David Chalmers' "hard problem" of consciousness : a critique

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dc.contributor.authorBurgoyne, Anthony Josephen_US
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-13T00:06:49Z
dc.date.available2024-08-13T00:06:49Z
dc.date.copyright2003en_US
dc.date.issued2003
dc.degree.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.degree.levelMaster of Arts M.A.en
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I will argue against the idea, put forth most notably in recent times by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, that a relationship based on logical necessitation or a priori entailment is required for there to be an adequate reductive explanation. I will argue, rather, that the paradigm cases of purported logical necessitation or a priori entailment do not obtain. Therefore, the case for logical necessitation or a priori entailment being an explication of reductive explanation is weak.
dc.format.extent106 pages
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1828/17136
dc.rightsAvailable to the World Wide Weben_US
dc.titleDavid Chalmers' "hard problem" of consciousness : a critiqueen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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