The issue of preparedness in the Canadian army, 1919 to 1939 as reflected in the career of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C.
Date
1968
Authors
Whitfield, Philip Rodney
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Abstract
The issue of preparedness in the Canadian army between the First and Second World Wars has received relatively little historical attention outside the field of regimental histories. This paper endeavours to present a somewhat different aspect of the picture by approaching the subject on three interrelated levels. At what might be termed the governmental or policy level it traces the underlying reasons for Canadian neglect of the army from 1919 to 1939. At the second level, it examines the effects of the policies of the period upon military preparedness generally. Finally, it reveals how these conditions were regarded by an individual officer, the then Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel George R. Pearkes, V.C.
As a Permanent Force staff officer between the wars, George Pearkes experienced at first hand the problems involved in creating and maintaining an effective peacetime army in the face of government and public indifference and even hostility. This paper shows that Pearkes' experiences and attitudes were not unique but were reflected throughout the army as a whole. The paper also attempts to make it clear that the causes of the inter-war military unpreparedness were beyond the control of any individual or government. Among these causes
were the isolationist attitude of French Canada, the strength of pacifism after the Great War and the sense of security afforded Canadians by their country's geographical position.
It is not intended that this thesis should draw any new or radical conclusions about the subject of Canadian military preparedness from 1919 to 1939. Rather, it is intended to present new, and it is hoped, useful material on the subject in the context of information already available from other sources.