Thomas Henry Huxley and the problems of the relation between nature, evolution and ethics
Date
1970
Authors
Wiwcharuck, Wayne Allen
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of the ethical and scientific philosophies of Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895). Most studies of Huxley's life have tended to ignore this problem, either because of the authors concerned did not realize that development had occurred, or because they were interested in other aspects of his life. I have relied primarily upon Huxley's essays and personal letters as my main source material. By studying his correspondence in essays in chronological order, I have been able to discover much evidence that his ethical and scientific views underwent several transitions.
The first chapter of this study provides a brief sketch of the development of science - mostly in England - in this eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries. Emphasis is placed on geology and biology, because it was in these fields that the groundwork was laid for the Origin of Species. One can detect a gravitation away from the traditional faith in the Bible as the final authority in science, to one in which the scientists independently form their own hypotheses based on empirical evidence. The popularity of science increases enormously among all strata of society - especially in the first half of the nineteenth century - and there is a corresponding weakening of religious convictions, particularly where traditional Christian beliefs sought to replace the worship of God with the worship of humanity, and to put science in the place of religion. Huxley could not imagine a more pathetic object of worship the positivists could have the man.
One conclusion of this study is that Huxley - although he was the most outstanding defender of Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis - was opposed to practically every system that applied the concepts of biological evolution to man as a social being. In effect, he was thoroughly saturated with the Christian ethic, although he rejected all Christian dogma. Even though he was the champion of science and Darwinian evolution, his basic evangelical-style moral code would not permit him to subscribe to Social-Darwinism or the replacement of religion with the worship positivists had for science and man. The main conclusion of this study is that Huxley's ethical and scientific views were not static throughout his life they went through several phases. It seems certain, however, that Huxley never found a philosophy that was deeply satisfying. At the end of his life, he could only recommend what Voltaire's Candide had said; "il faut cultiver notre jardin": the profundities of life are beyond our comprehension; all we can do is work at our respective vocations and accept what life brings our way.