Myths and realities of Vancouver's oriental trade, 1886-1942
dc.contributor.author | Adam, Robert David | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-07-31T22:14:41Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-07-31T22:14:41Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 1980 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 1980 | |
dc.degree.department | Department of History | en_US |
dc.degree.level | Master of Arts M.A. | en |
dc.description.abstract | The myth of Oriental trade, the conviction that trade with China and Japan was destined to be immensely lucrative, was common in the United States, Great Britain and Canada during the late nineteenth century. To some extent, it influenced government and business in all three nations. In Canada the myth supplied a minor motive for the construction of the C.P.R. and the main reason why the C.P.R. chose Vancouver as its western terminus and established a steamship service to the Orient. Thereafter the myth led Ottawa to oppose anti-Oriental legislation in British Columbia, lest it injure Canada's Oriental trade. Yet they need not have bothered, Canada's trade with China and Japan grew slowly before 1914 exposing the optimism as myth. Superficially, the story was the same in Vancouver, but there the myth and reality of trade had a much more positive influence. The myth was a powerful promotional element. Propagated in city publications, it deluded uncritical Vancouverites into believing that Oriental trade was already sizable, ever increasing or about to boom. Circumstantial evidence made the myth credible and Vancouverites embraced it because it was good publicity. Indeed, Vancouver came into existence because the C.P.R. followed the myth. The C.P.R. chose Vancouver's birthplace, named it and nurtured it as a transit port for Oriental trade. Company investment dictated the layout of the city's core, but after 1897 urban growth reduced the dominant influence of Oriental trade and the role of the myth in booster publications. The city's magazines had other assets to boast about. But domestic depression and the First World War enfeebled Vancouver's trade and exposed both the small size of Oriental trade and the myth. Despite the absence of many competitors Vancouver merchants could not trade with the Orient because they had no shipping or business connections. A few frustrated Canadians developed their own means of trade, but Americans and Japanese were mainly responsible for continuing Oriental trade. The Japanese expanded Vancouver's exports and sustained the port through the war years. Because Japan needed Canadian food and raw materials, Japanese entrepreneurs led the foreign interests which dominated Vancouver's post war trade. Famine and construction in China added to their demands to draw record exports from Vancouver in the 1920s. The boom revived the myth and poured millions of dollars into the city. But, based on unusually buoyant demand and foreign enterprise, it could not be permanent. When the Great Depression removed these elements, Canadian goods became overpriced, had no one to market them and Vancouver's Oriental trade collapsed. Nor did Oriental trade recover in 1935-1936 with other commerce, because protectionist agreements favoured Vancouver's trade with the British Empire rather than China and Japan. In 1937, the Sino-Japanese war cut off Chinese trade and, as fear of Japanese militarism increased, Ottawa legislated against mineral exports to Japan. Few lamented the loss because Vancouver was busy with other commerce. The Depression had buried the myth and without it Oriental trade no longer seemed worth saving. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 185 pages | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1828/16910 | |
dc.rights | Available to the World Wide Web | en_US |
dc.title | Myths and realities of Vancouver's oriental trade, 1886-1942 | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
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