Finitely Iterated Rational Secret Sharing With Private Information
| dc.contributor.author | Foster, Chelsey | |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Kapron, Bruce | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-01-06T19:14:01Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-01-06T19:14:01Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2014 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 2015-01-06 | |
| dc.degree.department | Department of Computer Science | en_US |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Science M.Sc. | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis considers the problem of finitely iterated rational secret sharing. We describe how to evaluate this problem using game theory and finitely iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The players each have a private horizon that the other player does not know. The only thing that a player knows about their opponent’s private horizon is a common upper bound. The description of a synchronous and asynchronous finitely iterated secret sharing protocol with private information is followed by a game theoretic proof of the viability of such protocols. | en_US |
| dc.description.scholarlevel | Graduate | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1828/5844 | |
| dc.language | English | eng |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
| dc.rights.temp | Available to the World Wide Web | en_US |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ | * |
| dc.subject | Rational Secret Sharing | en_US |
| dc.subject | Uncertainty in Prisoners Dilemma | en_US |
| dc.subject | Privately Informed Prisoners Dilemma | en_US |
| dc.subject | Rational Multi party computation | en_US |
| dc.title | Finitely Iterated Rational Secret Sharing With Private Information | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |