada, see King (2007), pp. 59-126; G. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997); J. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labour and Women’s Movements in the Occupied Territories (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991). These are taken up in the following chapter.} The national revolt was spontaneous, but its momentum was sustained and guided by advanced community-based organizations. The First Intifada is elaborated in the next chapter, but its organizational function is sketched here in order to define the contending theoretical positions. At this point, the substance of the case material is less important than the formal organizational models advanced by contending authors.

The following passage captures King’s organizational findings on the First Intifada:

The formation of thousands of committees and groups into networks of popular mobilization—a direct result of the conditions of occupation—had the effect of creating a civil society […] Popular participation in nonmilitary clubs, professional societies, and civilian movements introduced and familiarized groups of Palestinians with parliamentary procedures, balloting in elections, group decision-making, and the basics of nonviolent struggle. Large networks of committees prepared themselves to carry on, if their elected leaders were arrested. The activity of such committees was essential to the construction of the capacity for widespread confrontation with the Israeli military occupation. Without it, the sustenance of a popular uprising on the scale of the first Intifada, with its breadth of popular participation, would have been impossible.\footnote{King (2007), p. 2.}

The governance patterns identified in this passage closely approximate those charted out by Arendt (previous section), though Arendt is not cited. Among other sources, King draws significantly on Gandhi’s constructive program, the development of social infrastructure as resistance. Gandhi chose not, in King’s words, “to emphasize strategies that had the effect of centralizing power, because his ideal was direct democracy, which he believed had its best guarantor in decentralization.”\footnote{King (2007), p. 145.} In other words, nonviolent strategies decentralize power and ward off centralizing impulses, and are capable of
mounting challenges against British and Israeli colonial projects. For King, the dynamics of Gandhi’s often neglected and little implemented constructive program are manifest and writ large in the Palestinian Intifada.\(^{69}\) The uprising was coordinated and sustained by civil society, by a stateless population that lacked formal government, lacked centralized institutions of command and control. By virtue of their illegality under Israeli military law, the nearly countless community-based popular committees that constituted the unarmed insurgency were decentralized and highly self-sufficient. Yet through democratic delegation into ad hoc coordinating bodies at multiple levels, Palestinians were able to speak with one voice and coordinate action on a mass scale—for more than two years.

King is instrumental for tying the (relative) success of the First Intifada to its directly democratic organization, and for anticipating a number of further studies, pursuant to her call (quoted at the outset of this chapter) for more work on the internal organization of nonviolent resistance movements. The following texts do not explicitly respond to King’s challenge, but each make reference to her work, and each claim to offer “original” conceptualizations of organizational dynamics within the Palestinian struggle. Between them, three counter-posed organizational positions can be arrayed; they are, approximately, bottom up, top down, and mixed, represented respectively by Julie Norman, Wendy Pearlman, and Michael Bröning.\(^{70}\) After briefly sketching each of their main arguments, I will tease out their organizational implications for the thesis. I want to begin by summarizing their explicit arguments (with just a few sentences), so that my partially inferential use of their organizational points can be clearly distinguished from (without misconstruing) their original intents.

Norman’s 2010 *The Second Intifada: Civil Resistance* aims primarily to advance the integration of social-movement theory with the literature on civil resistance, which have remained relatively estranged. Norman argues that insights from social-movement theory shed light on debilitating constraints internal to Palestinian organization and at

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various levels. Norman also examines Palestinian cultural conceptions of violence and nonviolence and raises a number of arguments about grassroots organization that are particularly relevant to this discussion (below).

Second, Pearlman’s 2011 *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement* argues that movement “cohesion” is a prerequisite for waging mass nonviolent resistance. Cohesion means a significant degree of unity, of shared or concerted focus, and Pearlman evaluates it across three domains: leadership, institutions, and collective purpose. Obversely, movements characterized by fragmentation in terms of leadership, institutions, and collective purpose, mediate or encourage violent forms of protest. In other words, movement coherence is a necessary condition of organized and disciplined nonviolent resistance. Pearlman applies this hypothesis to a hundred years of Palestinian struggle, throughout linking coordinated strategies of civil resistance with moments of organizational coherence, and, conversely, breakdowns into violence with moments of organizational fragmentation. Pearlman’s argument poses a challenge for the participatory model: the cohesion she advances is often expressed in terms of Weberian command-and-control capacity, which seems contrary to participatory organization of the kind exemplified at the height of Palestinian resistance (but the difference between Pearlman’s position and my thesis is more superficial than decisive: more below).

Third, Michael Bröning in his 2011 *Politics of Change in Palestine: State-Building and Non-Violent Resistance* aims to draw attention to what he perceives to be novel and promising development on the Palestinian side of the conflict.

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71 This is Norman’s “unique” contribution to the field (2010), pp. 3-4, 117; specifically, she identifies and outlines resource deficiencies, political-process obstacles, and insufficient movement frames—which are three common analytical approaches of social-movement theory—and she applies them respectively at the local, national, and international levels of Palestinian organization, to elucidate various structural limitations of contemporary Palestinian civil resistance: “I examine these different levels of fragmentation through the social movement theory lenses of weak mobilization structures, political constraints, and ineffective movement frames,” p. 76, and see her Chs. 6-8, respectively “Local Constraints: Resource Mobilization,” “National Constraints: Political Structures,” and “International Constraints: Movement Frames,” pp. 75-112.

72 Norman (2010), pp. 61-74, 103-112.


74 To reinforce her “organizational mediation theory of protest,” Pearlman (2011) also applies it to similar effect in two smaller case studies of South Africa and North Ireland, pp. 187-216.

75 For Bröning (2011), this was a “fundamental and largely overlooked” development, “much neglected,” pp. 7, 9.
and political establishment the Palestinian Authority appear to Bröning to be aligning on a program of nonviolence, civil resistance, and diplomacy; the activists have continued their work on the ground and with solidarity from Israeli and international civil society, while the career politicians have pushed their “peace offensive” through legal and diplomatic channels internationally. Joined in collaboration, the two fronts—centralized and decentralized—offer a “revolutionary development.”

Each of these three studies has a particular formulation of the relational dynamics between nonviolent action and organizational participation in Palestinian resistance, but they contradict, and important questions remain open. In Palestinian civil resistance, what is the balance between bottom-up versus top-down organization? What kind of organization is most associated with more effective movements? What is the relationship between the agency and the structure of the resistance? Norman aligns with King’s findings on the First Intifada by portraying radically democratic organization as an asset to Palestinian nonviolent struggle in the mid-2000s. Norman examines the return of the popular committees in the rural areas outside the jurisdiction of the centralized PA, where communities united to resist, and sometimes successfully challenge, the construction of a separation barrier on their lands (the anti-wall movement is the subject of Chapter 4). Norman also emphasizes the debilitating and undemocratic structures of the Oslo regime—the PA—which systematically coopted or dismantled the grassroots civil-society organizations in its state-building exercises of the 1990s (not unlike the Bolsheviks’ betrayal of the democratic workers’ councils, and several other examples, as Arendt shows). In other words, Norman maintains that participatory organization more than centralized command structure has been an asset to Palestinian popular struggle.

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76 Bröning (2011), p. 7, also, “for the first time in the history of the Palestinian struggle, nonviolence is effectively promoted by all relevant political institutions and sectors of Palestinian society […] simultaneously emerging spontaneously from the grassroots and being encouraged by the leadership,” p. 148 (the latter clause in this passage is Bröning quoting Z. Asali, “A Peaceful Strategy for Palestinian Independence,” Guardian (Apr. 19, 2010).

77 “[R]ather than serving as a strong leadership for the Palestinian movement, the PA actually created constraints to popular struggle by adopting autocratic policies, limiting the role of civil society, and repressing activism,” Norman (2010), p. 91; also pp. 15, 89, 91-94. The imperatives that drove the authoritarian centralization of the PA are explored in the work of historian Robinson (1997); see also the latter part of the next chapter.

78 The regular suppression of the council system in the aftermath of revolutions reflects the failure of political leaders to recognize and explore the alternative to top-down, centralized states: Arendt (2006),
Framed this way, Wendy Pearlman’s conception of the relationship between nonviolent struggle and modes of organization poses a challenge. Pearlman elaborates a theory consistent with Helvey’s pronouncements against democratic resistance noted in the previous section (“decision-making by committee is inappropriate”). Pearlman treats nonviolent resistance as a strategic option available to cohesive or unified movements, whereas fragmented movements are more likely to produce disorganized violent protest. Through this concept of cohesion, Pearlman’s argument seems quite complementary to my thesis, and I suggest that participatory organization can be framed as a key factor in movement cohesion. However, Pearlman’s framing of the argument conflicts with my arguments about participatory organization. Pearlman identifies movement cohesion with monopolized “command and control” structures, against which radically democratic or participatory organization of the kind sketched above (Arendt and King) can seem antithetical or counterproductive. Citing sociologist Max Weber’s famous definition of a state—“the monopoly on the legitimate use of force”—Pearlman finds cohesive resistance in unitary command models, and she laments the lack of centralized coercive enforcement capacity as a handicap for stateless movements such as the Palestinians.79

Throughout Pearlman’s historical review of Palestinians’ use of both violent and nonviolent forms of struggle, going back to the British Mandate years, she continually finds broad-based practices of civil resistance coupled to moments of unified and centralized leadership. More, she frequently characterizes Palestinian elite leadership (especially the PLO) as struggling to minimize, suppress, or sublimate violent impulses that continuously rise up from the frustrated grassroots below.80 At other times she

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79 Citing Weber, Pearlman (2011) writes, “nonstate groups face some of the same burdens of states, such as creating social order and centralizing decision making. Yet they lack the powers of states, namely a successful claim of monopoly on the legitimate use of violence within a given territory,” p. 8; “[i]t is the capacity for internal command and control that enables a composite social actor to act as if it were a unitary one,” p. 9; “[a] centralized internal structure is a necessary condition for a movement’s pursuit of ‘specific results,’ as opposed to members’ contradictory aims,” p. 18; a resistance movement “must also exercise command and control if it is to prevent members from engaging in hostilities,” p. 18; “centralization of authority,” p. 49; [l]acking the sovereign authority of a state, the PLO could not enforce binding rules to compel its constituent parts to act in a unified way,” p. 71; “monopoly on decision-making authority [...] complete command and control,” p. 92; “the structure of internal cooperation, command, and control,” p. 223; “testimony to the consolidation of politics under his control,” p. 126; “its institutions remained partial due to the absence of territorial control and a monopoly on coercion,” p. 127.

specifically links elements of decentralized and democratic organizational structure with the breakdown of coherence and the descent into violence. Pearlman is not alone in linking cohesive civil resistance to notions of organizational command and control.

This poses a challenge and presents a contrast with the positions of King and Norman (and to a lesser extent, Bröning: below). However, the problem is less with the substance and more with the framing of the argument, particularly the Weberian or statist reference. Pearlman’s emphasis on centralized command and control is at odds with the well-documented coherence of decentralized organizational structures that made possible the 1987 Intifada. This does not mean that Palestinians lacked all centralization capacity. As Arendt shows, revolutionary council systems, tiered and directly democratic, can delegate authority upward to decision-making bodies. These are not like conventional organizations, but, according to Arendt, “entirely new form[s] of government” (previous section). In counter-distinction, as the following chapter also shows, the capacity for centralized command and control in Arafat’s PLO that Pearlman characterizes as a key ingredient of cohesion and the capacity for nonviolent resistance is the same that only came late to the Intifada, late to the idea of unarmed struggle, striving and eventually succeeding in co-opting it, and then spending the next several years dismantling the popular organs that had empowered it. In other words, the most centralized or Weberian component of Palestinian society was the slowest to grasp the strengths of unarmed struggle and structurally contributed to its suppression. For the same reason, when nonviolent-action campaigns became prominent in the anti-wall struggles since 2003,

81 For example, there is a “fine line between democracy and fragmentation,” Pearlman (2011), p. 87; “the tension between democracy and fragmentation,” pp. 228-229.

82 For example, on the ultimate failure of the 1987 Intifada to end the occupation, while acknowledging the popular character of the Palestinian resistance committees, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) also note that “[t]he persistence of PLO splinter groups and ‘rejectionist front’ undermined [the leadership’s] ability to achieve centralized command and control,” p. 141 (apart from this isolated and unexpanded reference, the authors make little or no reference to organizational form in their case study).

83 As elaborated in the next chapter (Section 3.4): “[i]n point of fact, until Arafat’s change of heart, the PLO abroad bombarded its squads in the field with orders to put their guns and explosives to use. But the men on the spot preferred the new style of confrontation and simply ignored these directives,” Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, Intifada: The Inside Story of the Palestinian Uprising that Changed the Middle East Equation, ed. and trans. by Ina Friedman (New York: Touchtone, 1991), p. 120; “rather than serving as a strong leadership for the Palestinian movement, the PA actually created constraints to popular struggle by adopting autocratic policies, limiting the role of civil society, and repressing activism,” Norman (2010), p. 91, also pp. 89-94; King (2007), pp. 137, 218, 239, 327; Robinson (1997), p. 174, 181.
they were in the rural areas outside the jurisdiction of the PA, where broad-based command-and-control capacity was lacking (Chapter 4). And in the Popular Struggle movement in the West Bank, the PA provides lip service and money to the activists on the ground, but also contains and represses their activism, often with force (Chapters 5 and 6). Pearlman periodically nods to the decentralized character of some phases of Palestinian civil resistance, especially the First Intifada and the popular resistance committees, though without addressing a potential disconnect with the overarching language of centralized, state-like command and control.

Participatory organization has proven to be cohesive in ways compatible with Pearlman’s otherwise compelling argument about cohesion (cohesion meaning a significant degree of unity and coordination in terms of each leadership, institutions, and goals). Participatory governance, incorporating Arendt’s radically democratic verticality, can substitute for the role played by Weberian and statist organizational analogies. The First Intifada’s cohesion came from the fact that in addition to its fundamental horizontality (in the form of vast networks of community-based organizations) its structure also contained a vertical axis, a capacity to make decisions, and in this sense, a degree of centralization. This does not mean it had a capacity to enforce its will on its body; overall, it relied on cooperation and consent. Its impetus was bottom up, not top down, and it existed in the absence of a state. This analysis does not challenge the substance of Pearlman’s argument so much as its framing (in terms of monopolized command and control).

Finally and more briefly, I want to return to Bröning, who constructs a classic middle-ground position. On the one hand, he extolls the grassroots nonviolent movement, identifying its strength in its decentralization: “[t]he disparate structure [of the Popular Struggle] is in fact often considered an organizational advantage and an informal form of life insurance for the movement. Proponents of NVR [nonviolent resistance], such as Mustafa Barghouti, stress that ‘if nonviolence was centralized, Israel would crush it’.” For Bröning, this form of struggle is not at odds with or threatened by centralized organization; rather, the two can exist simultaneously, in parallel, and supplement and

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strengthen each other. According to Bröning, the motion of Palestinian leadership, especially Fatah under President Mahmoud Abbas (and even Hamas, to an extent, on some days) toward explicitly unarmed struggle, combined with the peaceful institution building of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, constituted a potentially “revolutionary development.”86 In a passage consonant with Pearlman’s thesis, Bröning even suggests that the centralized leadership could help counterbalance some of the violent tendencies in the decentralized periphery.87 As I show before the end of the case studies, subsequent Palestinian history has not affirmed Bröning’s optimism regarding the constructive potential of coupling the popular committees with the PA.

This chapter has demonstrated how my thesis fits—where I find agreement and where I challenge—contemporary scholarship on the question of organization and its relation to action, in the broader theoretical currents of the field, and in the Palestinian case study. With reference to the organizational ideas of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp—claims which are by no means widely affirmed—I argue that this approach to organizing is as unlike authoritarian hierarchy as unarmed action is unlike warfare. The dynamics are different. Palestinian popular struggle is not cohesive, in Pearlman’s sense, when it resembles monopolies of command and control, but when it has taken the form of open, voluntary, democratic, bottom-up, community-based governance structures, founded more on cooperation and consensus than on enforceable rule. These organizational claims, along with the framework of unarmed action established in the previous chapter, are corroborated through a closer engagement with Palestinian popular struggle, beginning with the First Intifada of the late 1980s (Chapter 3) and continuing into the contemporary Anti-Wall Movement (Chapter 4) and the more ambitious Anti-Occupation movement (Chapters 5 and 6).

87 In passing, Bröning (2011) notes that on occasions, the PA “has attempted to coordinate local anti-barrier protest centrally—with the aim of preventing demonstrations from escalating into all-out violent confrontations,” p. 145; this claim runs counter to my research: the overwhelming proclivity of the spontaneous anti-wall movements, which were ignored by the PA for years, was unarmed struggle: see below, Ch. 4.
Chapter 3 – The First Intifada and its Aftermath

Palestinians who have lived under Israeli military occupation for twenty years on the West Bank and Gaza Strip have mounted what is by all accounts one of the most extraordinary anticolonial and unarmed mass insurrections in the whole sordid history of the modern period.

— Edward Said, 1988

3.0 Introduction

The first Palestinian intifada (First Intifada) was a popular uprising in the Israeli-occupied territories (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem) that began in December 1987 and lasted into the early 1990s. While angry street protests, rock throwing, and clashes against Israeli forces were common, the so-called “uprising of the stones” was also defined by organized campaigns of civil resistance, nonviolent action on a mass scale. This chapter shows that rather than challenging Israel militarily, the Palestinians shelved their guns (which were in limited but not insignificant supply) and leveraged ‘people power’ against the occupation. Their methods targeted the social sources of Israeli power. Workers withdrew their labour from the Israeli economy; consumers boycotted Israeli goods; curfews were defied; taxes were withheld. Military efforts to repress the movement only seemed to strengthen it, hardening Palestinian resolve and increasing international attention and sympathy. Stone throwing was pervasive, but, contrary to most analyses and despite the violence of the act, it often functioned more like civil resistance than it did like violent, or armed and militarized, action. This chapter shows that the dynamics of the Palestinian Intifada are better

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2 The Arabic word intifada literally means “a shaking off,” and evokes a stirring up, a casting off of burdens or restraints. The closest approximation in English is “uprising.” The term had been associated with outbursts of Palestinian struggle in the 1980s and quickly stuck to the mass revolt when it began in late 1987.
3 While most sources agree on a precise starting date, there is less agreement on the end date, because the uprising slowly lost coherence and momentum from 1990 to 1993: more below.
explained by a more permissive approach to strategic civil-resistance theory, which avoids the language of violence/nonviolence in favor of more contextualization and the incorporation of some relatively low levels of violence into the analytical framework (as Robin Celikates pushes the limits of civil resistance, under some circumstances, up to but not including militarization: Chapter 1, Section 4).

Additionally, this chapter highlights organizational patterns of the kind theorized by Mohandas Gandhi, Hannah Arendt, and Gene Sharp (Chapter 2, Section 1). For Gandhi, the organizational task is the most fundamental of resistance, and, as Mary King shows (2.2), his “constructive program” is in high relief during the First Intifada: alternative institution building, with an emphasis on social services and community self-reliance, strengthened the resisting population, increasing its capacity to withstand repression, while also marginalizing the governance institutions of the occupation. The basic units of Palestinian organization in the lead-up to and during the Intifada were grassroots committees, voluntary, community based, reminiscent of the “popular organs” and “direct democracy” that Hannah Arendt traced in revolutions, complete with an element of verticality in decision-making and coordination capacity (though bottom up rather than top down). The Palestinian committees showcase the power generation inherent in alternative institution building, demonstrating more specifically Sharp’s notion of dispersed “loci of power,” that is, a multiplicity of devolved social institutions, strengthening communities in terms of their self-sufficiency, and structurally countering oppressive centralization. I use the term ‘participatory’ to approximate the organizational qualities constituting the models of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp. The First Intifada was participatory in this sense, not entirely but predominantly. I conclude that without either its unarmed action strategy or its participatory organization, the uprising could not have had the same overall constructive impact.

This chapter has four sections. The first provides the immediate background to the Intifada, including some discussion of the action and organization that preceded it. The second section reviews the unarmed and participatory aspects of the Intifada, showing that their dynamics and mutual complementarity were crucial features of its endurance and impact. The third section examines the aftermath and legacy of the Intifada, as a ‘partial success’ in terms of advancing change but falling short of its ultimate goal. The
final section summarizes developments of the 1990s and early 2000s, including attempts at state-building, increasingly violent ways of resisting, and more brutal forms of repression by Israel. The chapter ends at the height of the Second Intifada, with the Israeli army breaking ground for a separation barrier in the West Bank, setting the stage for subsequent chapters.

3.1 Eve of the Uprising: Action and Organization

All parties were caught off guard when waves of mass protest swept across the territories in December of 1987. This section briefly addresses the question of timing and proximate causes: what had changed by late 1987? The answer, in short, is a confluence of factors: (a) most importantly, though incrementally over many years, the population developed an extensive participatory infrastructure of social governance that would prove capable of sustaining and coordinating mass popular revolt; (b) in early 1987, the main political factions achieved unprecedented formal unity, opening new space for collaboration across parties; (c) throughout 1987, different events contributed to the population’s sense of regional abandonment and bolstered their morale in terms of local self-empowerment, which made for a volatile atmosphere in the streets; and (d) in December of that year, a spark was tossed into this combustible mix when four Palestinians were killed in a provocative incident at a checkpoint in the Gaza Strip.

(a) The popular resistance committees that led the Intifada were new organizations, but they did not emerge from an organizational void; they extended from a complex network of participatory social organization that had been many years in the making. This has been detailed by historians of the First Intifada, and Mary King incorporates the democratic character of the civil-society organizations into her analysis of the Intifada as a powerful case of nonviolent resistance (her argument was summarized

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in Chapter 2 Section 2). After coming under Israeli occupation in 1967, as the previous chapter noted, Palestinians in the occupied territories began the long struggle of building independent governance bodies, in order to provide for social needs and to become less dependent on Israeli institutions and less vulnerable to Israeli repression. Small self-reliant community-based organizations were better able to channel participation, endure military curfews and closures, and mitigate the risks of infiltration or decapitation by Israeli forces.

Palestinian alternative institution building advanced along several distinct social fronts, with increasing momentum through the 1970s and 1980s. Youth and student associations were among the most active and regimented, with universities and schools deemed ‘hotbeds’ of illicit activity and frequently raided or shut down by Israeli authorities. Among student initiatives, and partially integrated with university curricula, a movement of voluntary work committees formed to provide vital social services to communities in need, from sanitation and health to agricultural development and land defense, often in the face of hostile and expanding Israeli settlements and under constant threat of crackdowns from the security forces. Palestinian trades in the occupied territories followed suit, with professionals forming support organizations like the Medical Relief Committees and the Agricultural Relief Committees, often defying military bans at great risk to themselves in order to deliver services. The labour unions were invigorated and infused with nationalist and socialist discourses, and they rapidly

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6 King’s conceptualization is not a coupling of action and organization, as in this study, though her work brings the two into close alignment: her explicit focus is tracing three interrelated causal sets of variables that she sees birthing the First Intifada: one, robust civil society and its democratic organization; two, new thinking about arms and other resistance methods; and three, knowledge transmission from external sources, including other national movements and theorists of nonviolent struggle: King (2007), pp. 1-2, throughout; M. King, “Palestinian Civil Resistance against Israeli Military Occupation” in M. Stephan (ed) Civilian Jihad Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 133.


8 Voluntary work committees: King (2007), pp. 95-99, 104-106; Robinson (1997), pp. 28-37; “These activities included cleaning streets, building schools, paving roads, picking olives, [and I]and reclamation was central [...]; voluntary work provided [...] the guard units, groups of local residents and others who assumed responsibility for guarding a plot of land against the uprooting of crops and trees by Israelis,” Dajani (1994), pp. 49-50, 60-64.

expanded and radically democratized their organizations in the decade leading up to the Intifada.¹⁰ Less formally, and operating almost entirely in the grassroots, women’s movements also proliferated across the territories, beginning in the late 1970s, providing training, counseling, and other support services to women, including actively encouraging their wider participation in the work force, social committees, and political organizations.¹¹ The informal, directly democratic, and community-based characteristics of the women’s groups would become the major blueprint of the new popular resistance committees of the Intifada.¹²

In the absence of state institutions, and under intense pressure from Israeli military repression, many aspects of Palestinian social and political governance became radically devolved to the community level, and directly democratic in the ad hoc committee model. King emphasizes the fundamentally democratic and cooperative character of the institutions:

The voluntary committees and civic organizations were based upon strategies that relied for their success on broad civilian participation and nonviolent means. A new politics was developing, its internal processes egalitarian, cooperative, and democratic. Leaders were elected; groups governed themselves in a broad social mobilization that would provide the infrastructure for the intifada.¹³

King is referring chiefly to the relief organizations and women’s groups, but also to the labour and student movements. “By the dawn of the intifada,” she estimates, “45,000 such committees were at work”¹⁴ (out of a population of less than two million). The unplanned protests that flared up across the territories in December 1987 may indeed

¹⁰ Labour movements: “decentralization and democratization of the union organizations [...] allowed for a large measure of worker participation on all levels of decision making [and] made it possible for young cadres to replace on short notice leaders imprisoned or deported,” Hilterman (1991), p. 56, also pp. 56-125; see also King (2007), pp. 73-75; Dajani (1994), pp. 48-49.
¹⁴ King (2009), p. 134. See also: “institutions of devolved authority numbered in the thousands,” Robinson (1997), p. xi; “[t]he fact is that by the spring of 1988, a sprawling network of popular committees was functioning in one form or another in every city, village, and camp, spreading the web of the uprising's machinery to the farthest corners of the territories,” Z. Schiff and E. Ya’ari, _Intifada: The Inside Story of the Palestinian Uprising that Changed the Middle East Equation_, ed. and trans. by Ina Friedman (New York: Touchtone, 1991), p. 248.
have dissipated in the following days and weeks, as Israeli authorities repeatedly predicted, had not this advanced foliage of social support embraced and channeled the indignation in the street. This background organization did not cause the Intifada, but made coordinating and sustaining it possible (more on organization below).

(b) More proximately, and directly facilitating unprecedented cooperation across the four main political factions of Palestinian society, a formal intra-Palestinian accord was struck in April of 1987.¹⁵ Fatah, the leading mainstream nationalist party, and the more radical leftist parties (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), reconciled long-standing divisions and agreed on a common political program at the 18th session of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers. Additionally, for the first time, the Palestinian Communist Party, with local roots going back further than the other three parties, became an equal member of the PLO. This internal political pact increased the capacity of activists and organizers in the occupied territories, accustomed to intense rivalry, to work more closely together, prefiguring the unity of the popular resistance committees and the Unified National Command that were soon to emerge.

The political parties cut across every social sector; they were not separate from the popular organizations. Each of the four main parties had their own corresponding labour, student, and women’s groups, and they were highly competitive along factional lines. So most movements had three or four rival blocs each competing for membership. They effectively performed the same social services but under four distinct and competing political ideologies (ranging from centrist nationalist to radical left, depending on the party).¹⁶ Thus, there were also multiple rival student movements and labour movements.¹⁷ Competition was often fierce and bitter, with groups sometimes refusing to even recognize their rival’s organizations. These divides running through the popular

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¹⁶ For example, “four different women’s committees were created, each belonging to a different PLO faction,” Dajani (1994), p. 46.

¹⁷ Hiltermann (1991); Robinson (1997).
networks made the political reconciliation of April 1987 all the more significant, for the Palestinian popular organizations to pool and coordinate their social sources of power. It should be noted that Islamist parties also contended with many of their own popular organizations, though these were the minority and relatively new (Islamic Jihad had only become a significant player in the preceding two or three years, and Hamas emerged in 1987, officially constituting in 1988). The Islamists were not included in the PLO or its April accord, though often practiced similar forms of participatory organizing and unarmed resistance.

(c) The timing of the PLO unity deal was felicitous, because it partially offset the growing sense that the aging organization was becoming increasingly isolated and irrelevant in the Arab world. Since 1982, driven from its base in neighboring Lebanon by the Israeli army and resettled in far-off Tunisia, the Palestinian leadership in exile seemed further than ever from its raison d’être.\(^\text{18}\) The countries of the Middle East had become more preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) than with the Palestinian issue, and in the mid1980s, murmurs stirred between Israel and Jordan about restoring Jordanian authority over the West Bank, which the majority of Palestinians opposed as a threat to their nationalist aspirations.\(^\text{19}\) The regional marginalization of the Palestinian cause was driven home in November of 1987 when the Arab League seemed to formally shun the issue at the Arab Summit in Amman, sidelining Yasser Arafat and the PLO.\(^\text{20}\)

The sense of geopolitical abandonment coincided with an increased experience of empowerment at the local level. Popular morale spiked several times throughout 1987, as a series of events seemed to show that the Israeli military could be stung, and Palestinians were the ones doing the stinging. There was an extraordinary prison break,\(^\text{21}\)


\(^{21}\) In May, six members of Islamic Jihad escaped from Gaza’s most heavily guarded prison; there were other attacks on Israeli soldiers and killing of settlers: “the Jihad strikes stirred the imagination of many Palestinians […] breaking the cognitive barrier of fatalism and demonstrating that Palestinian
a sensational hang-glider attack on a military base,\textsuperscript{22} and multiple ‘mini-intifadas,’ including a month-long siege of the Balata refugee camp near Nablus that prefigured the national revolt, with neighborhood committees coordinating defense and support services, relying heavily on stones and Molotov cocktails.\textsuperscript{23} In the historiography, these violent events are often depicted as confidence boosters, helping to galvanize the population in advance of the December mass uprising.

This is noteworthy from the perspective of civil-resistance studies. Taken at face value, the above examples appear to function at least partially under the logic of civil resistance: bolstering Palestinian social sources of power, generating excitement, confidence, cohesion, across the population. Such a reading cautions against overly dogmatic or absolutist approaches to civil-resistance theory, in which violent—or armed—action is deemed almost universally to counteract the social sources of power. However, the theory does not insist that all violent or armed action will backfire or undermine the actor’s social sources of power, only that it is more likely to do so. To more fully assess the impact of these isolated militarized actions in the months before the Intifada, further contextual investigation would be required, including into the impacts on Israeli social sources of power, and, consequently, on Israeli policy.

Highlighting the ambiguous or potentially constructive role played by such violent moments of resistance may be useful for reminding civil-resistance theorists of the possibility of analytical exceptions and gray zones, and of the importance of context and nuance. However, it also risks distorting the reality, unless forerunning acts of nonviolent and unarmed resistance are also added to the picture. Palestinian author and activist, Mazin Qumsiyeh, for example, shows that the months leading up to the Intifada were equally if not more characterized by empowering and escalating waves of civil empowerment against Israel was possible. While the grassroots organization-building occurring in the Palestinian lands in the 1980s was a more important form of self-empowerment in many ways, the brazen assaults by Jihad focused attention on the need for immediately confronting the occupation,” Robinson (1997), p. 147; “[t]hey were the match held to the long and winding fuse leading to the intifada,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 52.


\textsuperscript{23} Balata, on the outskirts of Nablus: Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 60-62.
disobedience, street demonstrations, student actions, and labour strikes. These nonviolent morale boosters, however, are often minimized or lost next to more sensational prison breaks and hang-glider attacks, partly the result of long-standing biases in public discourse toward the simplicity of violent political narratives over the nuances of nonviolent struggle.

(d) Finally, the catalyst for the mass revolt came on December 9, 1987 when four Palestinians were killed in a vehicle collision at a Gaza checkpoint. The details of the incident are less remarkable than its de facto incendiary function: it was the straw that broke the camel’s back, the final degree in temperature change before a chemical reaction. Thousands turned out for the funeral procession, prompting brazen clashes with Israeli troops, leading to more Palestinian fatalities, more and larger funerals and protests, and within three days, the whole of the occupied population seemed to be in the streets. The Palestinians had lost their proverbial fear. From the outset, Israeli officials repeatedly assured the public and the international community that the protests were subsiding, yet they persisted, day after day, week after week, month after month.

3.2 The Uprising: Unarmed and Participatory

Behind the highly visible stone-throwing youth and barricades of burning tires, practically every person had a nonviolent role to play, from the cities to the countryside. It was genuinely popular, transcending social and political lines. The mass movement

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26 For example, Palestinians were “not daunted by the shots fired in the air. On the contrary, again and again the soldiers were confronted by frenzied people taunting them in Hebrew and daring them to shoot while they stood rooted to the spot in defiance. Others let out cries of despair—‘It’s better to die than to go on like this!’,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 19-20, and throughout their Chs. 1, 3-4; see also “end of fear,” R. Hunter, The Palestinian Uprising: A War By Other Means, Revised and Expanded (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 61; “psychological barrier,” Hiltermann (1991), p. 213; “shrugged off [...] no sign of abating,” Sayigh (1997), p. 607; Peretz (1990), p. 44.
deployed the gauntlet of classic nonviolent-resistance methods. Methods of protest and persuasion included writing petitions and issuing public statements, demonstrating, marching, carrying signs, flying illegal Palestinian flags, communicating through illegal graffiti, among others. Methods of noncooperation included labor strikes, student strikes, general strikes, tax strikes, consumer boycotts, administrative boycotts, resigning from jobs and offices connected to the occupation, among others. Methods of direct intervention included human chains, roadblocks, breaking military curfews, defying school closures, fasting, establishing underground education systems, reclaiming land through agricultural projects, building other alternative social institutions to undermine occupation authority, and developing popular resistance committees to lead communities through the uprising. Framed this way, action and organization are undifferentiated under the label of methods of nonviolent action (more specifically under the label of methods of direct intervention). My analysis distinguishes the categories of action and organization into domains that resemble the distinction between agency and structure, discrete but related and co-constituting. This section first examines the Intifada with respect to action, including strategic considerations of unarmed resistance methods in relation to the social sources of power. Then, the organizational aspects are explored, highlighting the participatory structures that sustained the Intifada and how they compare to contending theoretical models. Finally, this section briefly touches on the interrelation between these two modalities of action and organization.

(i) Demonstrations, marches, and other street protests were among the most


visible of methods from the beginning, the public face of the Intifada. These ranged from completely peaceful, carrying signs and singing songs, to hostile and hurling stones and Molotov cocktails. Israeli security forces frequently responded with teargas, arrests, and physical attacks, including beatings and sometimes shootings (more on the dynamics of street confrontations, including the political jiu-jitsu of their violence, below). Protests also took lower risk and more symbolic forms: political graffiti denouncing Israel and the occupation or celebrating Palestinian fighters and martyrs; distributing and displaying the banned Palestinian national flag across the territories; “fasting, protest prayer vigils, guerrilla theater […] and other public expressions of solidarity.”

Less visible, though no less widespread, the Intifada was also a showcase of classic methods of noncooperation. Palestinian businesses shut down in coordinated actions, ranging from short-term general strikes or intermittent general strikes (partial days), to industry- and region-specific strikes. The tactic deprived Israel of tax revenue generated from the occupied territories (which was used to fund the occupation), in flagrant defiance of Israeli authority, to an extent that the army went to great lengths to enforce compliance, often trying to physically force Palestinians to open their stores, or to close them when they operated at banned times. Another major flank of commercial strikes came from the tens of thousands of Palestinians who worked in Israel but lived in the territories; the sudden and steep drop in Israel’s cheap labour market, especially in agriculture and construction, deflated the Jewish state’s economy.

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31 “During the first six months, general strikes were called thirty-two times,” Peretz (1990), p. 92. “Commercial strikes also figured prominently in the first days and weeks of the revolt. These occurred not just in Gaza but all over the West Bank,” Hunter (1993), p. 60; “During the first few weeks of the Uprising virtually every day was a general strike day,” Rigby (1991), p. 117.
32 Peretz (1990), p. 56; “efforts of the Israeli military to force them to remain open […] The response of the security forces was to try and force the shops to open, breaking the locks of those that were closed,” Rigby (1991), pp. 21, 117; “forcing of the merchants to open their shops […] tried to compel the shopkeepers […] the army had failed at forcing shops to close during the hours when the Unified Command permitted them to be open,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1990), pp. 124, 260.
33 “withdrawal of Palestinian labor from Israel,” Dajani (1994), p. 71; “Prior to the Intifada some 110,000 Palestinians from the occupied territories travelled to work in Israel each day, some 60,000 from the Gaza Strip and the remainder from the West Bank. During the first few weeks of the Uprising it was estimated that up to 70 per cent of this number failed to attend for work, either because they were responding to general strike calls, could not attend because their homes were under curfew, or because the buses on which they travelled had been fire-bombed, or they had been intimidated in some way or another. The consequences were felt immediately within Israel,” Rigby (1991), p. 115; Hiltermann (1991), p. 179.
There were many other kinds of noncooperation. Consumer boycotts aimed to wean Palestinians off Israeli goods, one product or brand at a time.\textsuperscript{34} Many individuals and groups, and some whole communities, intermittently engaged in tax resistance, most extensively the town of Beit Sahour in the Bethlehem region, which undertook a years-long tax strike, suffering intensive reprisals for their insubordination.\textsuperscript{35} Many hundreds of Palestinians resigned from administrative posts and police services tied to the occupation.\textsuperscript{36} There were calls, though relatively fewer responses, for Palestinians to turn in or burn their occupation-administered identification cards (for most Palestinians, the IDs were lifelines to their already restricted freedom of movement and employment opportunities).\textsuperscript{37}

There is no doubt that these methods of nonviolent resistance, especially the work stoppages, depleted Israeli social sources of power. The impact was in terms of authority (Israel’s legitimacy as an occupying power), material resources (monetary economic losses), and manpower (as Palestinians abandoned their posts and jobs). Between the commercial losses and the military expenditures, the Intifada is estimated to have cost

\textsuperscript{34} Hunter (1993), p. 124; “As the Intifada progressed, boycotts of Israeli goods became widespread; starting with cigarettes, then broadened to include the host of manufacture items that could catch and consumer markets and west bank and Gaza. Soft drinks, soap, household cleaning items, beer, clothing, canned foods—item after item was added to the list, until the boycott began to have a telling effect on both a local Arabs and Israeli economies;” Peretz (1990), pp. 55-56, also p. 52.

\textsuperscript{35} Qumsiyeh (2011) pp. 143-150; King (2007), pp. 232-232; Robinson (1997), pp. 67, 84-90; “refusing to pay taxes [but Israeli tax] raids forced Palestinians to resume paying taxes,” Dajani (1994), pp. 70, 72, also pp. 64-65; “Many refused to pay their taxes,” Hunter (1993), p. 120, also pp. 121-127; “Tax officials accompanied by the military have commandeered merchandise from shops in lieu of unpaid taxes. Other businesses were closed and their owners jailed because of the refusal to pay taxes,” Rigby (1991), p. 119, p. 118-120.

\textsuperscript{36} The UNLU “got the Palestinian policemen and employees of the tax, customs, and licensing authorities to resign and brought the various agencies and branches of local government to a standstill […] hundreds of people who had resigned their posts in the Civil Administration,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 256, 266; “600 police officers resigned on a single day, representing virtually the entire cohort of Palestinians working in the Israeli police force,” King (2009), p. 142; Hunter (1993), p. 122-125; “It has been estimated that somewhere in the region of 17,000 Palestinians were at that time in receipt of wages and salaries from the Israelis for their work in the police force and the various wings of the ‘civil administration’. Whilst the mass resignation of all these workers would have represented a most powerful symbolic victory for the leadership of the Uprising, it would also have been a severe economic blow to all those families and households who would have been deprived of their major source of their income. As it was, a number of tax officials and other workers with the civil administration resigned, along with the majority of the police officers,” Rigby (1991), p. 116.

\textsuperscript{37} See, for example, “rejecting identity cards,” King (2009), p. 142; “[a] few burnt and destroyed their identity cards [but] mass burning of identity cards […] never materialized,” Hunter (1993), pp. 120, 127; “[i]n one notable case, however, over 300 villagers of Beit Sahour, near Bethlehem, turned in their identity cards to the municipality in a collective act of defiance,” Rigby (1991), p. 120.
Israel between one and two billion dollars over the first two years. In one way, however, these methods were no less detrimental for the Palestinians themselves: economically, they increased their own suffering, as few families could afford to compensate for the income loss. For this reason, general strikes were never permanent, boycotts and resignations never total, IDs never destroyed in significant number. Significantly, the economic hardship was offset by the extensive participatory social networks, especially the voluntary relief societies, discussed in the previous section (and below). In other ways, the exacting economic methods may have bolstered Palestinian social sources of power: in their sense of unity in legitimacy, in their capacity to coordinate and mobilize large numbers of people, and in their capacity to sanction Israel (with the threat of various forms of noncooperation).

The unarmed methods of the Intifada were not new to Palestinian society, but their scale and coordination were unprecedented. They were steered through a series of directives or communiqués, stylized leaflets that began appearing in the streets within a month of the revolt’s eruption, printed in the hundreds of thousands on underground printing presses, distributed through mosques and schools, and broadcast from radio stations across the country and the region, all to much public fanfare, at least concerning a large subset of Arab and Palestinian national pride. The communiqués were issued and signed by a new clandestine steering committee, known as the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), and carried out on the ground by vast decentralized

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38 “By June [1988] the total cost of the Intifada to Israel’s economy was estimated at two per cent of its gross national product, or $600 million,” Hunter, p. 148; “In December 1989 the Minister of Economic Planning put the total cost of the Intifada at $1.5 billion. Perhaps a more authoritative figure was the estimate of Bank Hapoalim which gauged the accumulated cost to the Israeli economy after two years at $1 billion: a severe enough burden for an economy whose national output is about $27 billion,” Rigby (1991), p. 133, also pp. 115, 119, 128; “approximately $1 billion from taxes, low-cost Palestinian labor, and the sale of goods in the territories were wiped out in the first year of the uprising,” Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 416; Hunter (1993), pp. 147-148; Hiltermann (1991), p. 179; Rigby (1991), pp. 133; Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 263-264.


networks of community-based popular resistance committees (these leadership bodies are taken up below). The communiqués maximized the impact of the resistance by pooling human resources in concerted programs. “All sectors of our heroic people,” for example, one leaflet declares, “are to observe scrupulously the call for a comprehensive general strike from January 11, 1988, until Wednesday evening, January 13, 1988.”41 Another declares, “[l]et our people remain in their houses on Wednesday and Thursday [...] and the vociferous popular demonstrations resume on Friday,”42 and another, “[f]rom this day we well begin to boycott Israeli merchandise and products that our industry also manufactures [...] especially the boycott on Israeli chocolates, milk, and cigarettes.”43 The series of directives, along with statements issued through the conventional news channels, also articulated the political message of the uprising, calling for an independent Palestinian state, directing its ire not at Jews or even Israel, but at the occupation, the army, and the settlers.44

The message of the Intifada leadership can be characterized as mostly nonviolent, though the word ‘nonviolent’ (la ‘unf in Arabic) was rarely in the lexicon. Analysis of the first eighteen months of communiqués issued by the UNLU shows that more than nine tenths of the solicitations and directions were for methods that were nonviolent.45 The remaining seven-or-so percent was limited mostly to stone throwing but also included endorsements of Molotov cocktails, calls for punitive violence on Palestinian collaborators and informants, and occasional casual references to violence, such as “a day of violent clashes with the occupation forces and the cowardly settlers.”46

Indicative of

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41 Leaflet 1, quoted in Mishal and Aharoni (1994), p. 53.  
44 “In January 1988, the leadership in the territories called for an independent Palestinian state, led by the PLO, that would coexist with Israel,” Smith (2010), p. 406; “it presented the Palestinian strategy as one and at peace, negotiations at an international conference, and creation of an independent states alongside Israel [...] not one leaflet bade the destruction of Israel or death to the Jewish people,” King (2007), p. 218; “Palestinians have made it clear that the struggle was not aimed at the annihilation of Israel, but at ending the occupation and winning freedom for Palestinians. The political programme of the Uprising has always been for the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside that of Israel,” Rigby (1991), pp. 28-29; Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 211.  
45 King (2007), pp. 257-259, and notes 1-5 on p. 429; Peretz (1990), pp. 91-93.  
the proportions of violence in the Palestinian demonstrations, “for the whole of 1988,” according to Yezid Sayigh, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) “registered 23,092 unarmed protests or stone-throwing incidents, 1,390 involving molotov cocktails, and 149 in which knives, explosives, or guns were used.”47 These figures suggest between 45 and 65 documented protests or clashes per day, with firebombs used once or twice in every 20 such instances (it should be recalled that these figures give no indication of the numbers of people participating in noncooperation campaigns and alternative institution building).

The violence implicit in the above figures is put into perspective next to casualty statistics of the uprising. In contrast to the many hundreds of Palestinians killed, the numbers of Israelis killed remained relatively low. From the start of the uprising through the first full year (Dec. 9, 1987 to Dec. 31, 1988), a total of twelve Israelis were killed by Palestinians, including soldiers and civilians in the occupied territories and Israel combined.48 Remarkably, this figure is lower than the fatalities Israelis suffered at the hands of Palestinians in either 1985 or 1986, before the mass revolt began.49 The decline in Israeli deaths for the first year of the Intifada indicates the unarmed and largely nonviolent character of the mass revolt, at least in relative terms. After two years, the Israeli death toll had reached 43.50 In contrast, Palestinians suffered tremendously under Israeli violence. In the same two-year period, 637 Palestinians were killed by Israelis,51 a number more than ten times larger than the fatalities on the Israeli side.

47 Sayigh (1997), pp. 619-620. Similarly, “[i]n a single month the army’s operations log registered no fewer than 1,412 separate incidents of demonstrations, stonings, tire burnings, blocking roads, and raising barricades. At least 109 firebombs had been thrown in various places, in addition to twelve instances of arson, three grenade attacks, and the discovery of six improvised explosive devices,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 113.


50 “Fatalities in the First Intifada,” B’Tselem (n.d.).

51 “Fatalities in the First Intifada,” B’Tselem (n.d.), see under “Palestinians killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem)” plus “Palestinians within the Green Line,” online at http://www.btselem.org/statistics/first_intifada_tables. See also, “[a]fter two years, at least 626 Palestinians had been killed by the Israelis [...] Forty-three Israelis had also died, a sharp increase from the five Israeli deaths reported during the Intifada's first ten months,” Hunter (1993), p. 215; “from the start of the intifada through July 1990, 609 Palestinians had been killed by IDF fire [...] The number of Israeli casualties for the same period were 18 dead,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 340.
Injury statistics tell the same story. From gunshots and bludgeons, tens of thousands of Palestinians were wounded. After some early initial public outcry, domestic and international, the IDF reduced its use of live ammunition and elevated a supposedly more civil “break their bones” policy. Hospitals filled with tens of thousands of cases of fractured limbs and skulls, with gruesome anecdotes flourishing by word of mouth and through news media. In comparison, after a year of the uprising, according to Ackerman and DuVall, “[a] total of 402 Israeli civilians and a total of 730 soldiers were wounded, almost all by stones.” In injuries, the casualty discrepancy is more than twenty to one.

In addition to high casualty rates, Palestinians experienced a wide range of repressive measures, as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) tightened their “iron fist” across the territories. Under the military regime, much of Palestinian life was already illegal (from independent agricultural programs, to nationalist iconography and printing, to travelling without a permit, to all political activity and organizing), and the popular resistance committees were outlawed in the summer of 1988. Many tens of thousands of activists were arrested or detained, hundreds deported from the country. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were regularly put under military curfew, whole towns, cities, and regions at once, and at times, every school and university in the West Bank was

55 For example, see, “arrested Arabs for growing their own food,” Smith (2010), p. 408; “outlawed the alternative popular education that had replaced the closed schools and universities, establishing 10-year jail terms and fines equivalent to $5,000 for any teacher involved,” King (2009), p. 143; “denied freedom of assembly [...] All printed matter in the West Bank is subject to censorship [...] the law and practice on the West Bank does not permit the exercise of freedom of thought and expression in any manner which is contrary to the wishes or interests of the military government,” R. Shehadeh and J. Kuttab, The West Bank and the Rule of Law (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1980), pp. 82, 85, 88; “popular committees were outlawed by military decree on 18 August [1988]. The definition of the term ‘popular committees’ in the banning order was so vague as to allow the army considerable leeway in prosecuting anyone perceived as providing services at the grass-roots level,” Hiltermann, p. 181.
ordered closed, for their reputations as subversive and radical (leftist) hotbeds.\textsuperscript{57} Transportation and economy ground to a halt as military checkpoints cleaved the countryside. The Intifada may not have been nonviolent, but it was almost entirely unarmed, and in comparison to the violence of the occupation, it was relatively nonviolent.

This visible asymmetry between the two sides—in harm and suffering respectively—was widely grasped as the Intifada’s leading edge. It sent the image of ordinary people confronting an army into newspapers and onto television screens around the world, drawing attention to the violence of the occupation and the plight of the Palestinians. Ackerman and DuVall summarize:

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[I]mages of Palestinian teenagers in street clashes with one of the most sophisticated armies in the world were irresistible to television news shows around the world. It was called a ‘shepherd’s war’ in which a modern army was squaring off against civilians using the only weapons at hand—rocks, tires, and jeering taunts. The foreign press flocked to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and in the three months after the outbreak of the \textit{intifada}, more time was given to this story by the three major nightly U.S. television news programs than any other.\footnote{\textsuperscript{58}}
\end{quote}

In other words, the Intifada was one of the major news stories of the year, in the West and the Middle East. More to the point, the increased attention translated to increased support, “shift[ing] public opinion even in the United States toward a more positive, and sympathetic, view of the Palestinians.”\footnote{\textsuperscript{59}} Palestinian resistance leaders, especially in the territories but also to a lesser (and slightly later) extent in Tunis, recognized from the outset that guns and bombs—lethal attacks against Israelis—would undermine the narrative of the ‘Intifada of the Stones.’ So the armed struggle was suspended. According to Israeli journalists at the time:

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\begin{quote}
Equally unexpected was their self-restraint. Despite their animosity and rage, the Palestinians did not resort to arms—giving them a distinct advantage in the contest for sympathetic public opinion. There was a
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\textsuperscript{58} Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 398.
\textsuperscript{59} Lesch (2008), p. 302; see also, “[p]ublicizing the Palestinian case on the world stage, the PLO achieved dramatic results,” Bickerton and Klausner (2005), pp. 226, 227; “the street demonstrations […] without which the revolt would’ve gone unnoticed by the world community,” Hunter (1993), p. 81.
\end{quote}
modest collection of arms within the territories, and even these few weapons could have wreaked havoc among unsuspecting Israelis, especially civilians. But the Palestinians appreciated almost instinctively that restraint was in their own self-interest; resort to arms would only justify the IDF’s sweeping use of its far superior firepower and cause the Palestinians punishing losses.⁶⁰

This is not to say the Palestinian self-suppression of arms was easy, uncontroversial, or total; it was divisive, and different opinions threatened to break the consensus,⁶¹ sometimes leading to isolated acts of gunfire and explosive detonations. But on the whole, for the first two years, the mass uprising was unarmed, with impressive self-restraint on the part of the Palestinians (as the casualty figures above indicate).

The calculated avoidance of armed attacks contributed to the conditions in which the army’s violence backfired against its own objectives. In civil-resistance literature backfire is associated with “political jiu jitsu”⁶² and the contrast between violent and nonviolent action. The Israeli efforts to repress the unarmed Intifada by force—through crackdowns, arrests, beatings, teargas, shootings, closures, and curfews—achieved “exactly the opposite of what it was supposed to do,”⁶³ as journalists in the territories have written. Across all three parties of the conflict (Palestinian, Israeli, and international), power balances shifted, to varying degrees, in favour of the Palestinian struggle. Historians and journalists have identified these shifts. For example, among Palestinians, the repression had the effect of unifying the people, maximizing their participation, and fortifying their resolve, as David Lesch, for example, observes: Israel’s “iron fist policy only emboldened the uprising and lead to more and more Palestinians

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⁶⁰ Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 31-32, also, pp. 64-65, 120; see also, “a conscious decision at the beginning of the uprising to disavow the use of guns and knives,” W. Cleveland and M. Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East, 5th ed (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2013), p. 443; “knives and guns were banned,” Smith (2010), p. 406; “The UNLU determined that a campaign of civil disobedience would be more prudent at this point as well as play on the international stage better than outright violence employing guns and knives against Israeli interests,” Lesch (2008), p. 302; “decided not to use firearms (possessed by some people, but in small quantities) [...] forswear the use of guns,” Hunter (1993), pp. 60, 67, also, pp. 81-83.


participating in it.”64 Across the line, internal to Israeli society, the effort to crush the Intifada sowed doubts and division: the mandate of the hawkish rightwing government was weakened as opposition and dissent rose, with new peace groups forming and an upsurge in incidents of military insubordination and conscientious objection.65 These internal tensions should not be overstated; they were simmering, but they did not seem to threaten reaching a boiling point, or put differently, the Israeli public suffered some fractures, but no critical breaks. Internationally, opposition to Israeli policy and support for the Palestinian struggle rose to unprecedented levels, even within the American establishment, not decisively, but significantly, from a point of near inertia to a momentum that suggested to many that the occupation’s days were numbered.66 Within the first five weeks of the Intifada, three United Nations Security Council Resolutions condemned the deportation of Palestinian activists and expressed “grave concern over the

64 Lesch (2008), p. 303; see also, “what finally united the middle class with the younger generation was the indiscriminate nature of Israeli retaliation,” Smith (2010), p. 408; “[b]y punishing everyone, the Israelis caused Intifada to spread to every social class and age group until virtually all Palestinians had become one with it […] repression kept the uprising alive,” Hunter (1993), pp. 87, 200.

