Reasons and causes
Date
1973
Authors
Hilditch, Jennifer Joan
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Abstract
It is my concern in this thesis to consider the question whether the reasons for action in terms of the agent's wants, beliefs and motives constitute causally necessary and sufficient conditions for his intention to act, and subsequent action.
I begin by outlining the contributions of various philosophers towards an analysis of the various concepts involved, - my aim being to suggest where some of the boundaries between the concepts lie. I indicate that explanations in terms of motives, the intention with which an action is performed, and the agent's reasons, can be restated in terms of the agent's wants and corresponding beliefs; and hence whether the former attribute causal conditions depends on whether the wants and corresponding beliefs are causes.
I Also suggest at this point that criterion for intentional action is that the agent has the intention of performing the action, rather than that he has an intention in performing it, or an intention with which he performs it.
In the second chapter, I survey some prominent arguments presented by philosophers both for and against the claim that reasons for action are causes, and conclude that the arguments proposed against the causal hypothesis are untenable. They do indicate the various other explanatory roles of explanations in terms of reasons for action, - redescribing justifying, etc., but none of these roles eliminates the possibility of the antecedents to the action referred to in the explanations, the agent's wants and beliefs, being causal conditions of the action. I also support the arguments in favour of the 'realist' interpretation of dispositions, - and hence maintain that dispositional explanations may be causal explanations.
In the subsequent chapters, I consider various characteristics of 'wants'. I take 'want' in the widest sense to cover any pro-attitude towards the action, as opposed to the restricted sense in which it is sometimes used in contrast to e.g. 'obligation'. In the wide sense of 'want' 'he intends to X' logically entails 'he wants to X' i.e. 'he has some pro-attitude towards doing X'.
I suggest that there is a lack of parity between various causal models and the relationship of wants to the intention and fulfilling action. Wants are unlike dispositional causes in certain respects relating to conflicting wants. They are nevertheless like dispositions in that they are tendencies, but their characteristics are more appropriately describe by an indeterministic model.
I argue that 'He wants to X' logically entails 'If he believes (without a doubt) that he has the opportunity and capacity and no conflicting want, he is rational about these beliefs and he does not change his mind, he intends to X'. It could be claimed that although this is not a logical entailment, it may nevertheless also describe a causal connection. At this juncture I suggest that what is implied by the want is not a hypothetical proposition like e.g. a dispositional statement; but rather, the provisional intention 'he intends (to X if he has the opportunity, and capacity, and no conflicting wants)'. An agent cannot consistently want to X, and deny that he intends to X if the appropriate conditions prevail. But the belief implicit in the first person expression of the want, 'If conditions a, b and c prevail, I am going to X' cannot be simply a prediction of a future intention. In order to convey what is expressed by a want, it must be a represent provisional intention.
I then argue that certain peculiarities would result if the provisional intention were a causal condition of the categorical intention. I illustrate first of all the similarities and distinctions between the proviso of provisional intentions and the conditional of non-intentional quasi-self-fulfilling conditional anticipations. It emerges that the recognition of the self-fulfilling character of the provisional intention must be incorporated into the 'if-clause' in order for it to qualify as in intention, and be self-fulfilling. Given this necessary implicit awareness of its self-fulfilling character, the provisional intention would be irrational if causally self-fulfilling. The fulfillment of the categorical intention is the same as the fulfillment of the provisional intention from which it is inferred when the agent believes the conditions of the proviso to obtain. Hence if the provisional intention caused the categorical intention it would be causally self-fulfilling and thus irrational. On the presupposition that provisional intentions are not irrational, I suggest that the provisional intention does not cause the categorical intention.
After illustrating more fully the relationship between motive explanations and wants, I conclude by indicating that, although I have been concerned with elucidating the characteristics of the reasons for action in terms of the agent's wants and beliefs, an analysis of the intention, - the intention of acting -, is required for a full account of the nature of the antecedents to action - although to give the intention of is not to give one of the reasons why he did it. I suggest also that it is open to the physicalist to claim that although wants and beliefs exhibit this indeterminacy in the characteristics pertaining to conflicting wants, on the conceptual level, there may be an explanation giving causally necessary and sufficient conditions in physical terms.