Theses (Philosophy)
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Item The possibility of theoretical synthetic apriori knowledge within a Kantian frame of reference.(1974) Tse, Tony Kar-CheungItem The interrelations of Kant's formulae of the categorical imperative(1975) Tse, Grace Chung-yeeItem Varieties of holism in meaning theories(1995) Thorne, Terence WilliamItem Reasons and causes(1973) Hilditch, Jennifer JoanIt is my concern in this thesis to consider the question whether the reasons for action in terms of the agent's wants, beliefs and motives constitute causally necessary and sufficient conditions for his intention to act, and subsequent action. I begin by outlining the contributions of various philosophers towards an analysis of the various concepts involved, - my aim being to suggest where some of the boundaries between the concepts lie. I indicate that explanations in terms of motives, the intention with which an action is performed, and the agent's reasons, can be restated in terms of the agent's wants and corresponding beliefs; and hence whether the former attribute causal conditions depends on whether the wants and corresponding beliefs are causes. I Also suggest at this point that criterion for intentional action is that the agent has the intention of performing the action, rather than that he has an intention in performing it, or an intention with which he performs it. In the second chapter, I survey some prominent arguments presented by philosophers both for and against the claim that reasons for action are causes, and conclude that the arguments proposed against the causal hypothesis are untenable. They do indicate the various other explanatory roles of explanations in terms of reasons for action, - redescribing justifying, etc., but none of these roles eliminates the possibility of the antecedents to the action referred to in the explanations, the agent's wants and beliefs, being causal conditions of the action. I also support the arguments in favour of the 'realist' interpretation of dispositions, - and hence maintain that dispositional explanations may be causal explanations. In the subsequent chapters, I consider various characteristics of 'wants'. I take 'want' in the widest sense to cover any pro-attitude towards the action, as opposed to the restricted sense in which it is sometimes used in contrast to e.g. 'obligation'. In the wide sense of 'want' 'he intends to X' logically entails 'he wants to X' i.e. 'he has some pro-attitude towards doing X'. I suggest that there is a lack of parity between various causal models and the relationship of wants to the intention and fulfilling action. Wants are unlike dispositional causes in certain respects relating to conflicting wants. They are nevertheless like dispositions in that they are tendencies, but their characteristics are more appropriately describe by an indeterministic model. I argue that 'He wants to X' logically entails 'If he believes (without a doubt) that he has the opportunity and capacity and no conflicting want, he is rational about these beliefs and he does not change his mind, he intends to X'. It could be claimed that although this is not a logical entailment, it may nevertheless also describe a causal connection. At this juncture I suggest that what is implied by the want is not a hypothetical proposition like e.g. a dispositional statement; but rather, the provisional intention 'he intends (to X if he has the opportunity, and capacity, and no conflicting wants)'. An agent cannot consistently want to X, and deny that he intends to X if the appropriate conditions prevail. But the belief implicit in the first person expression of the want, 'If conditions a, b and c prevail, I am going to X' cannot be simply a prediction of a future intention. In order to convey what is expressed by a want, it must be a represent provisional intention. I then argue that certain peculiarities would result if the provisional intention were a causal condition of the categorical intention. I illustrate first of all the similarities and distinctions between the proviso of provisional intentions and the conditional of non-intentional quasi-self-fulfilling conditional anticipations. It emerges that the recognition of the self-fulfilling character of the provisional intention must be incorporated into the 'if-clause' in order for it to qualify as in intention, and be self-fulfilling. Given this necessary implicit awareness of its self-fulfilling character, the provisional intention would be irrational if causally self-fulfilling. The fulfillment of the categorical intention is the same as the fulfillment of the provisional intention from which it is inferred when the agent believes the conditions of the proviso to obtain. Hence if the provisional intention caused the categorical intention it would be causally self-fulfilling and thus irrational. On the presupposition that provisional intentions are not irrational, I suggest that the provisional intention does not cause the categorical intention. After illustrating more fully the relationship between motive explanations and wants, I conclude by indicating that, although I have been concerned with elucidating the characteristics of the reasons for action in terms of the agent's wants and beliefs, an analysis of the intention, - the intention of acting -, is required for a full account of the nature of the antecedents to action - although to give the intention of is not to give one of the reasons why he did it. I suggest also that it is open to the physicalist to claim that although wants and beliefs exhibit this indeterminacy in the characteristics pertaining to conflicting wants, on the conceptual level, there may be an explanation giving causally necessary and sufficient conditions in physical terms.Item John Stuart Mill and the practice of liberty : a study of John Stuart Mill's essay "On liberty"(1984) Getz, Russell JohnThe thesis gives an account of Mill's defence of liberty in the essay "On Liberty" and critically examines Mill's arguments therein. In Chapters One and Two, we consider Mill's principle of liberty, which is mainly dealt with in Chapters One, Four and Five of "On Liberty." We also consider the purported utilitarian justification of the liberty principle. In Chapters Three and Four, we analyze Mill's theory of the liberty of thought and discussion, and his theory of individuality, respectively. In Chapter Five we return to a consideration of the true nature of Mill's justification of liberty, in the light of our inquiry in the preceding chapters. Wherever possible, Mill's arguments are dealt with in the same order as they appear in "On Liberty." With respect to the principle of liberty, it is argued that Mill's concept of harm or injury to others is problematic and that the liberty principle is not ultimately a workable guide for delimiting the scope of individual liberty. It is also seen that the nature of Mill's justification for the liberty principle is by no means clearly utilitarian in the sense of Mill's essay "Utilitarianism." Mill's theory of liberty of thought and discussion as being necessary to the attainment of vigorous knowledge of truth and also thereby the mental well-being of mankind is seen as compelling and persuasive. Central to Mill's position is his belief in objective truth and in the importance to mankind of the rational search for and appreciation of the truth. We then turn to a discussion of Mill's account of individuality. Because of the rich variety of senses of individuality present in the limited space of Chapter Three of "On Liberty," it is not always easy to see the exact nature of Mill's conception of human personality, but running throughout the chapter is Mill's concern that although society is conformist, individuals are not naturally the same in all respects. Therefore individual choice and liberty in things which do not harm others are necessary in order to develop our human capacities for thought, judgment, discrimination and creativity. We see that, for Mill, contrary to the views of some critics, variety and eccentricity are not valued for their own sake. We also criticize Mill's overly atomistic view of man's place in society and argue that Mill's practical strategy for securing individuality could be improved by a sense of the need for individuals to seek support from helpful social practices and institutions. Ironically, among these may be some traditions, of which Mill is very critical. In concluding our study of "On Liberty," we see that despite the inadequacy of the liberty principle, Mill's arguments for liberty of thought and discussion, and for individuality, have enduring value. We see that the justification on which Mill's theory of liberty centres is mankind's capacity for developing our human faculties of mind and character, which he expounds in Chapters Two and Three of "On Liberty." As seen in the essay "On Liberty" and in passages from other relevant works, the justification of liberty in terms of the development of our distinctive human endowments, is underwritten by Mill's confidence in the advancement of knowledge of objective truth.Item An analysis of evolutionary ethics.(1973) Bharati, Navtej SinghOne of the mail claims of evolutionary ethics is that the theory of evolution can provide us with an ethical criterion. The present thesis investigates this claim. The thesis examines some of the important theories of evolutionary ethics and also reviews the up-to-date philosophical evaluation of evolutionary ethics. Chapter I, begins with a brief discussion of Darwin's theory of natural selection. It is shown that the theory does not imply, as it is thought, a law of progress. It is also shown that the theory is not entirely compatible with Darwin's theory of conscience. The account of Spencer's evolutionary ethics divided into two versions: social Darwinism and non-social Darwinism. The former version is dismissed as a misapplication of some of the biological terms to ethics. The latter is considered to be more complex. Spencer's ethical criterion, i.e. 'the conduciveness to life is good' is discussed and his argument for the 'inevitable progress' implied by the process of evolution is shown to be invalid. The chapter ends with a brief account of T. H. Huxley's refutation of what he calls 'the fallacy of perfection' related to the evolutionary process. Chapter II, examines in detail the theories of evolutionary ethics put forth by Julian Huxley, C. H. Waddington, T. Dobzhansky, G. G. Simpson and C. D. Leake. The concept of the general direction of evolution is examined. It is shown that this concept neither implies Julian Huxley's theory of the morality of open development nor does it imply C. H. Waddington's ethical criterion of 'biological wisdom.' Dobzhansky's concepts of freedom, genetic indeterminism, choice and Simpson's concepts of knowledge and responsibility are examined in the context of ethics. Similarly C. D. Leake's moral criterion i.e., "the probability of survival of a relationship between individual humans or groups of humans increases with the extent to which what relationship is mutually satisfying" is shown to be untenable. Chapter II deals with Henry Sidgwick's and G. E. Moore's criticism of Herbert Spencer's evolutionary ethics. It is argued that although their criticism is correct, it nevertheless seems to be misdirected. Chapter IV reviews contemporary philosophers' criticism of Julian Huxley's and C. H. Waddington's theories of evolutionary ethics. The philosophers reviewed are C. D. Broad, Stephen Toulmin, D. D. Raphael, Anthony Quinton and A. G. N. Flew. Finally it is concluded in Chapter V that although the theory of evolution does not imply an ethical criterion it nevertheless can be considerably helpful in solving the practical moral issues of our age.Item David Chalmers' "hard problem" of consciousness : a critique(2003) Burgoyne, Anthony JosephIn this thesis, I will argue against the idea, put forth most notably in recent times by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson, that a relationship based on logical necessitation or a priori entailment is required for there to be an adequate reductive explanation. I will argue, rather, that the paradigm cases of purported logical necessitation or a priori entailment do not obtain. Therefore, the case for logical necessitation or a priori entailment being an explication of reductive explanation is weak.Item Psychological behaviorism, explanation and action(1984) Ayers, James DouglasThis study examines the nature of explanation in psychological behaviorism and the relation of behaviorism to commonsensical and philosophical discussion of action. The central thesis in the study is that the type of explanation in behavioral psychology provides a correct but limited approach to understanding important aspects of action. This thesis is supported by an examination of representative criticisms, an analysis of explanation per se, an analysis of the concern within behavioral psychology for action as a class of behavior, and finally, by an argument for compatibility of behavioristic and intentional explanation in which the different explanation types are shown to be appropriate to particular questions. The study begins with a brief sketch of the behaviorist position and then moves to an examination of representative analytic criticisms; all of which suggest that behaviorism, in spite of whatever facts it offers up, fails to explain action. An analysis of explanation is then given in which a classification of different types of explanation is presented, criteria of adequacy and relevancy are developed and the significance of context dependency for explanation is demonstrated. The analytic distinctions developed in the consideration of explanation are then applied in an examination of the development of a behavioristic account of action. This leads to a more detailed consideration of some of the work of B. F. Skinner and, in particular, of his claim that a behavioral analysis on the model of operant conditioning can deal adequately with intentional action. The questions about adequacy of explanation raised in the criticisms of behaviorism are then addressed and it is argued that some of the criticisms rest on a misunderstanding of the explanatory project in behaviorism. Finally, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, the question of the compatibility of the behaviorist position with intentional explanation is examined. Here it is argued that, while a demonstration of compatibility based on an analysis of wants and beliefs as causes of action is inadequate, compatibility can be demonstrated in terms of context dependency.Item Error bounds for an inequality system(2018-10-23) Wu, Zili; Ye, Jane J.For an inequality system, an error bound is an estimation for the distance from any point to the solution set of the inequality. The Ekeland variational principle (EVP) is an important tool in the study of error bounds. We prove that EVP is equivalent to an error bound result and present several sufficient conditions for an inequality system to have error bounds. In a metric space, a condition is similar to that of Takahashi. In a Banach space we express conditions in terms of an abstract subdifferential and the lower Dini derivative. We then discuss error bounds with exponents by a relation between the lower Dini derivatives of a function and its power function. For an l.s.c. convex function on a reflexive Banach space these conditions turn out to be equivalent. Furthermore a global error bound closely relates to the metric regularity.Item Telling "I"'s: figuring the female subject in linking narratives by Anna Jameson, Sara Jeannette Duncan and Mavis Gallant(2018-06-14) Sellwood, Jane Leslie; Dean, MisaoThe linking short narratives explored in this study-- Anna Jameson's Winter Studies and Summer Rambles in Canada, Sara Jeannette Duncan's The Pool In the Desert and Mavis Gallant's Home Truths— employ first-person narrators to both comply with and subvert dominant ideas of the gendered female subject. In addition, these representative linking narrative texts demonstrate that choices to do with form, as well as subject and theme, may both support and subvert the discourses of the time and place in which they are written. My exploration of these three representative texts draws from W.H. New's fragmentation theory of short narratives, Gérard Genette's narrative theory of voice and mood, Paul de Man's problematization of generic distinctions between autobiography and fiction, and Julia Kristeva's theory of the speaking subject as text in process and vice versa. Jameson's Romantic "I" uses the miscellany's flexible form of linking short narratives autobiographically to both reify and recuse nineteenth-century genre conventions of travel narrative and the gendered position of women in Europe and Canada. As the Recusant "I," first person narration in Duncan's quartet of stories figures splits not only between female desire and gender codes, but also between creative imagination and conditions of exile. With a psychopoetics of the unsaid, the Remembering "I" of Gallant's linking narratives figures female subjectivity as a process of both psychology and history. These women-authored linking narratives challenge assumptions that first-person narration