The burning question : regulating the fire insurance industry in Ontario, 1883-1929
| dc.contributor.author | Cox, Theresa Michelle | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-13T18:16:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-08-13T18:16:28Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | 1994 | en_US |
| dc.date.issued | 1994 | |
| dc.degree.department | Department of History | |
| dc.degree.level | Master of Arts M.A. | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Studies of regulation have focussed on state regulation as the primary method of rationalizing the economy. However, self-regulation within industries provided an alternate form of regulation. The Canadian Fire Underwriters' Association (CFUA), a combination of joint stock insurance companies, sought to establish economic order in the Ontario insurance market by utilizing self-regulation. It controlled insurance rates, entry conditions, and enforced internal discipline over its membership in its exercise of private authority. It evolved because the unique legal and economic characteristics of fire insurance encouraged volatile price fluctuations in an unregulated market, creating hazardous and unstable business conditions for both ·consumers and insurance companies. Given the ambiguous constitutional jurisdiction and an aversion to state regulation, joint stock companies sought self-regulation as an appropriate regulatory mechanism. The Association's ability to reconcile industry problems and arbitrate members' differences without infringing on the managerial prerogatives of its membership was a measure of the Association's success, permitting competitors within the industry to regulate the industry effectively. The relationship between the insurance industry and the Ontario government was redefined between 1917 and 1923 as a result of an Ontario Insurance Commission which investigated the role of the CFUA and the availability of fire insurance in Ontario. The Commission recommended a new role for government in the regulatory process, while at the same time affirming the central and defining role played by the Underwriters in maintaining stability and price control. The Underwriters had convinced the Insurance Commissioner that, although they were exercising quasi-public power through their control of the industry, they were doing so, successfully, in the public interest. In their deliberations over the recommendations proposed by the Ontario Insurance Commission, Ontario governments pursued their own political goals. The United Farmers of Ontario government viewed the central purpose of the new regulatory impetus as reducing the costs of insurance to the consumer. The Conservative government which took office in 1923, on the other hand, sought to use the insurance issue as an opportunity to broaden its constitutional authority over "property and civil rights". These government agendas clearly defined the goals of the regulatory process and created the arena for political and economic activity. The Underwriters actively participated in the regulatory process, not to create favorable regulation, but to ensure that any inevitable regulation was not incompatible with the operation of their enterprise. The resulting regulation left self-regulation essentially unchanged. Unlike the public utilities, the Underwriters' exercise of monopoly control did not create social or economic instability. Implicitly, the government had defined fire insurance within the realm of private property, rather than public property. This allowed the Association to continue self-regulation, albeit under closer scrutiny. | en |
| dc.format.extent | 169 pages | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1828/17558 | |
| dc.rights | Available to the World Wide Web | en_US |
| dc.title | The burning question : regulating the fire insurance industry in Ontario, 1883-1929 | en_US |
| dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
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