Meaning in Language: Representation, Structure, and Wittgenstein's Worksite
Date
2024
Authors
Simons, Thomas
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
University of Victoria
Abstract
Most philosophy of language has proceeded as though, in the important cases, language is meaningful in virtue of representing reality. It has seemed clear to the majority of philosophers who have worked in this field that the study of linguistic meaning is the study of how symbols relate to the things they signify, which either are, or determine, those symbols’ meanings. Up to the turn of the 20th century, in fact, this approach to meaning had enjoyed near-total ubiquity. However, in the later part of his career, the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein became utterly disaffected with this dominant paradigm (which I call “representationalist”) and sought a new approach to understanding meaning in language. This approach centers language’s status as a human activity, an activity that is therefore inextricable from our behaviour, our aims, our culture, and myriad other aspects of human existence. Briefly put, “to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life” (Philosophical Investigations, §19). My research consisted mostly of reading, and reading about, philosophy of language that has been done since Wittgenstein. Being very sympathetic to many of Wittgenstein’s views, I also explored ways of characterizing them, and ways of defending them and related views against common objections.
Description
Keywords
Wittgenstein, language, semantics, intentionality