Theses (Philosophy)
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Item The possibility of theoretical synthetic apriori knowledge within a Kantian frame of reference.(1974) Tse, Tony Kar-CheungItem The interrelations of Kant's formulae of the categorical imperative(1975) Tse, Grace Chung-yeeItem Varieties of holism in meaning theories(1995) Thorne, Terence WilliamItem Reasons and causes(1973) Hilditch, Jennifer JoanItem John Stuart Mill and the practice of liberty : a study of John Stuart Mill's essay "On liberty"(1984) Getz, Russell JohnItem An analysis of evolutionary ethics.(1973) Bharati, Navtej SinghItem David Chalmers' "hard problem" of consciousness : a critique(2003) Burgoyne, Anthony JosephItem Psychological behaviorism, explanation and action(1984) Ayers, James DouglasItem Error bounds for an inequality system(2018-10-23) Wu, Zili; Ye, Jane J.For an inequality system, an error bound is an estimation for the distance from any point to the solution set of the inequality. The Ekeland variational principle (EVP) is an important tool in the study of error bounds. We prove that EVP is equivalent to an error bound result and present several sufficient conditions for an inequality system to have error bounds. In a metric space, a condition is similar to that of Takahashi. In a Banach space we express conditions in terms of an abstract subdifferential and the lower Dini derivative. We then discuss error bounds with exponents by a relation between the lower Dini derivatives of a function and its power function. For an l.s.c. convex function on a reflexive Banach space these conditions turn out to be equivalent. Furthermore a global error bound closely relates to the metric regularity.Item Telling "I"'s: figuring the female subject in linking narratives by Anna Jameson, Sara Jeannette Duncan and Mavis Gallant(2018-06-14) Sellwood, Jane Leslie; Dean, MisaoThe linking short narratives explored in this study-- Anna Jameson's Winter Studies and Summer Rambles in Canada, Sara Jeannette Duncan's The Pool In the Desert and Mavis Gallant's Home Truths— employ first-person narrators to both comply with and subvert dominant ideas of the gendered female subject. In addition, these representative linking narrative texts demonstrate that choices to do with form, as well as subject and theme, may both support and subvert the discourses of the time and place in which they are written. My exploration of these three representative texts draws from W.H. New's fragmentation theory of short narratives, Gérard Genette's narrative theory of voice and mood, Paul de Man's problematization of generic distinctions between autobiography and fiction, and Julia Kristeva's theory of the speaking subject as text in process and vice versa. Jameson's Romantic "I" uses the miscellany's flexible form of linking short narratives autobiographically to both reify and recuse nineteenth-century genre conventions of travel narrative and the gendered position of women in Europe and Canada. As the Recusant "I," first person narration in Duncan's quartet of stories figures splits not only between female desire and gender codes, but also between creative imagination and conditions of exile. With a psychopoetics of the unsaid, the Remembering "I" of Gallant's linking narratives figures female subjectivity as a process of both psychology and history. These women-authored linking narratives challenge assumptions that first-person narration is univocal, and therefore problematize distinctions between autobiography and fiction. In their uses of the linking narrative form, they also challenge aesthetic criteria that privilege wholeness and unity— of the novel, for example— in concepts of mimesis dominating representations of reality in their respective periods. These first-person linking narratives use the voice of the "I" subversively, telling the doubled position of the female subject in the discourses of genre and gender.Item Unbelievable doubts (and other skeptical discoveries)(2017-05-01) Faerber, Jonathan; Woodcock, ScottMoral skeptics sometimes argue that science is at odds with morality. These arguments sometimes privilege scientific explanations of moral belief at the expense of objective moral knowledge. More specifically, since morality is (arguably) a biological adaptation involving belief, Richard Joyce and Sharon Street doubt the justification and objective truth of moral belief, respectively. This thesis defends objective normative facts from this empirical problem. Reasons for moral skepticism are not compatible with arguments against objective normativity. Put simply, without objective normativity, skeptics have no ultimate reason to doubt anything in particular, moral or otherwise. So, on pain of incoherence, moral skeptics should doubt the truth, rather than the objective normativity, of moral belief.Item Health care in a multicultural Canada: the ethics of informed consent and the duty to warn of hereditary risk(2016-08-24) Dheri, Poonam; Kluge, Eike-Henner