Making freedom meaningful: why choice is not enough
Date
2002
Authors
Singh, Jakeet
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Abstract
A dominant conception of freedom in modem liberal society construes freedom as a matter of 'choice' alone, such that a person is considered 'free' when she is left alone to make her own choices. This view is grounded in a moral relativism which holds that each person's choices should not be challenged by others. This conception of freedom, however, is based on a faulty notion of the self and of choice, and produces two harmful effects: first, it erodes meaning in our lives, and second, it blocks the necessary conditions for certain aspects of freedom. Using the insights of Charles Taylor, Richard Rorty, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and others, a more adequate notion of the self is sketched, and an alternative conception of freedom is derived, one which protects the place of meaning in our lives, and makes room for the agonistic interactions that are integral to modem liberal freedom.