The concept of suffering in human rights discourse: a response to Richard Rorty's "Human rights, rationality and sentimentality"
| dc.contributor.author | Sutherland, Elizabeth Jane | |
| dc.contributor.supervisor | Magnusson, Warren | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2026-03-20T00:24:05Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2026-03-20T00:24:05Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
| dc.degree.department | Department of Political Science | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis is a response to Richard Rorty's essay entitled, "Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality," in which Rorty suggests that existing approaches to human rights concerns should be discarded in favour of an approach he calls 'sentimental education,' through which people learn about the particularities of others' lives - and particularly their suffering - in order to foster more enriched cross-cultural understanding and action to end violence and oppression. My method entails an analysis of Richard Rorty's writings, theoretical writings on human rights and suffering, and critical analyses of Rorty's writings. I explore the implications of attempting to use the concept of suffering as a foundation for a new approach to human rights problems. I argue that, although Rorty avoids some problems inherent in universalist approaches to human rights and some pitfalls inherent in constructivist discourses, his proposal does not provide a satisfying resolution to the central debates in human rights discourse. | |
| dc.description.scholarlevel | Graduate | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1828/23523 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.rights | Available to the World Wide Web | |
| dc.title | The concept of suffering in human rights discourse: a response to Richard Rorty's "Human rights, rationality and sentimentality" | |
| dc.type | Thesis |