W.; Arbour, LauraDifferent people can have different cultural interpretations of the person—atomic versus embedded—and these may affect health care decision-making. This study examines both the ethics of variations in personhood as well as their implications for the doctrine of informed consent and the duty to warn of genetic disease risk. It argues that variations in personhood are consistent with the ethics of the Principle of Autonomy and the Canadian stand on informed consent, though autonomy and consent play out differently in practice on the two models. Also as a result of different interpretations of the person, the duty to warn of hereditary risk is found to be relevant to the atomic conception but unnecessary among embedded individuals.Item Costly choices: gender and luck egalitarianism(2016-02-01) Byrnes, Emma; Macleod, Colin M.Does choice excuse inequality? Some contemporary egalitarians – often referred to as “Luck Egalitarians” – believe it does. However, many seemingly chosen inequalities obtain between men and women as a group. A recent surge of empirical literature has sought to demonstrate the role that individual choice plays in producing and maintaining a subset of existing gender inequalities (e.g. the gender wage gap). This thesis considers the status of such inequalities in the context of the Luck Egalitarian project. More precisely, it considers whether the claim that choice excuses inequality is appropriate to the phenomenon of gendered choice. In Chapter 1, I argue that Luck Egalitarianism, as it currently stands, does not adequately deal with the topic of gendered choice. I maintain that this is due largely to the fact that it is not sufficiently attentive to the social forces shaping gendered choices (e.g. socialization, hostile social climates). In Chapter 2, I discuss whether attending more fully to factors that facilitate autonomy gives Luck Egalitarianism a way to incorporate a more robust discussion of gender into its account of responsible choice. I argue that contextualizing the choice/circumstance principle is the key to ensuring that it tracks truly autonomous choice, and avoids treating choices shaped by gender norms as justifiably disadvantage-conferring. In Chapter 3, I begin the project of articulating a set of background conditions against which we can deem choices authentic. I draw on feminist approaches to the philosophy of autonomy to inform this project. I come to the conclusion that choice excuses inequality only if such choices are made against conditions which actively work against gender-specific constraints on choice.Item Social Intercourse and Social Epistemology from Thomas Reid's Point of View(2015-09-02) Crosby, Alastair; Rysiew, Patrick WilliamThe first aim is to present the correct interpretation of Thomas Reid’s (1710-96) social epistemology. The second is to use Reid’s insights on these matters to help make some progress on a related contemporary philosophical problem. In the first chapter, I present and argue for an original interpretation of Reid’s account of the social operations. In the second, I do the same with respect to Reid’s account of testimony (a particular species of social operation) and its epistemology. In the third, I discuss a contemporary debate between epistemic individualists and epistemic socialists. I point out that the theorists engaged in that debate assume that epistemic individualism and epistemic socialism are inconsistent positions. I then consider the debate from Reid’s perspective, and, in doing so, show how the two positions might be reconciled.Item On Virtue, Value, and Epistemic Normativity(2015-09-01) Boren, Ted (Buddy); Rysiew, Patrick William; Cameron, MargaretVirtue epistemology is epistemological evaluation that gives ‘intellectual virtue’ a primary consideration in its analysis. This thesis is about how two types of virtue epistemology are related to each other, and how when taken broadly as a whole, virtue epistemology has theoretical and practical benefits for epistemic and epistemological evaluation. I begin by way of a quick historical review, and define epistemology as the study of good or bad ways of grasping reality. Part One is then devoted to describing the ‘virtue’ part of virtue epistemology. I posit a broad view of virtue: that human excellences come in the form of cognitive faculties and character traits. What binds them is a meta-epistemological commitment that epistemological analysis should focus on the whole of the person, which includes how the person relates to the environment, other persons, and importantly the values of the whole person. In Part Two, I take a closer look of how the various conceptions of intellectual virtue are different, specifically with an examination of epistemic value. In Part Three, I take up an objection levelled by the Epistemic Anti-Realist that is a call for concern for intellectual virtues, and epistemological evaluation on the whole.Item Is Sufficientarianism Sufficient? Prospects for the Sufficiency