The first report of the Dardanelles Commission and the miswriting of history
Date
1995
Authors
Brucker, Laurie Gail
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Abstract
For the Allies, the Dardanelles campaign of the First World War was a disaster. Published in 1917, the First Report of the Dardanelles Commission criticised prominent individuals of the British government as explanation of this failure. Historians generally imitated this criticism of individuals. However, the First Report, and historians' use of it, are misleading. The Dardanelles Commission lacked documentary evidence, not all witnesses could testify before the Commission, and the report was censored. Furthermore, the evidence was never published, screening biases of the Commissioners. Historians have quoted from the First Report and its evidence without mentioning these important qualifications, thereby perpetuating misinterpretations of the Gallipoli expedition. This paper examines the production, limitations and evidence of the First Report. It concludes with an analysis of an oft-overlooked, but vital, section of the report which outlined "the higher organisation of the war" in Britain, and its broader responsibility for the Dardanelles fiasco.