The metaphysics of dappledness: Charles S. Peirce and Nancy Cartwright on the philosophy of science.
Date
2011-05-12
Authors
Teel, Paul David Wilkinson
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Abstract
Contemporary philosopher of science Nancy Cartwright (b. 1944) has raised many an eyebrow with her books How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983) and The Dappled World (1999), among others. The primary task of this dissertation is to link her philosophy with that of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914)—a link that includes Duns Scotus. My focus is especially on the criticism Peirce would have of Cartwright, and on the philosophical support he can offer her. The question is this: Given her stated philosophy of science, to what else must Cartwright be philosophically committed? This includes discussions of metaphysics, scholastic realism, laws of nature, and the very possibility of science. There are many striking similarities between Peirce and Cartwright, but I argue that he sees further and deeper into the metaphysical implications of her views on science.
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philosophy of science, problem of universals, realism, nominalism, laws of nature, peirce's categories, theology, scotus, capacities, pragmaticism, scholastic realism, vagueness, history of philosophy, aristotle, logic of relatives, possibility of science, firstness, secondness, thirdness, nomological machine