Stackelberg–Nash game approach for price-based demand response in retail electricity trading
Date
2024
Authors
Wan, Yanni
Qin, Jiahu
Shi, Yang
Fu, Weiming
Xiao, Feng
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems
Abstract
This paper studies the price-based demand response problem in a deregulated retail electricity trading, aiming to coordinate the energy consumption behavior of end-users under dynamic retail prices. The challenge here is that in addition to the hierarchical decision-making process between utility company and end-users considered in existing works, the non-cooperative and competitive interdependence among end-users cannot be ignored. To address this issue, we first construct a novel Stackelberg–Nash game, in which the Stackelberg game is used to capture the hierarchical decision-making process between utility company and end-users, while the Nash game is dedicated to describing the interdependence among end-users. Then the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium is provided along with theoretical analysis. On the basis of the analysis of equilibrium, we propose a distributed iterative algorithm with an adaptive step size, which is benchmarked with a fixed step-size algorithm. The comparison results on a real-life residential retail electricity market show that our proposed algorithm has better performance in terms of effectiveness and scalability.
Description
Keywords
smart grid, demand response, Stackelberg-Nash Game (SNG), Stackelberg-Nash Equilibrium (SNE), retail electricity trading
Citation
Wan, Y., Qin, J., Shi, Y., Fu, W., & Xiao, F. (2024). Stackelberg–Nash game approach for price-based demand response in retail electricity trading. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 155(Part B), 109577. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109577