Systematic Analysis and Methodologies for Hardware Security

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dc.contributor.authorMoein, Samer
dc.contributor.supervisorGebali, Fayez
dc.contributor.supervisorGulliver, T. Aaron
dc.date.accessioned2015-12-18T16:15:07Z
dc.date.available2015-12-18T16:15:07Z
dc.date.copyright2015en_US
dc.date.issued2015-12-18
dc.degree.departmentDepartment of Electrical and Computer Engineering
dc.degree.levelDoctor of Philosophy Ph.D.en_US
dc.description.abstractWith the increase in globalization of Integrated Circuit (IC) design and production, hardware trojans have become a serious threat to manufacturers as well as consumers. These trojans could be intensionally or accidentally embedded in ICs to make a system vulnerable to hardware attacks. The implementation of critical applications using ICs makes the effect of trojans an even more serious problem. Moreover, the presence of untrusted foundries and designs cannot be eliminated since the need for ICs is growing exponentially and the use of third party software tools to design the circuits is now common. In addition if a trusted foundry for fabrication has to be developed, it involves a huge investment. Therefore, hardware trojan detection techniques are essential. Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) system designers must now consider the security of a system against internal and external hardware attacks. Many hardware attacks rely on system vulnerabilities. Moreover, an attacker may rely on deprocessing and reverse engineering to study the internal structure of a system to reveal the system functionality in order to steal secret keys or copy the system. Thus hardware security is a major challenge for the hardware industry. Many hardware attack mitigation techniques have been proposed to help system designers build secure systems that can resist hardware attacks during the design stage, while others protect the system against attacks during operation. In this dissertation, the idea of quantifying hardware attacks, hardware trojans, and hardware trojan detection techniques is introduced. We analyze and classify hardware attacks into risk levels based on three dimensions Accessibility/Resources/Time (ART). We propose a methodology and algorithms to aid the attacker/defender to select/predict the hardware attacks that could use/threaten the system based on the attacker/defender capabilities. Because many of these attacks depends on hardware trojans embedded in the system, we propose a comprehensive hardware trojan classification based on hardware trojan attributes divided into eight categories. An adjacency matrix is generated based on the internal relationship between the attributes within a category and external relationship between attributes in different categories. We propose a methodology to generate a trojan life-cycle based on attributes determined by an attacker/defender to build/investigate a trojan. Trojan identification and severity are studied to provide a systematic way to compare trojans. Trojan detection identification and coverage is also studied to provide a systematic way to compare detection techniques and measure their e effectiveness related to trojan severity. We classify hardware attack mitigation techniques based on the hardware attack risk levels. Finally, we match these techniques to the attacks the could countermeasure to help defenders select appropriate techniques to protect their systems against potential hardware attacks.en_US
dc.description.proquestcode0544en_US
dc.description.proquestcode0984en_US
dc.description.proquestemailsamerm@uvic.caen_US
dc.description.scholarlevelGraduateen_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Fayez Gebali. "Quantifying Overt Hardware Attacks: Using ART Schema." Computer Science and its Applications. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 511-516. 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Fayez Gebali, and T. Aaron Gulliver ." Hardware Attack Mitigation Techniques Based on Hardware Attack Risk Levels."In IEEE Access, 2015. Submitted.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, T. Aaron Gulliver, and Fayez Gebali." Hardware Trojan Detection and Identification."In IEEE Access, 2015. Submitted.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Fayez Gebali, and T. Aaron Gulliver. "Hardware Attacks: An Algebraic Approach." In Journal of Cryptographic Engineering (JCEN), 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, T. Aaron Gulliver, and Fayez Gebali." A New Characterization of Hardware Trojan Attributes." In IEEE Transaction on Security and Forensics, 2015. Submitted.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Fayez Gebali, and Issa Traore. "Analysis of Covert Hardware Attacks." In Journal of Convergence Volume 5.3, 2014.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSabah Al-Fedaghi, and Samer Moein. "Modeling Attacks." In International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering 4.2, pp. 97-115, 2014.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationNicholas Houghton, Samer Moein, and Fayez Gebali. "A Web Based Tool For Classifying Hardware Trojans."In IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS ’16), 2016. Submitted.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Jayaram Subramnian, T. Aaron Gulliver, Fayez Gebali, and M. Watheq El-Kharashi. "Classification of Hardware Trojan Detection Techniques." In IEEE International Conference on Computer Engineering and Systems (ICCES ’15), 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Salman Khan, T. Aaron Gulliver, Fayez Gebali, and M. Watheq El-Kharashi. "An Attribute Based Classification of Hardware Trojans." In IEEE International Conference on Computer Engineering and Systems (ICCES ’15), 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, Fayez Gebali, T. Aaron Gulliver, and M. Watheq El-Kharashi. "Hardware Attack Risk Assessment." In IEEE International Conference on Computer Engineering and Systems (ICCES ’15), 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationAli Alzahrani, Samer Moein, Nicholas Houghton, and Fayez Gebali. "CRT Based Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption Over the Integers."In IEEE Pacific Rim Conference on Communications, Computers and Signal Processing (PacRim ’15), 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, and Fayez Gebali. "A Formal Methodology for Quantifying Overt Hardware Attacks." In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Computer Engineering and Applications (CEA ’15), pp. 63-69 , 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.bibliographicCitationSamer Moein, and Fayez Gebali. "Quantifying Covert Hardware Attacks: Using ART Schema."In Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Computer Engineering and Applications (CEA ’15), pp. 85-90, 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1828/6954
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.rightsAvailable to the World Wide Weben_US
dc.subjectHardware Attack Mitigationen_US
dc.subjectHardware Attacksen_US
dc.subjectHardware Securityen_US
dc.subjectHardware Trojan Detectionen_US
dc.subjectHardware Trojansen_US
dc.subject3D-ART Schemaen_US
dc.titleSystematic Analysis and Methodologies for Hardware Securityen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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