65 “Television images of Israeli troops shooting at unarmed teenager’s contributed to mounting criticism of the Israeli government both at home and abroad,” Cleveland and Bunton (2013), p. 444; “[e]ventually the excesses would stir public criticism within Israel,” Smith (2010), p. 407; “[d]uring the year [1988], the Peace Now movement, consisting of leftist groups and many of Israel’s most senior and respected military leaders, called for an end to the military occupation of the conquered territories,” Bickerton and Klausner (2005), p. 226; “[t]he Intifada also gave a stimulus to the Israeli left, especially the Peace Now movement,” Hunter (1993), p. 172; “collapse of the national consensus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict […] seriously forced Israel to consider the effect that the occupation has had on the occupiers,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 169, 328, also, pp. 12, 324; “[t]he number of conscientious objectors increased [to] 170,” Peretz (1990), p. 132, also 45-52; “[i]n excess of a hundred people have been jailed as conscientious objectors,” Rigby (1991), p. 76.

66 “Israel’s response was deemed by the world to be too harsh, and the Jewish state was widely criticized, even by Jews in the United States […] the harsh Israeli response to the Intifada enabled the PLO to take the diplomatic initiative […] The Intifada became the center of world attention […] Under the impact of the Intifada, relations between the Bush administration and Israel became strained,” Bickerton and Klausner (2005), pp. 226, 227, 232; Sayigh (1997), pp. 615, 617, 624; “unblocked a peace process frozen for almost a decade […] and brought the US government into a dialogue with it,” Hunter (1993), p. 4, also, pp. 83-84; “Israel looked the part of the aggressor and not the Palestinians, the latter, for the first time in the United States at least, being viewed as the victim,” Lesch (2008), pp. 302-303; “[w]ithin a short time of the outbreak of the uprising, Israel’s standing sank to its lowest ebb since the siege of Beirut in 1982 […] By far the most serious fallout from the intifada was its effect on U.S.-Israeli relations,” A. Shlaim, Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 454-455. “the United States has opened an official dialogue with the PLO (which constitutes recognition); and the Israeli government has come around to seeing that it must negotiate a settlement of the Palestinian problem with the Palestinians […] flurry of diplomatic activity brought on by the intifada […] caused a sharp turn in international public opinion,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 12, 314, 317, also pp. 131, 300-301, 307-308.
Such criticism of Israel has rarely passed through the Security Council, mostly due to the U.S. veto, and one of the three resolutions passed unanimously, meaning even the U.S. voted for it (rather than merely abstaining). The Intifada put the Palestinian cause high on the international agenda, legitimized the PLO in the eyes of the world, and induced Western countries, including the United States, to uncharacteristically put some pressure on Israel to address the grievances of the Palestinians. It was not enough pressure to coerce Israel to end the occupation, but it was enough pressure to impel Israel into a cost-benefit consideration in which the status quo was deemed more costly than seeking a significant compromise, not capitulation but accommodation. Nonviolent-resistance theory incorporates these dynamics into a framework that allows agency and choice of methods to alter power balances and trigger different mechanisms of change.

However, the action strategy of the Intifada had little to do with conceptualizations of ‘nonviolent’ resistance; few from any quarter characterized it as ‘nonviolent.’ There were exceptions, such as educator, counselor, and community organizer, Palestinian-American Mubarak Awad, scholar and advocate of nonviolent resistance, based in Jerusalem for much of the 1980s. Though he seemed to concern the Israeli authorities with his workshops and small-scale constructive projects, Palestinian society largely dismissed him as eccentric, an outsider, sometimes even as a foreign

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68 UNSC 607 (Jan. 5, 1988). Similar resolutions passed in the coming months (636, 641, 681, 694 709, 726), along with other resolutions critical of Israel (672, 673). In total, during the First Intifada years, more resolutions passed through the Security Council critical of Israeli policy toward Palestinians and the occupied Palestinian territories (approximately eleven such resolutions) than have passed in the 25 years since Oslo (approximately six such resolutions: 904, 1073, 1322, 1397, 1435, 2334).
69 On Sharp’s four mechanisms of change, Sharp (1973), pp. 69, 705-755; Sharp (2005), pp. 45-47, 415-421; as noted in Ch. 1. Also noted in Ch. 1, Sharp suggests that accommodation may be desirable in some instances, especially labour disputes between workers and management, but in struggles against oppressive and militarily superior regimes, accommodation rarely meets minimal expectations of a resistance group, typically because of the power imbalances and the lack of accountability mechanisms. This logic applies to the Palestinian case, as most Palestinians felt betrayed by the inadequacy of the Oslo accommodation (next sections).
70 In the five years preceding the uprising, Awad co-founded the Palestinian Center for the Study of Nonviolence in East Jerusalem and hosted public counseling sessions and distributed booklets in which he injected the ideas of Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr, and Gene Sharp in the Palestinian vernacular: see King (2007); pp. 127-164, 212; Ackerman and DuVall (2000), pp. 404, 405, 409-411, 418; Hunter (1993), p. xvii; Peretz (1990), pp. 53-58; Rigby (1991), pp. 173-174; Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), pp. 240-245.
intelligence agent, for peddling ideas that seemed odd, counterintuitive, and foreign. In 1984, Awad once provocatively declared, “[w]e are under occupation because we choose to be under occupation,”

71 invoking Sharp’s logic of power as dependent on consent, obedience, and cooperation, and echoing something Gandhi once said about the Indians and the British occupation. 72 Awad’s local creditability may have risen somewhat when Israel deported him from the country in 1988. Throughout the first two years of the Intifada, many of Awad’s views on civil disobedience and noncooperation in the occupied territories, minus the explicit language of nonviolence, began appearing unattributed in the leaflets of the UNLU. 73 Awad had connections to, and was sometimes a part of, a small circle of like-minded elites from Jerusalem, “activist intellectuals,” who cultivated loose ties with the UNLU and the parties’ leaderships, sometimes influencing the formulation the Intifada’s vision and strategy. 74 This is not to say that Awad shaped the modes of the Intifada, though he may have modestly influenced them; rather his contribution was holding a framework on standby, made suddenly sensible by the unexpected Intifada; it described what had always been a feature of Palestinian struggle, but came to the forefront in a big way in late 1987. The general public, and audiences around the world, including Israeli, may not have thought of the Intifada as “nonviolent,” but the methods themselves were mostly nonviolent, mostly classic methods of civil resistance—demonstrations, strikes, and boycotts.

The major exception was stone throwing. Across the occupied territories, the practice was widespread and widely supported. And across civil-resistance studies, as noted in Chapter 1, the practice has been widely deemed a violent deviation and a fundamental weakness of the Intifada. ‘If only the Palestinians had been less violent...’

72 “The English have not taken India; we have given it to them,” M. Gandhi, Indian Home Rule or Hind Swaraj (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1938), p. 31, a perspective Gandhi credits to L. Tolstoy’s “Letter to a Hindu” [1908].
73 “Substantial portions of the leaflets are immediately recognizable from Mubarak Awad’s 1983 booklet Nonviolence in the Occupied Territories,” King (2007) p. 212, also n. 67 on p. 413; “[h]is ideas seem suddenly relevant, and the uprising strategists seem to be picking up his themes, formulating them in almost identical language,” J. Greenburg, “The Battle Moves from the Streets,” Jerusalem Post (Mar. 18, 1988), cited in King (2007), p. 212.
theorists speculate, ‘the Intifada might have succeeded.’ The violence of the stone throwing (sometimes sloppily linked with the less frequent and significantly more violent throwing of petrol bombs\textsuperscript{75}) is said to contaminate the power of Palestinian nonviolent resistance, to backfire against the Palestinians. In their case study, for example, Ackerman and DuVall concur that stone throwing proved “counterproductive,” and that it “hamper[ed] the fracturing of Israeli support for the occupation and enable[d] the United States to hold back from condemning Israel.”\textsuperscript{76} In her study, Mary King writes that “the stones fed Israeli fear and let antagonists criticize the uprising as inherently violent, thus diminishing its political results [and] to neutralize Israeli dread and fright [...] might have required cessation of all throwing of stones.”\textsuperscript{77} Sharp is uncompromising when he advises that Palestinians become “100 percent nonviolent,” in order to “remove the ‘justification’ for Israeli repression and increase their actual and relative power capacity in the conflict.”\textsuperscript{78} Under the circumstances, these judgments seem unrealistic, unfair, and arguably untenable even by the standards of pragmatic nonviolent-resistance theory. Pragmatism puts practicality before abstract principle, flexibility ahead of rigidity, and the throwing of stones in this case did not function like conventional armed resistance, at least not for the most part.

As historian Charles Smith notes, “the image of the Palestinian populace confronting with stones armed Israeli troops who shot to kill was one that would affect world opinion.”\textsuperscript{79} The publicized and dramatic asymmetries in the conflict, with stone throwers at the forefront, propelled the news story, and with it, awareness of the brutality of the occupation. Stone throwing was a major catalyst in the political jiu-jitsu, through which Palestinians capitalized on Israeli backfire. Even Ackerman and DuVall, just quoted above in opposition to Palestinian stone throwing, nevertheless seem also to recognize its fundamental contribution to the Intifada, ceding that “Palestinians would be

\textsuperscript{75} See, for example, “the stones and petrol bombs are counterproductive,” G. Sharp, “The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle,” Journal of Palestine Studies 19:1 (Autumn, 1989), p. 7; “the intifada was compromised by those who threw stones and Molotov cocktails,” Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 495, as also noted in Ch. 1.
\textsuperscript{76} Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 407.
\textsuperscript{77} King (2007), pp. 264, 313, 495, emphasis added.
\textsuperscript{78} Sharp (1989), pp. 10, 13, emphases added.
unarmed underdogs—Davids against the Jewish Goliath,” p. 406, and, as quoted further above, that the “shepherd’s war” character of the struggle made it “irresistible to television news shows around the world.” These dynamics were fuelled by the inversion of the conventional David-and-Goliath narrative: Israel, ever the alleged underdog in a region of hostile states, had suddenly become Goliath, and the Palestinians took on the mantle of David; as historian Avi Shlaim writes, “[t]he biblical image of David and Goliath now seemed to be reversed, with Israel looking like an overbearing Goliath and the Palestinians with the stones as a vulnerable David.” Under these circumstances, Palestinian stone throwing often functioned like civil resistance. Assuming violence entails bodily harming or threatening bodily harm to others, to whatever extent, then throwing stones at anyone, even soldiers, is technically violent. But in the Palestinian case, and in comparison to the violence of the occupation, the violence of the stone throwing is typically negligible, more symbolic than actual, and relatively miniscule. Not only did it not counteract the power of Palestinian civil resistance, for example by backfiring or raising barriers to participation, but it appears to have contributed to the power of Palestinian civil resistance, particularly in terms of its impact on key social sources of power arrayed about the conflict.

The stone throwing mostly but not entirely followed the logic of civil resistance, constructively interacting with the social sources of power of two out of the three parties to the conflict (Palestinians and internationals, but not Israelis). For third parties,

82 Many soldiers have been injured from Palestinian stone throwing, but fatalities are virtually unheard of: Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 412. Since the First Intifada, in nearly 30 years, there have been approximately between 6 and 15 documented cases of Palestinian stone throwing causing or linked to Israeli deaths, and most of these involve targeting Israeli civilians in moving vehicles. Such deadly and isolated incidents, which tend to receive considerable press coverage when they occur, are the exceptions that prove the rule. Tellingly, precise data is lacking as neither B’Tselem (Israel’s leading NGO monitor of death and injury among Israelis and Palestinians) nor the Israeli military keep statistics on stone-throwing casualty: C. Levinson “Israel Defense Forces: Rock-throwing in West Bank Reaches New High,” Haaretz (Oct. 6, 2011).
particularly the US, the UN, and their corresponding publics, the stones were a prominent factor behind the shifts, as already indicated (inverting the David and Goliath myth, and making the Palestinian cause a top news story and top international issue). The existing body of literature suggests that among Palestinians, the practice appeared to enhance community cohesion, empowering local actors in cooperation, whether throwing stones, treating and supplying stone throwers, collecting stones, or providing rooftop lookouts (women and even grandmothers were known to often play these roles). Thus, the practice seems to have raised few if any “barriers to participation,” as Chenoweth and Stephan associate with violent or armed resistance, nor to have introduced centralizing tendencies in the movement, which Sharp associates with violent or armed forms of struggle. Unlike military weapons, the stones require no advanced technology or funding and supply lines; they are limitless and freely available, a “democratic weapon,” as one analyst supposed.

On the other hand, and not insignificantly, few Israelis were ever won over by the undeniably hostile act of stone throwing. As theorists of civil resistance have predicted and observed, some quoted above, the low-level violence probably strengthened Israel’s domestic pillars of support, consistent with the formula of backfire—working against the side of the stone throwers. However, given the broader conditions of the conflict, it is not clear how far Palestinians could have expected to win over Israelis even if the Intifada had professed and practiced complete nonviolence. Under the circumstances, the risk of further alienating the Israeli public appears to have been outweighed by the gains made internal to the Palestinian community, in terms of empowerment and cohesion at the grassroots level, and by the gains made with respect to international attention and

sympathy. The tradeoff complicates the analysis, but on balance, the stone throwing appears to have net contributed to the power of the Intifada. Without it, there may have been no Intifada at all, certainly no “intifada of the stones,” and many of the gains discussed above (and below) would have been diminished or nulled.

Palestinian stone throwing became a method of civil resistance that was violent, though only minimally so. The term “unarmed” more comprehensively and consistently embraces the character of resistance methods during the Palestinian Intifada, while preserving the logic of civil resistance theory. This modified civil-resistance framework emerges from analysis of, and engagement with, the Palestinian experience. It also matches the framework put forward by Robin Celikates in his aptly titled “Learning From the Streets,” where he argues that the language of nonviolence often harms the cause of civil resistance, first by not permitting a range of otherwise legitimate, and still unarmed, methods of resistance into practical analysis, and second for playing into the securitizing rhetoric of states, which strive to delegitimize opposition with the label “violence.”

While Celikates’ does not raise the Palestinian case in his essay, nor include stone throwing in his short list of exceptions to the rule of nonviolence, his logic applies. Labelling stone throwing as violent obscures its function as civil resistance, dismisses the importance of context and realities on the ground, and plays into Israel’s effort to delegitimize Palestinian struggle by the smear “violent.”

(ii) No less salient a feature than its unarmed character is the extent to which the Intifada was radically democratic, from its political leadership to its deep social foundations. The ‘head’ of the mass movement was a new clandestine organization called the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), fundamentally a PLO organization, though contained in the territories and with no formal ties to the exiled leadership structure in Tunis. The UNLU decided the priorities and wording of the leaflets through


deliberations of a four-seat committee, sitting one member from each of the four PLO factions, drawn from mid-level rank-and-file across the territories. Though centralized in this sense, and sometimes referred to as “the Command,” and though secretive and operating underground—in order to shield it from Israeli disruption—the UNLU was more of a steering committee than a control centre or executive “command.” Its decisions required unanimous votes, meaning each party had a veto. Reaching consensus was aided by the intra-PLO accord that had been achieved earlier in the year in Algiers (noted in previous section). According to Mary King, “coordination exhibited more democracy than is acknowledged by the PLO, because it was the only way to adjudicate differences between the factions and achieve unity.”

The UNLU’s function and structure were such that the organization withstood several decapitations, as Israel intelligence periodically located the group and arrested its membership, who were then replaced from the reservoirs of activists and organizers across the territories (although after the fourth wave of arrests and more than 24 months, the small organization, along with the Intifada as a whole, became less effective). For the most part, and especially

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90 “[T]he name ‘Command’ stood for coordination among the factions rather than a chain of command, in contrast to the military cadres’ top-down hierarchical structures [and it] its most important functions were to move the center of action from one location to another, and to distribute pressure and prevent fatigue by devising different methods for popular dissent,” King (2007), pp. 206, 209, also 310; “the UNLU was less a leadership committee than a regular meeting attended by representatives from the four main factions,” Hiltermann (1991), p. 237.
91 See “had become possible following the formal reconciliation in Algiers,” Hiltermann (1991), p. 119; “provided a necessary basis for coordination and cooperation between the different nationalist factions within the occupied territories,” Rigby (1991), p. 9.
92 King (2007), p. 209; see also, “[i]nsofar as the political system that the Palestinians created was a radically decentralised one, with the devolution of powers to the local level, the role of the [UNLU] became primarily one of establishing general political guide-lines and coordinating activities throughout the occupied territories. Thus, whilst it has continued to issue authoritative instructions and commands, in a manner reminiscent of hierarchically organised state systems, the [UNLU] has had to be responsive to the promptings from below in order to sustain the commitment and unity essential to the struggle,” Rigby (1991), p. 42; “Decisions of the Unified Leadership are made unanimously and after consultation with the local committees. The success of the uprising is to a large degree the result of democratic decision-making, unification of the community, the creativity of the leadership and its pragmatism in dealing with important issues,” Kuttab (Oct. 17, 1988).
93 See “March 1990 and the demise of the UNLU,” Robinson (1997), p. 97; “[t]his structure allowed it to survive imprisonments, because as the Israelis detained individual members, the factions appointed other representatives to it [...] survived at least four waves of arrests,” King (2007), pp. 206-207; “representatives were often second-level cadres, not leaders, in their factions. This has meant that when the army ‘arrested the UNLU,’ as it claimed to have done on more than one occasion, it may have arrested that
during the early phases, the UNLU served as a leadership initiative not inconsistent with the participatory model. It had organic ties to the population, with its small membership drawn from below, or laterally, rather than imposed from above. It was cooperative, and its power arose from legitimacy rather than command-and-control capacity, from cooperation of large numbers of people. Most importantly, it offered an apparatus for the Intifada to speak and act as one body, and in this sense, provided a vertical or centralized dimension to the movement’s organizational structure. Without this steering component the Intifada would have lacked coherence and direction (highlighting the importance of vertical elements even in participatory organization: previous chapter).

On the ground, the primary agents of the UNLU communiqués were new community-based organizations called ‘popular committees’ (lijan sha’biya), which formed in virtually every Palestinian community across the occupied territories. As noted above in Section 3.1, these emerged largely along the model of the existent women’s committees, which had spread to every corner of the territories with their model of place-based and directly democratic organization. Operating without any official status or formal structure, the Intifada’s popular committees enabled communities to come together, cooperate in their resistance, ensure the local needs of everyday living were met, and withstand leadership arrests (as the high participation rates and devolved committee system made replacing local activists relatively easy). Within each committee, members often had particular roles, such as dealing with the news media, managing resources, networking with counterparts in other committees, and delegating authority upward to higher committees. To maximize local participation and coordination, organizers strived to assemble membership from every political faction and social group,

period’s representatives of the PLO factions to the UNLU, who were easily replaced because they were rotating members anyway,” Hiltermann (1991), pp. 237-238.


95 In one of the fullest accounts of the organizational foundations of the Intifada, Hiltermann describes women’s role: “[t]he women’s committees lent their experience and leadership to the new structures that emerged during the first weeks of the uprising, especially the popular committees in neighborhoods, villages, and refugee camps. In the beginning, the work of the women’s committees and popular committees became indistinguishable, as women activists deployed their energies fully in the service of the uprising and its specific requirements,” Hiltermann (1991), p. 194.
incorporating figures from the political parties, often including Islamist,\textsuperscript{96} as well as from the trades and unions, the municipality, youth groups, student organizations, women’s movements, etc.. In the rubric of Hannah Arendt, the Palestinian popular committees were the “organs of the people,” the council or town-hall system that facilitate the revolutionary power of mass cooperative action.\textsuperscript{97}

To some extent, the popular resistance committees of the First Intifada were reported to have developed ‘command and control’ over their immediate communities in a way that the UNLU could not. By proximity, committee members had direct exposure to and influence over neighbors and peers, family members and friends, in their respective factions, sectors, and circles. Many of the popular resistance committees took on militant postures, and used the threat of violence to enforce compliance with the UNLU directives (e.g., maintaining strike days, policing boycotts, etc.). “Strike force” committees also developed out of the popular committees, to lead unarmed raids on Israeli soldiers or settlers, to patrol neighborhoods, and to deal—often violently—with collaborators.\textsuperscript{98} To the extent that popular committees took on physically coercive elements (socially coercive is different), they part ways with participatory organizing. Even though these limited physical enforcement capabilities sometimes played a role at the community level, they did not, on the whole, characterize the work and the role of the popular committees, the UNLU, or the extensive networks of social support committees on which they rested.

The relief committees and other social organizations, many having become increasingly participatory since 1967 (as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 2.2 above), entered a new phase of high-stakes, highly charged, and hyper politicized activity. Land-relief committees helped distribute seeds and produce against bans on production and restrictions on movement, in defiance of curfews and sieges and in spite of the risk of arrest and prosecution.\textsuperscript{99} Where food was successfully harvested across the territories

\textsuperscript{96} In the early days of the uprising, “many of the small local committees (the wellspring of the popular committees) had representatives from Jihad, as well as from Hamas,” King (2007), p. 267.


\textsuperscript{98} For example “[u]nderground tribunals sentenced dozens of Palestinian collaborators to death, and local villagers beat and murdered many more,” Cleveland and Bunton (2013), p. 443.

against Israeli prohibitions, so-called “victory gardens” became celebrated icons of struggle.\textsuperscript{100} Medical relief societies were more in demand than ever, with casualties surging and access to professional and urban hospital services more limited than ever.\textsuperscript{101} In the sphere of education, teachers worked with students to organize underground classrooms, as official universities were barred shut by the military.\textsuperscript{102} The trades and unions, extensively democratized in their recent and competitive membership drives across the territories, now became the vital infrastructure of economic noncooperation, conducting the work strikes, whether general, staggered, industry, or regional\textsuperscript{103} (and multiple accounts have noted that labour activists tended to take on lead roles in the new popular resistance committees and the UNLU). Women’s groups, which were among the most participatory in structure, in terms of the degree to which they were open, inclusive, place-based, and democratic, now intensified their support work, especially as thousand of women lost their income providers to prison, disability, or death.\textsuperscript{104} These were the deep social organizations that made Intifada possible, at least over any extended period of time—voluntary relief committees, professional associations, unions, students and women’s groups.

On the whole, despite some elements of physical and social coercion, Palestinian civil society and its resistance organizations were participatory, founded on consent and cooperation, open and democratic (to the extent possible under threat or repression and persecution), rooted in local governance, horizontal organizing, and bottom-up leadership and decision making. These organizational dynamics closely resemble the models advanced by Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp. Gandhi’s basic principles of constructive work and direct democracy are not only visible in the Intifada, but among its primary strengths. “Without it,” King concludes, referring to the robust constructive program, “the sustenance of a popular uprising on the scale of the first Intifada, with its breadth of

\textsuperscript{101} Ackerman and DuVall (2000), pp. 410-412; Dajani (1994), pp. 60-61.
popular participation, would have been impossible.” Likewise, the local committees are manifestations of Arendt’s popular organs, governing society and politics in the absence of state structures, and also manifestations of Sharp’s alternative institutions and dispersed loci of power, counteracting centralizing forces in society. Mary King is not the first to examine organizational infrastructure as a necessary condition of the First Intifada’s stamina, but she is the first in civil-resistance studies to raise the question of organization to the analytical level of the question of action (recall from Chapter 2 that King urged her colleagues to pay closer attention to the organization of movements). Before King and from outside the genre of civil-resistance studies, others examining the Palestinian case had documented the essential function of the First Intifada’s radical democracy. For example, historian Glenn Robinson writes that “central to understanding the Palestinians’ ability to sustain the Intifada is the notion of devolved authority [which] had spread downward in society and become much more diffused within it than before. This was of critical importance.” Such observations are not uncommon.

Therefore, in the context of Palestinian popular organization during the period of the First Intifada, there is strong basis to reject Wendy Pearlman’s explicitly Weberian language of “monopoly” and “command and control,” in her account of the coherence of Palestinian struggle. To conflate the participatory model with monistic hierarchy is to miss the pluralist characteristics Arendt sought to highlight and also to simultaneously miss the features that make the First Intifada a distinctive model of popular organizing. Indeed, the minimal command-and-control capacity, plus the exigencies of responding to Israeli repression, necessitated broad-based, decentralized, and community-based structures of mobilization and decision-making. As if pre-emptively rebutting the

106 Robinson (1997), pp. x-xi, adding that popular committees were “largely responsible for the Palestinians’ ability to sustain and deepen the uprising,” Robinson (1997), p. 94.
107 See also (emphases added): “a more democratic, bottom-up approach [...] was the key to the success of the intifada,” Qumsiyeh (2011), p. 139; “sustained itself through an extensive network of local committees formed over the previous decade and of neighborhoods that organized for mutual assistance,” Smith (2010), p. 406; “[i]ts unique mass character was sustained by a large number of youth and action committees organized by geographical location—village, refugee camp, and urban neighbourhood—or social category—women, students, and trade or profession,” Sayigh (1997), p. 619; “support structure needed to sustain the uprising’s momentum,” Hiltermann (1991), p. 173.
terminology of Pearlman’s thesis, King writes in 2007 that the Intifada’s “egalitarian and representative nature meant that it could not adopt the style of a central, coherent executive body to make decisions on behalf of all factions.”¹⁰⁹

Participatory organization interacted constructively with unarmed action. The social structures sustained the movement agency, providing an efficient welfare system, devolved to the community level as a matter of necessity and survival. This asset of participatory organization may not be restricted to nonviolent movements, as accounts have suggested that armed guerrilla insurgencies in a number cases around the world have also benefited from participatory organization (though an examination of these cases is beyond this study). The immediate point is that the unarmed movement depended on the participatory social fabric, to physically sustain it and also to permit a functioning form of governance under acute repression. Had the movement depended on large, centralized leadership structure, it would have been vulnerable to systemic defeat, or decapitation, by Israeli forces. Additionally, the cooperation of the participatory governance filled the voids left behind by the noncooperation of boycotts and strikes of all kinds—the internal cooperation compensated for the external noncooperation. Widely dispersed alternative organizations made possible the extensive (though never total) acts of withdrawal and disengagement from Israeli institutions. Moreover, the methods of nonviolent resistance were immaterial, unlimited and more-or-less equally available to all members of society. This inherently democratic quality of unarmed action aligned with the democratic structures of organization. Whereas military struggle can benefit from tightly controlled central leadership (in order to procure and marshal finite industrial weaponry), the means of civil resistance are effectively limitless, and therefore more aptly compatible with participatory organization. Another connection between participatory organization and unarmed action is that both logics, in different ways, bypass domination: unarmed action does not apply domination in action, and participatory organization does not apply domination in organization. Sharp argues that this radically democratic organization is inherently conducive to nonviolent methods of governance and struggle, in a kind of inversion of how he conceives centralized forms of governance to be conducive to violent

and armed modes of action. Centralization restricts a civil-resistance movement’s greatest asset, participation, whereas decentralization expands opportunities for increased participation. At least, this is my thesis. The following sections and chapters further explore how this relationship between methods and structure plays out in Palestinian resistance, and the dissertation’s Conclusion offers some further reflections.

3.3 Outcome and Legacy: Partial Success, Highpoint of Struggle

This section recounts the latter phases and aftermath of the Intifada, assessing its legacy and setting the stage for subsequent case chapters. The PLO under Yasser Arafat had been waffling for many years on whether the national policy was to make war or peace with Israel, but in late 1988, finally bowing to domestic pressure from the occupied territories and seizing it as a mandate, Arafat came down decisively on the side of accepting a two-state settlement. Yet Israel, under the rejectionist rightwing Likud government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, dispersed and balked as international pressure mounted, month after month, year after year. The Intifada maintained a united front—despite social upheaval and political divisions internally—for a period of more than two years, and to a lesser extent through 1990 and into 1991. Between 1990 and 1993, the Intifada’s momentum waned and its overall cohesion dissolved; it was marked by violence and armed attacks more than by organized civil resistance.

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112 “By the end of the second year of the intifada, however, the popular appeal of these groups [the popular committees] had waned. The population was beginning to tire from the burden of strikes and civil disobedience, and by the third year of the intifada whole cities and villages were openly disobeying specific strike calls,” Dajani (1994), pp. 61-62; “as the intifada dragged on into the early 1990s, stabbings and shootings became more widespread [and by the end of 1990] the intensity of the uprising began to diminish. Although it continued sporadically until spring 1992, the cooperation among all segments of Palestinian society that had sustained the intifada for its first two years started to evaporate in the face of Israeli countermeasures and internal divisions among Palestinians,” Cleveland and Bunton (2013), pp. 443, 444; “weakening [...] long decline [...] attacks were intensified,” Hunter (1993), pp. 232-234; Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 126; “increased attacks fourfold [...] outbidding,” Pearlman (2011), pp. 118-119; “[r]esistance became all things to all persons,” King (2007), p. 293, also, pp. 278, 282, 284, 292.
Working against the unity of the political vision espoused by the secular factions, Islamism or militant Islam rose to prominence during this period. The young Palestinian Islamic Jihad movement became a significant actor in 1986-1987, and Hamas, a militant offshoot of the traditionally pacifist Muslim Brotherhood, was founded in 1988, plotting its first armed attack in 1989.\(^\text{113}\) Completely outside the institutions of the PLO and the UNLU, the militant Islamist factions were a large minority and rivals to the secular bloc from the outset. Yet for the most part, at least for the first year of the revolt, all parties adopted the same tactical approach and sometimes coordinated their actions and campaigns, especially Islamic Jihad and the UNLU.\(^\text{114}\) After the apparent diplomatic concessions of the PLO—recognizing Israel and denouncing terrorism—the cracks between the Leftists/nationalist and the Islamists expanded, a rift that would bifurcate and debilitate Palestinian struggle in the years following the Oslo Accord of 1993.

Historic international events also seemed to conspire against the prospects of the Intifada. Between 1989 and 1991, with the sudden and unexpected end to the Cold War, thousands of Russian Jews began immigrating to Israel, providing a new source of labour to offset losses from the withdrawn Palestinian workforce.\(^\text{115}\) Then in 1990, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein invaded the oil-rich Gulf country Kuwait and conditioned his withdrawal on the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories.\(^\text{116}\) Unwisely (it proved), Arafat embraced Saddam as a champion for Palestine, and the international campaign that US President George H.W. Bush led against Iraq subsequently tarnished the Palestinians by association and alienated their Gulf supporters and donors (who were firmly in the US/Israel camp against Iraq). The PLO became increasingly desperate as it failed to produce tangible gains for the population, while extremist groups, secular and Islamist, were emboldened.

\(^{113}\) See also, Peretz (1990), pp. 100-106; Hunter (1993), p. 237
\(^{115}\) “Israel was soon able to accommodate by employing newly arrived Soviet Jewish immigrants and others,” Dajani (1994), p. 71; Hunter (1993), pp. 219-220, 223.
From early on, the U.S. had stepped up its pressure on the Israeli government to embark on a peace process that included the Palestinians, and this began to produce results in Madrid in the fall of 1991, as grassroots representatives of the Intifada met with Israeli officials. The unprecedented process advanced in fits and starts over the coming months but was eventually superseded when a secret negotiating backchannel was revealed: Arafat had unilaterally seized an opportunity to come in from the margins, striking a landmark deal with the Israeli government in Oslo, Norway, in August 1993.\footnote{117} The agreement, called the “Declaration of Principles,” allowed for the establishment of a Palestinian National Authority (PA) as a semi-autonomous governance entity in portions of the occupied territories, and also committed the parties to resolving the major political issues—the status of East Jerusalem, the settlements, and the refugees—within five years (a target that was never met). The Intifada came to an official end on the White House lawn, when Arafat famously shook hands with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (who would later be assassinated by a rightwing extremist Israeli). With that handshake, the PLO was recognized internationally, and the Palestinian national struggle seemed vindicated. Its aging leadership finally returned to the Palestinian homeland. But this apparent achievement proved pyrrhic, as Edward Said predicted at the time, against the prevailing mood of optimism, because the agreement lacked enforcement mechanisms and made no mention of a Palestinian state.\footnote{118} Despite the Oslo Accord and establishment of the PA, the oppression continued—the military rule, the expansion of settlements, and the dispossession of Palestinians. Simultaneously, militant groups in Palestinian society refused to relinquish armed resistance, and armed attacks never completely ceased. In the end, the Intifada failed to ‘shake off’ the occupation.

But it did ‘shake up’ the old order. There was no going back to the status quo ante. The Intifada united the Palestinian people behind a vision for peace, putting their struggle at the top of the international agenda, distancing Israel from its supporters, and generating conditions for change after many years of stultifying stasis. In the words of Palestinian activist-turned-politician Hanan Ashrawi, “[t]he intifada gave the Palestinian

\footnote{117} For documents and analysis, see Smith (2010), pp. 433-479.\footnote{118} Shlaim, (2010), pp. xii-xiii, 196.
political agenda the momentum necessary for the peace ‘offensive’ even if that ‘offensive’ was eventually and circuitously defeated. Mostly without the use of arms or military means, the Intifada challenged Israeli power and threatened to impose a permanent crisis on the government and even the society. In addition to the direct monetary costs that followed from strikes, boycotts, and military expenditures, there were other less-material costs, as Israeli journalists write at the time:

In calculating the cost of the uprising, Israel must take into account such intangibles as the harm done to its political standing, the setback in its struggle for support of public opinion, and the diminishment of its moral stature, especially in the eyes of its friends and of diaspora Jewry. Viewed in these terms, Israel has suffered far more damage as a result of the Palestinian uprising than it did from the Yom Kippur War.

The analogy to the Arab-initiated war of 1973 is particularly apt as it indicates the capacity of unarmed struggle to substitute for or provide an alternative to armed struggle and, as the journalists say in this case, outperform it.

Nevertheless, the costs, and perhaps the challenge itself, proved too great. By the early 1990s, the Intifada had become increasingly fragmented, strained, and violent. Palestinians did not achieve freedom or independence through the Intifada. The Israeli occupation continued, and settlements multiplied and expanded. However, the Intifada had come closer to succeeding than other movements in other times. For example, Mary King writes that it generated “the most cogent pressure to date to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel.” Historian Avi Shlaim adds, “the intifada accomplished more in its first few months than had decades of PLO military operations.” According to Israeli journalists at the time, “Palestinians had achieved what all the Arab armies over the course of two generations had repeatedly failed to do.” To the astonishment of many observers, the disarmed population living under occupation became the vanguard of the

120 Bickerton and Klausner (2005), p. 231.
122 King (2009), p. 151.
124 Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 120.
Arab-Israeli conflict, at least so it seemed for a few years. This stark comparison, extolling the unarmed Intifada’s rapid impact versus the longer and less successful armed struggle, is widely but not universally shared. As Yezid Sayigh points out, it may be overstated, to the extent that it dismisses prior contributions made by armed struggle. But all accounts agree that for the first time, Palestinians were setting the agenda, and their mass revolt “forced Israel to recognize the impact of occupation on the Palestinians.” Perhaps most pointedly, the Intifada “smashed the status quo beyond repair,” making change necessary. That statehood was not attained and the occupation not ended does not entirely indict the unprecedented conditions of possibility that were opened by the unarmed and participatory insurgency. Whether a more nonviolent movement might have generated more pressure and potentially more effectively coerced Israel, or whether that was possible under the socio-historical conditions, or whether Israeli material and military dominance simply would have proven insurmountable to any form of Palestinian uprising—are important questions that this study cannot answer.

3.4 Oslo and Second Intifada: Centralized, Armed, Unsuccessful

Already exhausted, strained thin, and frayed, the popular struggle was formally extinguished with the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993. This was partly due to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the imposition of a well-funded development program in the form of the professionalization and bureaucratization of civil society. The presumption of most Palestinians was that under Yasser Arafat’s leadership, following his triumphant return from exile, the newly minted PA would administer the

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125 See also, “the Intifada accomplished more in its first few months than decades of PLO terrorism had achieved outside the country,” Peretz (1990), p. 78; “the Intifada had achieved more than 20 years of armed struggle in promoting the Palestinian cause,” Rigby (1991), p. 28.

126 Sayigh (1997) cautions against dismissing the role of the armed struggle, which he argues helped build the momentum and morale behind the popular mobilization over a period of many years: “[t]he civilian uprising that erupted in 1987 initially appeared more effective in shaking Israeli control, but the armed struggle provided the political impulse and organizational dynamic,” p. viii, adding that the Intifada “was the result of a long accumulation of struggle, a view echoed by the entire spectrum of guerrilla groups,” p. 614. However, there is a risk of conflating violence and action; it may have been the coordinated and effective political actions that achieved the morale effects highlighted by Sayigh actions which happened to be (or perhaps in spite of being) violent. King (2007) raises some other concerns about Sayigh’s analysis: p. 444, n. 88.

127 Cleveland and Bunton (2013), p. 441.

transition to national independence and the occupation would be phased out. The Intifada was a basic cause of the opening up of space for a political sea-change, and the PLO elite establishment mobilized to carry it through by constituting and populating the new institutions of the PA. From this perspective, Arafat failed on two accounts. He turned his back on the modes of action that were the fists of the Intifada, when he officially terminated resistance against Israel, and he dismantled the devolved popular organs that been the spine of the Intifada, when he centralized governance in the PA presidency.

Concerning action, Oslo required the Palestinian leadership to again renounce violence, but “when the PLO abandoned armed struggle, many people felt that they had abandoned all struggle,” because “the marches, the strikes, the boycotts—all of which are classic, traditional, popular forms of nonviolent struggle, which have prevailed throughout the Palestinian movement—were never given prominence.” 129 This ambivalence toward unarmed action goes back to 1990, when the Tunis-based PLO solidified its hold over the Intifada leadership, and “[c]alls for preparations for civil disobedience disappeared.” 130 From the beginning of the uprising in 1987, the leadership based in the territories had struggled to contain the more militant impulses of the leadership abroad and to explain that the Intifada depended on a minimization of armed resistance in order to be effective. Mary King writes that the PLO “never fully appreciated, understood, or espoused the nonviolent strategies.” 131

With the practices of unarmed resistance went the structures of participatory organization. Under Oslo, the centralization of administrative power uprooted the organic decision-making bodies at the community level. Julie Norman writes that the Palestinian Authority “centralized power not only within the governing institutions and but also within Palestinian society itself, by limiting the role of alternative institutions and local

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130 King (2007), p. 239.
131 King, (2009), p. 137, also pp. 210-211, 212, 217, 272-274, 412; see also, “[i]n point of fact, until Arafat’s change of heart, the PLO abroad bombarded its squads in the field with orders to put their guns and explosives to use. But the men on the spot preferred the new style of confrontation and simply ignored these directives,” Schiff and Ya’ari (1991), p. 120; Rigby, p. 29.
committees.” She concludes that “rather than serving as a strong leadership for the Palestinian movement, the PA actually created constraints to popular struggle by adopting autocratic policies, limiting the role of civil society, and repressing activism.” The PA’s centralizing proclivities are sometimes attributed to the particular leadership style of the PLO at the time. For example, Arafat’s experience was geared toward public relations and running a militant party, not administering civil governance. He and his PLO appointees had never “experienced the democratic processes initiated by the local leadership through the UNLU, popular committees, and civil society organizations.”

The PLO long feared that the Intifada might produce rival Palestinian leadership, so once installed in the territories as the PA, moved swiftly to ensure that they were never challenged, by dismantling and usurping the functions of the popular organizations, “large and small.”

Writing from outside civil-resistance studies, Glenn Robinson provides a comprehensive account of the centralizing logic of the PA in the mid 1990s; in sum:

authoritarianism in decision-making, the anti-institutional personalization of power, and the pervasiveness of violence in the system [...] are the function of the dominant domestic political task facing Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian Authority: to undermine the power and position of the new elite that had emerged in Palestine in the 1980s. In order to consolidate their own power, Arafat and the other PLO ‘outsiders’ had to create a political process that was the antithesis of the politics of the new elite. This is the logic of Palestinian state building after Oslo. Devolved authority not only had to be recaptured by the center, but it had to be captured by an elite that was absent during the intifada.

Robinson depicts the centralization process as almost inexorable, which is striking

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132 J. Norman, The Second Palestinian Intifada: Civil Resistance (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 93; for example, referring to popular student organizations, “[n]ot only did they lose their leadership influence on the general public, but they also became subject themselves to the decisions of officials who redefined their roles,” p. 89.


135 “the PLO feared that the independence and self-reliance of those involved in the uprising and the world attention focused on the rebellion could be turned against it [...] the PA let it be known that it viewed with disfavor these freestanding community organizations [...] dismantled autonomous societies and institutions large and small,” King, (2007), pp. 218, 327; also Norman (2010) pp. 15, 91-94.

because in the same text he details, almost extols, the merits of the participatory popular organizing of the 1980s (cited extensively above in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). However, for Robinson as for many others, these participatory merits are trumped by raison d’état: “[t]he distribution of authority downward during the Intifada was in conflict with the needs to centralize power during the state-building process.”137 Dispersed power is resistant to centralizing projects—which is why Sharp advocates for “dispersed loci of power,” for radically democratic organization in order to inoculate society against the ills of tyranny, in his 1980 Social Power and Political Freedom (discussed in Chapter 2).

An additional front against Palestinian popular struggle during the Oslo period (the first can be summed up as the PLO’s betrayal of the Intifada’s modes of action and organization) came from the international community. In the mid1990s, Oslo ushered in billions of dollars and international development agencies and nongovernmental organizations.138 The new agendas were not based on Palestinian traditions or Palestinian political concerns but designed to foster professionalized, liberal, and “modernizing” economic development, meaning technocratic governance and commoditized consumer culture. “This so-called peace dividend was originally intended to help bolster support for the Accords by providing tangible social and economic benefit for the Palestinians,” writes Ava Leone critically of the massive influx of cash and bureaucratic administration, “but instead has largely resulted in increased dependency on foreign aid and in a transformation of existing civil society institutions.”139 Most significantly, as studies have shown, this administrative regime edged out grassroots initiatives in civil management and conditioned local organizations to adopt donor-driven models in the competition for lucrative funding.140

138 The NGOs were official entities, registered through the PA as the conduit to international finance and office: see Norman (2010), p. 94.
140 Norman (2010) shows “how Oslo transformed the civil society sector financially, programmatically, and structurally, resulting in new approaches to nonviolence that emphasized the peace process over activism,” p. 106, also pp. 14, 16, 86-88, 103-109, 111-112; see also I. Calis, “Aid and Occupation: Maintaining the Status Quo in Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 42:3 (Spring 2013); Leone (2011); A. Le More, International Assistance to the Palestinians After Oslo Political: Guilt, Wasted
In order to justify their work and salaries, large organizations sometimes portrayed Palestinian civil society as a “tabula rasa,” or worse, invoked colonial, developmentalist, and Orientalist discourses in which the natives were backwards, ignorant of democracy, and prone to violence.\(^{141}\) In short, development discourses played to stereotypical ills in order to offer remedies. Nonviolence was rigorously promoted through civics programs, but it was taught in the passive rather than the active, the nonviolence of peacefulness and reconciliation in the absence of any emphasis on nonviolent action. Practices of civil resistance were diluted or lost in a discourse of accommodation and coexistence.

Combined, the establishment of the centralized PA and the imposition of international development programs, “heralded the removal of initiative from the hands of the people and a return to elitism, with the consequent marginalization of nonviolence.”\(^{142}\) Practices of civil resistance, along with popular committee system, were lost. Oslo’s nonbinding five-year targets came and went, and the occupation continued, settlements expanded, and armed attacks continued on both sides. Palestinian militants were empowered by the failure of the moderates to deliver results. “Hamas was the main beneficiary of the growing disenchantment with the PA,” historians William Cleveland and Martin Bunton write.\(^{143}\)

The first suicide bombing in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was in 1993. By the end of the decade, Hamas, along with Islamic Jihad, had carried out almost two dozen such attacks causing scores of fatalities (with the attacks of the decade peaking between 1994 and 1996).\(^{144}\) The prospect of Israel becoming a genuine peace partner grew dim

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\(^{141}\) Leone (2011) applies a critical discourse analysis to international aid and development agencies to uncover “a discursive process of domestication, which eventually delimited Palestinians’ ability to imagine and employ alternative resistance strategies,” p. 14, with several examples, pp. 17-19.


\(^{143}\) Cleveland and Bunton (2013), p. 472; see also, “the reality of ongoing settlement growth in the occupied territories, especially the West Bank, led to many Palestinians to question the goals of the peace process and the legitimacy of Yasir Arafat’s leadership,” Smith (2010), p. 464; “for most Palestinians during the Oslo period, life became more difficult and desperate. With the continuing expansion of Jewish settlements, the Oslo peace process became a farce, nothing more than a cover for Israeli attempts to control the land,” Lesch (2008), p. 383.

\(^{144}\) According to Israeli human rights monitor, B’Tselem, between 1993 and the end of the decade, there were about 20 casualty-inflicting suicide bombings, a total of 376 Israelis were killed by Palestinian
when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had signed the Oslo Accords with Arafat’s PLO, was assassinated in November 1995 by a rightwing Israeli extremist (whose rejectionist views reflected the unease of a sizable conservative minority in Israeli society). “In the long run,” historian Charles Smith claims, “this meant that to evade a civil war within Israel, Palestinian expectations regarding the Oslo process would be denied.”

Military occupation, political stalemate, and sporadic resistance attacks, all contributed to a tightening coil that burst in late September 2000 with the Second Intifada. The catalysts for the new mass revolt included the breakdown of the Camp David peace talks in the summer of 2000 and a provocative visit by a rightwing Israeli politician (former military chief and soon-to-be Prime Minister Ariel Sharon) to the Al-Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem (hence the uprising’s other moniker, the Al-Aqsa Intifada). In the first few weeks and months, the new revolt was broad based and mostly unarmed, resembling the early phases of the First Intifada (though lacking the deep participatory structures). “In the beginning,” one activist recalls, “we were throwing rocks at every checkpoint, every corner in Palestine, and that was resistance, popular resistance.”

Before long, however, shootings and suicide attacks became the norm. Suicide bombings peaked in 2001 and 2002, with scores of attacks and hundreds of fatalities, at checkpoints, in settlements, and against civilian targets in Israeli cities. Armed wings of the secular groups Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian also began carrying out suicide attacks during this period, and the majority of the Palestinian attacks, while 897 Palestinians were killed by Israeli attacks: see online “Fatalities in the first Intifada,” B’Tselem (n.d.) http://www.btselem.org/statistics

145 Smith (2010), p. 447, adding immediately, “with the apparent compliance of American negotiators, while the Palestinians would be blamed for any rupture in that process.”


147 BJS interview (2014).

148 Between 2000 and 2005 there were over 100 casualty-inflicting suicide bombings, and almost 1,000 Israelis were killed by Palestinian attacks compared to more than 3,000 Palestinians killed by Israeli attacks. Since 2005, there have been around five Palestinian suicide bombings, mostly between 2006 and 2007: see online “Fatalities before Operation ‘Cast Lead,’” B’Tselem (n.d.) http://www.btselem.org/statistics

http://www.btselem.org/statistics
public expressed support for the tactic. The results were widespread destruction and casualties on both sides, but Palestinians bore the large brunt of the violence: “[o]n the Israeli side, the use of force was far deadlier and more heavily mechanized than before. The IDF deployed tanks, Apache helicopters, and F-16 fighter jets against what was essentially a civilian population.”

Citing security, and meeting little consternation from the international community, the Israeli government began constructing portions of a massive separation barrier in the West Bank that would eventually wind for hundreds of kilometers, much of it on Palestinian land (the ‘wall’ would become the focus of a new popular resistance movement: next chapter).

Armed Palestinian resistance began waning in 2003, especially in the West Bank, and by the time Arafat’s more diplomatically inclined successor Mahmoud Abbas took office in 2005 (after Arafat’s mysterious and controversial death), the Intifada was largely understood in the past tense. According to most sources, Palestinian and otherwise, the Second Intifada with its emphasis on armed attacks did not serve the Palestinian cause but rather set it back on most if not all fronts. The destructive power of the Israeli military was unleashed; Palestinians suffered immensely; and international support contracted or became silent. Such adverse and unintended consequences are encompassed in the literature on civil resistance by the concept of ‘backfire.’

The negative ramifications of militarized resistance in the Second Intifada extended to the capacity to mobilize the population and maintain or generate third-party support. In her study, Norman draws on a number of sources to show that “this shift in

149 For example, according to a 2002 opinion poll, “73% supported ‘suicide bombing of Israeli civilians’,” S. Kull, “The Potential for a Nonviolent Intifada: A Study of Palestinian and Israeli Jewish Public Attitudes,” Program on International Policy Attitudes (Maryland: School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, Aug. 28, 2002), p. 3.
150 Cleveland and Bunton (2013), p. 479.
152 For example, “the Second Intifada [...] many people, they used weapons against the Israeli army, and it wasn’t— It gave us bad effect from the international community,” CVOb interview (2014); “[t]he young Palestinian suicide bombers who struck marketplaces, malls, nightclubs, and public transportation inside Israel heightened the Israeli public’s feelings of vulnerability. These deadly attacks prompted the massive Israeli military intervention,” Cleveland and Bunton (2013), pp. 479-480; “Palestinians speak frequently of the heavy price they paid for the second intifada” N. Brown “Palestine: The Fire Next Time,” Carnegie Endowment (July 6, 2011); “[i]t was clear from early 2002 that Palestinian suicide bombings inside Israel helped [Israeli Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon more than the Palestinians,” Smith (2010), p. 495.
emphasis to violence limited opportunities for popular resistance [...] resulting in a kind of hijacking of the movement by militants.” Militarized struggle multiplies the costs of public protest by creating an atmosphere in which regimes have greater social license to use deadly force, making it more dangerous and difficult for ordinary people to participate, including international supporters. This point is the major thesis of Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011), that violence raises barriers to participation. Moreover, as Gene Sharp (1980) has argued, the technical logic of armed struggle is served by secrecy, centralization, and command and control. These factors combine to indicate that violent methods counteract popular participation.

To summarize this section: the grassroots self-governance networks of the 1980s gave way to professionalized civil society and state-like political institutions in the 1990s, and widespread practices of civil resistance gave way sporadic militarized struggle, hardening the Israeli public and distancing international supporters. These developments, from the centralization of the Palestinian Authority to the violence of the Second Intifada, followed from unlearned lessons of the 1980s. Unarmed and participatory struggle brought Palestinians their most promising movement to date, but in the months and years that followed, popular mobilization was uncritically sidelined into spectatorship of centralized state-building and armed insurgency. Ten years after the signing of Oslo, Palestinians seemed further than ever from their goal of ending the occupation. The stage was set for the emergence of new pockets of civil resistance.

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Chapter 4 – Anti-Wall Popular Struggle, 2002 - Present

But the brave villagers alongside the wall did not tolerate this abomination and their heroic defiance galvanized conscientious people around the world and in Israel itself to join forces in protesting against this monstrosity.

— Ilan Pappe, Israeli historian, 2016

4.0 Introduction

In 2002, with the major towns and cities of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under heavy military occupation, siege, and bombardment, and with Palestinian suicide bombers targeting Israelis in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and across the country, the Israeli government began constructing a massive separation barrier. The barrier’s route wove partially along the Green Line (Israel’s internationally recognized border with the West Bank) but also deep inside the West Bank, dividing Israeli colonial settlements from Palestinian communities, dividing Palestinian communities from Palestinian communities, and dividing Palestinian communities from their fields and livelihoods. Many towns and villages were slated to be completely encircled in loops or ‘enclaves’ of the barrier (see Figure 4.1 below for a map). With no help coming from the international community or from the Palestinian Authority, rural communities—with their backs literally and figuratively against the wall—formed popular committees in the tradition of the First Intifada, and launched a series of campaigns of nonviolent resistance. As this chapter shows, they succeeded in pushing back the planned or existing route of the barrier in several locations, directly preserving or restoring livelihoods of hundreds of

2 The barrier’s total length is projected to top 700 km, more than twice the length of the Green Line it covers, and it includes a ditch, a military service road, and a small buffer zone, meaning land devastation on a massive scale: “The Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier” UN OCHA (July 2013), p. 1. Approximately four fifths of the barrier’s length had been completed by spring of 2014: M. Zonszein, “Walled Off: 12 Years of Israel's Separation Barrier,” Al Jazeera America (Mar. 12, 2014). Under international law, the barrier, to the extent that it is built in the occupied territories, is illegal: International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004).
people, positively affecting thousands, as well as achieving a number of other modest results.

These success stories, small and localized though they are, are anomalies warranting inquiry. Some occur in the midst of one of the bloodiest periods of one of the world’s most intractable conflicts (2003-2004, when the Second Intifada was still underway), and over many decades, Israel has only rarely been compelled by Palestinian agendas, especially concerning occupation and land policy. Yet, like the First Intifada, which generated unprecedented international momentum against the occupation, these villages advanced their interests through unarmed and participatory struggle. Even though most village struggles came to naught, and the wall’s construction was never fully stopped—it stands and continues to be built today—the new popular committees set an example that triggered a wave of optimism at home and abroad, and their model of struggle was emulated and adapted in dozens of communities across the West Bank over the next ten years (this chapter). Around 2009, many of their ideas and practices coalesced into a new offshoot or parallel movement, one that strived to integrate their localized approach into a coherent, national, even globalized campaign to challenge the occupation itself (next chapter).

To comprehend the anti-wall popular resistance—its form, methods, objectives, and impact—this chapter divides it into two phases. The first phase (4.1) can be characterized as spontaneous outbursts of popular resistance, series of reactive ‘direct interventions’ (in the language of Gene Sharp’s typology of methods3) against the construction of the separation barrier from 2002 through 2005. In this period, nonviolent resistance came to the fore in several locations, loosely organized around new popular committees, perhaps most significantly in the villages of Budrus and Bil’in. The second phase (4.2), can be characterized more in terms of refining and standardizing practices of resistance, especially in the form of regular Friday demonstrations. The barrier was still the focus of resistance but now predominantly through media-oriented campaigns of ‘protest and persuasion’ (again, in Sharpian terms), targeting audiences near and far with

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messages rather than directly intervening in the barrier’s construction (which in many locations had been completed). The village of Bil’in became exemplary of this latter phase, especially after 2005, and its model would go on to inform (and many of its activists lead) the anti-occupation popular resistance (next chapter). I argue that the key to the limited achievements, such as they were, of Palestinian struggle during these phases, is the conjunction of unarmed action and participatory organization.

4.1 Budrus and the Early Period, 2002 - 2005

In the fall of 2002, farmers of the small village of Jayyous, located several kilometers east of the Green Line in the fertile hills of the Qalqilya district, began receiving written notices that the separation barrier would cut through their lands. Press reports were rife with speculation about Israeli intentions, but the course of the barrier was still unknown when construction crews began uprooting Jayyousi fruit trees. The villagers learned the barrier would pass within thirty meters of their homes, cutting them off from their land. Despite some international media coverage and pleas for assistance coming from the affected communities, the Palestinian Authority offered no financial or institutional support. Left to themselves, the people of Jayyous and surrounding villages organized a “land defense committee,” reached out to support groups like the International Solidarity Movement (ISM), and by December, with local and international activists—including a small number of Israeli activists—were staging regular nonviolent actions against the construction of the barrier. Marking a shift in Palestinian discourses of popular resistance that would characterize the entire anti-wall movement, the Jayyous

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leadership spoke the language of nonviolent action. Nevertheless, despite frustrating and slowing the construction of the wall, they were unable to stop it or alter its route, and the village has suffered economically ever since. Jayyous was the first Palestinian community to organize nonviolent direct action against the separation barrier.

In October 2003, a few months after the barrier through Jayyous was complete, the Israeli government approved and released details of a plan for the entire projected route of the barrier. If completed, it would slice off approximately 16% of the West Bank and leave 200,000 stateless Palestinians stranded on the Israeli side. Within days of the revelations, construction activity began on a segment north-west of Ramallah that would completely encircle a cluster of nine Palestinian villages and towns (one of several ‘enclaves’ produced by the barrier’s winding and looping path: Figure 4.1), while also separating many of the villages from tracts of their land. Among them, Budrus, population 1,200, would be cut off from approximately 250 acres, and between 2,000 and 3,000 olive trees would be uprooted. Civil and political society representatives of the nine villages held an emergency meeting and voted on a motion to organize nonviolent resistance against the construction of the barrier, but the vote was negative, as the majority opted to pursue civil action only through existing institutional channels: pleading for assistance to the Palestinian Authority and sending out distress signals.

7 Palestinian methods of popular resistance had always been amenable to nonviolent-action theory, as strongly evidenced in the 1980s (Ch. 3), even though the language of nonviolence was uncommon; now the grassroots leadership began to explicitly differentiate their vision from the ideas of armed struggle and violence. For example, as one of the Jayyous leaders wrote through USA Today, “I’ve chosen peaceful resistance to the wall because, as a father, I feel pain when my children are hurt. I have the same feeling for Israelis. I don’t want to cause them pain. Peaceful resistance also avoids giving the Israeli military justifications to kill more Palestinians. I hope peaceful protests will leave a positive impact on Israeli soldiers and strengthen our partnership with Israeli peace groups,” Omar (2003).


11 Norman (2010), p. 33; I. Morrar, “Peacefully Confronting the Wall in Budrus,” Electronic Intifada (July 16, 2004); A. Morrar, “It Must Come Tumbling Down,” Globe and Mail (Feb 25, 2004); “Occupied Palestinian Territories Humanitarian Update, 16 December 2003 – 19 January 2004,” Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Jan. 19, 2004), p. 3. There was talk of gates and permit systems, as implemented for Jayyousi farmers, but access would still be crippled, as it had been for Jayyous.
through the media.\(^{12}\)

Budrus activists were dismayed, having supported the motion, and with no help coming from the PA, they formed their own village-based “Popular Committee to Resist the Wall.” Invoking the grassroots leadership model of the First Intifada,\(^{13}\) and setting an organizational precedent that would characterize the coming movement, the new popular committee was a small decision-making and action-leading body, informal and voluntary. A core group of organizers set out to compose their committee of members from across the local political factions and social sectors, including Fatah, Hamas, the trades, students, and women.\(^{14}\) Mobilizing the community behind a plan to resist the barrier’s construction required ‘buy-in’ from each party and sector. As one Budrus organizer explains,

> When they [i.e., the people of Budrus] are seeing that Fatah is here, Hamas is here, Fatah leader is here, Hamas leader is here, the mayor is here. The youth club leader is here. The women. They know that it’s a consensus issue, and it’s nobody refuse it. So it’s honour for the people to participate. Maybe if Hamas will not participate, the people will ask, why Hamas isn’t here? So they didn’t know if it’s good to follow or not, or to participate […] If some component absent, the people will ask [imitating suspicious tone], ‘Why? Something we didn’t know it inside this movement?’\(^{15}\)

The popular committee facilitated and channelled broad-based participation from the village. Further analysis of the organizational dynamics of popular committees are included later in this chapter, and in the next two chapters.

Within a few days of the Budrus committee first convening, the first construction crews arrived on the edge of village land. The organizers scrambled to put a hundred people in the field, surrounding, obstructing, and occupying the machinery with their bodies. The Budrus activist recounts,

> In the first minute, or in the first few seconds, when we appeared to three soldiers, who were protecting three bulldozers there, five of our people were injured by rubber bullets. And we surprised them. And they were very afraid. And they were shouting in their communication sets, shouting

\(^{12}\) BOC interview (2014).

\(^{13}\) For example, “to take lessons also from the First Intifada,” BOC2 interview (2014); Norman (2010), p. 36; “[a]s in the first Intifada,” A. Morrar (July 15, 2004).

\(^{14}\) “It has members from all the components of the society,” BOC interview (2014); “from all political parties, old and young, male and female,” Norman (2010), p. 1; “uniting all the political factions as well as the women’s and youths groups,” Dolphin (2006), pp. 190-191.

\(^{15}\) BOC2 interview (2014).
for some who on the other side that hundreds of Palestinians are jumping on the bulldozers [...] we discovered that the easiest decision for that commander, is to take the bulldozers off.\textsuperscript{16}

The protesters effectively pre-empted the construction work, and the bulldozers did not return to Budrus for another six weeks.\textsuperscript{17} The action was effective because it generated a dilemma for the Israeli commander: either escalate force, which could lead to a fiasco (given that his men were severely outnumbered, and shooting nonviolent demonstrators could backfire, in terms of negative press coverage, generating international opposition, and enraging the local community into more determined and unified resistance), or cut his losses and withdraw, knowing he could return another day with more security.

During the interim, construction proceeded sporadically at several intermittent sites along the planned route, keeping the work schedule unpredictable, and the Budrus activists led numerous actions in several other locations in the district, including planned marches of persuasive protest, aimed at rousing more communities into action, and impromptu acts of direct intervention, frustrating construction at numerous sites in the area.\textsuperscript{18} Further north in the Salfit district, at a late-December demonstration in the village of Mas-ha,\textsuperscript{19} an Israeli and an American activist were seriously wounded by Israeli security forces, priming news media attention to the anti-wall protests, so that a few days later, when construction crews finally returned to Budrus, with a much larger security detail, they were met by 500 locals, many international and Israeli activists, and television cameras from across Israel and Palestine. “It became like an explosion in the media,” a participant recounts.\textsuperscript{20}

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\textsuperscript{16} BOC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{17} BOC interview (2014); Norman (2010), p. 34; J. McIntyre, “Interview: Budrus ‘Built a Model of Civil Resistance’,” \textit{Electronic Intifada} (Nov. 4, 2010).
\textsuperscript{18} BOC interview (2014); Norman (2010), p. 34
Thus began the often daily back-and-forth ‘battles’ that would last for several months and make the village famous.\(^{21}\) It was bulldozers versus villagers; machinery, soldiers, clubs, teargas, sound grenades, and rubber-tipped bullets versus cameras, songs, and chants of unarmed and predominantly nonviolent men, women and children. Hundreds of Palestinians were wounded or arrested.\(^{22}\) Village-wide curfews were imposed and defied.\(^{23}\) Hundreds of olive trees were uprooted.\(^{24}\) The popular committee emphasized and practiced nonviolent discipline, even banning stone throwing from the demonstrations (although, once the army’s response broke the order of the demonstration, or once the army entered into the village, locally youth typically threw stones). There was no trace of arms among the Palestinians, and their actions were primarily nonviolent. In February, one of the Budrus community leaders wrote through the *Globe and Mail*,

> We are tired of loss and violence, of seeing family members jailed and friends killed. We are tired also of the deaths of our neighbours, the Israelis. The people of Budrus have chosen non-violent resistance because we’ve seen enough blood and believe that violence is the root of fighting, not its solution.\(^{25}\)

This statement and the self-suppression of stone throwing indicate a clear commitment to nonviolence among the leadership of the new popular committees, over and beyond the pragmatic eschewal of military arms (an explicit formulation that was largely lacking in the First Intifada, which had been unarmed but with little emphasis on nonviolence).

After dozens of demonstrations effectively stalled construction efforts, and with numerous media channels paying close attention, the army abruptly suspended work in

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\(^{22}\) Addameer and Stop the Wall (2009), pp. 99-100.

\(^{23}\) Norman (2010), p. 35.

\(^{24}\) In Palestinian society and especially among the peasant traditions of the rural areas where the wall was wending, the *zeitoun*, the olive trees—many said to date back a thousand years—are deeply rooted in the cultural psyche; the trees are often named and sometimes valued on a level comparable to human life: see Norman (2010), p. 1; Bacha (2009): mn. 7:30-8:30.

\(^{25}\) A. Morrar (2004).
the spring and announced it was re-routing the barrier’s course off Budrus land and back to the Green Line, on the outskirts of village land. This was the major victory of Budrus.

The village’s struggle, however, was not quite over. The army shortly returned with a revised plan that would capture back behind the wall 50 of the originally threatened 250 acres, at which point, the village began a legal case, working with an Israeli attorney through the Israeli courts, and resumed disruptive protests. After several months, hundreds more Palestinians were injured, a teenage boy was killed, and the village ultimately lost about a dozen acres, or 5% of the land originally threatened by the barrier.26 In a classic display of effective nonviolent resistance, the people of Budrus had prevented the loss of hundreds of acres of land, saved thousands of olive trees, and set an example that would inspire activists in numerous other West Bank villages.

In the period from late 2002 to early 2005, the Budrus victory was the watermark of a broad-based grassroots movement that swept through many villages and neighbourhoods impacted by the construction of the barrier, from the north-west of the West Bank to the periphery around East Jerusalem. Organized nonviolent actions against the barrier were held in the Salfit area villages of Jayyous, Mas-ha, Deir Ballut, Zawiya; the Ramallah district villages of Budrus, Ni’lin, Deir Qaddis, Beit Liqia, Saffa, Kharbatha, and Bil’in; and in the Jerusalem area towns of Biddu, Beit Sourik, Qibya, Al-Ram and Abu Dis, Al ‘Izariya to name some of the more prominent.27 Budrus was the first but not the last to successfully challenge and alter the course of the barrier: similar local struggles, coupled with legal petitions to the Israeli courts, succeeded in the area of Biddu and Beit Sourik,28 in the university town of Abu Dis,29 and the Ramallah district

28 The achievement of Biddu (alternately transliterated “Biddu,” “Bidou”) was part of the Beit Sourik (alternately transliterated “Bait Sureek”) legal victory—both villages were in the impacted district designated by the court case—though most sources reference only one or the other: see Kaufman-Lacusta (2010), p. 207; Norman (2010), p. 38; Reinhart (2006), pp. 202-205; Dolphin (2006), p. 57; M. Kalman, “Parts of Israeli Wall illegal,” Globe and Mail (July 1, 2004). According to BOC2 interview (2014), the mass popular demonstrations in Biddu—which faced brutal military repression as several unarmed demonstrators were shot dead—bordering Jerusalem, and with unprecedented solidarity from Israeli activists on the ground, was a wake-up call to the Israeli state and prompted the district’s subsequent legal victories at the end of June 2004.
village Bil’in (below), among others.\textsuperscript{30}

In June of 2004, more than a month after Budrus had already pushed the barrier clear of most of its land, and after the Israeli Supreme Court had already ruled in favour of Biddu/Beit Suriq, and with additional legal challenges piling up, the Israeli government suspended most of the construction work and ordered a complete reassessment of the barrier’s route. A more modest plan was quickly redrawn, though not publicized until approved by Israeli cabinet in February 2005.\textsuperscript{31} After the lull in construction activity, many of the villages that had struggled for their threatened land soon found that they had lost their immediate \textit{casus belli}, as the planned barrier route no longer crossed their lands (see Figure 4.1). Under the new plan, the amount of Palestinian land severed from the rest of the West Bank dropped by approximately half, from 16% of the territory to 8-10%, and the number of West Bank Palestinians on the Israeli side of the barrier, or in the ‘enclaves,’ dropped from around 200,000 to under 50,000.\textsuperscript{32} To what extent the grassroots popular resistance influenced this rerouting is difficult to determine. It has not been addressed in the literature, but some of my interview participants indicated confidence that grassroots protests was a major influence on the course of legal and political decisions.\textsuperscript{33} The government cited its court rulings as the rationale for changes, though the question remains: to what extent did the resistance and its publicity influence the legal agendas?\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{29} In Abu Dis, students from Quds University camped 24-hours-a-day for a month in late 2003 along the planned path of the wall, which would have cut through the campus, until the courts intervened and the plan was re-routed outside the campus: see Kaufman-Lacusta (2010), p. 207, 235; A. Blenford, “Israel Changes Security Fence Plans to Avoid University,” \textit{Guardian} (Oct. 1, 2003).

\textsuperscript{30} “Six communities have successfully challenged the barrier's route across their land,” R. Boudreaux, “Palestinians Who See Nonviolent as Their Weapon,” \textit{LA Times} (Nov, 4, 2009).

\textsuperscript{31} “Since the cabinet’s decision to build the Separation Barrier, Palestinians have filed dozens of petitions against the proposed route. In June 2004, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled on a petition filed by a number of villages northwest of Jerusalem, stating that the proposed route around these villages is illegal for the most part, and that the state must propose an alternative route. In light of this ruling, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon instructed the security establishment to review the entire route. A new route was proposed, and the cabinet approved the amended route in February 2005,” B’Tselem, “The Separation Barrier” (Jan. 1, 2011); Dolphin (2006), pp. 57-59; “West Bank Barrier Route Projections” UN OCHA (July 2009).

\textsuperscript{32} B’Tselem (2011); Dolphin (2006), pp. 59-60, 169, 200.

\textsuperscript{33} BOC2 interview (2014); see below, INSERT.

\textsuperscript{34} T. Reinhart (2006) cites a Palestinian activist arguing that the protests changed the legal agenda in particular cases, p. 205.
Figure 4.1 – West Bank Separation Barrier Plans. The June 2004 Plan (right) shows reduction of the barrier’s intended reach with the elimination of several enclaves or “inner barriers.” Blue arrows added (not in original) to indicate the two enclaves in which Budrus, Biddu, and their surrounding villages waged their respective struggles. Maps Source: “West Bank Barrier Route Projections” UN OCHA (Jul. 2009), p. 5.

Another possible factor in the Israeli decision to scale back the barrier may have been the looming July 2004 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the construction. Though technically nonbinding, the overwhelming opinion of the court was that the barrier, insofar as it was built beyond Israel’s internationally recognized border—the Green Line—was illegal, that it should be dismantled, and that Palestinians should be remunerated for their losses. The Israeli government and courts rejected the premises of the ICJ opinion and declared that it had no impact on their own legal and policy decisions. The ruling nevertheless dominated international headlines concerning the conflict, at least for a short time, and became a

35 International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004); see also Dolphin, (2006), pp. 56-57.
permanent fixture in the discourses of Palestinian struggle, fueling anti-wall protests on
the ground by bolstering their claim to legitimacy. Some Palestinians involved with the
popular struggle believe their own efforts, at least in part, helped to spur and facilitate the
ICJ hearings.36

Writing in 2009, First-Intifada expert Mary King may have understated the
achievements of the village-based anti-wall movement:

Their gains have been significant, but ultimately producing only modest
results: they have managed to impede or slow the progression of the
system of barriers but they have not halted them outright. In the case of
Budrus and Deir Ballut, persistent civil resistance combined with legal
appeals and solidarity campaigns has actually changed the course of the
wall, enabling some communities to regain lost pastures, water sources,
and vineyards.37

This passage seems to minimize the outcome of the movement. The Budrus revolt
achieved its major victory—defending 90% of its threatened land, around 250 acres, and
changing the barrier’s route—by April of 2004 before the village launched its legal
challenge in conjunction with the popular struggle for the remaining 10% that persisted
into the fall of that year.38 This means that at least in this case nonviolent resistance can
be identified as the primary cause of the change (i.e., independent of Israeli legal
mechanisms). Moreover, as noted above, other resisting towns and villages not
mentioned by King, such as Biddu, Beit Sourik, and Abu Dis, also averted losses of land
in 2004 and 2005 (in conjunction with support from the courts), whereas King gives the
impression that only two communities achieved such results. King also says nothing of
the above-mentioned prospect that the movement may have influenced the Israeli
decision to significantly roll back the barrier’s reach between 2004 and 2005, sparing
hundreds of thousands of Palestinians additional hardship and suffering.

While suggesting that the early phase of the grassroots anti-wall movement had a
greater impact than is commonly recognized, I also want to avoid overstating it. As one

37 M. King, “Palestinian Civil Resistance against Israeli Military Occupation,” in M. Stephan,
Civilian Jihad: Nonviolent Struggle, Democratization, and Governance in the Middle East (New York:
Palgrave, 2009), p. 149, emphasis added.
38 As noted above; also, “do you know in Budrus we didn’t go to the Israeli court. We went to the
Israeli court after we, ah, they move the wall, they move the wall and we saved about 95%,” BOC2
interview (2014); Norman (2010), p. 35.
activist told me, for every five villages that took action in the impacted areas, fifty did not. Many Palestinians also expressed a more pessimistic bigger-picture perspective and rejected the notion that merely modifying the barrier constituted any kind of victory. And despite the attention Budrus received at the time, it scarcely registered compared to the attention going toward the violence of the Second Intifada.

4.2 Bil’in and the Later Period, 2005 - Present

Further-reaching achievements of the anti-wall popular resistance were yet to come. In February 2005, the same month that the Israeli government publicized the scaled-back barrier route, the village of Bil’in formed its popular committee and launched its long, creative, often theatrical resistance. Bulldozers had begun razing the land several weeks earlier and met with determined, though unorganized, protests. Drawing on the example set by their peers and friends in Budrus, activists from Bil’in formed their committee to coordinate the village’s response (more on the committee below). From the beginning, the Bil’in activists worked closely with a small number of Israeli and international supporters, and, through the Israeli courts, pursued legal challenges

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39 “We have many village, from north, from Jenin til Bil’in. We have around five, six villages, they protest. But we have more than 50 villages, they don’t protest,” BCC interview (2014).
43 For brief overviews of the Bil’in committee, see Burnat (2016), p. 41; Norman (2010), pp. 39-40; and below.
44 On the role of Israeli supporters in Bil’in, see: “[f]rom the beginning,” Burnat (2016), pp. 126-139; Gordon and Grietzer (2013) “solidarity and support of the 40 or 50 Israelis who are in almost constant contact with the villagers also sends a message to Palestinians as it demonstrates the existence of Israelis with whom they can have a relatively ‘normal’ relationship. Palestinians invite the Israelis and treat them as partners in the struggle, but by being the initiators and architects behind the planning of the demonstrations, the Palestinians retain a degree of power and superficial sovereignty in their village,” Hallward (2009); “Israeli solidarity activists,” Abu Rahme (2007); “Israelis are with Palestinians in the front row. When the soldier fires a bullet, the bullet doesn’t discriminate between Jonathan and Muhammad,” R. Blecher, “The
against the barrier’s construction and the neighbouring settlement’s expansion.

Writing through the *International Herald Tribune* in the summer of 2005, one of the Bil’in committee members describes the choice of resistance methods:

Our demonstrations aim to stop the bulldozers destroying our land, and to send a message about the wall’s impact. We’ve chained ourselves to olive trees that were being bulldozed for the wall to show that taking trees’ lives takes the village’s life. We’ve distributed letters asking the soldiers to think before they shoot at us, explaining that we are not against the Israeli people, but against the building of the wall on our land.\(^{45}\)

The organizer’s message is that their resistance is conducive to a longer term vision of peaceful co-existence with their Israeli neighbours. Writing in 2007, another prominent activist from the village adds that,

[C]haining ourselves to the olive trees was the epitome of creativity, where the spirit of nonviolent resistance was made evident, and which exemplified the attachment of the Palestinian people to the roots of these sacred trees. This action opened the way for a number of other actions of its kind making use of barrels, boxes/crates, a makeshift metal cage and gallows, coffins and gravestones, adhesive tape, mirrors, cardboard snakes, a solid iron bridge, columns, a mass grave, a huge Palestinian flag, lots of small flags, the scales of justice, black flags and so on [...] Popular demonstrations were our prevailing actions, in which children, youth, elders and women participated.\(^{46}\)

These passages indicate the innovative nonviolence inherent in the tactical vision of Bil’in’s activists (more on the creative methods and their results below). The passages also reflect the genuinely popular nature of the demonstrations, as most of the village came out in support of the demonstrations (more on participation rates, which would decline significantly over the years, below, and in Chapter 6).

Organizationally, Bil’in’s popular resistance is community based, inclusive, and directly democratic—participatory. The “Popular Committee to Resist the Wall and...
Settlements” emerged from a series of large and open town meetings. Its core membership was composed of several trusted figures from the village, primarily a group of youth and student leaders from the First Intifada, now in their late thirties and forties. As with Budrus, Bil’in’s organizers strived to tap every social corner of the village, to make a “cocktail from all of these people,” in the words of one local leader, in order to bolster local legitimacy and participation. Different committee members take on different roles. One member is the primary contact for local news media; another facilitates and hosts international supporters; another focuses on legal issues and works with Israeli attorneys, and so on. When the organized resistance began in 2005, the committee was made up of a handful of members, but after a year, expanded to around eleven or thirteen, with some members coming and going over the months and years, others remaining from the beginning. Members are not elected to the committee; rather

47 “They had a big meeting in Bil’in, most of the people attended [...] we had big meetings,” LOC interview (2014); “we have meetings, and they choose first of all, the first step, we choose a popular committee to follow the case [...] we have many meetings,” BCC interview (2014); “[w]e make many meetings between the people from the village and the internationals and the Israelis. Everyone can ask what he want, and to answer and to see and to hear everything... So no secrets, ya’ni,” COC interview (2014)

48 “we have a lot of experience in the First Intifada,” BCC interview (2014); “most of the members of the popular committee, ya’ni, were activists in the First Intifada. They were young and they joined the Intifada. And they did many things to help people before,” LOC interview (2014); “we have people who was joined the First Intifada, for example, myself,” JDC interview (2014).

49 “We need all of the people to be with us. For this, when we want to choose the leaders of the popular committees, we must put in our mind, why we want to choose A or B or C. For this, we try to take from the parties. From the Palestinian parties. What’s the parties here in Bil’in? Fatah. Hamas. Popular front. For example. These people, we took from, one member from all of the parties, one. Another thing, we have the organization, like Youth clubs, in the village. We can choose one member from the youth, because we have a big number of people in the club. Also, here one of the organizations is the council of the village, the municipal council, we can take them, we can choose the independents, the famous people, the people who have the character to be a leader in this action. Also we have in the village the . You know we have five families here. We try to choose one from every family. We make this cocktail from all of these people to be all of the village, representative, in the committee. And you see it’s the same in the First Intifada. They tried to take the parties, the health organization, the students, the women organization. Also we have a women’s organization in our village,” BCC interview (2014); “you want to take from the village, all the families, from this, from each family, one of them or two. From the Palestinian parties, one or two,” SCC interview (2014); “took political parties and local institutions into consideration,” Alazzeh (2011), p. 22.

50 “We have internationalist coordinators and media coordinators, events coordinators and children’s coordinators, on and on, wherever the need,” Burnat (2016), p. 28; “we need a team to follow everything [...] to coordinate between the Israeli activists and the international activists, and the lawyers [...] to follow the media, to prepare reports,” BCC interview (2014); “media coordinator [...] coordinator of the popular committee [...] coordinator with the Israeli activists, and with the international activists [...] coordinator with the, with the law,” SCC interview (2014); “popular committees undertake a variety of duties,” Norman (2010), p. 37.

51 “Some of our members they felt tired. Some of them they stopped from the first day. It means, if anyone tired, or stopped, we have another to continue [...] We start with seven but after one year we found
that people they want to participate, we open again, and it’s thirteen now, but some of them they stop working,” BCC interview (2014); “we started our committee by five people [...] after one year we have thirteen people on the committee,” JDC interview (2014); “some of them left after a while, because they thought it’s not the best way to do this, and they wanted to do something else. Some of them kept continue the same way,” LOC interview (2014).

52 According to a Bil’in organizer, “we started 2005, and because we are very close together and we are very friends, I mean the people when we established popular struggle committee, and we agreed to each other, ya’ni, we didn’t fight inside the committee,” LOC interview (2014). Speaking more generally, a Ramallah youth activist says, “[t]he thing about popular resistance, and popular committees, it’s a very human interaction. Relationships play a very important role,” BJS interview (2014).

53 “It’s open. Anyone, he wants to be member in it, he will come,” BCC interview (2014); “voluntarily and open,” BOC2 interview (2014); “open for everybody who wants to join,” JDC interview (2014); “Really, anybody can join the committee,” COC interview (2014).

54 “It’s open. Anyone, he wants to be member in it, he will come,” BCC interview (2014); “voluntarily and open,” BOC2 interview (2014); “open for everybody who wants to join,” JDC interview (2014); “Really, anybody can join the committee,” COC interview (2014).

55 For example, “people try to use the violence, to use the weapons. We tried to stop them [...] we saw some people carrying hand guns, put there. For this we told them, its not allowed for you to be in our action. We know about some people trying to prepare small bombs to throw. We know before, we go and we stop them,” BCC interview (2014); “Molotov, for Israelis cars, for example. This happened one time in Bil’in. But ya’ni, this is some problems we face, and we solve it,” COC interview (2014); similarly, according to an organizer from another popular resistance committee, “sometimes you will find some people who want to shoot on the soldiers, with weapons, because they got excited. You have to find them,” JVO interview (2014).
or the army has entered the village. Second, positively, inclusion requires participation in action. Those who do not actively participate cannot be a part of the popular committee. As one organizer explains,

We put in the mind of the people, to be member in the committee, it means to be the first one in the action, and the last one who leaves the action. It’s not to come take photos or make meetings or to be a member from behind your office and to tell the people go there or go there. When you speak about popular resistance, it means to be in the field.

For the popular committees, leadership is not about command, but example and participation.

These organizational qualities allowed the popular committee to bring direction and leadership to the village’s resistance in February 2005. For the first frenetic weeks and months, as the barrier was being constructed, the demonstrations were frequently daily, involving hundreds of people and dozens of actions. Unlike Budrus, however, Bil’in was unable to stop the construction of the barrier. It was completed in April 2006, a guarded and surveilled metal and barbwire fence, lined with a ditch on one side and a military road on the other. Running along the village’s western edge, the barrier split the village off from half of its 1,000-acre holdings. The village had already lost 200 of those acres to the expanding settlement bloc called Modi’in Iliit years earlier, and the barrier’s completion seemed to ‘seal the deal,’ trapping an additional 300 acres on the settlement side. But this did not stop Bil’in’s collective activism.

From early on, the popular committee was not solely focused on the separation fence. In December 2005, to protest the expansion of a new settlement (called Matityahu Mizrah or Matityahu East) on village land, the popular committee established their own

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56 Stone throwing typically follows Israeli teargas attacks, as groups of masked village youth tail and flank the demonstrations, awaiting their moment. “Our young Davids come forward only after the soldiers begin their attack on our peaceful demonstrators,” Burnat (2016), p. 32; “our strategy, we are, don’t throw stones. We didn’t start it, to throw stones. We keep going to our land. We were being face to face with the soldiers, and always the soldiers start the violence. There is some stones from the children, but it’s not started by our side,” JDC interview (2014); “the kids who want to throw stones, he can throw stones (laughing), you know, like, (or) don’t throw stones, you know? They don’t force anybody. You have your freedom. You do what you want in the demonstration. But you not able to do, for example, one thing: to be armed. To bring weapon and shoot because then you will cost all the people there their life. This is the only thing [...] No guns, nothing. This is what we all will be against,” ICC interview (2014); also, “we don’t even use stones. That distorts the story,” quoted in Blecher (2006).

57 BCC interview (2014); also, “not people who are in the offices; people who are on the ground [...] the people who are in the front always in the demonstrations who will be the member on the committee,” JDC interview (2014).
outpost on the far side of the wall, just a hundred meters from the Israeli construction site. Matityahu East was illegal even under Israeli law, because it lacked a permit, but concrete buildings were going up anyway. The Palestinian action was planned and executed jointly with Israeli activists. The structure they erected was a portable caravan trailer like those used by settlers when outposts are established, posing a dilemma for the Israeli military, as the Palestinians’ Israeli attorney Michael Sfard explained to the press at the time: “[t]his will be blatant proof of the fact that there is selective law enforcement if they deal with the poor caravan before the hundreds of housing units built illegally in [the area of] Upper Modi’in.” Indeed the army removed the Palestinian trailer without delay—and removed a second one on the same spot the following day—but explained the discriminatory treatment on the basis of differing guidelines for fixed and inhabited homes versus portable outpost trailers (to demolish the former required a court order, whereas portables could be dealt with at the discretion of commanders on the ground). Thus, overnight, the activists worked furiously to build a concrete structure on the spot, cementing cinder blocks around windows and a door, creating a single-room house, which activists then began to inhabit continuously. Caught in its own regulations, the army did not immediately destroy the structure and instead turned to the courts for authorization to clear the site. According to one of the organizers, this innovative method of nonviolent action (which is nowhere to be found in Sharp’s catalogue of 198) “was tantamount to a transformation in our struggle, and on December 25, 2005, the house was declared to be the Center for Joint Palestinian-Israeli-International struggle.”

The feat became Bil’in’s “first victory” when, in the first week of 2006, the Israeli court rejected the army’s request to demolish the Palestinian building. More, the

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58 This action is frequently recounted in the literature but worth emphasizing because it was the first of a new kind of method that would be used on an increasingly escalated scale in coming years (below and next chapter); Burnat (2016), pp. 61-66; Norman (2010), p. 40; Kaufman-Lacusta (2010), pp. 211-214; Hallward (2009), pp. 250-251; Abu Rahme (2007). See also, Burnat and Davidi (2011), mn. 27:40-32:00; M. Rapoport, “Bil’in Residents Set Up ‘Outpost’ West of Israel’s Separation Fence,” Haaretz (Dec. 22, 2005).


63 BCC interview (2014).
same court order halted the new settlement construction, pending further investigation into evidence submitted by the Palestinians’ Israeli attorney, which alleged that the Jewish outpost was unauthorized and therefore illegal (in a petition was filed jointly with Israeli NGO Peace Now). The same ruling also required that the army must facilitate around-the-clock access through the barrier’s gate for all Bil’in residents, not just the landowners. At this point, according to one of the committee members, even many of the skeptics in the village became interested in civil resistance. The new protest building was occupied continuously for years, becoming the site of celebrations, demonstrations, and conferences. The room was also used as a lookout station to monitor settlement compliance with the stop-work order on the illegal apartments. On multiple occasions, Israeli authorities were called upon to enforce their injunction, to stop new ‘facts on the ground’ from being created.

There were other kinds of direct actions during Bil’in’s first two years of resistance. For example, activists used their bodies to block the plots of land on which cranes were lowering settler trailers, delaying and frustrating, but ultimately not preventing, the work. On another occasion, the committee clandestinely moved three families and some of their furniture into a partially completed settler flat, though they were forcibly expelled hours later. The persistence of these actions—and their cumulating media coverage—helped expose and draw attention to the corruption of the Israeli settlement industry, particularly the illegal acquisitions on Bil’in land, and in August 2007, the construction company Heftsiba, one of the largest in Israel (and the

65 “We built our room, and we succeed to stop building in the settlement and this allowed us to be in our land 24 hours and we start to sleep there [...] small victories [...] all the village, not only by permit,” BCC interview (2014); “mandated that the Palestinian presence requires that farmers have access to the land on the far side of the wall by way of a gate,” Norman (2010), p. 40.
66 “I remember some of the people from my village. They told, ‘You by your nonviolent resistance, you can’t remove this wall! You can back our land for us?’ [but after] the first victory, the people: ‘Oooh, this is good!’,,” BCC interview (2014).
68 “When we saw any work in the settlement [...] we stop them, we call our friends, firstly, to come, to follow, we call our lawyers, and we try to stop them and to photo them, after 10 minutes, 20 minutes, the police coming, by our lawyer, and he knows, the order not allow them to build, and we, two years, by this way, to stop them, until the decision,” BCC interview (2014); Norman (2010), p. 40
69 Burnat and Davidi, 5 Broken Cameras (2011), nn. 26:10-27:40.
70 “We occupied it, this building,” BCC interview (2014); Abu Rahme (2007); D. Keinan, “Palestinians, Leftists Evacuated from Disputed Settlement Edifice,” Haaretz (July 6, 2006).
occupied territories) filed for bankruptcy.\footnote{71}{“the company declared bankruptcy in that time,” BCC interview (2014); “The Bil’in Popular Committee Against the Wall considered the bankruptcy of the Israeli construction company, Heftsiba […] another victory,” H. Ibhasi and K. ‘Ayed, The Separation Wall in the West Bank ed. by M. Saleh and R. Sa’adah, trans. by B. Darazi (al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies & Consultations, Beirut: 2013), p. 102; “the haredi squatters of Modi’in Illit are blaming Peace Now for causing the financial collapse of Heftsiba. ‘If not for Peace Now’s High Court petition [on behalf of Bil’in] against the Heftsiba project here in Modi’in Illit, the company might not even have gone bankrupt,’ said Natan Rosenblatt, a Breslav Hassid who heads a group of a few hundred squatters that forcibly took possession of apartments in Matityahu East,” D. Izenberg and M. Wagner, “Peace Now Blamed for Heftsiba Fall,” Jerusalem Post (Aug. 5, 2007); “Goliath Comes Tumbling [sic] Down,” ISM (Aug 2, 2007).}

In September 2007, the Israeli High Court finally reached a verdict on the petition submitted early in the previous year. The decision included a number of important elements. First, the new settlement plans were deemed illegal, annulled, and all further construction at the site cancelled.\footnote{72}{Burnat (2016), pp. 64-66, 107; “decision to stop working and building in the settlement,” BCC interview (2014);} The same ruling, however, also retroactively legalized the structures that had already been completed and sold to buyers.\footnote{73}{Y. Yoav, “High Court: Controversial Settlement Neighborhood to Remain in Place,” Haaretz (Sept. 5, 2007).} Most significantly, the ruling also declared that the current location and path of the separation fence on Bil’in land was illegitimate, that its route lacked credible security basis, and that it had to be moved off village land.\footnote{74}{Norman (2010), p. 41; Hallward (2009), p. 552; I. Kershner, “Israeli Court Orders Barrier Rerouted,” New York Times (Sept. 5 2007).} This result prompted spontaneous celebrations in the village and a spate of local and international media coverage.\footnote{75}{“A reservoir of joy burst and we began to scream and laugh with the tears of joy,” Burnat (2016), pp. 43-46; “the legal decision to change the route of the wall was hailed as a major victory by the Bil’in activists,” Norman (2010), p. 41; “international and Arab media poured into Bilin as soon as the surprise court decision was announced to witness the first spontaneous celebrations,” M. Asser, “West Bank Village Hails Victory,” BBC News (Sept. 5, 2007).} However, several years would pass before the army finally complied with this aspect of the ruling (more on moving of the wall: below).

These victories—establishing a permanent Palestinian building on the far side of the barrier, granting local residents access to the surrounding land, preventing the creation of a new settlement, contributing to the bankruptcy of the implicated construction company, and winning the ruling against the fence—were small, but not insignificant. The legal suits were crucial, but Bil’in activists and their supporters also
attribute the results to their persistent civil resistance.\textsuperscript{76} In the absence of significant political pressure, the Israeli courts are perceived to disregard Palestinian complaints in favor of settler interests.\textsuperscript{77}

In addition to these “small victories,” Bil’in has become famous for its dedicated commitment to weekly demonstrations, every Friday afternoon.\textsuperscript{78} The basic anatomy of the demonstration has not changed in ten years. From the village mosque after midday prayer, the popular committee marches with the people to the outskirts of the village and the barred gates of the separation barrier (demonstrations are illegal under Israeli military law, so the army never permits the demonstrators to pass), where the demonstrators are met with teargas, sound grenades, arrests, and sometimes worse. For more than 500 consecutive Fridays, young and old, men and women, Palestinian and Israeli, Muslim and Jewish (and Christian), local and foreign, put their unarmed bodies before the material symbol of the occupation and no less importantly before the cameras and witnesses of the world. Without fail, the army delivers its violence, usually nonlethal, ranging from harsh to brutal. The people of the village have paid and continue to pay a tremendous price for their resistance, in the form of arrests, administrative detentions, prison terms, midnight home searches, property damage, economic losses, physical injuries, disabilities, and, in two cases, death.\textsuperscript{79}

For the first year, local participation in the demonstrations was regularly a few hundred, out of a village of about 1,600 people, including the active support of Islamist

\textsuperscript{76}“we worked on the popular track and the legal track. The popular track served the legal one, which profited from the reputation of Bil’in. It influenced the articles that were written about the case and the way it was talked about in general. [...] The technicality wouldn’t have been invoked without the political action,” Blecher (2006). “Michael Sfard, an Israeli lawyer retained by the village, credits [popular committee member] Khatib with the ‘brilliant idea’ that turned the tide in a landmark legal victory two years ago,” Boudreaux (2009).

\textsuperscript{77}For example, “[t]hese courts, it’s to support and to help settlers and military forces, not Palestinians. In one percent of our cases, it will be for Palestinians. 99% for the settlers,” BCC interview (2014).


groups, and also dozens and sometimes hundreds of Israeli and international supporters. Major demonstrations and special events swelled the numbers into the thousands, with hundreds of Palestinians, Israelis, and internationals joining. Such larger turnouts were common in the early months and years, but have become much less common (though still happen: the tenth-anniversary march in February 2015 drew thousands). Over time, regular participation in Friday marches has declined steadily, sometimes down to a few dozen Palestinians or less, in addition to the hard core of Israeli and international supporters, plus a small number of new participants. During my field research, late 2013 to early 2014, there was a general sense that participation rates were continually slipping (mobilization challenges are the focus of Chapter 6). Yet every Friday without fail, the demonstrations continue, tear gas flies, and internationals witness.

Increasingly from 2006 on, many other villages and communities began adopting the Bil’in model. Local committees formed and launched weekly protests, striving to mobilize their communities and attract international support. By 2007, local media was loosely designating the movement ‘the popular resistance,’ as well as ‘nonviolent resistance,’ and ‘Gandhian resistance.’ Some prominent examples of communities that adapted the popular-protest model with regularized Friday demonstrations, include Beit Jala, Hebron Shuhada, Iraq Burin, Jayyous, Kufr Quddoum, al-Ma’sara, Nabi Saleh,

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80 “In the beginning […] it’s around 300, from 200 to 300,” BCC interview (2014); “most of the people joined these demonstrations,” LOC interview (2014); “[i]n the beginning it was most of the village […] the Islamic organization with us, and after, they go outside and keep silent about this struggle […] They are not participate all the time but they are not against,” IMC interview (2014).

81 “sometimes 300-400 from Israel, more than 100 internationals, and also more than 1000-2000 Palestinians,” BCC interview (2014).

82 A. Deger, “Bil’in Marks Ten Years of Resisting the Occupation,” Mondoweiss (Mar. 1, 2015).

83 “in the last years […] sometimes from 50 to 100,” BCC interview (2014); “since this time [moving the barrier in June 2011], the demonstrations became less than before. The people joined less than before,” LOC interview (2014); Alazzeh (2011) quotes an activist, “[n]ow we have a good 10% of the village constantly present in every activity,” p. 25.

84 “Now I see the struggle it’s going more and more weak. It’s not like before. But the idea is still,” IMC interview (2014).

85 “This discourse has been adopted […] after the success story of the occupied West Bank village of Budrus,” L. Alsaafin, “How Obsession with ‘Nonviolence’ Harms the Palestinian Cause,” Electronic Intifada (July 10, 2012); “[t]he unarmed protests at that time [2004-2005] were not categorized as nonviolent or unarmed but rather as an anti-Apartheid Wall demonstration. When the Wall started to be built on the land of more villages, mainly in the Jerusalem, Ramallah and Bethlehem areas, other villages adopted the same model of unarmed protests […] In 2007 local and Arabic-language media started describing the weekly demonstrations as ‘popular resistance’,” Alazzeh (2011), p. 35.
Ni’lin, Silwan, Sheikh Jarrah, al-Tuwani, and al-Walaja. The shift toward regular Friday demonstrations was a pragmatic development, as an NGO explained:

In many places the Wall has been completed and the daily mobilization aimed at stopping bulldozers had come to an end. [...] The popular resistance against the Wall had to develop forms of protest that were sustainable and appropriate for such a long-term effort. The daily protests, which were disrupting all everyday life in the village, were slowly replaced with Friday demonstrations that allowed resistance to take place alongside some semblance of a ‘normal life’.

It was also a controversial development. While the demonstrations generated varying degrees of attention and support, they also generated increased repression for the communities, as already indicated. Many activists were shot dead. Others felt it was a mistake to reduce the movement to a Friday-afternoon timeslot, and this scepticism continues to weigh on a number of communities, including Bil’in.

Over the last decade, around a dozen popular committees have been active at any given time, holding weekly Friday demonstrations. Each new Palestinian popular

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87 Addameer and Stop the Wall (2009), p. 22. See also, “after a few months, the committee start to have problems because it’s really hard to continue this struggle. Every day. Because the people have work, they have to work, they have many things to do. [...] And they decide to make weekly demonstration,” IMC interview (2014); “Friday is a free day,” CVOb interview (2014);

88 See especially Addameer and Stop the Wall (2009); PSCC (2010); Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall), “People Versus Oppression” (July 9, 2010), pp. 17-29.

89 Between 2003 and 2015, between 20 and 30 unarmed Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces (or died of complications associated with Israeli repression) while participating in popular-committee led actions and Friday protests: Gordon and Grietzer (2013), p. 9; see also, Addameer and Stop the Wall (2009), pp. 36-38; Stop the Wall (2010), pp. 19-21; PSCC (2010), pp. 6-7; R. McCarthy, “Teargas Canister Shot Kills Palestinian Demonstrator,” Guardian (Apr. 17, 2009); A. Horowitz, “Another Palestinian Protester Killed During Nonviolent Ni’lin Rally Against the Wall,” Mondoweiss (June 5, 2009); A. Hass and A Pfeffer, “Bil’in Protester Dies After Exposure to Tear Gas Shot by IDF,” Haaretz (Jan. 1, 2011); “Rushdi Tamimi Becomes Second Victim of Israeli Army in Nabi Saleh,” Palestine Monitor (Nov. 21, 2012); Mike J.C. (the author), “Elderly Palestinian killed on New Year’s Day,” Palestine Monitor (Jan. 9, 2014); “Palestinian Minister Dies at Protest,” Al Jazeera (Dec. 10, 2014).

90 For example, “Why to continue these demonstrations?” IMC interview (2014); “those who are care just for Friday,” BOC interview (2014).

91 For example, “At present [2010], between a thousand to two thousand people are mobilized on a weekly basis, in about ten active villages that organize diverse actions and activities against settlement expansion and the Wall,” PSCC (2010); “we have many popular committees now, about 15 to 20,” JDC interview (2014). In slightly more general terms, Darweish and Rigby (2015) determine that “at the height
resistance site has had its own leadership style and unique set of circumstances. The catalyst has usually been the separation barrier but also, especially after 2009, other occupation-imposed hardships, such as expanding settlements, home evictions and demolitions, closed roads, and lost water springs (some of the are taken up in the next chapter). On the question of arms, including explosives, incendiaries, blades, and other generally harmful attacks, there has been uniform agreement across the popular committees: neither promotion nor tolerance. But on the question of stone throwing, there is room for diversity—“they can decide it by their own committee, not the steering committee.”

In al-Ma’sara, near Bethlehem, for example, the weekly demonstrations have been literally nonviolent, with soldiers receiving goodwill gestures instead of stones. At the other extreme, Kufr Qaddoum’s Friday protests are violent but unarmed battles, with scores of youth hurling stones at the army as it enters the village to suppress the demonstration. Most places are somewhere in between, like Bil’in, as noted above, where stone throwing is generally minimized by the popular committee and kept apart from the nonviolent demonstrators but commonly occurs on the periphery or once the order of the demonstration has been broken.

For its sustained participation, media attention, leadership role, and achievements, Bil’in stands out, a distinction that owes much to the creativity of the committee. Even though the basic structure of Bil’in’s weekly demonstration has not changed in ten years, the organizers have strived to frame each week’s demonstration with a different theme. Sometimes the reference is to a holiday, an anniversary, a recent event, or a contemporary issue. A local activist explains that the strategy is to “give a new image to the media, that’s to push them to come to see Bil’in and to see what’s happening [...] it was a new thing for the media.” In his 2015 book about the village struggle, of the popular resistance during 2010-11 there was a maximum of 40-50 villages and neighbourhoods where there was some form of organized unarmed resistance against the ongoing occupation,” pp. 73-74.

92 JDC interview (2014).
93 With a mix of perplexity and derision, a Nabi Saleh activist said of al-Ma’sara: “Once they made a cake and gave it to the soldiers, and after 10 minutes everybody goes to his house, and that’s it! [...] Most of the time they don’t fire teargas,” NVO interview (2014); Darweish and Rigby (2015), pp. 80-81.
94 Nabi Saleh is another village whose popular committee is defiantly proud the practice of stone throwing (next chapter).
95 JDC interview (2014), adding “[s]o by these ideas you push the media, international media and Arab media, everywhere they were coming and taking photos of these actions”; also, “[w]e have a lot of creative actions. And the international friends, and the media, asks us every Friday, ‘What is the new in
popular committee coordinator Iyad Burnat elaborates:

it became apparent by January of 2005 that the media wasn’t interested in our struggle any longer. We were just one more anti-wall demonstration and looked like all the others [...] So we changed tactics [...] with these methods our message got through [...] The focus of our creative direct action then and now is to present something original at each demonstration, something media-worthy. That way, every journalist finds something new to report about, not the same old thing.  

For example, to coincide with Nakba Day, which commemorates the ‘catastrophe’ of 1948, Bil’in demonstrators carried giant keys symbolizing support for Palestinian refugees and their right of return. In 2010, expressing solidarity with an international Gaza-bound aid flotilla, the Bil’in activists wheeled a large wooden boat loaded with Palestinian flags and children to the barrier. During the World Cup, demonstrators dressed in football uniforms and kicked footballs over the barrier. Another time, activists dressed and painted themselves in blue from head to toe and staged scenes from the Hollywood blockbuster, Avatar, as if the Palestinians were the fictitious Na’vi natives valiantly fighting off the colonial invasion from space; even Fox News reported this demonstration. During the waves of prisoner hunger strikes of 2012 and 2014, activists in Bil’in, and committees across the West Bank, dedicated Friday marches to the fasting prisoners. In 2014, Bil’in sent a message of solidarity to African-American residents of

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For example, PSCC, “Bil’in Marks the Nakba” (May 13, 2011); ISM, “Nakba Commemoration: Protesters Carry a 5 Meter Long Key in Bil’in” (May 15, 2009).

Haitham Khatib, “Bil’in Protest In Solidarity Protest With The Gaza Flotilla 04-06-2010 By Haitham Al Katib,” YouTube (June 4, 2010). This was done again in Ramallah to coincide with the 2015 flotilla, not on a Friday, but by the Bil’in activists and their partners: “Protesters March through Ramallah in Solidarity with Freedom Flotilla Activists,” Palestine News Network (June 6, 2015).

“We tried to wear all the colours of the teams [...] we make a big ball,” BCC interview (2014); “kick balls to soldiers who respond with tear gas,” Matar (2015).


For example, ISM, “Photo Story: Prisoner Solidarity Protest in Village of Bil’in” (June 13, 2014); PSCC, “Thousands March Across the West Bank in Support of the Prisoners’ Hunger Strike,” Mondoweiss (May 11, 2012).
Ferguson, Missouri, who were undergoing their own struggle against state violence.\footnote{102}

Props, devices, and costumes are common, including, among others, large mirrors, scales of justice, orange jumpsuits, cages, coffins, gallows, banners, balloons, floats.\footnote{103}

To date, the most distinguished achievement of the Bil’in popular struggle has been moving the barrier and restoring most of the village’s lost land. The prize seemed to have been won in September 2007, when the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the barrier’s existing route had not been justified on security grounds and that it must be re-routed (noted above). The taste of victory soured, however, as months became years and the army seemed determined to delay compliance, until finally in June 2011, three kilometers of the barrier were demolished and a new segment erected along the edge of the settlement, restoring open access to hundreds of acres of land back to the village\footnote{104} (Figure 4.2). Waging unarmed and participatory struggle, coupled with legal and media campaigns, the people of Bil’in successfully mobilized their community and regained lost land—an unusual feat in the history of Palestinian struggle. While the Supreme Court decision was undoubtedly crucial, the Israeli attorney representing the village has said it never would have happened without the popular resistance on the ground: “I have no doubt whatsoever that without Bil’in’s public struggle we wouldn’t have gotten to the Supreme Court.”\footnote{105} A local activist adds that the fence was moved “because the struggle, not because they have nice with us and they give land to us. No, it’s because the struggle.”\footnote{106}

\footnote{102} “Protesters in the West Bank village of Bil’in carried signs at last Friday’s weekly demonstration with messages of solidarity and support for the ongoing struggle against deadly police violence in the United States,” H. Matar, “Photos: West Bank village of Bil’in stands with Ferguson protesters,” +972 (Dec. 9, 2014).
\footnote{104} J. Greenberg, “Israeli Army Takes Down Section of West Bank Barrier,” Washington Post (June 26, 2011); Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson’s Unit, “Map Outlining the New Security Fence Route Bordering the Palestinian Village Of Bil’in” (June 26, 2011).
\footnote{105} “Michael Sfard, Lawyer,” Just Vision (2011), responding to the question, “You mentioned that the Bil’in ruling was a partial success. Is there a relationship between the legal activity in this case and the nonviolent demonstrations?” http://www.justvision.org/portrait/204/interview
\footnote{106} IMC interview (2014).
Even though the immediate goal of moving the barrier was largely achieved, Bil’in’s Friday demonstrations nevertheless continue to this day. After noon prayer, the demonstrators now march a few hundred meters further, past a long scar in the land and a martyr’s shrine, to chant and shoot videos before the gate of a looming concrete wall at the edge of the settlement, a more starkly photogenic backdrop for film and photography and than the old fence in the middle of the field had been. Indeed, the demonstrations continue because their message and impact supersede the particular placement of the barrier, which provided the focal point around which the popular struggle took shape and mobilized. Tactically, the methods aimed at establishing or deepening power relations of solidarity among Palestinians and with third parties around the world, including within Israeli society; hence the recurrent emphasis on the joint activism with Israeli supporters, the lateral appeals to other struggling communities such as African-Americans, and the invocations of Palestinian nationalist iconography, such as the keys of 1948. Ironically, this approach to networking social relations and building solidarity has often depended on the violent response of the Israeli state, without which the optics of Bil’in’s
demonstrations would attract less coverage and international interest.

The wide dissemination of imagery from Friday demonstrations is subversive because it challenges stereotypes that reinforce the occupation and colonization of Palestine, namely that Israel is ‘the victim’ and Palestinians ‘the terrorists,’ even inverting the ‘David and Goliath’ trope, as mentioned above in Chapter 3. Even more than conventional images of stone-throwing youth, these new images challenge hegemonic narratives, sweeping all ambiguity aside with the stark contrast of soldiers tear-gassing, arresting, beating, nonviolent men, women, and children, people who were singing songs, playing musical instruments, dressed in costumes, marching in colourful parades, and flying kites. Pursuant to this emotive and almost theatrical appeal, the Bil’in popular committee has generally sought to repress stone throwing, or at least to insulate their nonviolent demonstrations as much as possible from the stone throwing. This is a pragmatic or Sharpian approach to nonviolence. In the words of a committee member, “you have to look, where is your goal? [...] In Bil’in, we have to show the violence of the Israeli soldiers.”[107] In addition to potentially obscuring that contrast, throwing stones simply does not draw the media or international support, as the activist explains:

if you started, go in the demonstration and started throwing stones and the soldiers throw teargas and rubber-coated steel bullets and this, this image, everybody knows it, outside. So they didn’t care. But you have to have a new strategy with the occupation. To show your message outside, you have to have a new image for the people to look at it. And this is the point in Bil’in, and this is how we succeed, to send our message out to many people.[108]

And certainly, in Bil’in’s case, the message got out. Many prominent international dignitaries have visited the small village in displays of support and recognition, including U.S. President Jimmy Carter, South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and former heads of state from Ireland, Norway, and Brazil.[109] A growing list of European figures

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107 JDC interview (2014).
108 JDC interview (2014).
have been teargased and shot with rubber-coated bullets in Bil’in. Prominent Israeli public figures have visited the village, including journalist Amira Hass, historian Ilan Pape, author Miko Peled, Knesset Members Muhammad Baraka and Uri Avneri, and a diverse array of other prominent global citizens, including Azmi Bishara, Rajmohan Gandhi, Martin Luther King III, Naomi Klein, Jody Williams, and others. In return, several of the local activists have been sponsored for speaking tours in Europe, as well as America, to spread the message directly to Western publics. The ideas bound up in the Bil’in ‘package’—grassroots nonviolent struggle against a colonial military occupation—expanded to new audiences worldwide when a 2011 documentary about life and death in the village’s struggle, made by one of the village activists (jointly with an Israeli director), won top awards at the Sundance Film Festival, the International Emmy Awards, and nomination for the Academy Award for Best Documentary Film in 2013.

Social media has become a major feature of Bil’in’s resistance. For many activists, new media represents a tool, a possibility, and hope: “[w]e are in 21st century, and we the people (have) the power with the new communications, with the new technology, not the tanks or the guns. It’s about how to send your message to the world, and we can send this message by our nonviolent resistance, better than using military resistance.” This is a novel development. Not so many years ago, such media capacity did not exist. Another activist: “[n]ow, I think, we began to depend on the media, on the internet which wasn’t before, and how to document these events which happened now, how to take it to the international community to let all the people know about it. But in the past, it was difficult.” Another: “the Internet makes the world small, village. I can publish photo any time and show people any time but before it was difficult [...] That’s it.

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113 “5 Broken Cameras (2011): Awards,” Internet Movie Database (no date).
114 BCC interview (2014).
115 CVOb interview (2014).
It’s about media.”\(^{116}\) Others describe the camera as “a big weapon,” and, referring to the Israeli establishment, say “they are so scared of media, you know.”\(^{117}\) These views are widely shared, though some activists also caution against overstating the potential: “media is very important, but the acts bring the media, not the media make the act.”\(^{118}\)

This does not mean that Bil’in has abandoned old-fashioned word-of-mouth communications. While in the West Bank for three months in 2013-2014, I was surprised at the degree of international exposure the village continued to receive. In addition to the usual Western youth activists who attend the demonstrations, several large travel groups of a dozen or more people from around the world, mostly Europe, visited Bil’in, receiving tours, speeches, and PowerPoint presentations. The groups were ordinary working class people, affiliated with unions and church groups rather than activist networks. In addition, Ramallah’s first youth hostel, established in 2013,\(^ {119}\) seems to have incorporated Friday trips to Bil’in as part of its weekend options for travellers (this was the case during my fieldwork, December 2013 through February 2014). Though anecdotal, these observations suggest that Bil’in continues to be a significant conveyor of images and experiences that feed global civil society solidarity with Palestinians.

This exposure has a number of consequences. In addition to leveraging social pressure for the local struggles and working against hegemonic narratives in the broader global media, the wide exposure has also translated into expanded space for political activism among the popular committees. The activists benefit from increased access to travel visas and international agencies, and some, when detained by the army, have found influential voices lobbying on their behalf as persecuted “Human Rights Defenders.”\(^ {120}\)

\(^{116}\) IMC interview (2014).
\(^{118}\) CVOa interview (2014); also “it’s not just the media, because your action,” JDC interview (2014).
Relatedly, the increased publicity adds domestic and international scrutiny to Israeli military conduct toward the villages, possibly helping to restrain the severity of the repression that inevitably accompanies resistance.\textsuperscript{121} Last but not least, the popular-committee resistance also feeds the global reservoir of support for the international boycott efforts against Israel, indirectly, through the steady stream of sympathetic news stories and international witnesses spreading word in their home communities, and directly, because many of the committee members have been staunch advocates of BDS in public fora at home and abroad. Though I seldom mentioned it or asked about it, most of my interview participants raised boycott advocacy: for example, “we link popular resistance with BDS.”\textsuperscript{122}

While Bil’in’s particular local story—resisting the barrier and the settlements and maintaining Friday demonstrations—has continued from 2005 until today, around 2009, the popular committee became simultaneously engaged in a broader, national resistance coalition that would take the fight outside the villages and across the West Bank in innovative ways (next chapter). Already during this earlier period there were signs of the coming developments. For example, there had been various efforts at coordination between the disparate popular committees and their agendas, most prominently through the broad-based, informal Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Campaign (also known

\textsuperscript{121} A standard operating principle of international and Israeli activists and peace groups is that their presence on the ground, along with increased media exposure, leads to less abuses of Palestinians by Israeli security forces and settlers; for example, Alazzeh (2011), p. 33. On the other hand, the decision to take up popular struggle has also increased the general level of collective punishment experienced by the villages, though this has been mostly nonlethal.

\textsuperscript{122} NDSb interview (2014); also, “we start talking about the boycott, boycott Israeli products, and all around the world, we do a lot of things for that,” CVOa interview (2014); “important thing if we have the BDS in all of the world,” JDC interview (2014); “motivate them to boycott the Israeli occupation,” BOC interview (2014); “boycott the Israeli product,” BCC interview (2014); “strengthen BDS,” BJS interview (2014); “by boycotting Israel,” CDS interview (2014). See also, “encouraging international outreach and solidarity, especially in the form of boycott, divestment, and sanctions,” Norman, “‘We Do Not Work for Peace’: Reframing Nonviolence in Post-Oslo Palestine,” in K. Schock (ed) \textit{Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggle} (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015), p. 36; “supporting boycott, divestment and sanctions […] BDS initiatives,” PSCC website, “Who We Are” (2015); “deeply involved in the campaign waged in the West to boycott Israel as a country, its goods and culture, and not necessarily those manufactured in Judea and Samaria,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre (2013), p. 26, note 12, see also, pp. 30, 177; “advocacy work,” in PSCC (2010), p. 9; Addameer and Stop the Wall (2009), pp. 25, 87, 94.
as Stop the Wall coalition),\textsuperscript{123} presaging the 2009 institution of the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC). Also, the formal 2009 Fatah/PA embrace of popular struggle and support for the Bil’in model can be traced back as far as 2006 when PA officials first attended Bil’in demonstrations,\textsuperscript{124} and the trend was clear when top officials of the Palestinian Authority, including Prime Minister Salaam Fayyad and President Mahmoud Abbas’s Chief of Staff, spoke at Bil’in’s 2008 annual conference on popular struggle.

One particular action stands out as marking the shift toward extra-village resistance and prefigures a tactical method that would be expanded with promise in early 2013. In December 2007, committee activists from Bil’in and other villages, working with Israelis as well, established a protest outpost just outside East Jerusalem. The tactic was an adaptation of the effective 2005 Bil’in house beyond-the-wall (above). The 2007 context was the Israeli government’s movement toward building on the open hills between greater East Jerusalem and the settlement Ma’ale Adumin, a plot of land designated “E1” under Israeli zoning schemes. As if to say ‘hands off,’ the group of approximately 30 activists planted a Palestinian flag and concrete foundations for their defiant outpost.\textsuperscript{125} They were shortly evicted, but some of the activists credit the action with deterring subsequent construction.\textsuperscript{126} These emerging trends—popular committee coordination, PA support, and centralized actions—would characterize the coalescing anti-occupation popular resistance, beginning especially in 2009.

4.3 Assessment: Nonviolent, Participatory, Relatively Successful

Before turning to the actions and organization of the expanded anti-occupation popular resistance, this section raises some observations and reflections on the grassroots anti-wall movement as a whole, illustrative of the logics of unarmed action and

\textsuperscript{123} Norman (2010), pp. 7, 44-45.
\textsuperscript{126} See “we built our room there and it was succeeded, that they stopped building that settlement from that spot,” JDC interview (2014).
participatory organization. Without the popular committees’ commitment to nonviolent resistance, the Israeli courts would have been less likely to have succumbed to political pressure to overrule government policy and roll back the route of the separation barrier in several instances and locations, most notably Budrus and Bil’in (the judiciary typically recuses itself in the face of plausible security claims, which are the constitutional jurisdiction of the executive). Moreover, the contemporaneous experience of the Second Intifada, and the longer history of armed resistance, suggests that more guns, explosions, threats, or kidnappings—even solely against military targets—would have produced intensified guerilla struggles, large-scale military incursions and sieges, and few if any gains for Palestinians. Also, as theorists of nonviolent resistance have explained, adopting armed struggle would have diminished the movement’s most valuable resource—people power—by raising “moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers” to popular participation. The militarization of the struggle would have made it more difficult for many Palestinians to take part, just as it would have restricted the space for international and Israeli supporters to become direct witnesses and participants.

For these reasons, armed resistance is not just another set of methods in the toolbox of resistance. Armed methods in particular seem to put at risk or complicate some of the specific ways that unarmed struggle works, i.e., facilitating maximum participation, causing opponent repression to backfire, and bolstering solidarity across first/second/third parties. Armed resistance negatively interferes with these mechanisms. From the beginning, Palestinian organizers on the ground have emphasized that their message and methods were nonviolent, even as they often professed their strategic motivations and usually did not condemn armed struggle in principle.

Julie Norman was among the first to engage the movement with nonviolent-action theory, showing how, for example, Gene Sharp’s three primary categories of nonviolent

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action—the escalating tri-classification of 198 methods as persuasive protest, noncooperation, and intervention—applied to the work of the Palestinian popular committees:

Regarding protest, popular committees are the primary organizers of sustained campaigns usually consisting of weekly demonstrations following the Friday prayer. Villages throughout the West Bank have mobilized to organize and sustain these weekly marches, usually near the construction sites of the separation wall. In terms of intervention, popular committees have organized episodes of civil disobedience, again focused on the separation wall, by mobilizing villagers to physically block the destruction of olive groves and other agriculture, or by blocking the bulldozers and other equipment used for the wall construction. Finally, regarding noncooperation, popular committees have been instrumental in organizing boycotts of Israeli products, particularly those manufactured in settlements.129

In short, Friday demonstrations exemplify the persuasive protests; boycott advocacy exemplifies withdrawal of cooperation; and obstructing the construction process indicates direct intervention.130 Other researchers interested in civil resistance have highlighted these Sharpian processes and dynamics in the Palestinian anti-wall popular resistance.131 William Parry concisely summarizes the shifts across the social sources of power, across all three parties to the conflict (Palestinians, Israelis, internationals):

the transformative power dynamics are visible. Nonviolent resistance delegitimizes Israel’s use of brute force, creating cracks and dissent within Israeli society and generating international criticism of Israel, while spawning support for, and sympathy with, the Palestinian struggle. Conversely, the popular struggle gains legitimization and gathers support locally and internationally. Nonviolent tactics also allow space for Israeli and international solidarity groups to join the struggle—an option not available to the majority of them with armed or violent resistance. This is visible at the weekly anti-wall demonstrations in villages like Bil’in and Nil’in, and in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah [...]

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130 I would further suggest that the three distinctions shed light on some activists’ criticisms of Friday demonstrations, as noted briefly above, i.e., that the resistance should not be reduced to stage-managed weekend activities. Understood categorically as a form of (merely) communicative protest and specifically not as a more escalated form of disruption or intervention, the method’s limitations and the critics’ concerns become more apparent (although I would not underestimate the need for persuasive protest, especially if it helps transmit the message to global audiences).
Moreover, nonviolent resistance belies Israel’s claims of victimization and reveals the true victims, thereby subverting Israeli propaganda, which has depended on portraying Palestinians as violent murderers in order to justify Israeli aggression and murder [...] And it empowers Palestinians who have, for the last two decades or so, seen their leaders squander their aspirations and rights.\textsuperscript{132}

Aspects of the passage are difficult to quantify, and it may overemphasize the optimal or potential performance of Palestinian popular struggle, rather than the mixed results of reality, yet to varying degrees, the shifts he sketches are evident.

Less has been written about the organizational aspects of the anti-wall popular resistance. In addition to the action component, Norman’s work also considers the participatory organization of the popular committees, and in similar terms to Mary King’s work on the popular committees of the First Intifada (previous two chapters). “Popular committees,” Norman writes in 2010 about the new movement:

popular committees are grassroots in the truest sense of the word, consisting of local volunteers with natural ties to the land and community. This proximity, in terms of geography and lived experiences, gives popular committees a degree of legitimacy and respect that may be difficult for non-community members to attain. The committees are not formal, therefore giving them considerable flexibility and freedom to communicate and associate with various groups and stakeholder. The membership of popular committees varies, but often includes village elders, farmers, activists, and local political leaders. The diverse composition of the popular committees allows community members to collaborate on various objectives and actions in such ways that overcome political divisions plaguing other levels of Palestinian society.\textsuperscript{133}

Norman sees these organizational features as assets to the movement, which depend on broad-based participation and local legitimacy. In Chapter 2, I argued that this aspect of nonviolent resistance—voluntary and community-based organization, transparent, inclusive—has been poorly understood and understudied in the literature, and I indicated some of the positions potentially arrayed against the analyses of King and Norman. These contrary positions include Pearlman’s argument that organized nonviolent struggle becomes more possible the more it resembles the command-and-control capacity of state-

\textsuperscript{132} Parry (2010).
\textsuperscript{133} Norman (2010), p. 36.
like movements, tapping the language of Weber’s monopoly of coercion, and Robert Helvey’s summary dismissal of democratic struggle and leadership by committee (Chapter 2). To the contrary, the anti-wall movement shows that coherent Palestinian nonviolent resistance coincided not with centralized or regimented organization but with an informal committee system that was decentralized, community-based, and directly democratic. Unlike monopolizing approaches to organization, the anti-wall movement manifests shades of Gandhi’s democratic “village republics,” Arendt’s “popular organs,” and Sharp’s decentralized “loci of power,” each conceived as contrary to the logic of top-down hierarchy.

In the following chapter, I advance the story of the popular resistance, beginning in 2009, when the movement began taking on new alliances, new kinds of action, and larger ambitions (an original case study in Palestinian popular resistance).
Chapter 5 – Anti-Occupation Popular Struggle, 2009 - present

Popular struggle has many meanings. First of all, to participate in many actions, not one type of action, against the—if we want to speak about our case—against the occupation. By popular struggle we can protest in action like what we do every Friday in Bil’in. By action, or boycott the Israeli product, or by staying in our land, and working in our land, to be green and beautiful, and not to allow it to the settlers and Israeli military force to confiscate. Popular struggle means all of the people participate in the action, not few people, not only the young, or students, or—to be all of the people, students, employers, workers, men, women. It means all of them, to boys and girls, to participate in this action. This is, it means, all of the types of people, and many types of action. And all of this under the nonviolent resistance or peace resistance or popular resistance. It’s the same in my mind. It’s the same meaning. All of this under the popular struggle, or popular resistance.

—Bil’in activist, 2014

5.0 Introduction: Overview, Vision, and Goals

Around 2009, the anti-wall popular struggle became something more, or a segment of it set its sights on a higher target: the occupation itself. Some of the popular committees that had made a mark in the struggle against the separation barrier now became the core of a broader political coalition, including new popular committees, an independent youth movement based in Ramallah, local and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the echelons of the political establishments of the Fatah party and the Palestinian Authority. The anti-occupation movement, as distinct from (but closely related to) the rural anti-wall movement has not been studied academically. One of the dissertation’s primary contributions is to bring into scholarly discourse a thorough account of this Palestinian movement.

Many of Bil’in’s creative approaches to civil resistance were adapted to a larger stage. For example, as this chapter elaborates, activists breached the barrier around Jerusalem, not for particular grievances but in acts of symbolic, communicative protest,

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1 BCC interview (2014).
aiming to reach global audiences.² The popular committees have also led actions that obstruct settler traffic, on occasions coordinating elaborate rolling roadblocks with human chains of local and international volunteers. Roadblocks are a kind of protest, sending a symbolic message, but primarily they are acts of direct intervention, disrupting the normalcy and economy of settler life. In January 2013, the same groups established an encampment outside East Jerusalem, with hundreds of participants occupying occupied land in protest tents dubbed Bab al-Shams, or Gate of the Sun, obstructing or directly intervening in a pending settlement construction project (plans which were subsequently shelved after the highly publicized direct action). The Bab al Shams camp energized the movement and spawned many follow-up actions (most notably Ein Hijleh in the Jordan Valley a year later) though the window of momentum seemed to have closed, as none of the follow-up actions generated comparable international attention. These among other diverse acts of civil resistance are catalogued with analysis in the latter part of this chapter (Section 5.2).

Before coming to the unarmed action campaigns of the anti-occupation popular resistance, this chapter sketches the organizational landscape, identifying the major groups and their relations. At its core, the movement is made up of several popular committees that have become associated with the Ramallah-based Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC), including especially the committees from the villages of Bil’in and Nabi Saleh (Ramallah region), and al-Ma’sara (Bethlehem region), along with coordination with other committees from across the West Bank, including, to differing degrees of influence and for different periods of times, Bil’in’s neighbor Ni’lin, Kufr Qaddoum in the north of the West Bank, al-Tuwani far in the south, and Jordan Valley Solidarity in the east, among several others in between. The village of Nabi Saleh is singled out for treatment because of its prominent role in the movement since 2009, and because it offers a compact metaphor or microcosm of the difficult task of expanding the struggle from the separation barrier to the occupation itself. With varying degrees of coordination, several of the village committees have begun to work closely with other civil-society associations, including most prominently an informal and independent youth

network that organized an Arab-Spring inspired ‘occupation’ of Ramallah’s central square in March 2011. The youth are generally radical and militant in their activism (though pragmatically committed to unarmed struggle), and they have helped the popular committees stay relevant beyond the villages by adding fresh faces, fresh ideas, youthful energy, and social-media savvy. The anti-occupation struggles’s organizational networks also include degrees of institutionalization through more formal channels, such as international NGOs, political parties, and the Palestinian Authority. The latter associations may have been empowering in some ways for the grassroots activists and committees, particularly financially and institutionally, but were also constraining in other ways, threatening to ‘domesticate’ the movement within the confines of political and bureaucratic conservatism. Such professional affiliations also tarnished the movement’s credibility among the local population, with the perception of salaried and foreign involvement raising questions about legitimacy and interests of the activists involved. Before detailing these organizational developments (5.1), and its direct actions across the West Bank (5.2), the remainder of this section more clearly defines the movement and some of its stated strategic vision and goals.

In local media, the term “popular resistance” (al-muqawama al-sha’biya) has frequently been used to characterize the activities of these groups. The term includes the ongoing anti-wall movement (discussed in previous chapter), and is particularly associated with the committees that took up regular Friday demonstrations in the wake of Bil’in’s example. Popular resistance is also generically understood to mean any kind of struggle or resistance that is embraced by the people, implying grassroots and community-based participation or at least support from wide portions of the population. For example, according to a youth activist based in Ramallah,

Well, I believe the popular struggle is basically anything that is being agreed on by the people on the ground and people who work on the grassroots level. So, if the grassroots level is agreeing to having resistance in the form of protests, then that’s popular struggle. If it’s in forms of boycotting the occupation, that’s also popular struggle. Blocking roads, any types of action that are basically from the people themselves, who live under occupation, that’s popular struggle.

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3 Search, for example, such online Israeli, Palestinian, and regional news sites as Ma’an News, Haaretz, Al Jazeera English, Mondoweiss, Electronic Intifada, +972 Mag, and Palestine Monitor.
4 ESC interview (2014).
The term is also contested. While many say that it categorically excludes armed struggle, others do not. All seem to agree, though, that in the contemporary West Bank, the term has come to firmly connote unarmed, though not necessarily entirely nonviolent, methods (see Appendix 1.b for interview excerpts of responses to the question, “what does popular resistance mean to you?”).

The West Bank anti-occupation popular resistance movement (which I call the Popular Struggle for short, taken to include as well ) is defined by a particular strategic vision. According to activists from Budrus, Bil’in, Nabi Saleh, and Ramallah (who disagree significantly on some important details), the goal is to develop models of unarmed resistance that can be exported to the wider population, not only across the West Bank, according to some of the movement’s leaders, but around the world. The goal is to establish practices and patterns of resistance that build a culture of resistance—local and global—against which the occupation could no longer stand. Reflecting back to 2003, an activist from Budrus explains the decision to invoke the First Intifada with the formation of a new “popular committee” to resist the wall:

We chose this name, and chose the tactic. We chose the strategy. Not because we are good boys, want to protect our grandparent’s fields. We had a project, we had an alternative, we had a strategy and we tried to put a live example of nonviolent struggle on the ground [...] And it will let the Palestinian people know what we mean by nonviolent struggle. What we mean by popular activities.6

According to the activist, the barrier’s construction in 2003 was an “opportunity” to re-empower Palestinian resistance against the occupation, by scoring a nonviolent victory that might serve as a first small step toward a larger unarmed insurrection.7 As hoped

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5 My fieldwork focused on these locations. Much or even most of the current movement’s impetus comes from the leadership in Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, who have received most international attention and have been at the forefront of engagement with the international community and global civil society. Several other villages and regions are also a part of this movement, though I have not focused on these, including Ni’lin, Jayyous, Beit Ummar, al-Ma’ sara, South Hebron Hills, Jordan Valley, Kufr Qaddoum, al Walaja, and many others. Budrus was central in the early phases of the anti-wall movement, arguably indispensible for inspiring Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, even though some of Budrus’ leading activists have grown aloof from the movement’s current approach, sometimes criticizing particular decisions and tactics (as noted in the previous chapter and raised below and in the next chapter).

6 BOC interview (2014).

7 “But when the wall arrived, I feel that maybe this is a good opportunity to come back, or to go back, to civil resistance [...] Even if this example is tiny and small, but it’s can be a good start,” BOC interview (2014).
Budrus had a ripple effect, amplified by Bil’in in 2005, but it seemed short-lived and confined to rural zones.

From the beginning, activists in the movement increasingly looked and worked outward into global civil society and the international community. Bil’in’s organizers emphasize the importance of international third parties. According to one:

We need the internationals, especially European, American, Canadian, Egyptians, African, we need all of the people. We know, we took this experience from the South African, how the world helped them, and we need the help from the world in this. By nonviolent resistance, we found this support from the others. But by military resistance we don’t found this. And we need the Israeli people to be with us. I think by this we know about the power of nonviolent resistance. It’s more than the power of military resistance. For this we use this.8

Another adds, “Israeli propaganda managed to mix, or to connect, between the Palestinian struggling and the international terrorist. And in these days we need very much the international solidarity, the international understanding. We need them to help us.”9 This sense of “need” comes from prior examples—the South Africa precedent—but also from a particular feature of Israel power: it has always been highly dependent on, and therefore vulnerable to, foreign relationships. Scholars of civil resistance warn against nonviolent movements’ overreliance on “foreign saviours.”10 However, given Israel’s historical and almost unique dependence on foreign powers (from the Balfour Declaration and the British Mandate in the first half of the twentieth century, to the ongoing support from the U.S. in the form of unparalleled aid packages and diplomatic immunity), Palestinian struggle cannot afford to overlook the importance of European and American social sources of power. As one activist put it, “as much as I hate the fact that our struggle needs to be looked upon positively from the world, but that’s the reality on the ground.”11

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8 BCC interview (2014).
9 BOC interview (2014); another: “we also, ya’ni, understand that the success of our struggle is, it relies heavily on the international community support, by, like, BDS campaigns, boycott campaigns, direct solidarity, and also, financial aid, or, and, increased visibility, about the situation in Palestine,” LOC interview (2014).
11 ECS interview (2014).
The Palestinian relation to external supporters is less about Palestinian self-reliance versus foreign dependence, and more about people, from anywhere, struggling together against an international injustice. As one activist put it, “popular resistance is taking its strength from the people, the Palestinians and the people from all over the world.”¹² The outreach, in other words, is not about asking for help, but building (global) solidarity. Another of Bil’in’s leaders:

I think if we work in right way, we can do it in all of the world. It will be a national, and if we talk about, global Intifada, it will be the same, that’s no leaders, the people working on the ground [...] And the BDS movement, the boycott, that’s important thing if we have the BDS in all of the world, that’s supporting the Palestinians for example. And they can build the committee from the ground.¹³

The activist envisions a transnational, nonviolent, committee-led resistance movement. Nabi Saleh activists also emphasize the global dimension of their struggle. According to one,

[T]he human rights believers and freedom fighters must make a globalization for their beliefs and their moral issues, and their thought. Because of that, we said that, you see that South Africa solution come from the pressure, outside pressure. This means, for me the Third Intifada must be global. And we choose the popular struggle as a strategy to give an opportunity for everyone in the world to do his duty and his responsibility.¹⁴

The theme of global responsibility is prominent among Nabi Saleh activists (and discussed further in the Conclusion).

Like Bil’in, Nabi Saleh became a revolving door of international solidarity, with activists and officials from governmental and nongovernmental organizations from around the world regularly passing through, and with Nabi Saleh activists crossing the West on speaking tours. The purpose is to win over hearts and minds among the electorates of some of Israel’s biggest international backers. According to one of Nabi Saleh’s leading women activists, “our war now, it’s more a mentality than any other kinds of war. It’s about how can I change your look to me [and if] I am able to change your mind to me, or your look to me as a terrorist to a freedom fighter, I gain one person

¹² COC interview (2014).
¹³ JDC interview (2014).
¹⁴ CVOa interview (2014)
and Israel loses it [...] it’s more a mentality war than a tanks or missiles war.”

This is a battle over human resources, numbers, aggregates of consent, obedience, and cooperation.

The global dimension, however, does not eclipse the local struggle, organizing at the community level, which is a primary task of the of movement and a primary analytical focus of this dissertation (through the concept of participatory organization). For Popular Struggle activists, the most pressing challenge is to mobilize larger portions of their communities and to spread that participation across the West Bank, especially into the major population centres, like the cities of Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron, as well as the large refugee camps. Like the global struggle, the domestic struggle is understood as a numbers game—the more people, the more power. For example, asked what makes some demonstrations more effective than others, an organizer replies, “[i]f the number of the people who participate is a big number, it will be a good one. If only a few people will participate in these actions, it will be weak. They can control it in a few minutes—I mean the soldiers. So if we have a good number, it will be a good action, and they cannot control it.”

Power is understood as a function of numbers, success as a function of participation. In the words of a Ramallah youth activist:

If every Palestinian at this point they decide to go and rip their ID cards and throw them at the checkpoints, that would create a revolution of the Palestinian people. If every Palestinian revolts, we probably would be, ya’ni, able to free the country, on the exact same day. Even if it’s not organized, but just at the same time, if people decide to move, then that would create the mass movements we were looking for.

In terms of potential numbers, human resources—unlike most other social sources of power, such as material resources and the capacity to sanction—Israel enjoys no clear advantage. On the contrary, Palestinians pose a distinct “demographic” threat (though

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15 NVO interview (2014).

16 Sharp identifies human resources as one of six social sources of power, along with authority/legitimacy, skills/knowledge, material resources, human resources, ideology, and the capacity to sanction: Sharp (1973), pp. 11-12, 744-754, as discussed above in Ch. 1.

17 JVO interview (2014).

18 ECS interview (2014).

19 In sheer quantity, the numbers between the two populations are close. Within Israel’s internationally recognized borders, its Jewish majority holds at about 80% of the population; however, taking account of the occupied territories, the levels flatten out, with approximately six million Jews and six million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea.
much of the population remains dormant, inactive, from the perspective of civil resistance).

Activists also understand that prospects for increased participation depend on unarmed strategies. This is not only because they cannot hope to compete with Israel militarily (as past attempts, such as the Second Intifada, failed disastrously), but also because unarmed strategies maximize the potential for higher numbers of participation.\(^{20}\)

For example, asked why she participates in the Popular Struggle, a young women responds, “as a Palestinian right now, especially as a Palestinian student, it gives me the ability to resist, but within my capabilities at the moment. And it gives you a voice, in terms of resistance. It helps you become— It helps you break out of the inferiority complex by actually going, moving forward, and resisting. In any shape or form, it makes your entire existence a part of the resistance movement.”\(^{21}\) Unarmed methods not only potentially empower more participants; unarmed methods also complicate the task of Israeli repression. Regimes cannot—without great cost—use airpower against demonstrators. An activist from Budrus explains:

> [w]e want to force the Israelis occupation to use the weakest link or the weakest arm in his army because we know that in popular struggle he need manpower to use it, to stop the demonstrators. But in armed resistance, they have to use the tanks and aircrafts and rockets, and Israel manpower is very limited, because limit associates (with its) small society. It has small manpower. But they proud of their killing machine abilities. So by popular struggle we force them to use manpower more than machines. And if we manage to involve the Palestinian people in unarmed resistance, and if we manage to force the Israelis to use the manpower, just the manpower to stop us, the balance must be in our favor.\(^{22}\)

In short, the more participation, the greater the force of the movement, and, so long as it is unarmed, it neutralizes the Israeli military advantage.

The crucial question for the organizers is how to expand participation, how to make the leap from the anti-wall popular resistance to a broader anti-occupation popular

\(^{20}\)E. Chenoweth and M. Stephan argue that relatively high participation rates are the key to successful resistance movements, and unarmed strategies are more conducive to mass movements because they raise fewer barriers to participation than armed strategies: *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

\(^{21}\)NDSa interview (2014); also, on getting involved, “for me, personally, that made me feel that there is a chance to make a difference, that if you work enough, you CAN,” BJS interview (2014).

\(^{22}\)BOC interview (2014).
resistance. The answer in-progress seems to be that each community mobilize against the aspect of the occupation nearest them. As one activist puts it,

We want to unify the power of the Palestinian population. And all the effort of the Palestinian society and population, to put pressure and to face the end, the occupation, in all the shapes or the faces of occupation of our land. To put the pressure on every shape or face of the occupation, like settlements, walls, roads, checkpoints, and wall, everything, every face or shape of the occupation we can target and do a pressure on it.\textsuperscript{23}

This means normalizing resistance against the occupation in all its forms, “not against one of its shapes.”\textsuperscript{24} Around 2009, 2010, new popular committees began mobilizing Friday demonstrations and other actions against other “shapes” of the occupation. Nabi Saleh launched its Popular Struggle when a neighboring settlement confiscated a local water spring (more below). Similarly, groups formed in Hebron (Youth Against Settlements) to challenge the settlement in the old city and the closure of the main-street market; in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarah neighborhood to protest the eviction of Palestinians from their homes; in the village of Kufr Quddoum to protest the closure of the main road to the Nablus. These new committees signify the diversifying of the anti-wall popular resistance model to other objects of the occupation.

Ramallah youth working with the PSCC characterize this work in terms of generating sustainable habits of community activism at new sites: “[i]t is first and foremost to politicize the masses and get the masses moving and to actually keep the idea of resistance rather than, you know, just praying for others to come and save them. It’s holding-- it’s empowering people to move, and it’s empowering the masses to move.”\textsuperscript{25} Another Ramallah activist explains,

[T]he goal of the popular struggle is to maintain the struggle of the people, and we hope that this struggle will kind of grow to be an actual Intifada at some point. We start in locations, but our goal is-- we provide examples, and we want people from different villages, different places, and different locations who suffer from occupation, whether its land confiscation, imprisonment, torture, killing, the building of the wall, the building of settlements, the economical conditions, all of this needs to be fought against. So, my goal is eventually to free Palestine and liberate this place I

\begin{footnotes}
\item[23] CVO interview (2014).
\item[24] JVOa interview (2014).
\item[25] NDSa interview (2014)
\end{footnotes}
live in.\textsuperscript{26}

The activists are under no illusions about the enormity of the challenge they have undertaken. Their project is a “very slow process [...] like turtle steps. It’s like putting the seeds in the minds, and you have to irritate (irrigate?) it every while and wait til it becomes to grow up to a tree and you can take the fruits of this tree.”\textsuperscript{27} They also recognize that in the meantime, the adjective “popular” remains somewhat euphemistic: “when it (is) distributed on all the Palestinian territories and among the Palestinian society, in that moment we say that this is a popular Palestinian struggle. Now it’s just a model to indicate.”\textsuperscript{28} Among the most pessimistic assessments offered to me by one of the movement’s organizers casts doubt on both international support and domestic prospects:

I am not doing it for the international community, because I believe nothing will come out of them, eventually. The only thing that they can do is BDS. And if popular resistance gets to the mass level of the First Intifada, then there will be an impact. But at this point, the only thing we can do is strengthen BDS, and strengthen these initiatives, and on the ground, to build communities. It’s much more for the Palestinians than it is for anyone else because we need to protect our areas. We need to protect the land, because we’re losing it. We’re losing everything.\textsuperscript{29}

Movement participation remains far from ‘mass,’ yet over the last ten years, no other groups or actors in the West Bank have been more prominent in terms of combining direct action against the occupation with international exposure and network building. Growth has been evident in some aspects of the movement, particularly in global civil society, and groundwork may be laid in the territories for larger domestic mobilizations in the future, but overall, the movement has only been genuinely ‘popular’ within a relatively narrow sector of Palestinian society (primarily rural, with elements of urban youth) and has appeared to be in a slow decline over several years (as of late 2016). The movement’s weakened participatory bases are discussed in the following section and in depth in the following chapter. The remainder of this chapter details, first, the inter-organizational contours of the anti-occupation popular resistance, and, second, its

\textsuperscript{26} ECS interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{27} NVO interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{28} CVO interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{29} BJS interview (2014), though the same activist also makes statements indicative of optimism.
repertoire of direct actions and their impact (limited but not insignificant). The dissertation suggests that the limited growth and limited success of the Popular Struggle are associated with a drift away from participatory organization (in addition to a host of structural obstacles).

5.1 Organization: New Alliances

A number of organizational developments in 2009 constitute the Popular Struggle movement, stemming from Bil’in more than any other centre: (1) the creation of a new steering body, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC), and its official registration as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) through the institution of the Palestinian Authority (PA); (2) the policy embrace—in word more than deed—of the popular committees’ agenda and tactics by the leadership of Fatah and the PA; and (3) the launching of Friday demonstrations in Nabi Saleh, whose popular committee, in close partnership with Bil’in, would shape and define the PSCC and the Popular Struggle. A further development becomes prominent in 2011: (4) the informal cooperative alliance with an independent youth movement based in Ramallah.

5.1.1 Popular Struggle Coordination Committee: NGO Leadership?

The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC) was born from discussions at Bil’in’s fourth annual conference on nonviolent struggle in April of 2009.\(^{30}\) The intention was to establish a common platform or steering body for the popular committees “to coordinate between each other [...] and sometimes to prepare for action together.”\(^{31}\) The PSCC marks an effort to overcome the “fragmented and localized nature” of the popular resistance that analysts had previously observed.\(^{32}\) The group has worked closely with, and helped coordinate resources between, popular committees across the West Bank, including Bil’in, Ni’lin, Nabi Saleh, al-Ma’sara, al-Walaja, South

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\(^{30}\) “In 2009, we have a conference in Bil’in, and we discussed together [...] with our friends and the internationals, we discussed with them to form the PSCC,” BCC interview (2014).

\(^{31}\) BCC interview (2014); also, “[b]asically, you want these hotspots of popular struggle to work amongst each other,” ESC interview (2014)

Hebron Hills, Tulkarem, and the Jordon Valley. A PSCC webpage provides the following background:

The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee was formed by prominent activists in the popular committees from all over the Occupied Territories and across the Palestinian political spectrum. Popular committees present a unique form of community based organizing and resistance in the tradition of the first Palestinian Intifada. These diverse, non-partisan committees lead community resistance to Israeli occupation in various forms, such as marches, strikes, demonstrations, direct actions and legal campaigns, as well as supporting boycott, divestment and sanctions.

By emphasizing grassroots organization and nonviolent methods of resistance, the PSCC invokes a vocabulary that resonates with the twin focus of this research project.

A 2010 policy paper published by the PSCC characterizes the strategic nonviolent approach to action, on the one hand, along with its strongly community-based orientation, on the other hand:

These committees served as an ad-hoc non-partisan mobilization platform for the creation of a civic grassroots movement [...] The popular struggle possesses the potential for a civic transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and poses the most significant alternative to ongoing violence and despair. Though demonstrations do sometimes escalate into clashes with limited, unarmed, violence by protesters, which are met with disproportional violence by the Army – the PSCC calls for and strives to organize nonviolent resistance as a strategic choice. Contrasting the violence embedded in military occupation with an essentially nonviolent, civilian mobilization, the popular struggle has the capacity to minimize the general level of violence in the conflict. It also strives to involve individuals and communities in a constructive, development-oriented endeavor for liberation and assertion of rights.

Several of the conceptualizations in this passage reflect a Sharpian framework. For example, the idea of “unarmed [and] nonviolent resistance as a strategic choice”

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33 See “from north til south, from Jordan Valley to Tulkarem, from Ramallah and from Hebron, Bethlehem,” BCC interview (2014); “the PSCC established, ya’ni, from many committees, like from Ma’sara, from Bil’in, Nī’lin, Nabi Saleh, from the Jordan Valley, Tulkarem, Yatta, or the Hebron hills,” LOC interview (2014), adding that “they are around 60, only 60 person, members, but the management are seven.”

34 “About/Page Info” Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, Facebook Page (2015); see also: “a civic grassroots movement, inspired by the long tradition of Palestinian nonviolence, as well as by the schools of Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi and the South African anti-Apartheid movement,” Popular Struggle Coordination Committee, “Under Repression: Policy Paper” (September 2010), p. 5.

(emphasis added), indicates the pragmatic rather than the principled disposition toward nonviolence, as outlined in Chapter 1. The notion of “a civic grassroots movement [that] strives to involve individuals and communities in a constructive, development-oriented endeavor,” speaks clearly to the community-based organizing of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp, as outlined in Chapter 2. In other words, the vision of the PSCC offers an opportunity to examine the formula of unarmed action and participatory organization in practice.

After 2009, the PSCC remained busy, sponsoring and promoting acts of nonviolent resistance and growing networks of activism at home and global solidarity abroad. Specific acts of resistance in which the PSCC has been associated include numerous instances of knocking holes in the separation barrier around East Jerusalem, blocking settlement roads and highways, staging demonstrations inside settlement supermarkets and on top of military bases, and establishing protest encampments (each covered in the next section). Internationally, the PSCC has been effective in lobbying and mobilization support, in terms of institutions and civil society, as even the group’s critics concede.

In terms of fostering domestic participation, “capacity building,” the PSCC has led many initiatives (the following list is expanded and sourced in the next chapter). They have provided training to several communities in social media and communication technology, sometimes providing equipment like cameras and laptops. They share or distribute experienced organizers through its networks to various communities forming committees and taking up Friday demonstrations. They have funded local programs like

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37 The PSCC itself does not plan or execute actions but rather provides coordination, logistics, and connections for the popular committees: “PSCC is just an NGO that helps the popular struggle. But it’s not a leadership for the popular struggle [...] We made the PSCC as an NGO to help how to bring some monetary support to help us in our act as a Palestine,” CVOa interview (2014). However, the line between the PSCC and the popular committees is thin because many of the PSCC board members and its internally elected heads have been leading activists from popular committees of Bil’in, Nabi Saleh, and Ma’sara: “a very thin line,” BJS interview (2014). More precisely, as Section 6.3 discusses, collaborative actions are typically planned by ad hoc steering committees.

38 See: “in effect are deeply involved in the campaign waged in the West to boycott Israel,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre (MAITIC), “The Palestinian Popular Resistance and Its Built-In Violence” (June 9, 2013); “[t]he model of the PSCC is built around generating international support and media awareness, and on this front it has proven to be highly successful,” L. Alsaafin, “How Obsession with ‘Nonviolence’ Harms the Palestinian Cause,” Electronic Intifada (July 10, 2012).
university scholarships and community works, provided legal and financial support to detained and arrested activists and their families.

However, the PSCC faces a number of challenges and limitations, some self-imposed. From the beginning, some activists and popular committees, including from Budrus, had opposed the basic idea of regularizing Friday demonstrations, and when Friday demonstrations became a central feature of the PSCC’s approach, the same activists and committees remained aloof from the new organization.\(^{39}\) There was also pushback or dissatisfaction from various communities against the degree to which the PSCC initially sought to assert itself over other popular committees, and the extent to which the Bil’in activists were asserting themselves over the PSCC.\(^{40}\) Some critics have also charged that the PSCC would strengthen its grassroots base if it redirected more of its resources, international funding and ‘boots on the ground,’ away from the more sensational acts of resistance, such as demonstrations and protests, and more toward basic social services, especially land-related, such as planting trees and helping with harvests, field maintenance, etc., from which local residents may have perceived more gain.\(^{41}\) Such activity is inline with the ideas of Gandhi’s constructive program, and confirm the findings of Mary King concerning the strengths of the First Intifada (which drew strength from its robust network of participatory social services).

Another concern I encountered about the PSCC, including from some of Bil’in’s activists in my interviews, stems from the decision to register the body as an official NGO through the Palestinian Authority.\(^{42}\) The controversial move expanded the group’s institutional power in a number of ways; it allowed the PSCC to legally receive international and local funding through the Oslo governance framework established in the 1990s, and it expanded access to official organizations, agencies, and diplomats from

\(^{39}\) The criticism of Friday demonstrations was noted in the second part of the previous chapter.

\(^{40}\) For example, “PSCC tried to take the rule of the popular committees,” BCC interview (2014); “they considered that it belonged to Bil’in only,” JVOa interview (2014); and referring to the creation of the PSCC, “after this I think we had a lot of troubles. Like, a lot of people will not like this person, and this not like this person […] after this, we start to have much problems, much. We are not much stronger as we used to be,” ICC interview (2014); “maybe 20 members [of 60] from Bil’in,” and two of the three (internally elected) heads have been from Bil’in, LOC interview (2014).

\(^{41}\) JVOb interview (2014). Constructive work in the Popular Struggle is expanded in Section 6.4.

\(^{42}\) For example, a Bil’in activist says, “we put the goals to be coordination between all the leaders, and to be committee to coordinate between each other, but as I told you […] I found it was NGO, like the other NGOs and this is difficult,” BCC interview (2014).
around the world. Among the PSCC’s biggest backers was the Palestinian Authority itself, which began funding the NGO 50,000 NIS (around $13,000 USD) per month over several years.\footnote{See “50,000 Shekels per month” BOC2 interview (2014); “50,000 Shekels” NVO interview (2014); “more than half a million shekels ($125,000) each year,” Alsaafin (July 2012).} However, these same connections, local and foreign, governmental and nongovernmental, also generated resentment and suspicions among other committees and groups, who were not receiving the same levels of attention and support.\footnote{“And the support they started to come more and more for PSCC from all of the world, from Palestinian society, or PA, you know? Now, this thing’s make the other committees not to be agree with it. Why? Because the PSCC they took all of the support from the world. Some of them, they thought, No. Why we are not involved in PSCC? And they tried to attack each other,” BCC interview (2014); an activist from Budrus describes how foreign and local connections, from the international Elders organization to Palestinian business leaders, were only interested in supporting the Bil’in movement: “they want to follow Bil’in [...] all of them are following the one master,” BOC2 interview (2014), BOC interview (2014).} Some popular committees, including those of Budrus and Beit Ummar, were vocally critical of the idea of taking salary from the seemingly corrupted PA.\footnote{“This means that it’s, it’s official, even if it’s NGO, but it’s money from the government, the independent media took their news from it, so it’s, everything is under control,” BOC2 interview (2014); “when they decide to follow the example of government, they became part (of it),” BOC interview (2014); “Beit Ommar has remained committed to operating outside of the influence of the Palestinian Authority,” M. Abu Maria, “Beit Ommar Returns to its Roots,” \textit{Electronic Intifada} (Dec. 7, 2009).} In turn, the PSCC found that its independence was curtailed by the influence of cautious international donor organizations, willing to sponsor cultural projects but unwilling to support political action,\footnote{For example, “they will tell you, ‘We could help for something for cultural thing, you know, and dancing thing, but we cannot help you for something against the occupation.’ What the fuck you think? You know like, I don’t need like the culture thing,” ICC interview (2014); “this money for the lawyers only, this money for the media only [...] a project like working on the land, like training, for the women, for the democratic, for courses like this. But for action, they, no European gives money for the action,” BCC interview (2014); “[t]hey can put strings on how we protest, where we protest, what we protest, what we--They can affect it completely if you allow them,” BJS interview (2014).} “and this is one of the biggest mistakes PSCC made, by letting people, or NGOs, or PA to control it.”\footnote{NVO interview (2014), adding, “and I think PSCC, they have many chances to build their own body, but it was easier for them to make other NGOs to control them. Because only for money, which is totally a big fault, or a big mistake they did.”} These negative side-effects of the professionalization and institutionalization of the popular resistance seem to recall the demobilizations that befell the First Intifada’s popular committees with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in the 1990s (Chapter 3). Yet I do not want to overstate the degree of domestication of the PSCC; in my research, especially during the 2013-2014 period of my fieldwork, the PSCC appeared to operate at arm’s length, and even independently of the PA, although largely within a modus operandi already acceptable to the PA.
According to a Palestinian youth activist with experience working with the PSCC, the organization is not a typical NGO, in the negative sense of being overly bureaucratic and excessively managed, but is rather flexible, informal, and cause driven—“they are fighting for a thing that they believe in.” Many of the activists have been vocally critical of the PA and the NGOs, and seem willing to defy both, though in practice, typically do not (next section).

5.1.2 Leaders follow: Fatah and the Palestinian Authority

The preceding subsection examined the formation of the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC), its problematic NGO status, and its quasi-client relationship with the Palestinian Authority (PA). Closely related, this section examines the formal endorsement of nonviolent popular resistance by the Palestinian political establishment in the West Bank, particularly the Fatah party under leader Mahmoud Abbas and the PA government under the technocratic Prime Minister Salam Fayyad. The official leadership’s shift was already under way, as noted in the previous chapter, from ignoring the anti-wall movement in the early Jayyous-Budrus years of 2002-2004, to offering modest support for Bil’in’s local struggle from 2006-2008.

A key moment came in August 2009 when Fatah and the PA updated their charters. At Fateh’s much-delayed Sixth General Conference in Bethlehem (the Fifth was in Tunis, 1989), more than 2000 party delegates voted (sometimes under significant pressure) to “radically transform” the face and agenda of the movement. In terms of the membership, the election results bolstered Abbas’s immediate camp of supporters, but many others from the ‘old guard,’ those who led from exile before the First Intifada, were finally ousted from their seats on the major leadership councils and committees.

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48 MXS interview (2014).
51 Bröning (2011), p. 80; see also, “[i]t was the first time in the history of the Fatah movement that the notion of resistance was coupled with the terms ‘popular’ and ‘unarmed’,” A. Alazzeh, “Non-Violent Popular Resistance in the West Bank: The Case of the Popular Struggle Committees,” Centre for Development Studies (Ramallah: Birzeit University, 2011).
Rising to take some of their places were many from the still-called ‘new guard,’ the locally rooted First-Intifada leadership cadres, now in their 40s and 50s. In a historic move, the call for armed struggle was extirpated from the party’s constitution. Rather, first among a list of seven agreed-upon forms of resistance and political action is: “[m]obilization of popular nonviolent struggle against settlement activities as expressed in its successful present model in Bil‘in and Ni’lin against the Wall.”

Simultaneously, the PA government released its “Program of the Thirteenth Government,” Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s famous two-year plan for statehood. The document outlined a new Ministry of the Wall and Settlement Affairs, whose task was to “[p]romote steadfastness” and “basic needs” of the affected communities while “[p]roviding necessary support to popular committees in their peaceful resistance against the Wall.” The decision to fund the PSCC 50,000 NIS ($13,000 USD) monthly followed from these policy directives. Often portrayed as the impartial economically-minded friend of the West, Fayyad used his office to support and promote the Popular Struggle and its Friday demonstrations on the ground and internationally.

At the highest levels, official Palestinian leadership in the West Bank appeared to have embraced nonviolent popular resistance as its official policy for challenging the Israeli occupation. An alliance was implied between the top-down political class and the bottom-up grassroots activists. The cooperation of these two forms of organization is optimistically identified and described in 2011 by Michael Bröning (whose organizational model is outlined in comparison to those of Julie Norman and Wendy Pearlman in the latter half of Chapter 2). For Bröning the emerging confluence of top-down and bottom-up Palestinian leadership in the contemporaneous West Bank had the

52 Fatah (Aug. 2009).
55 As noted in previous section and again in the next chapter (on money and government support).
potential to be “revolutionary” and “ground-breaking.”

