An analysis of evolutionary ethics.
Date
1973
Authors
Bharati, Navtej Singh
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Abstract
One of the mail claims of evolutionary ethics is that the theory of evolution can provide us with an ethical criterion. The present thesis investigates this claim. The thesis examines some of the important theories of evolutionary ethics and also reviews the up-to-date philosophical evaluation of evolutionary ethics.
Chapter I, begins with a brief discussion of Darwin's theory of natural selection. It is shown that the theory does not imply, as it is thought, a law of progress. It is also shown that the theory is not entirely compatible with Darwin's theory of conscience. The account of Spencer's evolutionary ethics divided into two versions: social Darwinism and non-social Darwinism. The former version is dismissed as a misapplication of some of the biological terms to ethics. The latter is considered to be more complex. Spencer's ethical criterion, i.e. 'the conduciveness to life is good' is discussed and his argument for the 'inevitable progress' implied by the process of evolution is shown to be invalid. The chapter ends with a brief account of T. H. Huxley's refutation of what he calls 'the fallacy of perfection' related to the evolutionary process.
Chapter II, examines in detail the theories of evolutionary ethics put forth by Julian Huxley, C. H. Waddington, T. Dobzhansky, G. G. Simpson and C. D. Leake. The concept of the general direction of evolution is examined. It is shown that this concept neither implies Julian Huxley's theory of the morality of open development nor does it imply C. H. Waddington's ethical criterion of 'biological wisdom.' Dobzhansky's concepts of freedom, genetic indeterminism, choice and Simpson's concepts of knowledge and responsibility are examined in the context of ethics. Similarly C. D. Leake's moral criterion i.e., "the probability of survival of a relationship between individual humans or groups of humans increases with the extent to which what relationship is mutually satisfying" is shown to be untenable.
Chapter II deals with Henry Sidgwick's and G. E. Moore's criticism of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary ethics. It is argued that although their criticism is correct, it nevertheless seems to be misdirected.
Chapter IV reviews contemporary philosophers' criticism of Julian Huxley's and C. H. Waddington's theories of evolutionary ethics. The philosophers reviewed are C. D. Broad, Stephen Toulmin, D. D. Raphael, Anthony Quinton and A. G. N. Flew.
Finally it is concluded in Chapter V that although the theory of evolution does not imply an ethical criterion it nevertheless can be considerably helpful in solving the practical moral issues of our age.