American policy toward Japan's military capability during the occupation : from disarmament to rearmament
Date
1985
Authors
Kinugawa, Kazuhide
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Abstract
As a result of its defeat in World War II, Japan was subject to Allied occupation from 1945 to 1952. The Occupation was carried out under the predominant influence of · the United States, and the ultimate objective of the Occupation was to "reorient" the Japanese. Under this circumstance, the defeated nation was told by the Americans, first, not to have armed forces and later to have them. American policy on Japan's maintenance of military forces changed diametrically from disarmament to rearmament. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the change in American policy toward Japanese military capability during the Occupation period. For this purpose, diplomatic documents published by the U.S. State Department are
used as primary sources.
To trace the change in American policy, I take note of three sets of legal documents although my argument is not strictly restricted to them. The documents are a war-renunciation clause in the Japanese Constitution, a Japanese disarmament treaty, and a Japanese peace treaty. The first was designed to institutionalize the disarmament of Japan domestically, and the other two internationally, at least at the beginning. As the American-Soviet relationship deteriorated, American attitude toward the documents ~hanged, and a Japanese disarmament treaty was dropped. Finally, a Japanese peace treaty did not impose any restrictions on the ex-enemy's armaments, and the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty urged Japan to rearm. I believe that those documents are useful clues in examining American attitude toward Japan's military strength.
A few points are notable in the change in American policy on Japan's armaments. First, the United States changed its Japan policy from disarmament to rearmament as the cold war intensified. In the process, a relatively large shift occurred twice, that is, in early 1948 and in mid 1950. Those shifts were brought about not simply by the mere intensification of the cold war, but rather by a sort of II shock. Second, while the problem of whether Japan should be disarmed or rearmed was determined in terms of America's own interests, U .S. policy-makers showed consideration for other Allied countries' fears of Japan in working out the way the ex-enemy should be disarmed or rearmed. Third, from the viewpoint of Washington policy-makers, the war-renunciation clause was not so much right as acceptable in 1946. Given the circumstance in which the clause was adopted, to Washington, the incorporation of the no-war article in the Japanese Constitution was not a mistake but an accident.