However, after several years, coordination between the grassroots popular committees and the state-aspirant PA has not transformed or arguably even improved the conditions of the conflict. The boost afforded to the activists in terms of institutional and financial power may have been overshadowed by losses in other areas; the money, for example, as already noted (and more in the next chapter), generated public suspicion about the activists’ motives and interests. Despite undoubtedly well-meaning intentions of many officeholders in the PA, various structural limitations may have proven insuperable; the bureaucracy was too big and too many livelihoods appeared bound to the status quo for the institution as a whole to take meaningful—and uncertain or risky—action in support of the resistance. In my interviews, activists regularly complained that officials’ support was limited to words, slogans, and cheques, rarely translating into deeds, or boots on the ground.

Most adversely, the PA has contained and even repressed the popular movement. It has done so primarily by preventing organized action in the more populated towns and cities. Ironically, support from the PA has only extended to the jurisdiction where the PA has no authority—Area C of the West Bank. As most of the separation barrier was being constructed on the hills and fields of Area C, most of the grassroots resistance concomitantly formed in towns and villages of Areas C (and B), including the region around East Jerusalem. Once it became fashionable (post-Bil’in), PA officials were happy to march side-by-side with activists in remote villages on special occasions, but the same activists have been prevented by the same officials from protesting in PA-controlled area A (the major population centres). Palestinian police stop demonstrators from passing through PA-controlled areas on their way to protest neighboring Israeli settlements.

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58 The second Oslo Accord (1995) divided the West Bank into three jurisdictions. Area A was the smallest but included most of the Palestinian population, designated under the control of the PA. Area C spanned more than half the territory of the West Bank but included only a fraction of the Palestinian population, and all of the Israeli settlements, under the control of the Israeli military. Of intermediary size and population, incorporating smaller Palestinian towns and seam zones, Area B was designated as a shared jurisdiction, with Israel controlling security. The Areas were to be phased over to PA control, but the process floundered in the late 1990s, and the jurisdictions became entrenched. See C. Smith (2010), pp. 444–464.
59 “For example, near Ofer prison they tried to stop them. If they go to Qalandiya (checkpoint) or Beit Il (settlement), they stop them. They don’t want problems, actually,” LOC interview (2014); “they
While maintaining an ostensible policy of popular resistance, the PA has proven committed to enforcing outlying and self-defeating boundaries of the movement.

This concern is widely expressed among activists of the Popular Struggle. Some openly characterized the PA as an adversary, including prominent figures from the Bil’in and Nabi Saleh popular committees and members of PSCC. For example, I was told bluntly, “the Palestinian Authority is against us [and] we hope as popular committees to end the Palestinian Authority.” In other words, the existing relationship with the PA is fraught with uncertainty, contradiction, and looming turmoil. The PA’s double game has the (increasing) effect of bifurcating the movement’s attention between Israeli and Palestinian security forces, while also stifling activism and mobilization among the communities under PA control, precisely the communities Popular Struggle leaders are striving to reach.

5.1.3 Nabi Saleh

A third defining development of the Popular Struggle in 2009, following the establishment of the PSCC and the official policy turns of Fatah and the PA, was the ignition of the Popular Struggle in the small village of Nabi Saleh (population 550), with its first Friday protest in December of that year, and every Friday since. The work of Nabi Saleh’s popular committee have come to rival that of Bil’in, in terms of influence on the movement and media. The two villages work closely together, and combined,

cannot do a demonstration in Area A, because the Palestinian Authority will stop them [...] didn’t agree for these actions,” JDC interview (2014); “they want to control it, to keep it in small numbers,” JVOa interview (2014); “it’s not allowed to prepare for action from Ramallah to Beit II, because the Oslo agreement, they told us,” BCC interview (2014); “they prevent them,” SCC interview (2014); “[e]ncouragement and containment,” MAITIC (June 9, 2013), p. 141, see also pp. 43, 145; “two oppressive regimes,” J. Heigilt, “The Palestinian Spring That Was Not: The Youth And Political Activism in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,” Arab Studies Quarterly (September 2013), p. 351, also pp. 354-355; “as long as they didn’t cross into areas in which the P.A. has jurisdiction,” B. Ehrenreich, “Is This Where the Third Intifada Will Start?,” New York Times Magazine (Mar. 15, 2013). For a vivid display of the PA’s two-faced ‘support’, see the contrast between the beginning and ending of the video documentary, “Resistance in the West Bank,” Vice News (2013); I. Audeh, “Jamal Juma’: PA ‘Killing Popular Resistance’,” Electronic Intifada (Aug. 8, 2011).  
60 JDC interview (2014); also, “a police state,” BJS interview (2014) and, “they are an enemy to me,” ESC interview (2014).
enjoy the bulk of local and international media attention and are at the forefront of global networking.\textsuperscript{62} Like Bil’in and the other sites, the demonstrations were unequivocally unarmed and largely nonviolent, though the overall level of violence has typically been markedly higher than in Bil’in, in terms of stone throwing and army repression. Nabi Saleh activists are proud of their long history of resistance, including, at times, armed struggle—now suspended—and they are also proud of their ongoing culture of stone throwing at occupation forces.\textsuperscript{63} They are also proud of the forward and independent role women play in the popular committee and in the demonstrations.\textsuperscript{64} Women have assumed lead roles in the actions, on the committee, and on international speaking tours in Europe and the United States,\textsuperscript{65} and according to one of the village’s male leaders, women’s equality is an obvious imperative for any popular struggle: “[i]t is inconceivable that there is a liberation struggle that excludes women […] It is imperative that women possess their full freedom.”\textsuperscript{66} The activists from Nabi Saleh have also been at the forefront of articulating the idea of the Popular Struggle as a striving for a Third and Global Intifada, waged locally on the model of the unarmed First Intifada and globally on the model of the anti-Apartheid movement against Apartheid South Africa—the boycott model.\textsuperscript{67}

\textsuperscript{62}Activists from the two villages dominate the PSCC leadership board, and they are usually at the forefront of Popular Struggle actions and projects across the West Bank (though many other villages are also involved); more below.

\textsuperscript{63}“especially the shabab [the youth] if they want to throw stones, they’ll throw stones,” NDSa interview (2014); “also, we make sandwiches for those who throwing stones,” CVOa interview (2014); “the stones, it came from our history or from our culture, because (since) long time ago, forbidden for the Palestinian people to use weapon. So our weapon to protect ourselves, from wild animals, or from enemies, or inside family fightings—The stones is the only tool, we can use it,” BOC2 interview (2014).

\textsuperscript{64}J. Adas, “B. Tamimi: ‘To Liberate Palestine, We Must Have Free Women’,” \textit{Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs} 34:8 (Nov./Dec. 2015); “Nabi Saleh, specifically, women had— still have a very strong role in leadership in Nabi Saleh,” BJS interview (2014); “Nabi Saleh is a very good example that the participation of women, it’s exactly on the same level or even more,” MXS interview (2014); in specifically Nabi Saleh, it’s women that are usually in the front lines, and that is also a form of them fighting patriarchy,” NDSa interview (2014); “half of our society, half of our power,” CVOa interview (2014); U. Gordon and G. Ohal Grietzer (eds) \textit{Anarchists Against the Wall} (2013), p. 134.

\textsuperscript{65}For example, “she go to France, to Holland, to Italy … Some people were invited to Spain, some people were invited to Sweden,” CVOb (2014); “invitation to go to America […] speaking tours about this,” NVO (2014); “Compte rendu de la venue à Montpellier de Manal, Nairman, Bochra de Nabi Saleh,” L’\textit{Association France Palestine Solidarité} blog (Mar. 18, 2013); and, as quoted in 5.1.3, “NKU to Host Free Forum on Life in the West Bank,” Northern Kentucky University press release (Nov. 4, 2011).

\textsuperscript{66}B. Tamimi, quoted in Burnat (2016), p. 165.

\textsuperscript{67}In addition to sources from the chapter’s Introduction above, “[o]ur vision is the First Intifada,” CVOa interview (2014); “[w]e wanted to become a Third Intifada—Palestinian in face, Arab in depth, global in form, and humanistic in goals,” quoted in Burnat (2016), p. 164.
The experience of the village also signifies the difficult aspiration, in microcosm, that underlies the idea of the Popular Struggle movement: the shift away from the small and the particular to the large and the universal. In 2009, grassroots organizers understood that Nabi Saleh’s movement contained an element that made its model potentially more replicable across the West Bank than the experiences of the other Popular Struggle sites, because Nabi Saleh’s focus and goal were not anchored to the separation barrier, which only impacted a narrow segment of the territory:

here in the village, exactly not what like happened in Bil’in or Budrus, or … There, popular resistance began against the wall, especially Bil’in and Budrus, and Ni’lin. In our village here we don’t have a wall. But here, we have the settlement which every year is bigger than before, on our land of course. So, even in their press, from the beginning of our popular resistance for four years, they considered the situation here is as a virus. They don’t want this thing to spread to other villages. As I told you, we were the first village which demonstrated against the occupation and against the settlements. If you took a tour of the West Bank, you will not find any village which not suffering from the settlers, the settlements, and the occupation. So they believe if this thing spreads to the other villages, it will be third intifada, and it will be difficult to stop it. So they began to face what’s happening here with a huge amount of violence, a huge amount of teargas, rubber bullets. They want to stop it. And they don’t want this to spread to other places.68

In other words, if Nabi Saleh could get its model ‘right,’ it could be adapted in hundreds of comparable communities across the West Bank. The progression of the wider movement, from anti-wall to Popular Struggle, can be summarized along these lines and in this crude sequence: in 2003 Budrus made a popular committee against the separation barrier; in 2005, Bil’in made a popular committee against the barrier and the settlements; in 2009, Nabi Saleh formed a popular committee against the settlements and the occupation. Particular to general.

However, the catalyst for Nabi Saleh’s sudden burst of popular resistance in early December of 2009 was not ‘the settlements’ or ‘the occupation’ abstractly. The community was responding to the appropriation of its traditional water spring, known locally as Ein al-Qaws (literally, “the bow spring”) in the valley between the village and the neighboring settlement, Halamish; under de facto military protection, settlers took

68 CVOb interview (2014).
over the grounds around the spring and renamed the site. This spark set off ferocious unarmed demonstrations, clashes, with the entire village mobilized in participation. Hundreds of people, along with supporters and friends from other popular committees (including Bil‘in and Budrus, plus a small number of dedicated Israelis\(^69\)), strived to break through lines of Israeli soldiers, to reach the lost spring. Media reports ever since tend to characterize Nabi Saleh’s movement and weekly demonstrations as a struggle to reclaim the lost spring.

Despite the symbolic potency of the lost spring—as a rallying cry and a tangible goal—many Nabi Saleh activists have downplayed its significance from the beginning. Focusing on the spring, they argue, risks delimiting the movement. Many other villages, for example, that had previously taken up popular struggle became less active or stopped their resistance activity altogether once the barrier was completed or its path altered, once their short-term aim was won or lost. This sheds light on the concern of Nabi Saleh’s leadership that making the spring the goal risked setting an expiry date on the movement; if the spring were reclaimed, then the movement might lose steam or even expire. “We see that when they talk about the specific goal, maybe it will harm the strategy,” one of the village organizers explains, just as “Jayyous stopped, or Budrus stopped.”\(^70\) Indeed, while Bil’in continues with its weekly demonstrations today, even after pushing the wall back to the settlement in 2011, many other committees, including those explicitly critical of the Friday-demonstration model, have lost momentum or ceased to regularly

\(^69\) “from the first minute either Israeli people (i.e., activists) came or the people in the other committees, like Bil’in, and Budrus,” CVOb interview (2014); “Beginning. First demonstration,” BOC interview (2014); however, another village resident disputes the timeline, maintaining that extra-village help first arrived after two weeks of protests: JVOb interview (2014).

\(^70\) CVOa interview (2014), elaborating, “[w]e see that when they talk about the specific goal, maybe it will harm the strategy. Because the problem is not the direction of the wall. Because the wall is on our land. And the change of direction is still on our land. And the wall itself is the problem. The wall itself is part of the component of the big problem, it’s the occupation. For that we don’t want to make the tactic over the strategy. We target the wall as a face or a shape of the occupation, or part of the component of the strategy. If we talk about, we believe that maybe it will harm the mentality or the thought of our generation if we target just a specific goal, because, maybe Bil’in youth, or the generation who started talking about the wall and the hundreds of dunams in Bil’in or in Budrus, or in Nabi Saleh, talking about the spring, it will harm the strategy. That they feel that when they protect 1000 dunams or 200 dunams or some specific goal succeeds, they feel that ‘we did our duty and our responsibility,’ and this is for the strategy will harm the strategy.”
participate in the movement.71

For Nabi Saleh, the dilemma came up almost immediately. When the resistance was in its earliest phases, Israeli military officials approached the village leadership and offered to remove the settler presence from the spring and to restore basic access to the Palestinian village, if the villagers agreed to stop their demonstrations. Some on the ground, including activists from Budrus and some from Nabi Saleh, felt that the military’s offer should have been accepted, claimed as a victory, and then demonstrators could have turned their sights to a new target, set a new goal.72 Another persuasion, however, including that of activists from Bil’in and some of the most influential activists in Nabi Saleh, worried that securing the spring so quickly risked taking the wind out of the sails of the village’s resistance, and perhaps worse, that accepting the military’s offer to police access amounted to recognizing the military’s authority. The latter camp prevailed; the offer was refused. The Friday marches go on, and the media and the world continue to witness. The water spring remains beyond the village’s reach (in fact, now behind a grove of settler olive trees), yet it also persists as a symbol and rallying cry of the village’s struggle—to reclaim the ‘lost spring.’

In some ways, the lost spring of Nabi Saleh symbolizes the difficulty of escalating the Popular Struggle from the small and the local to the large and general, from the wall to the occupation. According to one of the village organizers, the “actions continue, attracting participation on all levels and contributing to the freedom in the ‘uprisen villages,’ while we augment the model, promote the idea, and fortify the vision.”73 As with other sites and aspects of the Popular Struggle across the West Bank, Nabi Saleh’s participation rates have been modest and slipping (the crises and opportunities of participation are explored in Chapter 6). Like other resistance villages, Nabi Saleh has paid a high price in terms of repression and collective punishment since it began the unarmed struggle in December 2009, perhaps disproportionately so, with two unarmed protestors killed (one with a tear gas canister, one with live ammunition), hundreds more injured and arrested, and forms of collective punishment ranging from road closures,

71 Darweish and Rigby (2015) note this pattern: “once the Wall had been constructed or the settlement fence erected, activists found it increasingly difficult to mobilize people in protest and resistance,” p. 95.
72 BOC interview (2014); BOC2 interview (2014); JVOb interview (2014).
indiscriminate land and property damage, and disruptive nighttime incursions into the village and people’s homes.\textsuperscript{74}

Similar to Bil’in, Nabi Saleh has relied on creativity and media for its perseverance and growth.\textsuperscript{75} For its tenacity, and the high spirits of the demonstrators, the small village has become a significant focal point of global solidarity, a revolving door of activists, media, and politicians—“many ambassadors, many consulates, many human rights organizations”\textsuperscript{76}—especially between Palestine and Europe, but also with the United States as well. For example, a Republican Congressman supported Nabi Saleh speaking tours in Kentucky,\textsuperscript{77} and the village has worked with a variety of American

\textsuperscript{74}“Four years. One hundred and fifty prisoners, 50 of them under 18. Nine under 15. Twelve women. We have more than 350 injured persons, 40\% of them children. We have also a 7 houses partially burned. We have also most of the houses in the village, or all the houses of the village had broken windows, and you see that is like I mentioned, [gesturing to broken windows around us in this patio room on the edge of his home] this is from gas, this is from skunk, and sound grenade. This damage of the houses, we have also 13 demolition orders for houses which are located in Area C. This is to threat us to stop us,” CVO\textsubscript{a} interview (2014); C. Levinson and J. Khoury “IDF Probe: 80 Bullets Fired Without Justification in Death of West Bank Palestinian,” \textit{Haaretz} (Jan.16. 2013); “Rushdi Tamimi Becomes Second Victim of Israeli Army in Nabi Saleh,” \textit{Palestine Monitor} (Nov. 21, 2012); L. Alsaafin, “No Miracle Yesterday in Nabi Saleh: Mustafa Tamimi Murdered,” \textit{Electronic Intifada} (Dec. 10, 2011); B’Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, “Show of Force: Israeli Military Conduct in Weekly Demonstrations in a-Nabi Saleh” (Jerusalem, Sept. 2011); Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall), “People Versus Oppression” (July 9, 2010), pp. 12, 24-26.

\textsuperscript{75}For example, in December 2013, the popular committee distributed hundreds of Nelson Mandela masks—the human rights icon had just passed away—for the protestors to wear as they taunted soldiers before cameras: Mike J.C. (the author) (2013); another example: “freedom in colours” demonstration: “one day we decided to have a day for the kids, because the kids basically were gassed every freaking Friday. They had no social life. Nothing was normal for these kids. They got all these night raids taking place, so one of the events we organized [...] We made kites, paper kites, with the kids. We painted their faces. We dressed as clowns, and we marched down the main road and we were not in a protest, we were just marching down the main road, and we wanted to go fly the kites on the mountain and we were extremely gassed. Now, an event like that, when you portray that image of kids, youth, none of us is violent, none of us is even throwing stones. It’s simply a fun day for the kids and we want to freaking get to the mountain which belongs to the village, and we were gassed. So when you bring in the media attention to an event like that you raise the bar of the whole struggle, and the whole international attention towards a village like Nabi Saleh,” ESC interview (2014).

\textsuperscript{76}CVOb interview (2014); “we never, ever expected that we were going to have, like a European Parliamentary or American Congress representative, or … If you said this four years ago—Okay, why is an American representative going to come to Nabi Saleh, are you crazy just to ask this question? But we have many of them from all over Europe, from Belgium, from Netherlands, a Britain minister came here, Italy, France—everywhere in Europe, there are somebody came at one point of this four years. So these people are to change their mentality, or to put the seeds in their mentality, it’s very important for us because they, these people who put the policy of their countries,” NVO interview (2014).

\textsuperscript{77}After Geoff Davis (Rep. Kentucky) toured Israel and some of the settlements of the West Bank, he also took the unusual step of going beyond the wall, and he soon found himself witnessing demonstrations in Nabi Saleh, visiting an injured Palestinian youth in the hospital with his mother by his bedside, and before long, the Congressman was arranging speaking events for some of the Nabi Šaleh
Prominent human rights groups have also shone public light on Nabi Saleh, including B’Tselem and Amnesty International. Many of the village’s activists, including women and children, have become tech savvy and broadcast across various social media platforms. Nabi Saleh’s resistance leaders have been prominently featured on the cover of *New York Times Magazine* in 2013, and their story is interpreted in a documentary film the same year, titled *Thank God It’s Friday* (Figure 5.1 “Nabi Saleh in the Media”). The images indicate that a branding process accompanies the village’s efforts—the brand is trendy, gritty, edgy, as well as defiant, radically principled, and unbending. Apart from Bil’in and official politicians, no West Bank activists have received as much attention in the West as the people of Nabi Saleh.

activities, including the mother of the wounded boy, in the American south: NVO interview (2014); “[o]ffering her firsthand account will be Manal Tamimi, a mother of four young children who is also a community activist in her village, Nabi Saleh. U.S. Representative Geoff Davis will introduce the discussion,” “NKU to Host Free Forum on Life in the West Bank,” Northern Kentucky University press release (Nov. 4, 2011): [http://www.nku.edu/display_news.php?ID=4652](http://www.nku.edu/display_news.php?ID=4652).

78 Including, for example, a Jewish American group called Extend, which counters Israel’s “Birthright” program with sponsored extensions for “Birthrighters” to visit sites across the West Bank, such as Nabi Saleh: NVO interview (2014).


80 “Janna Jihad” is a nine-year old girl who video blogs protests in English and Arabic, and has 16,000 Facebook followers. Another young Nabi Saleh girl was invited to breakfast with the Turkish Prime Minister for her viral video confronting an Israeli soldier: CVOa interview (2014); “Erdogan Meets Palestinian Girl Who Cursed Soldiers,” Ynetnews (Dec. 30, 2012). “Nabi Saleh” searches on YouTube turn up hundreds if not thousands of videos and combined have garnered millions of views (one prominent uploader alone, “Bilal Tamimi,” has over a million views).
One Friday in August 2015, a dramatic incident was caught on camera that went ‘viral’ across social and then news media. The video depicts an intense three-minute struggle between a soldier, who is ham-handedly trying to apprehend a frightened and wounded 12-year-old boy, and several girls and women from the boy’s family, furiously fighting to free the boy; the struggle ends when military backup arrives and the soldier is apparently instructed to abandon the effort and withdraw. The video catapulted Nabi Saleh and its struggle into virtually all major news outlet, generating headlines and analysis, even though much of this reporting was impoverished for its context deficiency. The media attention did not persist, however. Within three days, a new

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82 For example, “‘Black eye’ or ‘PR stunt’? Video shows Israeli soldier struggle to arrest Palestinian boy,” Global News (Aug. 31 2015) “Questions Raised Over Shocking West Bank Image of Boy
'viral’ sensation swept the international news media—a baby Syrian boy, lying face down in the Mediterranean, which fast became the optic symbol of the world’s recognition of a refugee crisis on a scale unrivalled since the end of World War II. A few weeks later, Nabi Saleh seemed even further from the media, as the outbreak of dozens of stabbings and car rammings in the West Bank diverted attention away the Popular Struggle movement and to rumblings and speculations of a new and violent Intifada.

5.1.4 March 15 youth movement and the “Olive Revolution”

In addition to the advent of new alliances and partners in 2009 (with NGOs, with the political class, and with the beginning of Nabi Saleh’s weekly protests) a fourth vital component of the Popular Struggle coalesces in 2011 with the support of activists from an informal and independent youth movement based in Ramallah. Middle East scholar Nathan Brown could have been describing the same individuals I met characterized the group a few years earlier: “impressive, imaginative, and intelligent [and] full of paradoxes: they are a group of savvy novices; a headless movement of cerebral activists; an elite group of populists; [...] a coalition of political activists who seek to transcend politics.” From diverse backgrounds, many with living experience around the world through the Palestinian diaspora, the youth activists tend to be socially progressive, militant in their activism, and “radical” in their politics. They are radical in the sense that they are staunch supporters of the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction movement; they condemn the Oslo Accords, the Palestinian Authority, and the peace process as facades failed, bankrupt, and suspect, and they express support for the idea of armed struggle (in principle, though not necessarily under current conditions). They support and practice

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85 For example, “me personally, I’m against violence. But, again, as I said, the history shows you that if you strong, you can do, or you can take the land back or even you can free the land or you can even attack and take more land. So this is the history, I’m very sad to say,” CDS interview (2014); “I think military resistance has a very strong impact. And I’m 100% pro military action. A militarized resistance. But with the ethics. So for example, if there is a military action against an Israeli military compound,
unarmed action, and they hope it will be enough.

Their movement came to prominence in 2011 when the activists launched their own “Palestinian Spring.” On March 15, which became the moniker of the movement in the media, an intense social-networking campaign paid off with a turnout of tens of thousands of mostly young people taking to the streets across the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 86 Thousands filled Ramallah’s square, al-Manara, one of West Bank’s closest simulacra, in miniature, to Egypt’s Tahrir Square. Through much of the West Bank, there are few open and central public spaces that can compare with the platform provided by Cairo’s Tahrir. Ramallah’s al-Manara is not spacious, but it is central, and accessible, and not far from the PA headquarters.87 Two days before the planned protest, a few dozen organizers began their tent protest in the Ramallah square, and it persisted into April, sometimes with only a handful of protestors present but often swelling by hundreds on Fridays. During this period, the organizers took part in or led hunger strikes, marches, and other demonstrations. Young women were often at the forefront of planning, prominent behind megaphones, and leading chants and marches.88 Their message was primarily a call for an end to the rift in Palestinian political leadership between Fatah and Hamas.89 In a media frenzy that followed, some of the activists met with President

hallelujah! [...] I wouldn’t like to draw any lines because it’s-- At a certain point, every Israeli is born with his military badge on him. Every Israeli is gonna go to the army. So, it’s a Zionist state and everyone in it is part of the occupation and part of the system...,” BJS interview (2014); “Many people here for example, maybe very good friend of mine, they are not like the way where I am going, and I discuss with them, why I am in this way and why he is in his way, you know. I have believed in his way. I respect his way, you know. He want to fight in his way, you know, and he want to believe that, for example, in my, through social media and what I am writing, nonviolent resistance, many of my friends they say, ‘Oh, go fuck with- What this nonviolence?’ You know? ‘The Israeli they just need violence.’ I said, ‘I, like, I believe in this, you know. And I believe in your way, you know. I am not saying you, by your armed things, it’s bad, like, but I am like, I am a person, I believe in this thing because I feel its better, for me and for my family, you know?” ICC interview (2014).


87 A possible rival location would be Qalaidiya checkpoint on the road between Ramallah and Jerusalem, which is much more spacious than Ramallah’s square and a major convergence point of West Bank travel, but also easily shut down by the Israeli military.

88 For example, “and they’re just listening to my voice and following orders,” BJS interview (2014).

89 For example, “calling for PNC elections, and unity between Fatah and Hamas,” BJS interview (2014); “[t]he protesters’ demand was simple: al-sha'b yurid inha al-inqisam (the people want the split
Mahmoud Abbas, and the parties made some gestures toward reconciliation (though little came of it). Apart from the date March 15, the movement’s participation was slim, and it may have bottomed out sooner had not a number of politically charged anniversary dates intervened in the following weeks that boosted morale and activism. At one point, there was little uproar when plain-clothed agents of the PA beat up a number of the Ramallah leaders and burned their tent.

Since that time and earlier, many of the youth have been regulars at weekly demonstrations, including in Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, and in the coming months they would participate in and often lead the new actions carried out across the West Bank (next section). Some among these informal youth networks credit their work in 2011 with drawing the spotlight to Nabi Saleh, ‘arming’ the local residents with the weapons of social media, and increasing the number of participants drawn to the village’s weekly demonstrations. The same activists work closely with many of the popular committees and the PSCC, often as equals in terms of planning actions, crafting and delivering media messages, and leading chants and protests on the ground. This is significant because it testifies to some degree of independence of the PSCC and the Popular Struggle from PA or Fatah interests, since these are openly challenged by many of the “radical” views espoused by the young independents (a dissent sometimes heard from the popular

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[Land Day, March 30, saw genuinely popular participation as thousands took to the streets across the territories and Israeli cities. Prisoners Day on April 17 brought the masses into the streets again. Then, Nakba Day on May 15 witnessed unprecedented activism—thousands from the refugee camps of bordering countries coordinated a storming of Israel’s borders; most efforts were thwarted, repressed by local Arab forces, although from Syria, thousands reached the border, and hundreds (temporarily) crossed; more than a dozen were killed: “Israeli Forces Open Fire at Palestinian Protesters,” BBC (May 16, 2011). The movement did not grow or persist, apart from similar and mostly repressed activities on Naksa Day, June 5.

For example, “we had a tent, which they burned, on us,” BJS interview (2014); L. Alsaafin, (Mar. 23, 2012); “Protest Tent in Ramallah Square Vandalized,” Ma’an News (Mar, 31, 2011).

“Okay, we’re gonna help Nabi Saleh with numbers on the ground, but also we want to bring Nabi Saleh into the media. So we had people from the ground Tweeting everything that was taking place, taking photos of all the arrests. We had at some point, one of the guys was running around with a computer to live stream the protests. And in a matter of three months, Nabi Saleh went from a place that almost nobody heard about to being the highlight of the news on Palestine, all over the world. And this, yeah, I do give the credit for the youth movement from Ramallah that joined. Obviously there’s a huge impact of the locals, and because it’s a very interesting case and it just slightly needed a push from us who had that knowledge of using social media, or the knowledge of writing reports, or anything in that sense. And at some point, yes, we did direct the protests toward what we saw doable,” ESC interview (2014); “[w]e used to go in busses. Instead of having (at) their protests only 50 people, we used to bring them a 100 people to protest,” BJS interview (2014).]
committees as well, as noted above). It also suggests a dimension of women’s empowerment, as many of the Ramallah youth activists are young women, and they appear to have been accepted as kin and sometimes role models among the more rural, traditional, and conservative resistance villages. The participation of the March 15 activists added a youthful face to the movement’s leadership, along with a more energized sense of urgency, precisely when the movement was in danger of stalling, reaching the limits of the confines of rural communities, old parties, and aging activists.

The claim to political independence is important to their identity, as they try to escape old party labels, which they perceive as stale and divisive. “It’s not the political party enforcing the resistance or enforcing that tactic, it’s the youth themselves […] the potential in that is basically breaking all the systems. We’re really bored and tired of all the political parties, and what they’ve done to the Palestinian cause. They’ve had their role. They’ve achieved amazing things in the past.”

Finally, in grasping the position of the new Popular Struggle movement, a comparison to another grassroots movement that emerged in 2011 is instructive. The 2011 “Olive Revolution” movement was in large part the brainchild of activists from Budrus, the same who had cautioned their friends in Bil’in and Nabi Saleh against overemphasizing Friday demonstrations. The flag of the Olive Revolution featured the outline of an olive tree, a universal Palestinian symbol, and the movement’s goal was to provide an independent banner, an umbrella framework open to all parties and sectors, a forum to determine how best to mobilize the sum total of popular, social, and political organizations—“the popular machine”—toward an unarmed Intifada. The movement played a prominent role in a number of actions large and small across the West Bank in 2011, most notably, an action dubbed “Knocking on Jerusalem’s Doors” in August, when thousands of protestors staged demonstrations at different checkpoints around Jerusalem to coincide with Jerusalem Day. However, relatively few other parties, groups, and

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93 Based on informal observation over three months, Dec. 2013 through Feb. 2014.
94 ECS interview (2014).
95 BOC interview (2014); BOC2 interview (2014).
96 BOC interview (2014); BOC2 interview (2014).
97 “We called it Knocking on the Doors of Jerusalem. We made demonstrations in four directions, around Jerusalem, from the north, at Qalaniya checkpoint, and from the south, in Beit Jala, and from the East, in Shufat, and from the West in Biddu, in Beit Surik,” BOC interview (2014); “Israeli Troops Fire...
activists seemed interested in adopting a new flag, and support for the Olive initiative from Bil’in and the PSCC was lukewarm at best.98 The Olive movement never caught on; funds and organized activities dwindled and practically ceased. According to one of the Olive Revolution founders, potential influential supporters, like the international Elders organization, may have been deterred by the adamant independence of the Olive Revolution’ leadership when they opted instead to put their international voice behind the PSCC and its Popular Struggle, with its apparent alignment with the seemingly safe and moderate Fayyad and Abbas.99

To conclude, 2009 to 2011 was a formative period for the Popular Struggle movement. It emerged from the rural anti-wall movement, with several of the community-based popular committees taking a leadership role. The Popular Struggle is a mixture of grassroots civil society initiatives, including a young cadre of independent, cosmopolitan, and radicalized youth, plus the official institutional backing—and sometimes constraint—of various local and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. To the extent that other groups or individuals, from Palestine and around the world, participate in Popular Struggle campaigns or actions, they may be said to be part of the movement. The goal of the organizers is not to move the wall ‘here’ or reclaim a spring ‘there,’ but to establish an example, to craft a model that can make the leap from the small and particular to the large and global, to globalize a mindset and a practice of popular resistance. Overall, the movement has shown potential in organizing elaborate actions and has maintained a slow thickening of solidarity across other civil and political strata of Palestinian society (next section and Ch. 8), yet for the most part, it has remained vibrant only in narrow sectors of Palestinian society, certainly not approaching a mass movement on the scale of the First Intifada; and some respects, participation is on the decline. Also, despite carrying out numerous actions effectively, the movement has not achieved clear victories such as those of Budrus and Bil’in, though

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98 See, for example, “he told me, ‘If you are following [an activist from Bil’in], I will help you. If not, I couldn’t help’ […] Nothing […] didn’t receive,” BOC interview (2014).

99 For example, “I don’t want to hear from you, I want you to hear from me,” an Olive Revolution organizer told me that he proudly told representatives of the Elders in 2011. They told him that they had been in contact with Salam Fayyad’s people in Bil’in, then “they left and didn’t send anything,” BOC interview (2014).
there may be exceptions: the protest encampment of Bab al-Shams in 2013 (below: 5.2.3).

5.2 Action: Beyond the Villages

This section catalogues a range of prominent direct actions undertaken by Popular Struggle activists outside the village setting and beyond the regular Friday demonstrations. These actions include three classes (1) breaking the wall around Jerusalem, (2) blocking settler roads, and (3) establishing protest camps on threatened land, among others.

5.2.1 Breaching Jerusalem’s wall

The first of many breaches of the separation barrier dividing East Jerusalem from the West Bank occurred on November 9 of 2009 (the movement’s ‘break out’ year), when activists used a truck and cables to tear down a four-meter-tall slab of the concrete barrier near Qalandia between Ramallah and Jerusalem.100 There had been earlier instances when the barrier was broken during the struggles of particular villages, most notably in Ni’lin in the preceding days and weeks,101 but the method had apparently not been transplanted outside of the rural context before November 9. The date is also important for another reason: “[t]oday we commemorate 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall,” one of the organizers (a prominent activist from Bil’in) told Al-Jazeera on the scene.102 On the two-decade anniversary of East Germans’ rejection of the Berlin Wall, Palestinians packaged the historic event into their own struggle with a provocative act meant to generate and maximize media attention. Any public association between the

100 “Palestinians Tear Down Wall, 20 Years After Berlin,” AFP (Nov. 10, 2009); “Activists Break West Bank Barrier,” BBC News (Nov. 9, 2009); “Palestinians Break Israel’s Wall,” Al-Jazeera English (Nov. 9, 2009); “Watch: Palestinians Breach Israel’s Wall - Again,” Ma’an News (Nov. 9, 2009). “Activists Break Part of Barrier on Anniversary of Berlin Wall Fall,” Associated Press (Nov. 9, 2009).

101 See Burnat (2016), pp. 159-161; Darweish and Rigby (2015), pp. 77-78; “Twenty Years After Berlin, Palestinians Crack Israel’s Wall,” Ma’an (Nov. 6, 2009) and “Nil’in Anti-Wall Protest Damages Wall,” Ma’an (Sept. 18, 2009): “[t]his is the first time something like this has ever been happened, and the people were happy to have such a success,’ the committee said [adding that] one day the wall will fall and Ni’lin will be the start.”

102 “Palestinians Break Israel’s Wall,” Al-Jazeera English (Nov. 9, 2009); see also, “[t]he activists carried out the protest to mark the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall,” “Activists Break West Bank Barrier,” BBC News (Nov.9, 2009).
Israeli separation barrier and the Berlin Wall—an infamous symbol of oppression—was potentially subversive to Israel’s image in the world. For its considerable media coverage in this regard, the 2009 Qalandia wall breach was successfully executed and effective.

The action can be considered the first major coordinated (extra-village) direct action of the anti-occupation movement. The committees and their partners were explicit at the time that they were embarking on a new course. BBC quotes the same Bil’in activist cited above: “[t]his is the beginning of the activities, which we do, to express our hold on our land, and our refusal to this wall—the wall of torture, the wall of humiliation.” Echoing the message, a prominent politician and supporter of the anti-wall movement told another news outlet on the same day, “[t]his is just the beginning of a popular decision taken by Palestinians to demolish the apartheid wall because they refuse to live like slaves and be imprisoned in cages like what happened in South Africa.”

The barrier itself in the abstract, not just particular segments, had become a focus and frontline in the struggle, a metaphorical battleground of the organizers’ choosing. Of course, networks of activists and groups across the West Bank had long framed the barrier this way (e.g., ‘Apartheid Wall’), but now many of the committees were adapting their methods of direct action to match this more general and abstract message of struggle, a logical first step for an aspiring movement with roots in the rural anti-wall movement.

Since 2009, variations of the tactic have been tried, involving sledge hammers, wire cutters, and ramps (see Figure 5.2). The actions continued to generate press coverage, though less in comparison to the 2009 event, until five years later and the 25th anniversary of the Berlin Wall’s fall: in November 2014, activists again connected their nonviolent assault on the barrier to the historic fissure of the Soviet Union, making

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103 “Activists Break West Bank Barrier,” BBC News (Nov. 9, 2009).
104 “Watch: Palestinians Breach Israel’s Wall - Again,” Ma’an News (Nov. 9, 2009), quoting Dr. Barghouti, PLC Member and leader of the PNI.
105 R. Lewis, “Palestinians Scale Israeli Separation Wall in Solidarity with Jerusalem,” Al-Jazeera America (Nov. 14, 2014); “25 Years After Berlin Wall Fall, Activists Break Open Israeli Wall,” Ma’an (Nov. 8, 2014); “Activists Smash, Cut Holes in Israel’s Separation Wall,” Ma’an (Nov. 19, 2013); “Youths Smash Hole in Israel’s Separation Wall Near Abu Dis,” Ma’an (Oct. 24, 2013). Other instances, that may or may not have been affiliated with the Popular Struggle, include: “Palestinian Activists Dismantle Gate in the Israeli Security Fence,” Demotix (Jan. 26, 2014); “Palestinians Smash Holes in Israel's Wall,” Ma’an (Jul. 9, 2013); “Palestinians Demolish Part of Separation Wall,” Al Monitor (May 20, 2013); “Palestinians Protest in West Bank,” Al Jazeera (Nov. 2012).
headlines around the world. The subversive edge comes from the alignment of the message with the action. Breaching the wall has become an iconic Palestinian image, with the potential to increasingly inflect public perceptions sympathetically toward Palestinian grievances (it is difficult to imagine a more unambiguous and marketable symbol of resistance to oppression, occupation, and apartheid, than breaching an actual separation barrier). The packaging of the image itself is crucial, as the photos in Figure 5.2 indicate. Like a stage-managed performance, hammers and wire cutters seem synchronized, Palestinian flags and headscarves are prominently featured. Going forward, a challenge for the activists will be to creatively frame and promote the ‘wall-breaking’ events so that they continue to attract significant attention (enough at least to offset the costs and risks of planning and executing such protest actions). 

For example, “On Berlin Wall’s Collapse Anniversary, Palestinians Punch Hole Through West Bank Wall,” Haaretz (Nov. 9, 2014); “From Berlin to Palestine: Palestinian Activists Blast Hole in Separation Fence,” Ynetnews (Nov. 8, 2014); “Palestinians Knock Hole Through Israeli Barrier 25 Years After Fall of Berlin Wall,” Independent (Nov. 9, 2014); “Palestinians Break Through West Bank Barrier to Mark Berlin Wall Anniversary,” RT (Nov. 9, 2014); “Palestinians Remind World of Their Own Wall,” Al-Jazeera English (Nov. 9, 2014); “Palestinian Youths Break Through Israeli Partition on Berlin Wall Anniversary,” International Business Times (Nov. 10, 2014).

According to an experienced youth activist, the impact of the method extended as well to participants and the domestic front: “people have this illusion that they can’t break the wall, which is something for me that I’ve been always sitting and thinking, like, why the hell are people in a cage? They’re surrounded by a wall, and they haven’t just thought of breaking this bloody wall? It’s a wall! You can break it. And I think the first time it happened, and people saw the opening in the wall, it completely changed the way people think [...] It gave people the sense that, ‘Yes we can,’ basically,” BJS interview (2014).
5.2.2 Blocking settler roads

Breaching the wall is not the only recurrent tactic used by the Popular Struggle. On numerous occasions, the popular committees have barricaded settler-only roads and highways.\(^{108}\) Among the first instances was the work of the Beit Ummar (Beit Omar) popular committee; calling attention to unchecked settlement expansion and settler violence, the activists closed the major north-south road of the West Bank, Road 60, between Hebron and Jerusalem, not far from their village.\(^{109}\) Perhaps the most ambitious

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\(^{108}\) Especially Route 60, the north-south axis of the West Bank, and Route 443, the main highway from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, which runs partially through the West Bank; much of these roads have been opened to some Palestinian traffic but remain on the whole “severely constrained” through closed access roads and checkpoints: “West Bank Movement and Access Update,” OCHA (Aug. 2011) p. 9, see also pp. 3, 9-10; see also, B’Tselem, “Restriction of Movement: Route 443 – West Bank Road For Israelis Only” (Jerusalem, Jan. 1, 2011).

\(^{109}\) See: “about 70 Palestinians, supported by international solidarity activists, blocked Route 60 (a road that is heavily trafficked by Israeli settlers) near the entrance of Beit Ommar village, between the cities of Hebron and Bethlehem. Traffic came to a halt for almost half an hour as activists waved Palestinian flags and chanted against the occupation. The demonstration was organized as a collective response to increasing settlement expansion in the West Bank and frequent attacks by Israeli Forces on the
road closure was a November 14, 2012 initiative of the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC), involving about 150 international volunteers and activists, more than a thousand Palestinians, and many successful (and some unsuccessful) attempts at closing major traffic junctions across the West Bank. The plan was funded and the participants mobilized by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and European organizations that supported the PSCC, as well as by the usual grassroots channels, while the popular committees and their close allies conducted the demonstrations on the ground. From Jericho, 2,000 protestors marched to reach and block Route 90, which was the lone artery of traffic up and down the length of Jordan Valley, but the army intercepted and cordoned the demonstrators before they could reach their target. Simultaneously, other groups of activists succeeded in temporarily blocking Route 443 with their bodies and a chain. The brief disruption of the highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by Palestinian demonstrators triggered an anticipated armed-forces mobilization to disperse the protesters that also caused thousands of motorists, mostly Israeli settlers, up to hours of delay—“[s]o you stop the road for half an hour, they need all the day to open the road.” Falling back from 443 as soon as the teargas flew, rather than persisting in demonstrations, the activists and volunteers quickly regrouped in their busses and sped off to temporarily obstruct a number of other roads and junctions, including several along highway 60, the north-south spine of the West Bank, in guerrilla fashion, striking, retreating, and striking again. All the while, the activists “emphasize[d to the media] Palestinian people,” “One Arrested as Palestinian Activists Block Route 60 Near Beit Ommar,” Palestine Solidarity Project (Mar. 9, 2011). The Palestine Solidarity Project is a civil society initiative of the activists of Beit Ummar, similar to the PSCC, but proudly independent of the PA and (relatedly?) operating on a smaller scale; they foster global civil society solidarity, draw international activists, and coordinate direct acts of unarmed resistance, and, like activists from many other popular committees, also participated as friends and partners in many of the actions described in this section.

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111 JDC interview (2014).

112 “Palestinian demonstrators also blocked the road next to the Camp Ofer prison, and disturbances were reported on the Bir Zeit Road near the West Bank city of Ramallah. Two buses blocked traffic on Route 446 near the village of Na’alin, and some 80 Palestinians marched from the village of Bil‘n toward the nearby Route 443 to block the road with chains and locks. Demonstrators also reached the Hawara Road, which leads to the West Bank settlements of Itamar, Alon Moreh, Bracha, and Yitzhar, where they were met by IDF vehicles. Groups of demonstrators congregated near the settlement of Tekoa, and next to the Palestinian village of Sinjil, in the northern West Bank. The IDF appraises that the demonstrations will continue onto Route 60, which crosses the West Bank,” Cohen and Issacharoff (2012); see also, Winer (2012); “I remember we make, four stops, we cut four roads [...] it was huge because we
that these demonstrations [were] popular and nonviolent.”113

If knocking holes in the wall around Jerusalem was primarily a symbolic act of protest and persuasion, directed especially at attitudes and behaviours of potentially sympathetic domestic and international constituencies, the blocking of roads was more an act of disruption, a direct intervention meant to generate inconvenience for the structurally privileged class, the settlers. A Palestinian organizer on the ground during the November 14 action, a youth spokeswoman for the PSCC, told Vice News that the aim was to get the Israelis’ attention:

We’re saying, basically, that as long as Palestinians are living under occupation, apartheid and colonisation, as long as they’re suffering settler attacks and settlement expansion, we’re not going to let Israeli settlers’ lives go on as normal, continue as normal. So we want to disrupt the lives of the colonialists and the settlers, and we want to send a message, that we’re not going to sit there while our country is being colonised.114

Another activist, in an interview, cited the roadblocks as among the most effective methods in the Popular Struggle’s arsenal, reflecting Sharp’s qualitative distinction between acts of protest and persuasion, and acts of intervention or disruption:

I think the most successful strategies have been the random ones that target

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114 “Resistance in the West Bank” (2013).
settlements. For instance the closing down of settler roads that are only used, that are only basically Israeli used roads, or Jewish only. And you see that being successful, because, it creates a kind of-- the settlers stop feeling safe. And when a colonizer stops feeling safe, you know, there is kind of discouragement to colonize, because when you colonize, you realize that you get some benefits, and all the stuff. But once you realize there isn’t really security, and you start moving, letting them think more [...] Because you can’t target them in actions that are just, you know, subtle. If you want to do actions like weekly demonstrations and stuff, yes, it’s great, and it will be very effective for a while, but after a while the only strategy you can achieve from that is getting more Palestinians to come to you so you can create more of a bond for the future, but it’s the random, spontaneous actions that aren’t really expected by the colonizer that are the most effective, in terms of unarmed resistance.

The interventions also resemble Martin Luther King Jr’s strategy of “constructive, nonviolent friction” in the American South, imposing the civil-rights movement into the daily affairs of white communities, even though that meant making a lot of people uncomfortable, afraid, and angry.¹¹⁵ The Popular Struggle’s November 14 actions were unprecedented and generated a buzz of (mostly domestic) media excitement before they were almost immediately overtaken—by evening—by the military escalation between Israel and Hamas, with low-tech rocket barrages from the Strip railing against the IDF’s Operation Pillar of Cloud, from November 14 to 21.¹¹⁶ The tactic of blocking roads has been used several times before and since,¹¹⁷ but November 14 stands out for its scale and coordination.

### 5.2.3 Bab al-Shams and other protest camps and actions

Since 2009, the Popular Struggle movement has been involved or associated with several other kinds of nonviolent resistance in the West Bank. For example, youth and committee activists from Bethlehem area, Hebron, and Ramallah, organized a Palestinian “Freedom Rides” campaign in 2011, tying their action to the 50th anniversary of the

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¹¹⁶ The escalation followed Israel’s airstrike-assassination of Hamas’ top military commander, who had been in a back-channel process of negotiating a long-term cease-fire with Israel when he was targeted: G. Baskin, “Israel’s Shortsighted Assassination,” New York Times (Nov. 16, 2012). The subsequent violence killed several Israelis and more than 150 Palestinians in Gaza.

¹¹⁷ For examples, see MAITIC (2013), pp. 124-127.
Freedom Rides in the American South, boarding a Jerusalem-bound Israeli-only bus outside a settlement and refusing to exit until hauled off by force.\textsuperscript{118} In the fall of 2012, more than a hundred activists, including from Bil’in, Ni’lin, Nabi Saleh, stormed a controversial settlement supermarket, waved Palestinian flags and chanted “Boycott Israel!” before a number of the organizers were arrested.\textsuperscript{119} Popular Struggle activists have also supported or participated in various cultural forms of resistance, such as the Palestine Marathon in Bethlehem put on by a local group called Right to Movement,\textsuperscript{120} and also a roving applied-theatre troupe organized by Jenin’s Freedom Theatre, which performed across the West Bank, including on Fridays in resistance villages al-Tuwani and Nabi Saleh.\textsuperscript{121} The popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC) was behind a 2013 art exhibit at Bethlehem and Ramallah galleries that made sculptures of barbed-wire, concrete, teargas canisters, and bullets.\textsuperscript{122} Popular committee activists have also dismantled occupation roadblocks\textsuperscript{123} and participated in illicit tree-planting campaigns.\textsuperscript{124}


\textsuperscript{119} See “we went to Rami Levy Supermarket,” JVOa interview (2014); also “to indicate for the boycott of the Israeli product,” CVOa interview (2014). The main message was not apartheid but normalization, because the supermarket chain was branded as “an oasis of coexistence” where “Palestinians and Israelis can be seen shopping or working together there,” T. Lazaroff, “Palestinian Activists Raise their Flags in Rami Levy,” \textit{Jerusalem Post} (Oct. 24, 2012); the demonstration was “a great thing that [made] the whole people know that they should boycott the Israeli factories and products. After that we can see that it’s began to spread in West Bank. Most the stores should put up a label that his store doesn’t have any products from settlements,” CVOb interview (2014).


\textsuperscript{122} “they transformed repression in art […] attract another kind of people, another kind of media […] to transform all the bullets, the gas canisters […] they get a lot of media attention,” MXS interview (2014); S. Marusek, “New Exhibition Features Palestinian Artwork Created out of Israel’s Tools of Oppression,” \textit{Middle East Monitor} (Dec. 23, 2013).

\textsuperscript{123} For example, “[m]any of the activists who participated in this action were attending the Bil’in International Popular Resistance Conference, taking place this week,” Activestills, “PHOTOS: Palestinian Activists Dismantle Israeli Roadblock,” +972 (Oct. 3, 2013).

\textsuperscript{124} For example, “more than 60 Palestinian men, women and children from the South Hebron Hills and city of Hebron gathered in the Palestinian village of Susiya and together with international and Israeli
Several of the Popular Struggle’s direct actions have been specifically women’s actions. For example, one Sunday in the spring of 2012, dozens of women from Nabi Saleh and Ramallah, plus a few female Israeli activists, staged a women’s picnic at the confiscated spring outside Nabi Saleh. Many of the women reached the spring before the army cordoned it off and barred more from entering (this was the first time Palestinian activists had reached the spring since it was appropriated in late 2009). Surrounded by soldiers, with local media cameras flashing, the women enjoyed their tea and snacks, dubbing the event the “Palestinian women’s spring” in an apparent double entendre, evoking the still plausibly positive connotations of the Arab Spring. In another action, commemorating International Women’s Day 2012, Ramallah youth activists who work with the PSCC were among the hundreds of women marching in solidarity with female prisoners on Qalandiya checkpoint, the major checkpoint between Ramallah and Jerusalem; the nonviolent demonstration was violently repressed. In an audacious actions planned by the popular committees, twenty women stormed a military base and occupied its rooftop, twice in a 12-hour period, leading to frantic media scenes and several arrests. In these cases, creative direct actions were undertaken primarily by activists, participated in a nonviolent action organized by the South Hebron Hills Popular Committee. The action consisted in planting some 100 olive trees on Palestinian-owned land near the settlement of Suseya,” Operation Dove, “Palestinian Activists Successfully Plant 100 Olive Trees in Fields Targeted by Settlers” (Feb. 16, 2014).

125 “[W]e called it the Palestinian women’s spring [...] It was one of the best movement to show, especially there were a lot of media there, that we are just women having snacks, doing a picnic, and settlers throwing stones at us, soldiers around, 100 soldiers surrounded us,” NVO (2014); “in Nabi Saleh, we had a women’s action where we all gathered in buses and went to the spring that was annexed by the settlers. And it was all women, with the exception of a few journalists, and we went, and it was a very successful action. We went to the spring. We did what we wanted to. We confronted the soldiers as women, not just as Palestinians. We had our own voice, as feminists as well,” NDSa (2014); Darweish and Rigby (2015), p. 80; A. Hass, “For Palestinian Women, a Picnic With a Purpose,” Haaretz (Apr. 30, 2012); H. Matar, “Palestinian Women Take Back Spring as Settlers, Soldiers Look on,” +972 Mag (Apr. 22, 2012).

126 “[W]hen it was international women’s day, where women went on Qalandiya checkpoint and we all gathered, all the way to the front of the checkpoint. We were skunked. We were attacked, with teargas canisters being shot directly at us. We had some women suffocation cases, injuries on the head, and you know, fractured arms, et cetera,” NDSa (2014); “[i]n the crowd empowered women were carrying Palestinian flags and placards saying ‘Women break barriers,’ ‘Raise your voices against all oppression,’ and ‘Feminist resistance against the occupation,’” “Women’s Day Demonstration in Qalandia for the Rights of Female Palestinian Prisoners,” ISM (Mar. 8, 2012).

127 “[W]e were a group of twenty women. We went to Bet Il settlement, to the military base. We took over the roof of the military base, and soldiers, they were, like, shocked and they were screaming, closing the windows [...] there were, I think, four or five women from Jerusalem, some from Ramallah, eight, nine actually from Nabi Saleh, and also there were men with us, but they stayed away. We took over the roof,” NVO (2012); A. Horowitz, “Video: Palestinian Women Occupy Israeli Military Base in West Bank to Protest Gaza Attack,” Mondoweiss (Nov. 15, 2012).
women, though it should be noted women have typically been present, though underrepresented, and most other Popular Struggle actions, including the barrier breaches, roadblocks, and others.

Perhaps the most distinctive and excitement-generating method of the Popular Struggle came to the forefront in January 2013 with the protest encampment of Bab al-Shams, “the Gate of the Sun,”¹²⁸ between East Jerusalem and the city-sized settlement of Maale Adumim. As noted at the end of the last chapter, the innovative action had precursors, including the small encampment on the “E1” hills outside East Jerusalem in 2008. Now, in late 2012, the Israeli government was again motioning toward settlement expansion onto E1, potentially sealing the crescent of settlements around East Jerusalem and effectively bisecting the West Bank.¹²⁹ On the early morning of January 11, 2013, activists converged on the site—following diversionary reports about a ‘conference’ in the Jordan Valley¹³⁰—and set up a protest encampment, this time with tenfold the number, around 250 activists and volunteers (Figure 5.4).

The left image shows the scale of the operation, at least 20 tents. The right image reveals more clearly its professional character: rather than a motley assortment of scavenged

¹²⁸ The name alludes to a story about Palestinian land-attachment by Lebanese author, Elias Khoury.
¹³⁰ “All they think we going to make camp, you know, in Jericho,” ICC interview (2014); “we told the people we want to go to the Jordan Valley [...] for a conference,” BCC interview (2014).
canvases and flags, the image shows that they are uniform, identical in shape, size, and colour, indicating the centralized funding and logistical capacity of the Popular Struggle movement. The money and materials for the action presumably flowed through the PSCC from the Palestinian Authority and other international donors.

As it became evident that the most important phase of the action was a success (i.e., the camp’s establishment), the PSCC issued a press release, in part:

[W]e hereby establish the village of Bab Alshams to proclaim our faith in direct action and popular resistance [...] For decades, Israel has established facts on the ground as the International community remained silent in response to these violations. The time has come now to change the rules of the game, for us to establish facts on the ground—our own land.131

Perhaps the more important difference between Bab al-Shams in 2013 and the 2008 E1 protest camp was not the scale of the action but the scale of the response. Bab al-Shams generated unprecedented coverage from mainstream newspapers and broadcasters around the world.132 As the story broke, official Fatah and PA leaders began lauding the deed.133 Some organizers complained that the PA overstated its input in the action and tried to frame the message of the campaign to its own advantage.134 Meanwhile, the Israeli

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131 “Palestinians Establish a New Village, Bab Alshams, in Area E1” PSCC (Jan. 11, 2013).
133 For example, “Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s executive committee, said in a statement: ‘This initiative is a highly creative and legitimate nonviolent tool to protect our land from Israeli colonial plans. We have the right to live anywhere in our state, and we call upon the international community to support such initiatives,’” I. Kershner, “Palestinians Set Up Camp in Israeli-Occupied West Bank territory,” New York Times (Jan. 11, 2013).
134 One activist recalled with resentment that lead PA negotiator Saeb Eraket cast the action as an endorsement of “the idea of two-state solution,” when many organizers did not share the emphasis: LOC interview (2014); also, “they start to announce that they are responsible for what happened, and they were
military sealed the area and manoeuvred immediately to evict the protestors but was slowed by a court injunction obtained by the activists that required the state to justify the camp’s removal—a legal stalling tactic used by settlers founding unofficial settlement outposts. In response, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu invoked public order to overturn the injunction, and the demonstrators were evicted before the end of the second day.135

Though the new ‘village’ did not last more than 48 hours, the result was that the Netanyahu government’s settlement plans that had sparked the initiative were quietly shelved and dropped from public discourse.136

During my fieldwork, Bab al-Shams was the answer most of my interviewees gave to questions about which methods or actions had been most effective or memorable. This perception is partly due to the international media buzz and partly because the Israeli government seemed to back down from its settlement plans, and also because there was a sense of a ‘thickening’ of solidarity within Palestinian society in the West Bank for the ideas and practices associated with the Popular Struggle. For example, “[t]he result was wonderful. We stopped them [...] You know, Hamas and Fatah and other parties, they don’t agree with each other, but in Bab al Shams, we were like one person.”137

The action became the first in a campaign, with numerous follow-up events in different sites across the West Bank in the days and weeks that followed, such as the

the ones supporting Bab al Shams, and they have to continue doing such things in different areas—only in front of the media. But in reality, on the ground, they did nothing,” JVOa interview (2014).

135 “The state responded to the High Court of Justice on Saturday night, arguing that the gathering would become a focus of protest that could lead to rioting, and asserting that most of the tents had been pitched on territory that Israel had declared state land. The court overturned the injunction, allowing the people to be removed from the site,” I. Kershner, “Israelis Evict Palestinians From a Site for Housing,” New York Times (Jan. 12, 2013). “Asked why the protesters were removed, Netanyahu said: ‘They have no reason to be there. I asked immediately to close the area so people would not gather there needlessly and generate friction and disrupt public order’,” H. Sherwood, “Israel Evicts E1 Palestinian Peace Camp Protesters,” Guardian (Jan. 13). There were no serious injuries and no formal arrests.


137 LOC interview (2014); also, “Bab al Shams was something that was different, in a sense, that we felt that we, we made a difference. And our voices were heard from everywhere around the world. And there was engagement with the idea that Palestinians are taking action, you know, like, we are taking direct action. We are not responding to Israel’s actions. We are taking, you know, we’re being more proactive, in a way, with the resistance,” BJS interview (2014); “I think the experience of Bab al-Shams and what it led to, I mean, when I say Bab al-Shams, let’s say Bab al-Shams experience, which means the other, ah, initiatives like Ahfad Younis and others as well, as last one, Ein Hijleh. It’s this whole thing was a very important step forward. For the first time all popular committees or most popular committees from different districts came together in a unified action,” NDSb interview (2014); “I think, ya’ni, the most important--Bab al-Shams was a big action,” COC interview (2014).
camps of al-Karameh (January 18-21) near Beit Iksa northwest of Jerusalem; al-Manatir (February 2) near Burin in the Nablus area; and Ahfad Younis (March 20-24) in E1 again. These subsequent actions, however, generated less participation and less media coverage than Bab al-Shams, and some attempts, such as a planned camp of Bab el-Qamar (February 9), were thwarted before they came to fruition, as Israeli military intelligence adapted, making an already arduous logistical operation even more difficult and costly. The campaign was summarized in a report by a Zionist watchdog NGO that monitors and impugns Palestinian popular resistance activity as soft forms of terrorism:

The Bab el-Shams outpost was widely covered by the media and enhanced the image of the popular committees involved in building it. Israel, the Palestinians believed, had been caught off guard, unprepared for this type of activity. Therefore, inspired by Bab el-Shams, other attempts were made to erect outposts. They stopped only after a several attempts were prevented by Israel and their partial successes did not generate much interest.

The Bab al-Shams campaign began with a bang in January but fizzled out by spring. A year later, organizers thought they found an effective adaptation and sought to escalate the Popular Struggle with a twist on the protest-encampment tactic.

5.2.3.1 Ein Hijleh, reclaiming the Jordan Valley

I was welcomed as a witness and a participant in a large action that began on Friday January 31, 2014: the reclamation and restoration of an abandoned West Bank village called Ein Hijleh in the Jordan Valley. A few days earlier, after asking one of my interviewees if she could recount her role and experience in any of the movement’s actions, she responded coyly, “I think if you wait another week, I’ll have a more interesting story for you.” In the coming hours and days, I was told little more, except

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139 For example, “finding the soldiers to be before us, And to stop us. Sometimes they put a checkpoint, and they put our names,” BCC interview (2014); “if you just went to any part of area C and you want to establish or build anything, they will come and demolish it, immediately. So, it’s a big problem for the Palestinian people [...] So, if this idea, we want to repeat it in a different place, we already knew the sequences of this action, because they will came and demolish everything” JVOa interview (2014); MAITIC (June 9, 2013), pp. 121-122.
140 “Built-in Violence,” MAITIC (June 9, 2013),
141 ESC interview (2014)
the names of a handful of activists and journalists to stay close to on Friday morning, and to pack food and blankets. Something of the sort and scale of Bab al-Shams was evidently afoot, but with many unanswered questions, particularly Where? and Would it be thwarted before it began? On Friday morning in Ramallah, I was with a few journalists and activists. Following a frenzy of confusing and disconnected phone calls and two diversionary false starts,\(^\text{142}\) we finally learned that most of the activists and volunteers had already converged on the site, just south of Jericho, in the ruins of an ancient village called Ein Hijleh nestled among dry palm-tree groves and surrounded by vast expanses of dusty and cracked barren earth, just 500 meters from an Israeli military base.\(^\text{143}\)

When we arrived in the late afternoon, passing nervously and awkwardly through seemingly ill-equipped and under-manned Israeli patrols, the dilapidated stone buildings were teeming with life and activity. Cars and vans of activists and volunteers continued to trickle in and unload. People sang, danced, chanted victory slogans, and gave speeches. Through the media, before sunset, the popular committees—backed on the ground by a broad-based civil-society and political coalition\(^\text{144}\)—announced that they had reclaimed a lost Palestinian village and affirmed Palestinian sovereignty over the Jordan Valley. The

\(^\text{142}\) My companions and I were first informed around noon that everyone was gathering on the outskirts of al-Azariya, near the original site of Bab al-Shams just outside East Jerusalem, but on our way we became stuck in a grueling traffic jam, apparently caused by tightened military checkpoints. After barely moving for an hour or more, we received a despondent phone call from one of the lead organizers that the plan was defeated, that no one was able to reach the site. Not long after, however, we began hearing that everyone was actually meeting north of Jericho in the Jordan Valley and that al-Azariya had been a diversion. Soon we were on our way again, but after driving up the long Jordan Valley for at least an hour, we learned that we had been sent in the wrong direction, as part of.


\(^\text{144}\) Present were many from the PSCC, especially from Bil’in, whole families from Nabi Saleh, and many from al-Masara, but also popular-committee members from across the West Bank, including the South Hebron Hills and Abu Dis. On equal footing, importantly, Ramallah youth activists who worked with the popular committees were also behind the planning, execution, and at the fore of shaping the media message. Also present were numerous other individuals from various organizations in the Popular Struggle coalition, prominently Dr. Barghouti and his Mubadara party, always involved in these actions, as well as prominent Fatah leaders, and student union representatives from major universities.
political context or catalyst of the action was the stream of leaks in the news media to the
effect that permanent Israeli control of the Jordan Valley was on the negotiating table in
the otherwise secretive nine-month round of US-brokered talks between the Palestinian
Authority and the Netanyahu government. The mood in Ein Hijleh was festive and
jubilant, with a hint of astonishment that the security forces had failed to stop the first and
crucial phase of the action. It was simply too costly for the army to stop all or even most
of the traffic; as I wrote at the time,

Although Ein Hijleh lies in territory under the control of occupation
authorities—“Area C” under the terms of the 20-year-old Oslo Accords
constitutes more than half the West Bank—the military has not completely
restricted access to the village, in part because the village is on private land
owned by the nearby Christian Orthodox monastery of Deir Hajla, and the
resistance organizers obtained permission from the landowners to enter the
abandoned village. In addition, the village is adjacent to highway 90, the
main artery for travel up and down the Jordan Valley, used by motorists
from dozens of illegal Israeli settlements and just a few kilometers from
the King Hussein border crossing into Jordan; the army cannot afford to
completely seal off the road.

The Israeli response seemed to be making transit in as difficult as possible, without
completely blocking off the commercial artery, while diverting few or no resources to
impeding those who left. Media vehicles and unmarked vans and busses were singled out
and frequently denied entry. Continuing from the same article,

Vehicles and bags are searched, and water and food supplies are
confiscated. The military seems to believe it can strangle the initiative,
compelling thirsty and hungry occupants to leave of their own volition.
However, activists have been able to smuggle in a continuous supply of
essentials through alternate means, and the Palestinians have no intention
of surrendering the village. On the contrary, they aim to restore it and
make it livable again, and works are already underway toward these ends:
cleaning the grounds, restoring old buildings, and planting new trees.

The restoration also included setting up flags, tents, fire pits, a power generator, sound
system, film screen, Wi-Fi hotspot, and solar panels. From the beginning, there were two
to three hundred activists and volunteers, men, women, and children, and the number

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146 Mike J.C (the author) (Feb. 3. 2014).
may have swelled as high as five hundred over the coming seven days. Most were middle-aged men or male youth, but many women, girls, boys, and elderly were also present, diverse in background (students, urban, rural, parties, independents). The action drew a steady stream of press coverage and public support from across Palestinian society and perhaps a degree of solidarity unprecedented for the Popular Struggle.\footnote{And the numbers are growing. Like Bab al Shams, we were 200. Ein Hijleh, we were 500 to arrive. There was 100 evicted in Bab al-Shams. There was 350 evicted in Ein Hijleh. And everyone is coming, and they want to go back. So there is, you know, there is more victories,” BJS interview (2014); see also, “Delegations Visit Ein Hijleh Protest as Israeli Siege Enters 6th day,”\textit{Ma'an News} (Feb. 5, 2014): “Greek Orthodox Archbishop Atallah Hanna visited the village on Wednesday, praising the protesters and saying he will encourage Palestinians to reach the village and support their efforts. The head and members of the local council of Jericho also visited the village and called upon the ministry of local governments to recognize Ein Hijleh as part of the Jericho district. The Palestinian Authority minister of agriculture also visited the village and expressed his ministry's willingness to help repair the land and fix the old homes in the area. Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah phoned protesters to show his support for them, stressing that although it is the only Palestinian village east of Route 90, it will not be the last due to the efforts of the popular resistance movement. A delegation representing the European Union also visited the village after receiving an invitation from protesters. They showed their support for the village after protesters briefed them on the circumstances in the Jordan Valley and the threat of Israeli annexation. Palestinian member of the Israel Knesset Hanna Sweid also visited the village and expressed the support of his party, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality” (paragraph breaks removed).} The participants were overwhelmingly Palestinian; myself among perhaps a dozen or fewer internationals at any given time.\footnote{I was there for the better part of four days, including three nights. I was not present the night of the eviction.}

Restoring the lost village was an act of nonviolent intervention, a method that might be added to Sharp’s catalogue of 198. It was also an exercise in the constructive program and participatory organization, designed to resonate politically, socially, and historically. Politically, the organizers defied the authority of the diplomatic and institutionalized political class, which was closed and shielded from the democratic process as it allegedly negotiated away the Jordan Valley. Socially, it was an appeal to Palestinian yearning for normalcy, the prospect of travel and leisure in their own country: “[w]e want to clean this area so Palestinians can come for picnics, considering that Palestinians are not allowed to go to any beaches, on the Mediterranean, or even to the Dead Sea.”\footnote{Mike J.C. (the author) (Feb. 3, 2014).} The action and its framing—the reclaiming of a lost village—resounded with the legacy of the 1948 Nakba (catastrophe) and 1967 Naksa (disaster), when many hundreds of Palestinian towns and villages were lost. From the first day, the army threatened to move in and forcibly evict the protestors, and it often postured as if about
to, but it also seemed to hesitate.\(^{150}\)

After several days, the Palestinian organizers and their supporters grew complacent. They believed the army was unwilling or unprepared to move in. There was apparently no contingency plan, when the army conducted a full scale invasion from all sides in the pitch dark hours before the eighth day.\(^{151}\) With sheer force but no firearms, the army corralled as many people as they could into clusters then filed them onto buses and dropped them off several kilometers away in Jericho before the sun rose.\(^{152}\) There were dozens of minor injuries; no fatalities, no serious injuries, and no arrests or detentions—and scarcely any news coverage outside the country. Most of the Ein Hijleh renovations were bulldozed or otherwise destroyed in the coming hours and days, and the army prevented several activist attempts to return to the village.

Like Bab al-Shams a year earlier, Ein Hijleh was also the first in a new campaign of actions. The goal of the 2014 campaign, called Melh al-Ard (the Salt of the Earth), was to energize grassroots activism around the Palestinian claim to the Jordan Valley, and in the subsequent days, a number of other similar protest camps were established or attempted.\(^{153}\) Like the Bab al-Shams series, none of the actions past the first generated as much activity, and the campaign soon fizzled out.

While the action generated buzz in Palestinian media and society and appeared to mark a ‘thickening’ of the Popular Struggle, across parties and societies, it was little noted in Western media, and seemed much less effective overall than Bab al-Shams had been a year before. In part, the weaker international response may have been because the latter site was remote, in the sparsely populated Jordan Valley rather than on Jerusalem’s doorstep. Another difference was that during the 2013 action, there were no intensive

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\(^{150}\) For six days, the military harassed the camp, including by intermittently blocking access, detaining activists, and seeming to try to provoke violence: at night, the army stalked the perimeters of the encampment, sometimes storming in part way, in coordinated formations, and frequently shining spotlights into the camp and firing flares overhead.

\(^{151}\) As indicated in previous sections, Fridays are potent for popular struggle, and this was coming on the tail of a momentous week, at least domestically. According to Dr. Barghouti at the time, “Tomorrow was going to be the largest gathering of popular nonviolent resistance in recent times. We would have had thousands of people in the village, and Israeli occupation authorities wanted to abort this success by this attack that is not justified by any means,” Mike J.C (the author) (Feb. 7, 2014).

\(^{152}\) PSCC, “Video: Nonviolent Palestinian Protesters Sing as They are Forcibly Evicted by Soldiers from Occupied Village,” Mondoweiss (Feb. 7, 2014).

US-led peace talks underway, perhaps leaving a void for alternative politics; a year later, media and public fixation on the official talks seemed to sideline or minimize anything that went on beyond their formal auspices. The grassroots organizers and participants were frustrated at the miniscule international response.\footnote{Yet, as suggested, the campaign would have been better served by more careful contingency planning; an unarmed defence plan shared and perhaps even drilled among the activists and participants in the camp could have drawn out the eviction over many hours or even days, or forced the Israelis to back down or use much more excessive force, either way potentially magnifying the international impact and causing the eviction to backfire to some extent on Israeli interests.}

### 5.3 Assessment: Nonviolence Up, Participation Limited, Efficacy Limited

This chapter reveals a new phase of Palestinian resistance that began around 2009 when a number of the village committees took a leadership role in a new coalition loosely known as the Popular Struggle. The grassroots activists worked closely with several sectors of Palestinian society, from the Ramallah-based independent youth movement to professionals within the PA political class and international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Some of their action campaigns have been ambitious and promising, but to date the movement has not broken through to the majority of the Palestinian population or effectively set the agenda at the national or international level. Why has the movement’s impact been relatively marginal compared to the First Intifada (Chapter 3) or even to a number of the local village victories, such as in Budrus and Bil’in (Chapter 4)?

One framework helps answer this question as well as explain the shifting outcomes of the various phases of struggle described throughout the previous two chapters: the conjunction of unarmed action and participatory organization. Where these have aligned most—in the absence of armed struggle and centralized authority—resistance campaigns have often become genuinely popular and most effective (meaning momentous, influencing larger events, moving toward goals, generating international support). In the case of 1987, suspending armed struggle across the robust community-based organizations that characterized Palestinian society at the time helped to produce one of the most powerful Palestinian movements to date, the First Intifada. However, the Palestinian state-building exercises of the 1990s, though never achieving self-
determination or external sovereignty, monopolized organizational capacity domestically and had the effect of demobilizing and disempowering the population (Chapter 3, Section 4). It is then not surprising that during the more violent Second Intifada, when popular committees re-emerged to mobilize entire communities and sometimes achieve significant gains against the separation barrier, there was also an absence of armed struggle and of monopolized governance. The villages were outside the formal jurisdiction of the PA (which was confined to larger towns and cities). The new committees emerged in the absence of armed methods and in the void of hierarchal command capacity. The ‘wall’ that the contemporary Popular Struggle seems to have hit, in terms of not mobilizing the major Palestinian population centres or more than a thousand protestors at a time (at best), maps onto the territorial jurisdiction of the centralized Palestinian Authority. Even though this ‘authority’ remains quite limited, superseded by Israeli military control, it employs police forces within the major towns and cities, and these police the limits of the Popular Struggle. The weakness of the contemporary popular mobilization is the centralized and militarized PA. The Popular Struggle is officially allied with that which structurally precludes it.

The apparent lesson from the case of Palestinian popular resistance appears to be that integrating with centralized institutions or moving toward command-and-control governance, is ‘playing with fire’ and risks backfiring no less than militarized resistance actions. Large centralized organization threatens the bases of resistance—popular participation—and twice the Palestinian struggle has been burned, once in the early 1990s (Chapter 3) and once again in recent years (this chapter, and next). Evidently, when mobilization has been at its most vibrant, both nationally during the 1980s and on a smaller scale in recent years, its composition has been most grassroots and least hierarchal. Again, this does not mean that all organizational verticality is necessarily detrimental to the participatory character of the movement, so long as the structures and procedures remain bottom up rather than top down.

The following chapter undertakes a closer examination of the prospects and limitations of participatory organizing in Palestinian resistance, looking inside the dynamics of the Popular Struggle.
Chapter 6 – Limits of Participatory Organizing in Palestinian Popular Struggle

I do support the popular committees with all my heart but some of the popular committees did exclude a lot of locals as well. Because of this whole, like, political parties culture existing among the Palestinians, and this whole individualistic view towards the struggle, many people were excluded. So you got opposition existing in those villages as well, to protests, whether it’s because they belong to other political parties that are not in support of the popular struggle in those villages, or to the fact that they no longer want to be part of any resistance movement against the occupation. And that’s the whole general mood amongst Palestinians and this is the main challenge for us as the PSCC and the main struggle for all these popular struggle committees existing anywhere is to get more people involved. But as long as the Palestinians are so tied up with this economy existing today, this whole political situation, this division amongst the political parties, it’s very hard. It’s one of the main challenges, growing a mobilization, getting everybody involved. It’s not as easy.

—Palestinian youth activist asked about dwindling local support, 2014¹

First Intifada, it was much more community based. Now, with the PA, and all of this stuff, it’s a different story. I think if all hell breaks loose, the only thing you can build on is the popular committees. Because, water shortages, village to village, the areas which are cut off, that’s how they will survive, the committees will take charge of all these things. I don’t think now is the time to get-- They do things, but it’s not the same. They don’t have that kind-- There isn’t such a necessity for that kind of work [...] They haven’t tried very hard, if you want full honesty, full disclosure. They should, you know, be doing more.

—Palestinian youth activist asked about constructive social work, 2014²

6.0 Introduction

The Popular Struggle suffers from a complex mobilization crisis, with macro, micro, exogenous and endogenous structural constraints. The problem on the ground exceeds any theoretical notion of organizational dichotomies such as democratic vs.

¹ ECS interview (2014).
² BJS interview (2014).
undemocratic, top down vs. bottom up, or centralized vs. decentralized. Not only is the reality a mixture of overlays, middle grounds, and contradictions, but other factors also intervene, including social, economic, and political conditions. Yet the dynamics of participatory organization remain both salient and under-examined in the Palestinian case and in the wider literature on civil resistance. As outlined in Chapter 2, contemporary civil-resistance literature neglects or too hastily rejects directly democratic resistance. This dissertation addresses that gap, and this chapter summarizes my fieldwork on the participatory aspects of the Popular Struggle.3

From my research question about the impact and implications of participatory organization (defined approximately as inclusive, community based, directly democratic, and bottom up) in civil resistance, the case of the Popular Struggle becomes a tragedy of incremental alienation of the local community, a slow evaporation of popular support. The tragedy is that the damage seems largely unacknowledged and might have been mitigated had lessons from the First Intifada and its aftermath been better heeded. After 1993, the Palestinian leadership gained little by betraying the popular organs to the Weberian principle of monopolistic state-building (as Chapter 3 showed, post-First Intifada). Community-based, directly democratic governance—participatory organization—has been (then) and is being (now) neglected and abandoned without much apparent reflection. Undoubtedly, maintaining persistent community mobilization amidst an acute conflict over many years is itself a tremendous task, perhaps insuperable under the circumstances. Yet, drawing on activist and non-activist interviews, and surveys from the community and the larger public, this chapter points to some ways that the popular committees lack or have lost participatory fundamentals. My key findings are, first, that there are perceptions of exclusion from within the communities regarding the popular committees (6.3); second (perhaps most importantly), that agricultural and other community relief works have been courted but overall neglected (6.4); and third, that

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3 The Popular Struggle movement was defined and its organizational contours sketched in the previous chapter. In short, the movement is a cooperative effort by several popular committees, especially Bil’in, Nabi Saleh, and al-Ma’sara, working with many other popular committees and groups across the West Bank, including a network of independent youth activists based in Ramallah, striving to establish practices of resistance that can be spread across Palestinian society and generate an international movement for Palestinian liberation. The ‘Popular Struggle’ proper noun is a construct for present purposes; most of the activists would not delineate their movement in such a definitive way.
selective external funding has corroded local support (6.5). Before expounding on these findings, this chapter describes a more ‘ideal’ popular-committee system as a foil to the more limited forms and processes of the current movement, with reference to the First Intifada and touching on the question of verticality in movement organization.

My focus on endogenous issues confronting Palestinian participatory organization risks minimizing the myriad of other external structural limitations that beset popular mobilization in the West Bank.4 These should be emphasized. Number one is the occupation itself, which deters participation through its severe restrictions on movement across the West Bank plus the threat of ruined livelihoods from arrests, security records, and worse (injury or death).5 Number two is the economy; ‘times are tough,’ and many people are tied up in an individualist consumer system in as well as bound to structural aid dependency.6 Other structural constraints inhere within Palestinian society, for example, the debilitating rift between the two main parties, Fateh and Hamas.7 Coordinated participation is also deterred by a more general culture of sectarianism, of dismissal and scorn between groups and ideas.8 The geographic division of the West Bank into three territorial jurisdictions (Areas A, B, and C), has further complicated

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5 For example, “most of these people are married, they have family, or a student in the university, so they don’t want to lose their future or their income, so their family won’t be able, won’t have any income or … So this is also another reason that people began not to participate in the protests,” NVO interview (2014).
6 “There are a relatively low number of participants, in our assessment, because large sections of the Palestinian population are unmotivated and concerned primarily about their daily economic problems,” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre (MAITIC), “The Palestinian Popular Resistance and Its Built-In Violence” (June 9, 2013), p.42
7 “And also the problem between the parties. The two big parties here in Palestine. Hamas and Fateh, it makes a lot of problems for the Palestinians to go against the occupation, to fight,” JDC interview (2014); “the political fracture between Fatah and Hamas,” M. Darweish and A. Rigby, Popular Protest in Palestine: The Uncertain Future of Unarmed Resistance (London: Pluto, 2015), p. 97.
8 Sectarianism in Palestinian society transcends political factions and religious identity; it pervades between families, towns, classes, and groups of all sorts: “the sectarian approach is where you (say) ‘because somebody else started it, I don’t want to relate to it,’ you know […] if they did not create popular resistance or they are not perceived as the leaders of popular-- they are not participating […] and because of their sectarianism, they are missing a very huge opportunity,” NDSb interview (2014); “I know that in Palestine, we couldn’t find followers. If we want everybody to be involved, or if we want to involve everybody, we must allow them to feel that they are partners, not followers […] we know that this is a special thing in Palestine. We must care for it,” BOC interview (2014); “[w]e don’t have followers. Everyone likes to be the leader,” NDSa interview (2014) (quoted at length above in Section 6.3); see also, “a pervasive lack of trust in leadership at any level,” Darweish and Rigby (2015), p. 97.
mobilization. All of these factors work against increased participation in the Popular Struggle, and they should not be forgotten in a close analysis of local issues at the community level.

Though most of the chapter is constructed of fieldwork data, its underlying logic is built on the theoretical literature concerning participatory organization within the field of nonviolent-resistance studies (Chapter 2). This includes the relatively under-appreciated ideas of Mohandas Gandhi’s “constructive program,” of Hannah Arendt’s “popular organs” in revolutionary struggle (1963), and of Gene Sharp’s “dispersed loci of power” that build immunity into societies against tyrannical overtures (1980) (Section 2.1). This chapter also incorporates insights from the work of Mary King and Julie Norman on Palestinian popular committees (Sections 2.2, 3.2, 3.3, 4.2, and 4.3). With reference to these ideas, my findings suggest a possible link between diminished or absent modes of participatory organization in the contemporary Popular Struggle, and its failure to take root, expand, and accumulate victories as a resistance movement. Finally, a theoretical summation awaits the next chapter: Conclusion.

6.1 Broad Comparisons

Before examining some of the participatory structures and processes of the Popular Struggle movement, the relatively ideal type of the First Intifada should be recalled for the purpose of comparison and perspective. As introduced in Chapter 2 and elaborated in Chapter 3, the Palestinian popular committees of the late 1980s were informal community-based organizations that practiced a significant degree of direct democracy in the process of running society and coordinating national resistance. The Intifada’s organizational infrastructure strengthened the resistance by making communities more self-reliant, better able to withstand the shocks of occupation, repression, and collective punishment. Broad-based committee leadership also allowed the movement to avoid decapitation and withstand arrests of particular individuals, while extending participation to every corner of the population. This model of organization should not be confused with exclusively ‘horizontal’ constructs. Rather, the First Intifada was participatory, democratic, and vertically tiered, with upward delegation of authority
and decision-making that allowed the mass movement to speak and act almost as one. Nor should the model be confused with statism; this was stateless civil-society organization, predating the establishment of the Palestinian Authority and operating outside Israeli state institutions (more on monistic organizing below).

The following organizational cross-section of the First Intifada by Joost Hiltermann indicates the high degree of directly democratic process and structure. He is describing the organizational structure of a pro-Communist Party women’s organization, though similar accounts could be made of other factions’ networks in other social sectors—the point is not the specific details but a vivid impression of the democratic complexity and bottom-up structure:

There are branch committees in camps, villages, and town neighborhoods. Each branch sends one of its members to the area committee, which is based in the nearest town. Each cluster of fifty members sends one representative to the general council. Elections to the general council take place on a yearly basis, but are planned individually by each branch. New committees that are not yet ready to hold elections may send observers to the general council. The council elects an executive committee from among its members.

The FPWAC [Federation of Palestinian Women’s Action Committees] has the most elaborate structure of the four [primary women’s] committees. Its smallest unit is the base committee, which consists of between fifteen and thirty members, and is headed by an administrative committee of seven to nine members, including a general secretary, her deputy, and a treasurer. As soon as the unit expands beyond thirty members, a new unit is created along similar lines, and the two committees together form a branch with its own administrative committee. This structure on the grass-roots level allows for a large measure of participation by all members and smooth access to higher levels of leadership.

Base units and branch committees send one representative each to their district committee, and district committees send three members each to the higher committee. From this is drawn the seventeen-member national executive committee. The executive committee is broken up into various other committees controlling all aspects of the FPWAC’s work: the Internal Affairs Committee, the Financial Committee, the Kindergarten and Nursery School Committee, the Public Relations Committee, the Education Committee, the Workers Committee, the Prisoners Committee, the Youth Committee, the Training Courses Committee, the Coordination Committee, and the Social Committee, which is subdivided into the Committee for Centers to Abolish Illiteracy, the Health Committee, the Consumer Market Committee, and the Defense of the Camps and the Land.
Committee. The highest legislative body in the FPWAC is the general assembly, which consists of representatives from all the base units and branches. It meets annually to review the FPWAC’s activities, to discuss the general situation in the Occupied Territories, to amend the FPWAC’s program and bylaws, and to give direction to the federation’s future program.\(^9\)

This portrayal, multiplied across the territories, testifies to Mary King’s citation of up to 45,000 civil-society committees on the eve of the 1987 revolt.\(^10\) This is stateless civil and political society, participatory organization of the kind seen in other revolutionary movements, as Hannah Arendt has shown, from the American and Russian Revolutions, to Germany in 1918 and Hungary in 1956, as ad hoc council-based organs coalesced to challenge illegitimate forms of rule.\(^11\) Many established state structures are inherently centralized, formal, and premised on monopolies of coercion, features that do not match the First Intifada or Arendt’s revolutionary council systems. The First Intifada was an outstanding example of participatory organization.

There is little comparison between the degree of participatory organization and popular engagement from the revolutionary mass movement of the First Intifada to the much more modest and inconsequential Popular Struggle today. However, the early period of the anti-wall movement can be classified as genuinely popular along with the First Intifada, however at dramatically different scales. Each garnered high levels of popular engagement, though the units varied greatly. Part of Budrus’ 2003-2004 success in rebuffing the barrier from village land is attributed to the persistence of the entire community’s mobilization (4.1). The same is true of Bil’in’s committee, which achieved most of its momentum and ‘small victories’ during the 2005-2007 period, when active support in the village was much more saturated (4.2). Somewhat contrastingly, over the last half decade, the Popular Struggle committees have struggled to maintain popular participation in their Friday demonstrations and in other direct actions across the West.

Bank. Despite varying scales and degrees of popular involvement, all three cases—First Intifada, early anti-wall movement, and ongoing Popular Struggle movement—can be described as participatory to some extent. See Figure 6.1. In short, the Popular Struggle has expanded its operational reach while bleeding grassroots engagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Participatory structure</th>
<th>Organizational depth</th>
<th>Movement scale/breadth</th>
<th>Popular participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Intifada 1987 - 1991</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Wide</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-wall movement (early) 2003 - 2007</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Narrow</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-occupation movement, 2009 - (compromised)</td>
<td>✔, ✗</td>
<td>Low-medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>✓ (partial)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.1 – Case Organization/Mobilization Table
The column “Participatory structure” refers to basic organizational form: grassroots, community based, directly democratic, inclusive, and bottom up. The third case is marked as “compromised” because since 2009 the committees have developed institutional ties with non-participatory organizations—professional NGOs and centralized governance structures, as discussed in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 and revisited below in 6.3 and 6.4. The “Movement scale/reach” column refers to the amount of area and population covered or directly implicated by the movement’s presence and activity. The “Popular participation” column refers to the degree of active support within the movement’s reach. The third case is marked “partial” because of the waning local participation.

Participatory depth is a crucial difference between the first case and the latter two. The organization of the late 1980s was typically multiple layers deep and sometimes duplicated across several other factions. By contrast, today there is often only one level and a single unit per community, the popular committee itself. The resistance committees that emerged in late 1987 and early 1988 were just the tips or visible extensions of much larger ‘icebergs’ of participatory social organization. Today there are only ‘tips.’ Of course there are many other kinds of organizations and institutions constituting contemporary West Bank Palestinian society, but these are mostly unconnected to popular resistance. The relative lack of complexity and interconnectivity between parts

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12 In fact, many of the old organizations still exist as aging institutions; for example, the Palestinian Medical Relief Society, led today by many of the same activists who pioneered the volunteer services in the late 1970s and 1980s. Such organizations, however, adapted to the Oslo environment and became entrenched, professionalized bureaucracies. Similarly, the political party organizations remain extensive, but they have also fossilized and grown estranged from a significant portion of the youth. In
and layers translates to significantly reduced resilience in the Popular Struggle’s organizational capacity.

There have been remedial efforts to add organizational depth to the movement, as Section 5.1 showed, such as the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC) that came out of Bil’in in 2009, or the Budrus-initiated Olive Revolution of 2011. Organizers understand and strive for a more integrated or tiered approach. For example, a Ramallah youth activist with the PSCC answers an open question about how the popular committees might coordinate their efforts more effectively:

I think the example of PSCC, if it’s properly organized, from within, it can be a great example. Because if you have a committee of five to ten people in all these villages and these committees mandate one person or two from each committee and these people are part of a bigger committee that unites all these villages together, then we can move forwards with our actions.13

Similarly, a Nabi Saleh activist responded,

We want to build a new body for the popular resistance that will lead the popular resistance all around Palestine. And it can decide and develop the tactics of the popular resistance. And it will be some of them from Nabi Saleh, some of them from all the popular resistance villages, they will participate in this body in order to coordinate well, to organize things well, to achieve something in the near future. If it get the right organization, it will achieve something.14

To date, however, such ideas and overtures at leadership structure have not been embraced beyond their limited spheres of influence and only partially within their spheres (and apparently decreasingly so).

Some of the reasons for the Popular Struggle’s stagnant or even negative domestic growth have been discussed in previous sections and are raised again below. In this chapter, the broader structural factors should not be forgotten, even though they are not

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13 ECS interview (2014), adding “Because at the same time, you’re organizing amongst all of these, you’re creating the support units, you’re creating the unity of all these villages, but at the same time, if all these villages work together then we can stretch and include more villages and more communities, because we, at that point, we’re setting a very successful example to anyone whose thinking about creating a committee in their own community.”

14 JVOa interview (2014).
the focus; these are the primary independent variables, first and foremost, the Israel occupation, and to a lesser extent its subsidiary Palestinian Authority, which put a high price on dissent, and, secondly, foreign-funded development programs, which have commoditized civil society and rendered the population aid-dependent (as discussed in Chapter 3 and touched on below in 6.4 and 6.5) (with other structural factors noted in 6.5). The focus of the present chapter is the endogenous factors, including public mistrust of some of the methods and the perceived motives of the popular committees, with reference to concerns about Friday demonstrations (raised in 4.2, recalled in 5.1.1 and below in 6.4), and about salaried or official resistance (5.1.1, 5.1.2, 6.4, 6.5).

From this perspective, popular organization on the scale of the First Intifada seems a distant memory. However, the comparison may be misleading, because accelerated globalization and the expansion of the institutions of global governance since the 1980s have arguably encroached into the spaces where local groups once had greater latitude and independence to operate. As a woman with the PSCC told me,

I think it’s quite unfair to compare the committees existing at this point to those committees existing in the First Intifada because what happened in the First Intifada was that everybody was involved [...] But at this point, what Oslo did to the Palestinians, economically, politically, socially, everything, and I think it’s very much connected to how the whole world functions, the whole capitalist system.15

In the context of the present, on its own terms, the new popular committees mark a significant development, a rupture in the dominant twenty-first century fabrics of centralization, professionalization, bureaucratization, and, in the face of conflict and oppression, notions of armed struggle. Unarmed and participatory, the new organizations defy convention, have yielded some limited results on the ground, and galvanized new networks of international solidarity.

6.2 Popular Committees Today

Popular committees are community based, voluntary, informal, inclusive, bottom up, and directly democratic, participatory for short (not perfectly, or always, but mostly: some flaws below). First and foremost, they plan and direct the demonstrations, make

15 ECS interview (2014).
arrangements with internationals and Israeli activists, and work with media and legal organizations. As one of Bil’in’s organizers puts it, “we need a team to follow everything, to take the responsibility for this.”\textsuperscript{16} Different committee members fulfill different roles, as an organizer from Nabi Saleh elaborates:

> And we have like small groups, each one takes responsibility for one thing, for, let’s say media. Four or five people for media. Five or four people for going to other committees. Another group for internationals. For, like, following what’s happening on the Internet, by articles, especially in the Israeli media, what they said about Nabi Saleh, what is their opinion of what’s happening this Friday, what … \textsuperscript{17}

The role played by the popular committees of Budrus and Bil’in in leading their villages through effective civil-resistance campaigns was discussed throughout Chapter 4, and the ideas and dilemmas of Nabi Saleh’s popular committee were discussed in 5.1.3. It was emphasized that organizers strive to assemble committees with members from every political faction and social sector of local society, to mix a “cocktail from all of these people,”\textsuperscript{18} in order to maximize legitimacy and participation. Chapter 4 also stressed that committees are active in the field, and “to be member in the committee, it means to be the first one in the action, and the last one who leaves the action.”\textsuperscript{19} I drew on the work of Julie Norman, who was among the first to engage the popular committees with civil-resistance theory, and I quoted some of her organizational findings, describing the committees as “grassroots in the truest sense of the word, consisting of local volunteers with natural ties to the land and community.”\textsuperscript{20}

In my 2014 interviews with popular-committee members and their close supporters, I asked most of my twenty participants, “What is a popular committee?” From their responses, common themes emerge, including: leadership is voluntary, informal, and predicated on practice and local legitimacy; committees strive to be open, inclusive, and representative of the community, while remaining independent of political forces outside the village. Following are some excerpts of initial responses, each with

\textsuperscript{16} BCC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{17} NVO interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{18} BCC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{19} BCC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{20} J. Norman, \textit{The Second Intifada: Civil Resistance} (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 36, quoted at greater length in Section 4.3.
slightly different inflections. A Ramallah youth activist, for example, highlights the place-based character of the committees and alludes to the model of the 1980s:

In my understanding, a popular committee is basically a committee formed within a certain community. I think the naming is very much connected to the naming that was used during the First Intifada, because you’ve got committees organizing local schools, local actions within the community or neighborhood or the city or the village or the refugee camp. So a popular committee is basically a committee that represents that certain location, geographically, a geographical location.21

Another Ramallah youth activist responds by focusing on the committees’ leadership role as mobilizing the community and accepting responsibility:

It’s basically a group-- I really don’t want to say leaders, but they are leaders that have taken a very dominant role in terms of organizing and networking and getting people on the streets [...] you know, these active leaders that are usually in the front lines in terms of organizing, in the front lines in terms of networking and getting people on the streets and they’re usually on the streets themselves, they help strategize and they help assess situations. They help, you know, get funding, and kind of, they’re the closest thing we have to a leadership right now, in terms of people on the ground.22

An activist from Bil’in stresses the grassroots legitimacy and the independence of the committee:

The popular committee is a committee that’s open for everybody who wants to join, but not people who are in the offices. People who are on the ground. [...] And the people who are in the front always in the demonstrations who will be the member on the committee. Not the people from outside. We didn’t have-- we are not under the control of any party or any government. We are a grassroots resistance, working on the ground.23

An activist from Budrus emphasizes the informality of the committee, along with the importance of organic community ties:

Popular committee is a committee, it’s open committee, it’s not official committee, it’s not registered at any place, in Palestinian Authority, or Israeli, it’s not registered, it has no, ya’ni, bank credit, or no official

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21 ECS interview (2014).
22 NDSa interview (2014).
23 JDC interview (2014).
subject. It’s open and it’s voluntary, and it’s not official. It has members from all the components of the society.24

And from Nabi Saleh, an activist characterizes popular committees in terms of moral character, selflessness and courage:

It’s an amount of people that are sharing the same beliefs, same hopes, same dreams, and they are working hard to make these dreams come true. They are fighting for others, not just for themselves, because, maybe I have the courage to stand in front of a soldier but not everybody has this courage. There are people who are afraid. There are sick people. There are people who don’t want to participate. So if you choose to be a member of the popular committee you should fight for everybody. You should not be selfish. You have to fight for future for everyone. For each Palestinian, not just yourself.25

In response to follow-up questions about maintaining local legitimacy and village unity, many respondents point to the small size of their village. The smallness and closeness of the communities where popular committees have thrived appear to be important and possibly necessary conditions of their success. With populations ranging from around 600 to 2000 residents, most people know each other. “First of all,” one activist says, “as a small village, all of us are know each other. They know us. Everyone in Bil’in know who I am.”26 Similarly, “Bil’in is a small village and we are, ya’ni, like one family.”27 According to one of Nabi Saleh’s organizers,

The village here, all of us are one family, so I know you since you’re born, til now. I know everything about you, about your mother, your father, your brothers, your sisters, and all of us know each other very good [...] so if you ask (villagers) about these people who are mainly participate in this community, mainly you will find, all the people told you that they are good people, they have good opinions, they … You will find many people who are agree that they are should be in this position. But we don’t need to make election, or votes, or something for anything.28

24 BOC interview (2014).
25 NVO interview (2014).
26 COC interview (2014).
27 LOC interview (2014).
28 CVOb interview (2014).
This factor—small scale—suggests a possible limitation to the transferability of the popular-committee model to other (i.e., larger) settings.\textsuperscript{29}

So far, the portrayals are highly generalized, roundly positive, even idealized. Outside their immediate circles (and sometimes among them), there are less flattering conceptions of the popular committees and their methods; the following sections take a closer and more critical look at the participatory structures and processes of the Popular Struggle.

\textbf{6.3 Decision Making, Leadership, Exclusions}

Many of my interview participants elaborate on how popular committees make decisions and how internal disagreements are resolved. The following samples shed light on the flexibility and informality of the system, as well as its dependence on personal qualities and relations. There are no formal rules or procedures for deciding arguments or resolving decisions, but the major issues, the contours of the movement’s goals and options, are widely agreed upon, with the details decided in the spirit if not the letter of democracy. Radically democratic processes can be untidy, or “quite fluid,” as one activist put it,\textsuperscript{30} but overall democratic nonetheless.

According to one of Bil’in’s leaders, voting is a mechanism for resolving internal deliberations: “we have a big conversation between the committee that some people agree, some people not agree, but in the end, we agree by the vote. If we have any problem in the meeting that we want to do something or we want to plan something and some people didn’t agree, we do this by vote. And everybody will follow this.”\textsuperscript{31} Yet according to another activist from Bil’in, voting is more of a euphemism, even if the underlying principle is majority rule.

\begin{quote}
From the beginning we want our committee to be a democratic, to be vote, but to be honest with you, no one, no time, used vote [...] I remember some meetings we took four or five hours. And we have a big battle between us.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{29}This connection between participatory organization and village/town size is reflective of a common motif in the theory and practice of direct democracy going back to the ancient Greek city states; J.J. Rousseau writes that “democratic government suits small states [...] where the people may be readily assembled and where each citizen may easily know all the others,” \textit{The Social Contract} translated by M. Cranston (London: Penguin, 1968), pp. 111, 113.

\textsuperscript{30}ECS interview (2014).

\textsuperscript{31}JDC interview (2014).
But finally when we finish the meeting, the majority of us, we support the idea [...] The others respect the majority [...] and also some people who refuse (i.e., disagreed), we found them in the first row. They respect the others.\textsuperscript{32}

In other words, voting is not systematized, but the principle is democratic, majoritarian, deliberative, and leaning toward consensus unity. Ramallah youth activists, with insight into inner workings of the local committees and the PSCC, paint a slightly more colourful portrait:

Look (laughing), in Palestinian society, basically everyone likes to consider themselves a leader, you know? We don’t have followers. Everyone likes to be the leader. So, you know, in terms of giving an idea and discussing, you know, it does get loud. But at the end of the day, you just look at, you assess, whatever is being given. You look at the strategy, is it going to be effective? And you will have a few people that might disagree, but at the end of the day, they’ll still go forward with it because, you know, the majority agreed, and they know that the goal of the suggestion for instance is to benefit this, this, and that.\textsuperscript{33}

Another adds with hyperbole,

Um, we debate it until we die. We sit for hours and hours and hours and it’s a matter of negotiations, and someone eventually has to surrender. Not surrender. How do you say, give concessions [...] If it’s political things, nobody compromises. For example with Nabi Saleh, it’s one thing. PSCC, because you’re talking about people from very different groups and backgrounds, what we do, is we look at the full part of the glass. So, whatever is common between you and me, and we can agree on, and we stay away from the things that we cannot agree-- like one-state, two-state solution is never on the table of discussions, because we will kill each other and there is no concession. No one is gonna, try with the... But whether it is, we do it on Friday or we do it on Saturday? Are we gonna call it Ein Hijleh or Deir Hijleh? We sit, we argue, we argue, we argue, until we get somewhere. And sometimes we vote.\textsuperscript{34}

Again, there is no formal democratic mechanism, but the idea of “respect the majority” is foundational.\textsuperscript{35} Procedurally, \textit{majority} is decisive over \textit{unanimity}. This is important for

\textsuperscript{32} BCC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{33} NDSa interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{34} BJS interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{35} BCC interview (2014), quoted in full above; additionally, according to an activist from Nabi Saleh, “[y]ou can say we still have a democratic decision. We use democracy. We have a meeting every week, for the committee. We discuss many things during these meetings, week by week. We already agreed
the committees’ capacity to make decisions and act upon them in rapid fashion, setting them apart from some recent Western social movements, which have insisted upon 100% consensus in decision-making, sometimes rendering themselves vulnerable to paralysis and minority spoilers and blockers.\textsuperscript{36}

Many interview participants speak about “Tuesday meetings” as a vehicle for planning and decision-making. Particularly in the early months and years of the demonstrations in Bil’in and in Nabi Saleh, according to local activists, the committees convened weekly, typically on Tuesdays, to discuss the past demonstration, to plan the pending demonstration, and to assign tasks.\textsuperscript{37} The meetings have been described as open and transparent. For example, a Bil’in activist says, “[w]e make many meetings between the people from the village and the internationals and the Israelis (i.e., peace activists). Everyone can ask what he want, and to answer and to see and to hear everything... So no secrets, ya’ni.”\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, in Nabi Saleh,

In the beginning, we were making like a weekly meeting for all the people who are participate, not just for the main people. And they hear from all the people and they try to negotiate with them what is good, what is bad [...] Even sometimes, (people) who are against, or who don’t like what’s happened, they came to give the other people their view, their opinion, about the general idea. Okay. That we have to resist. So the small things, it doesn’t, ah, like that we, ‘I don’t agree with that, I don’t agree with that, I don’t agree with that.’ No, we already saw the whole picture, and we can discuss the details by how these things can help in the main aim. Maybe somebody will disagree. But at the end, if all the people, all the people of the committee, they are convinced about one subject, he has to follow the decision,” JVOa interview (2014); “first, it depends about the disagreements, about what and what is it. So if it’s about how to do the protest or the theme of the protest, most of the time, ‘Okay, we will do this this Friday, and that next Friday.’ So it depends about other issues that mostly we are voting, ‘Okay, who want to do this?’ [...] So it depends about the argument, and what kids of argument, but mostly even if we have a big disagreement, we try to calm down, keep it for another week. Okay, we will discuss it next Tuesday-- usually it’s on Tuesday. And after that, everyone will think about what’s a new idea, or about how we should solve the agreement or about if anybody should be involved or not. But, of course, every meeting there are disagreements about things, something, but usually we are, we solve it,” NVO interview (2014)

\textsuperscript{36} M. Castells, \textit{Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age} (Cambridge: Polity, 2012) raises this tension, noting that there have been considerations of moving toward majority-based processes for these reasons, pp. 130, 181. This is the second major difference between the organizational principles of the West Bank popular committees and the Western Occupy movements—majority versus unanimity. The other related difference discussed above concerns the new social movements’ taboo against all organizational verticality (Section 2.1).

\textsuperscript{37} For example, “[o]n the Tuesday meetings, we evaluate the last event, see what’s the problem we face, and what’s happened, and we can plan for the second event,” CVOa interview (2014); “Nabi Saleh, for example, I used to go to the meetings. We would sit together, decide on what we’re gonna do on Friday, what’s the theme, who’s gonna get busses, da da da da da, we organize it there,” BJS interview (2014).

\textsuperscript{38} COC interview (2014).
their … So you can see, usually this meeting is open meeting for anybody who agree or who disagree of what’s happening or what will happen.39

According to another activist, “[e]veryone who participates, man, women, child, he can participate on the meeting.”40 Sometimes as many as fifty people or more were in attendance,41 and sometimes as few as “fifteen or five.”42 Reflecting the closeness of the community, meetings also happened more informally and impromptu between small numbers of people, sometimes over tea, in the street, or at dinner.43

In both cases, Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, the weekly meetings are no longer weekly, if at all, at least in terms of any degree of formality. In the case of Nabi Saleh, “[t]hese meeting, for more than two years (since 2009 when demonstrations began), you can say it was weekly meeting.”44 Asked if the Bil’in popular committee still holds weekly meetings, a Bil’in activist replies, “[n]o, not now. The meeting every month. Maybe every two month now. I tell you the truth. I am not speaking like I want to make propaganda about Bil’in. The truth, the popular committee not making meeting, (at) this time.”45 Indeed, the very notion of Bil’in and Nabi Saleh ‘committees’ has become somewhat euphemistic. The term implies more organization and delineation than actually currently exists. The villages have been repeating the same tasks long enough that their local movements are basically on ‘autopilot.’ In Bil’in, for example, “we not have, really, committee now. It’s-- everyone knows what he doing [...] it’s not big problem.”46 Similarly, some organizers from Nabi Saleh maintain there is no actual committee; rather, week to week, a new ‘committee’ forms and dissolves, made up of whoever happens to get together to take care of the Friday details (dealing with visitors, planning routes, picking protest themes).47

However, creative direct actions outside the villages between multiple groups require more careful attention. Concerted acts like Bab al-Shams and Ein Hijleh (5.2),

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39 CVOb interview (2014).
40 CVOa interview (2014).
41 CVOb interview (2014).
42 CVOa interview (2014).
43 CVOb interview (2014).
44 CVOb interview (2014).
45 IMC interview (2014).
46 IMC interview (2014).
47 CVOa interview (2014).
which are sometimes referred to by the activists as “central” or “centralized” actions (because they involve a convergence of committees on a common action), involve hundreds of people, if not thousands in total, as well as international press coordination. These are planned by small and at times necessarily secretive ad hoc steering committees, made up of members from the committees and other groups involved in the action. For example, “when we do action together, we have a steering committee that we invite the people from all of the villages to do this action.”

A youth activist with PSCC experience adds, “if there is a centralized (action), everyone sits. We have meetings outside [...] it’s not only PSCC, it’s-- you sit with Fateh, you sit with Mubadara (the Palestinian National Initiative party), you sit with all the people who are partners in the struggle.”

During the planning and execution of central actions, the Popular Struggle movement takes on a temporary vertical leadership quality, or organizational depth, as discussed earlier in this chapter with reference to the First Intifada’s organization (6.1); see also Figure 6.2.

Such steering committees are tied to specific actions, and therefore short-lived. The Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC) often becomes the public face of such central actions, as Chapter 5 showed, but the group technically has not been the planning and executing body, even though its board and staff are often the same organizers who form the one-off steering committees, as noted in 5.1.1: “a very thin line.”

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48 Secret planning of central actions has become increasingly common in the Popular Struggle, solely for the purpose of preventing Israeli intelligence from thwarting actions before they begin.
49 JDC interview (2014).
50 BJS interview (2014).
51 BJS interview (2014).
Overall, these descriptions have cast the popular committees as open, inclusive, and deliberative, if messy and imperfect in process. However, this is not a leaderless movement. Each community, and in each committee, leaders are evident, typically a few individuals, usually (but not always) middle-aged men. These individuals stand out; locals look to them for guidance; and their voices carry more weight. For example, an activist familiar with the committees clarifies, “in villages, I think if ______ says, for example, if the leader in Nabi Saleh says ‘one, two, three is going to happen,’ it will happen.” This means that some voices count more than others. Indeed, a prominent Palestinian youth activist and journalist, Linah Alsaafin, has objected to the premise of the “popular resistance,” in a 2012 critique: “[t]he structure of the committee is built on an undemocratic basis, with self-appointed figures from the various villages fulfilling the leadership roles.”

The presence of leaders, even “self-appointed,” does not necessarily mean that the movement’s leadership is imposed or illegitimate or even undemocratic. Grassroots leaders in these circumstances lack coercive means and depend instead on the consent and cooperation of their communities. The lack of formal elections, oversight, and institutionalized accountability precludes perfect democracy or certain conceptualizations of democracy, such as electoral, but does not mean that the popular committees are undemocratic. This is community based, less structured, more radical, and voluntarist; it partakes in the revolutionary and directly democratic tradition described above and in Chapter 2. The movement has leaders, but it may be called participatory leadership, emerging organically from a wider base of a movement that is overall democratic, popular, and inclusive (certainly popular in its early stages at the local level).

In evidence that individual leaders are not lynchpins or ‘heads’ of the movement, the same local leader referred to in the previous interviewee’s quote was arrested, along with another prominent figure from the committee, by Israeli forces in March 2011 and

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52 BJS interview (2014). According to one of the more outspoken of my interview participants, “I will tell you. To be a leader, you don’t need the permission. Yeah. On the field you will be a leader. And everybody can recognize that you are a leader or not. And distinguish between a leader and not,” CVOa interview (2014)

imprisoned for a year in a case that drew the attention of international media and human rights organizations. Significantly, the period of their detention witnessed an upsurge in mobilized defiance from the villagers, protesting the arrests of their kin and resolving to send a message: no matter who the Israelis target, they would stop the popular resistance. Some Nabi Saleh activists refer to this period—the year when their “leaders” were imprisoned—as the “golden age” of the village’s popular resistance. It is therefore misleading to dismiss the popular committees as undemocratic on the basis of its leadership alone. The committees are, in a word, participatory.

However, the Popular Struggle movement has undemocratic aspects, and, from the beginning, has made significant exclusions. For example, the meetings described above were not always as open and inclusive as some of the speakers may have implied. A clue is hidden in one of the quotations—“[e]veryone who participates, man, women, child, he can participate on the meeting.” In other words, the meetings have generally been open for those who already support the movement, those who turn out for the Friday demonstrations. As a Ramallah youth activist clarifies, in response to a question about the extent of the inclusivity of the committee meetings, “[y]eah, but not really just anyone (can attend). You have to be known, you know? In terms of being active, on the ground.”

According to a resident of Nabi Saleh, not a member or supporter but a critic of the movement, the meetings were never representative of the village; this interview participant alleges that the activists have unduly claimed to speak on the village’s behalf, that many people were simply excluded, not invited, or not informed of meetings; “[s]o,

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55 “For example, when they arrested _____ and _____ they thought that they are the coordinators for the village, and when they arrested them, the model would fall down. But since the beginning, we have no leaders. As I said everybody can have an idea. He can participate, and he can give his idea, we will do it. So when _____ and _____ arrested, nothing happened. On the contrary, more people began to participate. Their arrest gave us the strength to continue because now we have a reason, that it’s not _____ and _____ who led us, it’s our beliefs. So everybody participated, not because of somebody, they participated because of their beliefs in what they are doing. And I think during _____ and _____ imprisonment, it was one of the, you can say, the golden age of popular resistance in Nabi Saleh, because we wanted to send this powerful message that even, doesn’t matter who you are arresting but nobody will weaken our resistance,” BJS interview (2014).

56 CVOa interview (2014).

57 NDSa interview (2014).
the meeting, yes, meeting has been held, but who attending the meeting? This is very important.”

Another kind of exclusion has been generational. As indicated, much of the popular committee leadership includes middle-aged and older men with leadership experience from the First Intifada (although many youth participate, including in the front lines of the demonstrations, and also in the wings with faces covered and stones to hand). The older generation has appeared uneager to yield planning or their place at the face of the movement to the younger—and less experienced—generation. According to a Ramallah youth activist, “the youth in Nabi Saleh are quite excluded from decision making. The guys who go and throw stones, ya’ni, the people who participate in the protests [...] if you do talk to the youth in Nabi Saleh, yeah, it seems some of them are excluded.”

Linah Alsaafin, the youth critic noted above, highlights significant limitations and exclusions about the movement generally: “the use of the term of ’popular resistance’ is unfair and quite simply an inaccuracy as these demonstrations are built around no mobilizing strategy or goal, do not include the majority or even half of the villagers, and some of those who do take part prevent their wives and daughters from joining in.” This is an incisive rebuke of the movement’s claims to participatory organization. Since Alsaafin’s writing, those low levels of participation have fallen even lower. Some of my interview participants also point out that “popular” is the more aspirational than descriptive. The prevention of women’s participation on any scale is an indictment. Among the popular committees, Nabi Saleh is at the forefront for the prominent leadership and participation by local women, but overall, in most centres of resistance, patriarchy is the norm; in some villages, like Kufr Quddoum, the weekly protests are entirely male (and also more violent and dangerous).

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58 JVOB interview (2014). He gives an analogy of a handful of students from one grade, out of a school of twelve grades and hundreds students, claiming to speak on behalf of the entire school: “Why the other student in the school didn’t go to the meeting? [...] The meeting was closed to them in one house of them. No one get know that there is a meeting,” JVOB interview (2014).
59 ECS interview (2014).
My survey results shed light on questions of inclusion/exclusion. Mostly, the committees are perceived positively, though significant minorities seem to harbor doubts and suspicions. In February 2014, I collected 201 completed questionnaires, including 153 from three different university campuses, 16 from Bil’in, 23 from Nabi Saleh, and 9 from Nablus. The surveys included a series of organizational questions. For example, given a choice between, “yes,” “no,” and “often,” in response to the statement, “Popular committees invite everyone to participate,” the large majority responded positively: 100 said “yes”; 52 said “often”; and only 31 said “no.” However, asked if popular committees are “democratic,” the results are much less clear: 93 responded “no”; 67 responded “yes,” and 32 responded “often” (put differently, 93 said “no” compared to 99 “yes” and “often” combined). So there is strong agreement that the popular committees reach out to or “invite” everyone, but an approximate split on whether or not they are “democratic.”

Strikingly, asked if popular committees “exclude part of the community,” the large majority concurred (83 “yes”; 39 “often”; and 70 “no”). Yet asked if the popular committees “exclude women,” the largest plurality by far said “no,” even the majority of women (only 6 out of 51 female respondents indicated that women were excluded). In other words, there is strong agreement that popular committees are exclusionary, but not of women. Whom they are presumed to exclude is beyond this data, but likely refers to a blend of youth/party/sect. Finally, asked if popular committees should lead the national struggle, the largest share said “yes” (107 compared to 82 “no”).

These are mixed results, largely positive but containing significant contradictions. By some of the indicators, the committees are perceived in line with their claims, especially in terms of “inviting everyone” and not “excluding women.” Yet by other indicators, support is less apparent and even negative, such as whether or not the

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61 For methodology, see Section 0.4 and Appendix 2.
62 The results concerning women may be somewhat skewed by the present sample. All but 5 of the 51 female respondents were university students (or youth recruited on the outskirts of campuses). Students and urban youth presumably experience more liberty than many women in rural sectors, and may not have access to such perspectives (although surely some rural women are among this university sample). The 5 non-university site respondents were from Nabi Saleh, and all five indicated that women were not excluded by the committees (which is not surprising because Nabi Saleh’s women are known for playing lead roles). The conclusion that women largely do not feel excluded is bolstered by the fact that almost all the 51 women otherwise rated the committees poorly on democratic and inclusive criteria; female participants who were highly critical of the committees would not likely give them a pass on women’s exclusion, if they felt excluded. See also Appendix 2.
committees are “democratic” and by the strong consensus that they “exclude some from the community.” These divergent results invite further investigation. Random error seems unlikely, because the data patterns recur across the sample, whether parsed by gender, age, or place. The most notable deviation and perhaps the most surprising finding from the survey data is that for almost every organizational question, the levels of suspicion or doubt are higher on average within the communities of Bil’in and Nabi Saleh (39 surveys) than they are for general sample (201 surveys in total, mostly university students). The most glaring disparity came in response to a question about who leads and organizes the popular committees, given a choice between “members of the community,” “political parties,” “Palestinian Authority officials,” and “Israeli or foreign views.” In the total sample, the results are muddled: 37 said “members of the community”; 56 said “political parties”; 13 said “Palestinian Authority officials”; 33 said “Israeli or foreign views”; and 68 made no response (an unusually large number). However, of the 39 random surveys from Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, effectively half (19) said “Israeli or foreign views” were behind the committees, while the remaining half (20) was divided over the other four categories. These responses suggest a perception within Bil’in and Nabi Saleh that the movement is driven by alien agendas. See Appendix 2.b for data and comparative charts.

These negatives, including published and spoken criticisms and less-than favorable survey data, tarnish and complicate but do not nullify claims of directly democratic and community-based organization in the Popular Struggle. These qualities are not binary, either perfectly democratic or completely undemocratic; they exist on continua, and precisely quantifying the participatory extent across multiple social fronts is beyond the task of this study. On the whole, this research indicates that the

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63 The sample size is suspect in absolute terms (only 39 total, 23 from Nabi Saleh, 16 from Bil’in), even though it is proportionally quite large, especially in the case of Nabi Saleh, with 5% of the village population represented. Some negative skewing is expected, because, after random recruitment, several participants led me to further participants, snowballing across presumably like-minded peers, sharing similar criticisms of the movement. Also, survey respondents from the two villages were disproportionately more likely to have entered comments on the last question, which was open; their comments indicate degrees of skepticism, and two comments in particular, from Bil’in, stand out: “the current popular resistance is not real” and “the popular committees mostly only work for money.” However, the numbers are so small, statements like this so few, that their significance should not be projected too far (nor can collaborator or collaborator influence be ruled out); yet they cannot be ignored. All comments are listed in Appendix 2.b. See also Introduction for methodological details and concerns.
movement is mostly open, inclusive, and directly democratic. It is equally clear, however, that some segments of the community and the larger public are disaffected with the movement and its leadership, and in large enough numbers that if a crisis of confidence is not imminent, it may not be far off.

6.4 Constructive Work and Solidifying the Base

This section details an area of practice that has served communal unity and has the potential to further solidify local support for the committees. As detailed above in Chapter 2, the constructive program refers to alternative social organization designed to make individuals and communities more self-reliant through planned cooperative social works at the grassroots level. Constructive work can serve nonviolent struggle in a number of ways: it facilitates the capacity for sustained mass boycott/noncooperation by reducing external dependencies; this also has the effect of fortifying communities against repression and collective punishment; most pertinently, it generates grassroots solidarity and participation. Mary King has shown that these ideas explain the degree and duration of the First Intifada’s power, as discussed in 2.2. and 3.2. This section examines constructive work in the Popular Struggle, drawing primarily on three months of fieldwork in the West Bank, over 2013-2014. Compared to the extensive community-based support programs of the First Intifada, the current efforts are minor, a disparity partly explained by the transformed social conditions between the two periods. Presently, most Palestinian social services in the occupied territories are provided by a combination of centralized governance institutions (the Palestinian Authority or the Israeli occupation) and a professional corps of NGO operations (including Palestinian and international). Apart from scattered niches, an appreciation for the constructive program’s function—to build mobilization capacity at the community level—is as inadequately evident today as it was in the 1990s when the PA and the international community disregarded the under-appreciated alternative social institutions. This is not surprising, as this particular relic of Gandhi’s thought, the constructive program, has remained one of the most arcane, least explored, and least understood (2.1).

Before coming to my findings in contemporary constructive work, I want to highlight some of the existing pertinent literature concerning the contemporary West Bank. Among the fullest treatments is four pages from Marwan Darweish’s and Andrew
Rigby’s recent chapter couplet on the West Bank popular resistance. The authors concisely survey the field, pointing to constructive activities in the southern tip region of the Hebron Hills, the Jordan Valley in the east, and around Nablus in the north, raising the central concept of *sumoud*, or steadfastness, and quoting the famous phrase, “to exist is to resist.” The authors recognize *land* as a central motif in Palestinian resistance, as the land itself is all that separates Palestinians from displacement; as such, holding fast to it is a political imperative: plowing, growing, renovating, and building on it, “all as part of attempt to deter any attempt by Israel to take control of the land and properties.” In her 2010 study, Julie Norman delves into what I have called the participatory qualities of the popular committees; though she explores less the constructive activity or potential, she includes this concise summation:

Each popular committee also performs other tasks in accordance with local grievances and needs, with several committees even pursuing legal cases in Israeli courts on behalf of the villagers. Many popular committees also handle their village’s communications with Israeli authorities and sometimes settlers, maintain records and maps of land closures and seizures, act as spokespersons with the media, offer support to other villages, and coordinate actions, conferences, and events with other committees.

The practice and local significance of tree (re)planting is also touched on throughout her work, though largely in symbolic cultural terms rather than from an organizational perspective or as a latent manifestation of constructive work. These two texts, Norman (2010) and Darweish and Rigby (2015), are among the few monographs in the academic literature on contemporary civil resistance in the West Bank that take up this topic, and I have encountered few articles and chapters. In the civil-resistance literature, there has

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64 Darweish and Rigby (2015), pp. 90-93.
67 One instructive example is T. Seidel, “Development as Peacebuilding and Resistance: Alternative Narratives of Nonviolence in Palestine-Israel,” in Hallward and Norman (2011), which identifies the dearth of study in this research area within civil-resistance literature. Focusing mostly on a wastewater-to-irrigation project that began in the West Bank village of Nahhalin and spread to many other villages, Seidel challenges standard direct-action-based conceptions of nonviolent resistance, arguing that the concept should be broadened to include less sensational and more indirect forms of resistance such as development projects, and even just daily living under occupation (*sumoud*). Tellingly, Seidel does not cite Gandhi’s constructive program or Sharp’s work on devolved social organization, though he does cite both
been a paucity of academic treatment of constructive programs or alternative institution building in the West Bank over the last ten or fifteen years. In part, this paucity reflects the limited extent of such work on the ground; indeed, almost all the examples covered in this section come from Area C, the rural and least populated regions of the West Bank (indicating that grassroots constructive work is not a widespread or pervasive practice, outside of scattered pockets).

The general topic (if not the theory) of constructive community building is perhaps more salient in the NGO literature that has accrued around the activity of the grassroots Palestinian organizations across the West Bank. A prominent example is a 2012 report on the popular resistance committees (PRCs), which contains this insightful passage on alternative institution building at the grassroots level:

A critical element of the PRCs’ activism has been in community-building. In particular, this has included the following: supporting the community in moments of crisis through a process of egalitarian decision-making regarding its needs, encouraging voluntarism, consciousness-raising about the injustice of colonial conditions, creating local alternative media outlets in place of dependence on mainstream national and international media, developing a strong outreach strategy to international institutions and officials, and helping rebuild after the destruction caused by Israeli policies. This last includes re-cultivating and planting confiscated and uprooted olive trees, rebuilding houses demolished by Israel (such as in Jiftlik village in the Jordan Valley), rebuilding schools, instigating local boycotts of Israeli products and encouraging the consumption of local Palestinian products, and refusing to work in Israeli settlements. [...] A Jordan Valley activist reflecting on the PRC’s work noted that: “It is small achievements here and there. We learn about local communities and their needs, such as building a school for the community’s children. Now there are more than 100 students in that school. This is a successful project. It is initiating the beginning of change.”

This is a strong statement of the purpose and place of constructive work, though shy on detail (offering one concrete example). For another example of an NGO report touching

authors for their legacies of contributing to a research literature that has “limit[ed] our understanding of nonviolent resistance to these instances of ‘direct action’,” p. 35—Seidel does not also note that both Sharp and Gandhi do indeed balance their action approaches with organizational counterparts (even though this latter focus has received less attention and remains less well understood: Ch. 3).

on these issues, a 2009 document includes a list of eight recommendations for NGOs and other supporters of the grassroots movements on the ground, with two recommendations that stand out as local constructive efforts. Number two of eight recommendations is: “[t]rain Wall-affected communities in the use of new media, including video and still cameras for the purpose of documenting human rights violations.” This is media constructive work, a valuable social service/skill with political yield. The seventh of the eight recommendations identifies the agricultural question: “[d]irect services and development projects in a way that supports the sustainability of the communities, their capacity to continue cultivating isolated lands and to uphold their capacity to gain a livelihood and access services.”69 My research, as I show below, suggests that this last point should be listed first and foremost (at least were the report to be written today). As a final NGO reference, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC) in their 2010 policy statement identifies local “capacity building” as a central tenet of its strategic outlook, offering this limited explanation:

[The] capacity-building program includes increasing the involvement of the Palestinian political leadership and cooperation with the Israeli and international solidarity movements. The committees’ agenda includes nonviolent direct action, legal and media training for local activists, monitoring and reporting, advocacy and legal assistance [...] It also strives to involve individuals and communities in a constructive, development-oriented endeavor for liberation and assertion of rights.70

To better understand the role and extent of constructive programs in the contemporary movement, I asked most of my interview participants if they could talk about examples of social services or programs offered or arranged by the popular committees for the benefit of whole communities. Many examples were given, which I have grouped into three categories: land-related projects (these have been engaged on a contingency basis and hold untapped potential); multimedia capacity building (this has been an effective focus, amplifying the Palestinian message while delegitimizing the occupation where it is weakest—publicity); and third, everything else, ranging from

69 Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association and Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign (Stop the Wall), “Repression Allowed, Resistance Denied” (July 9, 2009), p. 93.
educational to medical. The following accounts offer impressions and preliminary maps of the areas and activities of concern to the popular committees. Items in the lists that follow should not be taken for evidence of widespread programs but more typically individual or ad hoc cases, ‘one offs,’ and more often than not, in the past tense.

First, programs to build multimedia capacity have been a strategic priority for the popular committees. The emotive power of photography or video—when it captures injustice, repression, state violence, or the human spirit in the face of suffering—has been discussed throughout the case chapters. To equip struggling villages and communities with the capacity to document human rights violations as well as to communicate the conditions of their existence across multimedia platforms is a kind of empowerment, social and political. In response to a question about providing services to the community, a youth activist based in Ramallah raises media capacity building:

[O]ne of the work that they (the PSCC) used to do, before I joined, was to have a media training for all these locations. So they trained locals from Nabi Saleh on how to use a video camera, on how to write reports, on how to video edit, so that people of Nabi Saleh can bring their own media, their own work of media to the world. Rather than just depend on the local journalists, or rather than depend on different media agencies to come and cover. And we did this in different locations, we did this in Susya, at al-Tuwani, all this, next to Hebron, in Bethlehem, in al-Khaleel, in Nablus, in all these locations.

Another youth activist working with the PSCC describes similar programs:

They do a lot of, um, like internal trainings, and ah, like, to raise the awareness about the popular resistance, they do trainings to, like, to, capacity building of, for example, in the villages, and this is an amazing work that they did of, like giving tools to the young boys instead of throwing stones, to give them a camera and to start to, ah, monitoring and recording human rights violations in the field, because they are the only ones who have access to the repression that they, that happens every Friday, so they work a lot on internal trainings, conferences, eight Bil’in conferences […] In Nabi Saleh, in al-Masara, I think in Kufr Quddoum also, in al-Walaja, in Bil’in. And it was cameras, laptops-- it was like, to make that each village has its own media centre, to give them the voice

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71 I did not independently verify most of the claims that follow, though I saw evidence of a number of them at work, and most were corroborated by more than one interview participant, some by other media sources; nor is the information quantified (I have not pinned down precise numbers, times, and places).

72 ECS interview (2014).
and the tools to cover themselves, what is happening in the village [...]
Also, in the media thing, this year we did ah, information training about
“communication 2.0,” and how like the people of the committees can use
better the 2.0 tools that are like Twitter, Facebook, Bambooz (?) like all
the social networks.73

According to an organizer from Nabi Saleh, “[w]e give them (the local community)
courses in photography, especially for the children, in order to take pictures for the
violations by the soldiers, during the demonstrations, because when you give cameras to
the children, everywhere in the village, they can take pictures and they can document
everything that the soldiers do.”74 In the same context, the same activist points to English
courses arranged by the committee as a related boost to the community’s capacity to
reach the outside world.75 Examples of communications constructive work in this context
has been documented in news media and NGO reports, from Vice News to Middle East
Research and Information Project.76 Because the materiality of this work is largely
technical and technological, foreign individuals and groups can readily play a supportive
role, simply by supplying Palestinians with digital cameras and laptop computers. Human
rights groups from Israel and Europe have been doing so for more than ten years.77 Media
empowerment is a kind of weapon against the Israeli occupation (the Israeli press has
quoted a soldier saying “cameras are our kryptonite”78), but this work also builds social

73 MXS interview (2014).
74 JVOa interview (2014).
75 “I already announced for two courses right now, for two courses in English, level 1 and level 2,
for the people who want to learn English, because, as you know, most of the children, they finished high
school without knowing [...] And this will encourage them, because they already met many internationals
who speak English, and they have the motive right now to learn English, so we will hold these courses in
the meantime in order to help them understand the others, to make it easy for them to contact with others,
to share them their ideas, to spread our ideas,” JVOa interview (2014).
76 For example, S. Khalel and M. Vickery, “Small-Town Palestinians Are Fighting the Israeli
Occupation With Their Cameras,” Vice News (June 23, 2014); R. Stein, “Viral Occupation Cameras and
Networked Human Rights in the West Bank,” Middle East Research and Information Project (Mar. 20,
2013). Rightwing Zionist organizations have also documented the phenomenon, describing “the
collaboration between Al-Quds Open University in Ramallah and the popular committee of Bila’in: at the
end of January 2013 a course was given to 60 young popular committee activists at the university in the use
of cameras. Its objective was to improve their ability to document popular resistance events to se
rve the media and lawfare campaigns being waged against Israel,” MAITIC (2013), pp. 34-35.
77 For example, see B’Tselem, “Video Channel: Camera distribution project” (n.d.). Operation
Dove is an example of an Italian organization providing cameras. The Spanish group Novact is another.
78 Full quote: “[a] commander or an officer sees a camera and becomes a diplomat, calculating
every rubber bullet, every step. It's intolerable, we're left utterly exposed. The cameras are our kryptonite,”
capacities, as Palestinians use the same technologies to communicate with each other, and to document, celebrate, and broadcast their culture. The importance of media constructive work has been widely recognized, and it continues to be a key focus of the popular committees.

Before coming to land-related undertakings, I want to lump together all other forms of constructive work documented in my interviews, which refer to a diverse array of mundane (yet vital) acts of day-to-day living. A common response to my question concerned prisoner relief, especially when Popular Struggle activists have been arrested, covering legal fees and supporting the family. For example, one of Bil’in’s committee organizers told me,

[W]hen you are on the ground, you try to support by many ways. For example, the people who’s been arrested, and most of them are children, you have to support them by standing with them, by explaining to them, by bringing doctors to see them, to help the families of somebody who’s been arrested and he’s the main guy in the family, you have to support his family also. We were visiting them, if we have any support we can give these families, if there are people who were in jail, the father or...

A Ramallah youth activist corroborates, adding a dose of personal experience:

They’re very active in terms of prisoner families, they keep close ties with, you know, the prisoner families that they know. Especially since a lot of people in the popular committee have been prisoners themselves. So, they really know what it is. In terms of, you know for instance, people that get arrested, they try and cover their bail money, and you know, or expenses. Especially people that were arrested or taken during actions by these committees. So they show you that ‘Okay, you take part but you are not alone if anything happens, you know. We got your back.’ [...] When I was arrested, for instance, you know, I was arrested at an action done by the PSCC, and you know, they don’t leave you. They cover your bail, they cover your lawyers, they keep calling you and making sure you’re okay and there’s nothing to worry about if there is anything you need and all that.

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79 JDC interview (2014). Similarly, from Nabi Saleh, “we felt responsible for each one, who was arrested. We have to find the source to pay the fine for them. We support them [...] We pay for them, for the things that they need for hospitality, you know, when somebody came out from the prison and people go to say hello for him. So he need some money for the hospitality for the people. Sometimes we bought these things for them. You know, according to our abilities. We have to help people as much as we can,” JVOa interview (2014).

80 NDSa interview (2014).
I also heard from at least one activist in Bil’in that the committee has made efforts to help members of the community find alternate employment so that they could leave their jobs on Israeli settlements.\textsuperscript{81} Medical related projects came up in several interviews; for example, “you can see the ambulance of Bil’in, it’s from the popular committees, from the committee;”\textsuperscript{82} and “I know the people who got injured, they helped them for, \textit{ya’ni}, the medicine and stuff like that.”\textsuperscript{83} Some participants spoke of bringing trauma psychologists to the village to engage with the children, who endure perpetual conflict-like conditions:

> It’s very difficult without money to do anything, but we try, like with the children. I have friends in the torture victim center in Ramallah and YMCA, so I talked with them to come and give children psychologists, to give children lectures and work with the children because they were traumatized. Of course this is for free. Everything we are doing, we are doing for free.\textsuperscript{84}

Educational support was another common response; for instance, “we have a meeting with the universities to have a work, scholarship for our students, more than 50 students studying in Il Quds Open University and all of these students, they study freely without paying any fees.”\textsuperscript{85} The same activist talks about working closely with the village municipal council and lobbying for funds from prominent politicians:

> We coordinate between each other for the projects for the village. We have before, we built the school, all of the roads, all of these project, they came by the popular committee, because after the decision, from the supreme court in 2007, the Prime Minister Salam Fayyad visited us to support us, after the decision, and we asked him, “We are a poor village, we need the support from the government for school for the girls, for the roads, for the lines of the water, for many things. For these lights” (pointing out the window). Before this, our roads were not lit. And we succeed to achieve this project after that and we are responsible.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{81} “We tried to find jobs for some youngs who stop working in the settlements, for example, and yes all these things, we were thinking of everything,” COC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{82} BCC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{83} LOC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{84} NVO interview (2014); also, “[w]e have helping the children, for example, in the village to bring doctors, psychological things. You know, we are with the people,” JDC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{85} BCC interview (2014); also, “and teaching the students and help them in their schools,” LOC interview (2014); “they try, for example, to get funding for schools,” BJS interview (2014); “in the Jordan Valley as I said we’re building mud houses out of mud bricks and one of them was a school,” ECS interview (2014); “we built the school,” BCC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{86} BCC interview (2014).
Festivals and cultural events can also be a kind of constructive work, bringing together the community and strengthening group identity while defiantly celebrating in the face of the occupation; according to a Ramallah youth activist,

Nabi Saleh, for instance, holds festivals all the time. For the kids, you know. They make sure in the village that they have committees that could, committees, you know, um, they hold festivals for kids like Freedoms and Colors [...] It was basically, for the kids of Nabi Saleh, like, we brought clowns and had a fun day for the kids. Then after a while, we drew on that same idea and had a demonstration named Freedom and Colors and it kind of drew on the same theme. It brings the people a little relief and at the same time it goes back to fighting colonialism.  

Finally, land works have also been a part of the movement from the beginning. Most of the examples raised in my interviews concern repairs and replantings around the villages where the organizers reside, responding to damage and losses imposed by the occupation and the struggle against it. This often means trees, land, fences, windows, and homes damaged in connection with the weekly demonstrations, by the thousands of smoldering teargas canisters, the indifferent paths of military vehicles, and stray and sometimes not-so-stray bullets, skunk cannons, etc. For example, in Bil’in, an activist says, “what you see now, it’s-- we fixed, we fix from tractors, from people, some small walls [...] before, everything (was) black.” Another adds, “all of this work in the land, there if you see the project, this, the park, and the roads […] we work on to clean the roads, or to help.” The activists are referring to the plot of land that had been lost behind the wall for five years, between 2005 and 2011; once recovered, it was cleaned and ploughed, the roads and paths repaired, and a playground installed for the village children. This is mostly restorative or palliative constructive work.

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87 NDSa interview (2014); also, “we have many, many invitations for the people for the children, to make like a show for the children, small theatres, we working hard for this,” BCC interview (2014).
88 IMC interview (2014).
89 BCC interview (2014).
90 Additionally, “to fix the land for the farmers that’s been destroyed by the Israeli bulldozers. The freed land, I mean, that we have it now. We built the gardens (playground) for the children to play. And also this comes from the committee in the village that tries to support the farmers, tries to support the people in the village to be less difficult for their lives,” JDC interview (2014); see also Darweish and Rigby (2015), pp. 92-93.
A related issue is that farmers lack support to develop land on the edges of communities and fields, especially areas bordering Israeli settlements or zones of protest and clashes. As Marwan Darweish and Andrew Rigby point out, Israeli law allows for expropriation of untended Palestinian land after a small number of years, so working the fields becomes an imperative and intensely political. An organizer from Nabi Saleh explains,

We just thought about how to re-use the land, to make the people get back to use their own lands, and we already took to the Agricultural Minister, to support us by the trees and fences for these lands [...] In order to force the people to use their lands. You know, because most of the lands at Area C. Which means that there is a big risk for planting these lands, because most of the time, the gas canisters burn the lands, because it makes fire at the beginning. So any farmer from the village who wants to plant the land, he will think about the risk, if it get burned, what will happen? So, we just want to make sure that this will happen in the near future.

Occupation authorities forbid Palestinians to develop land or infrastructure in Area C, outside of a restrictive permit system, so works and projects are routinely demolished, further raising the risks of such investments by the Palestinians on the ground. The popular committees are trying to offer incentives and insurance to mitigate those risks, to maintain Palestinian hold of the land and “to stop the settlers from expanding.”

The olive tree is a particularly resonant indigenous symbol, and the annual olive harvest has often become a rallying season for the popular resistance, with many communities joined by Palestinian, Israeli, and international volunteers to collect olives from the land; “the working on the fields, and planting the olives or the trees there, and sometimes with the harvest, we have many, many volunteers who work with the farmers

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92 JVOa interview (2014).
93 As a Nabi Saleh organizer said, “to plant our land in that area, and to stop the settlers from expanding,” CVOb interview (2014); similarly, from Bil’in an activist add, “yes, we were, this was one of our tactics, to encourage the people, to stay on their land. So we looked for how to give some seeds, some plants, some, to plant it in the, ya’ni, we plant it in their lands, to encourage them to be there, to go there,” COC interview (2014); and another, “the popular committee tried to help people in many ways. Yes. Like, help them ya’ni, planting the land, and help them to get some trees and stuff to ya’ni how to say, in the farming ways. And also we organized this Friends of Freedom and Justice (organization) for the same reason, to help people in Bil’in especially the farmers,” LOC interview (2014).
there.” Some interview participants highlighted efforts in the more remote reaches of the West Bank. In the Jordan Valley, home- and school-building projects, along with renewable energy programs, have been a top priority of local committees since 2007. For example,

one of the interesting examples of the Jordan Valley Solidarity group was working on building mud-brick houses. They would use the muds on the land, and mix it with hay, and basically build houses. And that way, it’s at the same time environmentally friendly, but also it’s a form of resisting against occupation and maintaining the existence of people on the lands.

In the South Hebron Hills, popular committees have held numerous tree-planting demonstrations in “closed military zones” or lands threatened by encroaching settlements. An innovative application of the constructive program was devised and launched by activists with the PSCC in the reclaiming and attempted restoration of the lost village of Ein Hijleh in the Jordan Valley in early 2014; it was protest camp, but it was also a genuine effort to enrich the social lives of Palestinians living in the West Bank, to bolster communal support by establishing a place of refuge, a retreat, a place for festivals, films, and picnics (Section 5.2.3.1).

Broadly speaking, Popular Struggle constructive work has been modest and even neglected. Critics have pointed this out. According to the Palestinian activist and journalist Linah Alsaafin:

The struggle must be brought back to the Palestinians themselves, and one sure way to mobilize is not through protests or speeches, but through social community work (which incidentally is what made Hamas so popular from its establishment, especially in the refugee camps) [...] Get to know the people on the street. Ask them what they need, what they are suffering from. It could be a broken roof or not having enough money to pay their daughter’s university tuition. Trust begins to be built up in

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94 BCC interview (2014); “As with most forms of popular resistance in Palestine, international and Israeli solidarity activists have also played an important supporting role in relation to different forms of constructive direct action relating to land use, particularly through volunteering to assist in planting olive trees and helping with the olive harvest,” p. 91.


different communities, and with that awareness and the spark to rekindle a true resistance movement on the ground.\footnote{Alsaafin (2012).}

Alsaafin has already harshly charged the movement with being undemocratic, exclusionary, and unpopular (previous section); here she offers a remedy. It is simply community work, unglamorous, unsensational.

One of my interview participants conveys this perception from the perspective of Nabi Saleh. A known local critic of the movement (quoted in the previous section about exclusions from meetings) wants the committees to worry less about Friday demonstrations and more about local needs, extending his critique to the official Palestinian leadership as well:

The Palestinian should look for the farmers. You having a Ministry of Agriculture, what you are doing? Nothing! You are giving for a workshop for the NGOs about agriculture? No, this is not the work of this. You having a huge numbers of ah, tractors, and machines. Bring them, and cultivate the area. Kay? You need a petrol? Say to the farmer, “We will bring that machines and you put a petrol in it” […] Give them the seeds. The seeds. Bring the seeds. And give it to the farmers. This is popular struggle, also […] The farmers is the centre for any future movement.\footnote{JVOb interview (2014).}

He is calling on the Palestinian Authority to wield its weight to develop the land and support the farmers. Of course the PA will not, because the lands are in Area C, beyond the PA’s chartered and limited territorial jurisdiction.

The same critic from Nabi Saleh also takes issue with the particular role of international and Israeli activists, as determined by the popular committees. He sees the presence of foreign volunteers in the village as a squandered opportunity; rather than directing their time and energy toward symbolic popular protest (adding boots to the Friday demonstrations), they could be supporting the real work of popular struggle—community building:

The foreigner who is coming to Nabi Saleh, they are misled. How to lead them for the right one? […] I believe that the foreigners, they having with a good deeds in their heart, they coming to help the Palestinians. They don’t know all of these corruption details. But if you said to them, “Yes, I am having, ah, my field, I want the foreigners to help me with
harvesting that field.” Yes! They believe, they want to work like this one [...] This is the right popular resistance should do. And I spoke with activists. I said to them, I believe that you are having good deeds, a good things in your heart, you are coming like this one, you feel responsible about what is going in the world, because you are a human [...] they are coming here, they want to touch something, (to know) how they can help the Palestinian. Misled. [...] Who mislead them? First, PA misleading them. Second. International Solidarity Movement, misleading them. Third, each popular resistance in each village.99

This reflects a sentiment in some villages that resources and international partners are being misdirected in ways that benefit particular groups rather than the community as a whole. In my estimation, the value of constructive work has simply been overlooked. To be clear, of course the committees and international activists have been undertaking this kind of community-building work, as the preceding paragraphs indicate. The point here is about degree, and also about priority. There is certainly room for greater community outreach; for example, each visiting attendee of weekly demonstrations could be asked to spend time helping a local family. More such efforts could help restore and bolster the local foundations of the Popular Struggle.

Some of my interview participants seemed almost at a loss when I pursued questions about contemporary community-based social work (as indicated in the chapter’s second epigraph above). In the following illuminating passage, one of Bil’in’s lead activists distinguishes the higher priority of direct resistance against the occupation from the lower priority of “the economy”:

Yes, in Bil’in, the goal of the popular committee is to resist the occupation. This is the goal. But, in other side, if we have the economy to support the people, we did that. For example, we supported the farmers to plant seeds or olive trees. We support some farmers to have the bees to make honey because they lost their jobs. We have helping the children, for example, in the village to bring doctors, psychological things. You know, we are with the people. And we-- It’s the same community. You know? And we are on the ground. If the people trust, you, you have to help them, if you can do that. But the main goal for the popular committee is to fight the occupation.100

99 JVOb interview (2014).
100 JDC interview (2014).
Here, the theory of the Popular Struggle deviates from the ideas of Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp discussed in Chapter 2, each of whom arrived at the conclusion that local community work is *more* important than direct resistance activity. The Popular Struggle has reversed those priorities.

Yet, as highlighted above and in Chapter 2, these constructive organizational ideas have never proliferated to the extent that the same authors’ ideas on direct resistance have proliferated. Additionally, historical conditions have conspired to complicate the possibilities of Palestinian constructive work. An activist from Nabi Saleh explains, describing his experience from the First Intifada as socially immersive, then adding:

But now the situation is more different from the past. The condition is different. We have the Authority. The Palestinian security. We have also the Palestinian leaders or the Palestinian party leaders are on the ground here. Yeah. You can’t build, and they will not allow you to build an organization in front of their eyes, their hand, because they feel that they will lose their authority. For that, it’s not easy... We think that we *must* do that, it’s not away from our thought, because it’s the very important issue for, but, because of that, we try to convince Fateh, for example, or PFLP, or … to make their organization have the project of the popular struggle. To do it by their members and their organization and all the components of the organization. What make the First Intifada succeed is not just because of the people go out. They go out. But because there are organization that make the machine which make everything.

The activist reasonably blames exogenous factors like the Palestinian Authority civil administration for the infeasibility of taking on more local social responsibilities. In other words, the social need is partially recognized and partially attended, but not as much as it could or should be, because of the larger structural conditions. However, this explanation only goes part way. There are avenues available, as the Nabi Saleh critic has suggested above; the PA, for instance, has little or no bearing on the popular committees’ capacity to divert the ready-and-willing hands and feet of activists and volunteers on community-service missions across the countryside, to serve and rally the people, and to diminish doubts about the organizers’ motives.

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101 CVOa interview (2014).
6.5 The Curse of Money and Other Obstacles

The adverse effects of structural economic conditions on Palestinian popular resistance have been raised above and in preceding chapters. The pacifying tendencies that came with developmentalist aid in the 1990s following the signing of the Oslo Accord in 1993 were discussed in 3.3 as part of the denouement of the First Intifada. More than a decade later, as 5.1.1 showed, the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC) registered as an official NGO and found itself partially discredited in the public eye and tamed by the strings held by the external financiers, including the Palestinian Authority (PA) itself. In my fieldwork, I was surprised how often I encountered complaints of money’s bitter trace.

According to some locals I spoke with, the injection of $5,000 or $10,000 into a village was sometimes enough to create instant community fissures. For example, a resident of Nabi Saleh and a critic of the popular committee claims to identify the moment when things went wrong: a $5,000 contribution from the PA during the first half of 2010. The money was said to be for the community to cover costs of damages incurred during the weekly protests. However, according to this interview participant, the money only went to a few sets of hands, while other residents with home damage were not told about or included in the remunerations; and “the corruption started there.”

Similarly, an activist from Budrus recounts an example from Bil’in’s larger neighbor Ni’lin, explaining that the town’s popular resistance buckled the same day that Prime Minister Fayyad showed up with $11,000 for the local committee; “in that day, that day, the people started complain to me. I heard many from them that ‘they paid with this one and not paid to me’.”

A youth activist from Bil’in acknowledges and characterizes such concerns in sympathetic terms:

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102 “They say send 5000 dollar. Okay. If you are having money like this you should it distribute it equally [...] But what happened? They give it for four person. No one (knew) where is the big money went. ‘Hey, why your house been rebuilded and recultiva-- um, repairing the windows, and we are not?’ He say, he don’t know. But later on, one of the Fatah group, he say, ‘We donate to Nabi Saleh, $5000.’ ‘What? You donate 5000 dollar? Where is that for?’ ‘We gave it to the people over there.’ So... the corruption started there,” JVOb interview (2014).

103 BOC2 interview (2014), in full: “it’s a very big issue, and, but, I can tell you what the general scene, how the people consider the Palestinian or the popular resistance, when the money started. And it’s in general, but in the specific places, I can tell you exactly what happened in Ni’lin. When Ni’lin in the beginning, it’s follow, Budrus example. So Salam Fayyad jumped to Ni’lin in one day and he a meeting,
It’s like this. “Why this person, he get paid for struggling, and I am not getting paid?” It’s like you know, something like, “Oh, why I will follow this person, he’s just, his work, he’s not fighting for me? He’s fighting for his work, just because he’s working, and why I will go there and die just because this person, he go there and he get paid?” You understand what I mean?\textsuperscript{104}

In part, this is a problem of distribution and management, of efficiency, equity and transparency.

However, according to some, the problem is much more basic: the money itself. A prominent West Bank politician and supporter of the Popular Struggle thinks the movement should shut down its external revenue sources. He offers three reasons: the processes can never be adequately transparent to stave off suspicion; the money provides mechanisms of control for the financing party; and popular resistance requires very little capital anyway:

I think money always played a demobilizing role. Always. I’ll tell you why [...] It’s a dividing instrument. It immediately creates suspicion [...] and creates division and it creates competition, and since it’s not fully transparent it can create possibility of corruption of course. But mainly because I think, I think ah, ... To do a grassroots work, you don’t need much money. And that’s where you know grassroots-- I mean, what do you need to, for, I mean, transportation, basically, that’s it [...] I think grassroots movements have to be extremely careful especially when it comes to the official structures, because the official structures will always like to control. And of course the best way of controlling is through, is through money. And we’ve seen the effect of that.\textsuperscript{105}

An activist and critic from Budrus raises similar concerns. For popular resistance, he says, “you don’t need 50,000 shekels per month.”\textsuperscript{106} He also interprets the Bab al-Shams protest camp of January 2013—which is widely cited by other activists as a highpoint of their movement—as an example of resistance corrupted by money, referring to the expensive industrial tents procured for the operation (as noted in 5.2.3, Figure 5.4), as

\textsuperscript{104} ICC interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{105} NDSb interview (2014).
\textsuperscript{106} BOC2 interview (2014).
opposed to relying on provisions from the participants’ own communities.\(^\text{107}\) One of Bil’in’s leading activists, who was quoted in opposition to the decision to register the PSCC as an NGO in 5.1.1, lends support to the skeptic’s view of external funding:

> I think it’s better for us if we want to succeed, to pay the money from our pockets, to our organization, to be free in our decisions. To choose what want, we don’t need the European money, we don’t want the money of the PA […] We need flags, we can do it in our homes. If we need training, we can do the training. Many organizations, they can give you training without money. But if you want to be NGO, like, you can, you can, and you can support, but not to be the leader of the nonviolent resistance.\(^\text{108}\)

To what extent the role of external financing can be managed remains an open question, but it has clearly been identified as a source of disunity and distrust.\(^\text{109}\)

### 6.6 Conclusion: Participatory but Precariously

Building on a set of theoretical ideas concerning organization in civil-resistance literature, and pursuant to a call by Mary King for more research into internal dynamics of civil resistance (Chapter 2), this chapter has examined some of the participatory aspects and shortcomings of the Popular Struggle movement. Overall its structures and decision-making processes have been mostly open, grassroots, inclusive, and directly democratic. However, there are some weaknesses and limitations in these regards. While the primary factors working against the Popular Struggle are the occupation and repression, made possible by widespread support from Western states over many years,

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\(^{107}\)“The money is very big, ya ’ni… they want to threaten us from the popular movement, when they put in your mind that in one night you have to spend half million shekels because there are fifty tents, can confiscate. But who told that these tents is necessary? Maybe, this movement, this night, which is cost for you half thousand shekels-- half million shekels, maybe it will not cost more than ten, or one thousand shekels, if you can find people willing to do voluntarily to do that, feel that they are struggling, when they are sleeping there,” BOC2 interview (2014). While the sentiment is compelling, the criticism may go too far. Bab al-Shams participants thought they were going to the Jordan Valley for an afternoon conference, not Jerusalem’s doorstep for an open-ended protest camp—publicly soliciting tents or canvases from the people may have complicated or compromised the secrecy of the action.

\(^{108}\) BCC interview (2014).

\(^{109}\) Similarly, Darweish and Rigby (2015): “[t]he perception that popular resistance activists were driven more by their own selfish interests rather than concern for the well-being out of the wider community was widespread. People explained to us how—in their view—local activist leaders were treating the movement as their own NGO, their own ‘shop’,” p. 107. This also reflects a comment added to one of my Bil’in surveys: “the popular committees mostly only work for money,” Appendix 2.b (also cited above at the end of Section 6.3).
my research identifies three particular areas of concern internal to the movement: i) the committees are perceived to have excluded some segments of the community; ii) more constructive social work, especially agricultural, would bolster the committees’ local credibility; and iii) the dependency on external funding raises significant costs in terms of trust at home. Each of these contribute to the reduction of domestic popular support, not only across the West Bank but in the home communities of the popular committees. The second of these three findings is the most important, because few issues in Palestine rival the land issue, and addressing it has the potential to simultaneously mitigate the other two concerns—those who work the land would feel less excluded the more their needs were attended, and the community’s concerns about resource management would decline if more resources went to bolstering local land works.

Compiling and surveying limitations and obstacles to participatory organizing risks over-casting the severity of the challenges. There is no shortage of differing and opposing views, but this does not mean that society or even the movement is on the brink of collapse or dissolution (though it may be). As one of Bil’in’s organizers says with a nonchalant shrug, “I see the struggle, it’s going more and more weak. It’s not like before. But the idea is still.” Even the most vocal critics I encountered also spoke fondly of the individuals whose methods they condemned. Most participants also casually dismissed confidentiality concerns, insisting they had nothing to hide and that their views were publicly known. In other words, underlying the disagreements, sectarianism, and organizational disarray seems to be a bedrock of community and Palestinian identity that sustains the conditions of possibility for genuinely popular participation, whether in this movement or the next.

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110 IMC interview (2014).
Conclusion: Unarmed and Participatory

[Official Palestinian leadership] are also afraid of the growth of grassroots movement, that it becomes a power by itself, because this changes the balance internally. The grassroots leaders become more stronger. And that’s what happened, always, in the First Intifada, Second Intifada, each time there was a popular action. The leadership would try to take control. And in the Second Intifada, their way of taking over was by militarizing the Intifada. Which was a deadly mistake.

— Palestinian politician, activist, Ramallah, West Bank, 2014

Our vision is to build a Third Intifada, a popular Intifada, like the First Intifada, in which every person of every age has the opportunity to participate, to do his or her duty [...] but it must be global because it’s the duty and responsibility of everyone in the world who believes in justice and freedom and human rights.

— Palestinian activist, Nabi Saleh, West Bank, 2013

Resolving the Puzzle

The dissertation began with a puzzle. If only force can reclaim what was taken by force, or, more specifically, if only armed struggle can liberate Palestine, then how is it that in the history of Palestinian struggle against the occupation, unarmed struggle has achieved more than armed struggle, in terms of advancing goals and generating pressure against Israel? In evidence, Chapter 3 shows that, more than at any time before or since, the First Intifada—an unarmed uprising—led many Palestinians and other observers and analysts to predict the end of the occupation. More recently, West Bank villages of Budrus and Bil’in took back without resort to force most of the land they had lost to military confiscation, as Chapter 4 shows. Chapter 5 details some of the most prominent resistance activity in the West Bank over the last ten years, a series of unarmed direct-

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2 As quoted in the Introduction: “what was taken by force can only be restored by force,” attributed to Gamal Abdel Nasser, and “[a]rmed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine,” Palestine Liberation Organization, “Palestinian National Charter: Resolutions of the Palestine National Council” (July 1968), article 9.
action campaigns that has drawn international attention to the concrete barrier around Jerusalem, disrupted settler motorways and supermarkets, frustrated settlement expansion with protest camps, and fostered networks of global solidarity. Though largely outside this study (for my focus on community-based struggle in the territories), international boycott movements, such as the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, could also be cited here, for having nonviolently generated enough economic and cultural pressure that Israeli government officials have dubbed it a strategic threat. The defeat of South African apartheid is an important precedent of the coercive power in well-coordinated nonviolent international measures. Limited though these achievements have been for Palestinians, they stand out against a long record of few achievements and many setbacks, especially setbacks of armed struggle, as evidenced in the 1990s and early 2000s and discussed in the latter part Chapter 3 (and the impact of the armed struggle during earlier periods is also addressed in that chapter and in the background section of the Introduction).