is univocal, and therefore problematize distinctions between autobiography and fiction. In their uses of the linking narrative form, they also challenge aesthetic criteria that privilege wholeness and unity— of the novel, for example— in concepts of mimesis dominating representations of reality in their respective periods. These first-person linking narratives use the voice of the "I" subversively, telling the doubled position of the female subject in the discourses of genre and gender.Item Unbelievable doubts (and other skeptical discoveries)(2017-05-01) Faerber, Jonathan; Woodcock, ScottMoral skeptics sometimes argue that science is at odds with morality. These arguments sometimes privilege scientific explanations of moral belief at the expense of objective moral knowledge. More specifically, since morality is (arguably) a biological adaptation involving belief, Richard Joyce and Sharon Street doubt the justification and objective truth of moral belief, respectively. This thesis defends objective normative facts from this empirical problem. Reasons for moral skepticism are not compatible with arguments against objective normativity. Put simply, without objective normativity, skeptics have no ultimate reason to doubt anything in particular, moral or otherwise. So, on pain of incoherence, moral skeptics should doubt the truth, rather than the objective normativity, of moral belief.Item Health care in a multicultural Canada: the ethics of informed consent and the duty to warn of hereditary risk(2016-08-24) Dheri, Poonam; Kluge, Eike-Henner W.; Arbour, LauraDifferent people can have different cultural interpretations of the person—atomic versus embedded—and these may affect health care decision-making. This study examines both the ethics of variations in personhood as well as their implications for the doctrine of informed consent and the duty to warn of genetic disease risk. It argues that variations in personhood are consistent with the ethics of the Principle of Autonomy and the Canadian stand on informed consent, though autonomy and consent play out differently in practice on the two models. Also as a result of different interpretations of the person, the duty to warn of hereditary risk is found to be relevant to the atomic conception but unnecessary among embedded individuals.Item Costly choices: gender and luck egalitarianism(2016-02-01) Byrnes, Emma; Macleod, Colin M.Does choice excuse inequality? Some contemporary egalitarians – often referred to as “Luck Egalitarians” – believe it does. However, many seemingly chosen inequalities obtain between men and women as a group. A recent surge of empirical literature has sought to demonstrate the role that individual choice plays in producing and maintaining a subset of existing gender inequalities (e.g. the gender wage gap). This thesis considers the status of such inequalities in the context of the Luck Egalitarian project. More precisely, it considers whether the claim that choice excuses inequality is appropriate to the phenomenon of gendered choice. In Chapter 1, I argue that Luck Egalitarianism, as it currently stands, does not adequately deal with the topic of gendered choice. I maintain that this is due largely to the fact that it is not sufficiently attentive to the social forces shaping gendered choices (e.g. socialization, hostile social climates). In Chapter 2, I discuss whether attending more fully to factors that facilitate autonomy gives Luck Egalitarianism a way to incorporate a more robust discussion of gender into its account of responsible choice. I argue that contextualizing the choice/circumstance principle is the key to ensuring that it tracks truly autonomous choice, and avoids treating choices shaped by gender norms as justifiably disadvantage-conferring. In Chapter 3, I begin the project of articulating a set of background conditions against which we can deem choices authentic. I draw on feminist approaches to the philosophy of autonomy to inform this project. I come to the conclusion that choice excuses inequality only if such choices are made against conditions which actively work against gender-specific constraints on choice.Item Social Intercourse and Social Epistemology from Thomas Reid's Point of View(2015-09-02) Crosby, Alastair; Rysiew, Patrick WilliamThe first aim is to present the correct interpretation of Thomas Reid’s (1710-96) social epistemology. The second is to use Reid’s insights on these matters to help make some progress on a related contemporary philosophical problem. In the first chapter, I present and argue for an original interpretation of Reid’s account of the social operations. In the second, I do the same with respect to Reid’s account of testimony (a particular species of social operation) and its epistemology. In the third, I discuss a contemporary debate between epistemic individualists and epistemic socialists. I point out that the theorists engaged in that debate assume that epistemic individualism and epistemic socialism are inconsistent positions. I then consider the debate from Reid’s perspective, and, in doing so, show how the two positions might be reconciled.Item On Virtue, Value, and Epistemic Normativity(2015-09-01) Boren, Ted (Buddy); Rysiew, Patrick William; Cameron, MargaretVirtue epistemology is epistemological evaluation that gives ‘intellectual virtue’ a primary consideration in its analysis. This thesis is about how two types of virtue epistemology are related to each other, and how when taken broadly as a whole, virtue epistemology has theoretical and practical benefits for epistemic and epistemological evaluation. I begin by way of a quick historical review, and define epistemology as the study of good or bad ways of grasping reality. Part One is then devoted to describing the ‘virtue’ part of virtue epistemology. I posit a broad view of virtue: that human excellences come in the form of cognitive faculties and character traits. What binds them is a meta-epistemological commitment that epistemological analysis should focus on the whole of the person, which includes how the person relates to the environment, other persons, and importantly the values of the whole person. In Part Two, I take a closer look of how the various conceptions of intellectual virtue are different, specifically with an examination of epistemic value. In Part Three, I take up an objection levelled by the Epistemic Anti-Realist that is a call for concern for intellectual virtues, and epistemological evaluation on the whole.Item Is Sufficientarianism Sufficient? Prospects for the Sufficiency Threshold(2015-09-01) Hiebert, Melissa; Woodcock, Scott FrederickThe central doctrine of sufficientarianism is that there is a certain threshold below which people are said to be objectively "badly-off," and that providing benefits to people who fall into this category has a special moral urgency. A big part of sufficientarianism's success as a theory, then, relies on the ability to define the threshold in a manner that is non-arbitrary and that justifies a large difference in moral consideration between people who are on opposite sides of the threshold. This thesis examines some attempts to define such a threshold, and eventually concludes that no such threshold is available to us. However, while sufficientarianism may not work as a theory, sufficiency thresholds remain useful due to their practical ability to give useful instruction to policy makers in order to assist in resource distribution and the promotion of social justice.Item Overeating, Obesity, and Weakness of the Will(2015-08-28) Sommers, Jennifer Heidrun; Holder, CindyThe philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will tends to focus on individual actions, removed from their wider socio-political context. This is problematic because actions, when removed from their wider context, can seem absurd or irrational when they may, in fact, be completely rational or, at least, coherent. Much of akrasia's apparent mystery or absurdity is eliminated when people's behaviours are considered within their cultural and political context. I apply theories from the social and behavioural sciences to a particular behaviour in order to show where the philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will is insightful and where it is lacking. The problem used as the basis for my analysis is obesity caused by overeating. On the whole, I conclude that our intuitions about agency are unreliable, that we may have good reasons to overeat and/or neglect our health, and that willpower is, to some degree, a matter of luck.Item What makes pain unique? : a critique of representationalism about pain in service of perceptualism(2014-09-02) Park, Andrew Erich; Rysiew, Patrick WilliamThe goal of this thesis is to defend non-representationalist perceptualism about pain against the challenges brought to it by Murat Aydede. These challenges are intended to apply to both a strong version of representationalism and general perceptualism about pain, however I maintain that they are less effective when aimed at the latter. In the interest of pulling apart these two views, I suggest that a more comprehensive theory of introspection than what is currently being used in the debate should be given. This thesis is an attempt to put forward such a view in service of the perceptual theorist. Once an alternative theory of introspection is given, several of the challenges that target perceptualism are avoided. Additionally I argue that the version of representationalism developed by Michael Tye is undermined by his explanation of pain’s negative affect. Consequently, I claim that one need not endorse representationalist commitments in order to maintain the attractive tenets of perceptualism.Item Existence, Noneism, and the varieties of worlds(2014-08-06) Garland, Carolyn; Raven, Michael J.; Yap, AudreyIntentionality is a feature of mental states that are directed towards objects. One puzzle of intentionality is that mental states can be directed towards nonexistent objects. We may relate to fictional characters, or worry about events that never take place. However, if these objects do not exist, then it is difficult to make sense of how it is that we bear these relations towards them. In this thesis I outline Graham Priest’s world-based semantic and metaphysical theory of intentionality intended to accommodate these intentional relations born towards nonexistent objects. Priest supposes that this theory is compatible with any conception of worlds. I argue that this is not the case. Within Priest’s framework merely possible worlds should be understood as existent genuine worlds, and impossible worlds can be neither existent genuine worlds, nor should they be conceived of as nonexistent objects. Instead impossible worlds must be something quite revolutionary.Item Disability and Sexual Justice(2014-08-06) De Boer, Tracy; Macleod, Colin M.In this thesis my aim is to bring attention to the problem of sexual exclusion as experienced by members of the disability community and argue that this is an issue of justice. I do this by first discussing the value of sex. I maintain that sex is an integral part of a flourishing human life. Once this is established, I examine theories of justice and demonstrate how the systematic sexual exclusion of persons with disabilities can be understood as an injustice that must be addressed. Finally, I give an overview of some of the proposed solutions to the problem of sexual exclusion and conclude that the transformation of social attitudes is necessary for sexual justice.