Is Sufficientarianism Sufficient? Prospects for the Sufficiency Threshold
dc.contributor.author | Hiebert, Melissa | |
dc.contributor.supervisor | Woodcock, Scott Frederick | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-09-01T22:42:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-09-01T22:42:28Z | |
dc.date.copyright | 2015 | en_US |
dc.date.issued | 2015-09-01 | |
dc.degree.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
dc.degree.level | Master of Arts M.A. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | The central doctrine of sufficientarianism is that there is a certain threshold below which people are said to be objectively "badly-off," and that providing benefits to people who fall into this category has a special moral urgency. A big part of sufficientarianism's success as a theory, then, relies on the ability to define the threshold in a manner that is non-arbitrary and that justifies a large difference in moral consideration between people who are on opposite sides of the threshold. This thesis examines some attempts to define such a threshold, and eventually concludes that no such threshold is available to us. However, while sufficientarianism may not work as a theory, sufficiency thresholds remain useful due to their practical ability to give useful instruction to policy makers in order to assist in resource distribution and the promotion of social justice. | en_US |
dc.description.scholarlevel | Graduate | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1828/6647 | |
dc.language | English | eng |
dc.language.iso | en | en_US |
dc.rights | Available to the World Wide Web | en_US |
dc.subject | Sufficientarianism | en_US |
dc.subject | Moral Philosophy | en_US |
dc.subject | Distributive Justice | en_US |
dc.subject | Global Ethics | en_US |
dc.title | Is Sufficientarianism Sufficient? Prospects for the Sufficiency Threshold | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |