Can there be a good scientific explanation that nobody understands?
Date
2024
Authors
Tonkin, Nathan
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Publisher
University of Victoria
Abstract
My research looks at an ongoing debate in the philosophy of science about the nature of explanation. Central as data are three modes in which the term “explanation” is used: the representational mode, where models and theories explain phenomena; the ontic mode, where causes or mechanisms in the world explain phenomena; and the communicative mode, where people or groups explain phenomena to others. These different modes naturally employ diverging norms about how a successful explanation relates to the virtues of truth and understanding. For instance, in the communicative mode we often talk about explanations that simplify the facts to facilitate understanding. So we can see trade-offs where truth is sacrificed but understanding is gained. A mathematical model that is perfectly accurate but intractably complex would be an example of the opposite trade-off. Thus, puzzles arise over what is required for a putative explanation to really count as a scientific explanation. I researched philosophical arguments and surveys of opinion to familiarize myself with how philosophers and scientists view this complex relationship between explanation, truth, and understanding.
Description
Keywords
explanation, understanding, ontic explanation, communicative explanation, philosophy of science