The notion that force of arms is the necessary or only redress against militarized injustice is myopic and ahistorical. As Chapter 1 shows, the research field of civil resistance explains how movements can effectively challenge undemocratic and oppressive regimes, using nonviolent methods such as demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, mass sit-ins, alternative institution building, and many others. Textbook case studies include the Philippines ‘people power’ movement of 1986, the anti-Soviet uprisings across Eastern Europe in 1989, the independence struggle of East Timor against Indonesian occupation in the 1990s, the colour revolutions of the 2000s (Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Lebanon), the nonviolent ousters of presidents-for-life in Tunisia and Egypt

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3 See, for example, A. Schechter, “If BDS Isn’t a Real Threat, Why Does Netanyahu Make It Out to Be Such a Big Deal?” Haaretz (June 2, 2015); M. Schaeffer Omer-Man, “Israel’s President Calls BDS a ‘Strategic Threat’,” +972 Mag (May 28, 2015); T. Keinan, “BDS is an Existential Threat,” YNet News (Mar. 26, 2016).

in 2011, among others.\textsuperscript{5} The logic of civil resistance relies on the strategic application of unarmed methods to deplete or appropriate the social sources of an oppressive regime’s power.\textsuperscript{6} According to this approach, the adoption of violent and armed resistance methods typically, though not always, counteracts the social sources of power that a resistance movement depends on, via processes of political jiu-jitsu and backfire.\textsuperscript{7} Strategic nonviolent action is not posited as an infallible technique, because it often falters and fails, sometimes due to strategic blunders, sometimes due to intervention of external factors, as surely as militarized movements can also falter and fail. However, according to the research literature, unarmed struggles have historically been more effective than armed struggles, in terms of achieving their aims, including against oppressive regimes, foreign and domestic.\textsuperscript{8} Thus, force can be countered without force, or more accurately, with a different kind of force. Civil resistance is a kind of force, not an armed force, but, according to the research field, “a force more powerful,” in the phrase of Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall.\textsuperscript{9}

In the Palestinian context, however, the utility of civil-resistance theory has been distorted due to a misplaced analytic criterion of specifically nonviolent action, understood absolutely: according to theories of nonviolence and civil resistance, including pragmatic and strategic approaches associated with Gene Sharp, only completely nonviolent methods can function as civil resistance (the theory allows for instances of violence, but these are treated as exceptions, distinct from civil resistance, always a threat to the dynamics of civil resistance). In the case of the Palestinian First Intifada, the movement’s limited success (despite being the most successful Palestinian movement against the occupation in fifty years) is often linked to the ‘limited’

nonviolence of the movement. Common practices of stone throwing are alleged to have undermined the Palestinian cause, even though the Intifada arguably depended on the stone throwing to galvanize and engage the despondent youth, and to project disruptive images of a Jewish Goliath oppressing the Palestinian David onto newspapers and television screens around the world. Adopting a move of theorist Robin Celikates from another context, I extend the definition of civil resistance to permit some acts of violence, context dependent: if the violence is non-militarized, relatively miniscule, and overall affects the social sources of power more positively than negatively, then it can and has functioned dynamically as civil resistance. In this sense, the conventional pragmatists have misread the Palestinian case. The Intifada failed to defeat the occupation, not because many in the population threw stones, but, more plausibly, because the forces arrayed against it proved insurmountable, under the circumstances (Palestinians, a relatively small population, were not just taking on the most powerful country in the region; they were indirectly taking on the U.S. as well, through its extensive support of Israel).

Action is only one axis of Palestinian popular resistance that challenges some of civil-resistance theory’s key conceptual delineations. According to my research, participatory forms of organization have been at least as significant a factor in Palestinian struggle. This kind of organization is marked by directly democratic and community-based forms of governance: grassroots, open, voluntary, inclusive, and bottom up, not in absolute or binary either/or terms but as ideals embodied and enacted to imperfect and mixed extents. As Chapters 2 and 3 show, participatory organization allows not only for horizontal networking of units based on communities but also for upward delegation

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11 Or perhaps the resisting population could have been more united; there was broad-based but not total unity of vision. Or perhaps the alternative institutions and noncooperation programs could have been more extensive; they were advanced, but never reached saturation. Or perhaps the Intifada could have been purely nonviolent, not even hurling stones, with some other photogenic, provocative tactic for rousing community fervour and sustaining international headlines. However, such counterfactuals are divorced from conditions on the ground at the time. As it happened, the reality was a powerful and coherent case of unarmed struggle, and in important ways, the theorists missed it, caught up in a misplaced discourse of idealized nonviolence.
through tiered leadership bodies or steering committees (dependent on contingent functions, ad hoc rather than permanent fixtures, and subject to the active consent of implicated communities). Widely devolved leadership structures also have the advantage of being difficult to decapitate or eliminate in a single repressive blow (this advantage is common to armed and unarmed movements). According to the case chapters, Palestinian struggle against the occupation has been more effective when both unarmed and participatory, and that it has weakened with deviation from either or both of these qualities of action and organization. Without accounting for variation in organization, or without recognizing that participatory modes have bolstered struggle, Palestinian civil resistance has been insufficiently understood.

Thus, in the Palestinian case, conventional civil-resistance theory offers only a partial rebuttal of Nasser’s maxim about force and “only force.” Civil resistance, understood as both unarmed (though not necessarily perfectly nonviolent) and participatory (though not necessarily perfectly horizontal), provides a fuller explanation of the outcomes of Palestinian struggle against the Israeli occupation.

**Implications:**

This final section considers some of the implications of my findings, first in terms of Palestinian struggle, then in terms of theory, then in terms of global ethics.

(a) For Palestinian Struggle

My research may have implications for both the action and organization of Palestinian popular resistance. First, castigating Palestinians for throwing stones at occupation forces is as dubious pragmatically as it is ethically, and those who do so risk discrediting themselves in the eyes of the public. A more realistic response for analysts and supporters of civil resistance might be to reject impulses to apologize for, or downplay, the practice of stone throwing. It is a legitimate and functional component of Palestinian civil resistance (though not without practical limits or a proper place, understood in context). Also, despite common presuppositions to the contrary, shared not only by Palestinians but in political discourse more universally, unarmed methods can be more effective than armed methods, even in oppressive and conflict-prone situations, partly because violence can corrode social sources of power. Thus, the pragmatic
decision to eschew arms in the popular struggle is backed by the findings of the civil-resistance literature. However, in order for unarmed struggles to have a significant impact against an oppressive regime, they require significant levels of participation; this insight applies to the contemporary Palestinian Popular Struggle, which requires increased participation rates, both at home and abroad (more on the global dimension below).

Organizationally, my analysis suggests that Palestinian popular movements are undermined by incorporating centralized command hierarchies. In at least one way, the organizational risk resembles that posed by taking up arms, namely constricting the reservoir of potential active supporters. With centralization at large scale, the range of participation in leadership formulation narrows, alienating communities from the centre of the structure. Participatory forms invite local initiatives, integrating people, groups, and communities as leaders and partners in the movement rather than as followers. In the words of one youth activist, “in Palestinian society, basically everyone likes to consider themselves a leader, you know? We don’t have followers.”12 Another, older activist puts it more sensitively:

I know that in Palestine, we couldn’t find followers. If we want everybody to be involved, or if we want to involve everybody, we must allow them to feel that they are partners, not followers. The partners means that to feel that he is your partner in making decision level. And at a tactic level. And the demonstration or in activity itself level. So, forbidden, we know that this is a special thing in Palestine. We must care for it.13

Participatory models allow people to engage freely in ways meaningful to their time and place, as partners and leaders, not as foot soldiers. Yet, as the First Intifada showed, consistent with the organizational ideas of Hannah Arendt, grassroots radical democracy can also ‘centralize’ on contingent bases, delegating authority upward (not downward) into tiered and functionally narrowed committees, not as a permanent fixtures, but limited, task-specific bodies, grounded in and dependent on the continued and active support of invested communities. A large movement requires horizontal and vertical structure (vertical in the sense of decision making and coordination capacity at scale). Since the First Intifada, however, this kind of participatory organizational depth has been

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12 NDSa interview (2014), quoted in previous chapter at greater length.
13 BOC interview (2014).
lacking. Instead, the centralized institutions of the Palestinian Authority (PA) have mainly pursued diplomatic action, while otherwise working strenuously to satisfy U.S. and Israeli security expectations (except during the Second Intifada, when elements of the official secular leadership took up supportive or ambiguous roles in the militarized struggle).

Since 2009, the PA has institutionally endorsed the movement of committees associated with the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC). That support has proven two-faced and arguably overall counterproductive. Money, policy statements, and officialdom from the echelons of Fateh and the PA do not appear to have aided the popular committees in their struggle. In many cases, salary and other funding have fractured local community trust, sometimes upon contact (previous chapter). According to a prominent supporter of the anti-occupation popular struggle, no money is good money. More antagonistically, as Chapter 5 elaborates, the PA has also played the role of repressor when the popular committees have sought to expand from the negligible countryside into the more lucrative population bases of the cities, where the PA’s limited writ applies. These outcomes are consistent with those of the mid 1990s, when the new PA dismantled the extensive system of committees that had been the backbone of the First Intifada (Chapter 3, Section 4). Palestinian popular movements have been repeatedly let down and betrayed by the very centralized and state-aspirant structures they put their trust in.

Most activists I spoke with articulated dissatisfaction or hostility toward the PA, and many expressed a desire to see it collapse. Some also expressed an alternative vision for the arrangement between the committees and the PA: the PA should be retained but detached completely from the politics and strategies of resistance, reduced solely to the provision of logistical and social services to the people, while grassroots organizations should steer the struggle through unified coalitions, similar to those of the First Intifada.  

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14 Ch. 6, quoting, among others, “money always played a demobilizing role [...] dividing instrument [...] creates suspicion [...] creates division,” NDSb interview (2014).

15 “I think, if the PA wants to support the nonviolent resistance or the popular resistance, this is their duty. It’s not, ya’ni, I think they must about some of the action, we need their support. We need. Especially for the bills, for the fields, for the prisoners, and for the lawyers. [...] I think some of the action need sometimes transportation, sometimes we need flags, sometimes we need... I think the duty of the PA to pay for this. But not to be, to force us to follow their orders or their needs or their decisions. This popular
Such an arrangement might manifest the positive organizational dynamic Michael Bröning optimistically anticipated in the ostensible alignment of the official leadership and the popular committees (when Fateh and the PA revised their platforms to “support” the popular committees in 2009). While Bröning’s conceptualization is intellectually attractive for its balanced or middle-ground approach, it nevertheless seems disconnected from reality and the historical record: the PA has consistently sought to monopolize Palestinian leadership, while, for the most part, conserving the status quo. The implication is that the committees have little basis for trusting the PA as a partner in a struggle for change. The popular committees have expressed this distrust (Section 5.2), yet they remain ensnared in the official embrace. What is to be done about this implication is less clear.

Perhaps my most significant finding for Palestinian popular resistance concerns the weakening of local trust in the activities of the popular committees. The committees have persisted in their movement year after year, maintaining regular Friday demonstrations, undertaking other forms of direct action, building international and transnational networks, often travelling overseas to give speaking tours, all the while, at least since 2009, funded by the PA and other (mostly European Union) organizations (Chapters 4-6). A segment of the general public, including within the resistance villages, appears sympathetic to the view that “the current popular resistance is not real,” and “the popular committees mostly only work for money,” as two questionnaire respondents from one of the resistance villages wrote in response to the only open question on the survey (the question asked about who should lead the resistance). Some expression of distrust of the committees is a minority view that runs through my survey findings (as well as my anecdotal experience). However, on the whole, my research, including participant observation, interviews, the majority of questionnaires, and other sources, suggest that committees must be free,” BCC interview (2014); manage social services centrally, relinquish politics and struggle, use institutional reach to facilitate a mobilization, or at least a grand conference of, “the popular machine” BOC2 interview (2014); “there has to be a decentralized approach. I mean, centralizing things is not good at all. Yet, I think the centre should see itself mainly as a support of the local initiatives, and the organizer of unifying action or unified actions between different local structures,” NDSb interview (2014).

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17 Ch. 6 and Appendix II.
the popular committees are genuinely committed to resisting the occupation in the best way they know how, and are mostly perceived as such. But it is not difficult to understand diminishing domestic support. In addition to reasons cited above (money and PA repression), the resistance villages have suffered disproportionately due to the popular resistance, or rather due to the array of reprisals and collective punishment meted upon the villages by the Israeli army. The people are exhausted, their patience frayed. My estimation is that the villages are too closely knit internally for the residents to actively turn against the committees; however, a bottoming out of support is potentially little better for the movement.

This study suggests that the diminished domestic support correlates to the dilution of participatory forms of organization. In particular, community-based constructive work has been neglected. According to Gandhi, local social programs are the key to sustaining struggle and achieving independence, and Sharp also stresses the importance of building alternative institutions as dispersed loci of social power (Chapter 2). This is also a clear lesson of the First Intifada; voluntary community work programs were the glue that held the mass uprising together (Chapter 3). Without question, circumstances have changed; the grassroots infrastructure of the 1980s no longer exists, and contemporary social services are provided by a diverse range of groups and agencies, some local, some international, some from the PA, some from the occupation. Yet communities still suffer, and more could be done, presenting an opportunity for the popular committees to bolster local support (for example, by putting more international activists to work rather than just through the demonstration circuits). Considering the importance of land in the broader Palestinian experience, agricultural projects in particular, and any assistance toward practices of sumud, or ‘steadfastness’ (in holding to the land), probably offer the most yield in terms of growing local support through voluntary work programs (Chapter 6). (It should be stressed that this analysis is focused on internal dynamics; without question the number one factor deterring participation is external, the occupation itself, through its structures of violence, control, and sanction.)

The above points are propositions that follow from my research. They are not policy suggestions for Palestinian activists. Palestinians on the ground are best qualified to determine their modes of action and organization.
(b) For Theory

This section begins with implications of my work for civil-resistance theory, in terms of action and organization, and ends with a brief word on governance models more generally. First, my research suggests a number of advantages to identifying ‘unarmed’ or ‘non-militarized’ as the primary characteristic of civil-resistance action, rather than ‘nonviolent.’ As some theorists have argued, the association of civil resistance with nonviolence raises unrealistic expectations, overlooks or excludes unarmed movements that adopt relatively minor forms of violence, and potentially reinforces state discourses that seek to delegitimize opposition with the label ‘violent.’ The term ‘unarmed’ does not imply the presence of violent protest methods, though it does not necessarily preclude them either (up to a point, depending on the context: above and Chapters 1 and 3). ‘Unarmed’ specifies a range of action that may span from purely nonviolent up to, but generally not including, militarized action. The distinction seems especially appropriate in oppressive and conflict-prone conditions, with levels of violence or the threat of violence already elevated. The term ‘resistance’ is also particularly suited to such contexts, because it evokes high-stakes confrontation with oppressive regimes. For these reasons, ‘unarmed action’ and ‘civil resistance’ can be used to distinguish cases like Palestinian popular struggle from strictly nonviolent action, or from liberal civil disobedience, or from social movements in relatively free and peaceful countries. As a term, ‘unarmed action’ is useful because it encompasses all of these forms of struggle short of militarized strategies, from peaceful Gandhi to masked Palestinians flinging stones.

Turning to the participatory axis, my findings suggest that civil-resistance theory also re-examine its understandings of organization and its relation to action. For the most part, the potential range of organizational forms has been under-theorized, as I quoted Mary King’s observation to frame Chapter 2. When organization is raised, it has

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19 Examples of the latter include Occupy Wall Street and Idle No More during 2011-2012. Under the new Republican regime President Donald Trump, American social movements appear to be escalating into resistance movements.
sometimes been portrayed contrarily to the present formulation, such as in Pearlman’s coherence theory which leans toward top-down command-and-control structure. Other times, as Chapter 2 also shows, organization is treated neutrally, as a set of options to pick and choose from depending on the context. This neutralist approach resembles the more common conceptualization of the choice of methods within a range of nonviolent and militarized action, widely presupposed outside of civil-resistance circles. Civil-resistance theorists, however, maintain that the quality of the action, specifically whether it is armed or unarmed, varies the dynamic of struggle in either detrimental or non-detrimental ways, respectively. The Palestinian case may suggest that the quality of organization matters as well, that different forms may help or hinder struggle in ways analogous to the distinction between armed and unarmed methods: structured command-and-control hierarchies appear to have undermined, or ‘backfired’ against, Palestinian popular struggle, by narrowing participation options and at times directly constraining popular initiatives. In contrast, participatory organization appears to maximize the power of numbers, “human resources,” in the language of Sharp’s social sources of power, by throwing open the doors of participation. There is space for all neighbourhoods and villages to take initiatives, to become self-empowered, to act as autonomous agents, as partners in something larger, tailoring approaches to meet local wants and needs. Adapting an insight from Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (that nonviolent strategies raise fewer barriers to participation than violent strategies) I suggest that participatory organization raises fewer barriers to participation than coercive or top-down structures. Participatory organization, in other words, has value apart from simply rendering a movement difficult to decapitate; it maximizes the potential for increased numbers, and therefore the popular power, of a movement.

Another problem with the treatment of organization in the literature is that it is often relegated to a subset of action. Sharp once explored organization as distinct from, yet related to, methods of action. However, his other and better-known schema of nonviolent resistance, replicated in the large majority of his influential and voluminous

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20 Ch. 1, citing Sharp (1973), pp. 11-12, 744-754; Sharp (2005), pp. 28-30, 419-421.
21 G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1980), as discussed at length in Ch. 2.
publications, reduces organization to about seven methods of nonviolent action in a list of 198. This is an unsatisfactory formulation. While all organizing is a kind of acting, as all action is organized in some way, action and organization are distinguishable aspects of struggle. One concerns direct actions undertaken by individuals or by groups of individuals acting in concert. The other concerns governance relations in which, and from which, action is taken (though those structuring relationships are continuously formed and reformed by organizing actions of those embedded within them). Rather than reducing either action or organization to the other, I think a more compelling formulation relates them to agency and structure respectively, as different and non-reducible domains bound together in a co-conditioning relation. I suggest such an agency/structure approach better captures the relationship between action and organization than previous expressions in civil-resistance literature, which either discount participatory organization or reduce it to a method of resistance. My approach allows that action and organization vary separately, but recognizes that a particular combination of qualities introduces a synergistic dynamic into Palestinian struggle.

Unarmed action and participatory organization are mutually reinforcing in a number of ways. Both share a non-dominative principle, one in deeds (nonviolent or unarmed), one in relations (non-coercive, democratic). Both are consistent with ‘prefigurative’ approaches to politics and struggle, in which means are understood as constitutive of ends, as ‘ends in the making’: non-militarized means for non-militarized outcomes, democratic means for democratic outcomes, in short, non-dominative means for non-dominative outcomes. In more practical terms, participatory organization

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23 The idea of ‘structuration,’ lifted from sociology and international relations, offers a model for thinking about the agency/structure of resistance: structuration theory posits that neither agency nor structure is primitive; rather they mutually constitute, conditioning and structuring each other, but are nevertheless discernably different ‘stuffs’: A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1984); A. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization 41:3 (Summer 1987).

24 This idea goes back to Gandhi and is prevalent among contemporary social movements; it does not suggest covering laws or guaranteed outcomes in metaphysical terms but rather makes claims about tendencies in complex social and historical processes: Ch. 2, quoting Ackerman and DuVall (2000), p. 503; J. Tully, “Middle East Legal and Governmental Pluralism: A View of the Field from the Demos,” Middle East law and Governance 4:2-3 (2012), pp. 228, 226-227; C. Dixon, Another Politics: Talking Across Today’s Transformative Movements (Oakland: University of California Press, 2014), pp. 2, 65-66, and especially 82-105.
provides local cooperation and community self-help to offset the negative side-effects of noncooperation and disengagement campaigns. In the face of scarcity—as striking workers and resigned officials lose income, as populations boycott services and institutions of the regime, and as communities are strained under curfews or sieges—participatory organization provides a framework for the sustained provision of necessary social services. This is a basic function of Gandhi’s constructive program, to bolster the self-reliance capabilities of communities under duress and waging civil resistance (Chapter 2). It is also a lesson of the First Intifada (Chapter 3). Additionally, unarmed action and participatory organization complement each other in their cumulative function of maximizing participation rates. Each reduces barriers to participation, compared to armed and top-down strategies. Participatory structures open doors to participation, and unarmed methods provide limitless arsenals freely and equally available to all (demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, direct action), a democratic weapon for a democratic struggle. The combination of participatory organization and unarmed strategies maximizes the participation capacity of a movement.

Stepping back from civil-resistance theory, in terms of ideas of governance more generally, I am not suggesting that large-scale centralized organization is inherently ‘bad,’ or threatening to social and political welfare. There may be advantages to large and centralized organization (such as provision of social services, completion of large infrastructure projects, pooling of resources for competitive global trade), even sometimes coercive and top-down command structures (such as police forces). However, the participatory model has been unduly expunged from common governance discourse and practice in Western societies. As the Palestinian case shows (Chapters 3 and 4), and as some theorists have posited (namely Gandhi, Arendt, and Sharp: Chapter 2), participatory organization can be quite efficient, in terms of strengthening communities and coordinating action. The implication is not an all-or-nothing approach but a diversification of approaches. Participatory organization might be understood as one tool in society’s governance repertoire. For example, Elinor Ostrom won the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for showing that participatory organization, or “polycentric governance,” offers an alternative to private-market and centralized-state models of resource management, and that this under-recognized community-based model can be
expanded in scale through “multiple nested layers.”

Participatory organization offers alternative approaches to governance, disrupting conventional thought and practice, and my work extends the intervention into civil-resistance studies.

(c) For Global Ethics

This research has implications for questions of global ethics, in particular for citizens of Western countries complicit in the oppression of the Palestinian people. Israel routinely and systematically violates Palestinian rights in breach of international law. This is not a controversial claim, outside of right-wing Zionist circles. The Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem are not “disputed” territories; they are “occupied Palestinian territories,” and the Geneva Conventions apply, meaning that Israel bears numerous responsibilities toward the occupied population and is prohibited from transferring its own population into the territories. This view is virtually unanimous in the international community and global civil society. It is shared by the world’s highest executive body (the United Nations Security Council), the world’s highest democratic body (the United Nations General Assembly), the world’s highest judicial authority (the International Court of Justice), and the world’s leading experts on human rights (the UN Human Rights Council and the major nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch).

Nevertheless, Western countries, including the U.S. and Canada have in practice looked the other way.

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26 The following formulation of the international consensus is adapted from Norman Finkelstein, an American intellectual and critic of Israel who has often framed the one-sidedness of the conflict in terms of the world’s leading authorities in his public talks.

27 See, for example, United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2334 (Dec. 23, 2016), which re-affirms the longstanding illegality of the settlements; any of the annual UN General Assembly resolutions in concurrence with these points, regularly passing with the vast majority of member states’ support; International Court of Justice, “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Advisory Opinion” (July 9, 2004); UN Human Rights Council, “Independent International Fact-finding Mission to Investigate the Implications of the Israeli Settlements,” UN General Assembly (Feb. 7, 2013).

while providing material, diplomatic, and moral support to the continued Israeli annexation of Palestinian land. The prime accomplice is the U.S., for its unmatched material and military aid to Israel (around three billion annually). But other countries contribute. For example, Canadian officials were among the first in the world to break with convention by meeting with Israeli officials in occupied East Jerusalem (normalizing illegal annexation).\textsuperscript{29} This means the conflict is not confined to the parties in Israel/Palestine. Wittingly or otherwise, Western citizens have sided with the occupation and the illegal settlement enterprise, through the policies of their elected governments and/or their tax dollars.

Beyond the framework of international law, norms of justice and human rights call for increased global support for the Palestinian struggle. As with the legal status of the conflict, the basic facts of the long suffering of the Palestinian people since 1948 are not seriously disputed, even among prominent Israeli historians (even though the ascribed significance of the facts vary considerably).\textsuperscript{30} The common agreement can be sketched as follows (and is relevant because it establishes the disproportionate injustice borne by the Palestinians). During war of 1948, the Arabs of the country (about two thirds of the population, around 800,000 people) were forcibly pushed out or refused re-entry after displacement during the fighting, becoming refugees scattered across several countries. In the occupied Gaza Strip, West Bank, and East Jerusalem, more than four million Palestinians are stateless, subject to Israeli military rule since 1967, with permit and checkpoint regimes that severely restrict and prohibit movement as well as the flow of goods, medical supplies, and access to education. Political activism against the occupation in the territories is criminalized, subject to military law. The massive separation barrier winding through the West Bank has multiplied the hardships confronting hundreds of communities. Occupation forces routinely demolish Palestinian


homes, infrastructure, and agriculture across the territories.\(^{31}\) The Israeli military periodically bombards the infrastructure of the blockaded Gaza Strip in purported efforts to eliminate armed resistance capacity, killing thousands of civilians since 2009.\(^{32}\) Throughout the history of the conflict, Palestinians have intermittently taken up arms, but the overwhelming brunt of death and destruction has been borne by the Palestinian side.\(^{33}\)

For Western citizens cognizant of their governments’ complicity in the oppression of Palestinians, solidarity becomes incumbent. Global politics do not permit the moral retreat into the boundaries of one’s own nation-state (and even there, international law requires cessation of complicity in violations). The notion of citizenship as a singular and exclusive status awarded by states is increasingly contestable in an increasingly globalized world. In contemporary social sciences and emerging public philosophies, citizenship is sometimes more broadly understood as embodied in practices, contexts, and relations (plural).\(^{34}\) It refers to civic conduct and civic responsibility, within and without official institutions, within and across state borders. From these different perspectives, global and international citizens, particularly from those countries providing support to Israel, have an obligation to actively oppose the ongoing denial of Palestinians’ most basic freedoms.

Palestinian activists often express the need for international and global support,

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\(^{33}\) Fatality factors range from 3:1 to 10:1 against the Palestinians, and with an incalculable differential in infrastructure devastation: Israelis have destroyed many tens of thousands of Palestinian homes and buildings in the last few decades, and many tens of thousands more going back to 1948, whereas as the only period in which Palestinians damaged Israeli homes and infrastructure to any significant extent was during the Second Intifada, and that was dozens to hundreds of instances over five years. Major statistical source: B’Tselem.

and often in terms of rights and duties rather than mere benevolence.\textsuperscript{35} In 2004, while Budrus was still struggling daily to stop the wall, and as the International Court of Justice was conducting hearings into the legality of the barrier on Palestinian territory, one of the village’s leaders appealed through a Canadian newspaper with a reference to international law: “[a]s Budrus and many other villages work non-violently to resist occupation, we call on the world for support. The court at the Hague and the international community must stop this wall so that Budrus’s children have something to live for.”\textsuperscript{36} According to one of the leaders of Bil’in’s popular committee, “[w]e need the support of the international community, and words are not enough. We need people to take direct action, both here in Palestine, and in their own countries against the governments who support this Occupation.”\textsuperscript{37} Another of Bil’in’s activists maintains that the occupation is not just a Palestinian problem. “It’s a problem for the world,” he says, “[s]o we have to end it, to resist it together. If some people or group in Canada have any problems, we have to be with them. We have to resist together.”\textsuperscript{38} The activist is alluding to a give and take of global struggles, not just solidarity toward the Palestinian plight, but the need for Palestinians to stand with other movements, in an intersectional strengthening of solidarity networks. In calling for global and international support, some activists I interviewed make explicit reference to history. For example,

\begin{quote}
it’s one of our strategies too, that, we said that the popular resistance means that it’s not only for the Palestinian people, because we thought that, like the European Union, the European countries, is responsible for our problem, because, since the British Mandate, they bring the occupation to our land, so they have to take their own responsibility to solve this problem. So, we consider the popular resistance, it’s opened, for any free people all around the world who will participate to help the Palestinian people to get rid from this ugly occupation.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

And,

\begin{quote}
For us, as a Palestinian, we become a victim of the victim. After the international community woke up from the Holocaust crime against
humanity, and solved the problem from our account and on our land. They brought the Jewish refugees and put them in our land and we become the victim of the victim. For that, you have your responsibility, and your duty for us. You can’t be free if I lose my freedom. And I lose my freedom and my land because of your policy, and your government policy. For that, when you told me that your Prime Minister sang for Netanyahu, it means we have the same enemy. It’s the interest of the capitalists. Who harm the environment and who harm the human being.

Palestinian popular resistance against the occupation depends on global support, not because Palestinians are supplicants, but because the occupation is a global injustice. This is not an appeal to third-party charity but transnational ethics, responsibility, cooperation, and solidarity.

The discussions of civil resistance in this dissertation offer a map for direct action in support of Palestinian rights. This includes a range of action, beginning with communicative acts of protest, persuasive interventions in the conversations of communities, workplaces, politics, families, and friends, including online and through social media, where Palestinians’ own voices can be integrated. Action can also advance to more disruptive methods, namely acts of noncooperation and direct intervention. Noncooperation includes various forms of boycott and divestment in order to leverage economic, political, and cultural pressure against Israel or the Israeli occupation; many Western institutions, particularly unions, churches, and student or academic associations, have adopted this approach. Methods of intervention include a variety of direct interjections in the status quo, interfering in mechanisms and processes that contribute to Palestinian oppression; for example, by disrupting government policy and procedure concerning Israel, picketing retailers who carry various Israeli products, supporting transnational actions like the Free Gaza flotillas that strive to break the Israeli siege, or traveling to Palestine to participate in actions and constructive work. Global ethics implies at minimum that global citizens cease complicity in Palestinian oppression.

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Appendix I – Interviews: Methodology, Questions, Excerpts

I.a – Interview Methodology

Before coming to the guide questions and interview excerpts, this section elaborates the profiles of the interview participants and the conditions under which they were recruited and interviewed. (See also the methodological overview of Section 4 of the Introduction).

In January and February 2014, I conducted 21 separate interviews with 20 different participants. Interviews averaged a little over one hour each, for a combined total of nearly 26 hours of recorded interview time. Only a few were less than an hour (the shortest was 36 minutes), and only a few were longer than an hour and a half (the longest was almost two and a half hours).

All participants are Palestinians closely involved (in varying ways) with popular resistance. Seven of the participants are from Bil’in; six from Nabi Saleh; one from Budrus; five youth activists from Ramallah, and one professional politician. Most (approximately 15) are activists involved in the planning and execution of demonstrations and other actions. These individuals are regularly on the front lines, have in many cases been in and out of Israeli prisons, and are often the public face of the movement, in Arabic and English media channels, including statements and editorials published in major newspapers, speaking tours around the world, documentary films, and YouTube videos. A few (approximately 3) could be counted as peripheral activists.

All participants except two support and participate in the popular resistance. The first exception is a resident of Nabi Saleh who supports nonviolent struggle but rejects the current Bil’in/Nabi Saleh model and refuses to participate (JVOB, interviewed for almost 90 minutes). The second exception is a pioneer of the anti-wall popular resistance, from Budrus, who has grown skeptical of the Bil’in/Nabi Saleh approach (BOC, two separate interviews for a total of five hours).

Most respondents grew up in their respective West Bank villages, but most or all of the Ramallah youth activists are from the diaspora and grew up partly in Western countries (though they now mostly reside in Ramallah). Six of the interview participants
are women (4 Ramallah youth activists and 2 activists from Nabi Saleh). The four Ramallah women each work closely with one of the two village committees (Bil’in or Nabi Saleh), as well as for the Popular Struggle Coordination Committee (PSCC). The fifth Ramallah youth activist is a young man who supports the weekly Bil’in demonstrations apparently without direct organizational affiliation with the movement. Participant ages (to infer) range from late teens to late 40s, with two or three in their 50s or possibly 60s.

Given more time and resources, I would have interviewed more than two critics of the movement, to get a stronger sense of alternative views on the ground. To some extent, the questionnaires supplement this shortcoming, by asking 201 random persons, mostly from university campuses but also from Bil’in and Nabi Saleh, for their views on the popular resistance (Appendix 2). Also, I have spoken informally with many Palestinians about the popular resistance, and their views are diverse, largely resembling the range of views depicted in the survey data. I would also like to have done interviews with the youth who threw stones at the demonstrations, but the opportunity did not arise. Complicating the prospects of recruitment and interviews, none of the stone throwers I encountered presented much of a public face; nor did they seem to speak sufficient English (meaning I would require independent translators for which I lacked time and funds).

All interviews, except one, were conducted in English; the exception (OVO, #17, a woman) was done in Arabic with the help of an independent translator (although this interview is problematic, because another popular resistance activist (her husband) was in the room, for reasons I could not politely escape, rendering portions of the content—particularly discussions concerning gender liberty—unusable.)

To protect participants’ confidentiality, all interview recruitment was done discretely in person in the West Bank (to minimize third-party observation and data trails of recruitment). If participants agreed to an interview, I asked them to choose a time and place. Interviews occurred in participants’ homes, community centres, cafés, and outdoors. Before starting each interview, I advised participants verbally and in writing of the purposes of the research, and of the measures in place to protect their confidentiality. Most participants dismissed the need for confidentiality, saying they had nothing to hide.
(although I insisted on the measures, in order to encourage the participants to speak more candidly, knowing that their identities would be protected). Names and other acutely identifiable information of participants have been excised from the transcripts. Each participant as been ascribed a three-letter code (e.g., JDC, BOC, NVO) to conceal their identity.

Transcripts are mostly verbatim; only in some cases, when the speaker struggled with English as a second language, has the text been slightly altered, for purposes of readability. On the whole, I have preserved the broken English. Square brackets indicate modifications to the original transcript, either for brevity or clarity; words in parentheses indicate annotation for clarification purposes without alteration or abridgement to the original. The Arabic word ya’ni is ubiquitous in Palestinian colloquial speech. It means the verb “means” or “meaning that,” or “(it) is like,” and is used in moments of hesitation or thought, or to fill a silence while reaching for words.

I.b – Guiding Questions

The following basic sequence of questions structured most interviews, though not stridently or verbatim. Participants were told at the outset that I had three sets of questions, concerning their experience and popular struggle generally, concerning the tactics and strategies of the movement, and concerning the organizational approach of the movement.

First set (activist perspective and experience)
What does popular struggle mean to you?
What are its goals?
Can you talk about your community’s involvement in popular resistance?
Can you talk about your individual role or experience with the popular resistance?
Can you talk about your motivations for participating in the popular resistance?
Can you talk about some of the most difficult moments of the popular resistance?
Can you talk about some of your happiest moments with the popular resistance?

Second set (on action, tactics and strategy)
What are some strengths of unarmed and nonviolent methods against the occupation?
What are some of its limitations and weaknesses?
What are the differences, moral and practical, between armed and unarmed strategies?
Can you talk about some of the most effective actions/tactics?
Can you talk about some of the least effective actions/tactics?

**Third Set** (organization: convening, deliberating, consulting, deciding, mobilizing)
What is a popular committee?
How did the community decide to form a popular committee?
Was there opposition? How was opposition managed?
Can you talk about meetings and consultations with the community?
Who can be on a popular committee? Are there rules of inclusion/exclusion?
How does the committee make decisions? Resolve disputes?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of this kind of organization?
How does the committee coordinate with other committees and groups?
How does the committee coordinate with the Palestinian Authority? How should it?
Does the committee offer any social services, community building programs?

I.c – **Interview Excerpts: Popular Struggle Defined**

Following are excerpts from my 2014 interviews. Participants are responding to my lead question, “What does popular struggle mean to you?” Their responses indicate a mostly coherent conceptualization of the term, though some activists, in response to prodding follow-up questions, shared disparate views, indicating that in some ways the term remains contested (mostly in the way it relates to the concept of armed struggle):

The popular struggle means for me that to collect all the sources of pressure, to put on the occupation, with activities that don’t aim to kill. In Palestine you couldn’t find a specific idiom to consider that. You can hear it from somebody, nonviolent struggle, or popular struggle, or civil resistance, or unarmed resistance, but that’s the main meaning of this idiom, according to my opinion. **BOC**

* * * * * * *
I think popular struggle is the people who is working on the ground, as grassroots resistance. And the people who’s be always in the front of the demonstrations, organizing on the ground, being with the people, this is the popular struggle. JDC

* * * * * * *

Popular struggle has many meanings. First of all, to participate in many actions, not one type of action, against the—if we want to speak about our case—against the occupation. By popular struggle we can protest in action like what we do every Friday in Bil’in. By action, or boycott the Israeli product, or by staying in our land, and working in our land, to be green and beautiful, and not to allow it to the settlers and Israeli military force to confiscate. Popular struggle means all of the people participate in the action, not few people, not only the young, or students, or to be all of the people, students, employers, workers, men, women. It means all of them to boys and girls to participate in this action. This is, it means all of the types of people, and many types of action, and all of this under the nonviolent resistance or peace resistance or popular resistance. It’s the same in my mind. It’s the same meaning. All of this under the popular struggle, or popular resistance. BCC

* * * * * * *

The popular struggle means, that, it’s the way, to get our rights. Of liberation, of freedom, and justice. LOC

* * * * * * *

Popular struggle means to me, means to me unarmed struggle. Also means to me that, a mean that is easy and legal and it is acceptable and it’s more, more give an opportunity for anyone who believes in the right of, the human rights of freedom, justice, and democracy, and every human value, to take the opportunity to do his duty and responsibility and go after his belief. Popular means that every person can do something and can make something for the Palestinian issue. [...] But popular struggle or popular resistance, is means the unarmed resistance. I don’t feel that it’s make an understood by the Palestinians. They can distinguish between the two concepts. Because, I told you the armed resistance means al-harb as-shaabiyyey, or the kfeh muselha. Popular struggle or popular resistance means unarmed resistance, and also everyone understands the concept that it means unarmed resistance. CVOa

* * * * * * *
Popular struggle means that we are trying to defend on ourselves, with the suitable weapon, for this period of time. So, we believe that popular struggle and we take this experience from the First Intifada, which most of the Palestinian people who live here lived in that time, and we believe that the First Intifada was powerful. It gave us a good petition in the world, and all the world in that time began to understand what’s happened in Palestine, and West Bank, and why is this happening. For the-- in 2000 it was the second intifada and it was, let’s say, it wasn’t military, but it took the side-- many people, they used weapons against the Israeli army, and it wasn’t-- it gave us bad effect from the international community. So, we believe the popular resistance is the suitable weapon for us to face the Israeli occupation, and to have the supplied (support?) from the international community. CVOb

* * * * * *

Popular struggle, it means that the people must fight back in order to get their rights, especially the Palestinian people because they are suffered for a long time, from being occupied by the Israeli occupation. So, it’s one of the struggles that the Palestinian people tried for the whole period of the occupation. And finally, we want to try the popular resistance in a different type, because we already tried a lot of things during this conflict between us and the Israeli occupation. [...] And it doesn’t mean the armed resistance. Popular resistance means that all the people in the village must participate in this popular resistance. And that means that children, women, youth, everyone have to participate in this resistance. But it doesn’t mean that the Palestinian people haven’t the right to use any kind of resistance that they deem to free their own life. JVOa

* * * * * *

Well, I believe the popular struggle is basically anything that is being agreed on by the people on the ground and people who work on the grassroots level. So, if the grassroots level is agreeing to having resistance in the form of protests, then that’s popular struggle. If it’s in forms of boycotting the occupation, that’s also popular struggle. Blocking roads, any types of action that are basically from the people themselves, who live under occupation, that’s popular struggle. And I believe that for us, Palestinians when we talk about popular struggle, it includes everybody that works on the ground, whether it’s political parties, whether it’s individuals, whether it’s people who are independent and are not part of any political party or organizations, all of that includes popular struggle to us. [...] I don’t think it only includes unarmed struggle, but I think reflecting on the Palestinian struggle, I think, Yes, the popular struggle was clearly used to reflect on unarmed struggle. I mean the Palestinians did not, at least within the territories, let’s stop within the territories,
because there were armed struggle in Lebanon, *ya’ni*, Palestinians have participated in many armed struggles [...] But, in my opinion, no. That’s not a popular struggle. The popular struggle is when everybody participates, and not everybody can hold a gun, not everybody can participate in an armed struggle. Now an armed struggle is usually a branch of the bigger movement taking place on the ground. Even in the Second Intifada, it started as a popular struggle. It started with protests. And then the armed struggle joined. And people on the ground who were protesting could no longer protest, basically. So, no, popular struggle is when everybody is included, and the armed struggle is part of the popular struggle, but it’s … the armed struggle can be part of the popular struggle, but the popular struggle is something bigger. ECS

* * * * * * *

It means participation of the Palestinian community from all different levels of age groups and backgrounds in resistance of the Israeli occupation, using methods that are available to the Palestinian people at this point [...] the popular resistance includes parties. We try to include everyone who is capable and is able and is willing. It does not… For it to be popular that means it has to involve every political party, every union, every woman, every man, every child, everyone in the society, so it has to be open for everyone. [...] I think the concept of popular resistance now is being taken in a different kind of way. It has always existed, it’s just that now they’re trying to say as if it’s one thing that’s separate, and as if it does not include armed-- as if it’s this new thing that’s coming up when in reality, no, it has existed since the creation, since the Palestinians existed, and since the 20s when they had the first revolution, you had committees to organize. And any action which is popular, it’s just basically describing a state, which is when people are resisting in any means that they have possible to them as a community [...] especially because you have some people adding labels to popular resistance. There’s unarmed, or peaceful resistance, or any-- these are the things that are attached to the term nowadays. And it’s kind of a way to criticize popular resistance. And to say that it’s something that only belongs to a few people, when everyone resists in Palestine. There’s not one person who is not a participant in popular resistance. If you are sitting in a house in Sheikh Jarah, if you are sitting in your home in Beit Hanina, if you’re sitting in your home in Hebron, you’re resisting, because you’re refusing to leave. And that’s popular resistance, because it’s not organized by anyone, it’s not a political party leading you, it’s not armed, it’s just resisting by existing. BJS

* * * * * * *

Okay. Well it comes from the general term, popular struggle, and popular is a connotation which holds kind of the definition that it applies to
everyone. So it’s an uprising from everyone, by everyone, that goes beyond, you know, certain factions or certain motives. So that’s what it means to me, and specifically unarmed resistance. NDSa

* * * * *

It means many things. First of all, it is a continuation of Palestinian struggle in other forms. It’s the only effective way I can see we can change our reality and create new balance of power that would allow us to get our rights. And it’s deeply rooted in Palestinian history. It’s not new. Contrary to what people think, it’s not new at all. The nonviolent peaceful popular resistance has been there for long, long, long time. In the ‘30s in the ‘20s. In the ‘36 strike which was one of the longest strikes in history, 6 months, the whole nation went into civil disobedience and strike. Or the First Intifada, which in my opinion was the peek and the best model of popular resistance. So far, it also means people’s grassroots participation. It means liberating the Palestinian struggle from the system of indoctrination and ah, nepotism and clientelism which is pervading in the Palestinian Authority and prevailing in the West Bank and Gaza, by both parties, Fatah and Hamas. It’s an effort to bring back the grassroots to participation in this struggle, and it’s also an effort to bring back belief in the possibility of resistance and liberation. And to free people from the strong feeling of depression and demobilization that has been taking place for a long time. So it’s another way, it’s our new way of mobilizing the grassroots. [...] [The term] was used a lot during the whole Palestinian resistance period. But mainly by left groups. Ah, recently the difference-- in the First Intifada, the word intifada was predominant, as well as in the Second Intifada, of course, but I think this term took it’s shape outside the ranks of just being restricted to Left groups since the wall started to be built. When we actively and consciously participated. NDSb
Appendix II – Questionnaires: Methodology, Copies, Results

II.a – Questionnaire Methodology

In February 2014, I administered 201 confidential single-page questionnaires over six separate recruitment drives at five different locations across the West Bank. Most of the surveys, 153, were completed on the grounds of three major universities, Al Quds University in East Jerusalem (62), Birzeit University outside Ramallah (35), and An-Najah University in Nablus (56). The remaining 48 questionnaires were administered between the resistance villages of Bil’in (16) and Nabi Saleh (23), outside the local mosque after weekly prayer,¹ and at a café in the city centre of Nablus (9). All recruitment was random, with the aid of one to three assistants (my assistants for recruitment in Bil’in and Nabi Saleh had no connections to these communities). Potential respondents were approached and engaged with courtesies and small talk in Arabic, aided by my assistant(s), then offered a printed one-page summary of the research project, followed by a blank questionnaire. A small minority of questionnaires were obtained through snowballing, as some respondents wanted friends or family to complete questionnaires as well. The drives were conducted on separate days, within a single vicinity, over the course of one to two hours.

II.b – Questionnaire Copy, English and Arabic

¹ Nabi Saleh was the site of two drives on separate days, collecting 8 and 15 surveys respectively.
UNARMED AND PARTICIPATORY PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE IN THE WEST BANK

For university research only. Do not indicate your name. You may skip any questions, or stop at any time. By returning this survey to the researcher, you are expressing your implied consent to participate in this project (please read and retain “implied consent form.”). Do not hesitate to ask any questions. Thank you for participating.

#1 – PARTICIPANT BACKGROUND  Sex: MALE / FEMALE  Age: 17-22 / 23-29 / 30-35 / 35 +

#2 – RESISTANCE STRATEGIES

Have you ever participated in the following resistance actions? (choose any, and for your own protection, please do not indicate your participation armed resistance activities or stone throwing):

| Action                | never / rarely / sometimes / often | Steadfastness | never / rarely / sometimes / often | Tree planting | never / rarely / sometimes / often | Protest tent village | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
|-----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------------| ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
| Demonstration         |                                    |               |                                    |               |                                    |                      |                                    | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
| Street blockades      |                                    |               |                                    |               |                                    |                      |                                    | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
| Economic Boycott      |                                    |               |                                    |               |                                    |                      |                                    | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
| Labour strike         |                                    |               |                                    |               |                                    |                      |                                    | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
| Student strike        |                                    |               |                                    |               |                                    |                      |                                    | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |
| Hunger strike         |                                    |               |                                    |               |                                    |                      |                                    | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often | ____________ | never / rarely / sometimes / often |

For Palestinian goals today, which is more effective? (circle one):

ARMED RESISTANCE  /  UNARMED RESISTANCE  /  ARMED AND UNARMED RESISTANCE TOGETHER

“Popular resistance” primarily includes (circle one):

NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE  /  UNARMED RESISTANCE  /  ANY KIND OF RESISTANCE

#3 – PARTICIPATION

Most popular committees (for example, in Nabi Saleh, Bil’in, Budrus) are organized and led by (circle one):

Local community members  /  Political parties  /  Palestinian Authority officials  /  Israeli or foreign views

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee Feature</th>
<th>YES</th>
<th>NO</th>
<th>USUALLY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular committees invite everyone to participate</td>
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<td>Popular committees are dominated by a few individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular committees are democratic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular committees exclude part of the community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular committees exclude women</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular committees should lead the national struggle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular committees should follow orders from politicians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision making processes should be “bottom up”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decision making processes should be “top down”</td>
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National struggle should be mostly organized and led by: ____________________________________________
النضال الفلسطيني غير المسلح والمشاركي في الضفة الغربية

هذا الاستبان للإستخدام الجامعي فقط. الرجاء عدم ذكر اسمك/ي وسامك/كم تتخطى أي سؤال أو الوقف في أي وقت. من خلال اعادة هذه الاستمتاع للبحث، لكم تحب من موافقاتك العرضي في المشاركة في هذا البحث (الرجاء قراءة وحفظ نسختك من استمارة الموافقة الضمنية).

ارجو أن لا تتردد في طرح أي سؤال واسئلكم للمشارك.

خلفية المشارك: ننثني/ننثر

الجنس: ذكر / أثلي

العمر: 22 - 17 / 29-30 / 35-30 / 35

1. هل سبق أن اشتركت في أي من نشاطات المقاومة التالية؟ (الرجاء اختيار إما واحدة منهم و نهدف حمايتك الرجاء عدم الإفصاح عن مشاركك)

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<th>نادراً</th>
<th>حياناً</th>
<th>غالياً</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>غالياً</td>
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<td>اطلاقة</td>
<td>نادراً</td>
<td>حياناً</td>
<td>غالياً</td>
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<td>نادراً</td>
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<td>أضراس عن الطعام</td>
<td>اطلاقة</td>
<td>نادراً</td>
<td>حياناً</td>
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2. إستراتيجيات المقاومة وانشطتها:

|- عمليات إطلاقة نادراً حياناً غالياً|
|- مواجهة الاحتلال غير المسلح / المقاومة والسيرة المقاومة معاً|
|- المقاومة الشعبية وتشمل بشكل أساسي (الرجاء وضع دائرة حول اختيارك):|
|- مقاومة غير عنيفة / المقاومة غير المسلح / أي نوع من المقاومة.|

3. المشاركة:

معظم اللجان الشعبية (على سبيل المثال، في النبي صالح، بلعين، بدرس) منظمات مرؤوسية من قبل (الرجاء وضع دائرة حول اختيارك):

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<th>جبهة إسرائيلية أو أجنبية</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td>غالياً</td>
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<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td>غالياً</td>
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<td>نعم</td>
<td>لا</td>
<td>غالياً</td>
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</tbody>
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لمتبع اللجان الشعبية جميع المشارك

 systine عند قليل من الأشخاص على اللجان الشعبية

اللجان الشعبية هي لجان ديمقراطية

تستغذ اللجان الشعبية جزء من المجتمع

لمتبع اللجان الشعبية الإيديولوجية

 يجب على اللجان الشعبية أن تمارس النضال الوطني

 يجب على اللجان الشعبية أن تتبع امراء السياسيين

 يجب أن تبدأ عملية اتخاذ القرارات من المستوى الشعبي (من الأسفل إلى الأعلى)

 يجب أن تبدأ عملية اتخاذ القرارات من المستوى السياسي (من الأعلى إلى الأسفل)

 يجب أن يقد وينظم النضال الوطني من قبل الجهات

التالية:
II.c – Questionnaire Results and Charts

“For Palestinian goals today, which is more effective?” (circle one)

Armed resistance ... Unarmed resistance ... Armed and unarmed resistance together

* Note, 62 surveys from Al Quds University were struck from these results, as this particular question contained a significant typographical error (hence 139 total, instead of 201)
“Most popular committees (for example, in Nabi Saleh, Bil’in, Budrus) are organized and led by ..." (circle one)

Note: a few respondents circled two responses. All circled responses are counted.

“Popular committees invite everyone to participate”

“Popular committees are dominated by a few individuals”
“Popular committees are democratic”

# of results, all surveys (201)

Yes: 40%, No: 60%, Often: 0%

# of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)

Yes: 25%, No: 75%, Often: 0%

“Popular committees exclude part of the community”

# of results, all surveys (201)

Yes: 40%, No: 60%, Often: 0%

# of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)

Yes: 25%, No: 75%, Often: 0%

“Popular committees exclude women”

# of results, all surveys (201)

Yes: 20%, No: 80%, Often: 0%

# of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)

Yes: 10%, No: 90%, Often: 0%

# of results, all female (51)

Yes: 20%, No: 80%, Often: 0%

# of females in Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (5)

Yes: 0%, No: 100%, Often: 0%
“Popular committees should lead the national struggle”

- # of results, all surveys (201)
- # of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)

“Popular committees should follow orders from politicians”

- # of results, all surveys (201)
- # of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)

“Decision making processes should be ‘bottom up’ (grassroots)”

- # of results, all surveys (201)
- # of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)

“Decision making processes should be ‘top down’ (politicians)”

- # of results, all surveys (201)
- # of results, Bil'in & Nabi Saleh (39)
“National struggle should be mostly organized and led by ...”
(open question)

Listed, all 77 written responses (of 201 surveys):

(translated from Arabic with help of assistant)

The people
PA politicians
People with practical and political experience
PA politicians, but some must be changed
The people, the PA
The people, and all the political parties
The political parties, but united, not divided
the people
Leftist and religious parties (not of the PA)
The people
The national groups and the PA
Student associations and popular committees
Fateh
The PA
All people of the community without exception
Popular revolution like the Arabic Spring, not limited to politics
The party with the credibility to be accepted by the Palestinian people
The popular committees and political parties
Hamas
All the parties
The Arab and Muslim world
The state of Palestine
The leaders who have the right to lead
Community institutions, starting with the universities, then the unions, the workers and salaried employees, leading and practicing the struggle
Respect the self and love Palestine
Fateh
The municipalities and organizations
Groups with experience
Hamas
The popular groups and national institutions and political parties
Political parties
Political Parties
The people
Honest respected people, and unified parties
All the people
The popular groups, and the trusted political parties
Every educated, creative person who has vision to the future, doctors, engineers, religious people, regardless of political affiliation
Groups untainted and unconnected with Israelis and no suspicious actions with Israelis
Unarmed people in this land in this homeland which are not benefiting from the resistance
All sectors of the Pal community
The popular committees and the educated and the experienced
Respected people who don't benefit form this resistance
The people
The people from the popular sites, not involved with the PA
The nationalists
Responsible people in the communities and villages, or the PA
All the national and popular parties, not be controlled by one sector that benefits
All, and not just those who benefit
All national and popular sectors, but not those who benefit from the resistance
All the parties
The whole community
The respected, not the benefitting people
Political and national forces
Political, popular parties and all levels of the community
The current popular resistance is not real
Unified leadership from the people and the political parties
The armed resistance, the armed struggle parties
The popular committees mostly only work for money
People who care for Palestine and can make decisions
Non-professionals
National groups/parties
Popular and political groups together for the people against the occupation
Popular committees and political parties
People who have sacrificed and the parents of martyrs and prisoners, and people who lost land
The PA and the community
The people
The Palestinian people
The PA and the people
Political parties and the popular groups
The people not the government
People
The rebels and the guns, not the politicians and negotiations
The civil community and the parties and the leadership
The people first, because the people have the ability to raise or knock down anything, especially the youth
Palestinian people
Religion
The educated groups