Threshold(2015-09-01) Hiebert, Melissa; Woodcock, Scott FrederickThe central doctrine of sufficientarianism is that there is a certain threshold below which people are said to be objectively "badly-off," and that providing benefits to people who fall into this category has a special moral urgency. A big part of sufficientarianism's success as a theory, then, relies on the ability to define the threshold in a manner that is non-arbitrary and that justifies a large difference in moral consideration between people who are on opposite sides of the threshold. This thesis examines some attempts to define such a threshold, and eventually concludes that no such threshold is available to us. However, while sufficientarianism may not work as a theory, sufficiency thresholds remain useful due to their practical ability to give useful instruction to policy makers in order to assist in resource distribution and the promotion of social justice.Item Overeating, Obesity, and Weakness of the Will(2015-08-28) Sommers, Jennifer Heidrun; Holder, CindyThe philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will tends to focus on individual actions, removed from their wider socio-political context. This is problematic because actions, when removed from their wider context, can seem absurd or irrational when they may, in fact, be completely rational or, at least, coherent. Much of akrasia's apparent mystery or absurdity is eliminated when people's behaviours are considered within their cultural and political context. I apply theories from the social and behavioural sciences to a particular behaviour in order to show where the philosophical literature on akrasia and/or weakness of the will is insightful and where it is lacking. The problem used as the basis for my analysis is obesity caused by overeating. On the whole, I conclude that our intuitions about agency are unreliable, that we may have good reasons to overeat and/or neglect our health, and that willpower is, to some degree, a matter of luck.Item What makes pain unique? : a critique of representationalism about pain in service of perceptualism(2014-09-02) Park, Andrew Erich; Rysiew, Patrick WilliamThe goal of this thesis is to defend non-representationalist perceptualism about pain against the challenges brought to it by Murat Aydede. These challenges are intended to apply to both a strong version of representationalism and general perceptualism about pain, however I maintain that they are less effective when aimed at the latter. In the interest of pulling apart these two views, I suggest that a more comprehensive theory of introspection than what is currently being used in the debate should be given. This thesis is an attempt to put forward such a view in service of the perceptual theorist. Once an alternative theory of introspection is given, several of the challenges that target perceptualism are avoided. Additionally I argue that the version of representationalism developed by Michael Tye is undermined by his explanation of pain’s negative affect. Consequently, I claim that one need not endorse representationalist commitments in order to maintain the attractive tenets of perceptualism.Item Existence, Noneism, and the varieties of worlds(2014-08-06) Garland, Carolyn; Raven, Michael J.; Yap, AudreyIntentionality is a feature of mental states that are directed towards objects. One puzzle of intentionality is that mental states can be directed towards nonexistent objects. We may relate to fictional characters, or worry about events that never take place. However, if these objects do not exist, then it is difficult to make sense of how it is that we bear these relations towards them. In this thesis I outline Graham Priest’s world-based semantic and metaphysical theory of intentionality intended to accommodate these intentional relations born towards nonexistent objects. Priest supposes that this theory is compatible with any conception of worlds. I argue that this is not the case. Within Priest’s framework merely possible worlds should be understood as existent genuine worlds, and impossible worlds can be neither existent genuine worlds, nor should they be conceived of as nonexistent objects. Instead impossible worlds must be something quite revolutionary.Item Disability and Sexual Justice(2014-08-06) De Boer, Tracy; Macleod, Colin M.In this thesis my aim is to bring attention to the problem of sexual exclusion as experienced by members of the disability community and argue that this is an issue of justice. I do this by first discussing the value of sex. I maintain that sex is an integral part of a flourishing human life. Once this is established, I examine theories of justice and demonstrate how the systematic sexual exclusion of persons with disabilities can be understood as an injustice that must be addressed. Finally, I give an overview of some of the proposed solutions to the problem of sexual exclusion and conclude that the transformation of social attitudes is necessary for sexual justice.