Internal Accommodation in Moral Irrealism

dc.contributor.authorZolotar, Mark
dc.contributor.supervisorWoodcock, Scott Frederick
dc.date.accessioned2013-08-23T20:13:26Z
dc.date.available2013-08-23T20:13:26Z
dc.date.copyright2013en_US
dc.date.issued2013-08-23
dc.degree.departmentDepartment of Philosophy
dc.degree.levelMaster of Arts M.A.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn metaethics, moral irrealists argue that moral facts are neither ontologically real nor mind-independent. In moral semantics, irrealists who are descriptivist error theorists argue that typical moral claims attempt to report descriptive moral facts but that such facts do not exist, so typical moral claims are descriptively false or erroneous. Moral irrealists who are non-descriptivists, such as Mark Timmons, argue for a different function of moral claims. Timmons argues that moral claims attempt to guide action. He further maintains that moral claims can be true or false, but not according to a descriptivist function (he affirms cognitivism but denies descriptivism). I lay out Timmons‘ semantics and grapple with a number of objections to his view. I conclude that Timmons ought to discard his contextual truth-apt semantics and his non-descriptivism; instead he should defend the prescriptive, or evaluative, function of moral claims within an overarching descriptivist error theory.en_US
dc.description.proquestcode0422en_US
dc.description.scholarlevelGraduateen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1828/4829
dc.languageEnglisheng
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.rights.tempAvailable to the World Wide Weben_US
dc.subjectmoral realismen_US
dc.subjectmoral irrealismen_US
dc.subjectinternal accommodationen_US
dc.subjectmetaethicsen_US
dc.subjectmoral semanticsen_US
dc.subjectmoral truthen_US
dc.titleInternal Accommodation in Moral Irrealismen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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