Stackelberg–Nash game approach for price-based demand response in retail electricity trading

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dc.contributor.authorWan, Yanni
dc.contributor.authorQin, Jiahu
dc.contributor.authorShi, Yang
dc.contributor.authorFu, Weiming
dc.contributor.authorXiao, Feng
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-18T15:33:49Z
dc.date.available2024-03-18T15:33:49Z
dc.date.issued2024
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the price-based demand response problem in a deregulated retail electricity trading, aiming to coordinate the energy consumption behavior of end-users under dynamic retail prices. The challenge here is that in addition to the hierarchical decision-making process between utility company and end-users considered in existing works, the non-cooperative and competitive interdependence among end-users cannot be ignored. To address this issue, we first construct a novel Stackelberg–Nash game, in which the Stackelberg game is used to capture the hierarchical decision-making process between utility company and end-users, while the Nash game is dedicated to describing the interdependence among end-users. Then the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg–Nash equilibrium is provided along with theoretical analysis. On the basis of the analysis of equilibrium, we propose a distributed iterative algorithm with an adaptive step size, which is benchmarked with a fixed step-size algorithm. The comparison results on a real-life residential retail electricity market show that our proposed algorithm has better performance in terms of effectiveness and scalability.
dc.description.reviewstatusReviewed
dc.description.scholarlevelFaculty
dc.description.sponsorshipThis work was supported in part by the National Key Research and Development Program of China under Grant 2022ZD0120001; in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62303252; in part by the Anhui Provincial Natural Science Foundation 2208085QF201; in part by the USTC Research Funds of the Double First-Class Initiative YD2100002011; in part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities WK2100000029; and in part by the State Key Laboratory of Alternate Electrical Power System with Renewable Energy Sources LAPS22010.
dc.identifier.citationWan, Y., Qin, J., Shi, Y., Fu, W., & Xiao, F. (2024). Stackelberg–Nash game approach for price-based demand response in retail electricity trading. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 155(Part B), 109577. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109577
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109577
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1828/16214
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherInternational Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalen
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.subjectsmart grid
dc.subjectdemand response
dc.subjectStackelberg-Nash Game (SNG)
dc.subjectStackelberg-Nash Equilibrium (SNE)
dc.subjectretail electricity trading
dc.subject.departmentDepartment of Mechanical Engineering
dc.titleStackelberg–Nash game approach for price-based demand response in retail electricity trading
dc.typeArticle

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